POLITICAL LAW (For Personal Use Only)

A. THE CONSTITUTION
1. Definition, Nature and Concepts
The document which serves as the fundamental law of the state 1. That written instrument
enacted by direct action of the people by which the fundamental powers of the government are
established, limited and defined, and by which those powers are distributed among the several
departments for their safe and useful exercise for the benefit of the body politic 2.
It is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all
persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer. No act shall be valid, however noble
its intention, if it conflicts with the Constitution. The Constitution must ever remain supreme. All
must bow to the mandate of this law. Right or wrong, the Constitution must be upheld as long as
the sovereign people have not changed it.
2. Parts
a) Constitution of Liberty - the series of prescriptions setting forth the fundamental civil and
political rights of the citizens and imposing limitations on the powers of government as a means of
securing the enjoyment of those rights. E.g. Bill of Rights 3
b) Constitution of Government - the series of provisions outlining the organization of the
government, enumerating its powers, laying down certain rules relative to its administration, and
defining the electorate.E.g. Legislative, Executive and Judicial Departments, Constitutional
Commissions4
c) Constitution of Sovereignty - the provisions pointing out the mode or procedure in
accordance with which formal changes in the fundamental law may be brought about. 5 E.g. Art. XVII
Amendments or Revisions
3. Amendments and Revisions
Amendment isolated or piece-meal change only. It is the generic term used to denote
change in the Constitution.6
Revision a revamp or rewriting of the whole instrument. 7 It means overhauling of the
government.

1 V. Sinco, Philippine Political Law, 11

th

ed., p.68-70

2 Malcolm, Philippine Constitutional Law, p.6.

3 Art. III
4 Arts. VI, VII, VIII, IX
5 Art. XVII
6 Required Steps In The Amendatory Process
A. Proposal. It may come from:
1. Congress, by a vote of of all its members. The choice of method of method of proposal, i.e., whether made directly by Congress or through a
Constitutional Convention, is within the full discretion of the legislature. (Occena vs. COMELEC, 104 SCRA 1)
2.Constitutional Convention, which may be called into existence either by a 2/3 vote of all the members of Congress, or, if such vote is not obtained, by a
majority vote of all the members of Congress with the question of whether or not to call a Convention to be resolved by the people in a plebiscite
3. People, through the power of initiative. Through the initiative phase, the people propose the amendments. There is a valid proposal when a
proposition has received the approval of at least 3% of the registered voters of each district and 12% of the total number of registered voters nationwide.
This is followed by the referendum phase where the people vote to reject or ratify the proposal.
B. Ratification
Both amendment and revision signify change in the constitutional text. An amendment envisages of one or a few specific and isolated provisions of the
Constitution. Its guiding original intention is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions or to suppress existing ones accordingly as addition or
subtraction might be demanded by existing conditions.

In revision, the guiding intention and plan contemplate a re-examination of the entire document or an important cluster of provisions in the document to
determine how and to what extent it should be altered. The end product of a revision can be an important structural change in the government or a change
which affects several provisions of the Constitution.
A revision of the Constitution cannot be effected through initiative and referendum. The change authorized by Art. XVII, Sec. 2 through initiative and
referendum can only be amendment. The main reason is that formulation of provisions revising the Constitution requires both cooperation and debate which
can only be done through a collegial body.

** Judge Singco Notes

The Province of North Cotabato v. Republic, GR Nos. 183591, 183572,
183893, and 183951, October 14, 2008- The Court noted that inclusion of
provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE
and the Central Government is itself a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions
from the President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace
panel. Moreover, it virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to
the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the
GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee.
Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the
constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention,
or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only
way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment
process is through an undue influence or interference with that process.
-

IMBONG VS. COMELEC, 35 SCRA 28- Congress when acting as a Constituent

Assembly has full and plenary powers to propose amendments or to call a
convention. The grant to Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such plenary
authority includes, by virtue of the doctrine of necessary implication, all powers
necessary to the effective exercise of principal power granted, such as the power
to fix qualifications, apportionment, etc..

SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106- RA 6735 is insufficient in providing

for mechanism to govern initiatives for constitutional amendments. While the
Constitution recognizes the right of citizens to propose amendments, the people
cannot exercise such until Congress provides for its implementation.

LAMBINO VS., ET AL. VS. COMELEC, October 25, 2006 -Clearly, the framers
of the Constitution intended that the draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment should be ready and shown to the people before they sign
such proposal. The framers plainly stated that before they sign there is
already a draft shown to them. The framers also envisioned that the
people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must
prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature. The essence of
amendments directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people.
This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author
and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their
behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in
a petition.

DOCTRINE OF PROPER SUBMISSION- GONZALES VS. COMELEC, 21 SCRA

774- The power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments is not
included in the general grant of legislative power to Congress. It is part of the
inherent powers of the people as the repository of sovereignty in a republican
state. Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the
same explicitly grants such power. Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives act, not as members of
Congress, but as component elements of a Constituent Assembly.

When Congress, acting as Constituent Assembly, makes proposals for

amendments, it does not have the final say on whether or not its acts are within
constitutional limits- an issue which is clearly subject to judicial review.

There is nothing to indicate that a special election is all times necessary in the
ratification of amendments. A plebiscite may be validly held together with general
elections.

TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702- There can be no piece meal

ratification.

Presidential proclamation is not required for effectivity of amendment/revisions.

UNLESS, the proposed amendments/revisions so provide.

***
2 Stages of Amendment
1. Proposal (Secs. 1-3, Art. XVII)-the adoption of the suggested change in the
Constitution. A proposed amendment may come from(3 ways of proposing
amendments to, or revision of, the Constitution under Article XVII):
-

(a) Congress
i. (Sec. 1, Art. XVII) Acting as Constitutional Assembly and not as a legislative
body. -One of the non-legislative powers;
ii. By a vote of 3/4 of all its members. (3/4 of the Senate, 3/4 of the House of
Representatives
(b) Constitutional Convention- which may be called into existence either:
i. By directly calling a Constitutional Convention by a 2/3 vote of all the
Members of Congress, or;
ii. By submitting the issue to the people in a plebiscite [if the two-thirds (2/3) vote is
not obtained] by a majority vote of all the members of Congress with the question of
whether or not to call a Convention to be resolved by the people in a plebiscite.
(Sec.3, Art. XVII)
superior- people; Theory of Conventional Sovereignty
inferior- it is a mere creation of Congress;
co-equal to and independent of the 3 branches
Occena vs. COMELEC 104 SCRA 1, the choice of method of proposal, i.e., whether
made directly by Congress or through a Constitutional Convention, is within the full
discretion of the legislature.

(c) People, through the Power of Initiative (Sec.2, Art. XVII)- A petition of at least 12%
of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein
--This is not a self-executing provision, it will require an enactment of law.

RA 6735 Initiative and Referendum Law

INITIATIVE-the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose
and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose.

3 Kinds of Initiative:
1. initiative on the Constitution- refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution
2. initiative on statutes- refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation
3. initiative on local legislation- refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial,
municipal,
city, or barangay
law,
resolution
or
ordinance
[Sec.2(a),RA6735]
Section 2 (b), RA 6735 provides for:

INDIRECT INITIATIVE- exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to Congress
or the local legislative body for action; and
DIRECT INITIATIVE- the people themselves filed the petition with the COMELEC and not with
Congress
The COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the
right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of
initiative. It does not have the power under RA 6735. Reliance on the COMELECs power under
Section 2 (1), Article IX-C is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are
those promulgated by the COMELEC under Section 3 of Article IX-C or a law where subordinate
legislation is authorized and which satisfies the completeness and the sufficient standard
tests. (Santiago vs. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106)
2. Ratification- (Sec. 4, Art. XVII) The proposed amendment shall become part of the
Constitution when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held not earlier than
60 nor later than 90 days after the approval of the proposal by Congress or the Constitutional
Convention, or after the certification by the COMELEC of the sufficiency of the petition for
initiative under Sec. 2, Art. XVII.
REFERENDUM- the power of the electorate to approve or reject legislation through an
election called for that purpose.
Two (2) Classes:
1. Referendum on Statutes- refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, or part thereof,
passed by Congress
2. Referendum on Local Law- refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or
ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies
Doctrine of Proper Submission (proper frame of reference)
Because the Constitution itself prescribes the time frame within which the plebiscite is to be
held, there can no longer be a question on whether the time given to the people to determine
the merits and demerits of the proposed amendments is adequate.
The plebiscite may be held on the same day as regular elections.
Judicial Review of Amendments. The question is now regarded as subject to judicial review
because invariably, the issue will boil down to whether or not the constitutional provisions had
been followed. (Sanidad vs. Comelec, 78 SCRA 333; Javellana vs. Exec. Secretary, 50 SCRA 50)
Prohibited Measures: The following cannot be the subject of an initiative or
referendum
1. No petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the electorate;
and
2. Statutes involving emergency
measures, the
enactment of
which
is
specifically vested in Congress by the Constitution, cannot be subject of referendum until
ninety (90) days after the effectivity. (Sec. 10, RA 6735)

Local Initiative: not less than 2,000 registered voters in case of autonomous regions,
1,000 in case of provinces and cities, 100 in case of municipalities, and 50 in case of
barangays, may file a petition with the Regional Assembly or local legislative body,
respectively, proposing the adoption, enactment, repeal, or amendment, of any law, ordinance
or resolution. (Sec. 13, RA 6735)
Limitations on Local Initiative:

a. The power of local initiative shall not be exercised more than once a year;
b. Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of
the local legislative bodies to enact; and
c. If at any time before the initiative is held, the local legislative body shall adopt in toto the
proposition presented, the initiative shall be cancelled. However, those against such action
may, if they so desire, apply for initiative.
Limitation on Local Legislative Body vis--vis Local Initiative
Sec. 125, RA 7160any proposition or ordinance approved through an initiative and
referendum shall not be repealed, modified or amended by the Sangggunian within 6
months from the date of approval thereof, and may be amended, modified or repealed within 3
years thereafter by a vote of of all its members. In case of barangays, the period shall be 18
months after approval.

Revision
In the case of Lambino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006, the SC held
that a peoples initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the
Constitution and not to its revision. Certainly, the Lambino Groups initiative is a revision and
not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Groups proposed changes
overhaul two articlesArticle VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executiveaffecting a
total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter
substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a
bicameral to a unicameral legislature.

4. Self-Executing and Non-Self-Executing Provisions

Self-executing provision one which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the
aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies a sufficient rule by means of
which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected.
Non-Self-Executing Provision one which lays down a general principle.
5. General Provisions8
The flag of the Philippines shall be red, white, and blue, with a sun and three stars, as
consecrated and honored by the people and recognized by law.9
** The design of our flag may be changed only by constitutional amendment.
The Congress may, by law, adopt a new name for the country, a national anthem, or a
national seal, which shall all be truly reflective and symbolic of the ideals, history, and traditions of
the people. Such law shall take effect only upon its ratification by the people in a national
referendum.10
The State may not be sued without its consent.11
The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be composed of a citizen armed force which shall
undergo military training and serve as may be provided by law. It shall keep a regular force
necessary for the security of the State.12

8 Art. XVI
9 Sec. 1
10 Sec. 2
11 Sec. 3
12 Sec. 4

All members of the armed forces shall take an oath or affirmation to uphold and defend this
Constitution.
The State shall strengthen the patriotic spirit and nationalist consciousness of the military,
and respect for people's rights in the performance of their duty.
Professionalism in the armed forces and adequate remuneration and benefits of its members
shall be a prime concern of the State. The armed forces shall be insulated from partisan politics. No
member of the military shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any partisan political activity, except
to vote.
No member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be appointed or
designated in any capacity to a civilian position in the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries.
Laws on retirement of military officers shall not allow extension of their service.
The officers and men of the regular force of the armed forces shall be recruited
proportionately from all provinces and cities as far as practicable.
The tour of duty of the Chief of Staff of the armed forces shall not exceed three years.
However, in times of war or other national emergency declared by the Congress, the President may
extend such tour of duty. 13
The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and
civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. The
authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law. 14
The State shall provide immediate and adequate care, benefits, and other forms of
assistance to war veterans and veterans of military campaigns, their surviving spouses and
orphans. Funds shall be provided therefor and due consideration shall be given them in the
disposition of agricultural lands of the public domain and, in appropriate cases, in the utilization of
natural resources.15
The State shall, from time to time, review to increase the pensions and other benefits due to
retirees of both the government and the private sectors. 16
The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or
hazardous products.17
The State shall provide the policy environment for the full development of Filipino capability
and the emergence of communication structures suitable to the needs and aspirations of the nation
and the balanced flow of information into, out of, and across the country, in accordance with a
policy that respects the freedom of speech and of the press. 18
The ownership and management of mass media shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations, cooperatives or associations, wholly-owned and managed by such
citizens.
The Congress shall regulate or prohibit monopolies in commercial mass media when the
public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition therein shall
be allowed.

13 Sec. 5
14 Sec. 6
15 Sec. 7
16 Sec. 8
17 Sec. 9
18 Sec. 10

The advertising industry is impressed with public interest, and shall be regulated by law for
the protection of consumers and the promotion of the general welfare.
Only Filipino citizens or corporations or associations at least seventy per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens shall be allowed to engage in the advertising industry.
The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of entities in such industry shall
be limited to their proportionate share in the capital thereof, and all the executive and managing
officers of such entities must be citizens of the Philippines. 19
The Congress may create a consultative body to advise the President on policies affecting
indigenous cultural communities, the majority of the members of which shall come from such
communities.20

** Judge Singco Notes

-

IMMUNITY OF THE STATE FROM SUIT (Read general principles; Phil Agila
Satellite, Inc. vs. Lichauco, May 3, 2006)- The hornbook rule is that a suit for
acts done in the performance of official functions against an officer of the
government by a private citizen which would result in a charge against or financial
liability to the government must be regarded as a suit against the State itself,
although it has not been formally impleaded. However, government immunity
from suit will not shield the public official being sued if the government no longer
has an interest to protect in the outcome of a suit; or if the liability of the officer is
personal because it arises from a tortious act in the performance of his/her duties.

COA vs. Link Worth Intl. Inc., GR No. 182559, March 13, 2009- The COA is
an unincorporated government agency which does not enjoy a separate juridical
personality of its own, Hence, even in the exercise of proprietary functions
incidental to its primarily governmental functions, COA cannot be sued without its
consent.

Professional Video, Inc., vs. TESDA, GR No. 155504, June 26, 2009- Even
assuming that TESDA entered into a proprietary contract with PROVI and thereby
gave its implied consent to be sued, TESDAs funds are still public in nature and,
thus, cannot be the valid subject of a writ of garnishment or attachment.

GTZ v. CA, GR No. 152318, April 16, 2009- German Agency for Technical
Cooperation (GTZ), which implements a joint health insurance project of the
German and Philippine governments, is not entitled to immunity from suit in the
Philippines as GTZ, being the equivalent of a government-owned-and-controlled
corporation, has the power and capacity to sue and be sued under the Corporation
Code. GTZ is akin to a governmental owned or controlled corporation without
original charter which, by virtue of the Corporation Code, has expressly consented
to be sued,

PCCG vs. Sandiganbayan, March 6, 2006- When the government itself is the
suitor, as in Civil Case No. 0034. Where, as here, the State itself is no less the
plaintiff in the main case, immunity from suit cannot be effectively invoked. For,
as jurisprudence teaches, when the State, through its duly authorized officers,
takes the initiative in a suit against a private party, it thereby descends to the
level of a private individual and thus opens itself to whatever counterclaims or
defenses the latter may have against it. Petitioner Republics act of filing its
complaint in Civil Case No. 0034 constitutes a waiver of its immunity from suit.
Being itself the plaintiff in that case, petitioner Republic cannot set up its immunity
against private respondent Benedictos prayers in the same case.

19 Sec. 11
20 Sec. 12

NATIONAL POLICE FORCE- Under the DILG (Carpio vs. Executive Secretary, 206
SCRA 290). Alunan vs. Asuncion, January 28, 2000, the new PNP absorbed the
members of the former NAPOLCOM, PC and INP, all three of which accordingly
abolished.

Note: Professionalism of the AFP- cannot engage, directly or indirectly, in any

partisan political activity, except to vote. They cannot be appointed to a civilian
position in the government, including GOCCs or their subsidiaries.

IBP vs. Zamora- Since none of the marines were incorporated or enlisted as
members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to a civilian position to speak
of.

OPERATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES- 60% Filipino ownership.

MASS MEDIA- 100% Filipino ownership

ADVERSTISING INDUSTRY 70%

EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION- 60 % EXCEPT: Schools established by religious

groups and mission boards.

B. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
1. National Territory21
a. Archipelagic Doctrine
The waters around, between and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of
their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines. 22
** Judge Singco Notes
-

Archipelago as defined by Article 46 of UNCLOS:

A group of islands, including parts of the islands, interconnecting waters and other
natural features which are closely interrelated that such islands, waters, and other
natural resources form an intensive geographical, economic, political entity or to
have historically regarded as an archipelago.

Archipelagic Statemeans a State constituted wholly by one or more

archipelagos and may include other islands.

Archipelagic Baselines- basis: UNCLOS: how to treat Kalayaan Group of

Islands (KIG) and Scarborough shaol: whether to include or to exclude
them from the baselines; and/or consider as part of the regime of
islands.

Kalayaan Islands (constituted under RA 1596)- part of Region IV-B, Province

of Palawan but under the custody of DND. Found some 380 miles west of the
southern end of Palawan.

Scarborough shaol (Bajo de Masinloc)- also known as scarborough reef,

panatag shoal and Huangyan Dao. Found in the South China Sea, part of the
province of Zambales. A shaol is a traingle shaped chain of reefs and islands (but
mostly rocks. 55 kilometers around with an area of 150 square kilometer. Its 123
miles west of Subic Bay. Basis: terra nullius; 200 EEZ

21 Art. I
22 Art. I, Sec.1, 2nd sentence

Spratly Archipelago- international reference to the entire archipelago wherein the

Kalayaan chain of islands is located. The Philippines essentially claims only the
western section of Spratlys, which is nearest to Palawan.

RA 9552 (March 10, 2009)- It defines the general configuration of the

archipelago, including the extended continental shelf and exclusive economic
zone to make it more compliant with the UNCLOS.

It redrew the countrys baseline to comply with the UNCLOS requirements for
archipelagic state, in the process excluding the disputed Kalayaan Island Group
and the Scarborough shoal from the main archipelago and classifying them
instead as regime of islands. They excluded from the baselines. The national
territory constitutes a roughly triangular delineation which excludes large areas of
waters within 600 miles by 1,200 miles rectangular enclosing the Philippine
archipelago as defined in the Treaty of Paris.

Regime of islands (Art. 121 of UNCLOS) consists of islands or naturally

formed areas of land surrounded by water that remain above water during high
tide. The principle forces claimant states over a certain territory to maintain peace
in the area because no country can claim exclusive ownership of any of these
islands.

Magalona, et al. vs. Exec. Sec., GR No. 187167, August 16, 2011- Had
Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the
Philippine archipelago, adverse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines
would have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III. First, Article 47
(3) of UNCLOS III requires that "[t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to
any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago."
Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that "the length of the baselines shall
not exceed 100 nautical miles," save for three per cent (3%) of the total number
of baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical miles.

Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal for several decades, these outlying areas are located at an
appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago,
such that any straight baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint will
inevitably "depart to an appreciable extent from the general configuration of the
archipelago.
-

Constitutional issues:
Internal waters vs. Archipelagic waters
EEZ; claims over Sabbah and Spratly islands
Delineation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of
Paris vs. RA 9552

Right of innocent passage- archipelagic sea lane passage and right of

overflight

200-Economic Zone (includes Territorial Seas and Contiguous Zone)

READ: UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Contiguous Zone (12 nm from the end of territorials seas)

Teritorial seas/maritime domain (12 nm from baseline)
Internal waters vs. Archipelagic waters

Reagan vs. CIR, 30 SCRA 968- An exception to the full and complete power
of a nation within its territories is by virtue of the consent of the nation itself. The
embassy premises of a foreign power are within the territorial domain of the host

State. The ground occupied as embassy premises is not the territory of the foreign
State to which the premises belong.
-

Kalayaan Island Group

a) historic right
b) P.D. No. 1596, dated June 11, 1978
c) effective occupation
d) principle of contiguity because of proximity
e) part of the continental shelf
c) RA 3046 & RA 5446
c) RA 9552
-

Freedom islands to which Spratly islands belong- basis: terra nullius

***
Modes of acquiring territories:
1. Discovery and Occupationwhich are terra nullius (land belonging to no one) Doctrine
of Effective Occupationdiscovery alone is not enough. Mere discovery gives only
an inchoate right to the discoverer. For title to finally vest, discovery must be followed
by effective occupation in a reasonable time and attestation of the same.
2. Cession by Treaty. Examples are Treaty of Paris, treaty between France and US ceding
Louisiana to the latter and treaty between Russia and US ceding Alaska to the latter;
3. Prescriptionwhich is a concept under the Civil Code. Territory may also be
acquired through continuous and uninterrupted possession over a long period of time.
However, in international law, there is no rule of thumb as to the length of time for
acquisition of territory through prescription. In this connection, consider the
Grotius Doctrine of immemorial prescription, which speaks of uninterrupted
possession going beyond memory.
4. Conquest or Subjugation (conquistadores)this is no longer recognized, inasmuch
as the UN Charter prohibits resort to threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state; and
5. Accretionanother concept in the Civil Code. It is the increase in the land area of the
State, either through natural means, or artificially, through human labor.
Philippine Archipelago:
1. Treaty of Paris, December 10, 1898Cession of the Philippine Islands by Spain to the
United States;
2. Treaty between Spain and US at Washington, November 7, 1900inclusion of Cagayan,
Sulu and Sibuto;
3. Treaty between US and GB, January 2, 1930inclusion of Turtle and Mangsee
Islands.
Other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction:
1. Batanes(1935 Constitution);
2. Those contemplated under Article I, 1973 Constitutionbelonging to the
Philippines by historic right or legal title;
3. PD 1596, June 11, 1978-- constituting the Spratlys Group of Islands as a regular
municipality claiming it the Municipality of Kalayaan, placing it under the Province of
Palawan.
2 Kinds of Archipelago:
1. Coastal Archipelagosituated close to a mainland and may be considered a part thereof.
2. Mid-Ocean Archipelagosituated in the ocean at such distance from the coasts of
firm land. The Philippines is classified as mid-ocean archipelago just like Indonesia. The
Philippines is not in any way connected physically with the Asia mainland.
Components of National Territory:
I. Terrestrialland mass on which the inhabitants live;
II. Fluvialmaritime;
a. Internal or national watersbodies of water within the land mass, among
them are:

i. Riverswhich may be:

1. National
2. Boundarydivides the territories of States
3. Internationalflows thru various States
a. Thalweg Doctrinefor boundary rivers, in the absence
of an agreement between the riparian states, the boundary
line is laid on the middle of the main navigable channel.
b. Middle of the Bridge Doctrinewhere there is a bridge
over a boundary river, the boundary line is the middle or
center of the bridge.
ii. Bays and gulfsa bay is a well-marked indentation whose penetration
is in such proportion to the width of its mouth as to contain a land-locked
waters and constitutes more than a curvature of the coast. Also referred to
as juridical bay. The area must be as large as, or larger than, a semi-circle
whose diameter is a line drawn across the mouth of such indentation, or if
the mouth is less than 24 miles wide.
e.g. Hudson Bay
in Canada, one whose waters are
considered internal because of the existence of a historic title.
iii. Straitsnarrow passageways connecting 2 bodies of water. If the distance
between the 2 opposite coast is not more than 6 miles, they are considered
internal waters.
In international law, when a strait within a country has a width of more
than six (6) miles, the center lane in excess of the three (3) miles on both
sides is considered international waters.
iv. Canalsthe most famous is the Suez Canal, which is neutralized, and the
Panama Canal, which is open to everyone in times of war or peace.
b. Archipelagic watersare the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines,
regardless of their depth or distance from the coast.
Archipelagic Statea state made up wholly of one or two
archipelagos. It may include other islands.
Straight Archipelagic Baselineto determine the archipelagic waters,
the state shall draw straight baselines connecting the outermost points
of the outermost islands and drying reefs, provided that the ratio of the
area of the water to the area of the land, including atolls, is between 1:1 and
9:1. The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles,
except up to 3% of the total number of baselines enclosing any
archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum 125 miles. The
baselines drawn should not depart, to any appreciable extent, from
the general configuration of the archipelago. All the waters within the
baselines shall then be considered internal waters. The breadth of the 12mile territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone
and the continental shelf shall then be measured from the archipelagic
baselines.
Vessel may be allowed innocent passage
within the archipelagic waters, but this right may
be suspended, after publication, in the interest of international security. The coastal state
may also designate archipelagic sea lanes for continuous, unobstructed transit of vessels.
c.

Territorial Seathe belt of the sea located between the coast and the internal
waters of the coastal state on the other hand, and the high seas on the other,
extending up to 12 nautical miles from the low-water mark, or in the case of
archipelagic states, from the baselines.
Baselineis a line from which the breadth of the territorial sea, the
contiguous zone and the exclusive economic zone is measured in order to
determine the maritime boundary of the coastal state.
Types of baseline:
i. Normal Baseline Method ii.

Straight Baseline method

d. Contiguous Zoneextends up to 12 nautical miles from the territorial sea; this
shall not exceed 24 nautical miles from the archipelagic baselines.
The coastal state may exercise limited jurisdiction over the contiguous
zone:
1. To prevent infringement of customs, fiscal immigration or sanitary
laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea; and
2. To punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed
within its territory.
e. Exclusive Economic Zoneshall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the
archipelagic baselines.
f.

Continental shelfit is the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas extending
beyond the Philippine territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of the
land territory. It extends up to:
i. The outer edge of the continental margin; or
ii. A distance of 200 nautical miles from the archipelagic baselines, whichever
is the farthest.

The continental shelf does not form part of the Philippine territory. The Philippines
has the sovereign rights over the continental shelf for the purpose of exploring it and
exploiting its natural resources.
g. High Seastreated as res communes, thus, not territory of any particular State.
These are the waters which do not constitute the internal waters, archipelagic
waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zones of a state. They are beyond
the jurisdiction and sovereign rights of States.
Freedom of navigationrefers to the right to sail ship on the high sea, subject to
international law and the laws of the flag of the state.
2. State Immunity23
The general rule is that a state may not be sued without its consent. While the doctrine
appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to
complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge
of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to
perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to
pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself,
although it has not been formally impleaded.
It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for
acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. Inasmuch as the State authorizes only
legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of govt. officials or officers are not acts of the State, and
an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such
acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the
State from suit. The doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice.
The cloak of immunity is removed from the moment the public official is sued in his
individual capacity such as where he acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in
him. A public official may be liable in his personal capacity for whatever damage he may have

23 The doctrine is also available to foreign States insofar as they are sought to be sued in the courts of the local State.

The added basis in this case is the

principle of the sovereign equality of States, under w/c one State cannot assert jurisdiction over another in violation of the maxim par in parem non habet
imperium. To do so would "unduly vex the peace of nations." (Cruz.)
The consent to be sued, in order to be effective, must come from the State, acting through a duly enacted statute. Waiver of state immunity can only be
made by an act of legislative body.

caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction. In this case, the officers are liable for damages.
USA vs. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644, Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners
Lamachia, Belsa, Cartalla and Orascion for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force Recreation
Center at Camp John Hay Air Station in Baguio City. It had been ascertained after investigation, from
the testimony of Belsa, Cartalla and Orascion that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock
used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. Lamachia, as club manager,
suspended him and thereafter referred the case to a board of arbitrators conformably to the
collective bargaining agreement between the center and its employees. The board unanimously
found him guilty and recommended his dismissal. Genoves reaction was to file his complaint
against the individual petitioners.
SC: The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is one of the generally accepted
principles of international law that we have adopted as part of our law. Even without such
affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under
the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of states, such
principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and
consequence of its membership in the society of nations. All states are sovereign equals and cannot
assert jurisdiction over one another.
When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the
other contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity is expressed with more specificity in
the RP-US Bases Treaty. There is no question that the US, like any other state, will be deemed to
have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private
capacity. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such
waiver may be implied.
3. Principles and Policies24
Principles25
The Philippines is a democratic and republican State 26. Sovereignty resides in the people
and all government authority emanates from them.27
***
1. Essential features: Representation and Renovation.
2. Manifestations:
Ours is a government of law and not of men (Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39Phil 778).
Rule of the majority. (Plurality in elections)
Accountability of public officials
Bill of rights
Legislature cannot pass irrepealable laws.
Separation of powers.
- Republicanism

24 Art. II
25 Binding rules which must be observed in the conduct of the government (Tanada vs. Angara, see Vicente Sinco, Phil. Political Law 116 (11
26 Manifestations of a Republican State:
A.

th

ed. 1962)

Ours is a government of laws and not of men. Its essence is that all persons, from the highest official of the land down to the lowest level of the
citizenry, must respect the laws, and nobody, how great and painful might he have suffered in the hands of his persecutors or oppressors, must
resort to the rule of law rather than taking the law into his hands. It is a weapon of reason and civility.
The SC castigated a Mayor for expelling alleged prostitutes from Manila and dumped them against their will in Davao. The Court said that such act
constitutes a wanton violation of the principle that ours is a government of laws and not of men. (Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778, March 25, 1919)
B.
Rule of the majority.
(Plurality in elections)
C.
Accountability of public officials
D.
Bill of rights

27 Sec. 1

What is a republican form of government?

It is a government of the people, by the people, and for the people, a representative
government wherein the powers and duties of government are exercised and discharged
for the common good and welfare.
Characteristics of a republican form of government:
1. The people do not govern themselves directly but through their representatives;
2. It is founded upon popular suffrage;
3. There is the tripartite system of the government, the mutual interdependence of the
three departments of the government.
STATEa community of persons, more or less numerous, permanently occupying a definite
portion of territory, independent of external control, and possessing a government to
which a great body of inhabitants render habitual obedience. (CIR vs. Campos Rueda, 42 SCRA
23)
Republican stateone constructed on the principle that the supreme power resides in the
body of the people. Its purpose therefore is to guarantee against two (2) extremes:
1. On the one hand, monarchy and oligarchy;
2. On the other, pure democracy.
Elements of State:
1. People the inhabitants of the State; the # of which is capable for selfsufficiency and self-defense; of both sexes for perpetuity.
a. Inhabitants;
b. Citizens;
c. Electors.
2. Territorya fixed portion of the surface of the earth inhabited by the people of the State.
3. Governmentthe agency or instrumentality through which the will of the State is
formulated, expressed and realized.
Government of the Philippinesrefers to the corporate governmental entity through
which the functions of the government are exercised throughout the Philippines,
including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through
which political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to
the autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or other
forms of local government.
De Jure

De facto

Has a rightful title but

no power or control,
either because the same
has been withdrawn
from it or it has not yet
actually entered into the
exercised thereof.

Actually exercises the power or control but without legal title.

De facto proper government that gets possession and control of, or usurps,
by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal government and
maintains itself against the will of the latter;
Government of Paramount Forces established and maintained by the military
forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war;
Independent Government established by the inhabitants of the country who
rise in insurrection against the parent State.

Functions of the government:

a. Constituentcompulsory because constitutive of the society;
b. Ministrantundertaken to advance the general interest of the society; merely optional.
Doctrine of Parens Patriaethe government as guardian of the rights of the people may
initiate legal actions for and in behalf of particular individual. (Government of the Philippine
Islands vs. Monte de Piedad, 35 SCRA 738; Cabaas vs. Pilapil, 58 SCRA 94)

4. Sovereigntythe supreme and uncontrollable power inherent in a State by which that

State is governed.
It is the right to exercise the functions of a State to the exclusion of any other State.
While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the
domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the
Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. In its Declaration of
Principles and State Policies, the Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the
country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to
be automatically part of our own laws.
Government of Laws and Not of Men.sovereignty of the people also
includes the concept that government officials have only the authority given them by law
and defined by law, and such authority continues only with the consent of the people.
Kinds of Sovereignty:
a. Legalthe power to issue final commands;
b. Politicalthe sum total of all the influences which lie behind the law;
c. Internalthe supreme power over everything within its territory;
d. Externalalso known as independencefreedom from external control.
Characteristics:
a. Permanence
b. Exclusiveness
c. Comprehensiveness d. Absoluteness
e. Indivisibility
f. Inalienability
g. Imprescriptibility
Sovereignty, often referred to as Imperiumis the States authority to govern; it includes
passing laws governing a territory, maintaining peace and order over it, and defending it against
foreign invasion.
It is the government authority possessed by the State expressed in the concept of
sovereignty.
Dominiumis the capacity of the State to own or acquire property such as lands and natural
resources. (Lee Hong Hok vs. David, No. L-30389, December 27, 1972; Separate Opinion
of Justice Kapunan in Cruz vs. Secretary of DENR, G.R. No. 135385, December 2000)
It necessarily includes the power to alienate what is owned. It was the foundation for the
early Spanish decrees embracing the feudal theory of jura regalia that all lands were held from
the Crown.
Effect of Belligerent Occupationthere is no change in sovereignty. However, political
laws, except those of treason, are suspended; municipal laws remain in force unless changed by
the belligerent occupant.
Principle of Jus Postliminiumat the end of the occupation, when the occupant is ousted
from the territory, the political laws which have been suspended shall automatically
become effective again. (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, No. L049, November 12, 1945)
Effect of Change of Sovereigntypolitical laws of the former sovereign are abrogated unless
they are expressly reenacted by the affirmative act of the new sovereign. Municipal laws
remain in force. (Macariola vs. Asuncion, Adm. Case No. 133-J, May 31, 1982)
Effect of Revolutionary Governmentit is bound by no constitution. However, it did not

repudiate the Covenant or Declaration in the same way it repudiated the Constitution. As
the de jure government, the revolutionary government could not escape responsibility for the
States good faith compliance with its treaty obligations under international law. During the
interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued by
government officers did not exceed the authority granted them by the revolutionary
government. The directives or orders should not have also violated the Covenant or the
Declaration. (Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003)
Jurisdictionis the manifestation of sovereignty.
a. Territorialpower of the State over persons and things within its territory subject to its
control and protection.
b. Personalpower of the State over its nationals, which may be exercised by the state
even if the individual is outside the territory of the State.
c. Extraterritorialpower of the State over persons, things or acts beyond its territorial
limits by reason of their effects to its territory.
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of
peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations. 28
***
Three (3) Parts:
1. Renunciation of warthe power to wage a defensive war is of the very essence of
sovereignty;
2. Adoption of the principles of international law;
3. Adherence to a policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation & amity.
The second part is nothing more than a formal acceptance of a principle to which all civilized
nations must conform.
The third part is called the selfish policythe guiding principle of Philippine foreign policy is
the national interest. However, this is tempered with concern for equality, peace, freedom and
justice.
Section 23 (1), Article VI: The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in join
session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence
of a state of war.
Doctrine of Incorporationthe doctrine where the generally accepted principles of
international law are made part of the law of the land either by express provision of the
Constitution or by means of judicial declaration or fiat. The doctrine is applied whenever
municipal tribunals or local courts are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a
conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the Constitution or statute of a
State.
Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them so as to give effect to both. In case of
conflict between international law and municipal law, the latter shall prevail.
However, the doctrine dictates that rules of international law are given equal standing
with, and are not superior to, national legislative enactments.
Lex posterior derogate prioriin States where the constitution is the highest law of the
land, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the Constitution.

28 Sec. 2
Doctrine of Incorporation
The courts have applied the rules of international law in a number of cases even if such rules had not previously been subject of statutory enactments,
because these generally accepted principles of international law are automatically part of our own laws.
The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not subject to,
national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle of lex posterior derogat priori takes effect. In states where the constitution is the highest law of
the land, such as the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution. (Secretary of Justice v. Lantion,
G.R. No. 139465, January 18, 2000)

(Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, January 18, 2000)
Philip Morris, Inc. vs. CA, the fact that the international law has been made part of the
law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national law in
the municipal sphere.
Doctrine of Autolimitation
It is the doctrine where the Philippines adheres to principles of international law as a
limitationto the exercise of its sovereignty.
What war does the Philippines renounce?
The Philippines renounces an aggressive war because of its membership in the United Nations
whose charter renounces war as an instrument of national policies of its member States.
Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the
Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the
State and the integrity of the national territory. 29
***
Civilian Supremacy Clause
Sec. 18, Art. VIIinstallation of the President as the highest civilian authority, as the
commander-in-chief of the AFPexternal manifestation that civilian authority is supreme
over the military.
Sec. 5(1), Art. XVImembers of the AFP swear to uphold and defend the Constitution, which is
the fundamental law of the civil government.
Civilian supremacy is not a guaranteed supremacy of civilian officers who are in power but of
supremacy of the sovereign people. The Armed Forces, in this sense, is the protector of the
people and the State.
Sec. 6, Article XVIThe State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be
national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police
commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be
provided by law.
IBP vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000, the deployment of the Marines
does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the marines in this
case constitutes permissible use of military asset for civilian law enforcement. x x x The
limited participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the Letter of Instruction (LOI)
itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines authority. It is noteworthy
that the local police forces are the ones charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real
authority belonging to the PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader of the
PNP-Marines joint visibility patrols. Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient
the soldiers on police patrol procedures. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the
deployment of the marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the
Marines and render logistic support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be

29 Sec. 3
Ensured by:
1.
the installation of the President, the highest civilian authority as the commander-in-chief of the military [Sec. 18, Art. VII];
2.
the requirement that the members of the AFP swear to uphold and defend the Constitution, which is the fundamental law of the civil
government;
3.
the professionalization of the service and the strengthening of the patriotism and nationalism, and respect for human rights, of the military;
4.
insulation of the AFP from partisan politics;
5.
prohibition against appointment to a civil position;
6.
compulsory retirement of officers, so as to avoid propagation of power;
7.
a 3-year limitation on the tour of duty of the Chief of Staff, which although extendible in case of emergency by the President, depends on
Congressional declaration of emergency;
8.
requirement of professional recruitment, so as to avoid any regional clique from forming within the AFP [Sec. 5, Art. XVI]; and
9.
the establishment of a police force that is not only civilian in character but also under the local executives [Sec. 6, Art. XVI].

properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority.

It is worth mentioning that military assistance to civilian authorities in various forms
persists in Philippine jurisdiction. The Philippine experience reveals that it is not averse to
requesting the assistance of the military in the implementation and execution of certain
traditionally civil functions. x x x Some of the multifarious activities wherein military aid has
been rendered, exemplifying the activities that bring both the civilian and the military together in
a relationship of cooperation are:
1. Elections;
2. Administration of the Philippine National Red Cross;
3. Relief and rescue operations during calamities and disasters;
4. Amateur sports promotion and development;
5. Development of the culture and the arts;
6. Conservation of the natural resources;
7. Implementation of the agrarian reform program;
8. Enforcement of customs laws;
9. Composite civilian-military law enforcement activities;
10. Conduct of licensure examinations;
11. Conduct of nationwide test for elementary and high school students;
12. Anti-drug enforcement activities;
13. Sanitary inspections;
14. Conduct of census work;
15. Administration of the Civil Aeronautic Board;
16. Assistance in installation of weather forecasting devices;
17. Peace and order policy formulation in local government units.
This unquestionably constitutes a gloss on executive power resulting from a systematic,
unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of Congress and, yet, never before
questioned. What we have here is a mutual support and cooperation between the military
and civilian authorities, not derogation of civilian supremacy.
The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may
call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required,
under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military or civil service. 30
***
Does the Philippines renounce defensive war?
No, because it is duty bound to defend its citizens. Under the Constitution, the prime duty of the
government is to serve and protect the people.
Posse Commitatusit is the power of the state to require all able-bodied citizens to perform
civic duty to maintain peace and order.
In People vs. Lagman, 66 Phil. 13, the accused in this case, prosecuted for failure to
register for military service under the National Defense Act, assailed the validity of the Act. The
Supreme Court upheld the law on the basis of the compulsory military and civil service provision
of then 1935 Constitution. It said that: x x x. The duty of the Government to defend the State
cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of
the citizens would be to make this duty to the Government excusable should there be no
sufficient men who volunteer to enlist thereinx x x the right of the Government to require
compulsory military service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal with
its duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of the citizen. x x x.
The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the
promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings
of democracy.31

30 Sec. 4
31 Sec. 5

***
Right to bear arms: It is statutory and not a constitutional right. The license to carry a firearm is
neither a property nor a property right. Neither does it create a vested right.
Even if it were a property right, it cannot be considered absolute as to be placed beyond the
reach of police power. The maintenance of peace and order, and the protection of the people
against violence are constitutional duties of the State, and the right to bear firearm is to be
construed in connection and in harmony with these constitutional duties. (Chavez vs. Romulo,
G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004)
The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.32
***
The State should not use its money and coercive power to establish religion. It should not
support a particular religion. The State is prohibited from interfering with purely ecclesiastical
affairs. But it does not mean that there is total or absolute separation. The better rule is
symbiotic relations between the church and State.
Constitutional provisions evidencing the Separation of Church and State:
1. Sec. 6, Art. II
2.
Sec. 5, Art. IIINo law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No
religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil and political rights.
3. Sec. 2 (5), Art. IX-Creligious sect cannot be registered as political party
4. Sec. 5 (2), Art. VIno sectoral representative from the religious sector
5. Sec. 28 (3), Art. VICharitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents
appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or
educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
6. Sec. 29 (2), Art. VINo public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or
employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher,
minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest,
preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal
institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
7. Sec. 3 (3), Art. XIVAt the option expressed in writing by the parents or guardians,
religion shall be allowed to be taught to their children or wards in public elementary and
high schools within the regular class hours by instructors designated or approved by the
religious authorities of the religion to which the children or wards belong, without
additional cost to the Government.
8. Sec. 4 (2), Art. XIVFilipino ownership requirement for educational institutions,
except those established by religious groups and mission boards.
th
Austria vs. NLRC and CPU Mission Corp. of the 7
Day Adventists, G.R. No.
124382, August 16, 1999, an ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between the church
and its members and relates to matter of faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance of the

32 Reinforced by:
1.
Freedom of religion clause;
2.
Non-establishment of religion clause;
3.
No religious test clause [Sec. 5, Art. III];
4.
No sectoral representative from religious sector [Sec. 5 (2), Art. VI];
5.
Prohibition against appropriation for sectarian benefits. [Sec. 29(2), Art. VI]; and
6.
Religious denominations and sects cannot be registered as political parties [Sec. 2 (5) Art. IX-C].
Exceptions:
1.
Churches, personages, etc., actually, directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable and educational purposes shall be exempt from
taxation [Sec. 28 (3), Art. VI];
2.
Prohibition against appropriation for sectarian purposes, except when, priest etc., is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution or
government orphanage or leprosarium [Sec. 29 (2), Art. VI];
3.
Optional religious instruction for public elementary and high school students [Sec. 3 (3), Art. XIV];and
4.
Filipino ownership requirement for educational institutions, except those established by religious groups and mission boards [Sec. 4 (2), Art.
XIV].

congregation. Examples of these affairs in which the State cannot meddle are proceedings for
excommunication, ordination of religious ministers, administration of sacraments, and other
activities to which is attached religious significance. In this case, what is involved is the
relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee. It is purely secular
and has no relation whatsoever with the practice of faith, worship or doctrine of the church.

State Policies33
The Sate shall pursue an independent foreign policy, in its relations with other states the
paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and
the right to self-determination.34
***
The word relations covers the whole gamut of treaties and international
agreements and other kinds of intercourse. This is the closest reference to military bases.
There is a marked antipathy in the Constitution towards foreign military presence in the
country, or of foreign influence in general. (Lim vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 151445,
April 11, 2002)
The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom
from nuclear weapons in its territory.35
*** Clearly, the ban is on nuclear armsthat is, the use and stockpiling of nuclear
weapons, devices, and parts thereof. And this includes not only possessing, controlling and
manufacturing nuclear weapons, but also nuclear test in our territory, as well as the use of our
territory as dumping ground for radioactive waste.
The provision, however, is not a ban on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Nor is it a ban
on all nuclear-capable vessels. For a vessel to be banned, it is not enough that it is capable of
carrying nuclear arms; it must actually carry nuclear arms.
Nuclear weapons, if stored in our territory, may invite threats of foreign invasion and there
is a danger to the life and limbs of the people because of the threat of explosion.
The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and
independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide
adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved
quality of life for all.36
*** It reflects a preoccupation with poverty as resulting from structures that mire the people
in a life of dependence.
The State shall promote social justice37 in all phases of national development.38
*** (Read Sections 1 and 2 of Article XIII)
Sections 1&2 of Article XIII:
Section 1The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures
that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic,
and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and
political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition
of property and its increments.
Section 2The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create
economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.
The Constitution covers all phases of national development but with more emphasis

33 Guidelines for the orientation of the state (see IV Record of the Constitutional Commission, 768 and 580)
34 Sec. 7
35 Sec. 8
Policy of freedom from nuclear weapons
The Constitution prescribes a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons. The policy includes the prohibition not only of the possession, control, and
manufacture of nuclear weapons but also nuclear arm tests. Exception to this policy may be made by the political department; but it must be justified by the
demands of the national interest. But the policy does not prohibit the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

36 Sec. 9
37 It simply means the equalization of economic, political and social opportunities with special emphasis on the duty of the State to tilt the balance of social
forces by favoring the disadvantaged in life.

38 Sec. 10
Avancena | 21

not only on economic inequities but also on political and cultural inequities.
The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights.39
***(Read Sections 17-19 of Article XIII)
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family
as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of
the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the
youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.40
***(Read Article XV)
The family here is to be understood as a stable heterosexual relationship whether
formalized by civilly recognized marriage or not. Calling the family a basic social institution is an
assertion that the family is anterior to the State and is not a creature of the State. The
categorization
of the family as autonomous is meant to protect the family against
instrumentalization by the State.
Protection of the Unborn
The unborns entitlement to protection begins from conception, i.e., from the moment of
conception. The intention is to protect life from its beginning, and the assumption is that
human life begins at conception and that conception takes place at fertilization.
The provision is intended to prevent the State from adopting the doctrine in US Supreme
th
Court decision of Roe vs. Wade, 410 US 113, which liberalized abortion laws up to the 6
month of pregnancy by allowing abortion at the discretion of the mother any time during the first
6 months when it can be done without danger to the mother.
Natural Right and Duty of Parents
Parents are entitled to the support of laws designed to aid them in the discharge of their
responsibility.
The provision also highlights the inherent duty of the State to act as parens patriae and to
protect the right of persons and individuals who, because of age or inherent incapacity, are in an
unfavorable position vis--vis other parties.
People vs. Larin, G.R. No. 128777, October 7, 1998, RA 7610, which penalizes child
prostitution and other sexual abuses, was enacted in consonance with the policy of the State to
provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse, thus, the Court grants the victim
full vindication and protection granted under the law.
The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and
protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the
youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs. 41
The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men. 42
***(Read Section 14, Article XIII)
PT&T Co. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 118978, May 23, 1997, the SC held that the petitioners policy
of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts

39 Sec. 11
40 Sec. 12
41 Sec. 13
R.A. 7610, which penalizes child prostitution and other sexual abuses, was enacted in consonance with the policy of the State to provide special protection
to children from all forms of abuse; thus, the Court grants the victim full vindication and protection granted under the law. (People v. Larin, G.R. No.
128777, October 7, 1998)

42 Sec. 14
Avancena | 22

marriage, runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, which is guaranteed all
women workers under the Constitution. While a requirement that a woman employee must
remain unmarried may be justified as a bona fide occupational qualification where the particular
requirements of the job would demand the same, discrimination against married women cannot
be adopted by the employer as a general principle.
The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.43
***(Read Sections 11-13 of Article XIII as an aspect of Social Justice)
The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. 44
*** Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr., 224 SCRA 792, it was held that the 34 minors duly joined by their
respective parents pleading the cause of inter-generational responsibility and intergenerational justice, had a valid cause of action in questioning the grant of Timber Licensing
Agreements (TLAs) for commercial logging purposes. The minors filed the action for themselves
as representing their generation as well as generations yet unborn. The SC, on the basis of
Section 16, Article II linked with the right to health, recognized a right to a balanced and
healthful ecology and the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
C&M Timber Corporation vs. Alcala, G.R. No. 111088, June 13, 1997, on the issue that the
total log ban is a new policy which should be applied prospectively and not affect the rights of
petitioner vested under the Timber Licensing Agreement (TLA), the Sc held that this is not a new
policy but a mere reiteration of the policy of conservation and protection the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology.
The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports
to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation
and development.45
***(Read also Section 2, Article XIV)
In PRC vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. 144681, June 21, 2004, while it is true that the SC
has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or course of study
subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements, the exercise of
this right may be regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals,
peace, education, order, safety and general welfare. Thus, persons who desire to engage in
the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take
an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. This regulation assumes
particular pertinence in the field of medicine, in order to protect the public from the potentially
deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance.
PMMS, Inc. vs. CA, 244 SCRA 770, the Court said that the requirement that a school
must first obtain government authorization before operating is based on the State policy that
educational programs and/or operations shall be of good quality and, therefore, shall at least
satisfy minimum standards with respect to curricula, teaching staff, physical plant and facilities
and administrative and management viability.

43 Sec. 15
44 Sec. 16
This provision recognizes an enforceable right.

45 Sec. 17
The requirement that a school must first obtain governmental authorization before operating is based on the State policy that educational programs and/or
operations shall be of good quality and, therefore, shall at least satisfy minimum standards with respect to curricula, teaching staff, physical plant and
facilities and administrative and management viability. (Philippine Merchant Marine School, Inc. v. CA, 244 SCRA 770)
Avancena | 23

The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force.

workers and promote their welfare.46

It shall protect the rights of

The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos.47
*** The Constitution does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods
and services. It contemplates neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international
community.
Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on equality and reciprocity, the fundamental
law encourages industries that are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,
thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in
favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the
foreign markets. (Taada vs. Angara, 272 SCRA 18)
The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private
enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investments. 48
*** (Read Article XII)
Doctrine of Free Enterprise
Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators vs. PCA, G.R. No. 110526, February
10, 1998, the SC said that although the Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it
nevertheless reserves to the Government the power to intervene whenever necessary for
the promotion of the general welfare as reflected in Sections 6 & 19 of Article XII.
Pest Management Association of the Philippines vs. Fertilizer and Pesticide
Authority, G.R. No. 156041, February 21, 2007 and Pharmaceutical and Health Care
Association of the Philippines vs. Sec. Duque III, G.R. No. 173034, October 9,
2007, it was held that despite the fact that our present Constitution enshrines free enterprise
as a policy, it nevertheless reserves to the Government the power to intervene whenever
necessary to promote the general welfare. Free enterprise does not call for removal of protective
regulations. It must be clearly explained and proven by competent evidence just exactly how
such protective regulation would result in the restraint of trade.
The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform. 49
*** Rural development encompasses a broad spectrum of social, economic, human,
cultural, political and even industrial development.
(See the case of Association of Small Landowners of the Philippines vs. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343)
The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the
framework of national unity and development.50
***[Read Section 5(2), Article VI; Section 5, Article XII; Section 17, Article XIV]

46Sec. 18
47 Sec. 19
48 Sec. 20
49 Sec. 21
50 Sec. 22
Avancena | 24

The State shall encourage non-governmental, community-based, or sectoral organizations

that promote the welfare of the nation.51
***(Read Sections 15-16 of Article XIII)
The State recognizes the vital role of communication and information in nation-building. 52
***(Read Sections 10-11, Art. XVI; Sec. 23, Art. XVIII)
The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments. 53
*** (Read Article X)
Basco vs. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52, The SC held that the local autonomy under the 1987
Constitution simply means decentralization, and does not make the local governments
sovereign within the State or an imperium in imperio.
Limbonas vs. Mangelin, 170 SCRA 786
Decentralization of Administration

Decentralization of Power

-delegation of administrative powers to the

local government unit in order to broaden the
base of governmental powers.

-abdication by the national government of

governmental powers

Lina vs. Pano, G.R. No. 129093, August 30, 2001, the Sc said that the basic
relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been
enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy.
Without meaning to detract from that policy, Congress retains control of the LGUs although in
a significantly reduced degree now under our previous Constitutions. The power to create
still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or
recall. True there are notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the
LGUs of the power to tax which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large,
however, the national legislature is still the principal of LGUs, which cannot defy its will or
modify or violate it. Ours is still a unitary form of government, not a federal state. Being so, any
form of autonomy granted to local governments will necessarily be limited and confined within
the extent allowed by the central authority.
Judge Dadole vs. COA, G.R. No. 125350, December 3, 2002, even as we recognize that the
Constitution guarantees autonomy to LGUs, the exercise of local autonomy remains subject to
the power of control by Congress and the power of general supervision by the President.
xxx The President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a LGU if he finds that the latter
had acted contrary to law. The President or any of his alter egos, cannot interfere in local affairs
as long as the concerned LGU acts within the parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any
directive, therefore, by the President or any of his alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a lawconforming judgment on local affairs of a LGU is a patent nullity, because it violates the principle
of local autonomy, as well as the doctrine of separation of powers of the executive and legislative
departments in governing municipal corporations.

51 Sec. 23
52 Sec. 24
53 Sec. 25
Decentralization of Administration - delegation of administrative powers to local government unit in order to broaden the base of governmental powers.
Decentralization of Powers abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous. (Limbonas v. Mangelin,
170 SCRA 786)
Avancena | 25

The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit
political dynasties as may be defined by law.54
*** Pamatong vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004, the SC said that this provision
does not bestow a right to seek the Presidency; it does not contain a judicially enforceable
constitutional right and merely specifies a guideline for legislative action. The provision is not
intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate as many as
possible into public office. The privilege may be subjected to limitations. One such valid limitation
is the provision of the Omnibus Election Code on nuisance candidates.
The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and
effective measures against graft and corruption. 55
Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a
policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. 56
*** PRINCIPLE OF TRANSPARENCY
4. Separation of Powers57
Legislative power is given to the Legislature whose members hold office for a fixed term;
executive power is given to a separate Executive who holds office for a fixed term; and judicial
power is held by an independent Judiciary.
The principle of separation of powers is based on the conception that if the totality of
governmental powers were concentrated in one person or group of persons, the possibility of
establishing a despotic and tyrannical regime capable of suppressing and suffocating the rights of
the people becomes a tempting reality.
5. Checks and Balances
This allows one department to resist encroachments upon its prerogatives or to rectify mistakes
or excesses committed by the other departments, e.g. veto power of the President as check on
improvident legislation.
6. Delegation of Powers
General Rule: Potestas delegata non potest delegare
- premised on the ethical principle that delegated power constitutes not only a right but a
duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not
through the intervening mind of another.
Exceptions:58
1.

Tariff powers of the President59

54 Sec. 26
The purpose of this provision is to give substance to the desire for the equalization of political opportunities

55 Sec. 27
56 Sec. 28
57 Purpose: to prevent concentration of authority in one person or group of persons that might lead to irreparable error or abuse in exercise to the detriment
of republican institutions. (Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. Public Service Commission, G.R. No. 47065. June 26, 1940)
The SC nullified the veto exercised by the President adjusting the pension of Justices of the SC and the CA asserting in very strong terms that such an act
palpably violates the doctrine of separation of powers. The challenged veto has far-reaching implications which the Court cannot countenance as they
undermine the principle of separation of powers. The Executive has no authority to set aside and overrule a decision of the SC. (Bengzon vs. Drilon, 208
SCRA 133, April 15, 1992)

58 Permissible Delegation
59 Art. VI, Sec. 28 (2)
Avancena | 26

Emergency powers of President60

Delegation to the people;61
Delegation to Local Government units;62 and
Delegation to administrative bodies63.

2.
3.
4.
5.

7. Forms of Government
Presidential government is one in which the state, the sovereign, makes the executive
independent of the legislature, both in tenure and prerogative, and furnishes him with sufficient
power to prevent the legislature from trenching upon the sphere marked out by the State as
executive independence and prerogative.64
Parliamentary government is one in which the state confers upon the legislature the
complete control of the administration of laws. Under this system, the Cabinet or Ministry is
immediately and legally responsible to the legislature or one branch thereof, usually the more
popular chamber, and mediately or politically responsible to the electorate, while the titular or
nominal executive the King or Chief of State- occupies a position of irresponsibility. 65
Unitary or centralized government - is one in which the powers of government are vested in
one supreme organ from which all local governing authorities derive their existence and powers.
The Philippine government is an example of a unitary form of government. 66
Federal form of government is on in which the governmental powers are, by common
sovereign, distributed between a central government and the local government, each being
supreme within its own sphere.67
*** Judge Singco Notes
Republicanism
- Separation of Powers
- Principles of Blending of Powers and Checks & Balances
- under the principle of separation of powers, courts cannot interfere with the
exercise by the legislature of its authority to conduct investigations in aid of
legislation (Senate Blue Ribbon vs Majaducon, GR # 136760, July 29, 2003;
Executive privilege -Neri vs. Senate Committee, GR. No. 180643, Mach 25,
2008)
-

Judicial Review: Requisites (Francisco, et al. vs. HR,

et al., November 10, 2003; ABAKADA Guro Party List, et
al. vs. Executive Secretary Ermita, September 1, 2005;
David et al. vs. Ermita, et al., April 20, 2006).

Local governments: With Rep. Act No. 7160, the union of legislative and executive
powers in the office of the local chief executive under the BP Blg. 337 has been

60 Art. VI, Sec. 23 (2)

61 Art. VI, Sec. 32, Art. X, Sec. 10, Art. XVII, Sec. 2; RA 6753
62 Art X; RA 7160
63 power of subordinate legislation
64 The principal identifying feature of a presidential form of government is embodied in the separation of powers doctrine. Each department of government
exercises powers granted to it by the Constitution and may not control, interfere with or encroach upon the acts done within the constitutional competence of
the others. However, the Constitution also gives each department certain powers by which it may definitely restrain the others from improvident action,
thereby maintaining a system of checks and balances among them, thus, preserving the will of the sovereign expressed in the Constitution.

65 The essential characteristic of a parliamentary form of government is the fusion of the legislative and executive branches in parliament; the prime
minister, who is the head of government, and the members of the cabinet, who are chosen from among the members of parliament and as such are
accountable to the latter. Another feature is that the prime minister may be removed from office by a vote of loss of confidence by the parliament. There
may be a head of state who may or may not be elected and who usually merely exercises ceremonial functions.

66 The essence of a unitary form of government is the fact that a single organization has been created by the sovereign people (the people) through their
constitution, to which is left the task of providing for the territorial distribution of governmental powers with which it is invested. (Aruego and Laguio)

67 Aruego and Laguio

Avancena | 27

disbanded, so that either department now comprises different and nonintermingling official personalities with the end in view of ensuring a better
delivery of public service and provide a system of check and balance between the
two. The avowed intent of Rep. Act. No. 7160, therefore, is to vest on the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan independence in the exercise of its legislative
functions vis-a-vis the discharge by the Governor of the executive functions.
(Atienza vs. Villarosa, May 10, 2005).
Non-Delegation of legislative power ( Abakada Guro
Party List vs. Executive Secretary, September 1, 2005;
Epira case-Gerochi vs. DOE, GR. No. 159796, July 17,
2007).
Permissible delegation:
1. tariff powers of the President (Sec. 28 (2) Art. VI)
2. emergency power of the President (Sec. 23 (2) of
Art. VI
3. people (Sec. 32 of Art. VI; Sec. 10 of Art. X, Sec. 2
of Art. XVII; RA 6735)
4. local governments (Art X)
5. administrative bodies (power of subordinate legislation)
Tests of valid delegation:
1. completeness test * Gerochi vs. DOE, July 17, 2007
2. sufficient standard *Santiago vs. COMELEC,
3/19/97; Abakada Guro
Party List vs. Exec. Sec.
-

Incorporation Clause -By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by

generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be
automatically part of our own laws.[Tanada vs. Angara, May 2, 1997]

Incorporated: 1. Treaties duly ratified (Pimentel vs. Ermita,

462 SCRA 622, July 6, 2005)
2. norms of general or customary laws
3. treaties which have become part of customary
Law (Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons; Kuroda
vs. Jalandoni

Mijares, et al. vs. Javier, et al., April 12, 2005- There is no obligatory rule
derived from treaties or conventions that requires the Philippines to recognize
foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for the enforcement thereof. However,
generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation
clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not
derive from treaty obligations. The classical formulation in international law sees
those customary rules accepted as binding result from the combination
two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on
the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion
juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter
element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the
existence of a rule of law requiring it.

Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines, vs.

Duque, et al., GR No. 1703034, October 9, 2007- Customary international law
is deemed incorporated into our domestic system. A mere constitutional
declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.

Lim vs. Exec. Sec., April 11, 2002 generally accepted principles of
International Law, the provisions of a treaty are always subject to qualification or
Avancena | 28

amendment by a subsequent law, or that it is subject to the police power of the

State.
-

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local

courts) are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict
between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute
of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give
effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with
proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in
observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision
(Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). In a situation, however, where the
conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of
international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that
municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts (Ichong vs.
Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963];
In re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are organs of
municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances (Salonga & Yap,
op. cit., p. 13). The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the
land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or
municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in
most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal
standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments.
Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect a treaty may
repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the
constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the
Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in
conflict with the constitution [Sec. of Justice vs. Lantion]

- Civilian Supremacy (IBP vs. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81(2000)The calling of the marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian
enforcement. Notwithstanding the conduct of joint visibility patrols by the members
of PNP and the Philippine marines, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall
leader and it is the local police forces who are in charge at all times.
-

Gudani vs. Senga, August 15, 2006- The vitality of the tenet that the President
is the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces is most crucial to the democratic
way of life, to civilian supremacy over the military, and to the general stability of
our representative system of government. The Constitution reposes final authority,
control and supervision of the AFP to the President, a civilian who is not a member
of the armed forces, and whose duties as commander-in-chief represent only a part
of the organic duties imposed upon the office, the other functions being clearly civil
in nature. Civilian supremacy over the military also countermands the notion that
the military may bypass civilian authorities, such as civil courts, on matters such as
conducting warrantless searches and seizure. The ability of the President to
prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on
executive privilege, but on the Chief Executives power as commander-inchief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces.
The Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by
the same limitations as in executive privilege. The President could, as a
general rule, require military officers to seek presidential approval before appearing
before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly
diminishes the prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief.

Gonzales, et al vs. Gen. Abaya, G.R. No. 164007, August 10, 2006- Courtsmartial are instrumentalities of the Executive to enable the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, to effectively command, control, and discipline the
armed forces (see Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, 75 Phil. 875 [1946], citing Winthrops
Military Law and Precedents, 2nd edition, p. 49). In short, courts-martial form
part of the disciplinary system that ensures the Presidents control, and
thus civilian supremacy, over the military. At the apex of this disciplinary
Avancena | 29

system is the President who exercises review powers over decisions of courtsmartial (citing Article 50 of the Articles of War; quoted provisions omitted
-

Maintenance of Peace & Order and the protection of the people against violence
are constitutionsl duties of the State and to bear arms is to be construed in
connection and in harmony with these constitutional duties (Chavez s.
Romulo, G. R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004).

Separation of the Church and State- Estrada vs. Escritor, June 22, 2006- It
is indubitable that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory
or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine
Constitution. Benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality
based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interest.

Islamic DaWah Council of the Philippines vs. Office of the Executive

Secretary, July 9, 2003. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave
danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the
infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the
seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally
unacceptable. In a society with a democratic framework like ours, the State must
minimize its interference with the affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to
exercise reasonable freedom of personal and religious activity.

Balanced & Healthful Ecology- The right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
a fundamental legal right that carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment. This right implies, among other things, the judicious
management and conservation of the countrys resources, which duty is reposed in
the DENR. ( Prov. of Rizal vs. Exec. Sec., December 13, 2005)

Local Autonomy ( Basco vs. Pagcor)- the power of local government to impose
taxes and fees is always subject to limitations which Congress may provide by law.
The principle of local autonomy under the 1987 constitution simply means
decentralization. It does not make local governments sovereign within the
state of an imperium in imperio (unlike in a Federal System). The matter of
regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling is a State concern and
hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State to retain it or delegate it to local
governments.

Province of North Cotabato vs. GRP Peace Panel, (GR No. 183591, Oct. 14,
2008)- The Constitution does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other
than the Philippine State much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims
to prepare any part of the Philippine territory for independence.

Equal access to opportunity for public service Pamatong vs. COMELEC,

April 13, 2004the provision does not bestow a right to seek the presidency; it
does not contain a judicial enforceable constitutional right and merely specifies a
guideline for legislative action. It is not intended to compel the State to enact
positive measures that would accomodate as many as possible into public office.

A. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT68
1. Who May Exercise Legislative Power69
Vested in Congress, except to the extent reserved to the people by provision on initiative
and referendum.

68 Art. VI
69 power to propose, enact, amend and repeal laws.
Avancena | 30

a.

Initiative and Referendum

Initiative70 power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose

and enact legislation through an election called for the purpose.
Referendum71 power of the electorate to approve or reject legislation through an election
called for that purpose.
1.

Houses of Congress
a.

Senate

Composed of 24 senators, elected at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines.

b.

House of Representatives

Composed of not more than 250 members consisting of:

i. District Representatives elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area;
ii. Party-list Representatives shall constitute 20% of the total number of
representatives, elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations.72
1.

District Representatives and Questions of Apportionment

Representative districts are apportioned among provinces, cities and municipalities in

accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio.73
Each province, irrespective of population, is entitled to one representation; each city with a
population of at least 250,000 is entitled to at least one representative.
Each district must be contiguous, compact and adjacent. Gerrymandering 74 is not allowed.
Reapportionment within 3 years following return of every census.

2.

Party-List System

The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of

representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the COMELEC. 75

70 Classes of initiative:
1. Initiative on the Constitution petition proposing amendments to the Constitution;
2. Initiative on Statutes petition proposing to enact a national legislation;
3. Initiative on Local Legislation petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipality or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.

71 Classes of Referendum:
1. Referendum on Statutes petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed by Congress;
2. Referendum on Local Laws legal process whereby the registered voters of the local government units may approve, amend or reject any ordinance
enacted by the sanggunian. (Sec. 126, RA 7160 or the LGC of 1991)

72 The Party-list organization must represent the marginalized and underprivileged and the nominees themselves must comply with this qualitative
requirement (Ang Bagong Bayani, et al. vs. Comelec G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001)

73 The underlying principle behind this rule for apportionment is the concept of equality of representation which is a basic principle of republicanism.

One

mans vote should carry as much weight as the vote of every other man.

74 formation of one legislative district out of separate territories for the purpose of favoring a candidate or a party (Bernas,

Reviewer in Philippine

Constitution, P. 186)

75 The Court held that the intent of the Constitutional Commission and the implementing statute, RA 7941, was not to allow all associations to participate
indiscriminately in the party-list system but to limit participation to parties or organizations representing the marginalized and underprivileged.
Avancena | 31

3. Legislative Privileges, Inhibitions and Disqualifications

A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not
more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest 76 while the Congress is in session. No
Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the
Congress77 or in any committee thereof.
All Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall, upon assumption of
office, make a full disclosure of their financial and business interests. They shall notify the House
concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation
of which they are authors.78
No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without
forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the
emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected. 79
No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel
before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other
administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any
contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term
of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any officer of the Government for his
pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office. 80
4. Quorum and Voting Majorities
A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number
may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner,
and under such penalties, as such House may provide. 81

76 Congress must be in session, whether regular or special.

It does not matter where the member of Congress may be found (attending the session,
socializing in a private party, or sleeping at home); so long as Congress is in session, freedom from arrest holds;
The crime for which the member is to be arrested is punishable by 6 years of imprisonment or less.
"Punishable" refers to the maximum possible
penalty which a penal statute attaches to the offense. It follows too that if the crime is punishable by 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor or more, the
member can be arrested, even if he is session in the halls of Congress.
Speech or debate includes utterances made in the performance of official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, votes cast, as well as
bills introduced and other acts done in the performance of official duties. (Jimenez vs. Cabangbang, 17 SCRA 876) To come under the privilege, it is not
essential that the Congress be in session when the utterance is made. What is essential is that the utterance must constitute legislative action, that is, it
must be part of the deliberative and communicative process by which legislators participate in committee or congressional proceedings in the consideration
of proposed legislation or of other matters which the Constitution has placed within the jurisdiction of the Congress.

77This privilege protects the member concerned from any libel suit that may be filed against him for a speech made "in" the halls of Congress or in any of
its committees. Speech is not confined to traditional speech but even to the casting of votes, the making of reports, a debate or discussion, even
communicative actions, and any other form of expression.
The speech, however, must be made "in" Congress in the discharge of legislative duty. Thus,

78 Sec. 12
79 Sec. 13
An incompatible office is a post which a member cannot accept unless he waives or forfeits his seat in Congress. A sensu contrario, if he waives or
forfeits his seat, he may accept the other post, since the incompatibility arises only because of his simultaneous membership in both.
A forbidden office is one to which a member cannot be appointed even if he is willing to give up his seat in Congress. The effect of his resignation from
the Congress is the loss of his seat therein but his disqualification for the forbidden office nevertheless remains. The prohibition lies in the "fiduciary"
nature of the relationship involved.
Such a member cannot resign in anticipation of the passage of the law creating such office or increasing its emolument as a way of circumventing the
prohibition. However, the prohibition is not forever (as in the Jones Law); it is for the term for which he was elected.

80 Sec. 14
What the Constitution prohibits in the case of members of Congress who are also members of the bar is their personal appearance before any of these
bodies. This is not a prohibition against, the practice of law in any court. Thus, a member may still sign and file his pleadings, give legal advice, continue as
partner, and have a partner or associate appear for him in court.

81 Sec. 16 (2)
The quorum required to conduct business is a majority (1/2 + 1) of all the members.
But to pass a law, only the votes of the majority of those present in the session, there being a quorum, are required. This is known as the "shifting
majority".
To illustrate: 13 members of the Senate are sufficient to constitute a quorum. If only 13 members are present, a vote by 7 in favor of a bill is sufficient to
pass it. But as the number of those present increases, the number of votes needed to pass a bill would correspondingly increase, i.e., shift.
Avancena | 32

5. Discipline of Members82
Each house may punish its members for disorderly behavior 83, and, with the concurrence of
2/3 of all its members, suspend 84 or expel a member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall
not exceed sixty days.
6. Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments
a. Nature
Electoral Tribunals85
The Electoral Tribunal is independent of the Houses of Congress, and its decision may be
reviewed by the SC only upon showing of grave abuse of discretion in a petition for certiorari filed
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.86
Commission on Appointments87
It acts as a legislative check on the appointing authority of the President. For the effectivity
of the appointment of certain key officials enumerated in the Constitution, the consent of the
Commission on Appointments is needed.
b. Powers
Electoral Tribunals:
i.
ii.

Sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of their respective
members.88
Rule-making power89
Commission on Appointments90

i.

Shall act on all appointments submitted to it within 30 session days of Congress from their
submission; and

When a quorum cannot be had, a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and compel the attendance of the absent (recalcitrant) members by the
means of arrest or such other measures and penalties as the House may provide in its rules.
The basis in determining the existence of a quorum in the Senate shall be the total number of Senators who are in the country and within the coercive
jurisdiction of the Senate. (Avelino v. Cuenco, 83 Phil. 17)

82 Sec. 16 (3)
83 The determination of the acts which constitute disorderly behavior is within the full discretionary authority of the House concerned, and the Court will
not review such determination, the same being a political question. (Osmena vs. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863)

84 for not more than 60 days

85 Composition:
1) 3 Supreme Court Justices designated by Chief Justice; and
2) 6 members of the Chamber concerned (Senate or HR) chosen on the basis of proportional representation from political parties and parties registered
under the party-list system
Senior Justice shall act as Chairman.

86 Pena vs. HRET, G.R. No. 123037, March 21, 1997

87 Composition:
1) 12 Senators and 12 Representatives, elected by each house on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties and
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein.
2) Senate President as ex-officio chairman.
3) Chairman shall not vote except in case of tie.

88 Art. VI, Sec. 17

89 Lazatin v. HRET, 168 SCRA 391
90 Commission on Appointments meets only while Congress is in session.
Meetings are held either at the call of the Chairman or a majority of all its members.
Since the Commission on Appointments is also an independent constitutional body, its rules of procedure are also outside the scope of congressional
powers as well as that of the judiciary.
Avancena | 33

ii.

Power to promulgate its own rules of proceedings.

7. Powers of Congress
a. Legislative
(1) Legislative Inquiries and the Oversight Functions

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. 91
The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of the
President92, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear
before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written
questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be
limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State
or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be
conducted in executive session.93
(2) Bicameral Conference Committee
Bills or "suggested laws" are put forward by either Congress or Senate but it has to be
approved by both bodies before it can proceed to become law. There are some cases where the
version of the bill approved by Congress is different from the one in the Senate or vice-versa. The
bill cannot be passed if it has multiple forms because then multiple laws will be created, and each
version needs to be approved by both Congress and Senate. To resolve this issue, a bicameral
conference committee is created which takes representatives from both Congress and Senate and
they unify the two differing bills into one coherent law.
(3) Limitations on Legislative Power
(a) Limitations on Revenue, Appropriations and Tariff Measures
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of
local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but
the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. 94

91 Sec. 21
Each house or any of its committees may conduct "inquiries in aid of legislation" according to its duly published rules of procedures.
To enforce this right, the SC upheld the power of Congress to hold in contempt a person required to appear before Congress or its committee and answer
questions relevant to a matter of legislative interest.
It is an indispensable requirement for an effective discharge of legislative authority designed to gather data or information vital in the formulation of laws
without which legislative power becomes an empty term. However, the exercise of such duty is not illimitable. It has to be exercised in accordance with the
limitations imposed by the Constitution: (a) in aid of legislation; (b) in accordance with duly published rules of procedure; (c) rights of persons appearing
in, or affected by such, inquiry shall be respected
But, if the investigation is no longer in aid of legislation but in aid of prosecution which the stated purpose of the investigation is to determine the
existence of violations of the law, then it is beyond the scope of congressional powers.

92 In deference to separation of powers, and because department heads are alter egos of the President, they may not appear without the permission of the
President.

93 Sec. 22
Oversight functions
Such functions are intended to enable Congress to determine how laws it has passed are being implemented.

94 Sec. 24
Shall originate exclusively from the House the initiative for filing of RAT Bills must come from the House, but it does not prohibit the filing in the
Senate a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as the action by the Senate is withheld pending the receipt of the
House bill. (Tolentino v. Sec. Of Finance, 235 SCRA 630).
Appropriation Bill - one the principal and specific aim of which is to appropriate a certain sum of money from the public treasury.
Revenue Bill - one that is specifically designed to raise money or revenue through imposition or levy.
Private Bill - one that is addressed to a specific private interest.
Bill of Local Application - one that is addressed to a particular place or locality or where the interest of a designated community is the thrust of the bill.
Avancena | 34

(b) Presidential Veto95 and Congressional Override

(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the
President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same
with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its
Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of
such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other
House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members
of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined
by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal.
The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty
days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does
not object.96
c. Non-Legislative
1.

Informing Function

*** Judge Singco Notes

-

Pimentel III vs. COMELEC, G. R. No. 178413, March 13, 2008- in elections
for President, V-President, Senators and Members of the House of Representatives,
the general rule still is that pre-proclamation cases on matters relating to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or
certificates of canvass are prohibited. As with other general rules, there are
recognized exceptions to he prohibition namely: (1) correction of manifest errors;
(2) questions affecting the composition of proceeding of the board of canvassers;
and (3) determination of the authenticity and the due execution of certificates of
canvass as provided in Section 30 of RA 7166, as amended by RA No. 9369.

Non delegation of legislative power

Gerochi vs. DOE, GR. No. 159796, July 17, 2007 - Under the first test, the law
must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such
that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it.
The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation
from running riot. The Court finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in its
entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all its essential terms and
conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards. xxx In the past, accepted as
sufficient standards the following: "interest of law and order;" "adequate and
efficient instruction;" "public interest;" "justice and equity;" "public convenience
and welfare;" "simplicity, economy and efficiency;" "standardization and regulation

95 The exercise of the veto power of the President is purely discretionary.

He may veto a bill on any ground, whether on constitutional grounds or even on

the wisdom and practicability of the bill which cannot be interfered with on the theory that the exercise of such power is a political act.
As a general rule, when the President vetoes a bill, he must veto the bill in its entirety. However, the President is allowed to veto any item or items in an
appropriation, tariff or revenue bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.

96 Sec. 27
When the President vetoes a measure, he should return the measure to the House of origin, indicating his objections thereto in what is commonly known
as a "veto message" so that the same can be studied by the members for possible overriding of his veto
Upon consideration of the objections raised by the President in his veto message, the House from which the bill originated shall reconsider the bill. If
after such reconsideration, 2/3 of all the members of such house shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent together with the objections of the President, to
the other house by which it shall likewise be reconsidered. If approved by 2/3 of all the members of that house, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the
votes of each house shall be determined by "yeas" or "nays", and the names of the members voting for or against shall be entered in the Journal. [VI, 27(1)]
Pocket Veto
One by which the President secures the disapproval of a bill by mere inaction after the adjournment of Congress. Pocket veto is not allowed because
under the Constitution, where the President fails to communicate his veto on any bill to the House where it originated within 30 days after receipt thereof, the
bill becomes a law as if he had signed it. The inability of the President to return the bill within the reglementary period prescribed by the Constitution
converts the bill, by inaction, into law.
Avancena | 35

of medical education;" and "fair and equitable employment practices." Provisions

of the EPIRA such as, among others, to ensure the total electrification of the
country and the quality, reliability, security and affordability of the supply of
electric power and watershed rehabilitation and management meet the
requirements for valid delegation, as they provide the limitations on the ERCs
power to formulate the IRR. These are sufficient standards.
Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice- Being a mere constituent unit of the
Department of Justice, the Bureau of Corrections could not promulgate a manual
that would not bear the imprimatur of the administrative superior, the Secretary of
Justice as the rule making authority under RA No. 8177.
-

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V. POEA, 166 SCRA 533Power of Subordinate Legislation with this power, administrative bodies may
implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by filling the details which
Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected
by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the
implementing rules issued by DOLE on the new Labor Code. These regulations
have the force and effect of law.

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, September 1,

2005- No undue delegation of legislative power. It is simply a delegation of
ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the
increase rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the operation
of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or
condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon
factual matters outside of the control of the executive.

Congress did not delegate the power to tax to the President.- The intent
and will to increase the VAT rate to 12% came from Congress and the task of the
President is simply to execute the legislative policy.

Abakada Guro vs. Purisima, 562 SCRA 251- The requirement that the
implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by Congress as a condition
for their effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism
and the rule of presentment. A valid exercise of legislative power requires the act
of both chambers. It can be exercised neither solely by one of the two chambers
nor by a committee of either or both chambers.

The Presidents Ordinance Power is the Executives rule-making authority in

implementing and executing constitutional or statutory powers. Indisputably, there
are constitutional powers vested in the Executive that are self-executory.

Secretary of Finance, et al. vs. La Suerte Cigar, GR No. 166498, June 11,
2009- Unless expressly granted to the BIR, the power to reclassify cigarette brands
remains a prerogative of the Legislature which cannot be usurped by the former.

Review Center Assos. of the Philippines vs. Ermita, GR No. 180046, April
2, 2009- The President has no inherent or delegated legislative power to amend
the functions of the CHED under RA 7722.

SEMA VS. COMELEC, G. R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008- Congress cannot
validly delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create legislative
districts. The power to increase the allowable membership in the House of
Representatives and to reapportion legislative districts is vested
exclusively in Congress.

Avancena | 36

PARTY-LIST SYSTEM- BA-RA 7941 vs. COMELEC, GR No. 1777271, May 4, 2007No national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of the
nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave
abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the
nominees of the party-list groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus,
therefore, lies. xxx The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: [T]he names of
the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list is certainly not a
justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. To us, the prohibition
imposed on the Comelec under said Section 7 is limited in scope and duration, meaning,
that it extends only to the certified list which the same provision requires to be posted
in the polling places on election day. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the
absolute is to read into the law something that is not intended. As it were, there is
absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even
publishing through mediums other than the Certified List the names of the party-list
nominees. The Comelec obviously misread the limited non-disclosure aspect of the
provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure before the May 2007 elections. The
interpretation thus given by the Comelec virtually tacks an unconstitutional dimension
on the last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7941. xxx Comelec has a constitutional
duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups.
Veterans Federation Party vs. COMELEC, 342 SCRA 244, October 6, 2000;
Partido Ng Manggagawa vs. COMELEC, March 15, 2006 Section VI 5(2) of Article
of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats
in the House of Representatives. The Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution and RA
7941 mandate at least 4 inviolable parameters: (1) the 20% allocation: the combined
number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed 20% of the total membership of
the House of Representatives; (2) the 2% threshold: only those parties garnering a
minimum of 2% of the total votes cast for the party list system are qualified to a have a
seat in the House; (3) the three seat limit: each qualified party, regardless of the number
of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats, i.e., one qualifying
and two additional; and (4) proportional representation: the additional seats which a
qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total number of
votes.
BANAT vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009- 2% threshold in relation to
the distribution of additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A.
No. 7941
is declared unconstitutional. The two percent threshold presents an
unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest possible representation of
party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of
R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:
(1) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections. (2)The parties,
organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast
for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each. (3) Those
garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the
additional seats are allocated. (4) Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled
to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be
included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every
two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as additional seats
are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed
seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941
allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of
additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes
garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of
votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast
for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation.
First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which
Avancena | 37

is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List
System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of
the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a
partys share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat
to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely
distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat
allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each
qualified party-list candidate is entitled. Thus:
Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats

Votes
Garnered
over

Rank

Party

Votes
Garnered

Guarantee
d Seat

Additiona
l
Seats

(B)
plus
(C), in
whole
integer
s

Applyin
g the
three
seat cap

Total
Votes for
Party
List, in %

(First
Round)

(Second
Round)

(A)
(E)

(B)
(C)

(D)

BUHAY

1,169,234

7.33%

2.79

N.A.

BAYAN
MUNA

979,039

6.14%

2.33

N.A.

CIBAC

755,686

4.74%

1.80

N.A.

GABRIELA

621,171

3.89%

1.48

N.A.

APEC

619,657

3.88%

1.48

N.A.

A Teacher

490,379

3.07%

1.17

N.A.

AKBAYAN

466,112

2.92%

1.11

N.A.

ALAGAD

423,149

2.65%

1.01

N.A.

9[31]

COOPNATCCO

409,883

2.57%

N.A.

10

BUTIL

409,160

2.57%

N.A.

11

BATAS

385,810

2.42%

N.A.

12

ARC

374,288

2.35%

N.A.

13

ANAKPAWIS

370,261

2.32%

N.A.

14

ABONO

339,990

2.13%

N.A.

15

AMIN

338,185

2.12%

N.A.

16

AGAP

328,724

2.06%

N.A.

17

AN WARAY

321,503

2.02%

N.A.

18

YACAP

310,889

1.95%

N.A.

19

FPJPM

300,923

1.89%

N.A.

20

UNI-MAD

245,382

1.54%

N.A.
Avancena | 38

21

ABS

235,086

1.47%

N.A.

22

KAKUSA

228,999

1.44%

N.A.

23

KABATAAN

228,637

1.43%

N.A.

24

ABA-AKO

218,818

1.37%

N.A.

25

ALIF

217,822

1.37%

N.A.

26

SENIOR
CITIZENS

213,058

1.34%

N.A.

27

AT

197,872

1.24%

N.A.

28

VFP

196,266

1.23%

N.A.

29

ANAD

188,521

1.18%

N.A.

30

BANAT

177,028

1.11%

N.A.

31

ANG
KASANGGA

170,531

1.07%

N.A.

32

BANTAY

169,801

1.06%

N.A.

33

ABAKADA

166,747

1.05%

N.A.

34

1-UTAK

164,980

1.03%

N.A.

35

TUCP

162,647

1.02%

N.A.

36

COCOFED

155,920

0.98%

N.A.

Total

17

55

Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55
party-list representatives from the 36 winning party-list organizations. All 55 available
party-list seats are filled. The additional seats allocated to the parties with sufficient
number of votes for one whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of three seats for each
party, are shown in column (D).

Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections: The Constitutional

Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political parties to
participate in the party-list elections.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from
participating in the party-list system.
On the contrary, the framers of the
Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in partylist elections through their sectoral wings.
In fact, the
members of the
Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the
alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. In defining a
party that participates in party-list elections as either a political party or a sectoral
party, R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in
the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is
manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and
R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially
legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent
violation of the Constitution and the law.

Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
state that major political parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions
with, sectoral organizations for electoral or political purposes. There should not
be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-list election
through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other
major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector
Avancena | 39

or sectors.
To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a
fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list election, and this fisherfolk
wing can field its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI)
can do the same for the urban poor.
-

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the
entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution.
The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the
number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress: The House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, x x x.
The 20% allocation of party-list
representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more
than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. However, we cannot
allow the continued existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent
the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled. The threeseat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization
may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating
the party-list elections. Seats for party-list representatives shall thus be allocated in
accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 above.

However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans
disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or
indirectly.

Aquino vs. COMELEC, GR No. 189793, April 7, 2010- There is no specific provision
in the Constitution that fixes 250,000 minimum population that must compose
legislative district. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative with
nothing mentioned about a population, a city must first meet a population minimum of
250,000 in order to be similarly situated.

Aldaba, et al. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 188078, January 25, 2010- In this case, there
is no official record that the population of the City of Malolos will be at least 250,000,
actual or projected prior to the May 2010 elections. Thus, the City of Malolos is not
qualified to have a legislation district of its own under Section 5(3), Art. VI of the
Constitution.

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, GR No. 190582, April 8, 2010 - that Ang
Ladlad, an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs), has satisfied the
exacting standards that the marginalized and underrepresented sector must
demonstrate (1) past subordination or discrimination suffered by the group; (2) an
immutable or distinguishing characteristic, attribute, or experience that define them as a
discrete group; and (3) present political and/or economic powerlessness.

The Court said that Ang Ladlad has shown that the LGBT sector has been historically
disadvantaged and discriminated against because of negative public perception, and has
even alleged acts of violence perpetrated against members of the LGBT community by
reason of their sexual orientation and gender identity. It added that the magnitude of
opposition against petitioners participation in the party list system is, by itself,
demonstrative of the sectors lack of political power; so, too, is the fact that proposed
legislations seeking to prohibit discriminatory treatment against LGBTs have been
languishing in Congress.

LEGISLATIVE PERKS (PP vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689) The history of the
provision granting Senators and Congressmen immunity from arrest and
detention shows that the privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense.

Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, June 27, 2008- presumption of innocence does not
necessarily carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and political rights.
Avancena | 40

Parliamentary immunity guarantees the legislator complete freedom of

expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions
before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. However, it
does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever
his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming of a
member thereof (Osmea vs. Pendatun).

Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009- Richard Gordon did not
relinquish his Senatorial post despite his election to and acceptance of the post
Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors. PNRC is
a private organization merely performing public functions, and that the PNRC
Chairman is not a government official or employee. Not being a government
office, the PNRC Chairmanship may be held by any individual, including a Senator
or Member of the House of Congress. NRC is autonomous, neutral and
independent of the Philippine Government. It is a voluntary organization that
does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from
the Philippine Congress. The PNRC is not a part of any of the government
branches. PNRC Chairmanship is not a government office or an office in a GOCC for
purposes of the prohibition in the 1987 Constitution. Senator Gordon can validly
serve as the Chairman of the PNRC without giving up his senatorial position.
Avelino vs. Cruz- When the constitution declares that a majority of each House
shall constitute a quorum, it does not mean all the members. The base in
computing majority is normally the total membership of the body, within the
coercive power of the House.
Santiago vs. Guingona (298 SCRA 756)- The term majority simply means the
greater number or more than half. Who shall sit as officers is the sole
prerogative of the Senate. (Note: splitting of term between Senate President Drilon
and another Senator). When the Constitution provides that the Senate President
shall be elected by the majority it does not delineate who comprises the
majority or the minority. The defeated senator (s) in the election for the Senate
presidency are not necessarily the minority.

RULES OF PROCEEDINGS- Arroyo vs. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268- Courts

cannot inquire into the allegations that in enacting a law, a House of Congress
failed to comply with its own rules in the absence of showing that there was
violation of a constitutional provision or private rights. Parliamentary rules are
mere procedures which may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
proposing of the law on the VAT, he asked DE VENECIA to make a roll call, but he
refused and proceeded without having a quorum, Arroyo questioned the validity of
the law. not the SC by way of mandamus can compel on the rules of congress.

DISCIPLINING MEMBERS- Osmea vs Pendatun, The House of Representatives is

the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior. The courts will not assume
jurisdiction in any case which will amount to an interference by the judicial
department with the legislature.

People vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689- His election as congressman did not thereby
amount to a condonation of his offense; neither does it entitle him, pending appeal
of his case, to be free from confinement and to be allowed to attend sessions of
congress, for the people elected him with full awareness of the limitations on his
freedom of action and movement.

It was never the intention of the framers of the constitution to shield a member of
congress from the consequences of his wrongdoings. A member of Congress could
only invoke the immunity from arrests for relatively minor offenses, punishable at
most by correctional penalties.
Avancena | 41

Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan- suspension imposed by Congress to a colleague is

distinct from suspension spoken in Section 13 of RA 3019 which is not a penalty but
a preliminary preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not
being imposed for misbehavior as a member of Congress.
-

ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS- Vera vs. Avelino- The members of the Senate validly
suspended the oath-taking of the 3 senators elect. This does not fall within the
powers of the electoral tribunal. The latter has jurisdiction only over electoral
contests in which contestant seeks not only to oust the intruder, but also
have himself inducted into office.

LIMKAICHONG vs. COMELEC; Biraogo vs. Nograles; Paras vs. Nograles &
Villando vs. COMELEC, April 1, 2009- once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as member of the House of
Representatives, COMELECs jurisdiction over the election contests relating to his
election, returns and qualifications, ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.
The proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its
jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the
proclamation.

Accordingly, after the proclamation of the winning candidates in the congressional

elections, the remedy of those who may assail ones eligibility or ineligibility,
qualification or disqualification is to file before the HRET a petition for an
election protest, or a petition for quo warranto, within the period provided
by the HRET Rules.

Codilla vs. De Venecia, GR No. 150605, December 10, 2002Since

petitioner (Codilla) seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of
the Second Division suspending the proclamation and disqualifying him, the
COMELEC en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the
said Order of the 2nd Division. The said Order was yet unenforceable as it has not
attained finality, the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration suspends the
execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in office of the
respondent (Locsin) as the duly elected representative of the 4 th District of Leyte.

At the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the Resolution
of the COMELEC 2nd Division was seasonably challenged by the petitioner (Codilla)
in his motion for reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume
jurisdiction over the matter.

Barbers vs. COMELEC, June 22, 2005- The phrase election, returns and
qualifications should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters
affecting the validity of the contestees title. But if it is necessary to specify, we
can say that election referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of
voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the
votes; returns to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the
winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of
canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns; and qualifications to
matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed
winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of
candidacy.

Chavez vs. COMELEC- While the COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction over preproclamation controversies involving local elective officials (Sec. 242, Omnibus
Election Code), nevertheless, pre-proclamation cases are not allowed in
elections for President, V-President, Senator and Members of the House of
Representatives.

Avancena | 42

What is allowed is the correction of manifest errors in the certificate of

canvass or election returns. To be manifest, the errors must appear on the
face of the certificates of canvass or election returns sought to be corrected and/or
objections thereto must have been made before the board of canvassers and
specifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings.
Where the petition calls for the correction of manifest errors in the
certificates of canvass, COMELEC has jurisdiction. If it calls for the reopening and appreciation of ballots, the Electoral Tribunal has
jurisdiction.
-

This Supreme Courts jurisdiction to review decisions and resolutions of HRET

operates only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Tribunal tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such grave abuse of
discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack
of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or
personal hostility (Angara vs. Electoral Commission; Pena vs. HRET).

Bondoc vs. Pineda- Members of the HRET as sole judge of congressional election
contests are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy
security of tenure under our Constitution.

Robles vs. HRET- Jurisdiction of HRET once acquired is not lost upon the
instance of the parties bu| continues until the case is terminated.

Abubakar vs. HRET, March 7, 2007- The Supreme Courts jurisdiction to review
decisions and resolutions of HRET operates only upon a showing of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Tribunal tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Such grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of
power because of passion or personal hostility. The grave abuse of discretion must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law. It is absent in this case.

Abayon vs. HRET; Palparan vs. HRET, GR 189466 & 189506, respectively,
February 11, 2010- Since party-list nominees are considered as elected
members of the House, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their
qualifications.

Pimentel III vs. COMELEC, Zubiri, March 13, 2008 - It is the SET which has
exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of Pimentel involving, as it does, a
contest relating to the election of Zubiri, now a member of the Senate.

DAZA V. SINGSON, 180 SCRA 496- The House of Representatives is authorized

to change its representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at
any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its
membership. The changes must be PERMANENT and do not include temporary
alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or
formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to
another.

The provision on Section 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in

character and does not leave any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to
disobey or disregard. A political party must have at least two senators to be
able to have a representative in the Commission on Appointments, so that any
number less than 2 will not entitle such party a membership in the CA. (Guingona
v. Gonzales, 214 SCRA 789).

Pimentel, Jr. vs. House of Representatives, 11/19/02- Even assuming that

party-list representatives comprise a sufficient number and have agreed to
Avancena | 43

designate common nominees to the HRET and the CA, their primary recourse
clearly rests with the House of Representatives and not with this Court. Under
Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution, party-list representatives must
first show to the House that they possess the required numerical strength to be
entitled to seats in the HRET and the CA. Only if the House fails to comply with the
directive of the Constitution on proportional representation of political parties in
the HRET and the CA can the party-list representatives seek recourse to this Court
under its power of judicial review. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior
recourse to the House is necessary before petitioners may bring the instant case to
the court. Consequently, petitioners direct recourse to this Court is premature. The
discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not
absolute, being subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional
representation.
what is only required is proportional representation, ow cannot disqualify someone
simply bec of the allegations of bias based on proportional representation, the only
requirement is represents the political party thru proportional representationl the
removal in the political party, then cannot be removed with the electoral tribunal,
to maintain its independence.

APPROPRIATION- Gonzales vs. Narvasa, 337 SCRA 733, - The Presidents

creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform through an
executive Order involves no exercise by Congress of its taxing power or spending
power.

The appropriation for the PCCR was authorized by the President, not by Congress.
In a strict sense, appropriation has been defined as nothing more than the
legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution that the money
may be paid out of the treasury, while appropriation made by law refers
to the act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a particular
use a certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues from the
State to its creditors.

IMPORTANT: LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY- Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon (203

SRCA 76)- An investigation that seeks the determination whether a law has been
violated is not in aid of legislation but in aid of prosecution, and therefore, violative
of separation of powers. To allow the Committee to investigate the matter would
create the possibility of conflicting judgments; and that the inquiry into the same
justiceable controversy would be an encroachment on the exclusive domain of
judicial jurisdiction that had set in much earlier (investigation was not in aid of
legislation).

Subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial

proceedings to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the
administration of justice (Romero II vs. Estrada, GR No. 174105, April 2,
2009).

Standard Chartered Bank vs. Senate Committee on Banks, GR No.

167173, December 27, 2007- the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative
complaint before a court or quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the
conduct of legislative inquiry, otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any
intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal
or an administrative complaint.
not to transparent witht he business interest of foreigners on the banks. this is in
contrast of the bengzon case. mere filing of crim case would not preclude congress
from summoning any person of legislative inquiry. ***bar

The exercise by Congress or by any of its Committee of the power to punish

contempt is based on the principle of self-preservation as the branch of
government vested with the legislative power, independently of the judicial
Avancena | 44

branch, it can assert its authority and punish contumacious acts against it. Except
only when the Congress and/or its Committee exercise the power of contempt, it
cannot penalize violators even if there is overwhelming evidence of criminal
culpability. It can only recommend measures to address or remedy whatever
irregularities may be unearthed during the investigation, although it may include in
its Report a recommendation for the criminal indictment of persons who may
appear liable.
-

EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE- is the implied constitutional power of the President to

withhold information requested by other branches of the government. The
Constitution does not expressly grant this power to the President but courts have
long recognized implied Presidential powers if necessary and proper in
carrying out powers and functions expressly granted to the Executive
under the Constitution. xxx In this jurisdiction, several decisions have
recognized executive privilege starting with the 1995 case of Almonte v.
Vasquez, and the most recent being the 2002 case of Chavez v. Public
Estates Authority and the 2006 case of Senate v. Ermita.
As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and as Chief Executive, the
President is ultimately responsible for military and national security matters
affecting the nation. In the discharge of this responsibility, the President may find it
necessary to withhold sensitive military and national security secrets from
the Legislature or the public.
As the official in control of the nations foreign service by virtue of the
Presidents control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the President
is the chief implementer of the foreign policy relations of the State. The Presidents
role as chief implementer of the States foreign policy is reinforced by the
Presidents constitutional power to negotiate and enter into treaties and
international agreements. In the discharge of this responsibility, the President may
find it necessary to refuse disclosure of sensitive diplomatic secrets to the
Legislature or the public. Traditionally, states have conducted diplomacy with
considerable secrecy. There is every expectation that a state will not imprudently
reveal secrets that its allies have shared with it.
There is also the need to protect the confidentiality of the internal
deliberations of the President with his Cabinet and advisers. To encourage
candid discussions and thorough exchange of views, the Presidents
communications with his Cabinet and advisers need to be shielded from the
glare of publicity. Otherwise, the Cabinet and other presidential advisers may be
reluctant to discuss freely with the President policy issues and executive matters
knowing that their discussions will be publicly disclosed, thus depriving the
President of candid advice.
Executive privilege, however, is not absolute. The interest of
protecting military, national security and diplomatic secrets, as well as
Presidential
communications,
must
be
weighed
against
other
constitutionally recognized interests. There is the declared state policy
of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest, the
right of the people to information on matters of public concern, the
accountability of public officers, the power of legislative inquiry, and the
judicial power to secure testimonial and documentary evidence in
deciding cases.
The balancing of interests between executive privilege on one hand
and the other competing constitutionally recognized interests on the
other hand - is a function of the courts. The courts will have to decide the
issue based on the factual circumstances of each case. This is how conflicts on
executive privilege between the Executive and the Legislature, and between the
Executive and the Judiciary, have been decided by the courts.
Akbayan vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008 -Applying the principles
adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may
not be kept perpetually confidential since there should be ample opportunity for
discussion before [a treaty] is approved the offers exchanged by the parties
during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published.
Avancena | 45

It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese representatives submitted their

offers with the understanding that historic confidentiality would govern the
same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not
only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations. xxx
Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this
jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting no exception. It bears emphasis,
however, that such privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds,
recognizing a type of information as privileged does not mean that it will be
considered privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration of the context in
which the claim is made may it be determined if there is a public interest that calls
for the disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to overcome its
traditionally privileged status.

Operational Proximity Test (Neri vs. Senate Committee, G.R. No.

180643, March 25, 2008)- The communications elicited by the three (3)
questions [a)
Whether the President followed up the (NBN) project? b)
Were
you dictated to prioritize the ZTE? c)
Whether the President said to go ahead
and approve the project after being told about the alleged bribe?] are covered by
the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate
to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the power to
enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the
President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the
Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
Second, the communications are received by a close advisor of the President.
Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close
advisor, being a member of President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no
adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the
privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
subject to due process of law
the communication... are presidential comu privilege.

Conduct of legislative inquiries must be in accordance with publish rules.

In the matter of the petition for issuance of writ of habeas corpus of

Camilo Sabio- GR No. 174340, October 17, 2006- The Congress power of
inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of
existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends to
government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions
are within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish. PCGG
belongs to this class. xxx So long as the constitutional rights of witnesses, like
Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners, will be respected by respondent Senate
Committees, it is their duty to cooperate with them in their efforts to obtain the
facts needed for intelligent legislative action. The unremitting obligation of every
citizen is to respond to subpoenae, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its
Committees, and to testify fully with respect to matters within the realm of proper
investigation

Miguel vs. Gordon, GR No. 174340, October 17, 2006- a mere provision of
law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress in the absence of
constitutional basis.

Senate vs. Ermita (E.O. 464), April 20, 2006- Ultimately, the power of
Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the
lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot
frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands
for information.

Varieties of Executive Privilege

Avancena | 46

1. state secrets invoked by Presidents, if disclosed would subvert crucial military

or diplomatic objective.
2. informers privilege- not to disclose the identity of persons who furnish
information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that
law.
3. generic privilege for internal deliberations- attach to intragovernmental
documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations
comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are
formulated.
-

Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch

whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds
such information on the ground that it is executive privileged, it must so
assert it and state the reason therefore and why it must be respected.

When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for
department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of
privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are
department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this
power the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the
reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her
being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to
a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom.

The absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed

as limited in its appearance of department heads in the question hour
contemplated in Section 22 of Article VI, the objective of which is to
obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function.

The power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to

enhance its understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation
it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken
by Congress (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives; (b) to
determine whether agencies are properly administered; (c) to eliminate executive
waste and dishonesty; (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority;
and (e) to assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of public
interest.

The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers
may be divided into three categories, namely: scrutiny; investigation and
supervision.

ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE Abakada Guro Party List, et al. vs. Ermita, ed
al., October 18, 2005 the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the Housa and the
Senate Presi`ent and the certification od the Secretaraes of both houses of
Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment.

A bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in

the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole, a distinct bill
may be produced. The power of the Senate to propose amendments, it cal
propose its own version even with respect to bills which are required by the
Constitution to originate in the House.

BICAMERAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE- The Supreme Court recognizes the

long standing legislative practice of giving said conference ample latitude for
compromising differences between the Senate and the House. It can propose
amendment in the nature of a substitute, so long as the amendment is
germane to the subject of the bills before the committee. After all, its
Avancena | 47

report was not final but needed the approval of both houses of Congress to
become valid as an act of the legislative department.
-

Lung Center vs. Quezon City, G.R. No. 144104, June 29, 2004 Under the
1973 and 1987 Constitutions and RA 7160 in order to be entitled to the exemption,
the petitioner is burdened to prove, by clear and unequivocal proof, that (a) it is a
charitable institution; and (b) its real properties are actually, directly, and
exclusively used for charitable purposes. Exclusive is defined as possessed and
enjoyed to the exclusion of others; debarred from participation or enjoyment, and
exclusively is defined, in a manner to exclude; as enjoying a privilege exclusively.
The words dominant use or principal use cannot be substituted for the words
used exclusively without doing violence to the Constitution and the law. Solely is
synonymous with exclusively.

Suplico, et al. vs. Romulo Neri, et al, GR No. 178830, July 14, 2008- Any
government expenditure without the corresponding appropriation from Congress
is unconstitutional. There can be no dispute that the proceeds of foreign loans,
whether concluded or not, cannot be obligated in a procurement contract without a
prior appropriation from Congress. When the executive branch secures a loan to
fund a procurement of goods or services, the loan proceeds enter the National
Treasury as part of the general funds of the government. Congress must
appropriate by law the loan proceeds to fund the procurement of goods or
services, otherwise the loan proceeds cannot be spent by the executive branch.
When the loan falls due, Congress must make another appropriation law
authorizing the repayment of the loan out of the general funds in the National
Treasury. This appropriation for the repayment of the loan is what is covered by the
automatic appropriation

D. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT97
1. Privileges, Inhibitions and Disqualifications
a. Presidential Immunity
Immunity from suit during his tenure98
a.

Presidential Privilege99

Two kinds:
a. Presidential communications privilege refers to communications, documents or other
materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the President believes
should remain confidential.
b. Deliberative process privilege includes advisory opinions, recommendations and
deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are
formulated.

97 Art. VII
98 Deemed implied in the Constitution (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution, A Commentary 2003 Ed., p 803)
The immunity does not however extend to non-official acts or for wrong doing (Estrada vs. Desierto, G. R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001)
While the President is immune from suit, she may not be prevented from instituting suit. Such immunity must be exercised only by the President himself
and not by others on his behalf. (Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393)

99

It is highly recognized in cases where the subject of the inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the
area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief (Art. VII, Sec. 18); appointing
(Sec. 16, ibid); pardoning (Sec. 19, ibid); and diplomatic (Secs. 20 and 21, ibid) powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the
information relating to those powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.( Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigation, et al., G.R. No. 18063, March 25, 2008 citing U.S. Court of appeals In Re: Sealed Case No. 96-3124, June 17, 1997)
Avancena | 48

2. Powers
a. Executive and Administrative Powers in General
Executive Powers
The President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall
ensure that laws are faithfully executed.100
Until and unless a law is declared unconstitutional, President has a duty to execute it
regardless of his doubts as to its validity.101
Administrative Powers
(i) Create, abolish, group, coordinate, consolidate, merge or integrate departments, bureaus,
offices, agencies, instrumentalities and functions of the government; and transfer functions,
appropriations, equipment, property, records and personnel from one ministry, bureau, office,
agency or instrumentality to another;
(ii) Standardize salaries, materials and equipment;
and

(iii) Remove or otherwise discipline officers of the government as may be provided by law;

(iv) Commute or remove administrative penalties or disabilities upon officials or employees

in disciplinary cases.
b. Power of Appointment
1.

In General

The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may
be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers
lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress,
whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by
the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. 102
(2) Commission on Appointments Confirmation
i.
heads of executive departments;
ii. ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls;
iii. officers of the AFP from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and
iv. other ministers whose appointments are vested in him by the Constitution 103
(3) Midnight Appointments

100 Sec. 17
"Control" is the power to substitute one's own judgment in that of a subordinate.

101 faithful execution clause

Sec.1 and 17

102 Sec. 16
103 Sarmiento v. Mison, GR No. 79974, December 17, 1987
Avancena | 49

Those made by the President or Acting President two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.104
(4) Power of Removal
General rule: this power is implied from the power to appoint.
Exception: those appointed by him where the Constitution prescribes certain methods for
separation from public service.105
c. Power of Control106 and Supervision107
(1) Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency108
All executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the
heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and,
except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or
the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in
the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.109

1.

Executive Departments and Offices

The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He
shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.110
3.

Local Government Units

The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments.
Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with
respect to component barangays, shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the
scope of their prescribed powers and functions. 111
d. Military Powers112
a. To call out the Armed Force to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion;
and/or organize courts martial and create military commissions. 113

104 See Section 15, Art. VII

105 e.g. impeachment
106 The power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former for that of the latter.(Mondano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143). It is such power which has been given to the President over all executive
officers, from Cabinet members to the lowliest clerk. This is an element of the presidential system where the President is the Executive of the Government
of the Philippines, and no other.
But the power of control may be exercised by the President only over the acts, not over the actor. (Angangco v. Castillo, 9 SCRA 619)

107 It is the power of a superior officer to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed by inferiors.

The power of supervision does not include the power of

control; but the power of control necessarily includes the power of supervision. The power of the President over local governments is only of general
supervision.

108 Alter Ego Principle

109 Villena v. Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451
110 Sec. 17
111 Sec. 4
112 Sec. 18, Art. VIII
113 Commander-in Chief clause
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b. Suspension of the Privilege of Writ of Habeas Corpus and Declaration of Martial Law 114
e. Pardoning Power
(1) Nature and Limitations
Discretionary, may not be controlled by the legislature or reversed by the court, unless there
is a constitutional violation.
Limitations:
i. cannot be granted in cases of impeachment;
ii. cannot be granted in violations of election laws without favorable recommendations of the
COMELEC;
iii. can be granted only after convictions by final judgment (except amnesty);
iv. cannot be granted in cases of legislative contempt or civil contempt;
v. cannot absolve convict of civil liability; and
vi. cannot restore public offices forfeited.
(2) Forms of Executive Clemency
Pardon115 act of grace which exempts individual on whom it is bestowed from punishment
which the law inflicts for a crime he has committed.
Commutation reduction or mitigation of the penalty.
Reprieve postponement of sentence or stay of execution.
Parole release from imprisonment, but without full restoration of liberty, as parolee is in the
custody of the law although not in confinement.
Amnesty act of grace, concurred in by the Legislature, usually extended to groups of
persons who committed political offenses, which puts into oblivion the offense itself.
f. Diplomatic Power116
No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at
least 2/3 of all members of Senate.117

114 Grounds: invasion or rebellion, when public safety requires it.

Duration: not more than 60 days, following which it shall be lifted, unless extended by Congress.
Duty of the President to report to Congress: within 48 hours personally or in writing.
Authority of Congress to revoke or extend the effectivity of proclamation: by majority vote of all of its members voting jointly.
Authority of the Supreme Court: to inquire into the sufficiency of the factual basis for such action, at the instance of any citizen. Decision must be
promulgated 30 days within its filing.
Proclamation does not affect the right to bail.
Suspension applies only to persons facing charges of rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
Person arrested must be charged within 3 days; if not, must be released.
Proclamation does not supersede civilian authority

115 Pardon Classified:

1.Plenary or partial; and
2.Absolute or conditional.

116 Some of the foreign relations powers of the President

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

The power to negotiate treaties and international agreements

The power to appoint ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls
The power to receive ambassadors and other public ministers accredited to the
The power to contract and guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic
The power to deport aliens

Philippines

117 Sec. 21
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In public international law, the conduct of foreign relations or diplomatic power is vested in
the Head of State or sovereign. In States which observe the doctrine of separation of powers, the
President holds actual executive power including the conduct of foreign relations.
g. Residual Powers
Whatever is not judicial, whatever is not legislative, is residual power exercised by the
President.118
*** Judge Singco Notes
-

PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY- The immunity enjoyed by a sitting president evolved

through case law.
Soliven vs. Makasiar- The privilege pertains to the President by virtue of the
office. There is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving
the privilege. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely
the Presidents prerogative.
Estrada vs. Desierto- There is no basis in the contention that the immunity of
the President extends to the end of the term to which he was elected
notwithstanding his resignation. It is clear that the immunity of the President
from suit is concurrent only with his tenure (representing the period during
which the incumbent actually holds office) and not his term (the time during which
the officer may claim to hold office as a matter of right).
Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan, 435 SCRA 371- Executive immunity applied
only during the incumbency of a President.
David, et al. vs. Ermita, et al., April 20, 2006 It is not proper to implead
President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during
his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal
case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law.

SUPREME COURT AS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL- Lopez vs.

Roxas, 17 SCRA 755- When the law grants the Supreme Court the power to
resolve an election contest between or among presidential candidates, no new or
separate court is created. The law merely conferred upon the Supreme Court the
functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal.

The power of Congress to declare who, among the candidates for President and/or
Vice-President has obtained the largest number of votes, is entirely different in
nature from and not inconsistent with the jurisdiction vested in the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal by RA 1793. Congress merely acts as national board of
canvassers, charged with the ministerial and executive duty to make said
declaration, on the basis of the election returns duly certified by
provincial and city boards of canvassers. Upon the other hand, the
Presidential Electoral tribunal has the judicial power to determine
whether or not said duly certified election returns have been irregularly
made or tampered with or reflect the true results of the elections in the
areas covered by each and, if not, to recount the ballots cast, and
incidentally thereto, pass upon the validity of each ballot or determine
whether the same shall be counted, and, in the affirmative, in whose
favor, which Congress has no power to do.

118 Marcos v. Manglapus, 178 SCRA 760

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In assuming the Office of Senator protestant Santiago has effectively abandoned

or withdrawn her protest to the election protestee Ramos as President. (Santiago
v. Ramos, 253 SCRA 559).

Citing Defensor Santiago v. Ramos, the PET stressed that Legarda effectively
abandoned or withdrawn her protest when she ran in the Senate, which term
coincides with the term of the Vice-Presidency 2004-2010. (Min. Res., PET Case No.
003, Legarda v. De Castro, February 12, 2008)
-

The fundamental rule applicable in a presidential election protest is Rule 14

of the PET Rules. It provides,
Rule 14. Election Protest.Only the registered candidate for President
or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third
highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the
Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the
Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the
proclamation of the winner.

Pursuant to this rule, only two persons, the 2nd and 3rd placers, may contest the
election. By this express enumeration, the rule makers have in effect determined
the real parties in interest concerning an on-going election contest. It envisioned a
scenario where, if the declared winner had not been truly voted upon by the
electorate, the candidate who received that 2nd or the 3rd highest number of votes
would be the legitimate beneficiary in a successful election contest.
The Supreme Court ruled that it does not have any rule on substitution nor
intervention but it does allow for the analogous and suppletory application of the
Rules of Court, decisions of the Supreme Court, and the decisions of the electoral
tribunals. Rule 3, Section 16 is the rule on substitution in the Rules of Court. This
rule allows substitution by a legal representative. It can be gleaned from the
citation of this rule that movant/intervenor seeks to appear before the Presidential
Tribunal as the legal representative/substitute of the late protestant prescribed by
said Section 16. However, in the Supreme Courts application of this rule to an
election contest, it has every time ruled that a public office is personal to the
public officer and not a property transmissible to the heirs upon death. Thus, the
Supreme Court consistently rejected substitution by the widow or the heirs in
election contests where the protestant dies during the pendency of the protest.
This is not to say that death of the protestant necessarily abates the pending
action. In Vda. de De Mesa (1966) the Supreme Court held that while the right to a
public office is personal and exclusive to the public officer, an election protest is
not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that
the death of either would oust the court of all authority to continue the protest
proceedings. Hence, the Supreme Court has allowed substitution and intervention
but only by a real party in interest. A real party in interest is the party who
would be benefited or injured by the judgment, and the party who is
entitled to the avails of the suit. Herein movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ, herself
denies any claim to the august office of President. Thus, given the circumstances
of this case, we can conclude that protestants widow is not a real party in interest
to this election protest (Ronald Allan Poe vs. GMA, PET case No. 002, March 29,
2005).
Tecson vs. COMELEC, 424 SCRA 277- The actions contemplated in Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution are post election remedies, namely, regular election
contests and quo warranto. The word contest means that the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court only be invoked after the election and proclamation of the
President or Vice-President there can be no contest before a winner is
proclaimed.
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TERM OF OFFICE- Pormento vs. Estrada (GR No. 191988, August 31,
2010)- Estrada was not elected President the second time he ran. Since the issue
will be premised on the second election as President, there is no case or
controversy to be resolved in this case.

VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT- Estrada vs. Desierto, March

2, 2001- Also Read: TEMPORARY DISABILITY OF PRESIDENT- The question
whether the claimed temporary inability of Estrada is a political question beyond
the Supreme Courts power of review. The decision that President Arroyo is
the dejure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be
reviewed by the Supreme Court.
POLITICAL QUALIFIED AGENCY (ALTER-EGO DOCTRINE) Constantino vs.
Cuisia, G.R. No. 106064, October 13, 2005- Nevertheless, there are powers
vested in the President by the Constitution which may not be delegated to or
exercised by an agent or alter ego of the President. Justice Laurel, in his ponencia
in Villena, makes this clear: Withal, at first blush, the argument of ratification may
seem plausible under the circumstances, it should be observed that there are
certain acts which, by their very nature, cannot be validated by subsequent
approval or ratification by the President. There are certain constitutional powers
and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by
him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of
any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, in his power to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law (PAR. 3, SEC. 11, Art.
VII) and the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of mercy (par. 6, sec. 11,
idem]. These distinctions hold true to this day. There are certain presidential
powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would
involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the
supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches
of government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial
determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands
the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power. The list
is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the executive power in
question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import. We cannot conclude that the
power of the President to contract or guarantee foreign debts falls within the same
exceptional class. Indubitably, the decision to contract or guarantee foreign debts
is of vital public interest, but only akin to any contractual obligation undertaken by
the sovereign, which arises not from any extraordinary incident, but from the
established functions of governance.

APPOINTING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT- Sarmiento vs. Mison; Bautista vs.

Salonga; Bermudez vs. Torres; Calderon vs. Carale- Congress cannot expand
the constitution by increasing those officers who need prior confirmation
by the CA.

Election Ban (Midnight Appointments) GR No. 191002, De Castro v. JBC;

GR No. 191032, Soriano v. JBC; GR No. 191057, PHILCONSA v. JBC; AM No.
10-2-5-SC, In Re Applicability of Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution to
Appointments to the Judiciary; GR No. 191149, Peralta v. JBC; GR No.
191342, Tolentino, Jr. v. JBC; GR No. 191420, Philippine Bar Association,
Inc. v. JBC; March 17, 2010, April 20, 2010)- the prohibition under Article VII,
Section 15 of the Constitution against presidential appointments immediately
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the term of the outgoing
President does not apply to vacancies in the High Tribunal. Although Valenzuela
Avancena | 54

came to hold that the prohibition covered even judicial appointments, it cannot be
disputed that the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission. Thereby, the confirmation made to the JBC by then
Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado of this Court, a former member of the
Constitutional Commission, about the prohibition not being intended to apply to
the appointments to the Judiciary, which confirmation Valenzuela even expressly
mentioned, should prevail. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition
contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of members of the Supreme
Court, they could have explicitly done so.
-

Binamira vs. Garucho; Matibag vs. Benipayo, April 2, 2002- An ad interim

appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately
and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once an appointee has qualified
into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the CA does not alter its
permanent character. It is effective until disapproved by the CA or until the
next adjournment of Congress. It is extended only during a recess of
Congress. If disapproved by CA, appointee can no longer be extended a
new appointment. If by-passed, the President is free to renew the adinterim appointment.

Pimentel, Jr. v. Office of the Executive Secretary, 462 SCRA 622, July 6,
2005- The law allows the President to make such acting appointment. The
President may even appoint in acting capacity a person not yet in the government
service, as long as the President deems that person competent.

Acting appointment- It is temporary in nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended

to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to
the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of her choice as
acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume
office. It may be extended any time there is vacancy, given while Congress is in
session.

Rufino vs. Endriga, G. R. No. 139554, July 21 2006- Under Section 16, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three groups of officers. The first group
refers to the heads of the Executive departments," ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and
other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution. The
second group refers to those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint.
The third group refers to all other officers of the Government whose appointments are
not otherwise provided by law. Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth
group of lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress may by law vest
in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards . xxx The
President appoints the first group of officers with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. The President appoints the second and third groups of officers without
the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the third
group of officers if the law is silent on who is the appointing power, or if the
law authorizing the head of a department, agency, commission, or board to
appoint is declared unconstitutional.
Agyao vs. CSC, GR No. 182591, January 8, 2011- The position of department
manager such as Director Manager II of PEZA is not a third level position and does not
require presidential appointment.
CABINET SECRETARIES, UNDERSECRETARIES AND THEIR ASSISTANT
SECRETARIES are prohibited from holding multiple positions and receiving
compensation therefrom- BITONIO VS. COA, 425 SCRA 437, March 12, 2004.

CONTROL OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS- Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs.

Zamora, July 10, 2001- The general rule has always been that the power to
abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature. The exception, however, is
that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are
Avancena | 55

concerned, the Presidents power of control may justify him to inactivate the
functions of a particular office, or certain laws may grant him broad authority to
carry out reorganization measures. The chief executive, under our laws, has the
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the
President.
-

Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission, GR No. 192935, December 7,

2010- The creation of the Philippine Truth Commission finds justification under
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to
ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. The President's power to conduct
investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws - in this case,
fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency - is inherent in the
President's powers as the Chief Executive. Suffice it to say that there will be no
appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already
appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of
the power of Congress to appropriate funds.

Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines, Inc.

(MEWAP) vs. Romulo, GR No. 160093, July 31, 2007 The President has the
authority to carry out a reorganization of the Department of Health under the
Constitution and statutory laws. This authority is an adjunct of his power of control
under Article VII, Sections 1 and 17 of the 1987 Constitution.
The Presidents
power to reorganize the executive branch is also an exercise of his residual powers
under Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. No. 292 which grants the President broad
organization powers to implement reorganization measures. Be that as it may, the
President must exercise good faith in carrying out the reorganization of any branch
or agency of the executive department. Reorganization is effected in good faith if it
is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient.

Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No.

1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the
continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which
includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to
abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions,
services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials. The
validity of these two decrees [is]"unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly
provides that all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of
instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution
shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked.

Domingo vs. Zamora, GR No. 142283, February 6, 2003 The Presidents

power (EO 292) to reorganize offices outside of the Office of the President
Proper is limited merely transferring functions or agencies from the
Office of the President to Departments or Agencies and vice-versa. The
DECS is indisputably a Department of the Executive Branch. Even if the DECS is
not part of the Office of the President, Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 clearly
authorizes the President to transfer any function or agency of the DECS to the
Office of the President. Under its charter, the Philippine Sports Commission (PSC),
is attached to the Office of the President. Therefore, the President has the authority
to transfer the functions, programs and activities of DECS related to sports
development to the PSC, making EO 81 a valid presidential issuance.

Rufino vs. Endriga, GR No. 113956, July 21, 2006- The presidential power of
control over the Executive branch of government extends to all executive employees
from the Department Secretary to the lowliest clerk. This constitutional power of the
President is self-executing and does not require any implementing law. Congress cannot
limit or curtail the Presidents power of control over the Executive branch. xxx In
mandating that the President shall have control of all executive x x x offices,
Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not exempt any executive office
Avancena | 56

one performing executive functions outside of the independent constitutional bodies

from the Presidents power of control. xxx The Presidents power of control applies to the
acts or decisions of all officers in the Executive branch. This is true whether such officers
are appointed by the President or by heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards. The power of control means the power to revise or reverse the acts or decisions
of a subordinate officer involving the exercise of discretion.
-

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE AFP (Lacson vs. Perez, May 10, 2001)- The
declaration by the President of state of rebellion during or in the aftermath of the
May 1, 2001 seige of Malacanang is not violative of the separation of powers
doctrine. The President, as Commander in chief of Armed Forces of the Philippines,
may call upon such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion.

Sanlakas vs. Executive Committee, 421 SCRA 656, February 3, 2004- The
Presidents authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her
powers as chief executive and, at the same time draws strength from her
Commander-in-Chief powers pursuant to her calling out power.

Gudani vs. Senga, Augsut 15, 2006- It is on the President that the Constitution
vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions
appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the
chain of command mandate that the Presidents ability to control the individual
members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military
officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Supreme
Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President.
After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate,
who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. if the President or the Chief of
Staff refuses to allow a member of the AFP to appear before Congress, the
legislative body seeking such testimony may seek judicial relief to compel the
attendance.

Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora The President has full
discretion to call the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in
order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. There is no
equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the Presidents action
to call out the armed forces.
David, et al. vs. Executive Secretary Ermita, May 3, 2006- PP 1017
constitutes the call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence. However, PP 1017s extraneous provisions giving the President express or
implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct AFP to enforce obedience to all
laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by
the president; and (3) to impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint
on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. In the absence of legislation, the
President cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business
affected with public interest.
The President can validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency
even in the absence of congressional enactment. But the exercise of emergency
powers requires a delegation from Congress.

EMERGENCY POWER GRANT TO PRESIDENT- Requisites: 1) there must be a

war or other emergency; 2) the delegation must be for a limited period only; 3) the
delegation must be subject to such restrictions as Congress may prescribe and 4)
the emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared
by Congress.

Avancena | 57

David, et al. vs. Ermita- It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the
above provision refers not only to war but also to other national emergency. If
the intention of the Framers of our Constitution was to withhold from the President
the authority to declare a state of national emergency pursuant to Section 18,
Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the
existence of a state of war), then the Framers could have provided so. Clearly,
they did not intend that Congress should first authorize the President before he can
declare a state of national emergency. The logical conclusion then is that President
Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in
the absence of a Congressional enactment. But the exercise of emergency
powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest, is different matter. This requires a delegation from
Congress.
PARDONING POWER- Drilon vs. CA, 202 SCRA 370- The pardoning power of
the President is final and unappealable.
AMNESTY- Kapunan, Jr. vs. CA, 51 SCRA 42, March 13, 2009.- The text of
Proclamation No. 347 then issued by President Fidel V. Ramos covered the
members of the AFP- it extends to all persons who committed the particular acts
described in the provision, and not just rebels or insurgents.
-

TREATY MAKING POWER- Bayan vs. Zamora, 342 SCRA 449-It is

inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive
agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding
as a treaty. (Also read USAFFE Veterans Ass. v. Treasurer 105 Phil. 1030) In the field
of negotiation, the Senate cannot intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to
invade it.
Akbayan vs. Aquino The doctrine in PMPF v. Manglapus that the treatymaking power is exclusive to the President, being the sole organ of the nation in its
external relations, was echoed in BAYAN v. Executive Secretary where the Court
held:
By constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of his office, the
President, as head of State, is the sole organ and authority in the
external affairs of the country. In many ways, the President is the chief
architect of the nation's foreign policy; his "dominance in the field of
foreign relations is (then) conceded." Wielding vast powers and
influence, his conduct in the external affairs of the nation, as Jefferson
describes, is executive altogether.
As regards the power to enter into treaties or international
agreements, the Constitution vests the same in the President, subject
only to the concurrence of at least two thirds vote of all the members of
the Senate. In this light, the negotiation of the VFA and the subsequent
ratification of the agreement are exclusive acts which pertain solely to the
President, in the lawful exercise of his vast executive and diplomatic powers
granted him no less than by the fundamental law itself. Into the field of
negotiation the Senate cannot intrude, and Congress itself is powerless
to invade it. x x x (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The same doctrine was reiterated even more recently in Pimentel v. Executive
Secretary where the Court ruled:
In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is
regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the
country's sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of
foreign policy, the President acts as the country's mouthpiece with respect to
international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal
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with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain

diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of
foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole
authority to negotiate with other states.
Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to
negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to
his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the
Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. x x x (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
It has long been recognized that the power to enter into treaties is vested
directly and exclusively in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least
two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty. In this
light, the authority of the President to enter into trade agreements with
foreign nations provided under P.D. 1464 may be interpreted as an
acknowledgment of a power already inherent in its office. It may not be
used as basis to hold the President or its representatives accountable to
Congress for the conduct of treaty negotiations.
This is not to say, of course, that the Presidents power to enter into treaties is
unlimited but for the requirement of Senate concurrence, since the President must
still ensure that all treaties will substantively conform to all the relevant provisions
of the Constitution. It follows from the above discussion that Congress,
while possessing vast legislative powers, may not interfere in the field of
treaty negotiations. While Article VII, Section 21 provides for Senate
concurrence, such pertains only to the validity of the treaty under
consideration, not to the conduct of negotiations attendant to its
conclusion. Moreover, it is not even Congress as a whole that has been given the
authority to concur as a means of checking the treaty-making power of the
President, but only the Senate.
-

Pimentel, Jr. vs. Executive Secretary, July 6, 2005-Under our Constitution,

the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence
of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or
withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the
authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having
secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a
state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious
step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the
competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court
via a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over actions
seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties. The Court,
therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is
beyond its jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the government to
transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate.

POWER TO CLASSIFY PUBLIC LANDS and TO SELL THE SAME- The power to
classify lands as alienable belongs to the President. Only lands, which have been
classified as alienable, may be sold. There must be a law authorizing its sale or
alienation by the President or by another officer before conveyance can be
executed on behalf of the government (Section 48, Book I of the 1987
Administrative Code). Laurel vs. Garcia, 187 SCRA 797- The President may
not convey valuable real property of the government on her sole will. Conveyance
must be authorized by a law enacted by Congress.
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POWER OF SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENTS- to ensure that local

affairs are administered according to law. xxx Insofar as existing legislation
authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed
against local officials administratively.

E. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT119
1. Concepts
a. Judicial Power120
The duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government.121
b. Judicial Review122
The power of the courts, ultimately of the SC, to interpret the Constitution and to declare
any legislative or executive act invalid because it is in conflict with the fundamental law. This
authority is derived by clear implication from the provision of Sec. 5(2), Art. VIII of the Constitution.
Through such power, the SC enforces and upholds the supremacy of the Constitution
(1) Operative Fact Doctrine
An unconstitutional law has an effect before being declared unconstitutional. The doctrine of
operative fact as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. 123
It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior
to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. 124
(2) Moot Questions125
A case becomes moot when there are facts, injuries and heated arguments but for some
reason the legal problem has become stale. When a case is moot and academic, it ceases to be a
case and controversy. Any decision reached by the court would not be conclusive on the parties.

119 Art. VIII

120 vested in:
1.
2.

One Supreme Court; and

Such lower courts as may be established by law (Sec. 1, Art. VIII).

121 Sec. 1, par.2

122 All courts can exercise Judicial Review:
The Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law for Sec. 5 (2), Art.
VIII speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue. (J.M. Tuason and Co. v.
Court of Appeals, 3 SCRA 696).
The Constitution vests the power of judicial review not only in the Supreme Court but also in the RTC. However, in all actions assailing the validity of a
statute, treaty, presidential decree, order or proclamation and not just in actions involving declaratory relief and similar remedies, notice to the Solicitor
General is mandatory, as required in Sec. 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. The purpose of this mandatory notice is to enable the Solicitor General to decide
whether or not his intervention in the action is necessary (Mirasol v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128448, February 1, 2001)

123 Planters Products vs. Fertiphil Corp., G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008, citing Republic vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 79732, November 8, 1993,
227 SCRA 509.

124 Planters Products, supra citing Peralta vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 95832, August 10, 1992, 212 SCRA 425.
125 Moot refers to a subject for academic argument. They are abstract questions that do not arise from existing facts or rights.
The Court may still exercise the power of judicial review even if the issues had become moot and academic when it feels called upon to exercise its
symbolic function
Exceptions to mootness:
a) If the question is capable of repetition and evasive of review.
b) If there exits a mere possibility of collateral legal consequences if the court does not act.
c) Voluntary cessation from the wrongful act by the defendant, if he is free to return to his old ways.
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(3) Political Question Doctrine

Those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislature or executive branches of government. 126
2. Judicial Independence Safeguards
a.. SC is a Constitutional body; may not be abolished by law;
b. Members are only removable by impeachment;
c. SC may not be deprived of minimum and appellate jurisdiction; appellate jurisdiction may
not be increased without its advice or concurrence;
d. SC has administrative supervision over all inferior courts and personnel;
e. SC has exclusive power to discipline judges/justices of inferior courts;
f. Members of judiciary enjoy security of tenure;
g. Members of judiciary may not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions;
h. Salaries of judges may not be reduced; judiciary enjoys fiscal autonomy;
i. SC alone may initiate Rules of Court;
j. SC alone may order temporary detail of judges; and
k. SC can appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary
3. Judicial Restraint
A legal term that describes a type of judicial interpretation that emphasizes the limited
nature of the court's power. Judicial restraint asks judges to base their judicial decisions solely on
the concept of stare decisis, which refers to an obligation of the court to honor previous decisions.
Conservative judges often employ judicial restraint when deciding cases, unless the law is
clearly unconstitutional. Judicial restraint is the opposite of judicial activism, in that it seeks to limit
the power of judges to create new laws or policy. In most cases, the judicially restrained judge will
decide a cases in such a way as to uphold the law established by Congress. Jurists who practice
judicial restraint show a solemn respect for the separation of governmental problems.
4. Appointments to the Judiciary
i. Appointed by President from among a list of at least 3 nominees prepared by Judicial and
Bar Council for every vacancy.
ii. For lower courts, President shall issue the appointment 90 days from submission of the
list.
5. Supreme Court
a. En Banc and Division Cases
En Banc Cases127
i. All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement,
or law

ii. All cases which under the Rules of Court may be required to be heard en banc
iii. All cases involving the constitutionality, application or operation of presidential decrees,
proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances and other regulations
iv. Cases heard by a division when the required majority in the division is not obtained
v. Cases where the Supreme Court modifies or reverses a doctrine or principle of law
previously laid down either en banc or in division
vi. Administrative cases involving the discipline or dismissal of judges of lower courts

126 Taada v. Cuenco, 100 Phil 1101

127 When the Supreme Court sits en banc, cases are decided by the concurrence of a majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations
on the issues in the case and voted thereon. Thus, since a quorum of the SC is eight, the votes of at least five are needed and are enough, even if it is a
question of constitutionality. This is a liberalization of the old rule which required a qualified majority of a definite number. Moreover, those who did not
take part in the deliberation do not have the right to vote.
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vii. Election contests for President or Vice-President

Division Cases128
Other cases or matters may be heard in division, and decided or resolved with the
concurrence of a majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues
and voted thereon, but in no case without the concurrence of at least three such members.
b. Procedural Rule Making129
Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated
Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rule shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the
same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme
Court.130
c. Administrative Supervision over Lower Courts131
The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel
thereof.132
***Judge Singco Notes
-

JUDICIAL REVIEW- Joya vs. PCGG; Kilosbayan vs. Guingona; Oposa vs. Factoran
(petitioners-children); Kilosbayan vs. Morato; IBP vs. Zamora (IBP not proper party);
Gonzales vs. Narvasa (private citizen not proper party).

Garcia v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 157584,

April 2, 2009- The
immediate implementation of full deregulation of the local downstream oil industry
is a policy determination by Congress which this Court cannot overturn without
offending the Constitution and the principle of separation of powers. That the law
failed in its objectives because its adoption spawned the evils petitioner Garcia
alludes to does not warrant its nullification. In the words of Mr. Justice Leonardo A.
Quisumbing in the 1999 Garcia case, [a] calculus of fear and pessimism xxx does
not justify the remedy petitioner seeks: that we overturn a law enacted by
Congress and approved by the Chief Executive.

The Secretary of Justice vs. Koruga, GR No. 166199, April 24, 2009Although the courts are without power to directly decide matters over which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
the government and are not empowered to execute absolutely their own judgment
from that of Congress or of the President, the Court may look into and resolve
questions of whether or not such judgment has been made with grave abuse of

128 Decisions of a Division of the SC are not appealable to the Court en banc.

Decisions or resolutions of a division of the Court, when concurred in by a

majority of its members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in a case and voted thereon is a decision or resolution of the SC itself.
The SC sitting en banc is not an appellate court vis--vis its divisions, and it exercises no appellate jurisdiction over the latter. Each division of the Court is
considered not a body inferior to the Court en banc, and sits veritably as the Court en banc itself. The only constraint is that any doctrine or principle of law
laid down by the Court, either rendered en banc or in division, may be overturned or reversed only by the Court sitting en banc.(Firestone Ceramics v. CA,
G.R. No. 127245, June 28, 2000)

129 The SC declared that the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure. The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by the Court with Congress, more so with the Executive.
(Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601)

130 Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (5)

131 In the absence of any administrative action taken against the RTC Judge by the SC with regard to the Judges certificate of service, the investigation
conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the SCs power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of
separation of powers. (Maceda v. Vasquez, 221 SCRA 464)

132 Art. VIII, Sec. 6

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discretion, when the act of the legislative or executive department is contrary to

the constitution, the law or jurisprudence, or when executed whimsically,
capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias.
-

Gudani vs. Senga, August 15, 2006- Courts are empowered, under the
constitutional principle of judicial review, to arbitrate disputes between the
legislative and executive branches of government on the proper constitutional
parameters of power.

PROPER PARTY- In this jurisdiction, the Supreme Court adopts the DIRECT
INJURY test. In People vs. Vera, it held that the person who impugns the validity of
a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.

However, being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus

standi may be waived by the Supreme Court in the exercise of its
discretion. Even when the petitioners have failed to show direct injury, they have
been allowed to sue under the principle of transcendental importance.
DAVID, ET AL VS. ARROYO; CHAVEZ VS. PEA, 384 SCRA 152; BAGONG ALYANSANG
MAKABAYAN VS. ZAMORA, 342 SCRA 449; LIM VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 380
SCRA 739.

Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens and legislators may be accorded

standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met:
1. the cases involved constitutional issues;
2. for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public
funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
3. for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of
the election law in question;
4. for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues are of
transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
5. for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action
complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.

AIWA vs. Romulo, GR No. 157509, January 18, 2005- For a citizen to have
standing, he must establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury
as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action.

TELEBAP VS.C OMELEC- proper party

1. registered voter must show that the action concerns his right of suffrage
2. taxpayer he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of
money raised by taxation.
3. corporate entity- the party suing has substantial relation to the third party; the
third party cannot assert his constitutional right; the right of the third party will
be diluted unless the party in court is allowed to espouse the third partys
constitutional claim.

As the case involves constitutional questions, the Supreme Court is not concerned
with whether the petitioners are real parties in interest, but whether they have
legal standing. LA BUGAL-BLAAN TRIBAL ASS., INC., VS RAMOS, 421 SCRA
148.

EVEN WHEN THE ISSUES ARE MOOT AND ACADEMIC, the Court still entertains
to adjudicate the substantive matter if there is a grave violation of the constitution;
to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and public and capable
of repetition, yet evading review PROVINCE OF BATANGAS VS. ROMULO, 429
SCRA 736, May 27, 2004.
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The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide
cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is grave violation of the
constitution, second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount
public interest is involved, third, when constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and the public, and
fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. DAVID, ET AL. VS.
ARROYO, ET AL.; SANLAKAS VS. EXEC. SEC., 421 SCRA 656; ACOP VS.
GUINGONA, JR., 383 SCRA 577; ALBA-A VS. COMELEC, 435 SCRA 98.

POLITICAL QUESTIONS- are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom,
not legality of a particular measure. QUESTIONS REGARDING ADMINISTRATIVE
ISSUANCES will not preclude the SUPREME COURT from exercising its power of
judicial review to determine whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of issuing authority under its
EXPANDED JURISDICTION- BRILLANTES VS. COMELEC, 432 SCRA 269, June
15 2004.

KILOSBAYAN VS. ERMITA, GR No. 177721, July 3, 2007 - Petitioners have

standing to file the suit simply as peoples organizations and taxpayers since the
matter involves an issue of utmost and far-reaching Constitutional importance,
namely, the qualification nay, the citizenship of a person to be appointed a
member of this Court. xxxx This case is a matter of primordial importance
involving compliance with a Constitutional mandate. As the body tasked with the
determination of the merits of conflicting claims under the Constitution, the
Supreme Court is the proper forum for resolving the issue, even as the
JBC has the initial competence to do so. xxx It is clear, therefore, that from
the records of this Court, respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen.
The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the
Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the
trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized
along with his father.

FISCAL AUTONOMY- Bengzon vs. Drilon- The Chief Justice must be given a free
hand on how to augment appropriations where augmentation is needed.

PP VS. DY, 395 SCRA 256- Under Article VIII, Section 4(1) of the Constitution,
the Supreme Court may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of three, five,
or seven members.

IBP vs. Zamora, deployment of marines is justiciable- the problem being one of
legality or validity, not its wisdom.

FARIAS VS. EXEC. SEC., 417 SCRA 503- Policy matters are not the concern
of the Supreme Court- government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the
political branches of the government.

CHANGE OF VENUE-Larranaga vs. CA, 287 SCRA 581, A motion to change the
venue of (and authority to conduct) preliminary investigation cannot be taken
cognizance by the courts for lack of jurisdiction. The holding of a preliminary
investigation is a function of the Executive department and not of the judiciary.

PP vs. Sola, 103 SCRA 393 (1981)- In case of doubt, it should be resolved in
favor of change of venue.

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PP VS. TUBONGBANUA, GR No. 171271- August 31, 2006- In view of the

enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 or the Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death
Penalty on June 24, 2006, the penalty that should be meted is reclusion perpetua,
thus:

SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited.

Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One Hundred SeventySeven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by
Lethal Injection is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six
Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death
Penalty Law and all other laws, executive orders and decrees insofar as
they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended
accordingly.

SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:

(a)
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of
the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b)
the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make
use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.

PROMULGATE RULES
concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all court, the
admission to the practice of law, the IBP, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged.
NOTE: Limitations: simplified and inexpensive procedure; uniform; not diminish,
increase or modify substantive rights.
WRIT OF AMPARO The right to enforce and protect a persons rights guaranteed
and recognized by the bill of rights. It is a remedy available to any person whose
right to life, liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened with violation
by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity. The writ covers extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
or threats thereof.
Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final judgment, the court, justice
or judge may grant any of the following reliefs:
(a) Temporary Protection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon motion or
motu proprio, may order that the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any
member of the immediate family be protected in a government agency or by an
accredited person or private institution capable of keeping and securing their
safety. If the petitioner is an organization, association or institution referred to in
Section 3(c) of the Rule, the protection may be extended to the officers involved.
The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private institutions that shall
extend temporary protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any
member of the immediate family, in accordance with guidelines which it shall
issue. The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with the rules
and conditions that may be imposed by the court, justice or judge.
(b) Inspection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after
due hearing, may order any person in possession or control of a designated land or
other property, to permit entry for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying,
or photographing the property or any relevant object or operation thereon. The
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motion shall state in detail the place or places to be inspected. It shall be

supported by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge of
the enforced disappearance or whereabouts of the aggrieved party. If the motion is
opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the
information, the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to
determine the merit of the opposition. The movant must show that the inspection
order is necessary to establish the right of the aggrieved party alleged to be
threatened or violated. The inspection order shall specify the person or persons
authorized to make the inspection and the date, time, place and manner of making
the inspection and may prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional
rights of all parties. The order shall expire five (5) days after the date of its
issuance, unless extended for justifiable reasons.
(c) Production Order. The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after
due hearing, may order any person in possession, custody or control of any
designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or
tangible things, or objects in digitized or electronic form, which constitute or
contain evidence relevant to the petition or the return, to produce and permit their
inspection, copying or photographing by or on behalf of the movant. The motion
may be opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of
the information, in which case the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in
chambers to determine the merit of the opposition. The court, justice or judge shall
prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all the parties.
(d) Witness Protection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu
proprio, may refer the witnesses to the Department of Justice for admission to the
Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Program, pursuant to Republic Act No.
6981. The court, justice or judge may also refer the witnesses to other government
agencies, or to accredited persons or private institutions capable of keeping and
securing their safety.
WRIT OF HABEAS DATA- It is a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the
person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
Masangkay vs. del Rosario, G.R. No. 182484, June 17, 2008- To start off with
the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to
the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these
extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the
rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy
beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to
these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely
property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on
amorphous and uncertain grounds. Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing
civil process dealing directly with the possessory dispute and the reported acts of
violence and harassment, we see no point in separately and directly intervening
through a writ of amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie showing
that the right to life, liberty or security the personal concern that the
writ is intended to protect - is immediately in danger or threatened, or
that the danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an
application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending
case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the coexistence of the writ with a separately filed criminal case.

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Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following
material allegations of ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of a
writ of habeas data:
-(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;
(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects
the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party;
-(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or
information;
-(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and
the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information,
if known;

-(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification,
suppression or destruction of the database or information or files kept by
the respondent.
Aruelo vs. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 475- The COMELEC cannot adopt a rule
prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the regular courts. The power to
promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is
vested on the Supreme Court.
Republic vs. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 16429, December 19, 2005- Congress has the
plenary legislative power. The silence of the Constitution on the subject can only be
interpreted as meaning there is no intention to diminish that plenary power. RA
8974 which requires full payment before the State may exercise proprietary rights,
contrary to Rule 67 which requires only a deposit was recognized by the Supreme
Court.
PEOPLE VS. MATEO, July 7, 2004 While the fundamental law requires
mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases where the penalty is reclusion
perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere however, has it proscribed an
intermediate review. The Supreme Court deems it wise and compelling to provide
in these cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the
Supreme Court.
Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall more squarely within the
rule making prerogative of the Supreme Court than the law making power
of Congress. The rule allowing an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals, a
subordinate appellate court, before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court for
automatic review, is such a procedural matter.
-

MINUTE RESOLUTION- Komatsu vs. CA, 289 SCRA 604- does not violate
Section 14. Resolutions are not decisions within the constitutional requirement;
they merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained and the
petition to review decision of the CA is not a matter of right but of sound judicial
discretion, hence, there is no need to fully explain the Courts denial since, for one
thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the CA decision.

German Machineries Corporation vs. Endaya, 444 SCRA 329- The mandate
under Section 14, Article VIII of the constitution is applicable only in cases
submitted for decision, i.e, given due course and after the filing of the briefs or
memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where a resolution is issued denying
due course to a petition and stating the legal basis thereof.
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Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Laserna, 550 SCRA 613- The constitutional mandate
that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is bases, does not preclude the
validity of memorandum decisions, which adopt by reference the finding of fact
and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals.

Joaquin-Agregado v. Yama, March 20, 2009, GR No. 181107- The Supreme

Court stressed that it has the discretion to decide whether a minute resolution
should be used in lieu of a full-blown decision in any particular case. Further, the
Supreme Court explained that the grant of due course to a petition for review is
not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion. When it fails to find any
reversible error committed by the CA, there is no need to fully explain the Courts
denial as it means that the Supreme Court agrees with or adopts the findings and
conclusions of the CA. There is no point in reproducing or restating in the
resolution of denial the conclusions of the appellate court affirmed.The
constitutional requirement of sec. 14, Art. VIII of a clear presentation of
facts and laws applies to decisions, where the petition is given due
course, but not where the petition is denied due course, with the
resolution stating the legal basis for the dismissal.

Oil & National Gas Com. vs. CA, 293 SCRA 26- Section 14 does not preclude
the validity of Memorandum Decision which adopt by reference the findings of
fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals. It is
intended to avoid cumbersome reproduction of the decision (or portions thereof) of
the lower court.

F. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
1. Institutional Independence Safeguards
a. they are constitutionally created; may not be abolished by statute;
b. each is expressly described as independent;
c. each is conferred certain powers and functions which cannot be reduced by statute;
d. the Chairmen and members cannot be removed except by impeachment;
e. the Chairmen and members are given fairly a long term of office of 7 years;
f. the Chairmen and members may not be reappointed or appointed in an acting capacity; 133
g. the salaries of the Chairmen and members are relatively high and may not be decreased
during continuance in office;
h. the Commissions enjoy fiscal autonomy;
i. each Commission may promulgate its own procedural rules, provided they do not
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights [though subject to disapproval by the SC];
j.
the Chairmen and members are subject to certain disqualifications calculated to
strengthen their integrity;
k. the Commissions may appoint their own officials and employees in accordance with Civil
Service Law

2. Powers and Functions

Powers and Functions of COMELEC:134

133 Brillantes v. Yorac, 192 SCRA 358

134 The COMELEC's exercise of its quasi-judicial powers is subject to Section 3 of Article IX-C which expressly requires that 1) all election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies, shall be decided by the COMELEC in division, and 2) the motion for reconsideration shall be decided by the
COMELEC en banc.
The prosecution of election law violators involves the exercise of the COMELEC's administrative powers. Thus, the COMELEC en banc can directly
approve the recommendation of its Law Department to file the criminal information for double registration against petitioners in the instant case. There is no
Avancena | 68

a. Enforce and administer law and regulations relative to conduct of elections, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum or recall;
b. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to election, returns and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials.
c. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials
decided by RTC, or involving elective barangay officials by MTC;
d. Decide, except those involving right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including
the determination of number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and
inspectors and registration of voters;
e. Deputize, with concurrence of President, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities
for exclusive purpose of insuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections;
f. Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations or coalitions which
must present their platform or program of government; accredit citizens arms;
g. File upon verified complaint or motu propio petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of
voters; investigate and, where appropriate , prosecute cases of violations of elections laws;
h. Recommend to Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, limitation of
places and prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractice and nuisance
candidates; and
i. Submit to President and Congress, comprehensive reports on conduct of each election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum or recall.
Powers and Duties of COA:
a. Examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to revenue and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and property owned or held in trust or pertaining to government;
b. Keep general accounts of government and preserve vouchers and supporting papers;
c. Authority to define scope of its audit and examination, establish techniques and methods
required therefor; and
d. Promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for prevention
and disallowance.
3. Judicial Review
a. Quasi-Judicial Functions
b. Administrative
Given the new definition of judicial power as including the power to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government, the courts can review acts of all
administrative agencies, not only in the performance of their adjudicative function, but even in the
performance of their other functions 135 through the special civil action of certiorari.
*** Judge Singco Notes
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
-

GSIS VS. CSC, 202 SCRA 799- The grant to the Civil Service Commission of
adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and adjudge cases, necessarily
includes the power to enforce or order execution of its decisions, resolutions, or
orders. The authority to decide cases would be inutile unless accompanied by the
authority to see that what has been decided is carried out.

Pangasinan State University vs. CA, 526 SRCA 92- The CSC is the sole arbiter
of controversies relating to the civil service.

constitutional requirement that the filing of the criminal information be first decided by any of the divisions of the COMELEC. (Baytan vs. Comelec, G.R.
No. 153945, February 4, 2003)

135 quasi-legislative, administrative

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Office of the Ombudsman vs. CSC, 528 SCRA 535- since the responsibility of
the establishment, administration and maintenance of qualification standards lies
with the concerned department or agency, the role of the CSC is limited to
assisting the department agency with respect to these qualification standards and
approving them.

CSC vs. Sojor, GR No. 168766, May 22, 2008- The Constitution grants to the
CSC administration over the entire civil service. As defined, the civil service
embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the
government, including every government-owned or controlled corporation. It is
further classified into career and non-career service positions. Career service
positions are those where: (1) entrance is based on merit and fitness or highly
technical qualifications; (2) there is opportunity for advancement to higher career
positions; and (3) there is security of tenure. A state university president with
a fixed term of office appointed by the governing board of trustees of the
university, is a non-career civil service officer. He was appointed by the
chairman and members of the governing board of CVPC. By clear
provision of law, respondent is a non-career civil servant who is under
the jurisdiction of the CSC.

CSC v. Alfonso, GR No. 179452, June 11, 2009,- Even though the CSC has appellate
jurisdiction over disciplinary cases decided by government departments, agencies, and
instrumentalities, a complaint may be filed directly with the CSC, and the CSC has the
authority to hear and decide the case, although it may in its discretion opt to deputize a
department or an agency to conduct the investigation, as provided for in the Civil
Service Law of 1975. The Supreme Court also ruled that since the complaints were filed
directly with the CSC and the CSC had opted to assume jurisdiction over the complaint,
the CSCs exercise of jurisdiction shall be to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising
concurrent jurisdiction.

CSC vs. DBM, GR No. 158791, July 22, 2005- The no report, no release policy
may not be validly enforced against offices vested with fiscal autonomy. Being
automatic connotes something mechanical, spontaneous and perfunctory. It means
that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed.

Naseco vs. NLRC, 68 SCRA 122- Employees of GOCCs, as a general rule, are
governed by the Civil Service Law. But a distinction of the manner the GOCC was
created must be made. If the GOCC was established through an original charter (or
special law), then it falls under the civil service, e.g., GSIS and SSS. However,
corporations which are subsidiaries of these chartered agencies, e.g., Manila Hotel,
is excluded from the coverage of the civil service.

Leveriza vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 282- An agency of government refers to any of the
various units of the government, including a department, bureau, office,
instrumentality or government-owned or controlled corporation or a local
government or a distinct unit therein. Instrumentality refers to any agency of the
national government, not integrated within the department framework, vested
with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate
powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually
through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, institutes and
government-owned or controlled corporations,

MWSS vs. Hernandez, 143 SCRA 602- If one is employed in a GOCC,

whether regular or not, the civil service law applies. It is not true either that with
respect to money claims, the Labor Code applies. Regardless of the nature of
employment or claim, an employee in a GOCC with original charter is covered by
the Civil Service Law.
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Dimayuga vs. Benedicto II, 373 SCRA 652 (2002) the appointment to the
positions in the Career Executive Service may be considered permanent in which
the appointee enjoys security of tenure.

Achacoso vs. Macaraig, 195 SCRA 235- permanent appointment can be issued
only to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is
being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed. The mere fact
that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer
security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required
qualifications. Such right will have to depend on the nature of appointment, which
in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it.

Fernandez vs. Dela Paz, 160 SCRA 751- Unconsented transfer of the officer,
resulting in demotion in rank or salary is a violation of the security of tenure clause
in the Constitution.

Rosales, Jr. vs. Mijares, 442 SCRA 532- A transfer that aims by indirect method
to terminate services or to force resignation constitutes removal.

Estrada vs. Escritor, June 22, 2006 In the area of religious exercise as a
preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable to an authority higher than
the state, and so the state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that
its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the
freedom. In the absence of a showing such state interest exists, man must be
allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.

Mateo vs. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 284- The party aggrieved by a
decision, ruling, order, or action of an agency of the government involving
termination of services may appeal to the CSC within 15 days. Thereafter, he could
go on certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if he still
feels aggrieved by the ruling of the CSC.

PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL- Montecillo vs. CSC, June 28, 2001- The CSC is
expressly empowered by the Administrative Code of 1987 to declare positions in
the Civil Service primarily confidential. (Read: Salazar vs. Mathay, 73 SCRA 285, on
two instances when a position may be considered primarily confidential: (1)
President declares the position to be primarily confidential upon recommendation
of of the CSC; (2) when by the nature of the functions, there exists close intimacy
between the appointee and appointing authority which ensures freedom of
intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgiving or betrayals of
personal trust or confidential matters of state.
HILARIO VS. CSC, 243 SCRA 206, City Legal Officer is primarily confidential.
PAGCOR VS. RILLORAZA, June 25, 2001, The position of Casino Operations
Manager is not primarily confidential

RESIGNATION- Estrada vs. Desierto, March 2, 2001, There must intent to resign
and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a
resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It
can be written. It can be express. It can implied. As long as the resignation is clear,
it must be given legal effect.
To constitute a complete and operative resignation from public office, there must
be: (1) an intention to relinquish a part of the term; (2) an act of relinquishment;
and (3) an acceptance by the proper authority. The last one is required by reason
of Article 238 of the Revised Penal Code. (Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres,
Catanduanes vs. CA, 284 SCRA 276, 1997).
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Santos vs. CA, 345 SCRA 553, (2000) rule on double compensation not
applicable to pension. A retiree receiving pension or gratuity after retirement can
continue to receive such pension or gratuity if he accepts another government
position to which another compensation is attached.

PILC vs. Elma, G.R. No. 138965, March 5, 2007 PCCG Chair Magdangal
Elma is prohibited under the Constitution from simultaneously serving as Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel. The position of PCCG Chair and CPLC are incompatible
offices since the CPLC reviews actions of the PCGG Chair. It pointed out that the
general rule to hold more than one office is allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position/

Del Castillo vs. Civil Service Commission, August 21, 1997- When an
employee is illegally dismissed, and his reinstatement is later ordered by the
Court, for all legal intents and purposes he is considered as not having left his
office, and notwithstanding the silence of the decision, he is entitled to
payment of back salaries.

DOTC vs. Cruz, GR No. 178256, July 23, 2008 The Supreme Court follows as a
precedent, the DOTC did not effect Cruz's termination with bad faith and,
consequently, no backwages can be awarded in his favor.

David vs. Gania GR No. 156030, August 14, 2003- A civil service officer or
employee, who has been found illegally dismissed or suspended, is entitled to be
reinstated and to back wages and other monetary benefits from the time
of his illegal dismissal or suspension up to his reinstatement, and if at the
time the decision of exoneration is promulgated, he is already of retirement age,
he shall be entitled not only to back wages but also to full retirement benefits.

CSC vs. Dacoycoy, April 29, 1999 The CSC as an aggrieved party, may appeal
the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. Appeal now lies from a
decision exonerating a civil service employee of administrative charges.

CSC vs. Albao, October 13, 2005- The present case partakes of an act by
petitioner CSC to protect the integrity of the civil service system, and does not fall
under the provision on disciplinary actions under Sec. 47. It falls under the
provisions of Sec. 12, par. 11, on administrative cases instituted by it directly. This
is an integral part of its duty, authority and power to administer the civil service
system and protect its integrity, as provided in Article IX-B, Sec. 3 of the
Constitution, by removing from its list of eligibles those who falsified their
qualifications. This is to be distinguished from ordinary proceedings intended to
discipline a bona fide member of the system, for acts or omissions that constitute
violations of the law or the rules of the service.

SSS Employees Ass. vs. CA, 175 SCRA 686- While the Constitution and the
Labor Code are silent as to whether government employees may strike, they are
prohibited from striking by express provision of Memorandum Circular
No. 6, series of 1997 of the CSC and as implied in E.O. 180.

COMELEC

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REAPPOINTMENT OF COMMISSIONERS- Matibag vs. Benipayo, April 2,

2002- The phrase without reappointment applies only to one who has been
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments,
whether or not such person completes his term of office which could be seven, five
or three years. There must be a confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of the previous appointment before the prohibition on
reappointment can apply.

ISSUANCE of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only in aid of its

appellate jurisdiction.- Relampagos vs. Cumba, 243 SCRA 690.

Bedol vs. COMELEC, GR No. 179830, December 3, 2009- The COMELEC

possesses the power to conduct investigations as an adjunct to its constitutional
duty to enforce and administer all election laws, by virtue of the explicit provisions
of paragraph 6, Section 2, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
Article IX-C, Section 2. xxx
(6) xxx; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of
election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses,
and malpractices.

The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it by the 1987
Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, may be classified into administrative,
quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial. The quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC
embraces the power to resolve controversies arising from the enforcement of
election laws, and to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies; and of
all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications. Its quasilegislative power refers to the issuance of rules and regulations to implement the
election laws and to exercise such legislative functions as may expressly be
delegated to it by Congress. Its administrative function refers to the enforcement
and administration of election laws. In the exercise of such power, the Constitution
(Section 6, Article IX-A) and the Omnibus Election Code (Section 52 [c]) authorize
the COMELEC to issue rules and regulations to implement the provisions of the
1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code.7

The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear and

determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, and to
decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing
and administering the same law. The Court, in Dole Philippines Inc. v. Esteva,
described quasi-judicial power in the following manner, viz:

Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is the power

of the administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the
power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to
apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in
enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its
quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is
essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in
such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the
executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial
functions the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw
conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in
a judicial nature. Since rights of specific persons are affected, it is elementary that
in the proper exercise of quasi-judicial power due process must be observed in the
conduct of the proceedings.

Task Force Maguindanaos fact-finding investigation to probe into the veracity of

the alleged fraud that marred the elections in said province; and consequently, to
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determine whether the certificates of canvass were genuine or spurious, and

whether an election offense had possibly been committed could by no means be
classified as a purely ministerial or administrative function.
-

The COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was exercising its quasijudicial power in pursuit of the truth behind the allegations of massive fraud during
the elections in Maguindanao. To achieve its objective, the Task Force conducted
hearings and required the attendance of the parties concerned and their counsels
to give them the opportunity to argue and support their respective positions.

The effectiveness of the quasijudicial power vested by law on a government

institution hinges on its authority to compel attendance of the parties and/or their
witnesses at the hearings or proceedings.

In the same vein, to withhold from the COMELEC the power to punish individuals
who refuse to appear during a fact-finding investigation, despite a previous notice
and order to attend, would render nugatory the COMELECs investigative power,
which is an essential incident to its constitutional mandate to secure the conduct
of honest and credible elections. In this case, the purpose of the investigation was
however derailed when petitioner obstinately refused to appear during said
hearings and to answer questions regarding the various election documents which,
he claimed, were stolen while they were in his possession and custody.
Undoubtedly, the COMELEC could punish petitioner for such contumacious refusal
to attend the Task Force hearings.

Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC was acting as a board of canvassers
at that time it required petitioner to appear before it, the Court had the occasion to
rule that the powers of the board of canvassers are not purely ministerial. The
board exercises quasi-judicial functions, such as the function and duty to
determine whether the papers transmitted to them are genuine election returns
signed by the proper officers.10 When the results of the elections in the province of
Maguindanao were being canvassed, counsels for various candidates posited
numerous questions on the certificates of canvass brought before the COMELEC.
The COMELEC asked petitioner to appear before it in order to shed light on the
issue of whether the election documents coming from Maguindanao were spurious
or not. When petitioner unjustifiably refused to appear, COMELEC undeniably acted
within the bounds of its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed resolutions.

Sema vs. COMELEC, 558 SCRA 700- The COMELEC does not have the requisite
power to call elections, as the same is part of the plenary legislative power.

LDP vs. COMELEC, GR No. 151265, February 24, 2004 - The COMELEC
correctly stated that the ascertainment of the identity of [a] political party and its
legitimate officers is a matter that is well within its authority. The source of this
authority is no other than the fundamental law itself, which vests upon the
COMELEC the power and function to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election. In the exercise of such power and
in the discharge of such function, the Commission is endowed with ample
wherewithal and considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will
ensure the accomplishment of the great objectives for which it was created to
promote free, orderly and honest elections.

LP vs. ATIENZA, ET AL., GR No. 174992- April 17, 2007 COMELEC has
jurisdiction to decide questions of leadership within a party and to ascertain its
legitimate officers and leaders. xxx The COMELEC is endowed with ample
wherewithal and considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will
ensure the accomplishment of the great objectives for which it was created to
promote free and orderly honest elections.
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Atienza vs. COMELEC, GR No. 188920, February 16, 2010- While the
question of party leadership has implications on the COMELECs performance of its
functions under Section 2 of Art. IX-C of the constitution, the same cannot be said
of the issue pertaining to Ateinza, et al.s expulsion from the LP. Such expulsion is
for the moment an issue of party membership and discipline, in which the
COMELEC cannot interfere, given the limited scope of its power over political
parties.

Galang vs. Geronimo and Ramos, (GR No. 192793, February 22, 2011)- In
election cases involving an act or omission of a municipal or regional trial court,
petition for certiorari shall be filed exclusively with the COMELEC, in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction.

Balajonda vs. COMELEC, GR No. 166032, February 28, 2005- Despite the
silence of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure as to the procedure of the issuance of a
writ of execution pending appeal, there is no reason to dispute the COMELECs
authority to do so, considering that the suppletory application of the Rules of Court
is expressly authorized by Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
which provides that absent any applicable provisions therein the pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court shall be applicable by analogy or in a suppletory
character and effect.

Codilla vs. De Venecia, et al., December 10, 2002- Section 3, Article IX-C of
the 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC en banc to review, on motion for
reconsideration, decisions or resolutions decided by a division.
Since the
petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of
the Second Division suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him,
the COMELEC en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the
validity of the said Order of the Second Division. The said Order of the
Second Division was yet unenforceable as it has not attained finality; the timely
filing of the motion for reconsideration suspends its execution. It cannot, thus, be
used as the basis for the assumption in office of the respondent as the duly elected
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.
Sarmiento vs. COMELEC, 212 SCRA 307- The COMELEC en banc does not have
the authority to hear and decide cases at the first instance. Under the COMELEC
Rules, pre-proclamation cases are classified as Special Cases and in compliance
with the provision of the Constitution, the two divisions of the COMELEC are vested
with the authority to hear and decide these special cases.

Santiago vs. COMELEC, March 19, 1997 - COMELEC cannot validly promulgate
rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative.
It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELECs
power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the
laws and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC
under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where
subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the completeness and
the sufficient standard tests.

The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing.
The petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable
by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the COMELEC or its
personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the
petition; (2) to issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate
on the total number of registered voters in each legislative district; (3) to assist,
through its election registrars, in the establishment of signature stations; and (4) to
verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list
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of voters, voters affidavits, and voters identification cards used in the

immediately preceding election.
-

Cayetano vs. COMELEC, January 23, 2006- The conduct of plebiscite and
determination of its result have always been the business of the COMELEC and not
the regular courts. Such a case involves the appreciation of ballots which is best
left to the COMELEC. As an independent constitutional body exclusively charged
with the power of enforcement and administration of all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall, the COMELEC has the indisputable expertise in
the field of election and related laws. Its acts, therefore, enjoy the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.

Alunan III vs. Mirasol, GR No. 108399, July 31, 1997 Contests involving
elections of SK officials do not fall within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.

Loong vs. COMELEC, 305 SCRA 832- The COMELEC may validly order a manual
count notwithstanding the required automated counting of ballots in R. A. 8436,
the law authorizing the commission to use an automated election system, if that is
the only way to count votes. It ought to be self-evident that the Constitution did
not envision a COMELEC that cannot count the result of an election.

Limkaichong vs. COMELEC- Resolution No. 8062 is a valid exercise of the

COMELECs constitutionally mandated power to promulgate its own rules of
procedure relative to the conduct of the elections.
In adopting such policyguidelines for the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections, the COMELEC had in
mind the objective of upholding the sovereign will of the people and in the interest
of justice and fair play. Accordingly, those candidates whose disqualification cases
are still pending at the time of the elections, should they obtain the highest
number of votes from the electorate, shall be proclaimed but that their
proclamation shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and
resolution of the involved cases.

Fernandez vs. COMELEC, 556 SCRA 765The 1987 constitution vests

COMELEC appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving barangay officials
decided by the trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

Cayetano vs. COMELEC, GR 193846, April 12, 2011Final orders of a

COMELEC Division denying the affirmative defenses of petitioner cannot be
questioned before the Supreme Court even via a petition for certiorari.

COMMISSION ON AUDIT
-

COAS AUDITING POWER- Blue Bar Coconut Phils. vs. TantuicoCorporations covered by the COAs auditing powers are not limited to GOCCs.
Where a private corporation or entity handles public funds, it falls under COA
jurisdiction. Under Sec. 2(1), item, (d), non-governmental entities receiving
subsidies or equity directly or indirectly from or through the government are
required to submit to post audit.

DBP vs. COA, January 16, 2002 -The mere fact that private auditors may audit
government agencies does not divest the COA of its power to examine and audit
the same government agencies. The COA is neither by-passed nor ignored since
even with a private audit the COA will still conduct its usual examination and audit,
and its findings and conclusions will still bind government agencies and their
officials. A concurrent private audit poses no danger whatsoever of public funds or
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assets escaping the usual scrutiny of a COA audit. Manifestly, the express
language of the Constitution, and the clear intent of its framers, point to only one
indubitable conclusion - the COA does not have the exclusive power to
examine and audit government agencies. The framers of the Constitution
were fully aware of the need to allow independent private audit of certain
government agencies in addition to the COA audit, as when there is a private
investment in a government-controlled corporation, or when a government
corporation is privatized or publicly listed, or as in the case at bar when the
government borrows money from abroad.
-

BSP vs. COA, January 22, 2006 - Retirement benefits accruing to a public officer
may not, without his consent, be withheld and applied to his indebtedness to the
government.

MISON vs. COA, 187 SCRA 445, The chairman of COA, acting by himself, has no
authority to render or promulgate a decision for the commission. The power to
decide on issues relating to audit and accounting is lodged in the COA acting as a
collegial body which has the jurisdiction to decide any case brought before it.

PHIL. OPERATIONS, INC. vs Auditor General, 94 Phil 868, COAs power

over the settlement of accounts is different from power over unliquidated
claims, the latter of which is within the ambit of judicial power.

Santiago vs. COA, 537 SCRA 740- The COA can direct the proper officer to
withhold a municipal treasurers salary and other emoluments up to the amount of
her alleged shortage but no to apply the withheld amount to the alleged shortage
for which her liability is still being litigated.

NHA vs. COA, 226 SCRA 55, COA can validly disallow the approval of excess or
unnecessary expenditures.

BILL OF RIGHTS136
1.

Fundamental Powers of the State

a.

Concept and Application

Police Power - the power of promoting public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of
liberty and property
Power of Eminent Domain - this is also known as the power of expropriation, it is described
as the highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the government that may be acquired
for some public purpose through a method in the nature of a compulsory sale to the state.
Power of Taxation - Taxes are enforced proportional contributions from persons and property
levied by the state by virtue of its sovereignty, for the support of government and for all public
needs. Taxation is the method by which these contributions are exacted.
b.

Requisites for Valid Exercise

Police Power137

136 set of prescriptions setting forth the funda-mental civil and political rights of the individual, and imposing limitations on the powers of government as
a means of securing the enjoyment of those rights.

137 When exercised by a delegate:

express grant by law;
within territorial limits for LGUs except when exercised to protect water supply; and
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Requisites:138
i. Lawful Subject the interests of the public in general, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the exercise of the power;
ii. Lawful Means the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose, and not unduly oppressive on individuals;

Power of Imminent Domain

Requisites:
i. Necessity when exercised by:
Congress political question;
Delegate justiciable question
ii. Private property all private property capable of ownership may be expropriated, except
money and choses in action; may include services139
iii. Taking - when:
a. owner actually deprived or dispossessed of his property;
b. there is practical destruction or a material impairment of value of property;
c. owner is deprived of ordinary use of his property; and
d. owner is deprived of jurisdiction, supervision and control of his property. 140
iv. Public use - has been broadened to include not only uses directly available to the public
but also those which redound to their indirect benefit; that only a few would actually benefit from
the expropriation of the property foes not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public
use.141
v. Just compensation - compensation is qualified by the word just to convey that equivalent
must be real, substantial, full and fair; the value of the property must be determined either as of
the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first.142
vi. Due process of law the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard.

Power of Taxation
Inherent limitations
must not be contrary to law.

138 or limitations
139 Republic v. PLDT, 26 SCRA 620).
140 Requisites:
i.
expropriator must enter a private property;
ii.
entry must be more than a momentary period;
iii.
entry must be under a warrant or color of authority;
iv.
property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected;
v.
utilization of the property must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property (Republic v.
Castelvi, 58 SCRA 336).

141 Manosca v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 412

Once expropriated change of public use is of no moment. It is well within the rights of the condemnor as owner to alter and decide its use so long as it still
for public use. (Republic vs. C.A., G.R. No. 146587, July 2, 2002)
142
Formula: -- fair market value of the property, to which must be added the consequential damages, minus the consequential benefits, but in no case will the
consequential benefits exceed the consequential damages
Fair market value the price that maybe agreed upon by parties who are willing but are not compelled to enter into a contract of sale.
Consequential damages consist of injuries directly caused on the residue of the private property taken by reason of expropriation
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Public purpose;
a.
b.
c.
d.

Non-delegability of power;
Territoriality or situs of taxation;
Exemption of government from taxation;
International comity.
Constitutional limitations143

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.
l.

A.
B.
A.
D.
E.

Due process of law;

Equal protection of law;
Uniformity, equitability, and progressivity of taxation;
Non-impairment of contracts;
Non-imprisonment for non-payment of poll tax;
Origin of appropriation, revenue, and tariff bills;
Non-infringement of religious freedom;
Delegation of legislative authority to the President to fix tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues;
Tax exemption of properties actually, directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable
and educational purposes;
Majority vote of all members of Congress required in case of legislative grant of tax
exemptions;
Non-impairment of the Supreme Courts jurisdiction in tax cases;
Tax exemption of revenues and assets of, including grants, endowments, donations, or
contributions to, educational institutions.
c. Similarities
Inherent in the State, exercised even without need of express constitutional grant
Necessary and indispensable; State cannot be effective without them
Methods by which State interferes with private property
Presuppose equivalent compensation
Exercised/primarily/by/the//Legislature
F. Differences

Basis

Police Power

Power of Eminent Domain

Power of Taxation

Rights regulated

Liberty and property rights

Property rights only

Property rights only

Exercised by

Government

Government; Private entities

Government

Property taken
and purpose

Usually noxious; noxious

purpose
Intangible, altruistic feeling
of contributing to the
public good

Wholesome; public purpose

Wholesome: public purpose

Full and fair equivalent of the

property taken

Protection given / or public

improvements

Compensation

G.

143 Any question regarding the constitutionality of a tax measure must be resolved in favor of its validity.
Any doubt regarding the taxability of any person under a valid law must be resolved in favor of that person and against the taxing power.
Any doubt as to the applicability of a tax exemption granted to a person must be resolved against the exemption.
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d.

Delegation

Police power144
Congress may validly delegate this power to the President, to administrative bodies and to
lawmaking bodies of local government units. Local government units exercise the power under the
general welfare clause145 and under Secs. 391, 447, 458 and 468, R.A. 7160. 146
Power of Eminent Domain
Congress may validly delegate this power to the President, administrative bodies, local
government units, and even private enterprises performing public services.
Power of Taxation

Congress may validly delegate this power to local government bodies 147 and to a limited
extent, the President when granted delegated tariff powers148
2. Private Acts and the Bill of Rights
3. Due Process149
a.

Relativity of Due Process

The guaranties of due process are universal in their application to all persons within the
territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, color or nationality. The word
person includes aliens. Private corporations are within the scope of the guaranties insofar as their
properties are concerned.
b.

Procedural and Substantive Due Process

Procedural Due Process - due process was understood to relate chiefly to the mode of
procedure which government agencies must follow, it was understood as a guarantee of
procedural fairness. Its essence is a law which hears before it condemns. Thus, it serves as a
restriction on actions of judicial and quasi-judicial agencies of government.
Substantive Due Process - the due process clause must be interpreted both as a procedural
and a substantive guarantee. It must be a guarantee against the exercise of arbitrary power even
when the power is exercised according to proper forms and procedure. Thus, it serves as a
restriction on governments law and rule-making power.
c.

Constitutional and Statutory Due Process

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. 150
d.

Hierarchy of Rights

144 inherently vested in the Legislature

145 Sec. 16, R.A. 7160, see Reference
146 See Reference
147 Sec. 5, Art. X
148 Sec. 28 (2), Art. VI
149 That which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial (Darmouth

College v. Woodward, 4 Wheaton

518).

150 Art. III, Sec. 1

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The primacy of human rights over property rights are recognized.

Because these freedoms are delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our
society and the threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual
application of sanctions, they need breathing space to survive, permitting government regulation
only with narrow specificity.
Property and property rights can be lost through prescription; but human rights are
imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights us a
useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against
tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs.
Property is not a basic right. Property has an intimate relation with life and liberty.
Protection of property was a primary object of the social compact and that the absence of
such protection could well lead to anarchy and tyranny. Property is an important instrument for the
preservation and enhancement of personal dignity.
Property is as important as life and liberty and to protect their (poor) property is really to
protect their life and their liberty
e.

Judicial Standards of Review

Judicial review can only be exercised in an actual case and controversy.

This means (1) a party with a personal and substantial interest, (2) an appropriate case, (3)
a constitutional question raised at the earliest possible time, and (4) a constitutional question that
is the very lis mota of the case, i.e. an unavoidable question. 151
f.

Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine

The accused is denied the right to be informed of the charge against him, and to due
process as well, where the statute itself is couched in such indefinite language that it is not possible
for men of ordinary intelligence to determine therefrom what acts or omissions are punished and,
hence shall be avoided.152
4. Equal Protection
Nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. 153
a. Concept
All person or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed. The equal protection clause is a specific constitutional guarantee of
the Equality of the Person. The equality guarantees the legal equality or as it is usually put, the
equality of all persons before the law. Under it, each individual is dealt with as an equal person in
the law, which does not treat the person differently because of who he is or what he is or what he
possess.154
b. Requisites for Valid Classification
i. Substantial distinction

151 People v Vera, 66 Phil 56 (1937)

152 Nachura, Reviewer in Political Law, p. 131

153 Art. III, Sec.1

154 The equality guaranteed however, is not disembodied equality. It does not deny to the state the power to recognize and act upon factual differences
between individuals and classes. It recognizes that inherent in the right to legislate is the right to classify.
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i.

ii. Germane to the purpose of the law-the distinction which must make for real differences
should have reasonable relation to the purpose of the law.
iii. Not limited to existing conditions only
Must apply equally to all members of the same class
5. Searches and Seizures155
a.

Concept

Not just a circumscription of the power of the state over a persons home and possessions.
More important, it protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself. It is a guarantee of the
right of the people to be secure in their personsagainst unreasonable searches and seizures. It
is therefore also a guarantee against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint on the physical
liberty of the person. The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures
but only of unreasonable searches and seizures.
Available to all persons, including aliens whether accused of a crime or not. Artificial person
are also entitled to the guarantee, although they may be required to open their books of accounts
for examination by the state in the exercise of police and taxing powers.
b.

Warrant Requirement
1.

Requisites

1. Probable Cause156
2. Determination of probable Cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce 157
3. Must refer to one Specific offense
4. Particularity of Description 158
c. Warrantless Searches
Eight Instances of Valid Warrantless Searches and Seizures:

155

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized. (Art. III, Sec. 2).

156 Such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the warrant that in themselves are sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely on them and
act in pursuance thereof
Unlike proof of probable cause for warrant of arrest, probable cause for a search warrant need not point to a specific offender. But in either case, it should
be emphasized that what is required is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but merely probable cause. Evidence required to establish guilt is not necessary.

157 Art. III, Sec. 2

What the constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of the probable
cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of the probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examined
the complainant and his witnesses and on the basis thereof issue a warrant of arrest. He may also rely on the prosecutors report or if on the basis thereof, he
finds no probable cause, he may disregard the prosecutors report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. (Soliven V Makasiar, 167 S 393)
Where the court upheld that in the exercise of the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of the
probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. (Cruz Jr. V
People, 233 SCRA 439)
In the preliminary examination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the court is not tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the
preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that the judge personally evaluates the report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecution in
determining probable cause.

158 The court concluded in the case of People vs. Veloso, 42 P 886 that it is invariably recognized that the warrant for the apprehension of an unnamed
party is void except those causes where it contains a descriptio personae such as will enable the officer to identify the accused. The description must be
sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person upon whom the warrant is to be served. There is, however, a limit to John Doe warrants. Thus, a warrant for
the arrest of fifty John Does is of the nature of a general warrant which does not satisfy the requirement of particularity of description. (Pangandaman V
Casar 159 S 599)
The scatter-shot warrant charging more than one offense was declared null and void and the seizure of the money, which was not indicated in the
warrant was held unlawful.
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When the right is voluntarily waived159

When there is valid reason to stop-and-frisk160
Where the search (and seizure) is an incident to a lawful arrest 161.
Search of Vessels and Aircrafts 162
Search of Moving Vehicles/Automobiles at borders or constructive borders 163.
Where prohibited articles are in plain view164
Inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building
regulations
8. Search and Seizure under exigent and emergency circumstances 165
1. Conduct of areal target zoning and saturation drive in the exercise of military powers of the
President
10. Visual search at checkpoints
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

d. Warrantless Arrests
Instances of Valid Warrantless Arrests 166
A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
1.

When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing
or is attempting to commit an offense167

2.

When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
committed it168

159 Requisites of Valid Waiver

1.That the right exists
2.That the persons involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive of the existence of such right
3.That the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right

160 The vernacular designation of the right of

a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him and pat him for weapon(s). (Terry V Ohio 392

US 1)

161 Rule: Apply strictly Rule 126, Sec. 13, 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure:
A person lawfully arrested maybe searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an
offense without a search warrant.

162 Where a fishing vessel found to be violating fishery laws maybe seized without a warrant on two grounds: firstly, because they are usually equipped

with powerful motors that enable them to elude pursuit and secondly, because the seizure would be an incident to a lawful arrest. (Roldan VS Arca, 65 S
336)

163 Rule: Vehicles/automobiles may be searched only at borders or constructive borders. Search made within the interior of territory is justified only if
there is probable cause.

164 Under this exception, the objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure
and maybe introduced in evidence.
Rule: The discovery must be Inadvertent
Thus, if an officer encounters prohibited objects only after poking around, the discovery would not be inadvertent.

165 Where the SC deemed it a bounded duty, in light of advertence thereto by the parties, to delve into the legality of the warrantless search conducted by
the raiding team. The instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against warrantless search. There was general chaos and disorder at that
time because of the simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel
forces. The courts in the surrounding areas were obviously closed and for that matter, the building and houses therein were deserted. The raiding team had no
opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be
dispensed with. (People VS de Gracia, July 6, 1994)

166 Sec. 5, Rule 113, 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure167 The most common application of this in flagrante delicto rule is the buy-bust operation conducted to enforce the Dangerous Drugs Act. A buy-bust
operation is a form of entrapment. The method is for an officer to pose as a buyer. He however neither instigates nor induces the accused to commit a crime
because in these cases the seller has already decided to commit a crime. Since the offense happens right before the eyes of the officer, there is no need for a
warrant either for the seizure of the goods or for the apprehension of the offender (People V Burgos)

168 Sec. 5 (b) is otherwise known as the rule on hot pursuit arrests. In effecting this type of arrest, it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to
believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. The fact of the commission of the
offense must be undisputed.
Law enforcement officers may not actually witness the execution of acts constituting the offense, but they must have direct knowledge or view of the crime
right after its commission. They should know for a fact that a crime was committed.
Also, the arresting officers themselves must have personal knowledge of facts showing that the person to be arrested, the suspect, performed the criminal
act.
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1. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
e. Administrative Arrests169
Warrant of Arrest may be issued by administrative authorities but only for purpose of
carrying out a final finding of a violation of a law, cannot be for purpose of investigation.
f. Drug, Alcohol and Blood Tests
6. Privacy of Communications and Correspondence
a. Private and Public Communications
b. Writ of Habeas Data
It is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding
the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
7. Freedom of Expression
a. Concept and Scope
(1) Prior Restraint170
Prior restraint means official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of
expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination. Its most blatant form is a system of
licensing administered by an executive officer. Movie Censorship, although not placed on the same
level as press censorship, also belongs to this type of prior restraint. The guarantee of freedom of
expression also means a limitation on the power of the state to impose subsequent punishment.
2.

Subsequent Punishment

Without this assurance, the individual would hesitate to speak for fear that he might be held
to account for his speech, or that he might be provoking the vengeance of the officials he may have
criticized. However, the freedom is not absolute, and may be properly regulated in the interest of
the public. Accordingly, the state may validly impose penal and/or administrative sanctions, such as
in the following:
1. Libel171
2. Obscenity172
3. Criticism of Official Conduct 173

169 Where the SC ruled that the constitutional provision against unreasonable searches and seizures does not require judicial intervention in the execution
of a final order of deportation issued in accordance with law. It contemplates an order of arrest in the exercise of judicial power as a step preliminary to
prosecution for a given offense of administrative action, not as a measure indispensable to carry out a valid decision by a competent official, such as legal
order or deportation issued by the Commission on Immigration in pursuance of a valid legislation. The requirement for probable cause does not extend to
deportation proceedings. (Morano V Vivo, 20 S 562)

170 censorship
The constitution, as the paramount law, is exempt from the previous restraints by the executive and legislative branches. Therefore, constitutional
guaranties like liberty of the press are superior over legislative acts or law.

171 A public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, conditions, status, or circumstance tending
to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical persons, or to blacken the memory or one who is dead.

172 The determination of what is obscene is a judicial function

173 Where the court said that a publication that tends to impede, embarrass or obstruct the court and

constitutes a clear and present danger to the

administration of justice is not protected by the guarantee of press freedom and punishable by contempt. (In re: Atty. Jurado)
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b. Content-Based and Content-Neutral Regulations

OBrien Test:
1. It is within the constitutional power of the Government
2. It furthers an important or substantial governmental interest
3. The governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression
4. If the incidental restriction on alleged freedom is no greater than is essential to that
interest
c. Facial Challenges and the Overbreadth Doctrine
Facial Challenge
A manner of challenging a statute in court, in which the plaintiff alleges that the statute is
always, and under all circumstances, unconstitutional, and therefore, void.
Overbreadth Doctrine
Permits a party to challenge to a statute even though, as applied to him, it is not
unconstitutional, but it might be if applied to others not before the Court whose activities are
constitutionally protected.
d. Tests
1. Clear and Present Danger Rule whether the words are used in such circumstance and of
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evils that the state has the right to prevent.174
2. Dangerous Tendency Rule if the words uttered create a dangerous tendency of an evil
which the State has the right to prevent.175
3. Balancing of Interests test when particular conduct is regulated in the interests of public
order, and the regulations results in an indirect, conditional, partial abridgment of speech, the duty
of the courts is to determine which of the two conflicting interests demands the greater protection
under the particular circumstances presented.
e. State Regulation of Different Types of Mass Media
f. Commercial Speech
Communication which no more than proposes a commercial
transaction.176
A Senator was punished for contempt for having attacked a decision of the Supreme Court which he called incompetent and narrow minded, and
announcing that he would file a bill for its reorganization. (In re Sotto)

174 The substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of immense extremely high before utterances can be punished.
Clear means causal connection between danger of substantive evil arising from utterance questioned;
immediate danger; Thus, danger must not only be probable but very likely inevitable.)

Present refers to time-imminent and

175 Under

this rule, the constitutionality of a statute curtailing speech is determined in the same manner that the constitutionality of any statute is
determined, namely by answering the question whether a statute is reasonable.
That if the words uttered create a dangerous tendency of an evil which the state has the right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is sufficient if
the natural tendency and the probable effect of the utterance were to bring about the substantive evil that the legislative body seeks to prevent. (Cabansag V
Fernandez, 102 Phil 152)

176 To enjoy protection:

1. It must not be false or misleading; and
2. It should not propose an illegal transaction.
May be regulated if:
1. Government has a substantial interest to protect;
2. The regulation directly advances that interest; and
3. It is not more extensive than is necessary to protect that
interest. (Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of NY, 447 US 557)
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g. Private v. Government Speech

h. Hecklers Veto
Occurs when an acting party's right to freedom of speech is curtailed or restricted by the
government in order to prevent a reacting party's behavior. The common example is that of
demonstrators177 causing a speech178 to be terminated in order to preserve the peace.179
8. Freedom of Religion
a. Non-Establishment Clause
The State cannot set up a church, nor pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religion, or
prefer one religion over another nor force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from
Church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. 180
The intermediate views are chiefly two: (1) the non-establishment clause prohibits only
direct support of institutional religion but not support indirectly accruing to churches and church
agencies through support given to members; (2) both direct and indirect aid to religion are
prohibited but only if the support involves preference of one religion over another or preference of
religion over irreligion.
While there is no unanimity in non-establishment as a political principle, there is substantial
agreement on the values non-establishment seeks to protect. There are two: voluntarism and
insulation of the political process from interfaith dissension. 181
b. Free Exercise Clause
At the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human
conscience.
1. Right to Believe absolute
2. Right to act according to ones beliefs subject to state regulation
The absoluteness of the freedom to believe carries with it the corollary that the government,
while it may look into the good faith of a person, cannot inquire into a persons religious
pretensions. Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their
religious doctrines or beliefs. The moment however, belief flows over into action, it becomes subject
to government regulation.
9. Liberty of Abode and Freedom of Movement182

177 reacting party

178 given by the acting party
179 The term was coined by University of Chicago professor of law Harry Kalven.
180 This reinforces Sec. 6, Art.II, as the separation of Church and State.
181 In effect, therefore, what non-establishment calls for is government neutrality in religious matters. Such government neutrality may be summarized in
four general propositions:
1.Government must not prefer one religion over another or religion over irreligion because such preference would violate voluntarism and breed dissension;
2.Government funds must not be applied to religious purposes because this too would violate voluntarism and breed interfaith dissension;
3.Government action must not aid religion because this too can violate voluntarism and breed interfaith dissension;
4.Government action must not result in excessive entanglement with religion because this too can violate voluntarism and breed interfaith dissension.

182 It may be impaired even without the court order, but the appropriate executive officer is not assumed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations.
He can impose limits only on the basis of national security, public safety or public health and as may be provided by law.
Impairment of this liberty, moreover, must be subject to judicial review as even measures taken by the executive are subject to judicial review. The
constitution itself sets down the measure of allowable impairment: necessity in the interest of national security, public safety or public health as well as
explicit provisions of statutory law or the Rules of Court. Thus, for instance, a person who is out of bail may be prevented from leaving the country. The
right to travel should not be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal
cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, process and other means necessary to
carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer.
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The liberty of Abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not
be impaired.
a. Limitations
1. Liberty of abode - upon lawful order of the court
2. Right to travel a.

In the interest of national security, public safety, public health, as may be

provided by law;
ii. any person on bail183
b. Return to Ones County
Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own and to return to his country. 184
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country. 185
10. Right to Information
a. Limitations
i. National Security and intelligence information 186
ii. Trade or Industrial Secrets187
iii. Criminal matters188
iv. Other Confidential information.189
b. Publication of Laws and Regulations
Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their
existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and
give proper notice to the people.
c. Access to Court Records
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. 190

183 Silverio vs. CA, G.R. No. 94284. April 8, 1991.

184 Art. 13(2), Universal Declaration of Human Rights
185 Art. 12(4), Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
186 This jurisdiction recognizes the common law holding that there is a governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets
regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters. Likewise, information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties
and executive agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest;

187 pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code (RA No. 8293,approved on June 6,1997 & other related laws) and Banking Transactions (pursuant to the
Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act (RA No. 1405, as amended)].

188 such as those relating to the apprehension, the prosecution and the detention of criminals which courts may not inquire into prior to such arrest,
detention and prosecution;

189 The Ethical Standards Act (RA 6713, enacted on Feb.20,1989) further prohibits public officials and employees from using or divulging confidential
or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public. (Sec, 7[c], ibid.). Other acknowledged
limitations to information access include diplomatic correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings and Executive sessions of either house of Congress, as
well as the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court. (Chavez V PCGG,299 S 744)

190 Art. III, Sec. 7

The constitutional right, however, does not mean that every day is an open house in public offices. The right given by the Constitution is subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law. Thus, while access to official records may not be prohibited, it certainly may be regulated. The regulation can come
either from statutory law and from what the Supreme Court has called the inherent power [of an officer] to control his office and the records under his
custody and to. Exercise [same discretion] as to the manner in which persons desiring to inspect, examine or copy the record may exercise their rights. The
question then boils down to a determination of the scope of official regulatory discretion.
In determining the allowable scope of official limitation on access to official records, it is important to keep in mind that the two sentences of Sec.7
guarantee only one general right, that is, the right to information on matters of public concern. The right of access to official record is given as an
Avancena | 87

d. Right to Information Relative to

(1) Government Contract Negotiations
The right to information contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation
of the transaction. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is
consummated, or if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects.
However, the right only affords access to records, documents and papers, which means the
opportunity to inspect and copy them at his expense. The exercise is also subject to reasonable
regulations to protect the integrity of public records and to minimize disruption of government
operations.191
(2) Diplomatic Negotiations
Recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction. It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege
is only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as privileged
does not mean that it will be considered privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration of the
context in which the claim is made may it be determined if there is a public interest that calls for
the disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally privileged
status.192
11. Right of Association
It shall not be impaired without due process of law. 193
12. Eminent Domain194
a. Concept
This is also known as the power of expropriation, it is described as the highest and most
exact idea of property remaining in the government that may be acquired for some public purpose
through a method in the nature of a compulsory sale to the state.
b. Expansive Concept of "Public Use"
Any use directly available to the general public as a matter of right and not merely of
forbearance or accommodation. It does not matter whether the direct use of the expropriated
property by the public be for free or for a fee. Any member of the general public, as such, can
demand the right to use the converted property for his direct and personal convenience.
This cover uses which, while not directly available to the public, redound to their indirect
advantage or benefit.
c. Just Compensation
(1) Determination

implementation of the right to information. Thus, the right to information on matters of public concern is both the purpose and the limit of the right of access
to public documents. Thus, too, regulatory discretion must include both authority to determine the manner of access to them.

191 Chavez vs. PEA and Amari, G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002
192 Akbayan, et al. vs. Thomas Aquino, et al., G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008

193 Also guarantees the right not to join an association.

194 It is well settled that eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that need not be granted even by the fundamental law. Se. 9, Art. III of the
Constitution, in mandating that private property shall not betaken without just compensation, merely imposes a limit on the governments exercise of this
power and provides a measure of protection to the individuals right to property. An ejectment suit should not ordinarily prevail over the States power of
eminent domain. (Republic v. Tagle, G.R. No. 129079, December 2, 1998)
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The full and fair equivalent of the property taken; it is the fair market value of the property,
to which must be added the consequential damages, if any, minus the consequential benefits, if
any, but in no case shall the consequential benefits exceed the consequential damages. 195
(2) Effect of Delay
Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just, for the property owner is
made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to
wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.
d. Abandonment of Intended Use and Right of Repurchase
The property owners right to repurchase the property depends upon the character of the
title acquired by the expropriator, i.e., if land is expropriated for a particular purpose with the
condition that when that purpose is ended or abandoned, the property shall revert to the former
owner, then the former owner can re-acquire the property. In this case, the terms of the judgment in
the expropriation case were very clear and unequivocal, granting title to the lot in fee simple to the
Republic. No condition on the right to repurchase was imposed. 196
e. Miscellaneous Application
Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. 197
The State may, in the interest of national welfare or defense, establish and operate vital
industries and, upon payment of just compensation, transfer to public ownership utilities and other
private enterprises to be operated by the Government. 198
The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of
farmers and regular farm workers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till
or, in the case of other farm workers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the
State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such
priorities and retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological,
developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In
determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall
further provide incentives for voluntary land- sharing. 199
The State shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation with the
private sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make available at
affordable cost decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in
urban centers and resettlement areas. It shall also promote adequate employment opportunities to
such citizens. In the implementation of such program the State shall respect the right of small
property owners.200
13. Contract Clause
No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public
utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations
organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by
such citizens; nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a
longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the
condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the

195 The ascertainment of what constitutes just compensation for property taken in eminent domain cases is a judicial prerogative, and PD 76, which fixes
payment on the basis of the assessment by the assessor or the declared valuation by the owner, is unconstitutional. (EPZA v. Dulay, 148 SCRA 305)

196 Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139495, November 27, 2000
197 Art. III, Sec. 9
198 Art. XII, Sec. 18
199 Art. XIII, Secs. 4 & 9
200 Sec. 9
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common good so requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in public utilities by the
general public. The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility
enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive and
managing officers of such corporation or association must be citizens of the Philippines. 201
a. Contemporary Application of the Contract Clause
The contract clause protects public contracts, including onerous franchises and privileges
granted by the state. The charter itself constitutes a contract with the state.
The reservation was made in Article XII, Section 11 of the Constitution. With or without a
reservation clause, franchises are subject to alterations through a reasonable exercise of the police
power. They are also subject to alterations by the power to tax which like police power, cannot be
contracted away.
14. Legal Assistance and Free Access to Courts
Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not
be denied to any person by reason of poverty. 202
15. Rights of Suspects203
a.
b.
c.
d.

Right to Remain Silent204

Right to a competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice
Right to be provided with the services of counsel if he cannot afford the services of one 205
Right to be informed of such rights206
a. Availability

Available only under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense. 207

201 Sec. 11
202 ibid
203 Art. III, Sec. 12
204 Under the right against self-incrimination in Sec. 17, only an accused has the absolute right to remain silent. A person who is not an accused may
assume the stance of silence only when asked an incriminating question. Under Sec. 12, however, a person under investigation has the right to refuse to
answer any question. His silence, moreover, may not be used against him.

205 RA 7438, Sec. 2(a) provides that . Any person under arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall be at all times be assisted by counsel.
Where the court ruled that the right to counsel is intended to preclude the slightest coercion or would lead the accused to admit false. The lawyer,
however, should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. (People Vs Enanoria)
Where the court ruled that the Constitution requires that counsel be independent. Obviously, he cannot be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor,
counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. (People V Bandula 232 SCRA 566)
The right to counsel does not mean the accused must personally hire his own counsel. The constitutional requirement is satisfied when a counsel is
engaged by acting on behalf of the person under investigation or appointed by the court upon petition by said persons or by someone on his behalf.

206 The right guaranteed here is more than what is shown in television shows where the police routinely reads out the rights from a note card. As People V
Rojas 147 S 169 put it:
When the Constitution requires a person under investigation to be informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel, it must be presumed to
contemplate the transmission of a meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. As
a rule, therefore, it would not be sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of the Constitution. He is not
only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitled; he must also explain their effects in practical terms.
In other words, the right of a person under investigation to be informed implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain,
and contemplates an effective communication that results in understanding what is conveyed. Short of this, there is denial of the right, as it cannot then truly
be said that the person has been informed of his rights.

207 Jurisprudence under the 1987 Constitution has consistently held the stricter view, that the rights begin to be available only when the person is already
in custody. As Justice Regalado emphasized in People V Marra 236 S 565:
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of his freedom of action in any significant way. It is only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on
a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating
statements that the rule begins to operate.
Custodial investigation begins the moment an incriminating question is asked. But note RA 7438 which defines moment of invitation as start of custodial
investigation.
RA 7438, Custodial investigation shall include the practice of issuing an invitation to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he
is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the inviting officer for any violation of law.
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b. Requisites
1. The person in custody must be informed at the outset in clear and unequivocal terms that
he has a right to remain silent.
2. After being so informed, he must be told that anything he says can and will be used
against him in court.
3. He must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the
lawyer with him during the interrogation.
4. He should be warned that not only has he the right to consult with a lawyer but also that
if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.
5. Even if the person consents to answer questions without the assistance of counsel, the
moment he asks for a lawyer at any point in the investigation, the interrogation must cease until an
attorney is present.
6. If the foregoing protections and warnings are not demonstrated during the trial to have
been observed by the prosecution, no evidence obtained as a result of the interrogation can be
used against him.
c. Waiver
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of his counsel. 208
16. Rights of the Accused209
a. Criminal Due Process
a. accused to be heard in court of competent jurisdiction;
b. accused proceeded against under orderly processes of law;
c. accused given notice and opportunity to be heard;
d. judgment rendered was within the authority of constitutional law.
b. Bail210
All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties,
or be released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this rule:
a. Before or after conviction by the MTC, and
b. Before conviction of the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment. 211
Upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit the accused to bail.

208 Art. III, Section 12 (1), last sentence

The right to counsel during custodial investigation is not waived by reason of failure to make a timely objection before plea. There can only be a valid
waiver of the right if such right is in writing and in the presence of counsel as mandated by Art. III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution and the pertinent
provisions of R.A. 7438. (People vs. Buluran, et al., G.R. No. 113940, February 15, 2000).
Even if the confession of the accused is gospel truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the
absence of coercion, or even if it was voluntary given (People vs. Camat, et al., G.R. No. 112262, April 2, 19960). This refers to custodial investigation only.

209 Ibid, Sec. 14

210 The security given for the release of a person in custody of law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as
required under conditions specified under the rules of court. (see Sec. 1, Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure).

211 Rule 114, Sec. 4, RoC

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The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty after the
same bail bond during the period to appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20
years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail previously granted shall be cancelled, upon
showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, under certain circumstances. 212
No person, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution, shall be admitted to bail if:
a. charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment; and
(b.) evidence of guilt is strong.213
c. Presumption of Innocence
Every circumstance favoring the innocence of the accused must be taken into account. 214
d. Right to be Heard
The more active role of the accused in expressing the right to be heard includes three
specific rights:
1.
2.
3.

the right to present evidence215 and to be present at the trial,216

the right to be assisted by counsel,
the right to compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf.
e. Assistance of Counsel217

The accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself
to the cause of the defense and acts accordingly; an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance,
and not simply a perfunctory representation (People v. Bermas, G.R. No. 120420, April 21, 1999).
f. Right to be Informed
Description not designation of the offense is controlling.
g. Right to Speedy, Impartial and Public Trial
Speedy free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays;
Impartial accused entitled to cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
Public to prevent possible abuses which may be committed against the accused.
h. Right of Confrontation218

212 (a) that the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteracion;
(b) that the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid
justification;
(c) that the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or under conditional pardon;
(d) that the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) that there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit another crime. (Rule 114, Sec. 5)

213 Ibid, Sec. 7

214 The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. (People v. Austria, 195 SCRA
700)

215 The right to present evidence includes the right to testify in ones favor and the right to be given time to call witnesses. If accused of two offenses, he
is entitle to trial of each case, and its error for the court to consider in one case the evidence adduced against him in another. The substantial rights of the
accused should not be impaired because of his counsels anxiousness to have him promptly acquitted.

216 An important facet of the right to be heard is the right to be present at the trial. In all criminal prosecutions the accused has an absolute right to be
personally present during the entire proceedings from arraignment to sentence if he so desires. It has in fact been held that, because of the new provision
allowing trial in absentia, the right of the accused to be present may be waived totally except when his presence is needed for purposes of identification.

217 Right to counsel during the trial is not subject to waiver (Flores v. Ruiz, 90 SCRA 428).
218 Witnesses not submitted for cross-examination not admissible as evidence;
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Closely connected with and equally essential as the right to be heard is the right to meet
the witness face to face or as Rule 115, Sec. 1(f) of the New Rules of Court expresses it, to
confront and cross-examine the witness against him at the trial. The right has a twofold purpose:
1. to afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of the witness by crossexamination,
2. to allow the judge to observe the deportment of the witness
i. Compulsory Process
Equally important as the right to counsel is the right to compulsory process for the
attendance of the witnesses. The accused, however, may not invoke this right on appeal if he made
no effort during the trial to avail himself of it.
j. Trials In Absentia219
Trial in absentia can be had only if the 3 conditions concur:
1. accused has been arraigned220
2. notice of the trial was duly served to him and properly returned
3. his failure to appear is unjustified
17. Writ of Habeas Corpus221
A writ issued by court directed to person detaining another, commanding him to produce the
body of the prisoner at designated time and place, with the day and cause of his capture and
detention, to do, to submit to, and to receive whatever court or judge awarding writ shall consider
in his behalf. (Nachura, Reviewer in Political Law, p. 135).
a. Writ of Amparo222
A remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearance or
threats thereof.
18. Self-Incrimination Clause
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. 223
Right to cross-examination may be waived.
Closely connected with and equally essential as the right to be heard is the right to meet the witness face to face or as Rule 115, Sec. 1(f) of the New
Rules of Court expresses it, to confront and cross-examine the witness against him at the trial. The right has a twofold purpose:
1. to afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of the witness by cross-examination,
2. to allow the judge to observe the deportment of the witness

219 Trial in Absentia can also take place when the accused voluntarily waives his right to be present.
Restrictive Conditions for allowing Waiver:
The right may be waived Provided that after arraignment he may be compelled to appear for the purpose of identification of witnesses of the prosecution,
or provided he unqualifiedly admits in open court after his arraignment that he is the person named as the defendant in the case on trial. Reason for requiring
the presence of the accused, despite his waiver, is, if allowed to be absent in all the stages of the proceeding without giving the Peoples witnesses the
opportunity to identify him in court, he may in his defense say that he was never identified as the person charged in the information and therefore, is entitled
to acquittal. Thus, for an accused to be excused from attending trial, it is not enough that he vaguely agrees to be identified by witnesses in his absence. He
must unqualifiedly admit that every time a witness mentions a name by which he is known, the witness is to be understood as referring to him.

220 The presence of the accused at arraignment is an absolute requisite for any trial to proceed, the reason being that it is at arraignment that the accused is
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him and it is then that the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person

221 Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a persons liberty has been judicially adjudged to be illegal or unlawful (In Re: Petition for Habeas
Corpus of Wilfredo S. Sumulong-Torres, 251 SCRA 709).

222

It is an effective and inexpensive instrument for the protection of constitutional rights (Azcuna, The Writ of Amparo: A Remedy to Enforce
Fundamental Rights, 37 Ateneo L.J. 15 (1993).

223 Sec. 17
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a. Scope and Coverage

Available not only in criminal proceedings, but also in all other government proceedings,
including civil actions and administrative or legislative investigations. May be claimed not only by
accused but by witness to whom an incriminating question is addressed.
(1) Foreign Laws
b. Application
Applies only to testimonial compulsion 224 and production of documents, papers and chattels
in court except when books of account are to be examined in exercise of power of taxation and
police power.
c. Immunity Statutes
Transactional Immunity Statute the testimony of any person or whose possession of
documents or other evidence necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation
conducted is immune from criminal prosecution for an offense to which such compelled testimony
relates.225
Use and Fruit Immunity Statute prohibits the use of a witness compelled testimony and its
fruits in any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness. 226
19. Involuntary Servitude and Political Prisoners
Involuntary Servitude
General Rule: No involuntary Servitude shall exist.
Except:
a. as punishment for a crime whereof one has been duly convicted 227
b. service in defense of the state228
c. naval enlistment229
d. posse comitatus230
e. return to work order in industries affected with public interest 231 and
f. patria potestas232
Political Prisoners
No person shall be detained by reason of his political beliefs or aspirations. 233
20. Excessive Fines and Cruel and Inhuman Punishments 234

224 The Kernel of the right is NOT against ALL compulsion but testimonial compulsion only; i.e. extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of
his guilt. Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing and paraffin testing.

225 Art. XIII, Sec. 18 (8)

226 Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274
227 Art. III, Sec. 18(2)
228 Art. II, Sec 4
229 Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 US 275
230 US v. Pompeya, 31 Phil. 245
231 Kaisahan ng Mangagawa sa Kahoy v. Gotamco Sawmills, G.R. No. L-1573.

March 29, 1948

232 Art. 211, par.(2), FC

233 Art. III, Sec. 18

234 Ibid, Sec. 19
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Prohibited punishment - mere severity does not constitute cruel or unusual punishment. To
violate constitutional guarantee, penalty must be flagrant and plainly oppressive, disproportionate
to nature of offense as to shock senses of community.
21. Non-Imprisonment for Debts
No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of poll tax. 235
22. Double Jeopardy236
a. Requisites237
a. valid complaint or information;
b. filed before competent court;
c. to which defendant has pleaded; and
d. defendant was previously acquitted or convicted or the case dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent238
b. Motions for Reconsideration and Appeals
Basis for Motion for Reconsideration:
i. New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the decision rendered.
ii. The decision is not supported by the evidence on record, or errors of law or irregularities
have been committed which are prejudicial to the interest of the respondent
Appeals
The rule on double jeopardy prohibits the state from appealing or filing a petition for review
of a judgment of acquittal that was based on the merits of the case. Certiorari will issue only to
correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the
lower court.239
The prosecution can appeal if the accused waived or is estopped from invoking his right. 240
Appeal from the order of dismissal by the lower court is not foreclosed by the rule on double
jeopardy where the order of dismissal was issued before arraignment. 241
If the accused appeals his conviction, he waives his right to plead double jeopardy. The
whole case will be open to review by the appellate court. Such court may even increase the
penalties imposed on the accused by the trial court.
c. Dismissal with Consent of Accused

235 ibid, Sec. 20

236 Two types:
1. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense;
2. If an act is punishable by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
Crimes covered:
1. same offense; or attempt to commit or frustration thereof or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in
original complaint or information; and
2. when an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall bar another prosecution for the same act.

237

With the presence of the requisites the accused cannot be prosecuted anew for an identical offense or for any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof or for any offense which necessarily included in the offense charged in the original complaint or information

238 People v. Ylagan, 58 Phil 851

239 PP vs. CA and Maquiling June 21, 1999

240 PP vs. Obsania 23 SCRA 1249

241 Martinez vs CA 237 SCRA 575
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Does not put accused in first jeopardy, except:

a. when ground for dismissal is insufficiency of evidence; or
b. when the proceedings have been unreasonably prolonged as to violate the right of the accused
to a speedy trial.
23. Ex Post Facto Laws and Bills of Attainder
Ex post facto law242
Kinds:
a. law making an act criminal which was not before its passage;
b. law aggravating penalty for crime committed before passage;
c. law inflicting greater or more severe penalty;
d. law altering legal rules of evidence and receive less or different testimony than law required at
time of commission, in order to convict accused;
e. law assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty
f. of deprivation of right for something which when done was lawful;
g. law depriving accused of some lawful protection to which he had been entitled, such a protection
of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.
Bill of attainder - legislative act that inflicts punishment without trial; legislative
declaration of guilt.
*** Judge Singco Notes

Social Justice Society, et al. v. Atienza, Jr., GR No. 156052, February 13, 2008Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to property. They allege that they stand
to lose billions of pesos if forced [to] relocate. However, based on the hierarchy of
constitutionally protected rights, the right to life enjoys precedence over the right to
property. The reason is obvious: life is irreplaceable, property is not. When the state or [local
government unit] LGUs exercise of police power clashes with a few individuals right to property,
the former should prevail,.
-

Carlos Superdrug Corp. vs. DSWD,et al., GR No. 166494, June 29, 2007
(Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003)- When conditions so demand, as
determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power
because property rights, though sheltered by due process clause, must yield to the
general welfare.

Yrasuegi vs. PAL, Inc., 565 SCRA 467- In the absence of governmental interference,
the liberties guaranteed by the constitution cannot be invoked. The Bill of Rights is not
meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals.

Procedural Due Process- Banco Espaol-Filipino vs. Palanca Serano vs NLRC, 323
SCRA 445- Due process clause of the constitution is a limitation on government powers.
It does not apply to the exercise of private power, such as the termination of
employment under the Labor Code.

242 Characteristics:
1. refers to criminal matters;
2. retroactive; and
3. prejudice the accused.
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Chavez vs. Romulo, 431 SCRA 534- The license to carry firearm is neither a property
nor a property right. Neither does it create a vested right. A permit to carry a firearm
outside of ones residence maybe revoked at anytime.

MMDA vs. Garin, GR No. 130230, April 15, 2005- A license to operate a motor
vehicle is not a property right, but a privilege granted by the State, which may be
suspended or revoked by the State in the exercise of police power.

Mercury Drug Corp. vs. Serrano, March 10, 2006- In dismissing an employee, the
employer must serve the employee two notices: (1) the first to inform the employee of
the particular acts or omissions for which the employer seeks his dismissal, and (2) the
second to inform the employee of his employers decision to terminate him. The first
notice must state that the employer seeks dismissal for the act or omission charged
against the employee, otherwise, the notice does not comply with the rules.

Macias vs. Macias, September 3, 2003- Denial of due process suffices to cast on the
official act taken by whatever branch of the government the impress of nullity.

Estrada vs. Desierto, April 3, 2001- Alleged violations of the right to impartiality due
to adverse publicity must be substantiated by proof of actual prejudice.

Alauya vs. COMELEC, 395 SCRA 742- due process is satisfied even if there was no oral
argument if a party was able to file pleadings.

INSTANCES WHEN HEARINGS ARE NOT NECESSARY :

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

When administrative agencies are exercising their quasi-legislative functions;

Abatement of nuisance per se;
Granting by courts of provisional remedies;
Preventive suspension; (Co. Vs. Barbers)
Removal of temporary employees in the government service;
Issuance of warrants of distraint and/or levy by the BIR Commissioner;
Cancellation of passport of a person charged with a crime;
Issuance of sequestration orders
Judicial order which prevents an accused from traveling abroad
Suspension of banks operations by the Monetary Board upon a prima facie
finding of liquidity problems in such bank.
11. Extradition proceedings ([evaluation stage]- Sec of Justice vs. Lantion; Cuevas
vs. Munoz, 2000)
12. Reinvestigation (criminal cases)
Ang Tibay vs. CIR, Administrative Due Process
Equal Protection of the Law

Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, GR No. 179817, June 27, 2008 Election to Congress
is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and
duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.

People vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689, Election to the position of a Congressman is
not reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties
of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.

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USA vs. Puruganan, September 3, 2002- The position of Congressman is not a

reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of
the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest
and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those
belonging to the same class.

Farias vs. Executive Secretary, 417 SCRA 503, December 10, 2003,
Substantive distinctions exist between elective officials and appointive officials.
The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the people while the
latter hold their office by virtue of their designation by an appointing authority.

PAGCOR vs. BIR, GR No. 172087, March 15, 2011- PAGCOR cannot find
support in the equal protection clause of the constitution. It was granted a
franchise , subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress.

Section 2- Unreasonable searches & seizures

-

The right to security of a person- (Secretary of National Defense vs.

Manalo, GR No. 180908, October 7, 2008)-is a gurarantee of protection of
ones rights by the government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is
built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Art. III, Sec. 1 of the
1987 constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and
guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Art. III, Sec. 2.

PROBABLE CAUSE- Read: Stone Hill vs. Diokno; Lim vs. Felix; Webb vs. de Leon;
Roan vs. Gonzales; Papa vs. Mago; Aniag vs. COMELEC.

Del Rosario vs. People, May 31, 2001- Seizure of evidence in plain view is
justified only when:
1. there is prior valid intrusion based on a valid warrantless arrest in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
2. the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to
be there where they are;
3. the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
4. plain view justified the seizure without further search conducted.

Manalili vs. CA, 280 SCRA 400- The following are valid warrantless searches
and seizures:
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.

6.

Search incidental to lawful arrest (PP vs. Tiu Won Chua, 405 SCRA 280; PP vs.
Estella, 395 SCRA 553);
search of a moving vehicle (PP vs. Tampis, 407 SCRA 582);
seizure in plain view (PP vs. Go, 411 SCRA 81, The counterfeit nature of the
seals and stamps was not apparent and established until after they have been
turned over to the Chinese embassy and the Bureau of Immigration for
verification. Hence, not considered as evidence in plain view);
customs search (Salvador vs. PP, July 15, 2005);
waiver by the accused( 1. right to be waived exists; 2. person waiving has
knowledge of such right, actually or constructively; and 3. he/she has actual
intention to relinquish the right.) Silahis Intl Hotel vs. Soluta, Feb. 20,
2006; Valdez vs. People, 538 SCRA 611)- It is the State which has the
burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent
was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given.
stop & frisk (limited protective search); Terry Search (Terry vs, Ohio,
1968; Malacat vs CA, Dec. 1, 1997) it is a stop of a person by law
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enforcement officer based upon reasonable suspicion that a person may have
been engaged in criminal activity, whereas an arrest requires probable cause
that a suspect committed a criminal offense.
7. Armed conflict (war time)
8. Check points (limited to visual search; PP vs. Escao, GR No. 129756-58,
January 28, 2000);
9. Exigent and emergency circumstances (PP vs. De Gracia, 233 SCRA 716),
where a warrantless search was allowed where there was a prevailing general
chaos and disorder because of an ongoing coup;
10. Conduct of Area Target Zone and Saturation Drives in the exercise of
military powers of the President (Guanzon vs. Villa, 181 SCRA 623);
11. Routine Airport Security Procedure (PP vs. Suzuki, October 23, 2003; PP vs.
Johnson, GR No. 138881, December 18, 2000).
WARRANTLESS ARREST
HOT PURSUIT- Requisites:
1.The pursuit of the offender by the arresting officer must be continuous from
the time of the commission of the offense to the time of the arrest.
2.There must be no supervening event which breaks the continuity of the
chase.
-

Ladlad/Beltran, et al. vs. Gonzales/Velasco, June 1, 2007- Inquest

proceedings are proper only when the accused has been lawfully arrested without
warrant.

PP vs. dela Cruz, 571 SCRA 469- arrest in flagrante delicto to be availed,
the following requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing
or is attempting to commit a crime. (2) such commission of a crime must be done
in the presence and within the view of the arresting officer.

PP vs. Del Rosario, 305 SCRA 740, There must be a large measure of
immediacy between the time of the offense was committed and the time of the
warrantless arrest. If there was an appreaciable lapse of time between the arrest
and the commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured.

Padilla vs. CA, 269 SCRA 402, When the law speaks of a crime committed in the
presence of an arresting officer, it is not limited to actually seeing the commission
of the crime. The requirement of the law is complied where the arresting
officer was within an earshot from the scene although he did not personally
witness the commission of the crime.

PP vs. Martin, 193 SCRA 57, The Bill of Rights is protection against the State.
The protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be
extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within
the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. Right applies only
against the government and agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law.

Only a judge may validly issue a warrant- EXCEPT: By administrative authorities

(CID; BOC) only for the purpose of carrying out a final finding of violation of law.

Jackson vs. Macalino, November 24, 2003- the Commissioner of the Immigration
can issue a warrant of arrest against a foreigner who has been ordered to be
deported.

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SCATTER SHOT WARRANT- is a warrant having been issued to more than one
offense.

PRECISE AND MINUTE DETAIL AS TO THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED AND

THINGS OR PERSONS TO BE SEIZED NOT REQUIRED- the constitution does
not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute
detail as to no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities; TECHNICAL
DESCRIPTION IS NOT REQUIRED- It is only necessary that there be reasonable
certainty or particularity as to the identity of the property to be searched for and
seized so that the warrant shall not be a mere roving commission. THE TEST as
would be as to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer
executing the warrant. VALLEJO VS. CA, 427 SCRA 658, April 14, 2004.

Administrative arrest-Causes:
i. If you breach peace or if you are planning to do so, you
can be arrested but only if it is absolutely necessary to
do so. You will be freed as soon as you no longer
represent a threat to public security.
ii. If you disrupt a court hearing;
iii. If you are in a drunken state on the public highway;
iv. In case of brawling;
v. If you block traffic without authorization;
vi. If you refuse to give your ID documents or if these are
questionable;
vii.If you are in the country illegally.

Section 3- Privacy of communication & correspondence-

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In the matter of petition for habeas corpus of Capt. G. Alejano, et al. vs.
Cabuay, G.R. No. 160792, August 25, 2005- The letters alleged to have been
read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters between the detainees
and their lawyers. The petitioner who received the letters from detainees Trillanes
and Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees personal courier and not as
their counsel when he received the letters for mailing. In the present case, since
the letters were not confidential communication between the detainees and their
lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters. If the
letters are marked confidential communication between the detainees and their
lawyers, the detention officials should not read the letters but only open the
envelopes for inspection in the presence of the detainees. That a law is required
before an executive officer could intrude on a citizens privacy rights is a
guarantee that is available only to the public at large but not to persons
who are detained or imprisoned. The right to privacy of those detained is
subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as to the limitations inherent in lawful
detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of their detention, pre-trial
detainees and convicted prisoners have a diminished expectation of
privacy rights.

Roxas vs. Zuzuarregei, June 12, 2007- To prevent liability from attaching on
account of his letter, he invokes his rights to free speech and privacy of
communication. The invocation of these rights will not, however, free him from
liability. As already stated, his letter contained defamatory statements that
impaired public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. The making of
contemptuous statements directed against the Court is not an exercise of free
speech; rather, it is an abuse of such right. Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of
the courts cannot be disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot
be used to impair the independence and efficiency of courts or public respect
therefor and confidence therein. Free expression must not be used as a vehicle to
satisfy ones irrational obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy
this Court and its magistrates.

Right to Privacy Re Iggy Arroyos right to privacy ( the right to be let

alone) Read: PP vs. Molina, et al., - right to privacy may be waived by the
defendant).

Basis: It is expressly recognized in Section 3(1) of the Bill of Rights:Other facets of the right to
privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of Rights, viz: Sections1; 2; 6; 8; and 17.
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides
that "[e]very person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons" and punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person of
meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds a public officer or employee or
any private individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another
person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private communications. The Revised
Penal Code makes a crime the violation of secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and
industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws
like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposit Act and the Intellectual Property
Code. The Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise recognize the privacy of
certain information. (Ople vs. Torres, July 23, 1998.
-

In the matter of petition for habeas corpus of Camilo Sabio, October 17,
2006- In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy, a court
must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation
of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated by
unreasonable government intrusion.

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SJS vs. Dangerous Drugs Board and PDEA, GR No. 157870, November 3,
2008- Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional the provisions of RA 9165
requiring mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office and persons
accused of crimes. However, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
said RA insofar as random drug testing for secondary and tertiary school students,
as well as for officials and employees of public and private offices is concerned. The
need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to
override the individuals privacy interest under the premises.

Read: Ayer Productions vs. Capulong- The right of privacy or the right to be let
alone is not an absolute right where the person is a public figure and the
information sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him constitute
matters of a public character.
-Zulueta vs. CA, 253 SCRA 699- The only exception to the prohibition in the
constitution is if there is a lawful order from a court or when public safety or order
requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
-Relate to emails and other ways of communication.
-RA 4200 (Anti-Wiretapping Act)-A violation of the Anti Wire Tapping Law (R.A.
4200) which prohibits not only the unauthorized taping of private conversations,
but also: (a) the possession of such tapes with the knowledge of their nature as
illegal wiretaps; (b) the replaying of the tapes to any person; and (c) to
communicate the contents thereof either verbally or in writing, such as the
provision of transcripts. The potential jail term, if convicted, ranges from six
months to six years.

Arts. 290, 291, 292 and 299 of the Revised Penal Code

RA No. 9372 (Human Security Act)- The provisions of RA 4200 to the contrary
notwithstanding, a police or law enforcement official and members of his team
may, upon a written order of the Court of Appeals, listen to intercept, and record,
with the use of any mode, form, kind or type of electronic or other surveillance
equipment or intercepting and tracking devices, or with the use of any other
suitable ways and means for that purpose, any communication, message,
conversation, discussion or spoken or written words between members of a
judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of
persons or any person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism. Provided, that surveillance, interception and
recording of communications between lawyers and clients, doctors and
patients, journalists and their sources and confidential business
correspondence shall not be authorized.

Section 4- Freedom of expressionBayan vs Ermita, April 25, 2006 - The provisions of B.P. No. 880 practically
codify the ruling in Reyes:

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Reyes v. Bagatsing
(G.R. No. L-65366, November 9, 1983,
125 SCRA 553, 569)
8. By way of a summary. The
applicants for a permit to hold an
assembly should inform the licensing
authority of the date, the public place
where and the time when it will take
place. If it were a private place, only
the consent of the owner or the one
entitled to its legal possession is
required. Such application should be
filed well ahead in time to enable the
public official concerned to appraise
whether there may be valid objections
to the grant of the permit or to its
grant but at another public place. It is
an indispensable condition to such
refusal or modification that the clear
and present danger test be the
standard for the decision reached. If
he is of the view that there is such an
imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil, the applicants must
be heard on the matter. Thereafter,
his decision, whether favorable or
adverse, must be transmitted to them
at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so
minded, they can have recourse to the
proper judicial authority.

B.P. No. 880

SEC. 4. Permit when required and when not required.-- A written permit
shall be required for any person or persons to organize and hold a public
assembly in a public place. However, no permit shall be required if the
public assembly shall be done or made in a freedom park duly
established by law or ordinance or in private property, in which case only
the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is
required, or in the campus of a government-owned and operated
educational institution which shall be subject to the rules and regulations
of said educational institution. Political meetings or rallies held during
any election campaign period as provided for by law are not covered by
this Act.
SEC. 5. Application requirements.-- All applications for a permit shall
comply with the following guidelines:
(a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of
the leaders or organizers; the purpose of such public assembly; the date,
time and duration thereof, and place or streets to be used for the
intended activity; and the probable number of persons participating, the
transport and the public address systems to be used.
(b) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of
applicant under Section 8 hereof.
(c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city
or municipality in whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held, at
least five (5) working days before the scheduled public assembly.
(d) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged in
writing, the office of the city or municipal mayor shall cause the same to
immediately be posted at a conspicuous place in the city or municipal
building.
SEC. 6. Action to be taken on the application.
(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to
issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence
that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public
order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health.
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the
application within two (2) working days from the date the application
was filed, failing which, the permit shall be deemed granted. Should for
any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse to accept
the application for a permit, said application shall be posted by the
applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be
deemed to have been filed.
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of
a substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he
shall immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter.
(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the
applica[nt] within twenty-four hours.
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application
or modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the
decision in an appropriate court of law.
(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the
Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial
Court, or the Intermediate Appellate Court, its decisions may be appealed to
the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the
same. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required. A decision
granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant
shall be immediately executory.
(g) All cases filed in court under this section shall be decided within
twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be
immediately endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or, in his
absence, to the next in rank.
(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals areAvancena
hereby| 103

It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public
assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner
of the assemblies.
In sum, the Supreme Court reiterates its basic policy of upholding the fundamental
rights of our people, especially freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. In
several policy addresses, Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban has repeatedly vowed to
uphold the liberty of our people and to nurture their prosperity. He said that in cases
involving liberty, the scales of justice should weigh heavily against the government and
in favor of the poor, the oppressed, the marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak.
Indeed, laws and actions that restrict fundamental rights come to the courts with a
heavy presumption against their validity. These laws and actions are subjected to
heightened scrutiny.
For this reason, the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our
legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely
confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the other
hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail
or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as to
the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious,
maximum tolerance is for the benefit of rallyists, not the government. The
delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally permits is valid because
it is subject to the constitutionally-sound clear and present danger
standard.
IBP v. Atienza, GR No. 175241, February 24, 2010- Atienza gravely abused his
discretion when he did not immediately inform the IBP which should have been heard
first on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that
may warrant the changing of the venue under BP 880, the Public Assembly Act. It found
that Atienza failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit
against the standard of a clear and present danger test which is an indispensable
condition to such modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an imminent
and grave danger of a substantive evil, which blank denial or modification would, when
granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial
scrutiny thereto,
A heckler's veto occurs when an acting party's right to freedom of speech is curtailed
or restricted by the government in order to prevent a reacting party's behavior. The
common example is that of demonstrators (reacting party) causing a speech (given by
the acting party) to be terminated in order to preserve the peace.
Social Weather Stations vs. COMELEC, May 5, 2001- Election surveys are covered
by the protection to freedom of expression as they refer to the measurement of opinions
and perception of voters as regards to a candidates popularity, qualifications, platforms
or a matter of public discussion in relation to the election, including the voters
preference for candidates or publicly discussed issues during the campaign period.
The prohibition imposed by Section 5.4 of RA 9006 (Fair Election Act) is invalid
because: 1) it imposes prior restraint on the freedom of expression; 2) it is a direct and
total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a
limited period; and 3) the government interest sought to be promoted can be achieved
by means other than the suppression of freedom of expression.
TESTS of Valid Government Interference:
1. Clear & Present Danger
2. Balancing of Interests
3. Dangerous Tendency Rule
-

1.

Content based and content neutral regulations- Regulations of speech may

either be content-based (the subject of the speech or utterance is sought to be
regulated) and content-neutral (it regulates only the conduct associated with
speech, such as the time, place and manner). To pass constitutional muster, any
content-based regulation must show that the government has a compeling or
overiding interest in the subject regulation. A content neutral restriction, on
Avancena | 104

the other hand, need only show an important government interest, as long as it
leaves open alternative channels of communication.
-

Chavez vs. Secretary Gonzales, GR No. 168338, February 15, 2008- The
acts of the Secretary of Justice and the NTC in warning television stations against
playing the Garci tapes under pain of revocation of their licenses, were contentbased restrictions and should be subjected to the clear and present and danger
test.

Newsounds Broadcasting Network, Inc., et al. vs. Dy, et al., GR No.

170270/GR No. 179411, April 2, 2009- The immediate implication of the
application of the strict scrutiny test is that the burden falls upon respondents as
agents of the government to prove that their actions do not infringe upon
petitioners constitutional rights. As content regulation cannot be done in the
absence of compelling reason to infringe the right to free expression.

The overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special application only
to free-speech cases, and are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal
statutes. The doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are
analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases
or, as they are called in American law,

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects:
(1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing
of the Government muscle.[57] The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that
a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to
state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.

As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes

that individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain
from that behavior, even though some of it is protected.

A facial challenge is likewise different from an as-applied challenge.

Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts

affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law,
pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the
parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause
others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
activities.[60]

The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are
not applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial
challenge against a criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds.

The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim to
avert the chilling effect on protected speech, the exercise of which should not at
all times be abridged.[62] As reflected earlier, this rationale is inapplicable to plain
penal statutes that generally bear an in terrorem effect in deterring socially
harmful conduct. In fact, the legislature may even forbid and penalize acts
formerly considered innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains from diminishing or
dissuading the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.
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The rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious
freedom, and other fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no case
may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. The rationale is
obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of
crimes may be hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism
against employing a facial challenge in the case of penal statutes, if the same is
allowed, would effectively go against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an
existing and concrete controversy before judicial power may be appropriately
exercised. A facial challenge against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous and
speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to consider third parties who are
not before it. As I have said in my opposition to the allowance of a facial challenge
to attack penal statutes, such a test will impair the States ability to deal with
crime. If warranted, there would be nothing that can hinder an accused from
defeating the States power to prosecute on a mere showing that, as applied to
third parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that the law
is clear as applied to him.[65] (Emphasis and underscoring

It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth doctrine is
limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial
challenge, applicable only to free speech cases.

By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of
invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always
under situations not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the
substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly
analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts
as applied to the litigants.

In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in at least
two cases,[67] observed that the US Supreme Court has not recognized an
overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment,[68] and
that claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes
which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words.[69] In Virginia v. Hicks,
[70] it was held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed against
a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or speech-related
conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the transcendent value
to all society of constitutionally protected expression.

American jurisprudence[74] instructs that vagueness challenges that do not

involve the First Amendment must be examined in light of the specific facts of the
case at hand and not with regard to the statute's facial validity.

In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the due process
clause has been utilized in examining the constitutionality of criminal statutes. In
at least three cases,[76] the Court brought the doctrine into play in analyzing an
ordinance penalizing the non-payment of municipal tax on fishponds, the crime of
illegal recruitment punishable under Article 132(b) of the Labor Code, and the
vagrancy provision under Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. Notably, the
petitioners in these three cases, similar to those in the two Romualdez and Estrada
cases, were actually charged with the therein assailed penal statute, unlike in the
present case.

From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited Section 3 of RA
9372, the following elements may be culled: (1) the offender commits an act
punishable under any of the cited provisions of the Revised Penal Code, or under
any of the enumerated special penal laws; (2) the commission of the predicate
crime sows and creates a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic
among the populace; and (3) the offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the
government to give in to an unlawful demand.
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Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a
predicate crime actually committed to trigger the operation of the key qualifying
phrases in the other elements of the crime, including the coercion of the
government to accede to an unlawful demand. Given the presence of the first
element, any attempt at singling out or highlighting the communicative
component of the prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected conduct into a
protected speech.

ABS-CBN vs. COMELEC, 323 SCRA 811 (2000)- The prohibition of publication
of exit poll or electoral survey would be unreasonably restrictive because it
effectively prevents the use of exit poll data not only for election day projections,
but also for long term research.

MTRCB vs. ABS-CBN, et al., January 17, 2005- P.D. No. 1986 gives petitioner
the power to screen, review and examine all television programs, emphasizing
the phrase all television programs. Thus, when the law says all television
programs, the word all covers all television programs, whether religious, public
affairs, news documentary, etc. The principle assumes that the legislative body
made no qualification in the use of general word or expression. It then follows that
since The Inside Story is a television program, it is within the jurisdiction of the
MTRCB over which it has power of review.

Soriano v. Laguardia, GR No. 164785; Soriano v. MTRCB GR No. 165636,

April 29, 2009-The Supreme Court said that Sorianos statement can be treated
as obscene, at least with respect to the average child, and thus his utterances
cannot be considered as protected speech. Ang Dating Daan has earlier been
given a G rating for general viewership. The Supreme Court said the MTRCB
suspension was limited only to the show Ang Dating Daan, not Soriano,
as the MTRCB may not suspend television personalities, for such would
be beyond its jurisdiction.

Borjal vs. CA, 301 SCRA 1, In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the
victim is identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named. It must also be
shown that a third party could identify him as the object of the libelous article.
Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no
good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the
following:
1. private communication made by any person to another in
the performance of any legal, moral or social duty;
2. a fair and true report, made in good faith, without remarks,
of any judicial, legislative or other official proceeding which are
not confidential in nature including any statement made
therein or act performed by public officer.

A privileged communication may either be absolutely privileged (those which are

not actionable or even if author acted in bad faith, e.g. speech by member of
Congress therein or any committee thereof) or qualified privileged (those
containing defamatory imputations which are not actionable unless found to have
been made without good intention or justifiable motive, e.g., private
communications and fair and true reports without any comments/remarks).

Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and

constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of
fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation
Avancena | 107

publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent

until his guilt is judicially proved.
Section 5- Freedom of Religion-

Ebralinag vs. Div. Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, 219 SCRA 256 members of Jehovahs witnesses may validly refuse participating in flag
ceremonies (singing the national anthem, saluting the flag, etc.) on account of
their religious beliefs.

Iglesia ni Cristo vs. CA, 259 SCRA 529- The exercise of religious freedom can
be regulated when it will bring about clear and present danger of a substantive evil
which the State has a duty to prevent. However, criticism on certain catholic tenets
and dogmas does not constitute clear and present danger.

Tolentino vs. Sec. of Finance, 235 SCRA 630 Freedom of religion does not
prohibit imposition of a generally applicable sales and use tax on the sale of
religious materials by a religious organization. For the purpose of defraying cost of
registration.

Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines vs. Executive Secretary, 405

SCRA 497- Classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the
standards are drawn from the Quran and Islamic beliefs. By giving the Office of
the Muslim Affairs exclusive power to classify food products as halal, E. O. No. 46
encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organization to interpret what food
products are fit for Muslim consumption. The State has in effect forced Muslim to
accept its own interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah on halal food.

Citing Art. III, sec. 5 of the Constitution, the Court stressed that [n]o law shall be
made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. Thus, it found a grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the
COMELEC to utilize the Bible and Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. The
Court held that moral disapproval is not a sufficient governmental interest to
justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party list system.
Upholding equal protection, the Court ruled that from the standpoint of the political
process, LGBTs have the same interest in participating in the party-list system on
the same basis as other political parties similarly situated. As such, laws of
general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs and they deserve to
participate in the party list system on the same basis as other marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. The Court also found that there was a transgression of
Ang Ladlads fundamental right of freedom of expression since, by reason of the
COMELEC action, the former was precluded from publicly expressing its views as a
political party and participating on an equal basis in the political process with other
party-list candidates. (GR No. 190582, Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC,
April 8, 2010)

Taruc vs. Bishop dela Cruz, et al., GR No. 144801, March 10, 2005- The
expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is a
matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said
institution/organization.

Section 6- Liberty of abode & Right to travel-

Read: Villavicencio vs. Lukban; Manotoc vs. CA; Silverio vs CA- Relate to
suspension of deployment of OFWs to SARs infected countries. In relation to bail
(Manotoc vs. CA; Santiago vs. Vasquez)- valid restriction on his right to travel.
Avancena | 108

Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 115132, August 9, 1995- The persons

right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of
safeguarding the system of justice. Whether the accused should be permitted to
leave the country for humanitarian reasons is a matter addressed to the courts
discretion. (Yap vs. CA, GR No. 141529, June 6, 2001).

Art. 13 (2), Universal Declaration of Human Rights- provides that everyone

has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.

Art. 12 (4), Covenant on Civil and Political Rights- provides that noone shall
be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.

Section 7- Right to Information

-

1.
2.

Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority, July 9, 2002- The constitutional right to
information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final
contract is consummated. The information, however, must constitute definite
propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions liked
privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters
affecting national security and public order.

Legazpi vs. CSC; Valmonte vs. Belmonte; BARA vs.

COMELEC
-

Berdin vs. Mascarinas, 526 SCTA 592- While access to official records may not
be prohibited, it certainly may be regulated.

Section 8- Right to form Unions of public sector

-

United Pepsi Cola Supervisory Union vs. Laguesma, 288 SCRA 15- Congress, via
Art. 125 of the Labor Code, validly prohibited supervisors from forming labor
unions. the right to strike does form an integral part of the Right to Association.

Section 9- Expropriation

Republic vs. Gingoyon, December 19, 2005- Rule 67 outlines the procedure under
which eminent domain may be exercised by the Government. Yet by no means does it
serve at present as the solitary guideline through which the State may expropriate
private property. For example, Section 19 of the Local Government Code governs as to
the exercise by local government units of the power of eminent domain through an
enabling ordinance. And then there is Rep. Act No. 8974, which covers expropriation
proceedings intended for national government infrastructure projects.

Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more favorable to the
property owner than Rule 67, inescapably applies in instances when the national
government expropriates property for national government infrastructure projects.

Republic vs. Holy Trinity Realty Development Corp., 551 SCRA 303- There are at
least two crucial differences between the respective procedure under RA No. 8974 and
Rule 67. Under the statute, the government is required to make immediate payment to
the property owner upon the filing of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of possession,
whereas Rule 67, the government is required only to make an initial deposit with an
authorized government depositary, and Rule 67 prescribes that the initial deposit be
equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purpose of taxation, unlike RA 8974
Avancena | 109

which provides, as the relevant standard for initial compensation, the market value of
the property as stated in the tax declaration or the current relevant zonal value of the
BIR, whichever is higher, and the value of the improvements and/or structures using the
replacement cost method.
-

ATO vs. Tongoy, 551 SCRA 320- the right of the previous owners who were able to
prove the commitment of the government to allow them to repurchase their land.

Asias Emerging Dragon Corp. vs. DOTC, 552 SCRA 59- The State, through
expropriation proceedings may take private property even if, admittedly, it will transfer
this property again to another private party as long as there is public purpose to the
taking.

Tiongson vs. NHA, 558 SCRA 56- Where the initial taking of a property subject to
expropriation was by virtue of a law which was subsequently declared unconstitutional,
just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint, and
not the earlier taking.

MCWD vs. J. King and Sons Co., Inc., GR No. 175983, April 16, 2009 - For MCWD
to exercise its power of eminent domain, two requirements should be met, namely: first,
its board of directors passed a resolution authorizing the expropriation, and second, the
exercise of the power of eminent domain was subjected to review by the LWUA.

Republic vs. Lim, June 29, 2005- Section 9, Article III of the Constitution is not a grant
but a limitation of power. This limiting function is in keeping with the philosophy of the
Bill of Rights against the arbitrary exercise of governmental powers to the detriment of
the individuals rights. Given this function, the provision should therefore be strictly
interpreted against the expropriator, the government, and liberally in favor of the
property owner.

While the prevailing doctrine is that the non-payment of just compensation does not
entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots, however, in
cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years
from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners
concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property. This is in
consonance with the principle that the government cannot keep the property and
dishonor the judgment. To be sure, the five-year period limitation will encourage the
government to pay just compensation punctually. This is in keeping with justice and
equity. After all, it is the duty of the government, whenever it takes property from
private persons against their will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation.

Local government units possessed the delegated power of eminent domain, subject to
judicial review (City of Manila vs. Chinese Community).

Any property owned by a municipal corporation in its private capacity (patrimonial),

in any expropriation proceeding, must be paid just compensation. If the property
owned is public or otherwise held in trust then no compensation need be paid (City of
Baguio vs. NAWASA).

To set just compensation is a judicial prerogative (EPZA vs. Dulay).

GR No. 177056, Office of the Solicitor General v. Ayala Land Incorporated,

September 18, 2009- The Court said that the total prohibition against the collection by
respondents of parking fees from persons who use the mall parking facilities has no
basis in the National Building Code or its implementing rules and regulations. It added
that the State also cannot impose the same prohibition by generally invoking
Avancena | 110

police power, since said prohibition amounts to a taking of respondents

property without payment of just compensation.
-

Cmsr. of IR vs. Central Luzon Drug Corp., GR No. 148512, June 26, 2006, Cmsr.
of IR vs. Bicolandia Drug Corp., GR No. 148083, July 21, 2006 The tax credit
given to commercial establishments for the discount enjoyed by senior citizens pursuant
to RA 7432 is a form of just compensation for private property taken by the State for
public use, since the privilege enjoyed by senior citizens does not come directly from the
State, but from private establishments concerned.

Public use does not mean use by the public. As long as the purpose of the taking is
public, then power of eminent domain comes into play. It is inconsequential that private
entities may benefit as long as in the end, public interest is served (Ardona vs. Reyes).

Reyes v. National Housing Authority, 395 SCRA 494, Taking of property for socialized
housing is for public use.

Lands for socialized housing are to be acquired n the following order: 1) government
lands; 2) alienable lands of the public domain; 3) unregistered or abandoned or idle
lands; 4) lands within the declared areas for priority development, zonal improvement
program sites, slum improvement and resettlement sites which have not yet been
acquired; 5) BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired; and 6) privately-owned lands
(City of Mandaluyong vs. Aguilar, 350SCRA 487 2001).

Section 10- Non-impairment clause

-

There is no impairment in the imposition of the VAT against real estate transactions
entered or perfected even prior to its imposition. The contract clause is not a limitation
on the exercise of the States power of taxation save only where a tax exemption has
been granted for a valid consideration. (Tolentino vs. Sec. of Finance)

The non-impairment clause includes prohibition on judicial acts that impair contract.
(Ganzon vs. Inserto, 123 SCRA 135)

Sections 11 & 12 Custodial Investigation Rights

-

Read: Miranda vs. Arizona, Gamboa vs. Cruz, Escobedo vs. Illinois.

Applies to preliminary investigation, PP vs. Sunga, 399 SCRA 624

PP vs. Vallejo, May 9, 2002- To be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge
all the questions being propounded to his client. The presence of counsel to preclude the
slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. Indeed counsel
should not prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.

PP vs. Domantay, 307 SCRA 1- RA 7438 has extended the constitutional guarantee to
situations in which an individual has not been formally arrested but has merely been
invited for questioning.

PP vs. Garcia, 400 SCRA 229, A confession made to a private person is admission in
evidence.

PP vs. Lozada, 406 SCRA 494, An unwritten confession is inadmissible.

A party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel (Ampong

vs. CSC, 563 SCRA 293).
Avancena | 111

Van Luspo vs. People, GR No. 188487, February 14, 2011- The court sustained the
admissibility of the sworn statements of the other accused, explaining that the
investigations performed by the PNP were administrative and not custodial in nature.

Perez vs. People, 544 SCRA 532- While investigations by an administrative body
may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, a party in an administrative inquiry may
or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of
respondents capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish
the person being investigated with counsel.

Section 13- Bail

-

Where the accused was originally charged with a capital offense but later convicted of
non-capital and which he appeals, bail cannot be granted as a matter right (Obosa
vs. CA, 266 SCRA 281).

The constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. The right is
not available in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature. In the
absence of any provision in the constitution, the law or the treaty, adopting the practice
of not granting bail, as a general rule, would be a step towards deterring fugitives from
coming to the Philippines to hide from or evade their prosecutors.

Notwithstanding the rule that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases, bail may
be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing:
1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community; and 2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling reasons (Govt.
of USA vs. Purganan, September 24, 2002).

Government of Hongkong Special Administrator Region vs. Judge Olalia, Jr.,

April 19, 2007 Potential extraditee may be granted bail on the basis of clear and
convincing evidence that the person is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders
and processes of the extradition court.

Section 14- Rights of accused

1.

Presumption of innocence- as against presumption of law.

2.

The right to be heard

The vagueness doctrine merely requires reasonable degree of certainty for the law
to be upheld- not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude ( Estrada vs
. Desierto, November 19, 2001).

Despite the allegation of minority of the victim, an accused appellant may not be
sentenced to death under RA 7659 due to the failure of the information to allege
relationship to the victim. It would be a denial of the right of the accused to be
informed of the charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due process
(PP vs. Sandoval, 348 SCRA 476).

A person subject of an extradition request from another sovereign State is

bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of
the extradition process. An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not
criminal proceeding which will call into operations all the rights of an accused as
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The extraditees right to notice and hearing
is present only when the petition for extradition is filed in court- it is only
then when he has the opportunity to meet the evidence against him (Secretary of
Justice vs. Lantion, 343 SCRA 377, 2000).
Avancena | 112

3. Right to public trial

-

A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court
doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct
themselves with decorum and observe trial (Sec of Justice vs. Estrada, June
29, 2001).

RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE MURDER
CASES AGAINST MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY AMPATUAN, ET AL., [A.M. No.
10-11-6-SC ]- The impossibility of holding such judicial proceedings in a courtroom
that will accommodate all the interested parties, whether private complainants or
accused, is unfortunate enough. What more if the right itself commands that a
reasonable number of the general public be allowed to witness the proceeding as it
takes place inside the courtroom. Technology tends to provide the only solution to
break the inherent limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of a
transparent, open and public trial. Thus, the Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTS
PRO HAC VICE the request for live broadcast by television and radio of the trial
court proceedings of the Maguindanao Massacre cases, subject to the guidelines
outlined therein.
4.

Right to face to face confrontation

The absence of cross-examination by the defense due to the supervening death of

plaintiff/witness does not necessarily render the deceaseds testimony
inadmissible. Where no fault can be attributed to plaintiff/witness, it would be a
harsh measure to strike out all that has been obtained in the direct examination
(PP vs. Narca, 275 SCRA 696).

Section 16- Speedy disposition

-

Where the case for violation of the Anti-Graft Law was pending for preliminary
investigation with the Office of the Tanodbayan for 3 years and it is indicated that
the case is of simple nature and was prosecuted for political reasons, it is held that
there was violation of the accuseds right to speedy disposition of case. Right to
speedy disposition extends to preliminary
investigations.
(Tatad vs.
Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70).

Section 17- Against Self-incrimination

-

The right against self-incrimination is available in administrative hearings

when the nature of the penalty is penal in nature (like forfeiture of property or
dismissal from employment) and the hearing partakes the nature of criminal
proceeding (Cabal vs. Kapunan, 6 SCRA 1059).

Applicable to a proceeding that could possibly result in the loss of the privilege
to practice medical profession (Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners, ).

Standard Chartered Bank vs. Senate Committee on Banks, 541 SCRA

456The right against self incrimination is extended in an administrative
investigations that partake of the nature of or are analogous to criminal
proceedings. The privilege has consistently been held to extend to all proceedings
sanctioned by law; and all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon
a witness, whether a party of not.

The right against self-incrimination is defeated by the public nature of

documents sought to be accessed (Almonte vs. Vasquez).
Avancena | 113

In the recent case of PEOPLE vs. YATAR, G.R. No. 150224, May 19, 2004, the
Supreme Court affirmed the admissibility and probative value of DNA
(deoxyribonucleic acid). Citing the first ever Supreme Court decision on the
admissibility of DNA evidence, i.e., People v. Vallejo, G.R. No. 144656, 9 May 2002,
382 SCRA 192, 209, the Court, in Yatar, held that in assessing the probative value
of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following factors: how the
samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of
the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper
standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the
qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

In Yatar, in an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contended that
the blood sample taken from him as well as the DNA tests were conducted in
violation of his right to remain silent as well as his right against self-incrimination
under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution.

The Court rejected the argument. It held that the kernel of the right is not against
all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion, citing Alih v. Castro, G.R. No.
69401, 23 June 1987, 151 SCRA 279. It held that the right against selfincrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the
accused an admission of guilt and that it does not apply where the evidence
sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.

Citing People v. Rondero, G.R. No. 125687, 9 December 1999, 320 SCRA 383, the
Court held that although accused-appellant insisted that hair samples were
forcibly taken from him and submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for
forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him,
for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence
communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress.

Hence, according to the Court, a person may be compelled to submit to

fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and DNA, as there is no testimonial
compulsion involved. It cited People v. Gallarde, G.R. No. 133025, 27 February
2000, 325 SCRA 835, where immediately after the incident, the police authorities
took pictures of the accused without the presence of counsel. In that case, the
Court ruled that there was no violation of the right against self-incrimination. It
further stated that the accused may be compelled to submit to a physical
examination to determine his involvement in an offense of which he is accused.

Section 18 Involuntary servitude: (Article 272 of the Revised

Penal Code)
Exceptions:1. Punishment for a crime;
2.service in defense of the state
3.naval enlistment
4. posse comitatus
5.return to work order
6. patria potestas
Section 19- Death penalty
-

The death penalty is not a cruel punishment. There was no total abolition of the
death penalty. The ConCom had deemed it proper for Congress to determine its
reimposition because of compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. (PP v,
Echegaray, 267 SCRA 682).

Section 20- Non-imprisonment for Debt

Avancena | 114

The civil liability from a crime is not debt within the purview of the constitutional
provision against imprisonment for non payment of debt.

Vergara vs. Gedorio, 402 SCRA 520- Debt, as used in the Constitution, refers to a
civil debt or one not arising from a criminal offense. Clearly, the non payment of
rentals is covered by the constitutional guarantee against imprisonment.

Section 21- Double Jeopardy

-

As a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places the

accused under double jeopardy (Re MR in Lejano vs. People, GR No. 176389,
January 18, 2011).

The impeachment proceedings against petitioner Estrada was not concluded as a

series of events prompted the Senate to declare the impeachment functus officiothus, he was neither acquitted nor was the impeachment proceeding dismissed
without his express consent. Neither was there conviction/ It follows then that the
claim of double jeopardy must fail. (Estrada vs. Desierto, April 3, 2001).

Under Sec. 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, a provisional dismissal of a case
becomes permanent after the lapse of one year for offenses punishable by
imprisonment of not exceeding six years or a lapse of two years for offenses
punishable by imprisonment of more than six years.

For this rule to bar the subsequent filing of a similar case against the accused, the
following must be established: 1) the provisional dismissal had express consent of
the accused; 2) the provisional dismissal was ordered by the court after notice to
the offended party; 3) the 1 yr. or 2-yr. period to revive had lapsed; 4) there is no
justification to file a subsequent case beyond the period of one or two years. (PP
vs. Lacson, May 28, 2002).

The order approving the plea of guilty to homicide was not a judgment of
conviction. It merely approved the agreement between the parties on the plea to a
lesser offense by the accused and the condition attached to it. (PP vs. Romero, 399
SCRA 386)

Section 22- Ex post facto law/bill of attainder

-

RA 8249, an act which further defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, is not
penal law but a substantive law on jurisdiction whose retroactive application is
constitutional (Lacson vs. Exec. Secretary, 301 SCRA 298).

Nasi-Villar vs. People, 571 SCRA 202- A law can never be considered ex-post
facto law as long as it operates prospectively since its stricture would cover only
offenses committed after and not before its enactment.

The prohibition of ex post facto laws and bill of attainder applies to court
doctrines pursuant to the maxim legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet- the
interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of
law ( PP vs. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 602).

The law making the use of an unlicensed firearm a qualifying circumstance in

murder cannot apply retroactively. (PP vs. Patoc, 398 SCRA 62).

Avancena | 115

Re DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against accused being unconstitutional

on the ground that resort thereto was tantamount to the application of an ex-post
facto law- Describing the argument as specious, the Supreme Court held no expost facto law was involved in the case at bar. It added that the science of
DNA typing involved the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence
obtained under the Rules of Court. Whereas, an ex-post facto law referred
primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a factual determination of the
probative weight of the evidence presented. (PP vs. Yatar, May 19, 2004)

H. CITIZENSHIP
1.

Natural-Born Citizens and Public Office

a. Citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
their Philippine citizenship;
b. Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority243
2.

Naturalization and Denaturalization

Qualifications for Naturalization:

1.
2.

3.

4.
5.
6.

not less than 18 years of age on date of hearing of petition (as amended by RA 6809);
resided in the Philippines for not less than 10 years; may be reduced to 5 years, if:
a.honorably held office in the Philippines;
b.established new industry or introduced a useful invention;
c.married to a Filipino woman;
d.engaged as teacher in Philippine public or private school not established for exclusive
instruction to particular nationality or race, or in any of branches of education or industry for
a period of not less than 2 years; and
e.born in the Philippines;
character:
a.good moral character;
b.believes in the Constitution;
c. conducted himself in an irreproachable conduct during his stay in the Philippines;
Own real estate in the Philippines not less than P5,000 in value; or have some lucrative trade,
profession or lawful occupation that can support himself and his family;
Speak and write English or Filipino and any principal Philippine dialects; (as amended by Sec. 6
Art. XIV); and
Enrolled minor children in any public or private school recognized by government where
Philippine history, government and civics are taught as part of curriculum, during the entire
period of residence prior to hearing of petition.

Declaration of Intention must be filed with the Office of the Solicitor General one year before
filing of application for naturalization.
Exceptions:
1. Those born in the Philippines and received primary and secondary education in a Philippine
school;
2. Those who have resided in the Philippines for thirty years;
3. The widow or children of the applicant who died before his application was granted.
Disqualification for Naturalization:

243 Art. IV, Sec. 2

One who is a Filipino citizen by election is a natural born citizen as provided in the second sentence of Sec 2
A natural- born Filipino citizen who loses his citizenship but subsequently reacquires it is not a natural born citizen because of the first sentence of Section 2
The law does not treat natural-born citizens and naturalized citizens differently except in the instances where the Constitution itself makes a distinction.
Otherwise there would be a violation of the equal protection clause ( Chen Teck Lao vs Rep)
Avancena | 116

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.

opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons

who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments;
defending or teaching necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or
assassination for the success or predominance of their ideas;
polygamists or believers in polygamy;
suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious disease;
convicted of crime involving moral turpitude;
who during residence in the Philippines have not mingled socially with Filipinos, or not
evinced sincere desire to learn and embrace customs, traditions and ideals of Filipinos;
citizens or subjects of nations with whom the Philippines is at war, during the period of
such war;
citizens or subjects of foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos right to become
naturalized citizens or subjects thereof (no reciprocity).

Effects of Naturalization :
1.On the wife
vests citizenship on wife who might herself be lawfully naturalized; She need not
prove her qualifications but only that she is not disqualified. 244
2.On the minor children
(i) If born in the Philippines automatically becomes a citizen;
If born abroad
If born before the naturalization of
the father
(ia) residing in RP at the time of naturalization automatically becomes citizen;
(ib) if not residing in RP at the time of naturalization considered citizen only during
minority, unless begins to reside permanently in the Philippines;
(ii) If born outside the Philippines after parents naturalization considered Filipino, provided
registered as such before any Philippines consulate within 1 year after attaining majority
age and takes oath of allegiance.
Grounds for Denaturalization:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

naturalization certificate obtained fraudulently or illegally;

if, within 5 years, he returns to his native country or to some foreign country and establishes
residence therein;
naturalization obtained through invalid declaration of intention;
minor children failed to graduate through the fault of the parents either by neglecting
support or by transferring them to another school; and
allowing himself to be used as dummy.

Effects of Denaturalization:
a.
a.

If ground affects intrinsic validity of proceedings, denaturalization shall divest wife and
children of their derivative naturalization; and
If the ground is personal, the wife and children shall retain citizenship.
3. Loss of Citizenship

i.
ii.

Naturalization in a foreign country;

Express renunciation of citizenship245

244 Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Comm. of Immigration, 41 SCRA 292

245 Expatriation
Avancena | 117

iii. Rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country;
iv. Cancellation of certificate of naturalization;
v. Having been declared by final judgment a deserter of Philippines Armed Forces in times of war.
4. Repatriation246
Shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau
of Immigration shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue the
certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen.
Allows the person to recover or return to his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship.247
*** Judge Singco Notes

Valles vs. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 543- Having a Filipino father at the time of birth
makes one a Filipino. Having an Australian passport and an alien certificate of
registration does not constitute an effective renunciation of citizenship and does
not militate against the claim of Filipino citizenship.

Co vs. HRET, 199 SCRA 692- An attack on a persons citizenship may be done
through a direct action for its nullity.

Re: Vicente Ching, 316 SCRA 1- There are two conditions in order that the
election of Philippine citizenship is effective:
1. the mother of the person making the election must be
citizen of the Philippines; and
2. said election must be made upon reaching the age of
majority.
Ma v. Fernandez, July 26, 2010, GR No. 183133 - the evolvement from election of
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority under the 1935 Philippine
Constitution to dispensing with the election requirement under the 1973 Philippine
Constitution to express classification of these children as natural-born citizens under the
1987 Constitution towards the conclusion that the omission of the 1941 statutory
requirement of registration of the documents of election should not result in the
obliteration of the right to Philippine citizenship.
The Court concluded that, having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis of the
right of the petitioners to elect Philippine citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine
citizenship in form and substance. The failure to register the election in the civil registry
should not defeat the election and negate the permanent fact that they have a Filipino
mother. The lacking requirements may still be complied with subject to the imposition of
appropriate administrative penalties, if any.

The mere application or possession of an alien certificate of registration does not amount to renunciation (Mercado vs. Manzano, G.R. No. 135083, May
26, 1999)
Subscribing to an oath of allegiance to constitution or laws of foreign upon attaining of 21 years of age;
Citizens may not divest citizenship when Philippines is at war

246 RA 8171 is an act providing for the repatriation of:

a. Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and;
b. natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship on account or political or economic necessity.
The applicant should not be a:
a. Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized
government;
b. Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or association for the predominance of their ideas;
c. Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude: or
d. Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases.

247 Bengzon III v. HRET, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001

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Bengson vs. HRET, May 7, 2001- Repatriation may be had under various
statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: 1) desertion of the AFP; 2)
served in the armed forces of the allied forces in WWII; 3) service in the AF of the US at
any other time; 4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; 5) political and economic
necessity.

R.A. No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on 23 October 1995, is an act providing
for the repatriation (a) of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship
by marriage to aliens and (b) of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their
Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. To
claim the benefit of RA 8171, the children must be of minor age at the time
of the petititon for repatriation was filed by the parent [Angat vs. RP,
September 14, 1999; Tabasa vs. CA, GR. No. 125793, August 29, 2006- no
showing that Tabasas parents lost their Philippine citizenship on account of
political or economic necessity].

Repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the RP and

registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person
concerned resides or last resided.

Altarejos vs. COMELEC, 441 SCRA 655- In addition to the taking the oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the registration of the Certificate of
Repatriation in the proper civil registry and the Bureau of Immigration is a
prerequisite in effecting the repatriation of a citizen.

Repatriation retroacts to the date of the filing of ones application for

repatriation. Supra.

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. If he was

originally a natural born citizen before he lost his citizenship, he will be restored to
his former status as natural born Filipino.

NATURAL BORN- Read Sections 2 and 4 of RA 9225, amending CA 63,

otherwise known as Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act (August
29, 2003)- including citizens repatriated and unmarried children, whether
legitimate or illegitimate or adopted, below 18 years of age of those
repatriated.

DUAL CITIZENSHIP- Read: Mercado vs. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630- The phrase
dual citizenship in RA 7160 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance
(especially for naturalized citizens). In filing a certificate of candidacy, the person
with dual citizenship effectively renounces his foreign citizenship. The oath of
allegiance contained in the certificate of candidacy constitutes sufficient
renunciation of his foreign citizenship.

Corodora v. COMELEC, GR No. 176947, February 19, 2009- The Supreme

Court recently ruled that a natural-born Filipino, who also possesses American
citizenship having been born of an American father and a Filipino mother, is
exempt from the twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and
executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship under the Citizenship Retention
and Reacquisition Act (RA 9225) before running for public office. The Supreme
Court En Banc held that that it has applied the twin requirements to cases which
involve natural-born Filipinos who later became naturalized citizens of another
country and thereafter ran for elective office in the Philippines. In the present case,
[private respondent Gustavo S.] Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did not
subsequently become a naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the twin
requirements in RA No. 9225 do not apply to him.
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LOPEZ VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008 Valles and Mercado
Doctrines do not apply is one reacquires his citizenship under RA 9225 and runs
for public office. To comply with the provisions of Section 5 (2) of RA 9225, it is
necessary that the candidate for public office must state in clear and unequivocal
terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship.

Jacot vs. COMELEC, G. R. No. 179848, November 27, 2008 Mercado case
was decided under Section 40 of LGC re dual allegiance, and that time RA 9225
was not yet enacted.

Manuel B. Japzon vs. COMELEC, GR No. 180088, January 19, 2009- It bears
to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which a natural-born
Filipino may reacquire or retain his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a foreign
citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities under such circumstances. A
close scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it does not at all touch on the
matter of residence of the natural-born Filipino taking advantage of its provisions.
Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the reacquisition or
retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such
reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the
concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship
independently of residence. This is only logical and consistent with the general
intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may
hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may establish
residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a
citizen. Residency in the Philippines only becomes relevant when the natural-born
Filipino with dual citizenship decides to run for public office. Under Republic Act No.
9225, to run for public office, he must: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath.

Roseller de Guzman vs. COMELEC, GR No. 180048, June 19, 2009- R.A. No.
9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for:
1) natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; and 2) natural-born citizens of the
Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law, become citizens of a foreign
country. The law provides that they are deemed to have re-acquired or retained
their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance. However, it
must be emphasized that R.A. No. 9225 imposes an additional requirement on
those who wish to seek elective public office, as follows: Section 5. Civil
and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
Citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to
all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines
and the following conditions:

x x x x (2)Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy,
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. The filing of a
certificate of candidacy does not ipso facto amount to a renunciation of his foreign
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. The rulings in the cases of Frivaldo and Mercado
are not applicable because R.A. No. 9225 provides for more requirements.

BM No. 1678, Petition for Leave to Resume the Practice of Law, Benjamin
M. Dacanay, December 17, 2007- Dual citizens may practice law in the
Philippines by leave of the Supreme Court and upon compliance with the
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requirements, which will restore their good standing as members of the Philippine
Bar.

Effective nationality principle (Nottebohm case)- The Nottebohm case cited

by the petitioner invoked the international law principle of effective nationality
which is clearly not applicable to the case at bar. This principle is expressed in
Article 5 of the Hague Convention of 1930 on the Conflict of Nationality Laws as
follows: Art. 5. Within a third State a person having more than one nationality shall
be treated as if he had only one. Without prejudice to the application of its law in
matters of personal status and of any convention in force, a third State shall, of the
nationalities which any such person possesses, recognize exclusively in its territory
either the nationality of the country in which he is habitually and principally
resident or the nationality of the country with which in the circumstances he
appears to be in fact most closely connected. Nottebohm was a German by birth
but a resident of Guatemala for 34 years when he applied for and acquired
naturalization in Liechtenstein one month before the outbreak of World War II.
Many members of his family and his business interests were in Germany. In 1943,
Guatemala, which had declared war on Germany, arrested Nottebohm and
confiscated all his properties on the ground that he was a German national.
Liechtenstein thereupon filed suit on his behalf, as its citizen, against Guatemala.
The International Court of Justice held Nottebohm to be still a national of Germany,
with which he was more closely connected than with Liechtenstein.
*Read: Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, GR No. 87193, June 23, 1989
AASJS, Calilung vs. Datumanong, GR No. 160869, May 11, 2007- It is clear that
the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision
in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born
Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225
does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country.
On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme
authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly,
from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and
shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to
the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a
concern of Rep. Act No. 9225. xxx To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution
is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still
has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the
framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after
their naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set
specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is
done, it would be premature for the judicial department, including the
Supreme Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.
Tecson vs. COMELEC, 424 SCRA 148; Velez vs. Poe and Fornier vs.
COMELEC, March 3, 2004- Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, a citizen of the
Philippines was one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish
subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The term inhabitant was taken to include
1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of
Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on
or before 11 April 1899. Whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen,
which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe,
would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not
the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino
citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of
Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at
84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the
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Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of
residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could
have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would
have benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had
effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby
extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution,
during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all
persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are
legitimate or illegitimate.
-

As Section 3, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution does not distinguish

between legitimate child and illegitimate child of a Filipino father, we
should not make a distinction. The civil status of legitimacy or
illegitimacy, by itself, is not determinative of the Philippine citizenship.

Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner Immigration, 41 SCRA 292- When

citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial or administrative proceedings, the
resolution or decision thereon is generally not considered as res judicata in any
subsequent proceeding challenging the same.

Burca vs. Republic, 51 SCRA 248- EXCEPTIONS (to res judicata principle) 1.) a
persons citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where the
person is a party; 2.) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took
active part in the resolution thereof; and 3.) the finding on citizenship is affirmed
by the Supreme Court.

Administrative Naturalization (R.A. No. 9139) grants Philippine citizenship

by administrative proceedings to aliens born and residing in the Philippines. They
have the choice to apply for judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the
prescribed qualifications and disqualifications.

Kilosbayan vs. Ermita, GR No. 177721, July 3, 2007

. The alleged
subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of
Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial
court stating that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along
with his father.

JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179120, April 1, 2009Clearly, under the law and jurisprudence, it is the - State, through its
representatives designated by statute, that may question the illegally or invalidly
procured certificate of naturalization proceedings. It is not a matter that maybe
raised by private persons in an election case involving the naturalized citizens
descendant. ***it is the STATE solely who has the right to question the legality and
validity of procuring the certificate for naturalization proceedings, and can't be
attacked collaterally.

Ugdoracion, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 552 SCRA 231- A Filipino citizens acquisition of
permanent resident status abroad constitutes an abandonment of his domicile and
residence in the Philippines. The green card status in the USA is a renunciation
on ones status as a resident of the Philippines.

I. LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

1. General Principles
Public office.
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The right, authority or duty, created and conferred by law, by which for a given period,
either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with
some sovereign power of government to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public.
Public officer
a. A person who holds public office.
b. Any person who, by direct provision of law, popular election or appointment by competent
authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the Government of the Philippine
Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches, public duties as an employee,
agent or subordinate official, of any rank or class shall be deemed to be a public officer. 248
c) Includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary,
whether in the classified, unclassified or exempt service, receiving, compensation, even nominal,
from the government.249
Characteristics of public office:
1)Public office is a public trust created in the interest and for the benefit of the public.
2)There is no such thing as vested interest or an estate in an office or even an absolute right
to hold it.
3)Public office is personal to the incumbent thereof or appointee thereto.
2. Modes of Acquiring Title to Public Office
a. By appointment
b. By election
c. By being a de facto officer
3. Modes and Kinds of Appointment
Permanent- extended to a person possessing the requisite qualifications, including the
eligibility required for the position, and thus protected by the constitutional guaranty of security of
tenure.
Temporary- extended to one who may not possess the requisite qualifications or eligibility
required by law for the position, and is revocable at will, without the necessity of just cause or a
valid investigation.250
Acting Appointment - the appointee may not possess the required qualities or the eligibility
required by law for the position, and is revocable at will without the necessity of just cause and
valid investigation.251
Temporary Appointment for Fixed Period - the appointment may be revoked only at the
expiration of the period or, if revocation is made before such expiration, the same has to be for a
valid and just cause.252
Provisional appointment - one issued upon the authorization by CSC to a person who has not
qualified in an appropriate exam but otherwise meets the requirement for appointment to a regular

248 Article 203, Revised Penal Code

249Sec. 2, R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)
250 The acceptance by the petitioner of a temporary appointment resulted in the termination of official relationship with his former permanent position.
When the temporary appointment was not renewed, the petitioner had no cause to demand reinstatement thereto. (Romualdez v. CSC)
Acquisition of the appropriate civil service eligibility by a temporary appointee will not ipso facto convert the temporary appointment into a permanent
one; a new appointment is necessary. (Province of Camarines Sur v. CA)

251 Marahomsan v. Alonto

252 Ambas v. Buenasedo
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position whenever such vacancy occurs and filling it is necessary in the interest of service and there
is no appropriate register of eligible employees at the time of the appointment. 253
Regular- one made by the President while Congress is in session after the nomination is
confirmed by the COA and continues until the end of the term.
Ad-interim- one made by while Congress is not in session, before the confirmation by the
COA, is immediately effective and ceases to be valid if disapproved or by passed by the COA upon
the next adjournment of Congress.
4. Eligibility and Qualification254 Requirements
Qualifications:
May refer to endowments, qualities, or attributes which make an individual eligible for public
office.255
May refer to the act which a person, before entering the performance of his duties, is by law
required to do so.256
General qualifications:257
a) Citizenship258
b)Residence
c)Age
d)Educational Attainment
e)Civil Service259
5. Disabilities and Inhibitions of Public Officers
a) The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure.260
b) No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may old any other office or
employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term for which he was
elected.261

253 abolished already, considered temporary appointment.

Provisional appointment is one which may be issued, upon prior authorization to the CSC, to a person who has not qualified in an appropriate
examination but who otherwise meets the requirements for appointment to a regular position, whenever a vacancy occurs and filling thereof is necessary in
the interest of the service and there is no appropriate register of eligible at the time of the appointment.

254 Loss of any of the qualifications during incumbency will be a ground for termination (Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 174 SCRA 245)
255 Qualifications (endowments) must be possessed by the individual at the time of appointment or election and continuously

for as the official

relationship continuous.
Property, literacy or religious qualifications may not be imposed for the exercise of the right to run for public office
Loss of any of the qualifications during incumbency will be a ground for termination

256 e.g. taking an official oath or giving an official bond.

Failure of an officer to perform an act required by law (e.g. oath) could affect the officers title to the given office. He could become merely a de facto
officer. But prolonged failure or refusal to take an oath or office could result in the forfeiture of the office

257 Qualification standard-expresses the minimum requirements for a class in position in terms of education, training and expense, civil service eligibility,
physical fitness and other requirements for successful performance.

258 A voluntary change of citizenship or a change thereof by operation of law disqualifies him to continue holding the civil service position to which he
qualified and had been appointed.

259 Temporary appointments of non-eligible may be made in the absence of eligible actually and immediately available.
260 Art. VII, Sec. 13
261 Art. VI, Sec. 13
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c) The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be
designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. 262
d) No Member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other office
or employment263 the same disqualification applies to the Ombudsman and his Deputies. 264
e) The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall not be qualified to run for any office in the
election immediately succeeding their cessation from office. 265
f) Members of Constitutional Commissions, the Ombudsman and his Deputies must not have
been candidates for any elective position in the election immediately preceding their
appointment.266
g) Members of Constitutional Commissions, the Ombudsman and his Deputies are appointed
to a term of seven (7) years, without reappointment. 267
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the
President shall not during his tenure be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions,
or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus
or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations. 268

6. Powers and Duties of Public Officers

Powers
Ministerial Powers one the discharge of which by the officer concerned is imperative and
requires neither judgment nor discretion.
Discretionary Powers one imposed by law upon the public officer wherein the officer has
the right to decide how and when the duty shall be performed. 269
Duties
General/ Constitutional duties of Public Officers
a. To be accountable to the people; to serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency, to act with patriotism and justice; and to lead a modest lives. 270
b. To submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities and net worth upon the
assumption of office and as often thereafter as maybe required by law. 271
c. To owe the state and the Constitution allegiance at all times. 272
Specific Duties

262 Art. XI, Sec. 8

263 Art. IX-A, Sec. 2
264 Art. IX, Sec. 8
265 Art. XI, Sec. 11
266 Art. IX-B, Sec. 1, Art. IX-C; Art. IX-D, Sec. 1; Art. XI, Sec. 8
267 Art. IX-B, Sec. 1(2); Art. IX-D, Sec. 1(2); Art. XI, Sec. 11
268 Art. VII Sec. 13
269 Mandamus will not lie to compel the performance of discretionary powers
270 Art. 11, Sec.1
271 Ibid, Sec. 17
272 Ibid, Sec. 18
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a. The Solicitor generals duty to represent the government, its offices and instrumentalities
and its officials and agents except in criminal and civil cases for damages arising from felony- is
mandatory. Although he has the discretion in choosing whether or not to prosecute a case or even
withdraw there from such discretion must be exercised within the parameters set by law and with
the best interest of the state as the ultimate goal.
b. The government is not estopped from questioning the act of its officials, more so if they
are erroneous or irregular.
7. Rights of Public Officers273
a. Right to Office274
b. Right of Salary275
c. Right of Preference in Promotion
d. Right to Vacation and Sick Leave276
e. Right to Maternity, Paternity Leave
f. Right to Retirement Pay277
g. Right to pension and gratuity
h. Right to reimbursement for expenses incurred in the due performance of his duty.
i. Right to be indemnified against any liability which they may incur in the bona fide
discharge of their duties.
j. Right to longevity pay.
k. Right to present complaints and grievances.
l. Right to exercise the powers connected with the office.
m. Right to special protection.
n. Right to Self-Organization278
8. Liabilities of Public Officers
General Rule on Liability:
A public officer is not liable for injuries by another as a consequence of official acts done
within the scope of his official authority, except as otherwise provided by law.
A public officer shall be civilly liable if there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or
negligence.279

273 When may Public officer claim legal right to his office?
a)File a Quo Warranto both elective and appointive
b)File Election Protest on elective officer by the losing candidate.

274 the just and legal claim to exercise the powers and responsibilities of the public officer.
275 a personal compensation to be paid to him for services, and it is generally a fixed annual or periodical payment depending on the time and not on the
amount of services he may render. It is given to higher degree of employment.
Where there is a de jure officer, a de facto officer who, in good faith, has possession of the office and has discharged the duties thereof, is entitled to
salary.
The salary of a public officer cannot be subject to garnishment, attachment or order of execution be seized before being paid to him, and appropriated to
the payment of his debts.
Agreements affecting compensation are void as contrary to public policy.
A de jure officer, upon establishing his title to the office CANNOT recover from the public/government the amount so paid to the de facto officer for
services performed by him BEFORE the adjudication upon the title.

276 Under Office of President Memo Circ. No. 54 (3/24/88), government officers or employees are not entitled to commutation of all leave credits without
limitation and regardless of the period when the credits were earned, provided the claimant was in the service as of January 9, 1986.

277 Retirement is compulsory for a member who has reached the age of sixty-five (65) years with at least fifteen (15) years of service. If he has less than
fifteen (15) years of service, he shall be allowed to continue in the service to complete the fifteen (15) years, to avail of the old-age pension benefit.
(Profeta v. Drilon)

278 Art III, Sec 8 1987Consti.

Civil servants are now given the right to self-organize but they may not stage strikes (see: SSS Employees Assoc. vs. CA, 175 SCRA 686)

279 Administrative Code of 1987; Sec. 38 (1), Chapter 9, Book 1

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a. Preventive Suspension280 and Back Salaries

The proper disciplining authority may preventively suspend any subordinate officer under his
authority pending an investigation if the charge against such officer involves dishonesty, oppression
or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of a duty, or if there are reasons to believe that
the respondent is guilty of the charges which would warrant removal from the service.
Back salaries are also payable to an officer illegally dismissed or otherwise unjustly deprived
of his office the right to recover accruing from the date of deprivation. The claim for back salaries
must be coupled with a claim for reinstatement and subject to the prescriptive period of one (1)
year.281
b. Illegal Dismissal, Reinstatement and Back Salaries
The public officer shall not be entitled to salaries during the period of preventive suspension;
but upon exoneration and subsequent reinstatement, he shall be paid full salaries and emoluments
accruing during the period of suspension. Note that in order to be entitled to back salaries, the
employee suspended must be exonerated of the charges against him.282
9. Immunity of Public Officers
Presidential Immunity from suit283
10. De Facto Officers284
One who has the reputation of being the officer that he assumes to be, and yet is not a good
officer in point of law.285
He must have acted as an officer for such length of time, under color of title and under such
circumstances of reputation or acquiescence by the public and public authorities, as to afford a
presumption of election or appointment, and induce people, without inquiry, and relying on the
supposition that he is the officer he assumes to be, to submit to or invoke his action.
11. Termination of Official Relation
a. Expiration of term or tenure286

280 Preventive Suspension - a precautionary measure so that an employee who is formally charged of an offense may be separated from the scene of his
alleged misfeasance while the same is being investigated (Bautista v. Peralta, 18 SCRA 223)
Need not be preceded by prior notice and hearing since it is not a penalty but only a preliminary step in an administrative investigation (Lastimosa v.
Vasquez, 243 SCRA 497)
The period of preventive suspension cannot be deducted from whatever penalty may be imposed upon the erring officer (CSC Resolution No. 90-1066)
Period for Preventive Suspension:
For Local elective officials 60 days (max) for single offense within a single year for several offenses but not exceeding term of office.
For civil service officers and employees 90 days (max)
The Ombudsman may suspend for 6 months.

281 Cruz, Law on Public Officers, p126-126

282 Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 619
283 supra
284 Elements
1. A validly existing public office.
2. Actual physical possession of said office.
3. Color of title to the office

285 Torres v. Ribo, 81 Phil. 44

286 Term is the period of time during which a public officer has the right to hold the public office.
Tenure is the period of time during which the public officer actually held office.
When a public officer holds office of the pleasure of the appointing authority, his being replaced shall be regarded as termination through expiration of
term, not removal. (Astraquillo v. Manglapus, 190 SCRA 280)
When the constitution provides that the term of office of local elective official is three years, Congress cannot, by a law calling for delayed election,
effectively reduced the term. (Osmena v. COMELEC 199 SCRA 750)
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b. Reaching the age limit287

c. Resignation288
d. Recall
e. Removal289
f. Abandonment290
g. Acceptance of an incompatible office291
h. Abolition of office292
i. Prescription of the right to office
j. Impeachment
k. Death293
l. Failure to assume elective office within six months from proclamation 294
m. Conviction of a crime295
n. Filing of a certificate of candidacy.
12. The Civil Service
a. Scope
The Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. 296
b. Appointments to the Civil Service

287 The compulsory retirement age for members of the Judiciary is seventy (70) years of age and for the other government officers and employees, sixtyfive (65) years of age.
Special Retirement Laws, e.g. R.A. 1616, which allows optional retirement after an officer has rendered a minimum number of years of government
service, when availed of by the public officer, will result in termination of official relationship through reaching the age limit (or retirement).
Any request for extension of service of compulsory retirees to complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement for retirement shall be allowed only to
permanent appointees in the career service who are regular members of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), and shall be granted for a period
not exceeding one (1) year. The government agency concerned is vested with discretionary authority to allow or disallow extension of such service. (Toledo
v. COMELEC)

288 the formal renunciation or relinquishment of a public officer

Resignation must be accepted by competent authority, either expressly or impliedly (as in the appointment of a successor).
Mere tender of resignation, without acceptance by competent authority does not create a vacancy in public office; resignation is not complete until
accepted by proper authority (Joson v. Nario, 187 SCRA 453)
In the Philippines, acceptance of resignation is necessary, because Art. 238 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes any public officer who, before the
accepatance of his resignation, abandons his office to the detriment of the public service.
If the public officer is mandated by law to hold over, the resignation, even if accepted, will not be effective until after the appointment or election of his
successor.

289 entails the ouster of an incumbent before the expiration of his term.
290 It is the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the holder, with the intention of terminating his possession and control thereof.

291 Acceptance of Incompatible Office ipso facto vacates the other. There is

no necessity for any proceeding to declare or complete the vacation of the

first office. (Adaza v. Pacana, 135 SCRA 431)
Exception: Where the public officer is authorized by law to accept the other office, e.g., the Secretary of Justice who is, by express provision of the
Constitution, a member of the Judicial and Bar Council

292 Except when restrained by the Constitution, Congress has the right to abolish an office, even during the term for which an existing incumbent may
have been elected.
Constitutional Offices cannot be abolished by Congress.
Valid abolition of office does not constitute removal of the incumbent

293 The death of an incumbent of an office necessarily renders the office vacant.
A public official ceases to hold office upon his death and all his rights, duties and obligations pertinent to the office are extinguished thereby. A decision
becomes binding only after it is validly promulgated.
Consequently, if at the time of the promulgation of a decision or a resolution, a judge or a member
of the collegiate court who had earlier signed or registered his vote, has vacated his office, his vote is automatically withdrawn or cancelled. (JAMIL vs.
COMELEC)

294 Sec. 11, BP 881 provides: The office of any official elected who fails or refuses to take his oath of office within six months from his proclamation
shall be considered vacant, unless said failure is for a cause or causes beyond his control.

295 Conviction with a accessory penalty of disqualification-rule:

When the penalty impose, upon conviction, carries with it the accessory penalty of disqualification, conviction by final judgment automatically
terminates official relationship.

296The test in determining whether a government-owned or controlled corporation is subject to the Civil Service Law is the manner of its creation.
Corporations created by special charters are subject to the Civil service, while those incorporated under the Corporation Law are not. The moment that a
Corporation ceases to be government controlled, as when it is privatized, it ceases to fall under the Civil Service. Also, if what is involved is a private
corporation from which the government acquires shares of stock, it does not fall under the Civil Service (e.g. PAL, Manila Hotel).
The Boy Scouts of the Philippines is a government-owned or controlled corporation.
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Shall be made only in accordance to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as

practicable, and except appointments to positions which are policy determining; primarily
confidential or highly technical by competitive examination. 297
c. Personnel Actions
Disciplinary cases involving personnel action affecting employees in the CS including
appointment through certification, promotion, transfers, reinstatement, reemployment, detail,
reassignment, demotion and separation, as well as employment status and qualification standards,
all within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CSC. (Mantala v. Salvador)
13. Accountability of Public Officers
a. Impeachment
A national inquest into the conduct of public men.
b. Ombudsman
The champion of the citizens and protector of the people
Tasked to entertain complaints addressed to him against erring public officers and take all
necessary actions thereon.298
(1) Judicial Review in Administrative Proceedings
The administrative case may be appealed to the Court of appeals.
(2) Judicial Review in Penal Proceedings
The criminal Case may be appealed to the Supreme Court..
c. Sandiganbayan299

297 Art. IX-B, Sec. 2(2)

A. Career Service characterized by:
a. entrance based on merit and fitness, to be determined by competitive examinations, or based on highly technical qualifications;
b. opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and
c. security of tenure.
B. The positions included in the career service are:
C. Open Career Positions, where prior qualification in an appropriate examination is required.
D. Closed Career Positions. E.g. scientific or highly technical in nature.
E. Career Executive Service. E.g. undersecretaries, bureau directors.
F. Career Officers. Other than those belonging to the Career Executive Service, who are appointed by the President, such as those in the Foreign Office.
G. Positions in the Armed Forces, although governed by a separate merit system.
H. Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
I. Permanent Laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled.
J. Non-career Service characterized by:
a. entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests utilized for career service;
b. tenure limited to a period specified by law, or which is co-terminus with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to
the duration of a particular project for which purpose the employment was made.
K. The positions included in the non-career service are:
L. Elective officials and their personal and confidential staff.
M. Department heads and officials of Cabinet rank who hold office at the pleasure of the President and their personal and confidential staff.
N. Chairmen and members of commissions and boards with fixed terms of office, and their personal and confidential staff.
O. Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job

298 The Constitution and RA 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) has endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with a wide latitude of investigatory and
prosecutory power virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention. The Supreme Court consistently refrains from interfering with the
exercise of its powers, and respects the initiative and independence inherent in the Ombudsman who, beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people
and the preserver of the integrity of public service. (Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman, GR No. 139396, August 15, 2000)

299

Original Jurisdiction
a. violations of R.A. 3019 (AGCPA) as amended; R.A. 1379; and Chapter II, Sec.2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code where one or more of the
accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity at the time of the commission
of the offense:
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The anti-graft court shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now and
hereafter may be provided by law.
d. Ill-Gotten Wealth
The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or
employee, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription,
laches or estoppel300 but it applies only to civil actions and not to criminal cases. 301
13. Term Limits302
*** Judge Singco Notes
(ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS)

IMPEACHMENT- Estrada vs. Desierto, April 3, 2001Section 3(7) of Article XI

provides for the limit and the consequence of an impeachment judgment.
Conviction in the impeachment proceeding is not required before the
public officer subject of impeachment may be prosecuted, tried and
punished for criminal offenses committed.

READ: Francisco, et al. vs. House of Representatives, November 10, 2003definition of TO INITIATE IMPEACHMENT- proceeding is initiated or
begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee
on Justice.

Gutierrez vs. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, GR No.

193459, February 15, 2011- The proceeding is initiated or begins, when a
verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This
is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.

A vote of 1/3 of all the members of the House shall be necessary either to
affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee or
override its contrary resolution, De Castro vs. Committee on Justice, Batasan
Pambansa, September 3, 1995.

(i) Officials of the Executive branch with the position of regional director or higher, or with Salary Grade Level 27 (G27) according to R.A. 6758,
specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors; Board members, provincial treasurers, engineers and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, city councilors; city treasurers, assessors, engineers and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service from consuls or higher;
(d) PA/PAF colonels; PN captains and all officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the PNP while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
(f) City/provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and
(g) Presidents, directors, trustees, or managers of GOCCs state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(ii) Members of Congress and officials thereof with G27 and up;
(iii) Members of the Judiciary without prejudice to the Constitution;
(iv) Chairmen and members of the Constitutional Commissions without prejudice to the Constitution; and
(v) All other national and local officials with G27 or higher;
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a in
relation to their office;
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with E.O. nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A issued in 1986.
2. Exclusive Original Jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibitions, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunction and other
ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, Provided, that jurisdiction over these petitions shall be not exclusive of the Supreme Court;
and
3. Exclusive Appellate Jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original
jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction. (RA 8249)

300 Art. XI, Sec. 15

301 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, GR No.130140, October 25, 1999

302 infra
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Resignation by an impeachable official does not place him beyond the reach of
impeachment proceedings; he can still be impeached.

Salumbides vs. Ombudsman, GR No. 180917, April 23, 2010- The doctrine
of condonation cannot be extended to reappointed coterminous employees like
petitioners as in their case, there is neither subversion of the sovereign will nor
disenfranchisement of the electorate. The unwarranted expansion of the Pascual
doctrine would set a dangerous precedent as it would, as respondents posit,
provide civil servants, particularly local government, with blanket immunity from
administrative liability that would spawn and breed abuse of bureaucracy.

The 1987 Constitution, the deliberations thereon, and the opinions of

constitutional law experts all indicate that the Deputy Ombudsman is not
an impeachable officer. (Office of the Ombudsman vs. Court of Appeals and
former Deputy Ombudsman Arturo C. Mojica, March 4, 2005).

Marquez vs. Desierto, June 27, 2001- there must be a pending case before a
court of competent jurisdiction before inspection of bank accounts by Ombudsman
may be allowed.

OMBS POWER TO PROSECUTE, Uy vs. Sandiganbayan, March 20, 2001- The

power to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified.
The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts.

Ombudsman vs. Valera, September 30, 2005- The Court has consistently held
that the Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the
Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control and upon
authority of the Ombudsman. xxx However, with respect to the grant of the power
to preventively suspend, Section 24 of R.A. No 6770 makes no mention of the
Special Prosecutor. The obvious import of this exclusion is to withhold from
the Special Prosecutor the power to preventively suspend.

Honasan II vs. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of DOJ, April 13, 2004The power of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public
officers or employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with other
similarly authorized agencies of the government such as the provincial,
city and state prosecutors. DOJ Panel is not precluded from conducting any
investigation of cases against public officers involving violations of penal laws but
if the cases fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, then
respondent Ombudsman may, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction take over
at any stage.

Ledesma vs. CA,

July 29, 2005 - Ombudsman has the authority to
determine the administrative liability of a public official or employee at
fault, and direct and compel the head of the office or agency concerned to
implement the penalty imposed. In other words, it merely concerns the
procedural aspect of the Ombudsmans functions and not its jurisdiction.

Office of the Ombudsman vs. CA, et al.,GR No. 160675, June 16, 2006- the
Court similarly upholds the Office of the Ombudsmans power to impose the
penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public
officer or employee found to be at fault, in the exercise of its administrative
disciplinary authority. The exercise of such power is well founded in the
Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770. xxx The legislative history of Republic Act
No. 6770 thus bears out the conclusion that the Office of the Ombudsman was
intended to possess full administrative disciplinary authority, including
the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at
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fault. The lawmakers envisioned the Office of the Ombudsman to be an activist

watchman, not merely a passive one.
-

Facura vs. CA, et al., GR No. 166495, February 16, 2011- Appeals from the
decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases do not stay the execution of
the penalty imposed.

Ombudsman vs. CA, et al., GR No. 1772224, January 26, 2011- The decision
of the Ombudsman in administrative cases may be executed pending appeal. This
is pursuant to the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman which
explicitly states that an appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory.
Also, the power of the Ombudsman to implement the penalty is not
merely recommendatory but mandatory.

Masing, et al. vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 165584, January 22,
2008 Supreme Court reiterated this ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja,
where we emphasized that the Ombudsmans order to remove, suspend, demote,
fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee is not merely advisory or
recommendatory but is actually mandatory. Implementation of the order
imposing the penalty is, however, to be coursed through the proper officer.

Section 23(1) of the same law provides that administrative investigations

conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be in accordance with its rules of
procedure and consistent with due process. It is erroneous, therefore, for
respondents to contend that R.A. No. 4670 confers an exclusive disciplinary
authority on the DECS over public school teachers and prescribes an exclusive
procedure in administrative investigations involving them. R.A. No. 4670 was
approved on June 18, 1966. On the other hand, the 1987 Constitution was ratified
by the people in a plebiscite in 1987 while R.A. No. 6770 was enacted on
November 17, 1989. It is basic that the 1987 Constitution should not be restricted
in its meaning by a law of earlier enactment. The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No.
6770 were quite explicit in conferring authority on the Ombudsman to act on
complaints against all public officials and employees, with the exception of officials
who may be removed only by impeachment or over members of Congress and the
Judiciary.

QUIMPO vs. TANODBAYAN- It is not material that a GOCC is originally

created by charter or not. What is decisive is that it has been acquired by
the government to perform functions related to government programs
and policies.

JURISDICTION OVER GOCC- Macalino vs. Sandiganbayan, 376 SCRA 452Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution and Section 15 of RA 6770 granted the
Ombudsman the power to direct any officer or employee of government-owned
or controlled corporations with original charters to perform any act or duty
required by law or to stop any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties.

PRESCRIPTION- Presidential Ad-hoc Fact-finding Committee on Behest

Loans vs. Desierto , 317 SCRA 272- Section 15 of Article XI applies only to civil
actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth and not to criminal cases.

J. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
1. General Principles

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Branch of public law that fixes the organization of the government and determines
competence of authorities who execute the law and indicates to the individual remedies for the
violations of his rights.
2. Administrative Agencies
A body, other than the courts and the legislature, endowed with quasi-legislative and quasijudicial powers for the purpose of enabling it to carry out laws entrusted to it for enforcement or
execution.
3. Powers of Administrative Agencies
a. Quasi-Legislative303 Power
In exercise of delegated legislative power, involving no discretion as to what law shall be,
but merely authority to fix details in execution or enforcement of a policy set out in law itself.
(1) Kinds of Administrative Rules and Regulations
a.

Legislative regulation
i. Supplementary or detailed legislation,304
ii. Contingent regulation

b.

Interpretative legislation or internal rules305

(2) Requisites for Validity

i. law itself must declare as punishable the violation of administrative rule or regulation;
ii. law should define or fix penalty therefor; and
iii. rule/regulation must be published
b. Quasi-Judicial306 Power
Proceedings partake of nature of judicial proceedings. Administrative body granted authority
to promulgate its own rules of procedure, provided they do not increase diminish or modify
substantive rights, and subject to the disapproval by the Supreme Court.307
(1) Administrative Due Process308

303 Rule Making

304 e.g. Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code
305 e.g. BIR Circulars
Only an instruction from a higher officer to a lower officer within the same office. It has no effect of law because no clear legal right which can be
invoked by a third person emanates from it. It does not have to be published to be effective.

306 Adjudicatory
307 Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (5)
308 Notice and hearing as the fundamental requirements of due process, are essential only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicail
function, but in the performance of its executive or legislative functions, such as the issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply
with the requirements of notice and hearing, except when it involves revocation of a license. (Corona v. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Philippines,
283 SCRA 31)
Due process in administrative context does not require trial type-proceedings similar to those in the courts of justice. (UP Board of Regents v. CA, 313
SCRA 404 ) Administrative due process cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict judicial sense. (Ocampo v. Office of the Ombudsman, 322 SCRA
17)
A formal trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due process- it is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain heir respective sides of the controversy and to present evidence on which a fair decision can be based. (Melendres v. COMELEC, 319
SCRA 262)
The requirement of hearing is complied with as long as there is opportunity to be heard, and to submit any evidence one may have in support of his
defense, and not
necessarily that an actual hearing was conducted. (Busuego v. CA, 304 SCRA 473)
Where the litigants are given the opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, there is no denial of procedural due process.
(Domingo, Jr. v. COMELEC, 313 SCRA 311; Ablera v. NLRC, 215 SCRA 476) A party who chooses not to avail of the opportunity to answer the charges
cannot complain of denial of due process.(Ocampo v. Office of the Ombudsman, supra) There can be no denial of due process where a party had the
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The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied in administrative

proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of.309
Administrative due process is recognized to include the right to:
1. Notice, be actual or constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a
persons legal right;
2. Reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights, and to introduce witnesses and
relevant evidence in his favor;
3. A tribunal so constituted as to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality,
and one of competent jurisdiction;
4. And a finding or decision by that tribunal supported by substantial evidence presented at
the hearing or at least ascertained in the records or disclosed to the parties. 310
(2) Administrative Appeal and Review
Pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party litigant can
seek judicial intervention, he must exhaust all means of administrative redress available under the
law, subject to the exceptions provided for by law or jurisprudence.
By virtue of the power of control of the president over all executive departments, the
President, by himself or through the Department Secretaries (pursuant to the alter ego doctrine),
may affirm, modify, alter, or reverse the administrative decision of subordinate officials and
employees.311
(3) Administrative Res Judicata
It has the force and binding effect of a final judgment. 312
c. Fact-Finding, Investigative, Licensing and Rate-Fixing Powers
4. Judicial Recourse and Review313
a. Doctrine of Primary Administrative Jurisdiction314
Judicial action of a case is deferred pending the determination of some issues which properly
belong to an administrative body because their expertise, specializes skills, knowledge and
resources are required for the resolution of factual and non-legal matters. In such a case, relief
must first be sought and obtained in the administrative body concerned before the Court will supply
the remedy. Where a statute lodges exclusive original jurisdiction in an administrative agency, the
court will refuse to take up a case unless the agency has finally completed its proceedings. 315
opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so.(DBP v. CA, 302 SCRA 362; Tiomico v. CA, 304 SCRA 216)

309 Arboleda v. NLRC, 303 SCRA 38

310Air Manila, Inc. V. Balatbat, 38 SCRA 489 and Fabella v. CA, 282 SCRA 256
311 The appellate administrative agency may conduct additional hearings in the appealed case, if deemed necessary. But just like in the appellate courts,
appellate administrative bodies may only pass upon errors assigned. (Diamonon vs. DOLE, GR No. 108951, March 7, 2000)

312 applies only to judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings not to exercise of administrative functions (Brillantes vs. Castro 99 Phil. 497)

313 Requisites of judicial review of administrative action

1. Administrative remedies must have been exhausted or the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
2. Administrative action must have been completed or the principle of finality of administrative action.

314 or preliminary resort

315 The doctrine does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence. (Roxas & Co. Inc v. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 106 and Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. Court of
Appeals, 342 SCRA)
The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not call for the immediate dismissal of the case pending before the court. The case is merely
suspended until the issues resolvable by the administrative body are threshed out and fully determined.(Industrial enterprises, Inc v. CA, 184 SCRA 426)
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b. Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies316

Whenever there is an available administrative remedy provided by law, no judicial recourse
can be made until all such remedies have been availed of and exhausted.
Before a party can invoke the jurisdiction of the courts of justice, he is expected to have
exhausted all means of administrative redress afforded to him by law.
c. Doctrine of Finality of Administrative Action
No resort to courts will be allowed unless administrative action has been completed and
there is nothing left to be done in administrative structure.

K. ELECTION LAW
1. Suffrage
The right and obligation of qualified citizens to vote in the election of certain national and
local of the government and in the decisions of public questions submitted to the people. It includes
within its scope: election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.
2. Qualification and Disqualification of Voters
Qualifications:
1. Filipino citizenship- it may be by birth or naturalization.
2. Age - a person may be registered as a voter although he is less than 18 years at the time
of registration if he will be at least 18 on the day of election.
3. Residence - at least 1 year in the Philippines, and at least 6 months where he proposes to
vote immediately preceding the election. Any person who, on the days of registration may not have
been reached the required period of residence but who, on the day of election shall possess such
qualification, may register as voter.317
No literacy, property or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of
suffrage.
Disqualifications:
year.

1. Any person sentenced by the final judgment to suffer imprisonment for not less than one

2. Any person adjudged by the final judgment of having commit (a) any crime involving
disloyalty to the government or (b) any crime against national security (c) firearms laws.

316 Failure to exhaust administrative remedies will not affect the jurisdiction of the courts. Non-compliance with the doctrine will deprive the complainant
of a cause of action, which is a ground for a motion to dismiss the case. However, if no motion to dismiss is filed on this ground, there is deemed a waiver.
(Rosario v. CA, 211 SCRA and Baguioro v. Basa, 214 SCRA 437)
One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the separation of powers, which enjoins upon the judiciary a becoming a
policy of non-interference with matters coming primarily within the competence of other department. The Legal reason is that the courts should not act and
correct its mistakes or errors and amend its decision on a given matter and decide it properly. (Lopez v. City of Manila, 303 SCRA 448) And the practical
reason is that administrative process I intended to provide less expensive and speedier solution to disputes.

317 Any person who temporarily resides in another city municipality or country solely by reason of occupation, profession, employment in public or
private service, educational activities, work in the military or naval reservations within the Philippines, service in the AFP, PNP or confinement or detention
in government institutions, shall not deemed to have lost his original residence. (Sec. 9, RA 8189)
In election cases, the Supreme Court treats domicile and residence and residence as synonymous terms. In order to acquire a new domicile by choice,
there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality;(2) an intention to remain there; and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. The
residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual. (Romualdez vs. RTC,226 SCRA 406)
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3. Insane or incompetent persons as declared by competent authority.

3. Registration of Voters
The personal filing of application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the
office of the Election Office during regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted
during the period starting 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a special
election.318
4. Inclusion and Exclusion Proceedings319
Jurisdiction
Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Court original and exclusive Jurisdiction
Regional Trial Court appellate jurisdiction (5 days) 320
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over RTC on question of law (15 days) 321
5. Political Parties
Political party or party when used in the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) means an organized
group of persons pursuing the same ideology, political ideas or platforms of government and
includes its branches or divisions. A political party may refer to a local regional or national party
existing and duly registered and accredited by the COMELEC. To acquire juridical personality, qualify
for accreditation, and to be entitled to the rights of political parties, a political party must be
registered with the COMELEC.322

318 Sec. 8, R.A. 8189

319 Petitioners
Inclusion
1. Private person whose application was disapproved by the Election Registration Board or whose name was stricken out from the list of waters (Sec. 34,
RA 8189)
2. COMELEC [Sec. 2(6), Art. IX-C, PC]
Exclusion
1. Any registered voter in city or municipality
2. Representative of political party
3. Election Officer (Sec. 39, RA 8189)
4. COMELEC [Sec. 2(6), Art. IX C, PC]
Period for Filing
Inclusion Any day except 105 days before regular election or 75 days before a special election. (Sec. 24, RA 8189)
Exclusion Any time except 100 days before a regular election or 65 days before special election. (Sec. 35 RA 8189)
Procedure
1. Petition for exclusion shall be sworn (Sec. 35 , RA 8189)
2. Each petition shall refer only to only one precinct. (Sec. 35, RA 8189)
3. Notice
4. Parties to be notified
Inclusion and Exclusion Election Registration Board
Challenged voters [Sec. 32(b), RA 8189]
Manner
Notice stating the place day and hour of hearing shall be served through any of the following means:
1. Registered mail
2. Personal delivery
3. Leaving copy in possession of sufficient discretion in residence.
4. Posting in city hall or municipal hall and two other
conspicuous places in the city or municipality at least 10 days before the hearing (Sec. 32(b),
RA 8189)
Any voter, candidate or political party affected may intervene. (Sec. 32c, RA 8189)
Non-appearance is prima facie evidence the registered voter is fictitious (Sec. 32 (f), RA 8189)
Decision cannot be rendered on stipulation of facts (Sec. 32 (f), RA 8189)
No motion for reconsideration is allowed, (Sec. 33, RA 8189)

320 Sec. 33, ibid

321 Sec. 5(2)(e), Art. VIII, PC; Sec. 2, Rule 45 of the RC

322 The following political parties cannot be registered.

1. Religious sects
2. Those which seeks to achieve their goals through unlawful means
3. Those which refuse to adhere to the Constitution
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6. Candidacy
a. Qualifications of Candidates323
A. National
1. President and Vice President
a. natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
b. a registered voter,
c. able to read and write,
d. at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and
e. a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such
election.324
2. Senators
a. natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
b. a registered voter,
c. able to read and write,
d. at least thirty-five of years of age on the day of the election, and
e. a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding
the day of the election.
3. Congressmen District and Party List Representatives
a. natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
b. a registered voter,
c. able to read and write,
d. at least twenty -five of years of age on the day of the election, and
e. except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he
shall be elected, and
f. a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the
day of the election.325
B. Local
(a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the
barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be
elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election;
and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice-governor, or member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, or mayor, vice-mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized
cities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.
(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of independent component cities,
component cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.
(d) Candidates for the position of member of the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang
bayan must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.
4. Those that are supported by any foreign government

323 Qualifications prescribed by law are continuing requirements and must be possessed for the duration of the officers active tenure. Once any of the
required qualifications is lost, his title to the office may be seasonably challenged. (Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, 174 SCRA 245 and Labor vs. COMELEC, 176
SCRA 1)

324 Art. VII, Sec. 2

325 Art. Vi, Sec. 6
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(e) Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the sangguniang barangay
must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.
(f) Candidates for the sangguniang kabataan must be at least fifteen (15) years of age but
not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election day. 326
b. Filing of Certificates of Candidacy
(1) Effect of Filing
An appointive public official is considered resigned upon filing of his certificate. 327 This
includes an employs of a GOCC organized under the Corporation Code, 328 since the law makes no
distinction.329
Any elective official, whether national or local who has filed a certificate of candidacy for the
same or any other office shall not be considered resigned from office. 330
(2) Substitution of Candidates
Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. - If after the last day
for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political
party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by,
the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died,
withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned
may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the preceding
sections not later than mid-day of the day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or
disqualification should occur between the day before the election and mid-day of election day, said
certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is
a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country,
with the Commission.331
In case of valid substitutions after the official ballots have been printed, the votes cast for
the substituted candidates shall be considered as stray votes but shall not invalidate the whole
ballot. For this purpose, the official ballots shall provide spaces where the voters may write the
name of the substitute candidates if they are voting for the latter: Provided, however, That if the
substitute candidate of the same family name, this provision shall not apply. 332
If after the last day for filing certificates, a candidate dies, withdraws or is disqualified, he
may be substituted by a person belonging to his party not later than the mid day of election. Said
certificate may be filled with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is
an electorate of the country, with the COMELEC.333
Even if the withdrawal was not under oath, the certificate of the substitute cannot be
annulled after the election. Such technicality of the original candidates withdrawal of his certificate
of candidacy cannot be used to override the peoples will in favor to the substitute candidate. The
legal requirement that the withdrawal be under oath will be held to be merely directory and the
candidates failure to observe the requirement is considered a harmless error. Hence the bona fide

326 Sec.39, LGC

327 Sec. 66, BP 881; Sanciangco vs. Rono, 137, SCRA 671
328 Without original charter
329 PNOC EDC vs. NLRC, 222 SCRA 831
330 Sec. 26, COMELEC Resolution No. 3636, Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 9006
331 Sec. 77, BP 881
332 Sec. 12, RA 9006
333 Domingo vs. City Board of Canvassers, GR No. 105365, June 2, 1992
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certificate of the substitute candidate cannot be assailed. The votes in his favor should be
counted.334
There is nothing in the Constitution or statute which requires as condition precedent that a
substitute candidate must have been a member of the party concerned for a certain period of time
before he can be nominated as such.335
A valid certificate of candidacy is likewise an indispensable requisite in the case of a
substitution of a disqualified candidate under the provisions of Sec. 77 of the Election Code . . . The
concept of a substitute presupposes the existence of the person to be substituted, for how can a
person take the place of somebody who does not exist or who never was...
A disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy in
the first place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and seasonably filed
certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all. If a person was not a candidate, he
cannot be substituted under Sec. 77 of the Code . . . .
While Sec. 78 of the Election Code enumerated the occasion where a candidate may validly
substitute there is no mention of the case where a candidate is excluded not only by disqualification
but also by denial and cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. 336
(3) Nuisance Candidates
COMELEC may motu propio or upon petition of interested party, refuse to give due course to
or cancel certificate of candidacy if shown that said certificate was filed:
1. to put election process in mockery or disrepute;
2. to cause confusion among voters by similarity of names of registered candidates;
3. by other circumstances or acts which demonstrate that a candidate has no bona fide
intention to run for office for which certificate has been filed, and thus prevent a faithful
determination of true will of electorate.
(4) Petition to Deny or Cancel Certificates of Candidacy 337
The petition shall be filed by any registered candidate for the same Office within 5 days from
the last day of filing of certificates of Candidacy. 338
Under the election laws and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, any voter may file a petition
to disqualify a candidate on grounds provided by law.339
(5) Effect of Disqualification
After final judgment -Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted.
Before final judgment If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before
an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may, during the tendency thereof,

334Villanueva vs. COMELEC, 140 SCRA 352

335 Sinaca vs. Mula, 315 SCRA 266
336 Miranda vs. Abaya, 311 SCRA 617

337 A petition filed after the election is filed out of time. (Loong vs.COMELEC, 216 SCRA 769)
The COMELEC may motu propio refuse to give due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy. (Sec. 69, BP 881)
The proceeding shall be summary. (Nolasco vs. COMELEC, 275 SCRA 762)
The COMELEC can decide a disqualification case directly without referring it to its legal officers for investigation. (Nolasco, supra)
The decision shall be final and executory after 5 days from receipt unless stayed by the Supreme Court [Secs. 5(e) and 7, RA 6646]

338 Secs. 5a and 7, RA 6646

339 Torayno vs.COMELEC, 337 SCRA 574

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order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt
strong.340
(6) Withdrawal of Candidates
J.

Form written declaration under oath.

is

341

7. Campaign
a. Premature Campaigning
Election campaign or partisan political activity refers to an act designed to promote the
election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates for public office. 342
a.

If done for the purpose of enhancing the chances of aspirants for nomination for candidacy
to a public office by a political party, etc, it shall not be considered as election campaign or
partisan political activity.

b.

It shall be unlawful for any person or any party to engage in election campaign or partisan
political activity except during the campaign period.

c.

Members of the Civil Service to engage, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or

partisan political campaign.
b. Prohibited Contributions
No political contribution shall be made by the following:

i. Public or private financial institutions

ii. Public utilities and those who exploit natural resources 343
iii. Persons who hold contracts or sub-contracts to supply the government with goods and
services.
iv.
Persons granted franchises, incentives, exemptions or similar privileges by the
government
v. Persons granted loans in excess of P25, 000 by the government or any of its subdivisions
or instrumentalities
vi. Schools which received grants of public funds of at least P100,000
vii. Employees in the Civil Service or members of the Armed Forces.
viii. Foreigners344
ix. Corporations345

340 Sec. 6, RA 6646

Sec. 6 of RA 6616 authorizes the continuation of proceedings for disqualification even after the elections if the respondent has not been proclaimed.
(Perez vs. COMELEC, 317 SCRA 641)
A disqualification case may have two aspects, the administrative, which required only a preponderance of evidence to prove disqualification, and the
criminal, which necessitates proof beyond reasonable doubt to convict.
There is no provision in RA 6646 that treats of a situation where the complaint for disqualification is filed after the election. . . .
Second paragraph of paragraph 2 of Res. No. 2050 provides that where a complaint is filed after the election but before proclamation, as in this case, the
complaint must be dismissed as a disqualification case but shall be referred to the Law Department for preliminary investigation.

341

There was no withdrawal of candidacy for the position of mayor where the candidate, before the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy,
personally appeared in the COMELEC office, asked for his certificate of candidacy and intercalated the word vice before the word mayor and the
following day wrote the election registrar saying that his name be included in the list of official candidates for mayor. (Vivero vs. COMELEC, L 81059,
Jan 12, 1989)
Since his certificate of candidacy for the office of board member was filed by his party, and the said party had withdrawn the nomination which
withdrawal was confirmed by the candidate under oath, there was substantial compliance with Sec. 73. His filing under oath within the statutory period of
his individual certificate for candidacy for the separate office of mayor was, in effect, a rejection of the party nomination on his behalf for the office of board
member. (Ramirez vs. COMELEC, L-81150, Jan 12, 1992)

342 (Sec. 79, BP 881)

343 Thus, where an operator of a public utility disguised a contribution to a candidate for governor as loan, the promissory note is void: (halili vs. Court of
Appeals, 83 SCRA 633)

344 Sec. 95 , B.P. 881

345 Sec. 36 (9), Corp. Code
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8. Board of Canvassers
Nature of duty of board of canvassers
Ministerial- it has only the ministrial task of tallying the votes as reported in the election
returns and declare the results, and cannot exercise the judicial power of deciding an election
contest. The correction of the manifest mistake in the mathemathical addition calls for a mere
clerical task on the part of the board. The remedy is purely administrative. 346
Quasi-Judicial- The Comelec exercises judgment or discretion to determine whether any
given return before it is genuine in connection with the canvass of votes.
9. Remedies and Jurisdiction in Election Law
a. Petition Not to Give Due Course to Certificate of Candidacy
Subject to its authority over nuisance candidates and its power to deny due course or cancel
a certificate of candidacy, the rule is that the COMELEC shall have only the ministerial duty to
receive and acknowledge receipt of the certificates of candidacy. 347

b. Petition to Declare Failure of Elections

There are only 3 instances where a failure of elections may be declared, namely:
a.

The election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes;

b.

The election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes; and

c.

After the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the
custody or canvass thereof such election results in a failure to elect on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes.348
c. Pre-Proclamation Controversy349

346 Tatlonghari vs. COMELEC,199 SCRA 199

347 Sec. 78, BP 881
348What is common in these three instances is the resulting failure to elect.

In the first instance, no election is held while in the second, the election is
suspended. In the third instance, circumstances attending the preparation, transmission, custody or canvass of the election returns cause a failure to elect.
The term failure to elect means nobody emerged as a winner. (Pasandalan vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 150312, July 18, 2002)
The causes for the declaration of a failure of election may occur before or after the casting of votes or on the day of the election. (Sec. 4, R.A. 7166)
The COMELEC shall call for the holding or continuation of the election on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended, or
which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than 30 days after the cessation of the cause of such suspension or failure to elect. (Sec. 6, B.P. 881)
In such election, the location of polling places shall be the same as that of the preceding regular election. However, changes may be initiated by written
petition of the majority of the voters of the precinct or agreement of all the political parties or by resolution of the Comelec after notice and hearing. (Cawasa
vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 150469, July 3, 2002)

349 In pre-proclamation controversy, the board of canvassers and the COMELEC

are not to look beyond or behind election returns which are on their
face regular and authentic returns.(CHU,supra)
A pre-proclamation controversy is limited to an examination of the election returns on their face- The COMELEC as a general rule need not go beyond
the face of the returns and investigate alleged election irregularities.
To require the COMELEC to examine the circumstances surrounding the preparation of the returns would run counter to the rule that a pre-proclamation
controversy should be summarily decided.
Where the resolution of the issues raised would require the COMELEC to pierce the veil of election returns that appear prima facie regular, the remedy
is a regular election protest.
The office of pre-proclamation controversy is limited to incomplete, falsified or materially defective returns which appear as such on the face. (Sebastian
VS COMELEC, 327 SCRA 406)
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Refers to any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers
which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political
parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under
Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of the election returns.350
d. Election Protest351
Maybe filed by any candidate who has filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted
upon for the same office.
Grounds:
a.
b.
c.
d.

fraud,
terrorism,
irregularities or
illegal acts committed before, during or after the casting and counting of
votes

Time to file:
Within 10 days from the proclamation of the results of the election
e. Quo Warranto
Filed by any registered voter in the constituency.
Grounds:
1. ineligibility or
2. disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines
Time to file:
Within 10 days from the proclamation of the results of the election
10. Prosecution of Election Offenses
File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or
exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election
laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices. 352
*** Judge Singco Notes (Suffrage)

350 Chu vs. COMELEC,319 SCRA 482

351 The filing of an election protest results in abandonment of a pre-proclamation case even if the protest alleged it was filed as a precautionary measure,
if he did not explain why.(Laodenio vs. COMELEC,276 SCRA 405)
3.The rule that the filing of a protest implies abandonment of the pre-proclamation case does not apply if:
i.The protest was filed as a precautionary measure (mitmug vs. COMELEC,230 SCRA 54)
ii.The board of canvassers was improperly constituted, as when the Municipal Treasurer took over the canvassing without having been designated. (Saman
vs. COMELEC,224 SCRA 631)

352 Art IX-C, Sec. 2(6)

The COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation of and prosecute election offenses (Naldaza vs. Lavilles,254 SCRA 286)
This holds true even if the offense is committed by a public officer in relation to his office.(Corpuz vs. Tanodbayan, 149 SCRA 2281)
Whatever initiated motu propio or filed with the COMELEC by any other party, the complaint shall be referred to the COMELEC Law Department for
investigation.. The COMELEC Chairman, in his personal capacity may file directly with the COMELEC Law Department pursuant to Section 4, Rule 34 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. No requirement in section 5 that only the COMELEC en banc may refer a complaint to the Law Department for
investigation nor is there a rule against the COMELEC Chairman directing the conduct of a preliminary investigation, even if he himself were the
complainant in his private capacity Where the complaint was directly filed with the Law Department under Section 4 of Rule 32 of the COMELEC
RULES of Procedure obviously there is no need to refer such complaint to the same Law Department Under Section 5 of Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure, the preliminary investigation may be delegated to any of those officials specified in the rule upon the direction of the COMELEC
Chairman(Laurel vs. Presiding Judge, RTC Manila Br 10, 323 SCRA 778)
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READ: RA 9225 and RA 9189 (Absentee Voting)

AKBAYAN-Youth vs. COMELEC, March 26, 2001- where it is both impractical

and illegal to conduct a two-day special registration for new voters, the COMELEC
cannot be compelled to do so.

The right of suffrage is not absolute. The exercise of the right is subject to
existing substantive and procedural requirements embodied in our Constitution,
statute books and other repositories of law.

The right of citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon certain procedural

requirements he must undergo, among others the process of registration under RA
8189 (Voters Registration Act of 1996).

Makalintal vs. COMELEC, July 10, 2003- The interpretation of residence is

synonymous to domicile. An absentee remains attached to his residence in the
Philippines, as residence is considered synonymous with domicile. Domicile
means an individuals permanent home or a place to which, whenever absent for
business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and
circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent.

Ugdoracion, Jr. vs. COMELEC- Three basic rules on domicile: 1) a man must
have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) domicile, once established, remains
until a new one is validly acquired; (3) a man can have but one residence or
domicile at any given time.

Absentee voting under Section 2 of RA 9189 is an exception to the sixmonth/one-year residency requirement.

Lewis vs. COMELEC, August 4, 2006- There is no provision in the dual

citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to actually establish
residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise
their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that
duals are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same
right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189
(election for president, v-pres., senators). It cannot be overemphasized that
R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all
overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of
an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote.

L. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
1. Public Corporations
a. Concept
Public corporation - one formed and organized for the government of a portion of the State
(1) Distinguished from Government-Owned or Controlled Corporations
(GOCCs)
A provincial election supervisor authorized to conduct a preliminary investigation may file a case without need of approval of the provincial prosecutor.
(Pp. Vs. Inting,187 SCRA 788)
The COMELEC can deputize prosecutors to investigate and prosecute offenses even after election. (Pp. Vs. Basilla,179 SCRA 87)
Since it is a preliminary investigation, it is the COMELEC who will determine the existence of probable cause, the complainant cannot ask it to gather
evidence in support of the complaint. (Kilosbayan Inc vs. COMELEC,280 SCRA 8920
The court in which a criminal case was filed may order the COMELEC to order a reinvestigation. (Pp. Vs. Delgado, 189 SCRA 715)
A prosecutor who was deputized by the COMELEC cannot oppose the appeal filed by the COMELEC from the dismissal of a case, since the power to
prosecute election offenses is vested in the COMELEC.(COMELEC vs. Ssilva,286 SCRA 177)
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.Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized as a stock or

non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental of
proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either
wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one
percent (51%) of its capital stock.353
b. Classifications
(1) Quasi-Corporations - public corporations created as agencies of
State for narrow and limited purpose.
(2) Municipal Corporations - a body politic and corporate constituted by
incorporation of inhabitants of city or town for purposes of local
government thereof or as agency of State to assist in civil government
of the country; one formed and organized for the government of a
portion of the State
2. Municipal Corporations
a. Elements
i.
ii
iii.
iv.

Legal creation or incorporation

Corporate name
Inhabitants
Territory

b. Nature and Functions

Every local government unit created or organized is a body politic and corporate endowed
with powers to be exercised by it in conformity with law. As such, it shall exercise powers as
political subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity representing the
inhabitants of its territory.
i. Public/Governmentalit acts as an agent of the State for the government of the territory
and the inhabitants within the municipal limits; it exercises by delegation a part of the sovereignty
of the State.
ii. Private/Proprietaryit acts in a similar category as a business corporation, performing
functions not strictly governmental or political; it stands for the community in the administration of
local affairs. It acts as a separate entity for its own purposes and not as a subdivision of the State.
c. Requisites for Creation, Conversion, Division, Merger or Dissolution
A. Creation of LGUs:354
A local government unit may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundaries
substantially altered by law enacted by Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality, or
other political subdivisions, or by Sanggunian Panlalawigan or Sanggunian Panlungsod ordinance in
the case of a barangay. 355

353 Introductory Provisions, Sec. 2 (13), Adm. Code of 1997

354 Nature of the power to create: legislative

355 Sec.6
While the power to create barangays has been delegated to Sanggunian Panlalawigan and Sangguniang Panlungsod, Congress, in order to enhance the
delivery of basic services in indigenous cultural communities, may create barangays in such communities notwithstanding the requirements set forth by law.
(Sec.385a, LGC)
The creation or conversion of a local government unit to another level shall be based on the following verifiable indicators of viability and projected
capacity to provide services:
a. Sufficient income and
b. Population and/or
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Manner of Creation
1. Creation of Barangays:356
Substantive Requisites:
a. Population- at least 2000 inhabitants 357
b. Income- no minimum income requirement
c. Land Area- no minimum requirement, but it must be contiguous but it need not be
contiguous if the barangay is comprised with two or more islands. 358
2. Creation of Municipalities359
Substantive Requisites:
a. Population- at least 25,000 inhabitants
b. Income- average annual income of at least P2.5 million for the last two consecutive
years based on the 1991 constant prices.
c. Land Area- a contiguous territory of 50 square kilometers.
3. Creation of Component Cities360
Substantive Requisites:
a. Population- at least 150,000 inhabitants
b. Income- at least P100 million for the last two consecutive years
c. Land Area- contiguous territory of at least 100 square kilometers

4. Conversion of a Component City into a Highly Urbanized City361

Substantive Requisites:
a. Population- at least 200,000 inhabitants
b. Income- at least P50 million
c. Land area
As a matter of general rule, municipal corporations cannot, without legal authorization, exercise its powers beyond its own corporate limits. It is
necessary that it must have its boundaries fixed, definite and certain, in order that may be identified and that all may know the exact scope or section of
territory or geographical division embraced within the corporate limits and over which the municipal corporation has jurisdiction. A description of the
boundaries of a municipal corporation is said to be an essential part of its charter and necessary to corporate existence. An incorporation is void where the
boundaries of the municipal corporation are not described with certainty.

356 Role: serves as the primary planning and implementing unit of government policies, plans programs, projects and activities in the community, and as a
forum wherein the collective views of the people may be expressed, crystallized and considered, and where disputes may be amicably settled.
Who creates: a barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered by law or by an ordinance of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan or Sangguniang Panlungsod. Where a barangay is created by an ordinance of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, the recommendation of the
Sangguniang Bayan concerned shall be necessary.

357 Except in cities and municipalities within Metro Manila or in highly urbanized citiesmust be at least 5000 inhabitants

358 The creation of the new barangay shall not however reduce the population of the original

barangay to less than the minimum requirement prescribed

in the Code. (Sec.386, LGC)

359 Role: serves primarily as a general purpose government for the coordination and delivery of basic, regular and direct services and effective governance
of the inhabitants within its territorial jurisdiction.
Who creates: may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered only by an act of Congress subject to the criteria established
by the Code.

360 Role- serves primarily as a general purpose government for the coordination and delivery of basic, regular and direct services and effective governance
of the inhabitants within its territorial jurisdiction.
Who creates- may be created, divided, merged or abolished, or its boundary substantially altered only by an act of Congress subject to the criteria
provided in the Code.

361 If a component city shall have met the minimum requirements for a highly urbanized city, it shall be the duty of the President to declare the city as
highly urbanized city upon: (1) proper application and (2) upon ratification in a plebiscite by the majority of registered voters therein.
Avancena | 145

5. Creation of Provinces362
Substantive Requirements:
a. Population- not less than 250,000 inhabitants
b. Income- average annual income of at least P20 million
c. Land Area- a contiguous territory of at least 2000 square kilometers
6. Status of Sub-provinces
Existing sub-provinces are converted into regular provinces upon the approval by a majority
votes cast in a plebiscite to be held in the said sub-province and the original province directly
affected.363
7. Autonomous Regions
The Philippine Constitution mandates the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical
areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, and economic and social
cultures.364
8. Special Metropolitan Political Subdivisions
The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political subdivisions, but the
component cities and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their
own local executives and legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that
will be thereby created shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination. 365
9. Attack against invalidity of incorporation
No collateral attack shall lie; an inquiry into the legal existence of a municipal corporation is
reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto or other direct proceeding. But this rule
applies only when the municipal corporation is, at least, a de facto municipal corporation.
10. Plebiscite requirement: Who shall participate
The creation, division and merger, abolition or substantial alteration of the boundaries of
local government units must be approved by a majority of votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
unit or units directly affected. 366 Such plebiscite shall be conducted by the COMELEC within 120
days from the date of the effectivity of the law. The completion of the publication of the law should
be the reckoning point in determining the 120-day period within which to conduct the plebiscite, not
from the date of its approval when the law had not yet been published. Since publication is
indispensable for the effectivity of a law, a plebiscite can be scheduled only after the law creating a
city took effect.367

362 Role- as a political and corporate unit of government, it serves as a dynamic mechanism for development processes and effective governance of local
government units within its territorial jurisdiction.
Who creates- may be created, divided, merged, or abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, only by an act of Congress, subject to the satisfaction of
the criteria set forth by the LGC.

363 Sec.462, LGC

364 Art. X, Sec.15, 1987 Cons.
365 With the passage of RA 7924, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a special development and administrative region and the administration of
metrowide basic services affecting the region was placed under a development authority referred to as the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
(MMDA), whose functions were without prejudice to the autonomy of the affected local government units. The law does not grant police nor legislative
powers to MMDA. Even the Metro Manila Council, the governing board of the MMDA, has not been delegated any legislative power. Clearly, MMDA is
not a political unit. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. MMDA
cannot open for public use a private road in a private subdivision (MMDA vs. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., G.R. No. 135962, March 27, 2000).

366 Sec. 10 of the LGC

367 Cawaling vs. COMELEC, Oct. 26, 2002
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The plebiscite for the creation of a new province or municipality shall include the
participation of the residents of the mother province or mother municipality in order to conform to
the constitutional requirement. 368 In the conversion of a municipality into a component city,
however, only the registered voters of the municipality sought to be converted into a component
city, shall participate in the plebiscite.
Summary of Substantive Requirements in the Creation of LGUs
LGU Created

Income

Population

Land area

Barangay
No minimum requirement
2,000 but 5,000 for Metro Manila and highly
urbanized cities
Municipality No minimum requirement
P2.5 million 25,000, and 50 sq.km
Component City
P100 million
150,000 or
100 sq.km.
Highly Urbanized City
P50 million
200,000
No minimum requirement
Province
P20 million
250,000 or
2,000 sq.km.
11. Beginning of Corporate Existence
When a new local government unit is created, its corporate existence shall commence upon
the election and qualification of its chief executive and a majority members of the Sanggunian,
unless some other date is fixed therefore by law or ordinance creating it. 369
12. Division and Merger of LGUs
The division and merger of local government units shall comply with the same requirements
for their creation. The income, population or land area shall not be reduced to less than the
minimum requirements. Likewise, the income classification of the original local government unit
shall not fall below its current income classification prior to such division. 370
13. Abolition of LGUs
A local government unit may be abolished when its income, population or land area has
been irreversibly reduced to less than the minimum standards prescribed for its creation under the
LGC, as certified by the national agencies to Congress or to the Sanggunian concerned. Likewise,
the law or, ordinance abolishing an LGU shall specify the province, city, municipality, or barangay
with which the local government unit sought to be abolished will be incorporated or merged. 371
14. Effects of Annexation/Consolidation of Municipal Corporations
a. On the legal existence of the territory annexed- Unless otherwise provided for by law, the
annexation of one municipal corporation to another will dissolve the annexed territory. It shall
become part of the annexing corporation and will fall under the jurisdiction of the latter.
b. On the laws and ordinances of the annexed corporation- In the absence of any provision of
law to the contrary, when a territory is annexed to a municipal corporation, it shall become subject
to all the laws and ordinances by which the annexing corporation is governed.
c. On the right of officers or employees of the annexed or consolidated territory to continue
to hold their offices- Subject to what the legislature may provide upon annexation, the officers and
employees of the annexed or consolidated territory shall terminate their official relation with their
offices.

368 Padilla vs. COMELEC, 214 SCRA 735

369 Sec.14, LGC

370 Sec.8, ibid
371 Sec.9, ibid
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d. On the title to the property of the annexed territory- When a municipal corporation is
annexed to another, the annexing territory shall acquire title to the property of the annexed
territory at the time of annexation without compensation unless the annexing statute provides
otherwise. Where the annexed territory, however, forms part of a municipality from which it is
taken, the legislature may provide for the payment of compensation for the indebtedness incurred
on account of the property taken.
With regard to public buildings and improvements located in the annexed territory, the
annexing territory is not required to pay for said buildings or improvements as they have already
been paid for by the annexed territory. It would be otherwise if there exists an indebtedness on
said buildings in which case, the annexing state may be required to share in the payment of said
indebtedness.
e. On the debts and obligations of the annexed territory- It has been stated that debts and
obligations of a municipal corporation contracted before its annexation to another territory shall be
assumed by the annexing territory in the absence of any provision to the contrary. The same rule
applies of consolidation where the consolidating municipal corporation is held responsible for the
indebtedness and obligations incurred by the territories which are consolidated.
15. Effects of Division of LGUs
On the legal existence of the original corporation: The division of municipal corporation
extinguishes the corporate existence of the original municipality.
On the property, powers and rights of the original corporation: Unless the law provides
otherwise, when a municipal corporation is divided into two or more municipalities, each
municipality acquires title to all the property, powers, rights and obligations falling within its
territorial jurisdiction.
3. Principles of Local Autonomy
Local Autonomy- is self-governing.
It is the granting of more powers, authority,
responsibilities and resources to the lower or local levels of a government system. The principle of
local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means decentralization. It does not make the
local government sovereign within the state or an imperium in imperio.
4. Powers of Local Government Units (LGUs)
a. Police Power372
The power of promoting public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property
b. Eminent Domain
The power to expropriate private property has been delegated by Congress to LGUs under
Section 19, LGC. The exercise by LGUs of the power of eminent domain are subject to the usual
constitutional limitations such as necessity, private property, taking, public use, just compensation
and due process of law.373

372 General Welfare Clause

Police power concerns government enactments, which interfere with personal liberty or property to promote the general welfare or the common good.

373 Private property already devoted to public use can still be a subject of expropriation by Congress but not by LGUs.
The promulgation of the ordinance authorizing the local chief executive to exercise the power must be promulgated prior to the filing of the complaint for
eminent domain with the proper court, and not after the court shall have determined the amount of just compensation to which the defendant is entitled.
(Heirs of Suguitan vs. City of Mandaluyong, 328 SCRA 137)
An LGU may immediately take possession of the property upon filing of expropriation proceedings and deposit in court of 15% of the FMV of the
property.
Avancena | 148

The determination of whether there is genuine necessity for the exercise of the power of
eminent domain is a justiciable question when exercised by the LGUs and generally a political
question when exercised by Congress.374
c. Taxing Power375
Taxes are enforced proportional contributions from persons and property levied by the state
by virtue of its sovereignty, for the support of government and for all public needs.
Taxation is the method by which these contributions are exacted. 376
d. Closure and Opening of Roads
A local government unit may, pursuant to an ordinance, permanent or temporarily close or
open any local road, alley, park, or square falling within its jurisdiction, provided that in case of
permanent closure, such ordinance must be approved by at least 2/3 of all the members of the
sanggunian, and when necessary, and adequate substitute for the public facility shall be
provided.377

e. Legislative Power
(1) Requisites for Valid Ordinance
i.
ii.
ii.
iv.
v.
vi.

Must not contravene the Constitution and any statute;

Must not be unfair or oppressive;
Must not be partial or discriminatory;
Must not prohibit, but may regulate trade which is not illegal per se;
Must not be unreasonable; and
Must be general in application and consistent with public policy.
(2) Local Initiative and Referendum
Local Initiative

It is the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may directly
propose, enact or amend any ordinance. It may be exercised by all registered voters of the
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. 378
Local referendum:

374 The additional limitations on the exercise of the power of eminent domain by LGUs are, as follows:
1. Exercised only by the local chief executive, acting pursuant to a valid ordinance;
2. For public use or purpose or welfare, for the benefit of the poor and the landless;
3. Only after a valid and definite offer had been made to, and not accepted by, the owner;
4. An LGU shall file a complaint for expropriation on the strength of an ordinance and not a mere resolution passed by the Sanggunian. (Municipality of
Paranaque vs. VM Realty Corp., 292 SCRA 676)

375 The power to tax is inherent, thus, it need not be granted by the constitution.
376Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines
and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the
local governments (Sec. 5, Art. X, 1987 Cons.)

377 Sec. 21, RA 7160

Additional limitations in case of permanent closure:
i. Adequate provision for the maintenance of public safety must be made;
ii. The property may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property may be lawfully used or conveyed, but no freedom park shall be
closed permanently without provision for its transfer or relocation to a new site.
Temporary closure may be made during an actual emergency, fiesta celebrations, public rallies, etc.

378 The power of local initiative shall not be exercised more than once a year.
Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the sanggunian to enact.
Avancena | 149

It is the legal process whereby the registered voters of the local government units may
approve, amend or reject any ordinance enacted by the sanggunian.379
f. Corporate Powers
1) To Sue and Be Sued
The rule is that suit is commenced by the local executive, upon the authority of the
Sanggunian, except when the City Councilors, by themselves and as representatives of or behalf of
the City, bring the action to prevent unlawful disbursement of City funds. 380
2) To Acquire and Sell Property
i. The local government unit may acquire real or personal, tangible or intangible property,
in any manner allowed by law381
ii. The local government unit may alienate only patrimonial property, upon proper authority.
iii. In the absence of proof that the property was acquired through corporate or private
funds, the presumption is that it came from the State upon the creation of the municipality and,
thus, is governmental or public property.382
iv. Town plazas are properties of public dominion; they may be occupied temporarily, but
only for the duration of an emergency.383
v. A public plaza is beyond the commerce of man, and cannot be the subject of lease or
other contractual undertaking. And, even assuming the existence of a valid lease of the public
plaza or part thereof, the municipal resolution effectively terminated the agreement, for it is settled
that the police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through the medium of a
contract.384
3) To Enter Into Contracts
(a) Requisites
i. The local government unit has the express, implied or inherent power to enter into the
particular contract.
ii. The contract is entered into by the proper department, board, committee, officer or
agent. Unless otherwise provided by the Code, no contract may be entered into by the local chief
executive on behalf of the local government unit without prior authorization by the sangguniang
concerned.
iii. The contract must comply with certain substantive requirements, i.e., when expenditure
of public fund is to be made, there must be an actual appropriation and a certificate of availability
of funds.
iv. The contract must comply with the formal requirements of written contracts, e.g., the
Statute of Frauds.
(b) Ultra Vires Contracts

379 The local referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the Comelec within 60 days (in case of provinces), 45 days (in case of
municipalities) and 30 days (in case of barangays). The Comelec shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum.

380 City Council of Cebu vs. Cuison, 47 SCRA 325.

381 e.g., sale, donation, etc
382 Salas vs. Jarencio, 48 SCRA 734; Rebuco vs. Villegas, 55 SCRA 656
383 Espiritu vs. Municipal Council of Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, 102 Phil. 866
384 Villanueva vs. Castaneda, 154 SCRA 142
Avancena | 150

When a contract is entered into without compliance with the first and the third requisites
(above), the same is ultra vires and is null and void. Such contract cannot be ratified or validated.
Ratification of defective municipal contracts is possible only when there is non-compliance with the
second and/or fourth requirements above. Ratification may be express or implied.
g. Liability of LGUs
Specific provisions making LGUs liable:
a.

Liability for damages- Local government units and their officials are not exempt from liability
for death or injury to persons or damage to property. 385

b. The local government unit is liable in damages for death or injuries suffered by reason of the
defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other public works. 386
c. The State is responsible when it acts through a special agent. 387
d. The local government unit is subsidiarily liable for damages suffered by a person by reason
of the failure or refusal of a member of the police force to render aid and prosecution in case of
danger to life and property. 388
Liability for Tort
a. If the local government unit is engaged in governmental functions, it is not liable.
b. If engaged in proprietary functions, local government unit is liable.
h. Settlement of Boundary Disputes
Boundary disputes between and among local government units shall, as much as possible,
be settled amicably.
To this end:
a. Boundary disputes involving two or more barangays in the same city or municipality shall
be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned.
b. Boundary disputes involving two or more municipalities within the same province shall be
referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned.
c. Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces
shall be jointly referred for settlement to the sanggunians of the provinces concerned.
d. Boundary disputes involving a component city or municipality on the one hand and a
highly urbanized city on the other, or two or more highly urbanized cities, shall be jointly referred
for settlement to the respective sanggunians of the parties.389
i. Succession of Elective Officials
Rules on Succession390

385 Sec. 24, RA 7160

386 Art. 2189, NCC
387 Art. 2180, par.6, NCC
388 Art. 34, NCC
389 Sec. 118 a-d, RA 7160
390 Secs. 44-46, id.
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A. Permanent vacancies: A permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a
higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office,
voluntarily resigns, or is permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.
a.

Governor and Mayor

i. Vice Governor and Vice Mayor
ii. Sanggunian members according to ranking

b.

Punong barangay
i. Highest ranking sanggunian member
ii. Second highest ranking sangguniang barangay member

c.

Ranking in the sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of the
votes obtained to the number of registered votes in each district.

d.

Ties will be resolved by drawing of lots.391

e.

Sanggunian:
i. Provinces, highly urbanized cities and independent component cities- appointment
by the President
ii. Component city and municipality- appointment by governor
iii. Sangguniang barangay- appointment by mayor
iv. Except for the sangguniang barangay, the appointee shall come from the political
party of the member who caused the vacancy. 392
v. If the member does not belong to any party, the appointee shall be recommended
by the sanggunian.
vi. The appointee for the sangguniang barangay shall be recommended by the
sangguniang barangay.
vii. Vacancy in the representation of the youth and the barangay in the sanggunian
shall be filled by the official next in rank of the organization. (45)

j. Discipline of Local Officials

(1) Elective Officials
(a) Grounds
An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the
following grounds:
i. Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines.
ii. Culpable violation of the Constitution
iii. Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of
duty.
iv. Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by
at least prision mayor.

391 Sec. 44, id.

392 A nomination and a certificate of membership of the appointee from the highest official of the political party concerned are conditions sine qua non,
and any appointment without such nomination and certificate shall be null and void and shall be a ground for administrative action against the official
concerned.
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v. Abuse of authority.
vi. Unauthorized absence for 15 consecutive working days, except in the case of
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, panlungsod, bayan and barangay.
vii. Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of
elective barangay officials, shall be filed before the sangguiniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan concerned, whose decision shall be final and executory.
(b) Jurisdiction
a.

By the President, if the respondent is an elective official of a province, a highly urbanized

or an independent component city;

b.

By the governor, if the respondent is an elective local official of a component city or

municipality;

c.

By the mayor, if the respondent is an elective official of the barangay.

(c) Preventive Suspension
Who may impose:

a. By the President, if the respondent is an elective official of a province, a highly urbanized

or an independent component city;
b. By the governor, if the respondent is an elective local official of a component city or
municipality;
c. By the mayor, if the respondent is an elective official of the barangay. 393
When may be imposed: Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time:
a. After the issues are joined;
b. When the evidence of guilt is strong; and
c. Given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the continuance in office of
the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of
the records and other evidence.394
(d) Removal
A verified complaint against any erring local elective official shall be filed to the Office of the
President if the official is of the province or city, to the sangguniang Panlalawigan in case municipal
elective officials, or to the Sangguniang Bayan or Panlunsod in case of barangay officials.395
Grounds for Removal396
1. Gross Misconduct: irregularity in official duties.397
2. Dishonesty

393 The authority to preventively suspend is exercised concurrently by the Ombudsman, pursuant to R.A. 6770; the same law authorizes a preventive
suspension of six months (Hagad vs. Gozo-Dadole, G.R. no. 108072, Dec. 12, 1995).

394 Provided that any single preventive suspension shall not extend beyond 60 days, and in the event several administrative cases are filed against the
respondent, he cannot be suspended for more than 90 days within a single year on the same ground or grounds existing and known at the time of the first
suspension.

395 Sec. 61, RA 7160

396 Common Grounds
Avancena | 153

3. Abandonment
4. Gross Negligence
(e) Administrative Appeal
Decisions may, within 30 days from receipt thereof, be appealed to:
i. The sangguniang panlalawigan, in the case of decisions of component cities sangguniang
panlungsod and the sangguiniang bayan;
ii. The Office of the President, in the case of decisions of the sangguniang panlalawigan and
the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities and independent component cities.
Decisions of the Office of the President shall be final and executory.
(f) Doctrine of Condonation
Condonation by the people of the offense when an incumbent official is reelected.
(2) Appointive Officials398
Officials common to all Municipalities, Cities and Provinces 399
a. Secretary to the Sanggunian
b. Treasurer
c. Assessor
d. Accountant
e. Budget Officer
f. Planning and Development Coordinator
g. Engineer
h. Health Officer
i. Civil Registrar
j. Administrator
k. Legal Officer
l. Agriculturist
m. Social Welfare and Development Officer
n. Environment and Natural Resources Officer
o. Architect
p. Information Officer
q. Cooperatives Officer
r. Population Officer
s. Veterinarian
t. General Services Officer
k. Recall400
Termination of official relationship of an elective official for loss of confidence prior to the
expiration of his term through the will of the electorate.

397 liability for gross misconduct may arise when the act, although not one of the official duties, where such act was committed in the workplace or where
there is final conviction in a criminal case

398In the barangay, the mandated appointive officials are the Barangay Secretary and the Barangay Treasurer, although other officials of the barangay may
be appointed by the punong barangay.

399 Secs. 469-490, R.A. 7160

400 The elective local official sought to be recalled shall not be allowed to resign while the recall process is in progress.
Limitations on Recall:
1. Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence.
2. No recall shall take place within one year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a regular local election.
The official sought to be recalled is automatically a candidate.
Recall shall be effective upon the election and proclamation of successor receiving the highest number of votes.
Avancena | 154

a. By whom exercised- by the registered voters of a local government unit to which the local
elective official subject to such recall belongs.
b. Two modes of initiating recall:
i. By a preparatory recall assembly401
ii. By the registered voters of the local government unit 402
l. Term Limits
Three years, starting from noon of June 30, 1992, or such date as may be provided by law,
except that of elective barangay officials. No local elective official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms in the same position. The term of office of barangay officials and members of
the sangguniang kabataan shall be for five years, which shall begin after the regular election of
barangay officials on the second Monday of May, 1997.403
The three-term limit on a local official is to be understood to refer to terms for which the
official concerned was elected. Thus, a person who was elected Vice Mayor in 1988 and who,
because of the death of the Mayor, became Mayor in 1989, may still be eligible to run for the
position of Mayor in 1998, even if elected as such in 1992 and 1995. 404
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for
a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office
following the end of the third consecutive term. Any other subsequent election, like a recall election
is no longer covered by the prohibition. 405

*** Judge Singco Notes

(LOCAL GOVERNMENTS)
-

TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS- Socrates vs. COMELEC,

November 12, 2002, What the Constitution prohibits is an immediate re-election
for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however,
does not prohibit a subsequent re-election for a fourth term as long as the
reelection is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall
election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a
subsequent election but not an immediate re-election after the third
term.

Aldovino, Jr. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 184836, December 23, 2009- The
preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt their term for purposes
the three-term limit rule under the Constitution and the Local Government Code.

401 composed of the following:

i. Provincial level: All mayors, vice mayors and sanggunian members of the municipalities and component cities.
ii. City level: All punong barangay and sangguniang barangay members in the city.
iii. Legislative district level: Where sangguniang panlalalwigan members are elected by district, all elective municipal officials in the district; and in cases
where sangguniang panglungsod members are elected by district, all elective barangay officials in the district.
iv. Municipal level: All punong barangay and sangguniang barangay members in the municipality.
Procedure for initiating recall by preparatory recall assembly:
A majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members may convene in session in a public place and initiate a recall proceeding against any elective
official in the local government unit concerned. Recall of provincial, city or municipal officials shall be validly initiated through a resolution adopted by a
majority of all the members of the preparatory recall assembly concerned during its session called for that purpose.

402 Initiation of recall by registered voters:

Recall of a provincial, city, municipal or barangay official may also be validly initiated upon petition by at
least 25% of the total number of registered voters in the local government unit concerned during the election in which the local official sought to be recalled
was elected.

403 R.A. 8524

404 Borja v. Comelec, G.R. No. 133495, Sept. 3, 1998
405 Socrates vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 154512, November 12, 2002
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Preventive suspension, by its nature does not involve an effective interruption of

service within a term and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term
limitation.
-

The interruption of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit
is one that involves no less than involuntary loss of the title to office. In all cases of
preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred from performing the
functions of his office and does not vacate and lose title to his office; loss of office
is a consequence that only results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability.

Bolos, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 581 SCRA 786, March 18, 2009- Bolos was serving
his third term as punong barangay when he ran for Sangguniang Bayan member
and upon winning, assumed the position of SB member, thus, voluntarily
relinquishing his office as punong barangay which the court deems as voluntary
renunciation of said office.

Adormeo vs. COMELEC, February 4, 2002- The winner in the recall election
cannot be charged or credited with the full term of three years for purposes of
counting the consecutiveness of an elective officials terms in office. Thus, in a
situation where a candidate loses in an election to gain a third consecutive term
but later wins in the recall election, the recall term cannot be stitched with his
previous two consecutive terms. The period of time prior to the recall term, when
another elective official holds office, constitutes an interruption in the continuity of
service.

Lonzanida vs COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602- Voluntary renunciation of a term does

not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three-term limit.
Conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the
full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The
petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by
voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution
issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is
an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve
the 1995-1998 mayoral term.

Borja vs. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157- For the three term-limit rule to apply, the
local official concerned must serve three consecutive terms as a result of election.
The term served must be one for which he was elected. Thus, if he assumes a
position by virtue of succession, the official cannot be considered to have fully
served the term.

Ong vs. Alegre, et al., June 23, 2006- assumption of office constitutes, for
Francis Ong, service for the full term, and should be counted as a full term
served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional
and statutory provisions, barring local elective officials from being elected and
serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same position. His
continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term,
should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the
three-term rule, notwithstanding the subsequent nullification of his
proclamation. There was actually no interruption or break in the continuity of
Francis Ongs service respecting the 1998-2001 term.

Navarro vs. Ermita, GR No. 180050, April 12, 2011 - The land area
requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or
more islands," is declared VALID. Accordingly, Republic Act No. 9355 (An Act
Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands) is declared as VALID and
CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and
the election of the officials thereof are declared VALID.
Avancena | 156

League of the Cities of the Philippines vs. COMELEC, GR No. 176951, April
12, 2011- All the 16 cityhood laws, enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009
increasing the income requirement for cityhood from P20 million to P100 million in
sec. 450 of the , explicitly exempt the respondent municipalities from the said
increased income requirement. The respondent LGUS had pending cityhood bills
before the passage of RA 9009 and that the year before the amendatory RA 9009,
respondent LGUs had already met the income criterion exacted for cityhood under
the LGC of 1991.

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORTY- Its function is limited to

the delivery of basic services. RA 7924 does not grant the MMDA police
power, let alone legislative power. The MMDA is a development authority. It
is not a political unit of government. There is no grant of authority to
enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the
inhabitants of the metropolis. It is the local government units, acting through
their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police
power. (MMDA vs. BelAir Village Association, 328 SCRA 836).

Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is understood by the lower
court and by the petitioner to grant the MMDA the power to confiscate and
suspend or revoke drivers licenses without need of any other legislative
enactment, such is an unauthorized exercise of police power. The MMDA was
intended to coordinate services with metro-wide impact that transcend local
political boundaries or would entail huge expenditures if provided by the individual
LGUs, especially with regard to transport and traffic management, and we are
aware of the valiant efforts of the petitioner to untangle the increasingly trafficsnarled roads of Metro Manila. But these laudable intentions are limited by the
MMDAs enabling law, which we can but interpret, and petitioner must be reminded
that its efforts in this respect must be authorized by a valid law, or ordinance, or
regulation arising from a legitimate source (MMDA vs. Danilo Garin, April 15,
2005).

MMDA vs. Trackworks, GR No. 179554, December 16, 2009- MMDA has no
authority to dismantle billboards and other forms of advertisements posted on the
structures of the Metro Rail Transit 3 (MRT 3), the latter being a private property.
MMDAs powers were limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies,
installing a system and administration, and therefore, it had no power to dismantle
the billboards under the guise of police and legislative power.

MMDA vs. MenCorp Transport System, G.R. No. 170657, August 15, 2007In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is
devoid of authority to implement the Project (Greater Manila Transport System) as
envisioned by E.O 179; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the
President to undertake the Project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order
the elimination of respondents terminals. Even the MMDAs claimed authority
under the police power must necessarily fail in consonance with the above-quoted
ruling in MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. and this Courts subsequent
ruling in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin that the MMDA is not
vested with police power.

INTERNAL REVENUE ALLOTMENT- IRAs- are items of income because they form
part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit Alvarez vs.
Guingona, 252 SCRA 695).

Avancena | 157

LGUS SHARE IN THE IRA SHALL BE AUTOMATICALLY RELEASED WITHOUT

ANY CONDITION OF APPROVAL FROM ANY GOVERNMENTAL BODY-Section 6,
Art. X of the 1987constitution provides that LGUs shall have a just share, as
determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to
them. When passed, it would be readily see that such provision mandates that (1)
the LGUs shall have a just share in the national taxes; and (2) just share shall
be determined by law; (3) that just share shall be automatically released to the
LGUs. PROVINCE OF BATANGAS VS. ROMULO, 429 SCRA 736, May 27, 2004.

The legislative is barred from withholding the release of the IRA.

Zamora, June 8, 2005)

AO No. 372 of President Ramos, Section 4 which provides that pending the
assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee
of the emerging fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to 10% of the internal
revenue allotment to local government units shall be withheld is declared in
contravention of Section 286 of the LG Code and Section 6 of Art X of the
constitution (Pimentel vs. Aguirre, July 19, 2000).

LOCAL TAXATION Constitution itself promotes the principles of local autonomy

as embodied in the Local Government Code. The State is mandated to ensure the
autonomy of local governments, and local governments are empowered to levy
taxes, fees and charges that accrue exclusively to them, subject to congressional
guidelines and limitations. The principle of local autonomy is no mere passing
dalliance but a constitutionally enshrined precept that deserves respect and
appropriate enforcement by this Court. The GSISs tax-exempt status, in sum, was
withdrawn in 1992 by the Local Government Code but restored by the
Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997, the operative provision of
which is Section 39. The subject real property taxes for the years 1992 to 1994
were assessed against GSIS while the Local Government Code provisions prevailed
and, thus, may be collected by the City of Davao. (City of Davao vs. RTC, Br. 12,
August 18, 2005).

G.R. No. 165827, National Power Corporation vs. Province of Isabela,

represented by Hon. Benjamin G. Dy, Provincial Governor, June 16, 2006)the NAPOCOR is not exempt from paying franchise tax. Though its charter
exempted it from the tax, the enactment of the Local Government Code (LGC) has
withdraw such exemption, the Court said, citing its previous ruling in National
Power Corporation vs. City of Cabanatuan.

MCCIA vs. Marcos, September 11, 1996- The power to tax is primarily vested
in the Congress; however, in our jurisdiction, it may be exercised by local
legislative bodies, no longer merely by virtue of a valid delegation as before, but
pursuant to direct authority conferred by Section 5, Article X of the Constitution.
An agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of the
Government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or
government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct
unit therein; while an instrumentality refers to any agency of the National
Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special
functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers,
administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a
charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and
government-owned and controlled corporations. It had already become,
even if it be conceded to be an agency or instrumentality of the Government, a
taxable person for such purpose in view of the withdrawal in the last paragraph of
Section 234 of exemptions from the payment of real property taxes, which, as
earlier adverted to, applies to MCIAA.

(ACORD vs.

Avancena | 158

PPA vs. Iloilo City, November 11, 2004- The bare fact that the port and its
facilities and appurtenances are accessible to the general public does not exempt
it from the payment of real property taxes. It must be stressed that the said port
facilities and appurtenances are the petitioners corporate patrimonial properties,
not for public use, and that the operation of the port and its facilities and the
administration of its buildings are in the nature of ordinary business.

MIAA vs. CA, et al., July 20, 2006- MIAAs Airport Lands and Buildings are
exempt from real estate tax imposed by local governments. MIAA is not a
government-owned or controlled corporation but an instrumentality of the
National Government and thus exempt from local taxation. Second, the real
properties of MIAA are owned by the Republic of the Philippines and thus
exempt from real estate tax. The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property
of public dominion and therefore owned by the State or the Republic of
the Philippines. The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use
because they are used by the public for international and domestic travel
and transportation. The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are devoted to
public use and thus are properties of public dominion. As properties of public
dominion, the Airport Lands and Buildings are outside the commerce of
man. Real Property Owned by the Republic is Not Taxable.

When local governments invoke the power to tax on national government

instrumentalities, such power is
construed
strictly
against
local
governments. The rule is that a tax is never presumed and there must be clear
language in the law imposing the tax. Any doubt whether a person, article or
activity is taxable is resolved against taxation. This rule applies with greater
force when local governments seek to tax national government instrumentalities.

Another rule is that a tax exemption is strictly construed against the taxpayer
claiming the exemption. However, when Congress grants an exemption to a
national government instrumentality from local taxation, such exemption
is
construed
liberally
in
favor
of
the
national
government
instrumentality.

PRESIDENTS SUPERVISION- National Liga vs. Paredes, September 27,

2004- Like the local government units, the Liga ng mga Barangay is not subject
to control by the Chief Executive or his alter ego.

The President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government
unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of
the Presidents supervisory powers over local government units. Hence, the
President or any of his or her alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as
the concerned local government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the
Constitution. Any directive therefore by the President or any of his or her alter
egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a
local government unit is a patent nullity because it violates the principle of local
autonomy and separation of powers of the executive and legislative departments
in governing municipal corporations. (Dadole vs. COA, December 3, 2002).

Leynes vs. COA, 418 SCRA 180- By upholding the power of LGUs to grant
allowances to judges and leaving to their discretion the amount of allowances they
may want to grant, depending on the availability of local funds, the genuine and
meaningful local autonomy is ensured.

Batangas CATV Inc. vs. CA, 439 SCRA 326- In the absence of constitutional or
legislative authorization, municipalities have no power to grant franchises.

Avancena | 159

M. NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY406

1. Regalian Doctrine407
All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State.
2. Nationalist and Citizenship Requirement Provisions
Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands
and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law
according to the uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be
limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands
of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for
not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the
Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve
hectares thereof, by purchase, homestead, or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and
subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of
lands of the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions
therefor.408
The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when the
national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at
least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as
Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will
encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national
jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities. 409
The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally
produced goods, and adopt measures that help make them competitive.410
The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms
and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity. 411
3. Exploration, Development and Utilization of Natural Resources
The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full
control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may
enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or
corporations or associations at least 60 per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens.
Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than
twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may provided by law.
In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of waterpower, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

406 Art. XII

407 Sec. 2, Art. XII
- universal feudal theory that all lands were held from the Crown (Holmes, Cario v. Insular Government, 212 US 449).
Exception: any land in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial. (Oh Cho v. Director of Land, 75 Phil 890)

408 Sec. 3
409 Sec. 10
410 Sec. 12
411 Sec. 13
Avancena | 160

The State shall protect the nations marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea,
and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as
well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish workers in rivers,
lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided
by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In
such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical
resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this
provision, within thirty days from its execution. 412
4. Franchises, Authority and Certificates for Public Utilities
No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public
utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations
organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by
such citizens; nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a
longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the
condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the
common good so requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in public utilities by the
general public. The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility
enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive and
managing officers of such corporation or association must be citizens of the Philippines. 413
5. Acquisition, Ownership and Transfer of Public and Private Lands
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.414
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to
limitations provided by law. 415
6. Practice of Professions
The sustained development of a reservoir of national talents consisting of Filipino scientists,
entrepreneurs, professionals, managers, high-level technical manpower and skilled workers and
craftsmen in all fields shall be promoted by the State. The State shall encourage appropriate
technology and regulate its transfer for the national benefit. The practice of all professions in the
Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens, save in cases prescribed by law. 416
7. Organization and Regulation of Corporations, Private and Public
The use of property bears a social function, and all economic agents shall contribute to the
common good. Individuals and private groups, including corporations, cooperatives, and similar
collective organizations, shall have the right to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises,

412 Sec. 2
413 Sec. 11
414 Sec. 7
415 Sec. 8
416 Sec. 14
Avancena | 161

subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the common
good so demands.417
8. Monopolies, Restraint of Trade and Unfair Competition
The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires. No
combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed. 418
*** Judge Singco Notes
1.
ANCESTRAL DOMAIN- Alcantara vs. DENR, GR No. 161881, July 31,
2008- It must be emphasized that FLGLA No. 542 is a mere license or privilege
granted by the State to petitioner for the use or exploitation of natural resources
and public lands over which the State has sovereign ownership under the Regalian
Doctrine. Like timber or mining licenses, a forest land grazing lease agreement is
a mere permit which, by executive action, can be revoked, rescinded, cancelled,
amended or modified, whenever public welfare or public interest so requires. The
determination of what is in the public interest is necessarily vested in the State as
owner of the country's natural resources. Thus, a privilege or license is not in the
nature of a contract that enjoys protection under the due process and nonimpairment clauses of the Constitution. In cases in which the license or privilege is
in conflict with the people's welfare, the license or privilege must yield to the
supremacy of the latter, as well as to the police power of the State. Such a
privilege or license is not even a property or property right, nor does it
create a vested right; as such, no irrevocable rights are created in its
issuance. xxx
-

The Supreme Court recognized the inherent right of ICCs/IPs to recover their
ancestral land from outsiders and usurpers. Seen by many as a victory
attained by the private respondents only after a long and costly effort, the Court,
as a guardian and instrument of social justice, abhors a further delay in the
resolution of this controversy and brings it to its fitting conclusion by denying the
petition.

CRUZ VS. SEC. OF DENR, 347 SCRA 128- RA 8371 categorically declares
ancestral lands and domains held by native title as never to have been public
land. Domains and lands under native title are, therefore, indisputably
presumed to have never been public lands and are private. The right of
ownership granted to indigenous peoples over their ancestral domains does not
cover the natural resources. The right granted to IP to negotiate the terms and
conditions over the natural resources covers only their exploration to ensure
ecological and environmental protection.

Carino vs. Insular Government, 212 US 449 recognized the existence of a

native title to land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership
since time immemorial as an exception to the theory of jus regalia.

Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority, July 9, 2002- Foreshore and submerged
areas form part of the public domain and are inalienable. Lands reclaimed from
foreshore and submerged areas are also form part of the public domain and are
also inalienable, unless converted into alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain.

The prevailing rule is that reclaimed disposable lands of the public

domain may only be leased and not sold to private parties. These lands
remained sui generis, as the only alienable or disposable lands of the

417 Sec. 6
418 Sec. 19
Avancena | 162

public domain which the government could not sell to private parties
except if the legislature passes a law authorizing such sale. Reclaimed
lands retain their inherent potential as areas for public use or public service. xxx
The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore areas is rooted in the Regalian
Doctrine, which declares that all lands and waters of the public domain belong to
the State
-

But notwithstanding the conversion of reclaimed lands to alienable lands of the

public domain, they may not be sold to private corporations which can only
lease the same. The State may only sell alienable public land to Filipino citizens.

Chavez vs. PEA & Amari, May 6, 2003- Decision does not bar private
corporations from participating in reclamation projects and being paid for their
services in reclaiming lands. What the Decision prohibits, following the explicit
constitutional mandate, is for private corporations to acquire reclaimed lands of
the public domain. There is no prohibition on the directors, officers and
stockholders of private corporations, if they are Filipino citizens, from
acquiring at public auction reclaimed alienable lands of the public
domain. They can acquire not more than 12 hectares per individual, and the land
thus acquired becomes private land.

Freedom Islands are inalienable lands of the public domain. Government owned
lands, as long they are patrimonial property, can be sold to private parties,
whether Filipino citizens or qualified private corporations. Thus, the so-called Friar
Lands acquired by the government under Act No. 1120 are patrimonial property
which even private corporations can acquire by purchase. Likewise, reclaimed
alienable lands of the public domain if sold or transferred to a public or municipal
corporation for a monetary consideration become patrimonial property in the
hands of the public or municipal corporation. Once converted to patrimonial
property, the land may be sold by the public or municipal corporation to
private parties, whether Filipino citizens or qualified private
corporations.

Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the Philipipnes, GR No. 179987,

April 29, 2009)- public domain lands become patrimonial property or private
property of the government only upon a declaration that these are alienable or
disposable lands, together with an express government manifestation that the
property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the
development of national wealth. Only when the property has become patrimonial
can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public domain
begin to run.

in connection with Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48

(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes that those who by themselves or through
their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous and exclusive
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945 have acquired
ownership of, and registrable title, to such lands based on the length and quality of
their possession. The Court clarified that the Public Land Act merely requires
possession since June 12, 1945 and does not require that the lands should have
been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession. The
possessor is thus entitled to secure judicial confirmation of title as soon as the land
it covers is declared alienable and disposable. This is, however, subject to the
December 31, 2020 deadline imposed by the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A.
9176.

DENR vs. Yap, GR No. 167707, Sacay vs. DENR, GR No. 17775, October 8,
2008- Boracay Island is owned by the State except for the lot areas with existing
titles. The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants
Avancena | 163

do not automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a
right to apply a title to the land they are presently occupying. The present land law
traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine.
-

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, the Supreme Court said that
Boracay was unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proc. 1064 (which
classified Boracay as 400 hecs of reserved forest land and 628.96 hecs. of
agricultural land). Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD
No. 705. Forest lands do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or
expanses covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes.

Laureano V. Hermoso, et al. vs. Francia, et al., GR No. 16678, April 24,
2009 The classification of lands of the public domain is of two types, i.e., primary
classification and secondary classification. The primary classification comprises
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. The agricultural
lands of the public domain may further be classified by law according to the uses
to which they may be devoted. This further classification of agricultural lands is
referred to as secondary classification. Congress, under existing laws, granted
authority to a number of government agencies to effect the secondary
classification of agricultural lands to residential, commercial or industrial or other
urban uses.

Borromeo v. Descallar, GR No. 159310, February 24, 2009- While the

acquisition and the purchase of real properties in the country by a foreigner is void
ab initio for being contrary to the Constitution, the subsequent acquisition of the
said properties from the foreigner by a Filipino citizen has cured the flaw in the
original transaction and the title of the transferee is valid.

Chavez vs. NHA, et al., August 15, 2007- To lands reclaimed by PEA or through
a contract with a private person or entity, such reclaimed lands still remain
alienable lands of public domain which can be transferred only to Filipino citizens
but not to a private corporation. This is because PEA under PD 1084 and EO 525 is
tasked to hold and dispose of alienable lands of public domain and it is only when
it is transferred to Filipino citizens that it becomes patrimonial property. On the
other hand, the NHA is a government agency not tasked to dispose of
public lands under its charterThe Revised Administrative Code of 1987.
The NHA is an end-user agency authorized by law to administer and
dispose of reclaimed lands. The moment titles over reclaimed lands
based on the special patents are transferred to the NHA by the Register
of Deeds, they are automatically converted to patrimonial properties of
the State which can be sold to Filipino citizens and private corporations,
60% of which are owned by Filipinos. The reason is obvious: if the reclaimed
land is not converted to patrimonial land once transferred to NHA, then it would be
useless to transfer it to the NHA since it cannot legally transfer or alienate lands of
public domain. More importantly, it cannot attain its avowed purposes and goals
since it can only transfer patrimonial lands to qualified beneficiaries and
prospective buyers to raise funds for the SMDRP. From the foregoing
considerations, we find that the 79-hectare reclaimed land has been declared
alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and in the hands of NHA, it
has been reclassified as patrimonial property.

Republic vs. Tri-plus Corp., September 26, 2006- Section 6 of Commonwealth

Act No. 141, as amended, provides that the classification and reclassification
of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest land is the
prerogative of the Executive Department. Under the Regalian doctrine, which
is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State,
which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
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State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as
alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part
of the inalienable public domain.
-

JG Summit Holdings Inc. vs. CA, January 31, 2005- the prohibition in the
Constitution applies only to ownership of land. It does not extend to
immovable or real property as defined under Article 415 of the Civil
Code. Otherwise, we would have a strange situation where the ownership of
immovable property such as trees, plants and growing fruit attached to the land
would be limited to Filipinos and Filipino corporations only.

Ramos-Bulalio vs. Ramos, January 23, 2006- Under the Regalian doctrine, all
lands of the public domain belong to the State and those lands not appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Lands of the
public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and
national parks. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands. A homestead patent, such as the subject of the instant case,
is one of the modes to acquire title to public lands suitable for agricultural
purposes.

La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Ass., Inc. vs. Ramos, December 1, 2004 Foreign

corporations are confined to technical and financial assistance. The State
itself may explore, develop or utilize the countrys natural resources by entering
into the necessary agreements with individuals or entities in the pursuit of visible
operations. Service contracts with foreign corporations as contractors who invest
in and operate and manage extractive enterprises, subject to the full control and
supervision of the State. Control by the state must be on the macro level,
through the establishment of policies, guidelines, regulations, industry
standards and similar measures that would enable the government to
control the conduct of the affairs in various enterprises and restrain
activities deemed not desirable or beneficial.

GR No. 157882, Didipio Earth-Savers Multi-Purpose Association,

Incorporated, et al. v. DENR Sec. Gozun, et al., March 30, 2006- the
Constitution expressly allows service contracts in the large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and mineral oils via
agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial
assistance as provided by law. The Court said that these agreements with
foreign corporations are not limited to mere financial or technical
assistance. The 1987 Constitution allows the continued use of service
contracts with foreign corporations as contractors who would invest in
and operate and manage extractive enterprises, subject to the full
control and supervision of the State.

GR Nos. 152613 & 152628, Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Southeast Mindanao
Gold Mining Corp., et al.; GR No. 152619-20, Balite Communal Portal
Mining Cooperative v. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp., et al.; and
GR No. 152870-71, The Mines Adjudication Board and its Members, et al.
v. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp., et al., June 23, 2006- Mining
operations in the Diwalwal Mineral Reservation Area lies within the full control of
the executive branch of the state. xxx Mining operations in the Diwalwal
Mineral Reservation are now, therefore, within the full control of the State through
the executive branch. Pursuant to sec. 5 of RA 7942, the State can either directly
undertake the exploration, development, and utilization of the area or it can enter
into agreement with qualified entities.

Republic vs. Rosemoor Mining & Development Corp., 426 SCRA 517
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 constitution does not apply retroactively to a
Avancena | 165

license, concession or lease granted by the government under the

1973 constitution or before the effectivity of the 1987 constitution.
-

Zarate vs. Director of Lands, 434 SCRA 322- It is the rule of law that
possession, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.

PUBLIC UTILITIES- Republic vs. EXTELCOM, 373 SCRA 316 The operation of
public utility shall not be exclusive.

Ridjo Doctrine- (MERALCO vs. Wilcon Builders Supply Inc., 556 SCRA 742)doctrine states that the public utility has the imperative duty to make a reasonable
and proper inspection of its apparatus and equipment to ensure they do not
malfunction.

FRANCHISE - PLDT vs. Bacolod City, July 15, 2005 - In sum, it does not
appear that, in approving 23 of R.A. No. 7925, Congress intended it to operate as
a blanket tax exemption to all telecommunications entities. Applying the rule of
strict construction of laws granting tax exemptions and the rule that doubts should
be resolved in favor of municipal corporations in interpreting statutory provisions
on municipal taxing powers, we hold that 23 of R.A. No. 7925 cannot be
considered as having amended petitioner's franchise so as to entitle it to
exemption from the imposition of local franchise taxes.

Divinagracia v. CBS, GR No. 162272, April &, 2009-The National

Telecommunications Commission (NTC) is not authorized to cancel the certificates
of public convenience (CPCs) and other licenses it had issued to the holders of duly
issued legislative franchises on the ground that the latter had violated the terms of
their franchise. As legislative franchises are extended through statutes, they
should receive recognition as the ultimate expression of State policy.

City Government of San Pablo vs. Reyes, 305 SCRA 353- Under the
Constitution, no franchise shall be granted under the condition that it shall be
subject to amendment or repeal when the public interest so requires. Franchises
are also subject to alteration by the power to tax, which cannot be
contracted away.

Pilipino Telephone Corp. vs. NTC, 410 SCRA 82 The constitution is emphatic
that the operation of public utility shall not be exclusive.

Eastern Assurance & Surety Corp. vs. LTFRB, October 7, 2003 - The
constitution does not totally prohibit monopolies. It mandates the State to regulate
them when public interest so requires.

N. SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS419

1. Concept of Social Justices
Social Justice as Envisioned by the Constitution:
- equitable diffusion of wealth and political power for common good;
- regulation of acquisition, ownership, use and disposition of property and its
increments; and
- creation of economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and selfreliance.420

419 Art. XIII

420 ibid, Secs. 1 and 2
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2. Commission on Human Rights421

Powers and functions:
1. Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights;
2. Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for
violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
3. Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within
the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal
aid services to the under-privileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;
4. Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
5. Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance
respect for the primacy of human rights;
6. Recommend to Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for
compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;
7. Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on
human rights;
8. Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of
documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation
conducted by it or under its authority;
9. Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance
of its functions;
10. Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
1.

Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.422

*** Judge Singco Notes

-

SOCIAL JUSTICE- while the pursuit of social justice can have revolutionary effect,
it cannot justify breaking the law. (Astudillo v. Board of Directors, PHHC, 73 SCRA
15).

HUMAN RIGHTS- read EPZA VS, HR, 208 SCRA; Simon vs. Com. on Human Rights,
229 SCRA 1170- limited to violations of civil and political rights only either by
government official or private individual.

Human Security Act- granting adjudicatory and prosecutorial powers to the CHR
re violations of human rights.- refer to Section 5- perform such other functions and
duties as may be provided by law.

CHREA vs. CHR, November 25, 2004- The CHR, although admittedly a
constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not included in the genus of offices
accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat.

421 composed of a Chairman and four Members who must be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and a majority of whom shall be members of the Bar.
422 Sec. 18
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People vs. Leachon, 1998- The constitutional requirement that the eviction and
demolition be in accordance with law and conducted in a just and humane manner
does not mean validity or legality of the demolition or eviction is hinged on the
existence of resettlement area designated or earmarked by the government.

O. EDUCATION, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ARTS, CULTURE AND SPORTS

1. Academic Freedom
Aspects:
1. to the institution to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation,
experimentation and creation;423
2. to the faculty a. freedom in research and in the publication of the results, subject to the adequate
performance of his other academic duties;
b. freedom in the classroom in discussing his subject, less controversial matters
which bear no relation to the subject;
c. freedom from institutional censorship or discipline, limited by his special position in
the community.
3. to the student - right to enjoy in school the guarantee of the Bill of rights 424
*** Judge Singco Notes
-

Review Center Association of the Philippines v. Ermita, GR No. 180046,

April 2, 2009- A review center is not an institution of higher learning as
contemplated by RA 7722[i]t does not offer a degree-granting program that
would put it under the jurisdiction of the CHED. Moreover, [a] review course is
only intended to refresh and enhance the knowledge or competencies and skills of
reviewees, and it does not require enrollment, attendance, a grade or submission
of a thesis in order to complete the review center course requirements or take the
licensure examination.

ACADEMIC FREEDOM- from standpoint of the educational institution and the

members of the academe. The Supreme Court sustained the primacy of academic
freedom over Civil service rules on AWOL, stressing when UP opted to retain
private petitioner and even promoted him
despite his absence, the University
was exercising its freedom to choose who may teach or who may continue to teach
its faculty (UP, et al. vs. CSC, April 3, 2001).

Letter of the UP LAW: AM 10-10-4 SC; March 8, 2011- The Show Cause
Resolution does not interfere with respondnets academic freedom as it does not
dictat upon the law professors the subject matter they can teach and the manner
of their instruction. They are free to determine what they will teach their students

423 Freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds:

a. who may teach;
b. what may be taught;
c. how shall it be taught; and
d. who may be admitted to study (Miriam College Foundation v. CA, GR No. 127930, December 15, 2000);
As part of its constitutionally enshrined academic freedom, the University of the Philippines has the prerogative to determine who may teach its students.
The Civil Service Commission has no authority to force it to dismiss a member of its faculty even in the guise of enforcing Civil Service Rules.(UP v. Civil
Service Commission, GR No.132860, April 3, 2001)

424 Non v. Dames, 185 SCRA 523

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and how they will teach. Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the principle of
academic freedom for the Supreme Court to subject lawyers who teach law to
disciplinary action for contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with undue
intervention in favor of a party in a pending case, without observing proper
procedure, even if purportedly done in their capacity as teachers. The right to
freedom expression of members of the BAR may be circumscribed by their ethical
duties as lawyers to give due respect to the courts and to uphold the publics faith
in the legal profession and the justice system.

Morales vs. UP Board of Regents, December 13, 2004- As enunciated by this

Court in the case of University of San Carlos v. Court of Appeals, the discretion of
schools of learning to formulate rules and guidelines in the granting of honors for
purposes of graduation forms part of academic freedom. And such discretion may
not be disturbed much less controlled by the courts, unless there is grave abuse of
discretion in its exercise. Therefore, absent any showing of grave abuse of
discretion, the courts may not disturb the Universitys decision not to confer
honors to petitioner.

Lacuesta vs. Ateneo, December 9, 2005- Consistent with academic freedom

and constitutional autonomy, an institution of higher learning has the prerogative
to provide standards for its teachers and determine whether these standards have
been met. At the end of the probation period, the decision to re-hire an employee
on probation, belongs to the university as the employer alone.

UP vs. CSC, April 3, 2001- the University has the academic freedom to determine
for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be
taught, and who may be admitted to study. Clearly, this freedom encompasses
the autonomy to choose who should teach and, concomitant therewith, who should
be retained in its rolls of professors and other academic personnel. This Court
declared in Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong: As corporate entities,
educational institutions of higher learning are inherently endowed with the right to
establish their policies, academic and otherwise, unhampered by external controls
or pressure.

De LaSalle University vs. CA, December 19, 2007- Section 5(2), Article XIV of
the Constitution guaranties all institutions of higher learning academic freedom.
This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to
decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from
outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public interest
calls for some restraint. According to present jurisprudence, academic
freedom encompasses the independence of an academic institution to
determine for itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how
it shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study.

It cannot be gainsaid that the school has an interest in teaching the student
discipline, a necessary, if not indispensable, value in any field of learning. By
instilling discipline, the school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right to
discipline the student likewise finds basis in the freedom what to
teach. Indeed, while it is categorically stated under the Education Act
of 1982 that students have a right to freely choose their field of study,
subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to
graduation, such right is subject to the established academic and
disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution. Petitioner
DLSU, therefore, can very well exercise its academic freedom, which includes its
free choice of students for admission to its school.

*** Judge Singco Notes (Transitory Provisions)

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LIM VS. EXEC SEC., April11, 2002- Section 25 of the Transitory Provisions show
a marked antipathy towards foreign military presence in the country, or of foreign
influence in general. Hence, foreign troops are allowed entry into the Philippines
only be way of direct exception.

Under the Constitution, the US forces are prohibited from engaging in an offensive
war on Philippine territory. The Supreme Court, however, cannot accept the bare
allegations that the Arroyo administration is engaged in double speak in trying to
pass off as a mere training exercise an offensive effort by foreign troops on native
soil.

Bayan vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000, 342 SCRA 449-the VFA
was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by
the United States as attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of the
United States government. The fact that the VFA was not submitted for advice and
consent of the United States Senate does not detract from its status as a binding
international agreement or treaty recognized by the said State. For this is a matter of
internal United States law. Notice can be taken of the internationally known practice by
the United States of submitting to its Senate for advice and consent agreements that are
policymaking in nature, whereas those that carry out or further implement these
policymaking agreements are merely submitted to Congress, under the provisions of the
so-called CaseZablocki Act, within sixty days from ratification. The second reason has
to do with the relation between the VFA and the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of August
30, 1951. This earlier agreement was signed and duly ratified with the concurrence of
both the Philippine Senate and the United States Senate.

AKBAYAN CITIZENS ACTION PARTY (AKBAYAN), et al., Petitioners - versus THOMAS G. AQUINO, et al., No. 170516, July 16, 2008- While Article VII, Section 21
provides for Senate concurrence, such pertains only to the validity of the treaty under
consideration, not to the conduct of negotiations attendant to its conclusion. Moreover,
it is not even Congress as a whole that has been given the authority to concur as a
means of checking the treaty-making power of the President, but only the Senate.

Nicolas vs. Romulo, et al., G.R. No. 175888; Salonga vs. Smith, et al. G.R. No.
176051; and Makabayan vs. Arroyo, et al.,
G.R. No. 176222- February 11,
2009 - The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and
the United States, entered into on February 10, 1998, is UPHELD as constitutional,
but the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006 are DECLARED not
in accordance with the VFA, and respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs is hereby
ordered to forthwith negotiate with the United States representatives for the appropriate
agreement on detention facilities under Philippine authorities as provided in Art. V, Sec.
10 of the VFA, pending which the status quo shall be maintained until further orders by
this Court.

P. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

1. Concepts
The body of legal rules, which apply between sovereign states and such other entities as
have been granted international personality.
a. Obligations Erga Omnes
In international law, it has been used as a legal term describing obligations owed by states
towards the community of states as a whole. An erga omnes obligation exists because of the
universal and undeniable interest in the perpetuation of critical rights (and the prevention of their
Avancena | 170

breach). Consequently, any state has the right to complain of a breach. Examples of erga omnes
norms include piracy, genocide, slavery, torture, and racial discrimination. The concept was
recognized in the International Court of Justice's decision in the Barcelona Traction case, where it
said:
"(A)n essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the
International community as a whole, and those arising vis-a-vis another State In the field of
diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former are the concern of all States. In view of the
Importance of the rights Involved, all States can be held to have a legal Interest In their protection;
they are obligations erga omnes. Such obligations derive, for example. In contemporary
International law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the
principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, Including protection from
slavery and racial discrimination. Some of the corresponding rights of protection have entered Into
the body of general international law...; others are conferred by International Instruments of a
universal or quasi universal character."
b. Jus Cogens
A rule which has the status of a peremptory norm of international law.
Elements:
1.
2.
3.
4.

a norm accepted and recognized

by the int'l community of States as a whole
as a norm from which no derogation is permitted.
It can only be modified by a subsequent norm having the same character. 425

If a treaty, at the time of its conclusion, conflicts with jus cogens, it is void.
c. Concept of Aeguo Et Bono
This is the basis for a decision by an international tribunal on the grounds of justice and
fairness - equity overrides all other rules of law.
2. International and National Law
International Law the law that deals with the conduct of states and international
organizations, their relations with each other and , in certain circumstances, their relations with
persons, natural or juridical.426
3. Sources
Primary:
i. Treaties- the general rule is that the treaty to be considered a direct source of international
law, it must be concluded by sizable number of states and thus reflect the will or at least the
consensus of the family of nations.
ii. Custom- a practice which has grown up between states and has come to be accepted as
binding by the mere fact of persistent usage over a long period of time. Custom is distinguished
from usage in that the latter while also a long established way of doing things by states, is not
coupled with the conviction that it is obligatory and right.

425 Examples:
(1) prohibition against the unlawful use of force;
(2) prohibition against piracy, genocide, and slavery

426 American Third Restatement

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iii. General Principles of Law- mostly derived from the law of nature and are observed by the
majority of states because they are believed to be good and just (e.g. prescription, estoppel,
consent, res judicata and pacta sunt servanda).
Secondary Sources:
i. Decisions of international tribunals
ii. Writings and teachings of the most highly qualified publicists
4. Subjects
a. States
A state is a group of people, living together in a fixed territory, organized for political ends
under an independent government, and capable of entering into international relations with other
states.
b. International Organizations
May be vested with international personality, provided that they are non-political and are
autonomous and not subject to control by any state, e.g. ILO, FAO, WHO.
c. Individuals
Although traditionally, individuals have been considered merely as objects, not subjects, of
international law, they have also been granted a certain degree of international personality under a
number of international agreements.
5. Diplomatic and Consular Law427

6. Treaties
Treaty a formal agreement, usually but not necessarily in writing, which is entered into by
states or entities possessing the treaty-making capacity, for the purpose of regulating their mutual
relations under the law of nations.428
An international agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by
international law whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments. 429
7. Nationality and Statelessness
Nationality membership in a political community with all its concomitant rights and
obligations
An individual acquires the nationality of the state where he is born jure soli or the nationality
of his parents jure sanguinis.
Statelessness is the condition or status of an individual who is born without any nationality
or who loses his nationality without retaining or acquiring another. 430

427 See Reference

428 As a rule, a treaty is binding only on the contracting parties, including not only the original signatories but also other states which, although they may
not have participated in the negotiation of the agreements, have been allowed by its term to sign it later by a process known as accession.

429 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969

430 Treatment of Stateless Individual
- international conventions provide that stateless individuals are to be treated more or less like the subjects of a foreign state.
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A stateless individual is, from the traditional viewpoint, powerless to assert any right that
otherwise would be available to him under international law where he is a national of a particular
state. Any wrong suffered by him through the act of omission of a state would be damnum absque
injuria for in theory no other state had been offended and no international delinquency committed
as a result of the damage caused upon him.
8. Treatment of Aliens
Flowing from its right to existence and as an attribute of sovereignty, no State is under
obligation to admit aliens. The State can determine in what cases and under what conditions it may
admit aliens.
a. Extradition is the surrender of a person by one state to another state
where he is wanted for prosecution or, if already convicted for punishment. 431
(1) Fundamental Principles
1. Extradition is based on the consent of the state of asylum as expressed in a treaty or
manifested as an act of goodwill.
2. Under the principle of specialty, a fugitive who is extradited may be tried only for the
crime specified in the request for extradition and included in the list of offenses in the extradition
treaty.
If he is charged with any other offense committed before his escape, the state of refuge and not the accused has a right to object; Nevertheless, the prosecution will be allowed if the
extraditing state agrees or does not complain.
3. Any person may be extradited, whether he be a national of the requesting state, of the
state of refuge or of another state. The practice of many states now, however, is not to extradite
their own nationals but to punish them under their own laws in accordance with the nationality
principle of criminal jurisdiction.
4. Political and religious offenders are generally not subject to extradition.
In order to constitute an offense of a political character, there must be two or more parties in
the state, each seeking to impose the government of their own choice on the other. 432
5. In the absence of special agreement, the offense must have been committed within the
territory or against the interests of the demanding state.
6. The act for which the extradition is sought must be punishable in both the requesting and
requested states under what is known as the rule of double criminality.
(2) Procedure433
1.

Request through diplomatic representative with:

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

decision of conviction;
criminal charge and warrant of arrest;
recital of facts;
text of applicable law designating the offense;
pertinent papers.

431 The extradition of a person is required only if there is a treaty between the state of refuge and the state of origin. In the absence of such a treaty, the
local state has every right to grant asylum to the fugitive and to refuse to deliver him back to the latter state even if he is its national.

432 Under the attentat clause, the murder of the head of state or any member of his family is not to be regarded as a political offense for purposes of
extradition. Genocide is not a political offense.

433 Judicial and diplomatic process of request and surrender,

PD 1069
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2. DFA forwards request to DOJ;

3. DOJ files petition for extradition with RTC;434
4. Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must
study them and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether
(a) they are sufficient in form and substance,
(b) they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and
(c) the person sought is extraditable.
At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of further documentation or may
personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of this study and
examination, no prima facie finding is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of
the judge.
On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the magistrate
must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, 435 who is at the same time
summoned to answer the petition and to appear at scheduled summary hearings.
5. hearing436
6. appeal to CA within ten days whose decision shall be final and executory;
7. Decision forwarded to DFA through the DOJ;
8. Individual placed at the disposal of the authorities of requesting state costs and
expenses to be shouldered by requesting state.437
(3) Distinguished from Deportation
Deportation removal of an alien out of country, simply because his presence is deemed
inconsistent with the public welfare, and without any punishment being imposed or contemplated
either under the laws of the country out of which he is sent, or under those of the country to which
he is taken.
Extradition

Deportation

1. affected at the request of the state of nation

1. unilateral act of the local state

2. it is based on offenses generally committed in the state

of origin

2. based on causes arising in the local state.

3. calls for the return of the fugitive to the state of origin

3. an undesirable alien may be deported to a state other than

his own or the state of origin.

9. International Human Rights Law

a. Universal Declaration of Human Rights438
b. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 439

434 Due process requirement complied at the RTC level upon filing of petition for extradition.

No need to notify the person subject of the extradition

process when the application is still with the DFA or DOJ

435 Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given
the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings.
The foregoing procedure will best serve the ends of justice in extradition cases; (Government
of the US vs. Hon. Purganan and Mark Jimenez G.R. No. G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002)

436 provide counsel de officio if necessary;

437 A state may not compel another state to extradite a criminal without going through the legal processes provided in the laws of the former.
Extradition is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused provided in the bill of rights
For the provisional arrest of an accused to continue, the formal request for extradition is not required to be filed in court it only needs to be received by
the requested state in accordance with PD 1069

438 See Reference

439 ibid
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c. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 440

10. International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Neutrality
a. Categories of Armed Conflicts
(1) International Armed Conflicts
Those in which at least two States are involved. They are subject to a wide range of rules,
including those set out in the four Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I.
(2) Internal or Non-International Armed Conflict
Those restricted to the territory of a single State, involving either regular armed forces
fighting groups of armed dissidents, or armed groups fighting each other. A more limited
range of rules apply to internal armed conflicts and are laid down in Article 3 common to the
four Geneva Conventions as well as in Additional Protocol II.
(3) War of National Liberation
The first Protocol of 1977 provides that peoples fighting against colonial domination and
alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination are to
be treated as if they were engaged in an international armed conflict and not a civil war. There is
considerable difficulty over the meaning of this phrase, and it may be difficult to apply in
practice.441
b. Core International Obligations of States in IHL
c. Principles of IHL
(1) Treatment of Civilians442
Distinction between Civilians and Combatants
The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants.
Attacks may only be directed against combatants. Attacks must not be directed against civilians. 443
Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the
civilian population are prohibited.444
All members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict are combatants, except medical
and religious personnel.445
The armed forces of a party to the conflict consist of all organized armed forces, groups and
units which are under a command responsible to that party for the conduct of its subordinates. 446
Civilians are persons who are not members of the armed forces. The civilian population
comprises all persons who are civilians. 447

440 ibid
441 Encyclopedia Britannica
442 Customary International Humanitarian Law, March 2005, Rules 1-24
443 Rule 1
444 Rule 2
445 Rule 3
446 Rule 4
447 Rule 5
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Civilians are protected against attack, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in
hostilities.448
Distinction between Civilian Objects and Military Objectives
The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilian objects and military
objectives. Attacks may only be directed against military objectives. Attacks must not be directed
against civilian objects.449
In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by
their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose
partial or total destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers
a definite military advantage.450
Civilian objects are all objects that are not military objectives. 451
Civilian objects are protected against attack, unless and for such time as they are military
objectives.452
Indiscriminate Attacks
Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. 453
Indiscriminate attacks are those:
(a) which are not directed at a specific military objective;
(b) which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military
objective; or
(c) which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as
required by international humanitarian law; and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to
strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction. 454
Attacks by bombardment by any method or means which treats as a single military objective
a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in a city, town, village or
other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects are prohibited. 455
Proportionality in Attack
Launching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation
to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, is prohibited. 456
Precautions in Attack
In the conduct of military operations, constant care must be taken to spare the civilian
population, civilians and civilian objects. All feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any
event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. 457

448 Rule 6
449 Rule 7
450 Rule 8
451 Rule 9
452 Rule 10
453 Rule 11
454 Rule 12
455 Rule 13
456 Rule 14
457 Rule 15
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Each party to the conflict must do everything feasible to verify that targets are military
objectives.458
Each party to the conflict must take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and
methods of warfare with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. 459
Each party to the conflict must do everything feasible to assess whether the attack may be
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated.460
Each party to the conflict must do everything feasible to cancel or suspend an attack if it
becomes apparent that the target is not a military objective or that the attack may be expected to
cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated.461
Each party to the conflict must give effective advance warning of attacks which may affect
the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit. 462
When a choice is possible between several military objectives for obtaining a similar military
advantage, the objective to be selected must be that the attack on which may be expected to
cause the least danger to civilian lives and to civilian objects. 463
Precautions against the Effects of Attacks
The parties to the conflict must take all feasible precautions to protect the civilian population
and civilian objects under their control against the effects of attacks. 464
Each party to the conflict must, to the extent feasible, avoid locating military objectives
within or near densely populated areas.465
Each party to the conflict must, to the extent feasible, remove civilian persons and objects
under its control from the vicinity of military objectives.466
(2) Prisoners of War
Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to one of the
following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy:
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of militias or
volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.

458 Rule 16
459 Rule 17
460 Rule 18
461 Rule 19
462 Rule 20.
463 Rule 21
464 Rule 22
465 Rule 23
466 Rule 24
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(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of
organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside
their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps,
including such organized resistance movements, fulfill the following conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of
war.
(3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority
not recognized by the Detaining Power.
(4) Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, such
as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of
labour units or of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that they have
received authorization, from the armed forces which they accompany, who shall provide them for
that purpose with an identity card similar to the annexed model.
(5) Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, of the merchant marine
and the crews of civil aircraft of the Parties to the conflict, who do not benefit by more favourable
treatment under any other provisions of international law.
(6) Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy
spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form
themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and
customs of war.
The following shall likewise be treated as prisoners of war under the present Convention:
(1) Persons belonging, or having belonged, to the armed forces of the occupied country, if
the occupying Power considers it necessary by reason of such allegiance to intern them, even
though it has originally liberated them while hostilities were going on outside the territory it
occupies, in particular where such persons have made an unsuccessful attempt to rejoin the armed
forces to which they belong and which are engaged in combat, or where they fail to comply with a
summons made to them with a view to internment.
(2) The persons belonging to one of the categories enumerated in the present Article, who
have been received by neutral or non-belligerent Powers on their territory and whom these Powers
are required to intern under international law, without prejudice to any more favourable treatment
which these Powers may choose to give and with the exception of Articles 8, 10, 15, 30, fifth
paragraph, 58-67, 92, 126 and, where diplomatic relations exist between the Parties to the conflict
and the neutral or non-belligerent Power concerned, those Articles concerning the Protecting Power.
Where such diplomatic relations exist, the Parties to a conflict on whom these persons depend shall
be allowed to perform towards them the functions of a Protecting Power as provided in the present
Convention, without prejudice to the functions which these Parties normally exercise in conformity
with diplomatic and consular usage and treaties.467
d. Law on Neutrality
Law governing a country's abstention from participating in a conflict or aiding a participant
of such conflict, and the duty of participants to refrain from violating the territory, seizing the
possession, or hampering the peaceful commerce of the neutral countries. 468. For example, the
Neutrality Act of 1939,469 was passed by Congress for the purpose of preserving the neutrality of the

467 Art 4, Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949
468 166 U.S. 1
469 22 U.S.C. 441 et seq.,
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United States and averting the risks that brought the United States into World War I. 470 The codified
law of traditional neutrality is to be found in The Hague Conventions Nos. V and XIII of 1907.
11. Law of the Sea471
a. Baselines
Consist of straight lines joining appropriate points of the outermost islands of the
archipelago.
b. Archipelagic States
(1) Straight Archipelagic Baselines
1. In localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of
islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of straight baselines joining
appropriate points may be employed in drawing the baseline from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured.
2. Where because of the presence of a delta and other natural conditions the coastline is
highly unstable, the appropriate points may be
selected along the furthest seaward extent of the low-water line and,
notwithstanding subsequent regression of the low-water line, the straight baselines shall remain
effective until changed by the coastal State in
accordance with this Convention.
3. The drawing of straight baselines must not depart to any appreciable
extent from the general direction of the coast, and the sea areas lying within the lines must be
sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject
to the regime of internal waters.
4. Straight baselines shall not be drawn to and from low-tide elevations,
unless lighthouses or similar installations which are permanently above sea level have been built on
them or except in instances where the drawing of
baselines to and from such elevations has received general international recognition.
5. Where the method of straight baselines is applicable under paragraph 1, account may be
taken, in determining particular baselines, of
economic interests peculiar to the region concerned, the reality and the importance of which are
clearly evidenced by long usage.
6. The system of straight baselines may not be applied by a State in such a manner as to
cut off the territorial sea of another State from the high
seas or an exclusive economic zone.472
(2) Archipelagic Waters
The waters around, between and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of
their breadth or dimension,473 are to be treated as internal waters.
(3) Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage
The exercise in accordance with this Convention of the rights of navigation and overflight in
the normal mode solely for the purpose of continuous, expeditious and unobstructed transit

470 37 F. Supp. 268, 272

471 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
472 Art. 7, UNCLOS
473 Archipelago doctrine
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between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas
or an exclusive economic zone.
c. Internal Waters
Bodies of water within the landmass, such as rivers, lakes, canals, gulfs, bays and straits.
All waters on the landward side of the baselines of the territorial sea. 474
d. Territorial Sea
The belt of the sea located between the coast and intrernal waters of the coastal state on
the one hand,and the high seas on the other, extending up to 12 nautical miles from the low-water
mark, or in the case of archipelagic states, from the baselines.

e. Exclusive Economic Zone475

Extends 200 nautical miles from the coast or the baselines. All living and non-living
resources found therein belong exclusively to the coastal state.
f. Continental Shelf
(1) Extended Continental Shelf
Refers to:
a.

the seabed and the subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the
area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the depth
of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said
areas; and

b.

to the seabed and subsoil of similar areas adjacent to the coasts of islands.
g. Tribunal of the Law of the Sea476

ITLOS is composed of 21 independent members elected by the States Parties 477 to the
UNCLOS from among persons with recognized competence in the field of the law of the sea and
representing the principal legal systems of the world. ITLOS has jurisdiction over all disputes and all
applications submitted to it in accordance with UNCLOS and over all matters specifically provided
for in any other agreement which confers jurisdiction on the ITLOS.
12. International Environment Law
a. Principle 21 of Stockholm Declaration
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own
environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or
control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction.478

474 UNCLOS
475 or the patrimonial sea
476 International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS)
477 States which have consented to be bound by the Convention and for which the Convention is in force
478 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, having met at Stockholm from 5 to 16 June 1972, considered the need for a common
outlook and for common principles to inspire and guide the peoples of the world in the preservation and enhancement of the human environment.
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