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Viana v. Al-lagadan
20 August 2014
Ponente: Concepcion
Lia
SUMMARY:
Vianas sailboat sank, and crew member Alejandro disappeared with
the craft, prompting the latters parents (respondents) to file a claim
for compensation. Both the WCC Referee and the Commissioner found
ER-EE relationship by considering Alejandros share, which he should
have received at the end of the trip, as wages. The SC ruled it could
not determine whether Alejandro was an industrial partner or an
employee, as the facts are insufficient to warrant a reasonable
conclusion. Only element 2 could be assumed to exist.
DOCTRINE:
In determining the existence of ER-EE relationship, the following
elements are generally considered:
(1) the selection and engagement of the employee;
(2) the payment of wages;
(3) the power of dismissal; and
(4) the power to control the employees conduct although the latter
is the most important element
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Viaas sailboat Magkapatid sank in Sept 1948. Alejandro AlLagadan, member of the crew, disappeared with the craft. His parents
(respondents) filed a claim for compensation under Act No. 3428.
2. A Referee of the Workmens Compensation Commission (WCC) ordered
Viaa to pay P1,560. He based his decision on the report that the basis of
engaging the services of crewmen is determined in accordance with the
contract executed between the owner and the patron. The contract
commonly followed is on a share basis after deducting all the expenses. Onehalf goes to the owner, and the other half goes to the patron and the
members. The hiring of the crew is done by the patron himself. Usually, when
a patron enters into a contract with the owner, he has a crew ready with him.
2. The Commissioner affirmed the Referees decision. He sustained the
finding of an ER-EE relationship, and considered the share which Alejandro
received at the end of each trip was in the nature of wages which is defined
under sec 39 of the Compensation Act. This is so because such share could be
reckoned in terms of money.
3. Viaa brought the matter to SC for review by certiorari, on the ground that
Alejandro was, at the time of his death, an industrial partner, not an
employee. He alleged in his petition that the practice observed in engaging
the services of crewmen is on a partnership basis, such that that the owner
receives half of the earnings after deducting the expenses, the other half is
divided pro rata among the members, the patron receiving 4 parts, the piloto
3 parts, the wheelsman 1 1/2 parts and the members 1 part each.
ISSUES/HELD:
Was Alejandro an industrial partner or an employee? Could not be
determined. Case remanded to WCC.
RATIO:
In determining the existence of ER-EE relationship, the following elements
are generally considered:
(1) the selection and engagement of the employee;
(2) the payment of wages;
(3) the power of dismissal; and
(4) the power to control the employees conduct although the latter is the
most important element (35 Am. Jur. 445).
Assuming that the share received by Alejandro could partake of the nature of
wages and that the 2nd element exists, the record does not contain any
specific data regarding the 3rd and 4th elements.
With respect to the 1st element, the facts are insufficient to warrant a
reasonable conclusion.
Tirzo Cruz1 and his orchestra furnished music to the Manila Hotel for
several years before they were given written notice in 1994 that the Hotel would be
leased to Bay View Hotel and that employees to be laid off would be granted
separation gratuity.
Cruz and his musicians claimed gratuity but were denied so they filed a case
in CFI of Manila. CFI dismissed the action however stating Cruz and co had no cause of
action because they were not employees of the hotel.
They appealed directly to the SC.
Issue:
W/N Cruz and his band were employees of the Manila Hotel. No.
Ratio:
SC decided case based on the written notice (referred to in the case as Annex A)
and the contract (referred to in the case as Exhibit 1).
Cruz and friends not covered by the written notice2
-
1957 | Bengzon, J.
2 . . . . It is for this reason that the necessary authority has already been secured for the payment of
separation gratuity to the employees to be laid off as a result of the lease and who are not yet
entitled to either the optional or compulsory retirement insurance provided under Republic Act
No. 660, as amended, . . . .
Analysing the terms of the notice, it extends to those employees who were
not yet entitled to either the optional or compulsory retirement
insurance provided under RA 660;
They are not entitled to the gratuity because the announcement implied
reference to employees insured by GSIS; since they were never members,
they could not be covered by the same;
Dismissal Affirmed.
The film companies, not the musical directors, provide the transportation to
and from the studio. The film companies furnish meals at dinner time.
Also, during the recording sessions, the motion picture director who is
an employee of the company, not the musical director, supervises the
recording of the musicians and tells them what to do in every detail. The
motion picture director, not the musical director, solely directs the
performance of the musicians before the camera. The motion picture director
supervises the performance of all the actors, including the musicians who
appear in the scenes, so that in the actual performance to be shown in the
screen, the musical director's intervention has stopped. The movie director
directly controls the activities of the musicians.
It is well settled that an employer-employee relationship exists where the
person for whom the services are performed reserves a right to control not
only the end to be achieved but also the means to be used in reaching such end
(Alabama Highway Express). The decisive nature of said control over the
"means to be used" is illustrated in the case of Gilchrist Timber Co. in which,
by reason of said control, the employer-employee relationship was held to
exist between the management and the workers, notwithstanding the
intervention of an alleged independent contractor, who had, and exercised, the
power to hire and fire said workers. The aforementioned control over the
means to be used in reading the desired end is possessed and exercised by
the film companies over the musicians in the cases before us.
RULING: The order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against petitioners.
Torillo v. Leogardo
May 27, 1991
Ponente: Fernan, J.
Naomi Q.
with full backwages from date of dismissal on July 4, 1978 until date
of actual reinstatement
and holiday pay for seven (7) days plus his unpaid wages from July 1
to 3, 1978.
SUMMARY:
Realuyo/Roa was a pianist in the employ of Legend, with the
restaurant manager of Legend providing control over the manner of
work of Realuyo. Eventually, Realuyo was dismissed, which prompted
him to file an illegal dismissal complaint. The Court ruled that an EREE relationship exists and enumerated the factors involved in the
Four-Fold test, which is the yardstick used to determine the existence
of an ER-EE relationship used by the Court.
DOCTRINE:
The Court enumerated the Four-Fold doctrine used to determine
whether or not an ER-EE relationship exists. The factors to consider
are [SWeDE]:
a. Selection powers of the employer
b. Wage payment of the employer
c. Dismissal powers of the employer
d. Employee control or the control test
FACTS:
This is a labor case involving Realuyo, with stage name Joey Roa, a pianist
employed by Legend Hotel. Realuyo filed a complaint for alleged ULP,
constructive illegal dismissal, and underpayment of premium pay for
holidays, separation pay, service incentive leave pay, and 13th month pay,
with further prayer for attorneys fees and moral and exemplary damages.
Realuyo averred that he had worked as a pianist for the Legend Hotels
Tanglaw Restaurant from September 1992, starting with an initial rate of
P400/night, eventually increasing to P750/night. He could not choose the
time of his performance, as it was fixed from 7:00 pm to 10:00 pm for 3-6
times per week. He also stated that the Legend Hotels restaurant manager
required him to follow the hotel motif, and that he had been subjected to the
rules on employees representation checks and chits (which was a privilege
given to employees).
On July 9, 1999, however, hotel management informed Realuyo that, due to
cost-cutting measures undertaken by the hotel, his services would no longer
be required effective July 30, 1999 (only 21 days after informing him of his
the Madison Coffee Shop and Tanglaw Restaurant from September 1992
until July 1999.
In its defense, Legend denied the existence of any employer-employee (EREE) relationship with Realuyo, and that he was only a talent engaged to
provide live music at Legends Madison Coffee Shop for 3 hours/day on 2
days/week. Legend also averred that, due to the economic crisis,
management was constrained to dispense with his services.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the complaint for lack of merit upon the
finding that there was no ER-EE relationship between Realuyo and Legend.
This finding was based on the admission of Realuyo on a letter stating that
what he received from Legend in exchange for his services was a talent fee
and not a salary. This was reinforced by the fact that Realuyo received his
salary nightly, unlike the other employees who received their salaries
monthly. Upon appeal, the NLRC affirmed the same.
The CA, however, reversed the LA and NLRC, stating that the four elements of
ER-EE relationship exists, most importantly the element of employee control
in the form of the supervision and control exercised by the restaurant
manager of Legend.
ISSUES/HELD:
2. WON Realuyo was an employee of Legend Hotel. YES, ER-EE relationship
existed between the parties.
3. WON Realuyo was validly terminated.
RATIO:
1. The Court found for Realuyo in stating that an ER-EE relationship indeed
existed between the parties. The Court enumerated the four-fold test
factors, namely:
Power to select the employee
Payment of employees wages
Power to dismiss the employee
Exercise of control over the methods and results by which the
work of the employee is accomplished (employee control)
Applying these factors to the case at hand, the Court found that Realuyo
was indeed Legend Hotels employee. He was employed as a pianist in
Further to this, the Court pointed out that, despite the denomination of
the received remuneration as talent fees, these remunerations were
considered as included in the term wage in the sense and context of the
Labor Code, regardless of the designation. As stated in Article 97(f) of the
Labor Code:
Wage paid to any employee shall mean the remuneration or earnings, however
designated, capable of being expressed in terms of money, whether fixed or
ascertained on a time, task, piece, or commission basis, or other method of calculating
the same, which is payable by an employer to an employee under a written or
unwritten contract of employment for work done or to be done, or for services
rendered or to be rendered, and includes the fair and reasonable value, as determined
by the Secretary of Labor, of board, lodging, or other facilities customarily furnished
by the employer to the employee.
From the case, it was clear that Realuyo indeed received compensation
for services rendered as the hotels pianist.
Also, the fact that Realuyo worked for less than 8 hours/day was of no
consequence and did not detract from finding for the existence of the EREE relationship. In providing that the "normal hours of work of any
employee shall not exceed eight (8) hours a day," Article 83 of the Labor
Code only set a maximum of number of hours as "normal hours of work"
but did not prohibit work of less than eight hours.
Thirdly, the power of control over the work of Realuyo, considered as the
most significant determinant of the existence of an ER-EE relationship,
was seen on the following facts:
He could not choose the time of his performance, which
petitioners had fixed from 7:00 pm to 10:00 pm, three to six
times a week;
He could not choose the place of his performance;
It must be noted that the employer need not actually supervise the
performance of duties by the employee, for it sufficed that the employer
has the right to wield that power.
From the case itself, the Court concluded that the burden of proof of
Legend to prove that the dismissal was for a valid or authorized cause
was not given by Legend, as it did not submit evidence of the losses to its
business operations and the economic chaos it would imminently suffer.
The statements regarding Realuyos termination due to present
business/financial condition were considered as insufficient to show a
valid retrenchment. As a result, the Court cannot allow the termination of
Realuyo due to retrenchment.
Finally, the Court pointed out that Legend possessed the power to
dismiss Realuyo in that the memorandum informing Realuyo of the
discontinuance of his service because of the present business or financial
condition of Legend showed that the latter had the power to dismiss him
from employment.
2.
The Court has provided the standards that an employer should meet to
justify retrenchment, namely:
(a) The expected losses should be substantial and not merely de
minimis in extent;
(b) The substantial losses apprehended must be reasonably
imminent;
However, the lapse of time since the retrenchment may have made a
return to the job as unfeasible, therefore the Court ordered Legend to pay
separation pay at the rate of 1 month pay for every year of service
rendered, as well as full backwages.
SUMMARY:
Javier filed a case for illegal dismissal against Fly Ace before the NLRC,
alleging that he was a regular employee working as a
stevedore/pahinante when he was terminated without notice. Fly Ace
denied that Javier was its employee because he was only contracted on
a pakyaw basis.
DOCTRINE:
Before a case for illegal dismissal can prosper, an employer-employee
relationship must first be established by the petitioner by substantial
evidence.
The burden lies on the petitioner to pass the well-settled tests to
determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship, viz:
(1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of
wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the
employees conduct. Of these elements, the most important criterion is
whether the employer controls or has reserved the right to control the
employee not only as to the result of the work but also as to the means
and methods by which the result is to be accomplished.
FACTS:
Javier filed a complaint before the NLRC for underpayment of salaries and
other labor standard benefits.
Javier alleged that:
a) he was an employee of Fly Ace since September 2007, performing
various tasks at the respondents warehouse except when he would
be ordered to accompany the companys delivery vehicles, as
pahinante;
b) he reported for work from Monday to Saturday from 7AM to 5PM;
right to control the employee not only as to the result of the work but also as
to the means and methods by which the result is to be accomplished.
CA annulled the NLRC ruling and said that it is incumbent upon Javier to
prove the employee-employer relationship by substantial evidence, but he
failed to discharge his burden. The non-issuance of a company-issued
identification card to Javier supports Fly Aces contention that Javier was not
its employee.
Javier could not submit competent proof that Fly Ace engaged his services as
a regular employee; that Fly Ace paid his wages as an employee, or that Fly
Ace could dictate what his conduct should be while at work. In other words,
Javiers allegations did not establish that his relationship with Fly Ace had the
attributes of an employer-employee relationship on the basis of the abovementioned four-fold test. All that Javier laid down were bare allegations
without corroborative proof.
ISSUES/HELD:
4.
RATIO:
Before a case for illegal dismissal can prosper, an employeremployee relationship must first be established. The petitioner needs to
show by substantial evidence that he was indeed an employee of the
company against which he claims illegal dismissal. "Whoever claims
entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right
thereto". Javier failed to adduce substantial evidence as basis for the grant of
relief.
All that Javier presented were his self-serving statements
purportedly showing his activities as an employee of Fly Ace. Clearly, Javier
failed to pass the substantiality requirement to support his claim.
The lone affidavit executed by one Bengie Valenzuela was
unsuccessful in strengthening Javiers claim that he was a regular employee.
In said document, all Valenzuela attested to was that he would frequently see
Javier at the workplace where the latter was also hired as stevedore.
The Court is of the considerable view that on Javier lies the burden to
pass the well-settled tests to determine the existence of an employeremployee relationship, viz: (1) the selection and engagement of the
employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the
power to control the employees conduct. Of these elements, the most
important criterion is whether the employer controls or has reserved the
Fly Ace does not dispute having contracted Javier and paid him on a
"per trip" rate as a stevedore, albeit on a pakyaw basis. The Court cannot fail
to note that Fly Ace presented documentary proof that Javier was indeed paid
on a pakyaw basis per the acknowledgment receipts admitted as competent
evidence by the LA. Unfortunately for Javier, his mere denial of the signatures
affixed therein cannot automatically sway us to ignore the documents
because "forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive
and convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging
forgery."
DOCTRINE: The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of
the employer in the home of said employer. While it may be true that the nature
of the work of a househelper, domestic servant or laundrywoman in a home or
in a company staffhouse may be similar in nature, the difference in their
circumstances is that in the former instance they are actually serving the family
while in the latter case, whether it is a corporation or a single proprietorship
engaged in business or industry or any other agricultural or similar pursuit,
service is being rendered in the staffhouses or within the premises of the
business of the employer. In such instance, they are employees of the company
or employer in the business concerned entitled to the privileges of a regular
employee.
FACTS:
Sinclitica Candido (CANDIDO) was employed (May 1973) by Apex
Mining Company to perform laundry services at Apexs staff house located at
Masara, Davao Del Norte. In the beginning, she was paid on a piece rate basis.
Subsequently, she was paid on a monthly basis.
On December 1987, while she was hanging her laundry, she
accidentally slipped and hit her back on a stone. She reported the incident to
her immediate supervisor and to the personnel officer. CANDIDO was
permitted to go on leave for medication. The Immediate supervisor offered
CANDIDO 5,000 pesos to persuade her to quit her job. CANDIDO refused the
offer. Apex Mining did not allow her to return to work. She was dismissed in
February 1988. CANDIDO filed a request for assistance with DOLE. The labor
arbiter (LA) required the two parties to submit a position paper.
RATIO:
1. The definition under Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book 33 of the Labor Code
does not include househelp or laundrywomen working in staffhouses of a
company, like CANDIDO who attends to the needs of the companys guests.
Also, the definition, by the same token, does not include the driver, houseboy,
or gardener exclusively working in the company, the staffhouses and its
premises.
The said definition contemplates such househelper or domestic
servant who is employed in the employers house to minister exclusively to
the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employers family.
The criterion is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of
the employer in the home of said employer. While it may be true that the
nature of the work of a househelper, domestic servant or laundrywoman in a
home or in a company staffhouse may be similar in nature, the difference in
their circumstances is that in the former instance they are actually serving
the family while in the latter case, whether it is a corporation or a single
proprietorship engaged in business or industry, service is being rendered in
the staffhouses or within the premises of the business of the employer. In
such instance, they are employees of the company or employer in the
business concerned entitled to the privileges of a regular employee.
2. The mere fact that the househelper or domestic servant is working within
the premises of the business of the employer and in relation to or in
connection with its business, as in its staffhouses for its guest, warrants the
conclusion that such househelper or domestic servant is and should be
considered as a regular employee of the employer and not as a mere family
househelper or domestic servant as contemplated in Rule XIII, Section l(b),
Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended.
3 The term "househelper" as used herein is synonymous to the term "domestic servant" and shall
refer to any person, whether male or female, who renders services in and about the employer's
home and which services are usually necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment
thereof, and ministers exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer's
family.
November 20 2006
Ponente: Puno, J.
Leigh Siazon
On January 15 1998 she reported for work at the new site where
Remington relocated in Caloocan City, only to be informed that her
services were no longer needed.
Remington denied that it illegally dismissed Castaeda, alleging that
o She was a domestic helper and not a regular employee. She worked
as a cook, which has nothing to do with Remingtons business
o Her duty was merely to cook lunch and merienda, after which her
time was hers to spend
o Remington did not exercise any degree of control and supervision
over her work
o She was the one who refused to report for work when Remington
moved to Caloocan
Labor Arbiter: dismissed complaint. Castaeda was a domestic helper
under the personal service of Antonio Tan. Her work was not usually
necessary and desirable in the ordinary course of trade and business of
Remington, and the latter did not exercise control over her functions.
Also, it was she who refused to go to Caloocan when Remington
transferred offices; therefore, she could not have been illegally dismissed.
NLRC: reversed LA decision. Castaeda was an employee: her work as
cook inured not for the benefit of Tans family, but solely for the
Remington employees.
o Her employment is bolstered by a certification issued by the
corporate secretary, certifying that she is their bonafide employee.
o As to the illegal dismissal: Castaedas refusal to join the workforce
due to poor eyesight could not be considered abandonment of work
or voluntary resignation.
o Under Art. 287 of the Labor Code, an employee who reaches the age
of 60 has the option to retire or to separate from the service with
payment of separation pay/retirement benefit. When Castaeda filed
the complaint, she was already 60 years old. She is thus entitled to be
paid her separation pay/retirement benefit equivalent to 1/2 month
for every year of service.
o Ordered the payment of: Salary differential - P12,021.12. Service
Incentive Leave Pay - 2,650.00. 13th Month Pay differential 1,001.76 Separation Pay/retirement benefit - 36,075.00 (Total
P51,747.88)
Both parties filed MR. Castaedas was granted, and the award of
retirement pay was increased, to P62,437.50. Remington filed Petition
xxx
xxx
The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of the employer in
the home of said employer. While it may be true that the nature of the work of a
househelper, domestic servant or laundrywoman in a home or in a company
staffhouse may be similar in nature, the difference is that in the former, they are
actually serving the family, while in the latter, whether it is a corporation or a single
proprietorship, service is being rendered in the staffhouses or within the premises of
the business of the employer. In such instance, they are employees of the company or
employer in the business concerned entitled to the privileges of a regular employee.
The mere fact that the househelper or domestic servant is working within the
premises of the business of the employer and in relation to or in connection with its
business, as in its staffhouses for its guest or even for its officers and employees,
warrants the conclusion that such househelper or domestic servant is and should be
The situs and nature of Castaedas work as a cook, who caters to the needs
of Remingtons employees, makes her fall squarely within the definition of a
regular employee under the doctrine in the Apex Mining case. That she works
within company premises, and that she does not cater exclusively to the
personal comfort of Tan and his family, is reflective of the existence of
Remingtons right of control over her functions, which is the primary
indicator of the existence of an employer-employee relationship.
It is also wrong to say that if the work is not directly related to the employer's
business, then the person performing such work could not be considered an
employee of the latter. The determination of the existence of an employeremployee relationship is defined by law according to the facts of each case,
regardless of the nature of the activities involved. It would be unjust if we
were to hold that despite the fact that Castaeda was made to cook for the
Remington employees, she was merely a domestic worker of Tan.
SECOND ISSUE
Remington contends that there was abandonment when Castaeda refused to
report for work when they transferred to Caloocan, claiming that her poor
eyesight would make long distance travel a problem; thus, it cannot be held
guilty of illegal dismissal. The SC also rejected this.
A regular employee enjoys the right to security of tenure under Article 279
and may only be dismissed for a just or authorized cause, otherwise the
dismissal becomes illegal and the employee becomes entitled to
reinstatement and full backwages. Abandonment is a just cause for
termination of employment by the employer under Article 282. Two factors
should be present: 1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid
or justifiable reason; and 2) a clear intention to sever employer-employee
relationship, manifested by overt acts from which it may be deduced that the
employee has no more intention to work. The intent to discontinue the
employment must be shown by clear proof that it was deliberate and
unjustified, which Remington failed to do. In termination cases, the burden of
proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal is for a just and
February 8 ,1989
Ponente: Grio-Aquino, JJ.
Al Mohammadsali
SUMMARY:
SMC implemented a new distribution system where its beer products
were sold to wholesalers directly from the sales offices. The labor
union contested this on the ground that it affects the take-home pay of
salesmen and their truck helpers. MOLE dismissed the complaint. SC
affirmes MOLE.
DOCTRINE:
Management prerogatives are valid when they exercised in good faith
for the advancement of the employer's interest and not for the purpose
of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special
laws or under valid agreements.
FACTS:
San Miguel Corporation (SMC) and San Miguel Brewery Sales Force
Union (Union) had an existing CBA (effective May 1, 1978 until
January 31, 1981) where this clause is incorporated: Art. IV, Section
1. Employees within the appropriate bargaining unit shall be entitled
to a basic monthly compensation plus commission based on their
respective sales.
In September 1979, the company introduced a marketing scheme
known as the "Complementary Distribution System" (CDS) whereby
its beer products were offered for sale directly to wholesalers
through San Miguel's sales offices.
The Union filed a complaint for ULP in the Ministry of Labor, with a
notice of strike, on the ground that the CDS was contrary to the
ISSUES/HELD:
WON SMCs CDS marketing scheme violates the CBA? No.
RATIO:
It is not a violation of the CBA because it is a valid exercise of
management prerogatives.
Except as limited by special laws, an employer is free to regulate,
according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of
employment, including hiring, work assignments, working methods,
time, place and manner of work, tools to be used, processes to be
followed, supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer of
employees, work supervision, lay-off of workers and the discipline,
dismissal and recall of work.
Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of the employees, it must
also protect the right of an employer to exercise what are clearly
management prerogatives. The free will of management to conduct
its own business affairs to achieve its purpose cannot be denied.
So long as a company's management prerogatives are exercised in
good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest and not for
the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the
employees under special laws or under valid agreements, they will
be upheld.
SMCs offer to compensate the members of its sales force who will be
adversely affected by the implementation of the CDS by paying them
a so-called "back adjustment commission" to make up for the
FACTS:
ISSUES/HELD:
5. Did the petitioner commit unfair labor practice? NO.
RATIO:
The right to fix the work schedules of the employees rests principally
on their employer. In this case, the employer cited as reason for the
adjustment the efficient conduct of its business operations and its
improved production. Since the employees are no longer required to
work during this new one-hour lunch break, there is no more need
for them to be compensated for this period. SC agreed with LA that
the new work schedule fully complied with the daily work period of
8 hours without violating the Labor Code.
o Also, the new schedule applied to all employees in the
factory and not just union members.
As shown by the records, the change effected by
management with regard to working time is made
to apply to all factory employees engaged in the
same line of work, whether or not they are
members of the respondent union. There is no
prejudice to the right of self-organization.
The ruling in the earlier Sime Darby case is not applicable here as the
issue there involved the matter of granting lunch breaks to certain
employees while depriving others of the same break.
Every business enterprise endeavors to increase its profits. In the
process, it may devise means to attain that goal. Even as the law is
solicitous of the welfare of the employees, it must also protect the
right of an employer to exercise what are clearly management
prerogatives.
o Management is free to regulate, according to its own
discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment,
including hiring, work assignments, working methods, time,
place and manner of work, processes to be followed,
supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer of
employees, work supervision, lay off of workers and
discipline, dismissal and recall of workers. Management
retains the prerogative, whenever exigencies of the service
so require, to change the working hours of its employees.
SUMMARY:
Employees work stoppage after the companys refusal to discuss the
period of the new CBA. They alleged that there was no illegal strike as
they stopped working after rendering work for 8 hours, which was the
stated work schedule in the CBA. The SC ruled that the long standing
12-hr shift has effectively changed the CBAs provision on work
schedule.
DOCTRINE:
The working hours (even if stated in the CBA) may be changed by
management prerogative. The company implemented the 12-hr shift
due to the nature of the business and demands of the clients. The
unequivocal adherence to this by the employees is deemed as waiver
of the 8-hr shift.
FACTS:
ILEU-FFW is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file
employees of the pharmaceutical company. Months before the expiration of
the CBA, 2 union officers met with the VP-HRD regarding making the new
CBA effective for 2 years but were denied.
The next day, the employees stopped working, leaving the containers and
raw materials unsealed. The 6am-6pm workers left at 2pm while the 6pm6am workers left at 2am. After told to wait for the formal negotiations, they
continued the overtime boycott and even engaged in work slowdown.
Company filed a case with NLRC illegal strike. Preventive mediation at
NCMB failed. Union filed notice of strike. DOLE Sec issued an assumption
order RTW order to workers while the company will accept all striking
workers. DOLE Secs finding, adopting the LAs decision there was illegal
StanPhilCo on the other hand avers that the same case has already
been ruled upon by the NLRC in the case of Associated Labor Union vs.
Standard Fruit Corp where the Minister of Labor held (and should be
considered res judicata) that:
The thirty (30)-minute assembly time long practiced and
institutionalized by mutual consent of the parties under Article IV,
Section 3, of the Collective Bargaining Agreement cannot be
considered as waiting time within the purview of Section 5, Rule I,
Book III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code.
Public respondent NLRC, on January 30, 1987, issued a resolution
denying for lack of merit petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Hence this
petition for review on certiorari filed on May 7, 1987.
ISSUES/HELD:
6. WON the 30 minute assembly time long practice can be considered
waiting time or work time and therefore compensable? No.
RATIO:
1.
2.
Rada v. NLRC
09 January 1992
Ponente: J. Regalado
Roe Anuncio
SUMMARY:
Petitioner was hired by Respondent for a project as a driver. His
contract was renewed/extended for a few times until it finally expired
without having been further renewed. He filed for non-payment of
separation pay, as well as for unpaid overtime pay. He claims overtime
pay for the time he spent driving for the other employees to and from
work. SC says said travel time constitutes compensable work hours
and should herein be accordingly considered as overtime work.
DOCTRINE:
Travel time spent by an employee for the benefit of the employer is
compensable.
FACTS:
Petitioner's initial employment with this Respondent was under a
"Contract of Employment for a Definite Period" whereby Petitioner
was hired as "Driver" for the construction supervision phase of the
Manila North Expressway Extension, Second Stage for a term of
"about 24 months effective July 1, 1977.
Petitioner's first contract of employment expired on June 30, 1979.
Meanwhile, the main project, MNEE Stage 2, was not finished on
account of various constraints.
A second Contract of Employment for a Definite Period of 10 months
was executed between Petitioner and Respondent.
Respondent renewed Petitioners contract of employment
Accordingly, a third contract of employment was executed.
This third contract of employment was subsequently extended for a
number of times, the last extension being for a period of 3 months,
that is, until December 31, 1985.
Upon the expiration of the contract, Petitioner applied for "Personnel
Clearance" with Respondent. Petitioner also released Respondent
from all obligations and/or claims, etc. in a "Release, Waiver and
Quitclaim.
FACTS:
Petitioner Remerco Garments Manufacturing seeks the nullification of the
decision 1 of the Minister of Labor and Employment dated January 21, 1981,
declaring the dismissal of Zenaida Bustamante, Luz Raymundo and Ruth
Corpuz, (its employees) illegal, and ordering their reinstatement to their
former positions without loss of seniority rights and privileges and with full
backwages. The said decision set aside, on appeal, the order 2 of Acting
Director, National Capital Region, MOLE, dated March 6, 1978, granting
petitioner's clearance application to terminate the employment of its three
(3) employees.
ISSUES/HELD:
8. WON there are sufficient ground to uphold the dismissal of the 3? No.
RATIO:
1. While it is true that it is the sole prerogative of the management to
dismiss or lay-off an employee, the exercise of such a prerogative,
however, must be made without abuse of discretion, for what is at
stake is not only private respondents' positions but also their means
of livelihood.
2. In the case of Luz Raymundo, she was charged of insubordination for
allegedly refusing to work on a Sunday, October 15, 1978, which was
her rest day. In fact, she was granted a clearance slip. The
disapproval of her request by top management reasonably creates
the impression of a hostile attitude. Petitioner has not shown that
Luz Raymundo's failure to report for work on that Sunday, October
15, 1978, constitutes one of the just causes for termination under
Article 283 of the New Labor Code.
3. Zenaida Bustamante allegedly abandoned her employment by failing
to report for work after the expiration of her suspension on October
23, 1978. Like Luz Raymundo, her one week suspension arose from
her failure to report for work on a Sunday. It is a recognized
principle that abandonment of work by an employee is inconsistent
with the immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal. 12 It
would be illogical for Zenaida Bustamante to abandon her job and
then immediately file an action seeking her reinstatement. At that
time.
4. The lack of sympathetic understanding of the underlying reasons for
their absence aggravated by the indecent haste attendant to the
efforts of petitioner to terminate the services of private respondents
portray a total disregard of the constitutional mandate of "security of
tenure" and "just and humane conditions of work" which the State is
mandated to protect. The New Labor Code is clear on this point. It is
the duty of every employer, whether operating for profit or not, to
provide each of his employees a rest period of not less than twenty
four (24) hours after every six (6) consecutive normal work days.
Even if there really existed an urgency to require work on a rest day,
(which is not in the instant case) outright dismissal from
employment is so severe a consequence, more so when justifiable
grounds exist for failure to report for work.
5. The objections raised grounded on procedural technicalities devoid
of merit. The mere failure to furnish copy of the appeal
SUMMARY: SMC did not pay non-Muslim employees their regular Muslim
holiday pay (factory was in Iligan City). Regional Director Macaraya issued
a compliance order directing SMC to consider Muslim holidays as regular
holidays and to pay both its Muslim and non-Muslim employees holiday
pay of 200% of basic salary. DOLE Main Office: Regional Director Order
affirmed. CA: Modified the holiday pay from 200% to 150%. SC: CA
affirmed.
DOCTRINE: There is no distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims as
regards payment of benefits for Muslim holidays. Wages and other
emoluments granted by law to the working man are determined on the basis of the
criteria laid down by laws and certainly not on the basis of the workers faith or
religion.
SMC argues that Art. 3(3) of PD 1083 provides that "(t)he provisions of this Code
shall be applicable only to Muslims x x x."
At any rate, Art. 3(3) of PD 1083 declares that "x x x nothing herein shall be
construed to operate to the prejudice of a non-Muslim."
ISSUES/HELD:
WON the school faculty who according to their contracts are paid per lecture
hour are entitled to unworked holiday pay (NO to regular holiday pay; YES to
special holiday pay)
RATIO:
The petitioner is under obligation to give pay even on unworked
regular holidays to hourly paid faculty members subject to the terms
and conditions provided in the following provisions:
1) Art. 94 of the Labor Code provides:
Art. 94. Right to holiday pay (a) Every worker shall be paid his
regular daily wage during regular holidays, except in retail and service
establishments regularly employing less than ten (10) workers;
(b) The employer may require an employee to work on any holiday but
such employee shall be paid a compensation equivalent to twice his
regular rate;
2) Implementing Rules and Regulations,, Rule IV, Book III,
provides:
SEC. 8. Holiday pay of certain employees. (a) Private school
teachers, including faculty members of colleges and universities,
may not be paid for the regular holidays during semestral
vacations. They shall, however, be paid for the regular holidays
during Christmas vacations. ...
FACTS:
- Filipro, Inc. (now Nestle) filed with the NLRC a petition for declaratory relief
seeking a ruling on its rights and obligations respecting claims of its monthly paid
employees for holiday pay in the light of the Court's decision in Chartered Bank
Employees Association v. Ople.
- Arbitrator Vivar rendered a decision directing Filipro to pay its monthly paid
employees holiday pay pursuant to Article 94 of the Code, subject only to the
exclusions and limitations specified in Article 82 and such other legal restrictions
as are provided for in the Code.
- Filipro filed a motion for clarification seeking (1) the limitation of the award to
three years, (2) the exclusion of salesmen, sales representatives, truck drivers,
merchandisers and medical representatives (hereinafter referred to as sales
personnel) from the award of the holiday pay, and (3) deduction from the holiday
pay award of overpayment for overtime, night differential, vacation and sick leave
benefits due to the use of 251 divisor.
o The Union answered that the award should be made effective from the date
of effectivity of the Labor Code, that their sales personnel are not field
personnel and are therefore entitled to holiday pay, and that the use of 251
as divisor is an established employee benefit which cannot be diminished.
o The arbitrator issued an order declaring:
that the effectivity of the holiday pay award shall
0.
retroact to November 1, 1974, the date of effectivity of the Labor Code
that the company's sales personnel are field
0.
personnel and, as such, are not entitled to holiday pay.
with the grant of 10 days' holiday pay, the
0.
divisor should be changed from 251 to 261 and ordered the reimbursement
of overpayment for overtime, night differential, vacation and sick leave pay
due to the use of 251 days as divisor.
o The petitioner insists that respondent's sales personnel are not field
personnel under Article 82 of the Labor Code.
o The respondent company asserts that under Article 82, field personnel are
not entitled to holiday pay. Said article defines field personnel as "nonagritultural employees who regularly perform their duties away from the
principal place of business or branch office of the employer and whose actual
hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty."
- It is undisputed that these sales personnel start their field work at 8:00 a.m. after
having reported to the office and come back to the office at 4:00 p.m. or 4:30 p.m.
if they are Makati-based.
The petitioner maintains that the period between 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 or 4:30 p.m.
comprises the sales personnel's working hours which can be determined with
reasonable certainty.
ISSUES/HELD:
Whether or not, concomitant with the award of holiday pay, the divisor
should be changed from 251 to 261 days and whether or not the previous use of
251 as divisor resulted in overpayment for overtime, night differential, vacation
and sick leave pay.
RATIO:
No. The sales personnel are field workers and thus not entitled to holiday
pay.
The law requires that the actual hours of work in the field be
.
reasonably ascertained. The company has no way of determining whether or not
these sales personnel, even if they report to the office before 8:00 a.m. prior to
field work and come back at 4:30 p.m, really spend the hours in between in actual
field work.
Moreover, the requirement that "actual hours of work in the field
.
cannot be determined with reasonable certainty" must be read in conjunction
with Rule IV, Book III of the Implementing Rules
(e) Field personnel and other employees whose time and
.
performance is unsupervised by the employer . . .
The aforementioned rule did not add another element to
.
the Labor Code definition of field personnel. The clause "whose time and
performance is unsupervised by the employer" did not amplify but merely
interpreted and expounded the clause "whose actual hours of work in the field
cannot be determined with reasonable certainty.
The petitioner claims that the fact that these sales personnel are
.
given incentive bonus every quarter based on their performance is proof that
their actual hours of work in the field can be determined with reasonable
certainty.
The Court thinks otherwise. The criteria for granting
.
incentive bonus are: (1) attaining or exceeding sales volume based on sales
target; (2) good collection performance; (3) proper compliance with good market
hygiene; (4) good merchandising work; (5) minimal market returns; and (6)
proper truck maintenance.
251 days
0.
The use of 251 days' divisor by respondent Filipro indicates that holiday
pay is not yet included in the employee's salary, otherwise the divisor should
have been 261.
The daily rate, assuming there are no intervening salary increases, is a
constant figure for the purpose of computing overtime and night differential pay
and commutation of sick and vacation leave credits. Necessarily, the daily rate
should also be the same basis for computing the 10 unpaid holidays.
The respondent arbitrator's order to change the divisor from 251
to 261 days would result in a lower daily rate which is violative of the prohibition
on non-diminution of benefits found in Article 100 of the Labor Code. To maintain
the same daily rate if the divisor is adjusted to 261 days, then the dividend, which
represents the employee's annual salary, should correspondingly be increased to
incorporate the holiday pay.
There is thus no merit in respondent Nestle's claim of overpayment
of overtime and night differential pay and sick and vacation leave benefits, the
.
FACTS:
Vivien Imbuido was employed as a data encoder by International
Information Services, Inc., (IISI) a domestic corporation engaged in the
business of data encoding and keypunching, from August 26, 1988
until October 18, 1991 when her services were terminated.
RATIO:
Imbuido is a project employee.
In the recent case of Maraguinot, Jr. vs. NLRC, SC held that "[a] project
employee or a member of a work pool may acquire the status of a
regular employee when the following concur:
All that we hold today is that once a project or work pool employee
has been: (1) continuously, as opposed to intermittently, re-hired by
the same employer for the same tasks or nature of tasks; and (2) these
tasks are vital, necessary and indispensable to the usual business or
trade of the employer, then the employee must be deemed a regular
employee, pursuant to Article 280 of the Labor Code and
jurisprudence. To rule otherwise would allow circumvention of labor
laws in industries not falling within the ambit of Policy Instruction No.
20/Department Order No. 19, hence allowing the prevention of
acquisition of tenurial security by project or work pool employees
who have already gained the status of regular employees by the
employer's conduct."
petitioners did not report for work. The Labor Arbiter held that there was
illegal dismissal. It ordered Lhuillier to pay separation pay, service incentive
leave pay with full backwages without qualification. The NLRC remanded the
case for further proceedings. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the
petitioners/ employees.
DOCTRINE: The clear policy of the Labor Code is to grant service incentive
leave pay to workers in all establishments, subject to a few exceptions. Sec. 2,
Rule V, Book III of the IRR provides that every employee shall be entitled to a
yearly service incentive leave of five days with pay. It is a right which accrues to
every employee who has served within 12 months, whether continuous or
broken reckoned from the date the employee started working, including
authorized absences and paid regular holidays unless the working days in the
establishment as a matter of practice or policy, or that provided in the contract,
is less than 12 months, in which case said period shall be considered as one
year. It is also commutable to its money equivalent if not used or exhausted at
the end of the year.
(a) Every employee who has rendered at least one year of service shall
be entitled to a yearly service incentive leave of five days with pay.
FACTS:
Fernandez v. NLRC
28 January 1998
Justice Panganiban
Lindain
SUMMARY: The eleven petitioners in this case filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against Agencia Cebuana-H. Lhuillier and/ or Margueritte Lhuillier.
The Agencia Cebuana is a sole proprietorship operated by Margueritte
Lhuillier. The petitioners demanded an increase in their salaries since
Lhuilliers business was making good. The petitioners also alleged that
Margueritte Lhuillier was evading payment of taxes by making false entries in
her records of account. Lhuillier threatened them that something would happen
to their employment if they would report her to the BIR. Subsequently, Lhuillier
suspected them of stealing jewelry from the pawnshop and verbally informed
them not to report for work as their employment had been terminated. The
Petitioners/ employees: The said rule cannot prevail over Article 2235 of the Labor
Code, which does not provide for such exclusion.
Supreme Court: There is no conflict between the two provisions. Article 223 lays
down the requirement that an appeal bond should be filed. The implementing rule, on
the other hand, explains how the appeal bond shall be computed. The rule explicitly
excludes moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees from the computation of
the appeal bond.
The rule requiring the employer to post a cash or surety bond to perfect his
appeal assures the workers that they will receive the money judgment awarded to
them upon the dismissal of the employers appeal. It also discourages employers from
using an appeal to delay or even evade their obligation to satisfy the just and lawful
claims of their employees.
Hence, deducting from the total monetary award of P1,078,200.55 the
amount of P200,000.00 for moral and exemplary damages, P98,018.25 for attorneys
fees and P30,000.00 for litigation expenses, the amount of the bond should
be P750,182.55. Thus, the appeal bond actually posted in the amount of P752,183 is
even more than the amount of appeal bond that may be required from private
respondents under Respondent NLRCs rules.
Issue 2
Lhuillier/ employer: Labor arbiter erred in stating that the absence of their counsel
during the July 8 and July 12 hearings resulted in the waiver of their right to crossexamine the other partys witness and their right to present evidence.
Petitioners/ employees: Lhuillier was able to submit its position paper with supporting
affidavits and documents. Lhuillers counsels failure to appear on July 8 and July 12
hearings, without any justification or motion for postponement, warranted the
The Commission may, in meritorious cases and upon Motion of the Appellant, reduce the amount
of the bond. However, an appeal is deemed perfected upon the posting of the bond equivalent to
the monetary award exclusive of moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees.
4 Section 6. Bond. In case of the decision of a Labor Arbiter involves a monetary award, an
appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued
by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission or the Supreme Court in an
amount equivalent to the monetary award.
5 In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected
only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly
accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment
appealed from.
6 (c) In case of two (2) successive unjustified non-appearances by the respondent during his
turn to present evidence, despite due notice, the case shall be considered submitted for decision
on the basis of the evidence so far presented.
As regards Marilyn Lim and Joseph Canonigo, there was no illegal dismissal.
Marilyn Lims admission of the offense charged (see facts) shows that
she was not coerced to resign. Besides, the fact that her complaint for illegal
dismissal was filed long after her resignation on February 24, 1990 suggests that it
was a mere afterthought. Like Petitioner Lim, Joseph Canonigo did not immediately
file a complaint for illegal dismissal, doing so only on July 23, 1990. He voluntarily
tendered his resignation on the assurance of separation pay.
Issue 4
Solicitor general: The award of service incentive leave should be limited to 3 years,
based on Art. 2917 of the Labor Code.
Petitioners/ employees: Art. 291 of the LC speaks of the prescription of filing an action
upon monetary claims within 3 years from the time the cause of action accrued, but it
is not a prescription of a period of time for the computation of monetary claims.
Supreme Court: Service incentive leave is a right which accrues to every employee who
has served within 12 months, whether continuous or broken reckoned from the date
the employee started working, including authorized absences and paid regular
holidays unless the working days in the establishment as a matter of practice or
policy, or that provided in the employment contracts, is less than 12 months, in which
case said period shall be considered as one year. [Sec. 3, Rule V, Book III, IRR of the
Labor Code]
It is also commutable to its money equivalent if not used or exhausted at
the end of the year.[Sec. 5, Rule V, Book III, IRR of the Labor Code] In other words, an
employee who has served for one year is entitled to it. He may use it as leave days or
he may collect its monetary value. To limit the award to three years, as the solicitor
general recommends, is to unduly restrict such right. The law indeed does not
prohibit its commutation.
Since a service incentive leave is clearly demandable after one year of
service -- whether continuous or broken -- or its equivalent period, and it is one of the
benefits which would have accrued if an employee was not otherwise illegally
7 ART. 291. Money Claims. -- All money claims arising from employer-employee relations
accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the
cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred.
8 ART. 279. Security of Tenure. -- An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalentcomputed from the time his compensation is withheld from him up to the time of his
actual reinstatement.
9 Article 279. Security of Tenure. [as amended by Section 34 of RA 6715]. -- In cases of regular
employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just
cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall
be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent
computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement.
dismissal to the time of their actual reinstatement. Petitioners Lim and Canonigo,
whom we find to have voluntarily resigned, are not entitled to any benefit.
actual termination. To this, JPL replied that they merely sent a memo
notifying private respondents about the end of merchandising of CMC.
ISSUES/HELD:
1) WON private respondents are entitled to separation pay, 13th month pay,
and service incentive leave pay? Only to 13th month and service incentive
2) Granting that they are so entitled, what should be the reckoning point for
computing said awards: for 13th month pay first day of employment. For
service incentive leave pay 1 year after commencement of service
RATIO:
AS TO SEPARATION PAY
Separation pay is authorized only in cases of dismissals due to these reasons:
-
In all these instances, the employee was dismissed by the employer. In the
instant case, private respondents were not dismissed, whether legally or
illegally. What they received from was not a notice of termination of
employment, but a memo informing them of the termination of CMCs
contract with JPL. They were also advised that they were to be reassigned.
Furthermore, Art. 286 allows the bona fide suspension of the operation of a
business for a period not exceeding 6 months, wherein employees are placed
on the so-called floating status. When that floating status lasts for more
than 6 months, he may be considered to have been illegally dismissed from
the service, entitling him to separation pay. However, in this case, private
1996, as well as service incentive leave pay from the second year of
employment up to 15 August 1996.
SUMMARY:
Two employees were absent from work and this absence was charged
against their vacation leave credits. They also filed applications for
leave which were denied to due to non-compliance with imposed
conditions. The SC eventually ruled that the conditions imposed were
valid.
DOCTRINE:
In the grant of vacation and sick leave privileges to an employee, the
employer is given leeway to impose conditions on the entitlement to
the same as it is not a standard of law, but a prerogative of
management. It is a mere concession or act of grace of the employer
and not a matter of right on the part of the employee. Thus, it is well
within the power and authority of an employer to deny an employees
application for leave and the same cannot be perceived as
discriminatory or harassment.
FACTS:
Virgina Sugue was respondents Assistant Manager for Marketing
and Renato Valderrama was one of respondents Direct Sales
Manager. In 1999, respondents sales declined. Sales target, which
were set by Valderrama himself , were not met. The low sales
performance was the subject of correspondence between
Valderrama and the top management,
Sugue and Valderrama filed a complaint with the NLRC against
Triumph for payment of money claims arising from allegedly unpaid
vacation and sick leave credits, birthday leave and 14th month pay
for the period 1999-2000.
On 19 June 2000, Sugue and Valderrama attended a preliminary
conference of the case they filed. They did not file a leave and used
company car and driver. They were asked to explain where they
were in the morning of 19 June 2000. Sugue and Valderrama said
they went to the preliminary conference of the case and thought that
they could use company time.
Triumph charged Sugue and Valderramas one-half day absence to
their vacation leave credits.
Valderrama was absent from July 3 to July 5. He filed an application
for sick leave, which was denied because Valderrama failed to
present a medical certificate. The company policy requires such a
certificate for sick leave for more than one day.
Valderrama applied for leave for his executive check-up. This was
denied because of the arrival of the companys regional manager
(international region).
Sugue filed an application for leave for July 14 and 15, but the
approval of the same was conditioned on her submission of the 2001
Marketing Plan.
Sugue also applied for leave for his executive check-up. This was also
denied because of the arrival of the companys regional manager
(international region).
When Valderrama left (claiming constructive dismissal), Sugue
complained that she was asked to report to Temblique, who she
claims was her assistant and therefore she is being demoted.
Valderrama and Sugue then filed another complaint for constructive
dismissal.
LA ruled in their favor. On appeal to the NLRC, the LA was reversed.
On certiorari to the CA, the LAs decision was reinstated with the
modification of deletion of the attorneys fees and reduction of moral
damages.
Sugue and Valderammas heirs (Valderrama died sometime during
the pendency of the case) appealed to the SC to question the
modification of the LA decision. Triumph appealed to question the
NLRC reversal and reinstatement of the LA decision.
ISSUES/HELD:
1.
2.
3.
RATIO:
Sugue and Valderrama were not constructively dismissed. The
circumstances do not warrant a finding of constructive dismissal.
Explained below are the explanation for Triumphs actions. Anent
Sugues claims that she was demoted, this was found to be
unfounded by the Court. The person to whom she was to report to
was not under Sugue, but he was in the same level as Valderrama
(Sugues boss).
FACTS:
10 Mayon Hotel & Restaurant, Pacita O. Po, and/or Josefa Po Lam v Rolando Adana, Chona
Bumalay, Roger Burce, Eduardo Almares, Amado Almaes, Edgardo Torrefanca, Lourdes
Camigla, Tedoro Laurenaria, Wenefredo Loveres, Luis Gaudes, Amado Macandog, Paterno
Llarena, Gregorio Nicerio, Jose Attractivo, Miguel Torrefranca and Santos Bronola)
o
o