Title:

50 De La Llana v. Alba
Nature:
Petition directly filed with the Supreme Court for the adjudication of the
Constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg 129
Facts:
In 1981, BP 129, entitled "An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds
Therefor and for Other Purposes", was passed. De la Llana was assailing its validity because,
first of all, he would be one of the judges that would be removed because of the
reorganization and second, he said such law would contravene the constitutional provision
which provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts, He averred that only the SC can
remove judges NOT Congress.
Issue:
WON Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by such statute
(BP 129).
Held:
Wherefore the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg 129 not having been
shown, this petition is dismissed. No costs.
Ratio:
The SC ruled the following way: Moreover, this Court is empowered "to discipline
judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal." Thus
it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President
who was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination
by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After
the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an
occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of
strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless,
for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect,
no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid
of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the
assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of
constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this
Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be
entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does
not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly

this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments.
Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in
issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions
created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly
belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power.
Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any
plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the
inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is
ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional
taint, even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust.
Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the
choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a
statute, the former is to be preferred.