Barredo v.

Garcia*
petitioners
respondents

G.R. No. L-48006

July 8, 1942

Fausto Barredo
Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario

summary
Taxicab v Carretela A traffic accident resulted to death of a child, parents went after owner of taxicab. Can they go after
the owner directly even though no civil action was filed against the driver? Yes, parents have two options: go after the owner
directly using CC A1903 for culpa aquiliana or go after the driver as principal and the owner as subsidiary using RPC.

facts of the case

A traffic accident involving a cab of Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela resulted in the death of
Faustino Garcia, a passenger of the carretela. The parents of the deceased brought forth separate legal actions against
Fontanilla (criminal in nature) and Fausto Barredo (civil in nature) who was the sole proprietor of Malate Taxicab.
CFI and CA declared that the cause of the accident was obviously Fontanillas reckless driving as he was driving on the
wrong side of the road at high speed and Barredo, being his employer, was negligent in employing the former. Fontanilla was
convicted in the criminal case and Barredo was ordered to pay damages in the civil case. Barredo now appeals his case.
Barredos defense: (1) liability as the employer of Fontanilla would only be subsidiary since the nature of such was governed
by the Revised Penal Code, (2) cannot be the subject of any separate civil suit because no such action has been filed against
Fontanilla who is criminally liable

issue
WON the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against Barredo which would effectively make him primarily liable for
damages under Art 19031 as an employer of Fontanilla - YES

ratio
The court held that Barredo could be held primarily liable for the actions of his employee. According to the Court, a civil
liability may exist that does not carry with it any criminal liability. A quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual is a separate
and distinct legal institution, independent from the civil responsibility arising from criminal liability, and that an
employer is, under article 1903 of the Civil Code, primarily and directly responsible for the negligent acts of his
employee.
Thus, Barredo may be rightfully sued in his capacity as the employer of Fontanilla under Art 1903 of the Civil Code. As a
result of this reasoning, he incurred two possible liabilities: the first with regard to the criminal action filed against Fontanilla
where he would be subsidiarily liable and the second with regard to his responsibility as employer where he would be primarily
liable. The second liability arises from the notion that an employer has the duty to take great care in hiring the employees of
his company. Should any of those hired prove to be incompetent or negligent as evidenced by any damage their acts may
cause, the employer is necessarily presumed to be negligent insofar as hiring inadequate workers is concerned. Such failure is
cause for civil liability under Art 1903. This presumption is juris tantum [may be rebutted], however, Barredo failed to prove his
diligence.
The choice of which liability to hold him accountable for rested solely upon those filing the suit and they chose the second
option. The Court is of the opinion that this is the more expedient and favorable recourse for the parents of the deceased
because of the obvious fact that the owner of the taxi company would be much more capable of paying civil liabilities than the
taxi driver himself.

ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is enforcable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons
for whom another is responsible.
X
X
X
Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable for any damages caused by their employees while engaged in the branch of the
service in which employed, or on occasion of the performance of their duties

* edited A2016 oblicon digest J

Note:
Interest
Purpose
Scope

Delict [RPC]
Public interest
Punish criminal acts
Only acts covered by penal law

Quasi-Delict/Culpa extracontractual/Culpa aquiliana [CC]

Private concern
Repair damages caused through indemnification
all acts in which "any king of fault or negligence intervenes"

GARCIA v. FLORIDO
petitioners
respondents

G.R. No. L-35095

August 31, 1973

German C. Garcia, Luminosa L. Garcia and Ester Francisco

Hon. Mariano M. Florido of the CFI-Misamis Occidental, Marcelino Inesin, Ricardo Vayson, Mactan Transit
Co., Inc., and Pedyo Tumala

summary
PU car and passenger bus collision leads to filing of civil action for damages by petitioners. LC dismissed it for lack of the
required waiver/express reservation to file civil action separate from the civil liability in the criminal case, but the SC ruled that
the filing of the separate civil action of itself constitutes the waiver/express reservation and their lack of intervention in the
criminal case removes any bar to their filing of the separate civil action. LC judgment reversed.

facts of the case

Petitioners were riding on the PU car owned by respondent Inesin and driven by respondent Vayson on their way to a
hospital conference in Zamboanga city. While the car was traversing a slight curve on the national highway, it collided with an
oncoming passenger bus owned and operated by respondent Mactan Transit and driven by respondent Tumala. This collision
left petitioners with various physical injuries that required them to seek medical attention. Thus, they filed a civil action for
damages against all the private respondents, alleging that both drivers of the PU car and the passenger bus were at the time of
the accident driving their respective vehicles at a fast clip, in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in gross
violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car.
The PU car respondents imputed blame to the passenger bus respondents, while the passenger bus respondents moved to
dismiss the case on three grounds: 1.) the petitioners had no cause of action; 2) the complaint carries with it a prayer for
attachment but without the requisite verification, hence defective under the provision of Sec. 3, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court;
and 3) they had operated said passenger bus with maximum care and prudence. The passenger bus respondents first
allegation, which is the crux of the case, is that the petitioners had no cause of action for 20 days before the filing of the
present action for damages, respondent Tumala was charged in a criminal case by the Chief of Police, and that, with the filing
of the aforesaid criminal case, no civil action could be filed subsequent thereto unless the criminal case has been finally
adjudicated, pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. Thus, they averred that the filing of the instant civil action is
premature, because the liability of the employer is merely subsidiary and does not arise until after final judgment has been
rendered finding the driver, Pedro Tumala guilty of negligence; and that Art. 33 of the New Civil Code, is not applicable
because Art. 33 applied only to the crimes of physical injuries or homicide, not to the negligent act or imprudence of the
driver.
To this, the petitioners contended that their action for damages was instituted not to enforce the civil liability of the
respondents under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code but for their civil liability on quasi-delicts pursuant to Articles 21762194, as the same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Revised Penal Code
or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code, and the party seeking recovery is free to
choose which remedy to enforce.
The LC sided with the respondents and dismissed the case, citing as their reason the lack of a waiver/reservation on the
part of petitioners to file a civil action separate from the criminal case, and in addition, that inclusion of the assertion that the
respondents violated traffic rules made the case one that is not based on quasi-delict.

issue
WON the LC ruling was correct. NO.

ratio
First, the SC noted that the essential averments for a quasi-delictual action under Articles 2176-2194 of the New
Civil Code are present, namely: a) act or omission of the private respondents; b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack
of due care in the operation of the passenger bus No. 25 by respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of the bus with
the passenger car; c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by petitioners as a result of the collision; d) existence of
direct causal connection between the damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of private respondents; and e) the
absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties. The circumstance that the complaint alleged that
respondents violated traffic rules does not detract from the nature and character of the action, as one based on culpa
aquiliana. The violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the failure of said driver to observe for the protection of
the interests of others, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand. Certainly,

excessive speed in violation of traffic rules is a clear indication of negligence. Since the same negligent act resulted in the
filing of the criminal action by the Chief of Police, and the civil action by petitioners, it is inevitable that the averments on the
drivers' negligence in both complaints would substantially be the same. Further, it is well to note that the same negligent act
causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from a crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code or
create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under Arts. 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code.
Under Sec. 2 in relation to Sec. 1 of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, in the cases provided for by Articles 31, 33,
39 and 2177 of the Civil Code, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the civil action, may be instituted
by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided said party has reserved his right to institute it
separately, but it should be noted, however, that neither Section 1 nor Section 2 of Rule 111 fixes a time limit when such
reservation shall be made. The Court also took note of its earlier ruling that when the criminal action for physical injuries
against the defendant did not proceed to trial as he pleaded guilty upon arraignment and the Court made no pronouncement
on the matter or damages suffered by the injured party, the mere appearance of private counsel in representation of the
offended party in said criminal case does not constitute such active intervention as could impart an intention to press a claim
for damages in the same action, and, therefore, cannot bar a separate civil action for damages subsequently instituted on the
same ground under Article 33 of the New Civil Code. However, in the case at bar, there is no question that petitioners
never intervened in the criminal action instituted by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has
the said criminal action been terminated either by conviction or acquittal of said accused. It is, therefore, evident that
by the institution of the present civil action for damages, petitioners have in effect abandoned their right to press
recovery for damages in the criminal case, and have opted instead to recover them in the present civil case.
As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability of private respondents to the former has ceased to be involved in
the criminal action. Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right to intervene in the prosecution of a criminal case,
not only when he has waived the civil action or expressly reserved his right to institute, but also when he has
actually instituted the civil action. For by either of such actions his interest in the criminal case has disappeared.
Thus, the court ruled that whether we view the institution of the civil action for recovery of damages under quasi-delict by
petitioners as one that should be governed by the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules which require reservation
by the injured party considering that by the institution of the civil action even before the commencement of the trial of the
criminal case, petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene therein, or one where reservation to file the civil
action need not be made, for the reason that the law itself (Article 33 of the Civil Code) already makes the reservation and the
failure of the offended party to do so does not bar him from bringing the action, under the peculiar circumstances of the case,
there is no legal justification for respondent court's order of dismissal.

concurring opinion (J. Barredo)

The only substantive legal provision are Arts. 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code. These provisions definitely create a
civil liability distinct and different from the civil action arising from the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal Code.
Since the civil case in question is predicated on the above civil code articles and not on the civil liability imposed by the
Revised Penal Code, there is no necessity for a reservation in the criminal case. As to the specific mention of Article
2177 in Section 2 of the Rule 111, it is J. Barredos view that the latter provision is inoperative, it being substantive in
character and is not within the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate, and even if it were not substantive but
adjective, it cannot stand because of its inconsistency with Article 2177.

ELCANO v HILL
G.R. No. L-24803

petitioners
respondents

May 26, 1977

Barredo, J.

Pedro Elcano and Patricia Elcano, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano,
deceased,plaintiffs-appellants,
Reginald Hill, minor, and Marvin Hill, as father and natural guardian of said minor, defendantsappellees

summary
The parent is still liable for the minor child even if the child has been emancipated by marriage.

facts of the case

Reginald Hill, minor and married at the time, killed Agapito Elcano. He was tried and acquitted of the criminal case
because of lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake. Agapitos parents then filed an action for damages against Rreginald
and his father Marvin Hill. CFI QC dismissed the said complaint because:1) violated sec1 Rule 107 now Rule III of Rules of
court; 2) barred by res judicata; 3) no cause of action against the father since the son was emancipated by marriage, hence this
appeal.

issues
1. WON acquittal in the criminal case bars the filing of a separate civil action? NO
2. WON the father may be held liable under NCC Art 2180 given that the minor son was already emancipated by marriage?
YES

ratio
1. Court cited NCC Art 2177, Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code
Extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111 of Rules of Court, refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only
and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened
or has not been committed by the accused.
2. Parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child, but emancipation by marriage is not absolute. It shall
enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber
real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the
assistance of his father, mother or guardian. Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence
from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his
father.

Cinco v. Canonoy
petitioners
respondents

G.R. No. L-33171

May 31, 1979

Porfirio Cinco
Hon.Mateo Canonoy (Presiding Judge of 3rd Branch of CFI Cebu), Hon.Lorenzo Barria (City Judge of
Mandaue), Romeo Hilot, Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito

summary
A civil action based on quasi-delict, whether damage caused be to persons or to property, may proceed separately and
independently of the criminal proceedings.

facts of the case

Cinco filed in the City Court of Mandau for recovery of damages caused by a vehicular accident involving his automobile
and a jeep driven by Hilot and operated by the Pepitos. A criminal case was subsequently filed against the Hilot, arising from
the same accident. At the pre-trial in the civil case, respondents counsel moved to suspend the civil action pending the final
determination of the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111, Sec.3(b) of the Rules of Court, which provides:
(b) After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted, and
the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has
been rendered
The City Court ordered the suspension of the civil case. Cinco then elevated the matter on certiorari to the CFI Cebu. CFI
Judge Canonoy dismissed the petition on the grounds that: (1) there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the City
Court in suspending the civil action inasmuch as damage to property is not one of the instances when an independent civil
action is proper; (2) petitioner has another plain, speedy, and adequate remedy under the law, which is to submit his claim for
damages in the criminal case; (3) City Courts resolution is interlocutory and, therefore, certiorari is improper; and (4) the
petition is defective inasmuch as what petitioner actually desires is a writ of mandamus.

issue
WoN there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during the pendency of the criminal action - YES

ratio
Petitioner's cause of action is based on quasi-delict. Its concept as enunciated in Art.2176 CC includes not only injuries to
persons but also damage to property, as no distinction has been made between the two (damage to persons vs damage to
property). The word "damage" is therefore used in two concepts: the "harm" done and "reparation" for the harm done. And
with respect to harm, it is plain that it includes both injuries to person and property since the word is not limited to personal
but also to property injuries. It is also worth noting that the jural concept of a quasi-delict is that of an independent source of
obligation "not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony" based on Art.1157 CC. (see Barredo v Garcia for
distinction bet. criminal negligence and quasi-delict)
As the respondents liability being predicated on quasi-delict under Arts.2176 and 2180 CC, the civil case may proceed as a
separate and independent civil action, as specifically provided for in Arts.31 and 2177 CC.
The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly recognized in Sec.2, Rule 111 of the 1964 Rules
of Court (now Sec.3, Rule 111 on 1997 revised RoC), with cases provided for in Art.2177 CC allowed of such action.
The City Court therefore erred and gravely abused his discretion in suspending the civil case because the civil action
referred to in Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which should be suspended after the criminal action has
been instituted is that arising from the criminal offense, NOT the civil action based on quasi-delict.
Ruling: Writ of certiorari granted. CFI decision set aside. City Court ordered to proceed with hearing civil case.
Provisions used:
Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:
(1) Law;
(2) Contracts;
(3) Quasi-contracts;
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
(5) Quasi-delicts. (1089a)

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is caned a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions but also for those
of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a
felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article (A2176) is entirely separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for
the same act or omission of the defendant. (n)
1964 RoC, Rule 111, Sec. 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the
preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.

Mendoza v. Arrieta
petitioners
respondents

G.R. NoL-32599
June 29, 1979
EDGARDO E. MENDOZA
HON. ABUNDIO Z. ARRIETA, Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, Court of First Instance of Manila,
FELINO TIMBOL, and RODOLFO SALAZAR

summary
Truck bump jeep which bumps car. Jeep is not at fault so no civil liability.

facts of the case

Mercedes Benz- Edgardo Mendoza, Jeepney- Rodolfo Salazar, Truck- Freddie Montoya and owned by Felipino Timbol
The truck bumped the jeep in the rear causing it to move forward and bump the Mercedes. Case was filed against
Montoya and Timbol for the damage caused to jeep. Another was against Salazar for the damage caused on the Mercedes. At
the trial, petitioner testified that Salazar overtook the truck, swerved to the left and hit his car. He further testified that before
impact, Salazar jumped from the jeep not knowing that Salazar was hit by the truck of Montoya. Montoya affirmed this. On
the other hand, Salazar tried to show that after overtaking the truck, he flashed a signal showing his intention to turn left but
was stopped at by a policeman directing traffic at the intersection which he contends to be the time he was hit by the truck
causing his jeep to hit petitioners car.
Montoya was found guilty for the damage to the jeep and Salazar was acquitted for the offense of bumping the Mercedes.
Salazar was absolved of civil and criminal liability. The trial court ruled that the truck was at fault. Mendoza was not awarded
damages for he was only a complainant against the jeep driver and not the truck driver.
After the criminal case, Mendoza filed a case for indemnification against Salazar and Timbol, the truck owner. Lower
court dismissed it because of prior judgment in criminal case and because Mendoza has not reserved the right to file an
independent civil action

Issue/s
Whether or not the case was rightfully dismissed by the trial court. NO in Timbols case, Yes in Salazars case

ratio
Complaint against Timbol- For prior judgment to be a bar to a subsequent case the following requisites should concur: (1) it
must be a final judgment; (2) it must have been rendered by a Court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the
parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, Identity of parties,
Identity of subject matter and Identity of cause of action.
The fourth requisite is absent because the prior case was about the prosecution of Montoya for the damage to the jeepney and
not to the Mercedes. It was also an enforcement of civil liability from criminal negligence based from the RPC while this case
is based on quasi-delict in the NCC.
The SC also ruled that the lack of reservation for independent civil action is not fatal. The NCC provisions on independent
civil actions (31,32,33,34, 2177) does not mention about reserving such right. Rule 111, ROC can be regarded as an
unauthorized amendment of substantive law.
Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code create a civil liability distinct and different from the civil action arising from the
offense of negligence under the Revised Penal Code, no reservation, therefore, need be made in the criminal case; that Section
2 of Rule 111 is inoperative, "it being substantive in character and is not within the power of the Supreme Court to
promulgate; and even if it were not substantive but adjective, it cannot stand because of its inconsistency with Article 2177, an
enactment of the legislature superseding the Rules of 1940.
Complaint against Salazar- Inasmuch as civil liability co-exists with criminal responsibility in negligence cases, the offended
party has the option between an action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, and an action for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under Article 2177 of the Civil Code. The
action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court is deemed
simultaneously instituted with the criminal action, unless expressly waived or reserved for separate application by the offended
party. The circumstances attendant to the criminal case yields the conclusion that petitioner had opted to base his cause of

action against Salazar on culpa criminal and not on culpa aquiliana as evidenced by his active participation and intervention in
the prosecution of the criminal suit against said Salazar. The latter's civil liability continued to be involved in the criminal
action until its termination. Such being the case, there was no need for petitioner to have reserved his right to file a separate
civil action as his action for civil liability was deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal case.
Salazar cannot be held civilly liable for damages sustained by petitioners car for considering that the collision between the jeep
driven by him and the car owned and driven by Mendoza was the result of the hitting on the rear of the jeep by the truck
driven by Montoya, it cannot be said that Salazar was at fault. Hence, the right of petitioner to claim damages from Salazar did
not arise. Accordingly, inasmuch as petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is ex- delictu, founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, the civil action must be held to have been extinguished in consonance with Section 3(c)
which provides that, Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil right arise did not exist

Dulay v. CA
petitioners
respondents

G.R. No. 10817 April 3, 1995

J. Bidin
Maria Benita A. Dulay (in behalf of children)
The Court of Appeals, Hon. Teodoro P. Regino (As presiding judge of the RTC), Safeguard
Investigation and Security Co., Inc. and Superguard Security Corporation

summary
Art. 2176 and 2180 are applies not only to negligent acts by the employees but also to their voluntary and intentional acts.
Physical injuries in Art. 33 includes bodily injury causing death.

facts of the case

On Dec. 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela (Security Guard) and Atty. Dulay occurred at the Big Bang sa
Alabang (carnival), Alabang Village, Muntinlupa, which resulted in Torzuela shooting and killing Atty. Dulay.
Petitioner (wife) filed on Feb. 8, 1989 an civil case (for damages) against SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD, alleged
employers of Torzuela.
SUPERGUARD filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that the petitioner failed to state a valid cause of action. They
claim that the act of shooting Atty. Dulay was beyond the scope of duties of Torzuela, and it was with deliberate intent,
therefore, civil liability should arise only from a criminal action against Torzuela. Further, they contend that Art. 2176 should
only arise from quasi-offenses under Art. 365 of the RPC, and a conviction therefrom is a condition sine qua non for the
employers subsidiary liability.
SAFEGUARD also filed a motion praying that it be excluded, as it wasnt the employer of Torzuela.
Meanwhile, a criminal case against Torzuela was filed in RTC Makati on Mar. 21, 1989.
On April 13, 1989, respondent Judge Regino granted the motions of SAFEGUARD and SUPERGUARD, on the basis
that the civil case did not mention any negligence on the part of Torzuela in shooting Atty. Dulay or that the same was done in
the performance of his duties.
Petitioners are now asserting that the said act of shooting constitutes a quasi-delict actionable under Art. 2176, and that
under Art. 2180, employers are primarily liable for their negligence in the selection or supervision of their employees. This
liability is independent of the employees own liability for fault or negligence and is distinct from the subsidiary civil liability
under Art. 103 of the RPC. Moreover, Torezuelas act of shooting Dulay is also actionable under Art. 33 of the NCC stating
that in cases of physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party and such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and require only a
preponderance of evidence.

issue/s
WON a separate civil action can be filed against the employer even for deliberate acts by an employee. Yes.
WON the employers liability can only be subsidiary to the employees. NO

ratio
It is well settled that the filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the criminal action presents
evidence is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of an express reservation.
Elcano v. Hill already set the doctrine that Art. 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which
are voluntary and intentional.
In response to respondents claim that Art. 33 only applies to physical injuries intentionally committed pursuant to the
ruling in Marcia v. CA (it says that no civil action may be filed under Art. 33 for criminal negligence), the court ruled that it
should be noted that the term physical injuries in the said article also includes bodily injuries causing death or
also consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide, and since in the present case Torzuela is charged with
homicide (an intentional crime that caused physical injuries), a civil action lies.
For the degree of liability, the court ruled that since it has been established that the instant action is not ex-delicto,
petitioners may proceed directly against Torzuela and the private respondents. When an injury is caused by the negligence of
the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the employer, either in the
selection or in the supervision. The liability of the employer under Art. 2180 is direct and immediate, and it is not
conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such
employee. What they need to do is to prove that they exercised ordinary diligence in the selection and supervision of their
employees.

Since Art. 2176 covers not only negligence act but also intentional and voluntary acts, it was therefore erroneous on the
part of the Trial Court to have dismissed the petitioners complaint simply because it failed to make allegations of attendant
negligence attributable to private respondents.
The court granted the petition for review and orders the RTC to continue hearing the case on its merits.

PADILLA v. CA
petitioners
respondents

G.R. No. L-39999

May 31, 1984
Roy Padilla (mayor), Filomeno Galdones (chief of police), Ismael Gonzalgo (policeman) and Jose
Farley Bedenia (policeman)
CA

summary
Grave coercion by the mayor, chief of police, etc. Acquitted based on reasonable doubt but ordered to pay damages. SC
held that the 2 are distinct liabilities, acquittal from one does not extinguish the other. Also, there is no need to institute a
separate civil action for damages.

facts of the case

Pursuant to Memorandum No. 32 of the Mayor, the Vergaras (H&W) were served with an order to vacate their
market stall within 72 hours. However, when they did not comply, the co-accused Chief of Police Galdones and some
members of his police force, went to the market and, using ax, crowbars and hammers, demolished the stall of the
Vergaras who was not present or around, and after having first inventoried the goods and merchandise found therein,
they had them brought to the municipal building for safekeeping. Inspite of notice served upon the Vergaras to take
possession of the goods and merchandise thus taken away, the latter refused to do so. The loss and damage to the
Vergaras amounted to P9,600 (cost of stall construction, value of furniture and eqpt destroyed and value of goods and
eqpt taken). Galdones and the rest of the petitioners were later charged of grave coercion.
CA acquitted them because of reasonable doubt. However, they were ordered to pay jointly and severally the
amount of P9,600 as actual damages.

issues
1. WON CA committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity after acquitting them from
the criminal charge? NO, SC affirmed CAs decision.
2. WON a separate civil action is necessary to recover damages if the accused has been acquitted of the criminal charge?
NO

ratio
1. The petitioners were acquitted not because they did not commit the acts stated in the charge against them. There is
no dispute over the forcible opening of the market stall, its demolition with axes and other instruments, and the
carting away of the merchandize. The petitioners were acquitted because these acts were denominated coercion when
they properly constituted some other offense such as threat or malicious mischief. But the elements of threat or
malicious mischief were not alleged in the information (rt of the accused to be informed of the nature of the acts
imputed to him), hence, CA was constrained to acquit them. While appellants are entitled to acquittal they
nevertheless are liable for the actual damages suffered by the complainants by reason of the demolition of the stall and
loss of some of their properties.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it that of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from
a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. (Rule 111, Sec. 3
(c), Rev. Rules of Court)
The fact from which the civil might arise, namely, the demolition of the stall and loss of the properties contained
therein; exists, and this is not denied by the accused. And since there is no showing that the complainants have
reserved or waived their right to institute a separate civil action, the civil aspect therein is deemed instituted with the
criminal action. (Rule 111, Sec. 1, Rev. Rules of Court).
The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers exclusively to civil liability
ex delicto founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. In other words, the civil liability which is also
extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime.
2. Art. 29 CC: When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission MAY be instituted.
Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. xxx If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based

upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred
from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
According to some scholars, this provision of substantive law calls for a separate civil action and cannot be modified
by a rule of remedial law even in the interests of economy and simplicity and following the dictates of logic and
common sense. In the words of J. Sangco: Art. 29 of the Civil Code should be amended because it clearly and
expressly provides that the civil action based on the same act or omission may only be instituted in a separate action,
and therefore, may not inferentially be resolved in the same criminal action.
SC disagrees and held that there is no need to amend Article 29 of the Civil Code in order to allow a court to grant
damages despite a judgment of acquittal based on reasonable doubt. What Article 29 clearly and expressly provides is
a remedy for the plaintiff in case the defendant has been acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the ground that his
guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not
precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or omission. The Civil Code provision does not state that
the remedy can be availed of only in a separate civil action. A separate civil case may be filed but there is no
statement that such separate filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode of recovering damages.
From the records of the Code Commission:
The two liabilities (civil and criminal) are separate and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the
other, private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of
damages suffered by the aggrieved party... it is just and proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine
upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the
complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation
of every private right to be proved only by preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less
private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?
Also, there appears to be no sound reason to require a separate civil action to still be filed considering that the facts to
be proved in the civil case have already been established in the criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted.
Due process has been accorded the accused. He was, in fact, exonerated of the criminal charged. To require a separate
civil action simply because the accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary
duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned.
A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established or more evidence must be
adduced or where the criminal case has been fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just as efficacious or
even more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the criminal action was decided for further
hearings on the civil aspects of the case. The offended party may, of course, choose to file a separate action. These do
not exist in this case.

PEOPLE v. LIGON
petitioners
respondents

G.R. No. L-74041

July 29, 1987

People of the Philippines

Rogelio Ligon y Trias, Fernando Gabat y Almera

summary
Cigarette vendor. Gabat was charged with Robbery with Homicide for allegedly grabbing Rosales cigarette box and prying
the latters arm away from the car, causing Rosales to fall face down in the street. Was there guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
The evidence presented did not establish Gabats guilt beyond reasonable doubt. But he is still liable for damages since only
preponderance of evidence is needed for civil liability, and the facts clearly show that he acted with fault and negligence.

facts of the case

Gabat and Ligon were riding in a Volkswagen Kombi going towards the direction of Quiapo, with Ligon behind the
wheels. At the intersection of Q. Boulevard and Lerma street, while they were waiting for the light to turn green, Gabat
summoned Rosales, a cigarette vendor, to buy some cigarettes. Rosales handed him 2 sticks, and he paid for it with a five peso
bill.
This is the part where there are conflicting versions of what happened. According to a taxi driver named Castillo, who was
right behind the Kombi, when the light turned green, Gabat suddenly grabbed Rosales cigarette box as the car sped forward,
causing Rosales to grab on to the windowsill of the car and ran beside it, until he was eventually lifted off the ground because
of the speed of the car. Gabat allegedly pried off Rosales hand, causing him to fall face down on the street. Rosales was
rushed to PGH, and was treated for multiple physical injuries until he died.
Gabats defense, on the other hand, is that Rosales put the cigarette box on the cars windowsill, so that he could look for
Gabats change. When the car sped forward, the cigarette box fell inside the car, causing Rosales to run after them and grab on
to the cars windowsill. Gabat asked Ligon to veer to the right so that Rosales could get off at the sidewalk, but Ligon refused
because of the traffic. Then, as Ligon was veering to the right, Rosales lost his grip on the window frame and fell to the
pavement. Gabat then allegedly shouted at Ligon to stop but Ligon said they should tell Gabats parents first, then go back to
the crime scene. Eventually they were blocked by the taxi driver who was pursuing them, and brought to the police station.

issue/s
WoN Gabats guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Robbery with Homicide. NO.
WoN Gabats civil liability was also extinguished by the acquittal. NO.

ratio
The prosecutions star witness, the taxi driver Castillo, may be a disinterested witness with no motive, but his testimony,
though free from bias, is not entirely free from doubt because his observation of the event could have been faulty or mistaken.
The taxicab he was driving was lower in height compared to the Kombi. Also, the rear windshield of the Kombi occupied 1/3
of the rear end of the vehicle, thus making it visually difficult for Castillo to observe clearly what transpired between Gabat
and Rosales. The court also took notice of the fact that in his statement to the police that very same evening, he did not
mention that he saw Gabat forcibly prying off Rosales hand from the windowsill of the Kombi, although in his statement
during the police investigation, he indicated that Gabat did something to cause Rosales to fall from the Kombi (punch his
arm). Considering these circumstances, the court is not convinced with moral certainty that the guilt of the accused has been
established beyond reasonable doubt. He is therefore entitled to acquittal on reasonable doubt.
(RELEVANT PORTION)
However, it does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil liability. Only a preponderance
of evidence is required in a civil action for damages. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes civil liability of the accused only
when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. In the instant case, the court
found that Gabat by his act and omission with fault and negligence caused damage to Rosales and should answer civilly for the
damage done. Through fault and negligence, Gabat: (1) failed to prevent Ligon from moving forward while the purchase was
completed; (2) failed to help Rosales while the latter clung precariously to the moving vehicle; and (3) did not enforce his order
to the driver to stop the car. Finally, Gabat, acquiesced in Ligons act of speeding away, instead of stopping and picking up the
injured victim.

MANIAGO v. COURT of APPEALS

G.R. No. 104392

petitioners
respondents

20 Feb. 1996

Ruben Maniago
The Court of Appeals (First Division), Hon. Ruben C. Ayson (Acting Presiding Judge, Baguio City
Regional Trial Court Branch IV), and Alfredo Boado

summary
Key phrase: Shuttle buses. After an accident between a shuttle bus, owned by petitioner, and a jeepney, owned by
respondent, a criminal case was filed against the petitioner. A month later, respondent filed a civil case for damages against
petitioner. Whether respondent may file for damages against petitioner, separate from criminal action, without reserving the
right to do so. No; the Rules of Court direct that reservation must be made.

facts of the case

Ruben Maniago, petitioner, owned shuttle buses that transported employees of Texas Instruments Phils., Inc. within
Baguio City. One of his buses figured in an accident with a passenger jeepney, owned by respondent Boado.
A criminal case against Maniagos driver, Herminio Andaya, for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and
multiple physical injuries. A month later, respondent Boado filed a civil case for damages against petitioner Maniago.
Maniago moved for the suspension of the civil proceedings against him while the criminal case against his driver Andaya
was pending. The trial court, however, denied this motion: pursuant to the Civil Code, the action could proceed independent
of the criminal case, and Maniago was not the accused in the said criminal proceeding.
Petitioner raised the matter to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed his petition and allowed both cases to proceed.

issue
Whether Boado may file a separate action to recover civil liability against Maniago under the Civil Code provisions on quasidelicts, despite the absence of reservation. No.

ratio
Art. 2177 recognizes that responsibility for fault or negligence under Arts. 2176 and 2180 (which govern quasi-delicts) is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Revised Penal Code.
However, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that though civil action under the
abovementioned provisions may be brought separately from the criminal action, the right to bring it must first be reserved.
Otherwise, the action should be dismissed.
Without such reservation, all civil actions to recover damageswhether for civil liability arising from crimes under the
Revised Penal Code or from quasi-delicts under Art. 276 of the Civil Codewill be deemed instituted with the criminal case.
Hence, based on Rule 111, Secs. 1-3 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the general rule is that a civil action for
the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action.
The exceptions, however, are when:
1. Such action is waived;
2. The right to bring it separately is reserved;
3. The civil action has been instituted prior to the criminal action.
Even if the action has not been reserved, or it was brought before the institution of the criminal case, the acquittal of the
accused will not bar recovery of civil liability, unless the acquittal is based on a finding that the act from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist.
The practical reason for requiring that the right to bring an independent civil action be reserved is to avoid the filing of
more than one action for the same act or omission, against the same party.
Thus, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the civil complaint against petitioner Maniago is dismissed.

MANLICLIC v. CALAUNAN
petitioners
respondents

G.R. No. 150157

Date JANUARY 25, 2007
Mauricio Manliclic and Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines Inc
Modesto Calaunan

summary
Bus hit jeep while on speedway. Driver acquitted of criminal negligence but found by court to be still responsible for the
collision. Bus company failed to prove that it exercised diligence of a good father in supervision of its employees

facts of the case

Vehicles involved:
1) PLRBI Bus owned by PRBLI and driven by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic
2) Owner-type jeep owned by Modesto Calaunan and driven by Marcelo Mendoza
What happened?
- Both vehicles were on their way to Manila (jeep from Pangasinan, bus from Tarlac)
- Two vehicles collided at the NLEX, with the front right side of the PH Rabbit Bus hitting the rear left side of the jeep
causing the latter to move to the shoulder on the right of the road, and then fall on a ditch with water. (Calaunan suffered
minor injuries coz of what happened)
Cases filed:
- By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed before RTC of Malolos, charging Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property (Criminal case). Dec 2 1991, Calaunan filed a complaint for damages against Manliclic and
PRBLI (civil case)
- Criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case ( in criminal case, manliclic was acquitted by the CA of the charge)
Civil case:
- Both parties had versions of the story. Calaunans witness said that the bus tried to overtake the formers jeep but in the
process hit the jeep, which caused it to swerve. Manliclic and PRBLI admitted that they were trying to overtake but explained
that when the bus was about to go to the left lane, Calaunans jeep also swerved to the left because it was trying to overtake a
jeep in front of it.
- Trial court rendered its decision in favor or Calaunan and against petitioners. CA found no error in the decision.

Issue/s + Ratio
a) BASED ON FINDINGS OF THE CA, CAN MANLICLIC STILL BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE COLLISION
AND BE FOUND NEGLIGENT? YES
- The CA found that the swerving of Calaunans jeep when it tried to overtake the vehicle in front of it was beyond the control
of Manliclic when he tried to overtake the former therefore, absence of negligence on his part
- From the declaration of the CA, it appears that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted not on reasonable doubt, but on the
ground that he is not the author of the act complained of which is based on Sec 2(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure:
Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration
in a final judgment that the fact from w/c the civil might arise did not exist
- In spite of said ruling, Manliclic can still be held liable for the mishap. The extinction of civil liability in Sec 2(b)
refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the RPC. BUT the civil liability for the same act
considered as a quasi-delict only is not extinguished even by a declaration that the criminal act charged has not
happened
- as discussed in the previous cases, same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the
Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts under the Civil Code.
- As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict, same will not be extinguished by an acquittal. The responsibility arising
from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under
the Penal Code.

b) IS MANLICLIC LIABLE FOR HIS NEGLIGENCE? YES

- Although he was acquitted by the CA, both the Trial Court and the CA found Manliclic was negligent in driving the PRBLI
bus which was the cause of the collision (CA admitted that he wasnt the only one responsible though, that the driver of
Calaunans jeep suddenly moved left also)
-

This could be seen in the difference of the testimonies he gave before the Investigator of PRBLI and the testimony he
gave before the RTC of Malolos

c) IS PRBLI ALSO LIABLE? YES

- Under Article 2170 of the CC, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master/employer either in the selection/supervision of
employees. This liability is direct and immediate. It is therefore incumbent upon PRBLI to prove that they have
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee
- PRBLI was able to prove that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in choosing its employees as evidenced
by the screening processes Manliclic went through
- HOWEVER, as stated by the trial court, there is no evidence that it is as good in the supervision of its personnel.
There has been no evidence of rules promulgated by the bus company regarding the safe operation of its vehicle
and in the way its driver should manage and operate the vehicles assigned. There was no showing that somebody
in the bus company had been employed to oversee how its driver should behave while operating their vehicles
without courting accidents.
- The investigator was present only after the accident, when evidence must have been shown that there was regular
supervision of employees. Heck, there was only one manual containing the rules and regulations of PRBLI available
to all the drivers.
Petition for review denied