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E. Execution/ Garnishment
Republic vs Hidalgo
Facts:
Republic of the Philippines charged Judge Hidalgo with gross ignorance
of the law, manifest partiality and conduct prejudicial to the interest of
the service relative to civil case Mendoza vs RP.
Tarcila Mendoza filed an action for the annulment of declaration of
nullity of the title and deed of sale, recovery of ownership and
possession of 4924 sq m property against RP in RTC Manila. The
property is located at Arlegui Residence which housed 2 Philippine
presidents.
The case was initially dismissed on the ground of state immunity.
Certiorari was filed with the CA and reversed the decision of the court
and was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. SC
sustained CA decision.
In an order dated 7 July 2003, Judge Hidalgo declared RP in default for
failure of the OSG Ramirez to file the required answer within the
period prayed for his motion for extension.
Judge Hidalgo rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff Mendoza:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Deed of sale is nonexistent and is null and void from the

beginning.
Transfer of certificate of defendant RP has no basis
Reinstate Mendoza's transfer certificate
RP to pay just compensation of Php 143 600 00 plus interest
Ordering RP to pay more than Php 1 billion representing the
reasonable rental of the property
Ordering RP to pay Mendoza's atty. fees in amount of 15% of the
amount due

Manila. RP did not get the chance to oppose the execution because of
its hasty issuance. The Sheriff then informed the National Treasurer
Edeza of the Bureau of Treasury about the writ of execution of Judge
Hidalgo.
The antecedents begot the instant administrative complaint raising the
following allegations against Judge Hidalgo:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Complaint was already barred by laches

Money judgment by default is grossly in excess and
disproportionate when the property involved is valued at Php 371
million
Government funds are exempt from execution/garnishment.
No costs shall be allowed against RP unless otherwise provided
by law (Sec 1 Rule 142 of Rules of Court)

Issue:
1.
WON the government funds are exempt from
execution/garnishment.
2.
WON Judge Hidalgo is administratively liable for gross ignorance
of the law.
Held:
Plaintiff's cause of action has long prescribed and is legally barred by
laches, and the titled registered in the name of RP is indefeasible.
Judge Hidalgo violated the constitution and fundamental rule that the
government funds are exempt from execution/garnishment when he
caused the issuance of the writ of execution against RP. In the case at
bar, respondent Judge not only failed to perform his duties in
accordance with the Rules, but he also acted willfully and in gross
disregard of the law and controlling jurisprudence. He was ignorant of
the basic and simple procedural rules by issuing the writ of execution
and pronouncing the costs of suit against the government. Judge
Hidalgo's actions visibly indicate his lack of sufficient grasp of the law.

Contention of the Republic: Upon receipt of the OSG the judgment by

default, RP moved for new trial on the ground that the gross and
inexcusable negligence of Ramirez in handling the case does not bind
RP. RP is entitled to due process considering the enormous amount
involved.

In declaring the government answerable to atty fees of the plaintiff

and other costs of the suit, the respondent utterly disregarded the well
established rule that costs of suit are not recoverable against the
government. This is in violation of section 1 rule 142 of the rules of
court.

10 December 2003 Hidalgo issued an order for the issuance of a writ

of execution. The writ of execution was issued on 22 December 2003
commanding the RP to pay the dues and atty fees rendered in the
decision. The writ of execution was sent to Branch Sheriff of RTC

In the case of Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Co. vs. Rafferty, no
costs shall be allowed against the government of the Philippines when
the government is the unsuccessful party. This means that
government funds are exempt from execution/garnishment.

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WON the NLRC have jurisdiction over the Funds of DA?
It is settled when the state gives it's consent to be sued, it does not
necessarily consent to an unrestrained execution against it.
Judge Hidalgo was sanctioned for his failure of properly applying court
procedure and fined to Php 20k with a stern warning that repetition of
the same act will be dealt more severely.
Dept. of Agriculture Vs. NLRC
November 11, 1993
Ponente: Vitug
Topic: Immunity from Suit
Facts:

Dept. of Agriculture (DA) and Sultan Security Agency entered

into a contract, the latter shall provide security services of
the former

Several guards of the Sultan Security Agency filed a

complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th
month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay,
holiday pay and overtime pay, as well as for damages. Then
after filed a case against the Petitioners (DA and Sultan)

The Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the

petitioners liable and asked to pay the security guards. No
appeal from the respondents making decision final and
executory. As result City Sheriff levied motor vehicles of DA

Petitioners appeal to the National Labor Relations

Commission (NLRC) claiming that seizure of their property

Held:
No. DA as a government agency performing sovereign and
governmental acts is immune to suit.

The claims of the respondents (security guards) clearly

constitute money claims. Money Claims should be first
brought to COA.

the power of the court ends when the judgment is

rendered

Disbursement of public funds must be covered by the

correspondent appropriation as required by law.

The functions and public services rendered by the state

cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the
diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific
objects as appropriated by law.
Petition of DA was granted.

Note: the case is short but contains lots of information about the
subject that may help us in our exam. I suggest reading the entire text
will really help. The digest may help in the recitation but the text will
help in the long run.

Heirs of Pidacan vs ATO (G.R. No. 186192 )

In NLRCs ruling, the vehicles were returned and that the DA

FACTS:
Sometime in 1935, spouses Mateo Pidacan and Romana Eigo acquired under the
homestead provision of Act No. 2874 a parcel of land consisting of about 22
hectares situated in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Patent No. 33883
and Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 2204 were issued on the
land, in the names of the Pidacan spouses.

should find a way to pay the guards also they are mandated
to pay 50% of the total monetary award. Unsatisfied, DA
elevated the case to SC.
(In the petition of DA it claims that NLRC disregarded the cardinal
rule on the non-suability of the state)
Issue:

In 1948, the Civil Aeronautics Administration (now Air Transportation

Office or ATO) used a portion of the said property as an airport. Upon the
death of the Pidacan spouses in 1974, the ATO constructed a perimeter fence and a
new terminal building on the property. The ATO also lengthened, widened,
and cemented the airport's runway. The spouses' heirs namely, Pacita
Pidacan Vda de Zubiri and Adela Pidacan Vda. de Robles demanded

would hamper and jeopardize DAs functions to the prejudice

of the public good. NLRC partially favored the petitioners.

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from ATO the payment of the value of the property as well as rentals
for the use of the occupied premises. However, they were told that
payment could not be made because the property was still in their
parent's name.
The heirs claimed that they were entitled to payment of rentals plus
the value of the property.ATO countered that the heirs were not
entitled to any payment, either of the value of the land or of the
rentals because the property had been sold to its predecessor, the
defunct Civil Aeronautics Administration for P0.70 per square meter.
The ATO claimed that even if it failed to obtain title in its name, it had
been declaring the property for taxation purposes. The Trial Court
rendered a decision ordering ATO to pay rental and the value of the land at P89 per
square meter. On appeal, the CA ruled to remand the case to determine the just
compensation.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE CAN BE SUED IN THEIR EXERCISE OF
ITS POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN.

expropriation as early as 1948 when the airport was constructed on

petitioners' private land.As a rule, the determination of just
compensation in eminent domain cases is reckoned from the time of
taking. In this case, however, application of the said rule would lead to
grave injustice. Note that the ATO had been using petitioners' property
as airport since 1948 without having instituted the proper
expropriation proceedings. To peg the value of the property at the
time of taking in 1948, despite the exponential increase in its value
considering the lapse of over half a century, would be iniquitous. We
cannot allow the ATO to conveniently invoke the right of eminent
domain to take advantage of the ridiculously low value of the property
at the time of taking that it arbitrarily chooses to the prejudice of
petitioners. In this particular case, justice and fairness dictate that the
appropriate reckoning point for the valuation of petitioners' property is
when the trial court made its order of expropriation in 2001. As for the
fair value of the subject property, we believe that the amount arrived
at by the commissioners appointed by the trial court, P304.39 per
square meter, constitutes just compensation to petitioners

HELD:
Preponderance of evidence on record strongly indicates that the ATO's
conversion of the property into an airport in1948 comes within
the purview of eminent domain.

F. Suits Against Local Government Unit

Eminent domain or expropriation is the inherent right of the state to

condemn private property to public use upon payment of just
compensation. A number of circumstances must be present in the
taking of property for purposes of eminent domain:(1) The
expropriator must enter a private property;(2) The entrance
into private property must be for more than a momentary
period;(3) The entry into the property should be under warrant
or color of legal authority;(4) The property must be devoted to
a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
affected; and(5) The utilization of the property for public use must be in
such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment of the property.

Facts:
On February 5, 1989, Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato was
on board the Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Fidel Lozano, an employee
of the Municipality of Koronadal. The pick-up truck was registered
under the name of Rodrigo Apostol, but it was then in the possession
of Ernesto Simbulan. Lozano borrowed the pick-up truck from
Simbulan to bring Miguel to Buayan Airport at General Santos City to
catch his Manila flight.

In this case, it is undisputed that petitioners' private property was

converted into an airport by respondent ATO. As a consequence,
petitioners were completely deprived of beneficial use and enjoyment
of their property. Clearly, there was taking in the concept of

Jayme vs. Apostol

While travelling, the pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin Jayme who
was crossing the national highway. The collision sent Marvin 50 meters
away from the point of impact. Unfortunately, despite of the medical
attention, the boy died after 6 days.

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Petitioners spouses Buenaventura and Rosario Jayme, the parents of

establishing vicarious liability, the drivers negligence should not be

Marvin, filed a complaint for damages with the RTC against

attributed to a fellow employee who only happens to be an occupant of

respondents. In their complaint, they prayed that all

respondents be held solidarily liable for their loss. They pointed out
that that proximate cause of Marvins death was Lozanos negligent

the vehicle. Whatever right of control the occupant may have over the
driver is not sufficient by itself to justify an application of the doctrine
of vicarious liability.

and reckless operation of the vehicle. They prayed for actual, moral,

2. In Benson v. Sorrell, the New England Supreme Court ruled that

and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and litigation expenses.

mere giving of directions to the driver does not establish that the
passenger has control over the vehicle. Neither does it render one the

All the respondents denied the liability. Apostol and Sibulan averred
that Lozano took the pick-up with their consent. Miguel and Lozano
also pointed out that sudden sprint of the victim across the highway
made it impossible to avoid the accident. Miguel also denied being on
board the vehicle when it hit Marvin. There was also a prescription of
the claim to the insurance company due to non application.
Issue:
WON the municipal mayor be liable for the negligent act of the driver
assigned to him.
Held:
NO.
The RTC held in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant Municipality of
Koronadal cannot be held liable for the damages incurred by other
defendant being an agency of the State performing governmental
functions. Defendants Fidel Lozano, Rodrigo Apostol, and Mayor
Fernando Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato, are hereby ordered
jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff damages and other fees.
The CA however REVERSED the decision, which was subsequently
AFFIRMED by the SC based on the following grounds:
1. No negligence may be imputed against a fellow employee although

employer of the driver. This Court, in Soliman, Jr. v. Tuazon, ruled in a

similar vein.
________________________________________________
Vicarious Liability
Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that a person is not only liable
for ones own quasi-delictual acts, but also for those persons for whom
one is responsible for. This liability is popularly known as vicarious or
imputed liability. To sustain claims against employers for the acts of
their employees, the following requisites must be established: (1) That
the employee was chosen by the employer personally or through
another; (2) That the service to be rendered in accordance with orders
which the employer has the authority to give at all times; and (3) That
the illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or by reason of the
functions entrusted to him.
_____________________________________________________
As correctly held by the trial court, the true and lawful employer of
Lozano is the Municipality of Koronadal. Unfortunately for Spouses
Jayme, the municipality may not be sued because it is an agency of
the State engaged in governmental functions and, hence, immune
from suit.

the person may have the right to control the manner of the vehicles
operation. In the absence of an employer-employee relationship

NHA vs. Heirs of Guivelondo (2003)

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FACTS:
On February 23, 1999, petitioner National Housing Authority filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, an Amended Complaint
for eminent domain against Associacion Benevola de Cebu, Engracia
Urot and the Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo for the purpose of the public
use of Socialized housing.

While the judgment has been rendered in the RTC and an entry of
judgment and the motion for execution has already been issued, NHA
filed a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals. The CA denied
the petition on the ground that the Partial Judgment and Omnibus
Order became final and executory when petitioner failed to appeal the
same.

On November 12, 1999, the Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo filed a

Hence, this appeal to the Supreme Court.

Manifestation stating that they were waiving their objections to NHAs

power to expropriate their properties. Thus an order of execution has
been granted and the court already appointed commissioners to
determine the amount for just compensation.
On April 17, 2000, the Commissioners submitted their report
recommending that the just compensation of the subject properties be
fixed at P11,200.00 per square meter wherein a partial judgment has
been rendered.
After the report on the just compensation has been completed, NHA
filed 2 Motions for Reconsideration assailing the inclusion of lots 12,
13 and 19 as well as the amount of just compensation, stating
that it has no adequate basis and support. The respondents also filed a
motion for reconsideration on the Partial Judgment for the same
reason. The trial court issued an Omnibus Order denying the motion of
the respondents and the 2nd motion of the petitioner. The 1st motion
was however granted on the ground that the Commissioners Report
did not include Lots 12, 13, and 19 within its coverage.
On July 16, 2001, petitioner filed with the trial court a Motion to
Dismiss Civil Case No. CEB-23386, complaint for eminent domain,
alleging that the implementation of its socialized housing project was
rendered impossible by the unconscionable value of the land sought to

ISSUE:
Whether or not writs of execution and garnishment may be issued
against the state in an expropriation where in the exercise of power of
eminent domain will not serve public use or purpose.
HELD:
The petition was denied and the judgment rendered by the lower court
was affirmed.
The court held that the state can be compelled by the court to
continue to exercise its inherent power of eminent domain, since the
NHA did not exercise its right to appeal in the expropriation
proceedings before the court has rendered the case final and
executory.
Expropriation proceedings consists of two stages: first, condemnation
of the property after it is determined that its acquisition will be for a
public purpose or public use and, second, the determination of just
compensation to be paid for the taking of private property to be made
by the court with the assistance of not more than three
commissioners.
The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the
plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of

be expropriated, which the intended beneficiaries cannot afford. The

its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with

Motion was denied on September 17, 2001, on the ground that the
Partial Judgment had already become final and executory and there
was no just and equitable reason to warrant the dismissal of the case.

an order, if not of dismissal of the action, of condemnation declaring

that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint,

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upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the
date of the filing of the complaint. An order of dismissal, if this be
ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of
the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the
merits. So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for
thereafter, as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the
Trial Court, no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation
(or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard.
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the
determination by the Court of the just compensation for the property
sought to be taken. This is done by the Court with the assistance of
not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just
compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the
commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the
second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the
Court regarding the issue. Obviously, one or another of the parties
may believe the order to be erroneous in its appreciation of the
evidence or findings of fact or otherwise. Obviously, too, such a
dissatisfied party may seek a reversal of the order by taking an appeal
there from.
The court held that a socialized housing is always for public use and it
is not, in any way, diminished by the amount of just compensation
that the court has fixed.
The court ruled that in this case, the doctrine of state immunity cannot
be applied to the NHA, although it is public in character. It is only
public in character since it is government-owned, but having a juridical
personality separate and distinct from the government, the funds of
such government-owned and controlled corporations and noncorporate agency, although considered public in character, are not
exempt from garnishment.