Compania Maritima vs.

Ernesta Cabagnot
G.R. No. L-10675 April 29, 1960
Facts:
Dionisio Hio, a member of the Manila Bay Watchmen's Association, a duly registered labor
organization, was found dead. The deceased is survived by his wife Ernesta Cabagnot Hio and three
minor children all of whom were dependent on his wages at the time of his death. Upon a claim for
compensation made by the widow, in her behalf, and in behalf of her children, the Workmen's
Compensation Commission, finding that Dionisio Hio died of an accident that occurred in the course of
his employment, and declaring the Compaia Maritima as employer thereof, ordered that company to
pay these survivors the death compensation and other fees required of the Workmen's Compensation
Act, as amended. The petitioner claims that it never had any employer-employee relationship with the
deceased.
Issue: Whether or not the deceased was an employee of the Compaia Maritima, entitled to
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Ruling:
While it is true that no written employment contract between the petitioner and the deceased
was presented in evidence, it is not disputed that the petitioner company owns the vessel where the
deceased was assigned as gangwayman, and it was found by the Commission that the salary of the
deceased was paid directly from the funds of petitioner. From these circumstances, it would the appear
that at the time of the accident the deceased was under petitioner's employ.
SEC. 39 (b). "Laborer" is used as a synonym of "employee" and means every person who has
entered the employment of, or works under a service or apprenticeship contract for an employer. It does
not include a person whose employment is purely casual and is not for the purpose of the occupation or
business of the employer.
For an employee to be excluded from the term "laborer" or "employee" under the Act, his employment
must be "purely casual and is not for the purpose of the occupation or business of the employer".

Anastacio Viana vs. Alejo Al-Lagadan

G.R. No. L-8967
May 31, 1956
Facts:
Anastacio Viaa owned the fishing sailboat which had a collision with a vessel of the U.S.
Navy. Alejandro Al-Lagadan, a member of the crew of the sailboat, disappeared with the craft. The
respondents, his parents, filed the corresponding claim for compensation. The rendered decision
favored the respondents. Consequently, Viana filed a petition for review, and latter, a subsequent
motion for reconsideration was both denied affirming the decision of the Referee. Petitioner contends
that the case does not fall within the purview of Act No. 3428, because the gross income of his business
for the year 1947 was allegedly less than P10,000, and because Alejandro Al-Lagadan was, at the time
of his death, his industrial partner, not his employee.
Issue: Whether or not Alejandro Al-Lagadan was his industrial partner, not his employee.
Ruling:
In determining the existence of employer-employee relationship, the following elements are
generally considered, namely: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of
wages;cha (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employees conduct, although
the latter isthe most important element.
Assuming that the share received by the deceased could partake of the nature of wages, on
which the Court need not, and do not, express their view, and that the second element, therefore, exists
in the case at bar, the record does not contain any specific data regarding the third and fourth elements.
With respect to the first element, the facts before the Court are insufficient to warrant a reasonable
conclusion, one way or the other. On the one hand, Atty. Morente said, in his aforementioned report,
that the contract commonly followed is on a share basis. The hiring of a crew is done by the patron
himself. Usually, when a patron enters into a contract with the owner of the batel, he has a crew ready
with him. This statement suggests that the members of the crew are chosen by the patron, seemingly,
upon his sole responsibility and authority. It is noteworthy, however, that said report referred to a
practice commonly and usually observed in a given place. The record is silent on whether such
practice had been followed in the case under consideration.
More important still, the language used in said report may be construed as intimating, not only
that the patron selects and engages the crew, but, also, that the members thereof are subject to his
control and may be dismissed by him. Toput it differently, the literal import of said report is open to the
conclusion that the crew has a contractual relation, not with the owner of the vessel, but with the
patron, and that the latter, not the former, is either their employer or their partner.

Geronimo De Los Reyes vs. Gregorio Espineli

G.R. No. L-28280-81
November 28, 1969
Facts:
Petitioner, the owner of a coconut plantation, has his overseer who took into the land the 17
respondents under an agreement that the latter were to receive 1/7 portion of every coconut harvest.
Sometime later, petitioner dismissed said overseer upon the suspicion that the latter had been deceiving
him, in connivance with the respondents. Respondents filed petitions, seeking the delivery to them of
the difference between the 1/7 share which the petitioner had been giving them and the 30% share to
which they, as share tenants, were allegedly entitled. Upon the finding that the respondents were mere
agricultural workers of the petitioner, the CAR ordered the latter to retain them as such and to pay them
Issue: Whether or not the relationship is that of agricultural share tenancy or that of farm employer and
agricultural laborer.
Ruling:
The characteristics of a share tenancy contract are: (1) the parties are a landholder, who is a
natural or juridical person and is the owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of agricultural land,
and a tenant who, himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household,
cultivates the land which is the subject-matter of the tenancy; (2) the subject-matter is agricultural land;
(3) the purpose of the contract is agricultural production; and (4) the cause or consideration is that the
landholder and the share tenant would divide the agricultural produce between themselves in
proportion to their respective contributions.
A "farm worker" is "any agricultural wage, salary or piece worker but is not limited to a farm
worker of a particular farm employer unless this Code explicitly states otherwise, and any individual
whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, a current agrarian dispute or an
unfair labor practice and who has not obtained a substantially equivalent and regular employment." The
term includes "farm laborer and/or farm employees."10 An "agricultural worker" is not a whit different
from a "farm worker."
In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the elements that are
generally considered are the following: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the
payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the employer's power to control the employee's
conduct. It is this last element that constitutes the most important index of the existence of relationship.
The share tenant works for that joint venture. The agricultural laborer works for the farm
employer, and for his labor he receives a salary or wage, regardless of whether the employer makes a
profit. On the other hand, the share tenant participates in the agricultural produce. His share is
necessarily dependent on the amount of the harvest.
The record is devoid of evidentiary support for the notion that the respondents are farm
laborers. They do not observe set hours of work. The petitioner has not laid down regulations under
which they are supposed to do their work. The argument tendered is that they are guards. However, it
does not appear that they are under obligation to report for duty to the petitioner or his agent. They do
not work in shifts. Nor has the petitioner prescribed the manner by which the respondents were and are
to perform their duties as guards. We do not find here that degree of control and supervision evincive of
an employer-employee relationship. Furthermore, if the respondents are guards, then they are not
agricultural laborers, because the duties and functions of a guard are not agricultural in nature.

Hawaiian Philippine Company vs. Reynaldo Gulmatico

G.R. No. 106231
November 16, 1994
Facts:
Respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for claims under Republic Act 809 (The Sugar
Act of 1952). They claimed that the sugar farm workers within petitioner's milling district have never
availed of the benefits due them under the law. RA 809, Sec. 9 provides that in addition to the benefits
granted by the Minimum Wage Law, the proceeds of any increase in participation granted to planters
under this Act and above their present share shall be divided between the planter and his laborers in the
following proportions 60% of the increase participation for the laborers and 40% forthe planters. The
distribution of the share corresponding to the laborers shall be made under thesupervision of the
Department of Labor.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that public respondent Labor Arbiter has no
jurisdiction to entertain and resolve the case as provided in Article 217 of the Labor Code because
thereis no employer-employee relationship between petitioner milling company and respondent union
andfarmers, and that respondent union has no cause of action against petitioner.
Issues: 1. Whether or not public respondent Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case
against petitioner.
2. Whether or not respondent union and/or the farm workers represented by it have a cause of
action against petitioner.
Ruling:
1.
In the case at bar, it is clear that there is no employer-employee relationship between petitioner
milling company and respondent union and/or its members-workers. Absent the jurisdictional requisite
of an employer-employee relationship between petitioner andprivate respondent, the inevitable
conclusion is that public respondent is without jurisdiction to hear and decide the case with respect to
petitioner.
2.
Respondents do not have a cause of action to institute the present case. To have a cause of
action, the claimant must show that he has a legal right and the respondent a correlative duty in respect
thereof, which the latter violated by some wrongful act or omission. In the instant case, a simple
reading of Section 9 of R.A, would show that the payment of the workers' share is a liability of the
planters-employers, and not of the milling company/sugar central.
Petitioner would be a proper third party dependent impleaded because it is directly liable to the
planters for all or part of the workers' claim. However, the planters involved in this controversy have
not filed any complaint of such a nature against petitioner, thereby lending credence to the conclusion
that petitioner has fulfilled its part vis-a-vis its obligation under RA 809.

San Miguel Corporation vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 80774
May 31, 1988
Facts:
Petitioner sponsored an innovative program granting cash awards to employees who submit to
the Corporation Ideas and suggestions found to be beneficial to the Corporation. Rustico Vega
submitted a proposal but petitioner did not find the aforequoted proposal acceptable and consequently
refused Mr. Vega's subsequent demands for a cash award under the Innovation Program.
Hence, a complaint was filed against petitioner Corporation. Vega alleged that his proposal had
been accepted by the methods analyst and implemented by the Corporation, and that the same had
solved the problem of the Corporation. Thus, he was claiming for the cash prize. Petitioner, on the
other hand, alleged that private respondent had no cause of action. It denied ever having approved or
adopted Mr. Vega's proposal. It was also further alleged that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction, Mr.
Vega having improperly bypassed the grievance machinery procedure prescribed under a then existing
collective bargaining agreement between management and employees, and available administrative
remedies provided under the rules of the Innovation Program.
Issue: Whether or not the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over money claims which aroseout of or in
connection with the private respondent's employment.
Ruling:
Money claims of workers which now fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor
Arbiters are those money claims which have some reasonable causal connection with the employeremployee relationship. The petitioner's Innovation Program is an employee incentive scheme oered
and open only to employees of petitioner Corporation, more specically to employees below the rank
of manager. Without the existing employer-employee relationship between the parties here,there would
have been no occasion to consider the petitioner's Innovation Program or the submission by Mr. Vega
of his proposal; without that relationship,private respondent Vega's suit against petitioner Corporation
would never have arisen.
The money claim of private respondent Vega in this case, therefore, arose out of or in
connection with his employment relationship with petitioner. However, the fact that the money claim of
private respondent Vega arose out of or in connection with his employment relation with petitioner
Corporation, is not enough to bring such money claim within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
Labor Arbiters.

Teresita Montoya vs. Teresita Escayo

G.R. No. 82211-12 March 21, 1989
Facts:
All formerly employed as salesgirls in Montoyas store filed complaints for the collection of
sums of money against the petitioner for alleged unpaid overtime pay, holiday pay, 13th month pay,
ECOLA, and service leave pay: for violation of the minimum wage law, illegal dismissal, and
attorney's fees. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the complaints claiming that among others,
salesgirls failed to refer the dispute to the Lupong Tagapayapa for possible settlement and to secure the
certification required from the Lupon Chairman prior to the filing of the cases with the Labor Arbiter.
These actions were allegedly violative of the provisions of P.D. No. 1508.
Issue: Whether or not P.D. 1508, the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, is applicable to labor disputes.
Ruling:
The provisions of P.D. No. 1508 requiring the submission of disputes before the barangay
Lupong Tagapayapa prior to their filing with the court or other government offices are not applicable to
labor cases. Requiring conciliation of labor disputes before the barangay courts would defeat the very
salutary purposes of the law. Instead of simplifying labor proceedings designed at expeditious
settlement or referral to the proper court or office to decide it finally, the position taken by the
petitioner would only duplicate the conciliation proceedings and unduly delay the disposition of the
labor case. Thus, it is not applicable.

LABOR RELATIONS
Case Digests

1. COMPANIA MARITIMA vs. ERNESTA CABAGNOT, G.R. No. L-10675, April 29, 1960
2. ANASTACIO VIANA vs. ALEJO AL-LAGADAN, G.R. No. L-8967, May 31, 1956
3. GERONIMO DE LOS REYES vs. GREGORIO ESPINELI, G.R. No. L-28280-81, November
28, 1969
4. HAWAIIAN PHILIPPINE COMPANY vs. REYNALDO GULMATICO, G.R. No. 106231,
November 16, 1994
5. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 80774, May 31, 1988
6. TERESITA MONTOYA vs. TERESITA ESCAYO, G.R. No. 82211-12, March 21, 1989

Submitted by: Celina May R. Tang, Block A

Professor: Atty Mila Raquid-Arroyo