Case Digest of Estrada vs.

Desierto (March 2, 2001)

Petitioner: Joseph E. Estrada
Respondents: Aniano Desierto (GR#146710-15) et al. and Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (GR#146738)
Nature: Petition to question the legitimacy of the assumption as
President of the Republic of the Philippines by Gloria MacapagalArroyo.
Ponente: Justice Puno
Facts:
The court looked at the events that occurred prior and immediately
after the oath-taking of respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (to be
referred to in the rest of the digest as GMA) as president of the
Republic of the Philippines (RP).
On 11 May 1998, petitioner Joseph E. Estrada (will subsequently be
referred to as Erap) was elected as President of RP with GMA as his
vice-President. By the late 2000, word spread of Eraps alleged
involvement in jueteng and his receiving jueteng money as Jose
Pidal. Erap quickly loses popularity among different social groups
and public officials, even high ranking members of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP),
started defecting from his agendas. And because of the jueteng
scandal, an impeachment proceeding started on 7 December 2000.
Upon its resumption in January, however, a vote of 11-10 against
the opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained
evidence showing Erap as Jose Velarde with P3.3billion in secret
bank account cut short the impeachment trial as prosecutors
walked out and joined the rallying of people in the streets of
Manila.
Amidst the pressure, Erap proposed snap elections, which he is not
to run as candidate, to regain stability in the country but such a
move did little to quell the wave against him. Two rounds of
negotiations were held between Eraps camp and that of GMA in
the early hours of 20 January 2001 and at 12nn of the same day,

GMA took her oath as RP president. Both houses of Congress

acknowledged her presidency, as well as the international
community. Erap, on the other hand, left Malacanang and is now
faced with legal action against him by the Office of the Ombudsman
among other things.
Issues:
1) Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy? YES
2) Whether petitioner Estrada resigned as President? YES IMPLIEDLY
3) If the petitions are justiciable, whether petitioner Estrada is a
President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an acting President?
NO
4) Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a
condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of petitioner
Estrada? NO
5) Whether petioners prosecution should be enjoined on the
ground of prejudicial publicity? NO
Ratio Decidendi:
1) While the 1987 EDSA People Power Movement is considered by
the Court as a non-justiciable event, EDSA 2, as it has come to be
known, is very much different from the 1987 EDSA People Power
Movement (EDSA 1). EDSA 1 is extra-constitutional, hence, there
would be no legal basis if such an event was put to the courts. EDSA
2, on the other hand, is intra-constitutional as it is based on the
constitutionally protected rights of freedom of speech and
assembly. Even in GMAs oath-taking ceremony, she categorically
swore to preserve and defend the 1987 Constitution.
2) The Court used a Totality Test as an authoritative window to
ascertain petitioner Estradas state of mind on this issue. On reading
the then Executive Secretary Angaras diary published in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer, the Court held that petitioner impliedly
resigned because 1) he did not want to be a candidate in the
proposed snap elections, 2) he did not object to Senator Pimentels

dignified exit proposal, and 3) on Erap saying that he only had 5

days to a week left to stay in the Palace. Also, from what the court
eventually calls his resignation letter, Erap 1) acknowledged
GMAs oath-taking as President, 2) he did not mention any intent on
re-assuming his position as President, and 3) his gratitude in the
letter is on a past opportunity he served as President.
On his defense, Erap cites sec. 12 of Republic Act 3019 which states
that a public officer cannot resign pending legal action, in this case
the impeachment trial. A reading of history tells the Court that the
intention of Congress in passing such provision is merely to prevent
public officials from escaping liability to stop pending investigation.
It does not apply to petitioner.
3) The law states that Congress has the sole authority to say
whether a President is incapable of performing the duties required
of him of his office. Given the resolutions passed by Congress
immediately after GMAs oath-taking and the fact that both houses
filed bills signed by GMA into law, the Court recognizes that
petitioners inability to perform was permanent and also, the Court
would have no jurisdiction to change the decision already done by
Congress on his capacity as President.
4) Regarding immunity from suit, history shows us that the framers
of the 1987 Constitution did not retain the 1973 Constitution
provision on executive immunity. Also, the Impeachment court has
become functus officio. It is, then, untenable for petitioner to
demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted
before he can be prosecuted.
5) As for a prejudicial publicity, this would not apply to the present
case. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press
are incompatible. Theyre essentially unrelated. Also, since our
justice system does not use the jury system, the judge, who is a
learned and legally enlightened individual, cannot be easily
manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said that petitioner
did not present enough evidence to show that the publicity given
the trial has influenced the judge so as to render the judge unable

to perform. Finally, the Court said that the cases against petitioner
were still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the publicity of
the case would really have no permanent effect on the judge and
that the prosecutor should be more concerned with justice and less
with prosecutuion.