Soriao

vs. Pineda
CA-G.R. SP No. 31546 August 10, 1994

Facts: Louie Soriao was a high school student in the sub province of Dinalungan, Aurora (S.Y.
1993 to 1994). Due to his reputation of talking back to school authority during the past
years, he was refused readmission to complete his fourth and final year of high school
through a verbal notice not to readmit.

Soriao questioned the notice, averring that he was deprived of a hearing on the matter and
thus the verbal notice was a denial of his right to due process. The administration ignored
the students plea to reconsider its decision to deny him readmission claiming, it was their
prerogative. Seeking further remedies to no avail, Soriao filed a petition for certiorari to the
CA.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was denied his right to education.

Ruling: YES. The Court of Appeals ordered Pineda, Head Teacher of the Juan C. Angara
Memorial High School to allow Soriao to enroll and study after he was meted out a
disciplinary action without due process. The Court of Appeals invoked the 1987 Constitution
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article XIV, Sections 1 and 2 and Article II,
Sections 13 and 17 of the 1987 Constitution provide:

Article XIV, Section 1: The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality
education at all levels, and shall take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to
all.

Section 2: The State shall:
(1)
Establish, maintain, and support a complete, adequate, and integrated system of
education relevant to the needs of the people and society;
(2)
Establish and maintain, a system of free public education in the elementary and
high school levels. Without limiting the natural right of parents to rear their children,
elementary education is compulsory for all children of school age;
(3)
Establish and maintain a system of scholarship grants, student loan programs,
subsidies, and other incentives which shall be available to deserving students in both
public and private schools, especially to the under-privileged;
(4)
Encourage non-formal, informal, and indigenous learning system, as well as self-
study programs particularly those that respond to community needs; and

(5)
Provide adult citizens, the disabled, and out-of-school youth with training in
civics, vocational efficiency, and other skills.

Article II, Section 13: The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and
shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being.
It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement
in public and civic affairs.

Section 17: The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture,
and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total
human liberation and development.

Also since it is the Constitution which granted petitioner the right of education, he may only
deprived of such right with due process of law as stated in Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987
Constitution, No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws.



OPOSA vs. FACTORAN
G.R. No. 101083. July 30, 1993.


FACTS:
The petitioners, all minors, sought the help of the Supreme Court to order the respondent,
then Secretary of DENR, to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the
country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving
new TLAs. They alleged that the massive commercial logging in the country is causing vast
abuses on rain-forest.They further asserted that the rights of their generation and the rights
of the generations yet unborn to a balanced and healthful ecology. Plaintiffs further assert
that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so
capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of
judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert
witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have a locus standi.


HELD:
The SC decided in the affirmative. Locus standi means the right of the litigant to act or to be
heard.Under Section 16, Article II of the 1987 constitution, it states that: The state shall
protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature. Petitioners, minors assert that they represent their
generation as well as generation yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for
themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit.
Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded considers the rhythm and
harmony of nature. Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and
harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the countrys forest, mineral, land, waters fisheries, wildlife, off-
shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and
utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. Needless to
say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony
for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors
assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to
come. This landmark case has been ruled as a class suit because the subject matter of the
complaint is of common and general interest, not just for several but for ALL CITIZENS OF
THE PHILIPPINES.

Stonehill vs. Diokno
Stonehill et al and the corporation they form were alleged to have committed acts in
violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code. By the strength of this allegation a search warrant was issued against
their persons and their corporation. The warrant provides authority to search the persons
above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to
seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all

business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in
question may be split into (2) major groups, namely:
(a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and
(b) those found seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
Stonehill averred that the warrant is illegal for:
(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;
(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized;
(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in
deportation cases filed against them;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and
(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that
issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law.
The prosecution counters, invoking the Moncado doctrine, that the defects of said warrants,
if any, were cured by petitioners consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are
admissible in evidence against them. In short, the criminal cannot be set free just because the
government blunders.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant issued is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et al. The SC emphasized however that Stonehill et
al cannot assail the validity of the search warrant issued against their corporation for
Stonehill are not the proper party hence has no cause of action. It should be raised by the
officers or board members of the corporation. The constitution protects the peoples right
against unreasonable search and seizure. It provides; (1) that no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. In the
case at bar, none of these are met. The warrant was issued from mere allegation that
Stonehill et al committed a violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code. In other words, no specific offense
had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the
offensecommitted were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who
issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes
the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed
particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal
laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts
performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict
anybody of a violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal

Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code, as alleged in the aforementioned applications
without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or codes.
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search
warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for
and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and
loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of Stonehill et al, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal.
The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of Stonehill et al and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of the
Bill of Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described as well as tending to
defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants. The Moncado doctrine is
likewise abandoned and the right of the accused against a defective search warrant is
emphasized.

Stonehill vs. Diokno
Facts: Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against petitioners
personally, and/or corporations for which they are officers directing peace officers to search
the persons of petitioners and premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences to
search for personal properties books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other
documents showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance
sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins(cigarettes) as the subject of the offense
for violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and
Revised Penal Code.
Upon effecting the search in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and on the
respective residences of the petitioners, there seized documents, papers, money and other
records. Petitioners then were subjected to deportation proceedings and were constrained
to question the legality of the searches and seizures as well as the admissibility of those
seized as evidence against them.
On March 20, 1962, the SC issued a writ of preliminary injunction and partially lifted the
same on June 29, 1962 with respect to some documents and papers.

Held:
a. Search warrants issued were violative of the Constitution and the Rules, thus, illegal or
being general warrants. There is no probable cause and warrant did not particularly
specify the things to be seized. The purpose of the requirement is to avoid placing the
sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the
mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers.
b. Document seized from an illegal search warrant is not admissible in court as a fruit of a
poisonous tee. However, they could not be returned, except if warranted by the
circumstances.
c. Petitioners were not the proper party to question the validity and return of those taken
from the corporations for which they acted as officers as they are treated as
personality different from that of the corporation.

US Vs. Bustos

Facts: In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled,
and prepared and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary(privileged communication)
through the law office of Crossfield and O'Brien, and five individuals signed affidavits,
charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with
malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. The specific charges against the justice of
the peaceinclude the solicitation of money from persons who have pending cases before the
judge. Now, Punsalan alleged that accused published a writing which was false, scandalous,
malicious,
defamatory,
and
libelous
against
him.


Issue: Whether or Not accused is entitled to constitutional protection by virtue of his right to
free speech and free press.
The
1987
Constitution
of
the
Philippines

A historical and juridical study of the Philippine Bill of rights
The
Philippine
constitution
explained


Held: Yes. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize
judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether
the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the
people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer,
public opinion will be effectively suppressed. It is a duty which every one owes to society or
to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all

who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any
public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and
punish
them.

The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions
and the complement of the part of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens
to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any
person or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or
office of the government for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning
must, of course, assume responsibility for the charges made. All persons have an interest in
the pure and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs.

Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have
demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been
the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege. All persons have an interest in the
pure and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a
party is privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good
faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. Although the
charges are probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by
the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that
malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the motives of these
citizens to secure the removal from office of a person thought to be venal were
justifiable.
In
no
way
did
they
abuse
the
privilege.

In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys that
presumption. A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic
examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity.




Villacicencio Vs Lukban

Facts : One hundred and seventy women were isolated from society, and then at night,
without their consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their
rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions unknown.
Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the women left voluntarily and gladly, that such was

not the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of the police and the constabulary
was deemed necessary and that these officers of the law chose the shades of night to cloak
their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute and practically
admitted by the respondents.

ISSUE : WON Mayor Lukban has the right to deport women with ill repute.

HELD : Law defines power. No official, no matter how high, is above the law. Lukban
committed grave abuse of discretion by deporting the prostitutes to a new domicile against
their will. There is no law expressly authorizing his action. On the contrary, there is a law
punishing public officials, not expressly authorized by law or regulation, who compels any
person to change his residence Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as citizens of the
Philippines, entitled to the same rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other
citizen. Thei rchoice of profession should not be a cause for discrimination. It may make
some, like Lukban, quite uncomfortable but it does not authorize anyone to compel said
prostitutes to isolate themselves from the rest of the human race. These women have been
deprived of their liberty by being exiled to Davao without even being given the opportunity
to collect their belongings or, worse, without even consenting to being transported to
Mindanao. For this, Lukban etal must be severely punished