LUMIQUED VS EXEVEA 282 SCRA 125

FACTS:
Lumiqued was the Regional Director of DAR-CAR. He was charged by Zamudio, the
Regional Cashier, for dishonesty due to questionable gas expenses under his office. It was
alleged that he was falsifying gas receipts for reimbursements and that he had an unliquidated
cash advance worth P116,000.00. Zamudio also complained that she was unjustly removed by
Lumiqued two weeks after she filed the two complaints. The issue was referred to the DOJ.
Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued
was not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17,
1992, to enable him to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but
neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the
committee deemed the case submitted for resolution. The Investigating Committee
recommended the dismissal of Lumiqued. DOJ Sec Drilon adopted the recommendation. Fidel
Ramos issued AO 52 dismissing Lumiqued. The latter invoke his right to due process, hence this
petition.

ISSUE:
Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an
administrative inquiry?

HELD:
The SC ruled against Lumiqued. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless
the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an
accused during custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or
rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the
case at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have
competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused
of any crime in the proceedings below. The investigation conducted by the committee created
by Department Order No. 145 was for the purpose of determining if he could be held
administratively liable under the law for the complaints filed against him. The right to
counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the law.
There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal proceeding is
entitled to be represented by counsel and that, without such representation, he shall not be
bound by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable.
The legal profession was not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the

participation of its members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen
is not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side. In
administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain
ones side. Whatever irregularity attended the proceedings conducted by the committee was
cured by Lumiqueds appeal and his subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration.

NOTE:
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other
words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly
discriminate against others.
Substantive equality is NOT enough, it is also required that the law be enforced and
applied equally. Even if the law be fair and impartial on its face, it will still violate equal
protection if it is administered with an evil eye and uneven hand, so as to unjustly benefit
some and prejudice others.
The right to equal protection, basic as it is, sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on
all the three grand departments of the government and on the subordinate instrumentalities
and subdivisions thereof, and on many constitutional powers, like the police power, taxation
and eminent domain.
The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to
eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real
differences among men, the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It
merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions
both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Thus, the equal protection clause
does not absolutely forbid classifications.