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the doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The
power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by the courts with caution; care must be
taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and reasonable doubt on the subject should
be resolved in the negative
Facts:
The state prosecutors who are members of the DOJ Panel of Prosecution filed a
complaint against respondent Judge Muro on the ground of ignorance of the law, grave
misconduct and violation of the provisions in the Code of Judicial Conduct. The case at
bar involves the prosecution of the 11 charges against Imelda Marcos in violation of the
Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restriction in the Central Bank Circular 960. The
respondent judge dismissed all 11 cases solely on the basis of the report published from
the 2 newspapers, which the judge believes to be reputable and of national circulation,
that the Pres. of the Philippines lifted all foreign exchange restrictions. The
respondents decision was founded on his belief that the reported announcement of the
Executive Department in the newspaper in effect repealed the CB 960 and thereby
divested the court of its jurisdiction to further hear the pending case thus motu propio
dismissed the case. He further contends that the announcement of the President as
published in the newspaper has made such fact a public knowledge that is sufficient for
the judge to take judicial notice which is discretionary on his part.
The complainants contend that the respondent judge erred in taking judicial notice on
matters he purported to be a public knowledge based merely on the account of the
newspaper publication that the Pres. has lifted the foreign exchange restriction. It was
also an act of inexcusable ignorant of the law not to accord due process to the
prosecutors who were already at the stage of presenting evidence thereby depriving the
government the right to be heard. The judge also exercised grave abuse of discretion by
taking judicial notice on the published statement of the Pres. In the newspaper which is
a matter that has not yet been officially in force and effect of the law.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in
taking judicial notice on the statement of the president lifting the foreign exchange
restriction published in the newspaper as basis for dismissing the case?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held the respondent judge guilty for gross ignorance of the law. It
cannot comprehend his assertion that there is no need to wait for the publication of the
circular no. 1353 which is the basis of the Presidents announcement in the newspaper,
believing that the public announcement is absolute and without qualification and is
immediately effective and such matter becomes a public knowledge which he can take a
judicial notice upon in his discretion. It is a mandatory requirement that a new law
should be published for 15 days in a newspaper of general circulation before its
effectivity. When the Presidents statement was published in the newspaper, the
respondent admitted of not having seen the official text of CB circular 1353 thus it was
premature for him to take judicial notice on this matter which is merely based on his
personal knowledge and is not based on the public knowledge that the law requires for
the court to take judicial notice of.
For the court to take judicial notice, three material requisites should be present:
(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;
(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.
The fact that should be assumed as judicially known must be on such notoriety( state of
being famous or well known for something bad or an evil deed) that such fact cannot be
disputed. Judicial notice is not judicial knowledge where the personal knowledge of the
judge does not amount to the judicial notice of the court. The common knowledge
contemplated by the law where the court can take judicial notice must come from the
knowledge of men generally in the course of ordinary experiences that are accepted as
true and one that involves unquestioned demonstration. The court ruled that the
information he obtained from the newspaper is one of hearsay evidence. The judge
erred in taking cognizant of a law that was not yet in force and ordered the dismissal of
the case without giving the prosecution the right to be heard and of due process. The
court ordered for the dismissal of the judge from service for gross ignorance of the law
and grave abuse of discretion for dismissing the case motu proprio and for erring in
exercising his discretion to take judicial notice on matters that are hearsay and
groundless with a reminder the power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by the
courts with caution at all times.
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REGALADO, J.:
In an information
That on or about the evening of July 23, 1985 at Riverside, Laya West,
Tabuk, Kalinga-Apayao and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one
another, with treachery and evident premeditation, with intent to gain and by
the use of force, violence and intimidation of persons, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take and carry away the amount of ONE
THOUSAND (P1,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, belonging to the victim
and his wife, to their damage and prejudice in said amount, and by reason
and on the occasion of said Robbery, the accused tied said JACINTO
SALAMANCA to a coconut tree and thereafter, willfully, and feloniously shot
Jacinto Salamanca on different parts of his body (and) said multiple gunshot
wounds caused his direct and immediate death.
The crime is aggravated by nocturnity, craft, dwelling, treachery and abuse of
superior strength.
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW.
Pursuant to the order of arrest issued on November 5, 1985, the accused
were arrested and committed to the custody of the Provincial Warden on
November 22, 1985.
On December 4, 1985, accused Prudencio Pugal, Antonio Soriano, Ricardo
Adduca and Artemio Panagan, assisted by their defense counsel, Attys.
Cesar Purugganan and William F. Claver, were arraigned and entered a plea
of not guilty to the offense charged.
Accused Ricardo Adduca posted his bail bond and was ordered released on
October 2, 1986. However, on the basis of a motion to withdraw by his
bondsman, Adduca was re-arrested and committed to the provincial jail.
While detained therein, Adduca escaped. On February 2, 1989, the trial court
issued an order for his arrest but until now he remains at large.
Accused Antonio Soriano was "receipted" for by a certain Roberto Baggay,
the Acting Mayor of Pudtol, Kalinga-Apayao, inexplicably without the approval
of or an order from the trial court authorizing him to do so. Subsequently, said
accused also remained at large.
The trial court dismissed the case as against accused Artemio Panagan upon
motion of the prosecution on the basis of an affidavit of desistance of Erlinda
Salamanca, wife of the victim, wherein she stated that the former was not one
of those who killed her husband. Trial, however, proceeded against the herein
three accused since they had all been arraigned and the absence of accused
Soriano and Adduca was unjustified.
The record show that on January 11, 1989, accused Prudencio Pugal had
been ordered released from jail after filing his bail bond. However, after the
promulgation of the judgment of the trial court hereunder indicated, said court
issued an order on July 17, 1989 cancelling his bail bond and committing him
to the provincial jail where he was accordingly detained. 2
Parenthetically, aside from the above-named accused charged in the
information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Kalinga-Apayao, Pat. Raymund
Caseas of Pinukpuk, Kalinga-Apayao was also charged in connection with
the said killing of Jacinto Salamanca but the case against him was forwarded
to the military tribunal pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1850, as amended, 3 and the same is not involved in the present proceeding.
On July 17, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused
PRUDENCIO PUGAL, RICARDO ADDUCA and ANTONIO SORIANO guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of ROBBERY WITH
HOMICIDE WITH THE USE OF UNLICENSED FIREARM, defined and
penalized under Article 294, in relation with P.D. 1866, sentencing each of the
accused to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, to indemnify jointly and
severally the heirs of the deceased Jacinto Salamanca the amount of Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) plus Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00)
moral and exemplary damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency pursuant to Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code and to pay the
costs.
SO ORDERED. 4
Appellant Prudencio Pugal, the lone accused who appealed to us from said
decision, assigns the following errors allegedly committed by the court a quo:
1. The trial court grievously erred in holding that the killing of the victim was
positively witnessed by prosecution witnesses Hizon and Erlinda Salamanca;
2. The lower court grievously erred in giving full evidentiary weight and
credence to the testimonies of Hizon and Erlinda Salamanca who are biased
and whose testimonies are pregnant with serious and material
inconsistencies, improbabilities and shaky;
3. The lower court erred in finding that appellant Prudencio Pugal was the
one who pulled the deceased from inside the house, brought him outside and
tied him to a coconut tree;
4. The lower court erred in disregarding the plea of alibi by appellant
Prudencio Pugal;
5. The lower court committed grave error in not acquitting Prudencio Pugal on
ground of reasonable doubt. 5
The prosecution presented as witnesses Hizon Salamanca, son of the
deceased Jacinto Salamanca; Erlinda Salamanca, wife of said victim; Dr.
Jaime Almora; and Atty. Wayne Odiem, whose collective testimonies establish
the facts of this case as hereunder summarized.
On July 23, 1985, at around 9:00 P.M., Erlinda Salamanca, together with her
son Hizon and daughter-in-law Lolita, was resting inside their house at Laya
West, Tabuk, Kalinga-Apayao. Her husband, Jacinto Salamanca, had just
started to eat supper when the dogs started barking and they heard and
recognized the voice of Prudencio Pugal call "Apo" three times. 6 Jacinto, who
was followed by Erlinda, went to the sala and asked, "Who are you?" Somebody
answered, "Dakami," meaning "We are the ones." When Jacinto again called out,
"Who are you," the person outside replied, "We are the ones, we came from
Dagupan." Jacinto and Erlinda peeped through the jalousie window and they saw
Prudencio Pugal and Ricardo Adduca standing near the door. The place was then
lighted by a 20-watt flourescent lamp. 7
Erlinda told Jacinto to open the door. Once it was opened, however, Pugal
pulled Jacinto out of the house, and then three masked men rushed inside
the house. One of the men who had a long armalite rifle stood guard at the
door, while the other two, one of whom had a short firearm, entered the
house. 8 Adduca, one of the two men who came inside, demanded money and an armalite rifle from the
Erlinda
was thus compelled to give her earnings for the day amounting to P1,000.00 and, in
addition, she gave the ring of her daughter-in-law. They were then ordered and
forced to lie on the floor face down. Subsequently, Erlinda and Hizon heard the
clapping of hands from outside the house. 10 Sensing that nobody was guarding
them anymore, Erlinda and Hizon crawled towards the window. From there, they
saw the men drag Jacinto and tie him to a coconut tree with a rope. Erlinda also
saw Pugal slap and kick Jacinto. Then, the man with an armalite rifle pointed his
gun upwards and fired it several times. Afterwards, he moved backward, pointed
the gun at Jacinto, and shot the latter several times. 11
occupants of the house, and when the latter failed to produce any, Adduca ransacked the house.
The malefactors thereafter fled towards the north and when they reached the
"canto" leading to Cabaruan, another gunshot was heard. Upon seeing that
the culprits were already far away, Erlinda and Hizon rushed to where Jacinto
was, only to find his already lifeless body. Erlinda then sent Hizon to call for
assistance and, in no time, the barangay people and the police arrived at the
scene of the crime. When Jacinto's body was brought to their house, Hizon
noticed that his father's false teeth were missing. Efforts to look for the same
at and near the place where Jacinto was killed proved futile. 12
Two days after Jacinto died, Pugal went to the house of the Salamancas and
handed over to Hizon the missing artificial dentures of Jacinto which he
allegedly found near the place where the victim was killed. Puga stayed in the
house of the Salamancas for the entire duration of the wake until the ninth
day of prayer. 13
On July 24, 1985, Dr. Jaime Almora, a resident physician at the KalingaApayao Provincial Hospital, conducted an autopsy on Jacinto Salamanca and
submitted the following
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
External Examination = Cadaver fully clothed, flaccid, with no sign of rigor
mortis or lividity or decomposition.
Head = Left side of skull sagging and with multiple fracture due to multiple
gunshot wounds with loss of some brain tissue and left eye.
Chest = Gunshot wound with point of entry measuring 5mm to 7mm at the
54th ics mid clavicular line directed posteriorly, medially & horizontally exiting
at the (L) mid clavicular line level of the 8th lcs.
Extremities = R Thigh = grazing wound directed downward at the anterior
upper third of R thigh.
L Thigh = entry wound at the middle third, medial aspect of left thigh directed
laterally, posteriorly downward.
Left leg = Entry wound at the antero-medial aspect of left leg middle third with
no point of exit. Copper Jacket of Bullet recovered.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Multiple gunshot wound(s), head, chest, thigh, and leg. 14
It appears that Erlinda and Hizon Salamanca gave their sworn statements on
August 16 15 and September 8, 1985, 16 respectively, both to Police Sgt. Artemio
Catabay in the investigation room of the Tabuk Police Station at Tabuk, KalingaApayao.
The records further reveal that on September 24, 1985, accused Antonio
Soriano, accompanied by Sgts. Taguiam and Aquino, went to the office of
prosecution witness Atty. Wayne Odiem, District Citizen Attorney of the
Citizens Legal Assistance Office, to seek the latter's help in the taking of
I. Appellant Pugal asserts that the trial court erred in relying on the
testimonies of Erlinda and Hizon Salamanca which are allegedly replete with
inconsistencies and contradictions.
First, he contends that Hizon testified that the two men who entered the
house wore masks, whereas Erlinda testified that their faces were not
covered. This inconsistency, he claims, cannot be considered trivial.
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, appellant was obviously
confused. Hizon's testimony was in answer to the question when the robbers
were already inside the house, while Erlinda's was with respect to the first
time she saw appellant and his co-accused who were then calling from
outside the house. 20 Thus, Hizon Salamanca stated:
Q Now, Mr. Witness, you said that particular night and time of July 23, 1985,
two (2) men entered your house, were they using mask?
A Yes, sir. 21
and the testimony of Erlinda Salamanca was as follows:
Q Now, you said you saw Prudencio Pugal and Ricardo Adduca when you
peeped with your husband through the jalous(ie). How were you able to
identify them?
A Because during that night time we used 20 watts flourescent lamp and so I
saw them there, sir.
Q How far were they this Adduca and Pugal when you saw them?
A Pugal is near the window and Ricardo Adduca is behind Prudencio Pugal,
sir.
Q Were they in mask?
A No, they were not in mask because we opened it, if they were using a mask
we did (sic, would) not open the door, sir. 22
Furthermore, there could be no inconsistency to speak of precisely because
Erlinda likewise testified that the accused were already wearing masks when
they entered the house, in effect corroborating the testimony of Hizon on this
point. Hence, in her direct examination, Erlinda declared
Q Can you identify any of the two (2) persons who actually entered your
house?
A I can not identify the other one because he has a very tight mask but I can
identify the other one because he has a loose mask which when talking he
bite (sic) his bonnet with his mouth, sir. 23
which she further clarified in her cross-examination:
Q Let us go back to the crime when the two persons stood guard to the door
of the house, one allegedly Ricardo Adduca rushed in to search to (sic) your
belonging(s), these three (3) persons were all masked, is it not Mrs.
Salamanca?
A Yes, sir. It was only Pugal who was not masked, sir. 24
The fact that it was only appellant who was not masked was corroborated by
Hizon with the same declaration in court:
Q You said that the incident happened at around 9:00 o'clock in the night of
July 23, 1985, my question is: How could you have recognized Prudencio
Pugal as the one who pulled your father?
A It is because we have twenty (20) watts fluorescent lamp which energized
(sic) by a battery 12 volts battery.
Q Was Prudencio Pugal masked at that time, Mr. Witness?
A No, sir. 25
Second, appellant theorizes that it is hard to believe that a person who will kill
someone who is well known in the community will not hide his face, this being
contrary to human nature and common experience. Appellant premises this
postulation on his presence at the house of the victim during the wake until
the ninth day of prayer, which fact supposedly negated any and all indicia of
guilt on his part.
This, at best, is a mere conjectural pose which cannot stand against the
positive identification of the accused. Appellant's pretended innocence is
clearly non sequitur to his decision not to flee. Apart from the fact that there is
no case law holding that non-flight is a conclusive proof of innocence, the
argument does not hold weight in the light of the positive identification of the
appellant. The material factor here is that there is positive identification of the
accused as the author or, more accurately, co-author of the crime. 26
Generally, the decision of an accused not to flee despite an opportunity to do
so is hardly characteristic of a guilty person seeking to escape retribution for
his crime. 27 But this is not without exceptions. In a number of cases, we have had
the occasion to rule that the fact that accused did not flee from the scene of the
crime is not a sufficient ground to exculpate them from the proven criminal liability.
The fact that the appellant joined the search for the victim and that he and a
certain Gabriel Madlangbayan went to Noveleta, Cavite to buy a coffin for the
victim does not disprove his culpability of the offense charged nor strengthen
his claim of innocence. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The solicitous attitude of appellant was part of his craft to divert attention
from him and appear blameless. Appellant assumed this posture of innocence
despite his awareness that his charged because he was doubly certain that
Francisca, who feared for her life as well as the lives of her relatives, would
not expose him.
Still, in another case, this Court held that:
In some cases of murder, robbery, or even rape where a person is a prime
suspect, his not fleeing may be a badge of innocence. In the present case,
however, the crime was committed with impunity on three occasions by one
who thought the victim would not complain. Under the circumstances of this
case, the appellant would most likely not have been discovered if Josephine
did not become pregnant. The appellant did not have to flee. 30
The defense laid stress on the fact that appellants could have escaped, but
did not. On the contrary, both Bedico and Capio attended the vigil and funeral
of the deceased and even helped carry the bier of the latter. . . .
Verily, there is no argument on the fact that flight is indicative of guilty so that
it may be considered in favor of the accused in the case at bar that they did
no escape. Nonetheless, it has also been held by this Court that the fact that
the accused did not take flight but even helped the police to locate the
supposed culprits, is not a sufficient ground to exculpate them from the
proved criminal liability.
Third, appellant asseverates that the failure of Hizon and Erlinda Salamanca
to immediately give their statements to the police (which they gave only after
the lapse of 67 days after the incident took place) affects their credibility.
As a general rule, the failure of a witness to report at once to the police
authorities the crime he had witnessed cannot be taken against him for it is
not uncommon for a witness to a crime to show some reluctance about
getting involved in a criminal case. The natural reticence of most people to
get involved in a criminal case is of judicial notice, and the fear of
eyewitnesses when townmates are involved in the commission of the crime is
understandable for they may provoke retaliation from the accused. The delay,
when adequately explained, does not impair the credibility of the witness;
neither will it render his testimony biased nor destroy its probative value. 32
In the case at bar, the two principal witnesses for the prosecution gave more
than adequate reason for their initial reluctance in giving their sworn
statements to the police, that is, fear for their safety and their lives. As a
matter of fact, after the ninth day of prayer for the deceased, the Salamancas
had to leave their house and transfer to another place in apprehension of
possible reprisals from the culprits.
When asked why he failed to immediately report and disclose the identity of
the suspects, Hizon Salamanca testified:
Q Now, Mr. Hizon Salamanca, in spite (of) the death of your father, in spite of
the threats of Pugal, and in spite of the fact that you mauled him before and
you know that he is smaller than you are, you did not report his name to the
police that he was the one who entered your house and killed your father?
A Yes, sir, because we were afraid, for fear that they might come back for us.
Q You did not even tell that to anyone else You told it only to your mother,
is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q You did not even tell that to your wife?
A I told this to my wife and to my brothers.
Q Who were your brothers?
A Raymundo and all my brothers, sir.
Q You gave this information to them that Pugal was one of the murderers
immediately after the incident, is that correct?
A No, I did not say it immediately to my brothers because they were studying
in Tuguegarao.
Q But immediately after the killing the policemen of Tabuk came to Laya
West, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q They made an investigation of the crime?
A Yes, sir.
Q And they asked you know (sic) the killers, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you told them you do not know because you were afraid?
A Yes, sir.
Q According to you you stayed in Tabuk for the whole seven days that your
father was in his wake, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And there were many visitors who came even the Mayor of Tabuk came to
your house, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And they asked you if you know who the killers were?
A Yes, sir.
Q But just the same you stick (sic) your belief that you should not tell them
the truth?
A Yes, sir.
COURT:
Did you not know that if only you told them the identity of the killers of your
father, the police could have arrested them and put them to jail and for this
reason there would be no more danger in your life?
WITNESS:
Yes, but I am afraid, for fear that they might have still other companions.
COURT:
Proceed.
Q But when you gave your statements two months and seven days after the
incident, you were no longer afraid?
A No more, sir, because they were already apprehended.
Q It did not occur to you that there are still others at the time and they could
go out after you?
A No more, sir, because they (sic) already there in the jail,
depressed. 33
Fourth, appellant claims that Hizon and Erlinda are biased as witnesses
considering that they are related and very close to the deceased, hence they
have the tendency to exaggerate or give false color to their testimonies.
This Court has repeatedly held that mere relationship of the witnesses to the
victim does not render their clear and positive testimony less worthy of full
faith and credit. On the contrary, their natural interest in securing the
conviction of the guilty would deter them from implicating persons other than
the culprits, for otherwise, the latter would thereby gain immunity. 34 Hence, the
closeness of their relationship to the deceased should not, contrary to appellant's
view, be deemed erosive of their credibility as witnesses. That they are the wife and
son of the victim does not make them incompetent as witnesses, nor should it serve
to detract from the credit otherwise due them. 35
Besides, there is no iota of evidence to show that the family of the victim was
actuated by improper motives to testify falsely against the accused. It is a
jurisprudentially embedded and conceded rule that the mere fact that the
witness is a relative is not a valid or sufficient ground to disregard the former's
testimony nor does it render the same less worthy of credit, in the absence of
any ill motive. 36 Furthermore, the prosecution witnesses are not merely relatives
of the deceased; they are likewise victims of the robbery committed by the accused.
II. Appellant's defense hinges primarily on alibi. He claims though that while
alibi is the weakest of all defenses, nevertheless, where the evidence for the
prosecution is weak and betrays lack of concreteness on the question of
whether or not the accused committed the crime charged, the defense of alibi
assumes importance.
Time and again we have stressed, virtually to the point of repletion were it not
for its pertinency, that alibi is one of the weakest defenses an accused can
invoke 37 because it is easy of fabrication. 38 It cannot prevail over the positive
identification of prosecution witnesses. 39 To be given credence, it must not only
appear that the accused interposing the same was at some other place but also
that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time
of its commission. 40
In the case at bar, appellant was positively identified by Hizon and Erlinda.
The following observations thereon in appellee's brief accordingly merit our
approval:
. . . Appellant was not only seen and recognized through his face, he was
identified also through his voice.
As testified to by both prosecution witnesses, Erlinda and Hizon, appellant
was the one who called "Apo" for three times and also the one who replied
"Dakami" and "Naggapu kami Idiay Dagupan", when asked. (TSN, p. 7
Erlinda S.; TSN, p. 9, testimony of Salamanca). The voice of appellant is
familiar to both Erlinda and Hizon because they have had occasions in the
past to talk to him oftenly considering that appellant is their neighbor and
barriomate for more than 20 years. (TSN, p. 7, Erlinda S.; TSN, p. 8, Hizon
S.).
Appellant was also seen and identified by prosecution witnesses as he was
not wearing any mask and neither was his face covered during the time he
was calling from outside the house. (TSN, p. 8, Erlinda S.; TSN, p. 13-16,
Hizon S.).
Appellant was recognized by the prosecution witnesses because of the
fluorescent lamp in front of the house energized by a 12-volt battery then
illuminating their house. Besides, the night then was a moonlit night. (TSN, p.
8, Erlinda S.; TSN, p. 13, Hizon S.).
xxx xxx xxx
Worthy to note is the testimony of Erlinda that when she recognized the
identity of the persons calling from the outside, she even told her husband to
open the door. This is but natural and in accord with common observation and
human experience.
Otherwise, if the persons calling were masked as claimed by the defense, the
natural and logical reaction would be to suspect that they were bad elements
and there would be reason not to open the door. . . . 41
The pretension that appellant was allegedly at his house at the time of the
incident cannot stand against the clear and positive identification by the
prosecution witnesses. Also, the Solicitor General correctly concluded that
considering the proximity in the distance between the two houses, it was not
physically impossible for appellant to be at the locus criminis and then return
to his house shortly afterwards.
Finally, conspiracy has been sufficiently established in this case. The
concerted acts of the accused began with the deceased Juanito being called
by Pugal and Adduca who purposely made themselves identifiable to facilitate
their entry into the house. Once the door was opened, three of the accused
who were already wearing masks entered the house while Pugal pulled
Jacinto outside. Then one of the three who entered the house stood guard at
the door while the two others ransacked the place. Thereafter, upon hearing
the clapping of hands from the outside, the three malefactors immediately left.
The deceased was tied to the coconut tree and then shot to death. By these
concerted actions, it is beyond cavil that the accused acted in unison and
cooperated with each other towards the accomplishment of a common
criminal design, which was to rob the Salamancas and thereafter kill Jacinto.
The trial court definitely did not err in finding the existence of a conspiracy.
Where conspiracy is shown to exist, the act of one is the act of all.
While it
has not been established that it was appellant who actually shot the victim,
conspiracy having been found to exist, he is equally guilty of the crime of robbery
with homicide. The rule is whenever homicide has been committed as a
consequence or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part as
principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals in the robbery will also
be held guilty as principals of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide
although they did not actually take part in the homicide, unless it clearly appears
that they endeavored to prevent the homicide. 43 There is nothing in the records to
show that the exception applied in this case.
42
We, however, reject that portion of the decision of the trial court finding that
the liability of the accused for the crime of robbery with homicide was
attended by, and ostensibly should be modified by the circumstances of, their
use of unlicensed firearms. No evidence was presented to show, and even
the trial court made no finding, that the firearms used by herein accused were
unlicensed. In addition, the indemnity for which the accused is liable for the
death of Jacinto Salamanca should be increased to P50,000.00 in
accordance with the policy adopted by the Court en banc on August 30, 1990.
44
Footnotes
1 Original Record, 1.
2 Ibid., 390, 402.
3 Ibid., 378.
4 Ibid., 375; per Judge Simplicio C. Cabantac.
5 Brief for Accused-Appellant, 4; Rollo, 101.
6 TSN, July 25, 1988, Erlinda Salamanca, 7-8; Ibid., Id., Hizon Salamanca, 9.
7 Ibid., Id., Erlinda S., 5-8.
8 Ibid., Id., Hizon S., 6-7.
9 Ibid., Id., Id., 11-12; Ibid., Id., Erlinda S., 9, 11.
10 Ibid., Id., Id., 15, Ibid., Id., Id., 14.
11 Ibid., Id., Erlinda S., 15-17.
12 Ibid., Id., Id., 17-20.
13 Ibid., Id., Id., 21.
EN BANC
G . R . N o . 1 7 8 1 5 8 - S T R AT E G I C A L L I A N C E
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, v.
RADSTOCK SECURITIES LIMITED and
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION, Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 180428 - LUIS SISON, Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, and
RADSTOCK
SECURITIES
LIMITED,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DISSENT
BERSAMIN, J.:
I hereby register my dissent to the majority opinion of
Justice Carpio that grants the petition in G.R. No. 180428, and
declares (1) PNCC Board Resolution Nos. BD-092-2000 and
BD-099-2000 (recognizing liability for the Marubeni
Corporation (Marubeni) loans) void ab initio for causing
undue injury to the Government and giving unwarranted
benefits to a private party; and (2) the compromise agreement
between the Philippine National Construction Corporation
(PNCC) and Radstock Securities Limited (Radstock) inexistent
and void ab initio for being contrary to Section 29(1), Article
VI and Sections 3 and 7, Article XII of the Constitution;
Section 20(1), Chapter IV, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987; Sections 4(2), 79, 84 and 85 of
the Government Auditing Code; Section 3(g) of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act; Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code; and Articles 2241, 2242, 2243 and 2244 of the Civil
Code; and that grants the intervention of Asiavest Merchant
Bankers Berhad in G.R. No. 178158.
The majority opinion declares that Strategic Alliance
Development Corporation has no legal standing to sue.
II.
III.
II.
III.
2.
3.
3.
A
CAs Denial of Sisons Petition for Annulment of Judgment
Approving the Compromise Agreement Was Correct
Sison assails the resolution dated November 5, 2007 in
C.A.-G.R. SP No. 97982, whereby the CA, Ninth Division,
denied his motion for reconsideration of the decision
promulgated on June 12, 2007 dismissing his petition for
annulment of judgment approving the compromise agreement,
and also denied Asiavests urgent motion for leave to intervene
and to file the attached opposition and motion-in-intervention.
[43]
3.
xxx
xxx
does not diminish the fact that the latter owes its
existence to the Corporation Code. More pointedly,
Section 143 of the Corporation Code gives SEC the
authority and power to implement its provisions,
specifically for the purpose of regulating the entities
created pursuant to such provisions. These entities
include corporations in which the controlling shares
are owned by the government or its agencies.
Glaringly erroneous, therefore, is petitioner's
reliance on Quimpo v. Tanodbayan and its theory that
it is immaterial "whether a corporation is acquired by
purchase or through the conversion of the loans of the
GFIs into equity in a corporation [because] such
corporation loses its status as a private corporation
and attains a new status as a GOCC." First, based on
the discussion above, PNCC does not "lose" its
status as a private corporation, even if we were to
assume that it is a GOCC. Second, neither would
such loss of status prevent it from being further
classified into an acquired asset corporation, as
will be discussed below.
xxx
xxx
xxx
B
Public Bidding Was not Required
Sison opposes the disposition of PNCCs assets through
the compromise agreement as against public policy for lack of
a public bidding.
I cannot agree with Sison.
The rationale for requiring a public bidding is the need
to prevent the Government from being shortchanged by
minimizing the occasions for corruption and the temptations to
commit abuse of discretion on the part of government
authorities.[64]
As a rule, divestment or
property should be undertaken
bidding. The mode of disposition
and assets is not limited to public
disposal of government
primarily through public
of Government properties
bidding, however, because
3.
4.
8.
9.
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
It serves well to note, too, that the TOC was not for the
same project covered by PNCCs legislative franchise under
P.D. No. 1894, but for a new project, the rehabilitation of the
NLEX, which was completed in 2005. In the effort to
rehabilitate the NLEX, the MNTC incurred substantial costs.
The authority to collect reasonable toll fees from users of that
expressway was the consideration given to the MNTC as the
tollway operator to enable it to recoup the investment.
In this connection, the claim of the majority that
Radstocks counsel admitted during the oral arguments that an
appropriation law was needed to authorize the payment by
PNCC out of the toll fees is unwarranted. The supposed
admission was apparently counsels response to the query of
whether the collection of toll fees went to the general fund of
the National Government. As such, the response was an
expression of counsels interpretation of the law, which, albeit
sounding like an admission, has no legal significance for
purposes of this resolution. It hardly requires clarification that
an opinion on a matter of law given in the course of the
proceedings is not binding on the party on whose behalf it is
that is not a proper issue for the Court to consider and decide
herein. We should not forget that the issue was not presented to
the CA at the time it considered and approved the compromise
agreement. Besides, PNCC continued to have the right to the
revenues from the toll operation by authority of the TOC.
E
Compromise Agreement Is Not In Fraud
of the National Government
Another submission of Sison is that the disposition of
PNCCs assets through the compromise agreement would be in
fraud of the National Government, because Radstock would be
thereby preferred to the National Government in relation to the
assets of PNCC, in violation of the credit preference provided
in the Civil Code. He avers that the satisfaction of the PNCC
obligation to the State or the National Government clearly
takes preference and has priority over the satisfaction of the
obligation to RADSTOCK; and that the terms of the
compromise agreement which call for the transfer of PNCC
assets xxx to Radstock is in contravention of the order and
preference of credits under the New Civil Code, hence
void.[85]
However, Sisons submission does not really show how
the compromise agreement would contravene the credit
preference in favor of the National Government.
To begin with, the credit preference set by the Civil
Code may not be invoked herein to assail the compromise
agreement, considering that these cases were neither
proceedings for bankruptcy or insolvency, nor general judicial
Sec. 40. Sale or other disposition of assets. Subject to the provisions of existing laws on illegal
combinations and monopolies, a corporation may, by
a majority vote of its board of directors or trustees,
sell, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge or otherwise
dispose of all or substantially all of its property and
assets, including its goodwill, upon such terms and
conditions and for such consideration, which may be
money, stocks, bonds or other instruments for the
payment of money or other property or consideration,
as its board of directors or trustees may deem
expedient, when authorized by the vote of the
stockholders representing at least two-thirds (2/3) of
the outstanding capital stock, or in case of non-stock
corporation, by the vote of at least to two-thirds (2/3)
of the members, in a stockholder's or member's
meeting duly called for the purpose. Written notice of
the proposed action and of the time and place of the
meeting shall be addressed to each stockholder or
member at his place of residence as shown on the
books of the corporation and deposited to the
addressee in the post office with postage prepaid, or
served personally: Provided, That any dissenting
stockholder may exercise his appraisal right under the
conditions provided in this Code.
A sale or other disposition shall be deemed to
cover substantially all the corporate property and
assets if thereby the corporation would be rendered
incapable of continuing the business or accomplishing
the purpose for which it was incorporated.
After such authorization or approval by the
stockholders or members, the board of directors or
trustees may, nevertheless, in its discretion, abandon
such sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge or other
disposition of property and assets, subject to the rights
of third parties under any contract relating thereto,
without further action or approval by the stockholders
or members.
xxx
xxx
Yet, the majority would have the Court strike down the
resolution, and not give it effect, because it was null and void.
V
Asiavests Intervention
Had No Leg to Stand On
Asiavest was a judgment creditor of PNCC by virtue of
the Courts judgment in G.R. No. 110263. After 5 years from
the issuance of a writ of execution in its favor, Asiavests
judgment award is yet to be satisfied.[124]
In G.R. No. 178158, Asiavest filed its urgent motion for
leave to intervene and to file the attached opposition and
motion-in-intervention, claiming that it had a legal interest as
an unpaid judgment creditor of PNCC, nay a superior right,
over the properties subject of the compromise agreement.[125]
It prayed, if allowed to intervene, that the compromise
agreement be nullified because, otherwise, PNCC might no
LUCAS P.
BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
!
!
[1]
Philippine National Construction Corporation v. Hon. Amalia F. Dy, et al., G.R. No.
156887, October 3, 2005, 472 SCRA 1, 5. Penned by Associate Justice Azcuna and
concurred in by Chief Justice Davide, Jr., Associate Justice Quisimbing, Associate
Justice Ynares-Santiago, and Associate Justice Carpio.
[2]
Rollo, G.R. No. 178158, pp. 31- 43 (CA decision dated January 25, 2007; penned by
Associate Justice Del Castillo (now a Member of the Court) and concurred in by
Presiding Justice Reyes (now retired Member of the Court) and Associate Justice
Romilla-Lontok.
[3]
Rollo, G.R. No. 178158, pp. 259-271 (the resolution in G.R. No. 156887 dated
November 22, 2006).
[4]
[5]
[6]
Id.
[7]
[8]
[9]
Id., pp. 45-46 (CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 97982, penned by Justice Pizarro, and
concurred in by Justice Cruz and Justice Lampas-Peralta).
[10]
The narrative contained in the section Common Antecedents is partly derived from
the background facts rendered in Philippine National Construction Corporation v. Hon.
Amalia F. Dy, et al., G.R. No. 156887, October 3, 2005, 472 SCRA 1.
[11]
[12]
[13]
Id., p. 270.
[14]
[15]
[16]
Id., p. 48.
[17]
[18]
[19]
Rollo, G.R. No. 180428, at pp. 45-46 (penned by Justice Pizarro, and concurred in by
Justice Cruz and Justice Lampas-Peralta).
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
Id., p. 8.
[27]
Id., p. 11.
[28]
[29]
Id., p. 11.
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36]
Rollo, G.R. No. 178158, pp. 265-269 (CA decision dated January 25, 2007).
[37]
[38]
Nieto, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 166984, August 7, 2007, 529 SCRA 285;
citing Garcia v. David, 67 Phil. 279, 282-283.
[39]
Big Country Ranch Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102927, October 12,
1993, 227 SCRA 161, 165.
[40]
[41]
[42]
[43]
Rollo, G.R. No. 180428, pp. 45-46 (CA Resolution in CA-GR SP No. 97982).
[44]
[45]
Id., p 46.
[46]
G.R. No. 148456, September 15, 2006, 502 SCRA 67, 70.
[47]
[48]
Id., pp 148-151.
[49]
Id., p. 149.
[50]
[51]
[52]
laws, laws or rules governing the corporation or partnership to obtain the relief he
desires;
(3) No appraisal rights are available for the act or acts complained of; and
(4) The suit is not a nuisance or harassment suit.
In case of nuisance or harassment suit, the court shall forthwith dismiss the case.
[53] Yu v. Yukayguan, G.R. No. 177549, June 18, 2009.
[54]
PNCC v. Dy, G.R. No. 156887, October 3, 2005, 472 SCRA 1, 8-9.
[55]
[56]
[57]
G.R. No. 87710 & G.R. No. 96087, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 659, 667-668.
[58]
[59]
[60]
domestic or foreign, shall give donations in aid of any political party or candidate or for
purposes of partisan political activity;
10. To establish pension, retirement, and other plans for the benefit of its directors,
trustees, officers and employees; and
11. To exercise such other powers as may be essential or necessary to carry out its
purpose or purposes as stated in the articles of incorporation.
[63] Section 2, Corporation Code, provides:
Sec. 2. Corporation defined. - A corporation is an artificial being created by operation
of law, having the right of succession and the powers, attributes and properties
expressly authorized by law or incident to its existence.
[64]
[65]
[66]
[67]
[68]
[69]
[70]
[71]
[72]
Section 4, Rule 129, Rules of Court; 5 Herrera, Remedial Law, Rex Book Store, p.
107 (1999).
[73]
PNCC v. Pabion, supra, at footnote 61; also National Shipyard & Steel v. Court of
Industrial Relations, 118 Phil. 782, 789.
[74]
[75]
[76]
[77]
[78]
[79]
G.R. No. 119528, March 26, 1997, 270 SCRA 538, 550-551.
[80]
[81]
[82]
[83]
[84]
[85]
[86]
G.R. No. 79351, November 28, 1989, 179 SCRA 630, 634-635.
[87]
[88]
G.R. No. 158261, December 18, 2006, 511 SCRA 123, 147.
[89]
[90]
[91]
21A Words and Phrases, p. 397; citing Howell v. Knox, Tex.Civ.App., 211 S.W.2d
324, 328.
[92]
Id., p. 396; citing Sturgill v. Lovell Lumber Co., 67 S.E. 2d 321, 323, 13 W. Va. 259.
[93]
[94]
[95]
[96]
[97]
[98]
[99]
The company has entered into Joint Venture Partnerships with internationally notable
engineering companies and other reputable local corporations, under the Build-OperateTransfer scheme, for the construction, rehabilitation, refurbishment, modernization, and
expansion of the existing Expressways.
A product of this partnership is the Metro Manila Skyway Project, the first elevated
tollway in the country built in joint partnership with the Indonesian firm P.T. Citra
Gung Persada (CITRA). Another project of the joint undertaking efforts is the Manila
North Tollway Project with First Philippine Infrastructure Development Corporation
(FPIDC), which involves the rehabilitation of the North Luzon Tollway and its
expansion to the special economic zones in Zambales, Clark Pampanga, Bataan, and
Subic, Olongapo City. The rehabilitation and extension of the South Luzon Tollway
has been entered into by the Company through a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) and
subsequently an amended JVA with Hopewell Crown Infrastructure, Inc. (HCII). The
objective of which is to refurbish the Alabang to Calamba, Laguna segment of the
South Luzon Expressway and extend the same to Lucena City in Quezon Province.
An Alternative to the JVA with HCII, if the same does not materialize, is an on-going
negotiation with the NDC to develop design, construct, finance, operate, and maintain
the SLEX Project. The proposed Project involves the rehabilitation of the Alabang
Viaduct and the extension of the SLEX from Calamba, Laguna to Sto. Tomas,
Batangas. This will be documented likewise by a JVA.
[105]
21 C.J.S. 330.
[116] Zarate v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 747.
G.R. No. 89914, November 20, 1991, 203 SCRA 767, 784.
[121]
[122]
Id.
[123]
G.R. No. 155001, January 21, 2004, 420 SCRA 575, 606.
[124]
[125]
[126]
[127]
[128] Batama Farmers Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. v. Hon. Rosal, 149 Phil.
514, 524.
[129]
[130]
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
penalty of death. He was also ordered to pay the heirs of his victim Lilia
Tactacan P172,000.00 for funeral, burial and related expenses, P50,000.00
as indemnity for death, P1,000.00 for the cash taken from her bag, and to
reimburse Gregorio Tactacan P2,500.00 for the Seiko wristwatch taken from
him.
1wphi1.nt
When Gregorio returned to the crime scene, the jeepney was still there. He
went to the driver's seat. There he saw his wife lying on the floor of the
jeepney with blood splattered all over her body. Her bag containing P1,200.00
was missing. He brought her immediately to the C.P. Reyes Hospital where
she was pronounced dead on arrival.5
At the time of her death Lilia Tactacan was forty-eight (48) years old.
According to Gregorio, he was deeply depressed by her death; that he
incurred funeral, burial and other related expenses, and that his wife was
earning P3,430.00 a month as a teacher.6
Dr. Lily D. Nunes, Medical Health Officer of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, conducted
a post-mortem examination on the body of the victim. Her medical report
disclosed that the victim sustained eight (8) stab wounds on the chest and
abdominal region of the body. She testified that a sharp pointed object like a
long knife could have caused those wounds which must have been inflicted
by more than one (1) person, and that all those wounds except the nonpenetrating one caused the immediate death of the victim.7
Subsequently, two (2) informations were filed against accused Armando
Reanzares and three (3) John Does in relation to the incident. The first was
for violation of PD 532 otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway
Robbery Law of 1974 for allegedly conspiring, with intent to gain and armed
with bladed weapons and a .38 caliber revolver, to rob and carry away one (1)
Seiko wristwatch owned by Gregorio Tactacan and P1,000.00 cash of Lilia
Tactacan, and on the occasion thereof, killed her. The second was for
violation of RA 6538, An Act Preventing and Penalizing Carnapping, for taking
away by means of violence and intimidation of persons one (1) passengertype jeepney with Plate No. DBP 235 owned and driven by Gregorio Tactacan
and valued at P110,000.00. Only the accused Armando Reanzares was
arrested. The other three (3) have remained unidentified and at large.
The accused testified in his defense and claimed that he could not have
perpetrated the crimes imputed to him with three (3) others as he was in
Barangay Tagnipa, Garchitorena, Camarines Sur, for the baptism of his
daughter Jessica when the incident happened.8 His father, Jose Reanzares,
corroborated his story. Jose claimed that the accused borrowed P500.00 from
him for the latter's trip to Bicol although he could not say that he actually saw
the accused leave for his intended destination.9 To bolster the alibi of the
accused, his brother Romeo Reanzares also took the witness stand and
alleged that he saw the accused off on 9 May 1994, the day before the
incident. Romeo maintained that he accompanied the accused to the bus
stop that day and even helped the latter carry his things to the bus. He
however could not categorically state where and when the accused alighted
or that he in fact reached Bicol. 10
On 26 May 1997 the trial court found the prosecution's evidence credible and
ruled that the alibi of the accused could not prevail over his positive
identification by complaining witness Gregorio Tactacan. The court a quo
declared him guilty of Highway Robbery with Homicide under PD 532 and
sentenced him to death. It further ordered him to pay the heirs of Lilia
Tactacan P50,000.00 as indemnity for death, P172,000.00 for funeral, burial
and related expenses, and P1,000.00 for the cash taken from her bag. The
accused was also ordered to reimburse Gregorio Tactacan P2,500.00 for the
Seiko wristwatch taken from him. 11 But the trial court exonerated the accused
from the charge of carnapping under RA 6539 for insufficiency of evidence.
The accused insists before us that his conviction for Highway Robbery with
Homicide under PD 532 is erroneous as his guilt was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt. He claims that the testimony of private complainant
Gregorio Tactacan, who implicated him as one of the perpetrators of the
crime, is incredible. He maintains that Gregorio failed to identify him because
when the latter was questioned he stated that he did not know any of the
culprits. He also claims that in the publication of Hotline by Tony Calvento in
People's Tonight, Gregorio even asked the readers to help him identify the
malefactors.
The trial court observed that Gregorio Tactacan testified in a categorical,
straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, and was consistent on crossexamination. Indeed, Gregorio might not have immediately revealed the
name of accused Armando Reanzares to the police authorities when he was
first investigated but the delay was not an indication of a fabricated charge
and should not undermine his credibility considering that he satisfactorily
explained his reasons therefor. According to him, he did not immediately tell
the police about the accused because he feared for the safety of his family as
his neighbors told him that they saw some people lurking around his house
on the day of the incident. Moreover, he was advised not to mention any
names until after the burial of his wife. No ill motive could be attributed to him
for implicating the accused. If at all, the fact that his wife died by reason of the
incident even lends credence to his testimony since his natural interest in
securing the conviction of the guilty would deter him from implicating persons
other than the real culprits, otherwise, those responsible for the perpetration
of the crime would escape prosecution.
To further undermine the credibility of Gregorio, the accused underscores
Gregorio's refusal to be subjected to a lie detector test. We cannot subscribe
to this contention as the procedure of ascertaining the truth by means of a lie
detector test has never been accepted in our jurisdiction; thus, any findings
based thereon cannot be considered conclusive.
Finally, the accused chides Gregorio for supposedly suppressing a very
material piece of evidence, i.e., the latter failed to present as witnesses a
certain Renato and his wife who allegedly saw the holduppers running away
from the crime scene. But this is only a disputable presumption under Sec. 3,
par. (e), Rule 131, of the Rules of Court on evidence, which does not apply in
the present case as the evidence allegedly omitted is equally accessible and
available to the defense.
Consequently, the accused should be held liable for the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide under Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by RA 7659 14 as the allegation in the Information are enough to
convict him therefor. In the interpretation of an information, what controls is
the description of the offense charged and not merely its designation. 15
Art. 294, par. (1) of the Revised Penal Code as amended punishes the crime
of robbery with homicide by reclusion perpetua to death. Applying Art. 63,
second par., subpar. 2, of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "[i]n all
cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof: . . .
2. [w]hen there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the
commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied," the lesser
penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposed in the absence of any modifying
circumstance.
As to the damages awarded by the trial court to the heirs of the victim, we
sustain the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the wrongful death of
Lilia Tactacan. In addition, the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages is
ordered. Also, damages for loss of earning capacity of Lilia Tactacan must be
granted to her heirs. The testimony of Gregorio Tactacan, the victim's
husband, on the earning capacity of his wife, together with a copy of his wife's
payroll, is enough to establish the basis for the award. The formula for
determining the life expectancy of Lilia Tactacan, applying the American
Expectancy Table of Mortality, is as follows: 2/3 multiplied by (80 minus the
age of the deceased). 16 Since Lilia was 48 years of age at the time of her
death, 17 then her life expectancy was 21.33 years.
At the time of her death, Lilia was earning P3,430.00 a month as a teacher at
the San Roque Elementary School so that her annual income was
P41,160.00. From this amount, 50% should be deducted as reasonable and
necessary living expenses to arrive at her net earnings. Thus, her net earning
capacity was P438,971.40 computed as follows: Net earning capacity equals
life expectancy times gross annual income less reasonable and necessary
living expenses
Net earning
capcity
(x)
=
life
expectancy
x
gross annual
income
reasonable &
necessary; living
expenses
x
=
2 (80-48)
3
x
[P41,164.00
P20,580.00]
=
21.33
x
P20,580.00
=
P438,971.40
However, the award of P1,000.00 representing the cash taken from Lilia
Tactacan must be increased to P1,200.00 as this was the amount established
by the prosecution without objection from the defense. The award of
P172,000.00 for funeral, burial and related expenses must be reduced to
P22,000.00 as this was the only amount sufficiently substantiated. 18 There
was no other competent evidence presented to support the original award.
The amount of P2,500.00 as reimbursement for the Seiko wristwatch taken
from Gregorio Tactacan must be deleted in the absence of receipts or any
other competent evidence aside from the self-serving valuation made by the
prosecution. An ordinary witness cannot establish the value of jewelry and the
trial court can only take judicial notice of the value of goods which is a matter
of public knowledge or is capable of unquestionable demonstration. The
value of jewelry therefore does not fall under either category of which the
court can take judicial notice. 19
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Accused
ARMANDO REANZARES also known as "Armando Rianzares" is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with Homicide under Art. 294
of the Revised Penal Code as amended and is sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. He is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as
indemnity for death, another P50,000.00 for moral damages, P1,200.00 for
actual damages, P438,971.40 for loss of earning capacity, and P22,000.00
for funeral, burial and related expenses. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
1wphi1.nt
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 135695-96. October 12, 2000]
does not marry can never enter heaven and he got angry with her when she
contradicted his statement.
That while the penis of her father was inside her vagina and (he) was
humping over her, she felt intense pain that she cried and told him to pull it
out but did not accede and in fact, said: Why will I pull it out when it feels
so good(?)
That after removing his penis from her vagina and after telling her that she
could not go to heaven if she did not get married, her father just stayed
there and continued smoking while she cried.
That in the evening of November 7, 1997, she was at home washing the
dishes while her father was just smoking and squatting. That after she
finished washing the dishes, she lied (sic) down to sleep when her father
embraced her and since she does not like what he did to her, she placed a
stool between them but he just brushed it aside and laid down with her and
was able to take her womanhood again by using a very sharp knife which
he was holding and was pointing it at the right side of her neck which
made her afraid.
That in the early morning of the following day, she left her fathers place
and went to her neighbor by the name of Bebie Cabahug and told her what
had happened to her, who, in turn, advised her to report the matter to the
police, which she did and accompanied by the policemen, she went to the
Southern Islands Hospital where she was examined and after her medical
examination, she was brought back by the police and was investigated by
them.[5]
Appellants claim that the complainants charges were
manufactured did not impress the trial court, which found him twice
guilty of rape. Now before us, appellant assails his double
conviction, simply contending that:[6]
THE TRIAL COURT HAS COMMITTED AN ERROR IN NOT
ABSOLVING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES
CHARGED IN THE INFORMATIONS DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF
REASONABLE DOUBT TO EXCULPATE HIM OF THE SAME.
Smears:
Conclusions: sperm identification (-)
Gram staining of vaginal disc.[16]
Dr. Acebes testified that her findings of healed hymenal
lacerations in the complainants private parts meant a history of
sexual congress on her part.[17] According to her, the lacerations
may have been caused by the entry of an erect male organ into
complainants genitals. The examining physician likewise pointed
out that previous coitus may be inferred from complainants Ushaped fourchette since the fourchette of a female who has not yet
experienced sexual intercourse is V-shaped.[18] While Dr. Acebes
conceded under cross-examination, that the existence of the datum
U-shape(d) fourchette does not conclusively and absolutely mean
that there was sexual intercourse or contact because it can be
caused by masturbation of fingers or other things,[19] nonetheless,
the presence of the hymenal lacerations tends to support private
complainants claim that she was raped by appellant.
Appellant next contends that his daughter pressed the rape
charges against him because she had quarreled with him after he
had castigated her for misbehavior. He stresses that the
prosecution did not rebut his testimony regarding his quarrel or
misunderstanding with private complainant. He urges us to consider
the charges filed against him as the result of his frequent
castigation of her delinquent behavior.[20]
Such allegation of a family feud, however, does not explain the
charges away. Filing a case for incestuous rape is of such a nature
that a daughters accusation must be taken seriously. It goes
against human experience that a girl would fabricate a story which
would drag herself as well as her family to a lifetime of dishonor,
unless that is the truth, for it is her natural instinct to protect her
honor.[21] More so, where her charges could mean the death of her
own father, as in this case.
Appellant likewise points out that it was very unlikely for him to
have committed the crimes imputed to him considering that he and
his wife had ten children to attend to and care for. This argument,
however, is impertinent and immaterial. Appellant was estranged
from his wife, and private complainant was the only child who lived
with him.[22] As pointed out by the Solicitor General, appellant was
thus free to do as he wished to satisfy his bestial lust on his
daughter.[23]
Nor does appellants assertion that private complainant has
some psychological problems and a low IQ of 76 in any way favor
his defense. These matters did not affect the credibility of her
testimony that appellant raped her twice. We note that the victim
understood the consequences of prosecuting the rape charges
against her own father, as shown by the following testimony of the
victim on cross-examination:
Q : Were you informed that if, and when your father will be found
guilty, your father will be sentenced to death?
A : Yes.
Q : Until now you wanted that your father will be sentenced by death?
A (Witness nodding.)
xxx
Q : I will inform you, Miss Witness, that you have filed two cases
against your father and in case your father would be found guilty,
two death sentences will be imposed against him?
A: Yes.
Q: With that information, do you still want this case would proceed?
A: I want this to proceed.[24]
matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive
of a material issue in the case.
In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim is improper,
despite the defense counsels admission, thereof acceding to the
prosecutions motion. As required by Section 3 of Rule 129, as to
any other matters such as age, a hearing is required before courts
can take judicial notice of such fact. Generally, the age of the victim
may be proven by the birth or baptismal certificate of the victim, or
in the absence thereof, upon showing that said documents were
lost or destroyed, by other documentary or oral evidence sufficient
for the purpose.
Thus, in People v. Rebancos, 172 SCRA 426 (1989), the victim
was below 12 and we found that the rape committed was statutory
rape. The mother testified that her daughter was born on October
26, 1974, and so was only 9 years old at the time of the rape on
February 12, 1984. Although no birth certificate was presented
because the victims birth had allegedly not been registered, her
baptismal certificate was duly presented. Hence, we ruled that the
mothers testimony coupled with the presentation of the baptismal
certificate was sufficient to establish that the victim was below 12 at
the time of the rape.
However, in People v. Vargas, 257 SCRA 603 (1996), we ruled
that appellant can only be convicted of simple rape, and not
statutory rape, because of failure of the prosecution to prove the
minority of the victim, who was allegedly 10 years old at the time of
the rape. The prosecution failed to present either the birth or
baptismal certificate of the victim. Also there was no showing that
the said documents were lost or destroyed to justify their nonpresentation. We held that testimony of the victim and her aunt
were hearsay, and that it was not correct for the trial court to judge
the age of the victim by her appearance.
In several recent cases, we have emphasized the need for
independent proof of the age of the victim, aside from testimonial
evidence from the victim or her relatives. In People v. Javier,[35] we
stressed that the prosecution must present independent proof of the
age of the victim, even though it is not contested by the defense.
The minority of the victim must be proved with equal certainty and
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