Wanting, Liking, and Learning: Neuroscience and Paternalism

Author(s): Colin F. Camerer

Source: The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 73, No. 1, Symposium: Homo Economicus,
Homo Myopicus, and the Law and Economics of Consumer Choice (Winter, 2006), pp. 87-110
Published by: The University of Chicago Law Review
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4495545 .
Accessed: 02/10/2014 01:48
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

The University of Chicago Law Review is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
The University of Chicago Law Review.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 190.232.56.220 on Thu, 2 Oct 2014 01:48:47 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Wanting,Liking,and Learning:
Neuroscience and Paternalism
Colin F Camerert
A large number of young childrendie every year from ingesting
poisons by accident.Revealed-preferencetheory,the foundationof microeconomics,has only two conceptsto explainthese accidents:beliefs
and preferences (that is, utilities revealed by choices). In the beliefpreferencelanguage,all we can say is that a child who died of accidental poisoningeither believed the poison was safe, and made a mistake,
or that the child preferreddeath to life, and committedsuicide.While
economic theory may be comfortablecallingthese accidentsonly mistakes or expressionsof preference,I am not. My goal in this Essay is to
acquaintthe legal audience with ideas emerging in neurosciencethat
could potentiallybe a richerlanguagefor talking about cases like accidental child poisoning and, more broadly,about welfare and paternalism in some limited cases. Furtherdevelopment of the framework
could lead to a broaderview with wider applicability.
The idea is that three separable neural systems are relevant for
choice and welfare:a hedonic "liking"system (welfare), a "wanting"
system that guides choice, and a learning system that, ideally, links
informationstored in the other systemsso that people choose to learn
what they truly like. Other multiple-processneuroeconomicaccounts
use differentcomponentsbut have similarimplications.'
t Rea A. and Lela G. Axline Professor of Business Economics,CaliforniaInstitute of
Technology.Thanksto conferenceparticipants,to MeghanaBhatt, MingHsu, and Ian Krajbich
for researchassistance,andto Alice Lin for a presentationon the Berridgework.
1 See Drew Fudenbergand David K. Levine,A Dual Self Modelof ImpulseControl(Aug
17, 2005), online at http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/fudenberg/papers/dualself.pdf
(visin selfited Jan17,2006) (arguingthat a simple"dual-self'modelexplainsempiricalirregularities
controlproblemsand can give a valuefor commitmentin decisionproblems);IsabelleBrocasand
Juan D. Carillo,The Brain as a HierarchicalOrganization(Aug 2005), online at http://www(visitedJan 17, 2006) (constructinga model of conrcf.usc.edu/-juandc/PDFpapers/wp-brain.pdf
sumptionand time allocationthat is solved usingtools frommechanismdesignand economicsof
Decision
information);B. Douglas Bernheimand Antonio Rangel,Addictionand Cue-Triggered
Processes,94 Am Econ Rev 1558,1561(2004)(proposinga modelof addictionthatis premisedon a
pathologicaldivergencebetweenchoiceandpreferenceconsistingof mistakes,environmentalcues,
and attemptsby users to minimizetheir mistakes);George Loewensteinand Ted O'Donoghue,
and DeliberativeProcessesin EconomicBehavior(July27,2004),onlineat
AnimalSpirits:Affective
(visited Jan 17, 2006)
http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/research/workshops/behavioral/lowenstein.pdf
(discussinga model of humanbehaviorbased on the interactionof a deliberativesystem and an
affectivesystem);George Loewenstein,Out of Control:VisceralInfluenceson Behavior,65 Org

87

This content downloaded from 190.232.56.220 on Thu, 2 Oct 2014 01:48:47 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

88

The Universityof ChicagoLaw Review

[73:87

The Essay is organizedin several parts.Part I sets the historical

stage and then describesa canonicalexperiment(with mice) on wanting and liking.Part II describes anecdotal evidence of wanting-liking
gaps from psychological disorders and choices over time (addiction
and credit card use). Paternalismenters in Part III, not with much
vigor, but as a potentially efficient response to gaps in wanting and
liking. Part IV suggests some directions for positive analysis.Part V
concludes.
I. REVEALED PREFERENCESAND WANTING-LIKING

A. Historyof Thought:The Revealed-PreferenceApproachIs a

Convention
In the early1900s,VilfredoParetowon a debate amongeconomists
about the epistemologicalbasis of utility,'a victory later cemented in
the 1930sby the ordinalistrevolution.
Pareto and his contemporaries,such as Edgeworthand Jevons,all
believed in the "concrete deductive method" of John Stuart Mill,
which starts with simple empiricalregularitiesor "laws"and makes
deductions from those regularities.3Furthermore,all of these scholars
believed that understandingthe hedonic basis of utilitywas necessary,
in a form that is now called psychology(but was not called psychology
then). As Jevons wrote:"But it is surely obvious that economics does
rest upon laws of humanenjoyment;and that, if those laws are developed by no other science, they must be developed by economists....
[T]he theory of economics must begin with a correct theory of consumption."
Pareto's view was the opposite: he thought rooting economic
preferences in psychologicaldetail was an unnecessaryburden.In an
1897 letter Paretowrote:
Behav & Hum Dec Proc272 (1996) (attributingactionsagainstself-interestdespitefull knowledge to visceralfactorsdefinedby a directhedonicimpactand an effect on the relativedesirability of differentgoods andactions).
2 ConsiderLuiginoBruni and Robert Sugden,The Road Not Taken:TwoDebatesabout
the Role of Psychologyin Economics1, 2 (unpublishedmanuscript2002) (on file with author)
(explainingthat the behavioraleconomicsmovementis tryingto reversethe approachinitiated
by Paretoand othersto removepsychologyfromeconomics).
3 Later, Milton Friedman'sessay, The Methodologyof Positive Economics,in Milton
Friedman,Essaysin PositiveEconomics3 (Chicago1953),liberatedeconomistsfrom even having to startwith empiricalregularities.He suggestedthat simpleassumptionswith no empirical
backingcould also serve as a startingpoint, because they might lead to accuratepredictions
despitebeing "wrong."His "F-twist"is best seen as encouraginga reduced-formstyle of modeling in which incorrectfoundationalassumptionsmight lead to good predictionsbecause they
approximatepredictionsfrommoreaccuratefoundationalassumptionsthat are left unspecified.
4 W. StanleyJevons, The Theoryof PoliticalEconomy 102-03 (Penguin1970) (arguing
thatknowledgeof the conditionsof humanutilityare necessaryto understandeconomics).

This content downloaded from 190.232.56.220 on Thu, 2 Oct 2014 01:48:47 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Neuroscience
andPaternalism

2006]

89

It is an empiricalfact that the naturalsciences have progressed

only when they have taken secondaryprinciplesas their point of
departure,instead of tryingto discover the essence of things....
Pure politicaleconomy has thereforea great interestin relyingas
little as possible on the domainof psychology.'
Pareto advocated divorcingeconomics from psychology by simply assumingthat unobservedutility is necessarilyrevealed by choice
(though stay tuned):"[W]e are concerned only with certain relations
between objective facts and subjective facts, principallythe tastes of
men. Moreover,we will simplify the problem still more by assuming
thatthesubjectivefact conformsperfectlyto the objectivefact."6
While Pareto was comfortablesevering economics from psycholof his contemporarieswere not. Writingabout him in 1926,
some
ogy,
shortlyafter Paretodied, Edgeworthsaid:
[Pareto's]The Manuale is distinguishedby the original idea of
treating the laws of demand and supply,or ratherthe "curvesof
indifference"from which those may be deduced,as objective,capable of being ascertainedby external observation without the
psychological knowledge obtained through sympathy.In short,
the economist may be a solipsist.The conception has been criticised . . . as a needless abandonment of one large source of in-

formation.7
Remember that Pareto did not win this argumentabout how to
proceed by mathematicalproof or data. The equation of utility with
choice was not a scientific discovery on par with a powerful theorem
or solid empiricalregularity.Pareto simplyassertedthat,as a matterof
convenience,it was okay to give up on understandingthe "essence of
things."Pareto thought economics could start with "secondaryprinciples" like utility-maximization(which, ironically,are now taught to
graduate students as "firstprinciples").Pareto's turn-the definition
of utility as a quantity revealed by expressed preference equation-5

BruniandSugden,TheRoadNot Takenat 20 (citedin note 2).

VilfredoPareto,Manualof PoliticalEconomy103 (AugustusM. Kelley 1971) (emphasis
added) (arguingin favor of simplifyingproblemsto the objectivefacts by consideringonly repeated actionswhere the actor has correctedpreviousmistakesand has determinedhis or her
exact preferencesso thatsubjectivepreferencesare identicalto objectivefacts).
7 FrancisY. Edgeworth,Pareto,Vilfredo,in Henry Higgs,ed, 3 Palgrave'sDictionaryof
PoliticalEconomy711 (MacMillan1926)(surveyingPareto'sworksand criticismof those works)
(internalcitationomitted).Solipsismis "a theoryholdingthat the self can know nothingbut its
own modificationsand states ... [and]that the self is the only existent thing."Webster'sThird
New InternationalDictionary2170 (Merriam-Webster
1993).That is, the world is a figment of
one's imagination.Solipsismis not taken seriouslyas a philosophicalstance;it is just a challenge
for philosophersto explainpreciselywhyit is wrong.
6

This content downloaded from 190.232.56.220 on Thu, 2 Oct 2014 01:48:47 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

90

The Universityof ChicagoLaw Review

[73:87

was an agreementon a convention for how to do economics,like the

rules of tennis,or assumingawayfrictionin physics.
Of course,the equation of utility and choice was also historically
justifiablein the early 1900s because measuringutility directly,at that
time, was as far-fetchedas, say,sending people to the moon or cloning
animals.In Pareto'sday there was no abilityto place electrodes into a
monkey or humanbrain and recordfiring rates of individualneurons,
to alter genes in mice and see what those mice can't do, to record
online brain activitywith 3-mm spatial resolutionusing PET or fMRI,
to identify areas of brain damage (lesions) in humans and see what
skills those humanslack, to genotype people and correlategenes with
behavior and skill, to give humans drugs and see how their behavior
changes,or to create "temporarylesions"using transcranialmagnetic
stimulation(TMS).
The huge advancesin all these tools force the readerto drawone
of two conclusions:(1) Pareto was right in his own time-he and his
peers shouldn'thave tried to measureutilitydirectly,it was hopelessand his intellectualheirs are still right today,because their tools can't
possibly measureutility,or (2) Pareto was rightthen because the tools
didn't exist, but the neo-Paretians are wrong now because we have
tools to measureutilitythat didn'texist in Pareto'stime (and the tools
will only get better). Conclusion (1) might be right, but betting that
something is impossible in science is dangerousand neglects the option value of exploring wild ideas. Conclusion (2) is the progressive
conclusionwith upside potential.
The ideasin thisEssayarenot an insistencethatrevealed-preference
theoryhas not been useful.It has,and will continueto be. But the usefulness of one theorytellsus nothingaboutwhetheran alternativeapproach
mightproveequallyuseful.
B. Beyond Revealed Preference:Typesof Utility
The distinction between utility and choice has been revived in
two ways.
First,Kahneman,Wakker,and Sarin noted that one can conceptually distinguishfour types of utility:experiencedutility (the hedonic
sensation at the time of consumption that Jeremy Bentham had in
mind); remembered utility; forecasted utility (a forecast of experienced utility);and finally,the familiarnotion of decision utility (numbers an observercould use to rankan agent'srevealedpreferences).8

8 See Daniel Kahneman,Peter P.Wakker,and RakeshSarin,Back to Bentham?Explorationsof ExperiencedUtility,112 Q J Econ 375,376-77 (1997);Daniel Kahneman,New Challenges

This content downloaded from 190.232.56.220 on Thu, 2 Oct 2014 01:48:47 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

2006]

Neuroscienceand Paternalism

91

Thinkinglike a psychologist,it is easy to see why these types of

utility might differ. Remembered and experienced utility can differ
because of nostalgic biases in memory (for example, the inability to
recreatethe pain of childbirthin imagination).Forecastedutility could
be subjectto "projectionbiases"relativeto experiencedutility-people
buy more grocerieswhen they'rehungry,'and overestimatehow badly
they will feel if their favored candidate loses an election.10Most fundamentalfor my purposes,decision utility could deviate from experienced utilityif people have not yet learnedwhat they like (for example,
children),or if thereis some dissociationbetweenwantingand liking.
The revealed-preferencesview basicallyequates welfare (experienced utility) with choice (decision utility), as a matter of the definition of welfare.Is this the best we can do? If my neighborthumpshis
head repeatedlywith a ball-peenhammer,do I have no alternativebut
to infer that hammeringhis head with a ball-peenhammeris the most
fun he can have? A more sensible direction is to study the relation
between experiencedand decisionutilityempirically.
The second revivalof the debate about utilityis work by the psychologist Kent Berridge and colleagues on "wanting,""learning,"and
"liking"that addresses the measurementchallenge, suggesting some
ways in whichexperiencedutility (liking)and decisionutility (wanting)
mightdiffer,dependingon learningthat potentiallylinksthe two."
My suggestion in this short Essay is that the wanting-learningliking distinctionprovides a potential basis,groundedin neuroscience,
for assertingthat choices are not alwaysutility-maximizing.
In fact,the
of
this
framework
was
endorsed
Pareto
as a
clearly
by
learning part
for
that
the
fact"
of
and
the
assuming
"subjective
utility
justification
"objectivefact"of revealed preference are the same.A longer quotation containingthe short excerptquoted above,reads:
We will study the many logical, repeatedactions which men perform to procure the things which satisfy their tastes.... [W]e are
concernedonly with certainrelationsbetween objectivefacts and
subjectivefacts,principallythe tastes of men. Moreover,we will
simplify the problem still more by assumingthat the subjective
to the RationalityAssumption,150 J Institutional& TheoreticalEcon 18, 21 (1994) (discussing
the distinctionbetweenthe two primarynotionsof utility:experiencedand decision).
9 See George Loewenstein,Ted O'Donoghue,and MatthewRabin, ProjectionBias in
PredictingFutureUtility,118 Q J Econ 1209,1215(2003).
10 See Daniel T. Gilbert,et al, ImmuneNeglect:A Source of DurabilityBias in Affective
75 J Personality& Soc Psych617,625 (1998).
Forecasting,
11 See Kent C. BerridgeandTerryE. Robinson,ParsingReward,26 TRENDS in Neurosciences 507, 510-12 (2003) (discussingthe interactionsof wanting,learning,and liking in conditioned stimuli as motivationalmagnets,cue-triggered"wanting,"response reinforcement,and
cognitiveincentives).

This content downloaded from 190.232.56.220 on Thu, 2 Oct 2014 01:48:47 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

92

TheUniversity
of ChicagoLawReview

[73:87

fact conformsperfectlyto the objectivefact.This can be done because we will consider only repeatedactions to be a basis for
claimingthatthereis a logical connectionunitingsuch actions.1
Pareto clearly implicates learning as a mechanism that brings
wantingand likingtogether:
A man who buys a certain food for the first time may buy more
of it than is necessary to satisfy his tastes, price taken into account. But in a second purchasehe will correct his error,in part
at least, and thus,little by little, will end up by procuringexactly
what he needs. Wewill examinethis actionat the timewhenhe has
reachedthis state. Similarly,if at first he makes a mistake in his
reasoningabout what he desires,he will rectifyit in repeatingthe
reasoningand will end up by makingit completelylogical."
Thus,the standardassumption,that choices reveal "true"utilities,
is clearly endorsed by Pareto only for choices that are repeated often
enough to ensure that learning has occurred.The wanting-learningliking frameworkcan therefore be seen as a proper generalizationof
revealed-preferencetheory and, in fact, it is perhaps the kind of general theory Pareto had in mind in the first place. Bruni and Sugden
note that the "discoveredpreferencehypothesis"is a revivalof Pareto's
idea.14They assert that rationalchoice theory appliesafterpreferences
have been "discovered"by trial-and-errorlearningand reflection.But
this leaves a large and importanthole: what happensbeforelearning?
Besides generalizing revealed-preference theory, the wantinglearning-likingframeworkprovides a potential way to talk scientifically about how restricting or imposing choices (paternalistically)
could improve welfare.The core idea is simple:if there are separate
systems for recordingliking, expressingwanting,and for learning to
want what the brain likes, then paternalismcould be justified if the
wanting system produces choices that are not later liked, and if a paternalisticcorrectionproduces choices that are unwantedby an agent
but will be liked by her, or that are wanted but not liked, and if the
correction does not cause other harms (or much harm to rational
agents).
12 Pareto,Manualof PoliticalEconomyat 103 (citedin note 6) (emphasisadded).
13 Id (emphasisadded).
14 See Bruniand Sugden,TheRoadNot Takenat 7 (cited in note 2) (labelingthe claimthat
rational-choicetheorycan predictbehaviorwhen certaincriteriaare satisfiedas the "discovered
preferencehypothesis").See also CharlesR. Plott,RationalIndividualBehaviourin Marketsand
Social ChoiceProcesses:The DiscoveredPreferenceHypothesis,in KennethJ.Arrow,et al, eds,
The RationalFoundationsof EconomicBehavior225, 226 (St. Martin's1996) (suggestinga theory thatrationalchoicesevolve throughthree stagesreflectingexperienceandpractice).

This content downloaded from 190.232.56.220 on Thu, 2 Oct 2014 01:48:47 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

2006]

Neuroscienceand Paternalism

93

By the way,note that I am truly not an eager paternalist.I could

care less about paternalism,per se. Paternalismis only interestingas a
challenge for behavioral economics,both normativelyand positively
(to make sense of paternalismthat is currentlypracticed,and changes
in paternalismacrosstime and geography).
At this point, the neuroscientificbasis for any practicalpaternalism is flimsy.But progressin neuroscienceis very rapid.And of course,
there is a genuine dangerof a slipperyslope in movingfrom paternalism that is designed to be unobjectionable,because it helps some and
doesn't harmothers,to paternalismthat is scary,intrusiveand wrongheaded. The political economy of capture by special interest groups
also should make us wary,in practice,that opening the door to even
the mildest paternalismcould get out of hand. But it can't hurt to instigate a purely academicdebate about how limitedpaternalismmight
someday be scientificallyjustified,subject to a reasonable consensus
of scientists,lawyers,and citizens.
C. Wanting-Learning-Liking
Illustrated
I will motivate my discussionby startingwith details of a simple
experiment with mice by Pecifia and colleagues."Their experiment
uses mice with a dopamine transporter(DAT) "knockdown"due to
genetic engineering.As I understandit (which is not well), the knockdown mice produce only about 10 percent as much dopamine transporter (which "takes up" or recycles dopamine) as the control mice,
but as a result have 70 percent more extracellulardopamine sloshing
aroundbetween neurons.
Whenfreelyallowedaccessto food and drink,the DAT-knockdown
mice consumedtwice as much as the control mice.This difference,by
itself,does not tell you whethertheylikedthe consumptionor justwanted
it more.
The mice were also put through a standard "runway"task, in
which they are kept hungry for eight hours, then trained to move
down a short runwayfrom a start box to a goal box containingfood.
During a learningperiod, the DAT-knockdownmice ran about twice
as quickly down the runwayas the control mice and were much less
likely to reverse course or pause and sniff. Because the knockdown
and control mice are about equally fast in a pretrainingphase, and

But
MutantMice Have Higher"Wanting"
15 See SusanaPecifia,et al, Hyperdopaminergic
Not "Liking"forSweetRewards,23J Neuroscience9395 (2003)(findingthatchronicallyelevated
butdoes not increase"liking").
extracellulardopaminein mutantmicefacilitates"wanting"

This content downloaded from 190.232.56.220 on Thu, 2 Oct 2014 01:48:47 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

The Universityof ChicagoLaw Review

94

[73:87

equally fast after a lot of training,this difference duringlearningsuggests that extra dopaminefacilitatesfaster learning.16
These experiments show that the DAT-knockdownmice eat
more, and learn there's food waiting in the goal box faster than the
control mice do, but do they actuallylike food and liquid more? Here
we have no choice but to skate out onto thin empiricalice:how do you
measureliking?
If you are open-minded about the possible difference between
choice, which is observable,and liking (true utility), which is not as
readily observable,then you should accept that any measure of true
utility won't be as sharp and agreeable as observingchoice is. If you
aren'twillingto accept this sad fact,stop readingnow.
Pecifia and colleagues measureliking and dislikingusing physical
movementsof the mice--tongue protrusionsand paw lickingto represent liking,and gaping (mouth-opening,like a yawn),screwingup the
face, and arm flailing to representdisliking.Your first reaction might
be that these are not serious scientific measures.But they are taken
very seriouslyby people who study animals,because they are the best
availablemeasuresof liking"(puttingobservedchoice aside,of course;
if you use choice to infer likingwe're back to squareone with Pareto).
These expressions and movements are also very similar across mice,
primates,and humaninfants;in fact, they are so similarthat researchers use an equation (d = .26(w)32)to predict the duration(d) of a facial expression(in milliseconds)in termsof a species' body weight (w)
(in kilograms).'8
In any case, these measures of liking and dislikingshow that the
DAT-knockdownmice do not like the sucrose solution more than the
control mice. In fact, 1.0 M sucrose,the largest concentration,is liked
significantlyless by the knockdownmice."
16 See SamuelM. McClure,NathanielD. Daw, and P. Read Montague,A Computational
Substratefor IncentiveSalience,26 TRENDSin Neurosciences423,424 (2000).
17 Methodslike this are used by pediatriciansto judge how much
pain childrenare in.An
"oucher"scale is used by pediatriciansto map facialexpressionsonto a numericalscale.See, for
example,How to Use the Oucher,online at http://www.oucher.org/differences.html
(visitedJan
17,2006). See also,for example,Rita Rubin,Kids' DistressIs No SmallThing,USA TodayD1-2
(May 9, 2005). This can be thoughtof as a utilityfunctionthat mapsfacial expressionsinto numerical"truedisliking."If the goal is to prescribean optimaldose of painkiller,you can'tjust let
a child "choose"a dose. Therefore,inferringchildren'sdisutility- pain--from choice is a bad
idea.Inferringtheirpain fromfacialexpressionsis a good idea.
18 See BerridgeandRobinson,26 TRENDS in Neurosciencesat 509 (citedin note 11).
19

A concern in the study is that the eating task used regular food (Purina Rat Chow) and

water;the learningtask used Froot Loops;and the likingmeasuresused sucrosesolution.I presume Pecifiaand colleaguesare comfortablewith the workinghypothesisthat knockdownmice
do not have differenttastes for any of these substancesthan controlmice do. See also Kent C.
Berridge and Terry E. Robinson, What Is the Role of Dopamine in Reward: Hedonic Impact,

This content downloaded from 190.232.56.220 on Thu, 2 Oct 2014 01:48:47 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

2006]

Neuroscienceand Paternalism

95

This is just one study that shows a potential dissociationbetween

wanting and learning,which the knockdownmice reveal more of, and
liking, which they reveal less of. They eat and drink more, but don't
seem to like it.
The same kindsof wanting-likingdissociationshave been shown in
experimentswith humans.20 Dopamine-receptorantagonistsappear to
suppress cigarette-smokerwanting without changing (self-reported)
pleasurefrom cigarettes.2'Environmentalcues createlearnedassociation
withpleasurabledruguse;when these cues arepresentedthey can create
rapid craving,just like the conditionedstimulusproducedsalivationin
Pavlov'sdogs.These cues are clearlyaffectingwanting,thoughthey may
not affecteventualliking.
An importantpropertyof the wanting and liking systems is that
they may react implicitly,without consciousness.For example, drug
addictswill work (lever-pressing)for doses of stimulantsor morphine
that are so low that the addicts report no subjectiveeffects and have
no measurableautonomicresponses.That is, the addictsdetect enough
of the drug to keep wanting the low doses, but don't think they are
getting any dose at all.22
Berridgeand Robinsonsuggestgeneralregionsof the mouse brain
that are responsiblefor wanting,liking,and learning.23Nobody has constructedsuch a neurogeographicalmap of utility for the humanbrain,
and it will be a long time before we have a good one. (Furthermore,
utility for food, shopping,drugs,sex, and golf may all work differently,
so we'll need a book of brain maps.)But the point is that such a map
has alreadybeen proposed for mice, based on a relativelyrecent and
modest amount of research.So it is conceivablethat at least a rough

RewardLearning,or IncentiveSalience?,28 BrainRsrch Revs 309, 350 (1998) (findingthat dopamine-depletedratsstill"like"rewardsandsimplyfail to "want"rewards).
20 See Berridgeand Robinson,26 TRENDS in Neurosciencesat 508 (cited in note 11)
(discussinghow drug addictswill work for low doses of stimulantsor morphinedespite no subby Humans,157
Self-administration
jective effect). See also CarlL. Hart,et al, Methamphetamine
75, 80 (2001) ("[S]everalinvestigatorshave reporteddata demonstrating
Psychopharmacology
that drug-related'positive'subjectiveeffects do not entirely accountfor drug-takingbehavior
andsome have suggestedthatotherfactorsshouldalso be considered.").
and
21 See LisaH. Brauer,et al, HaloperidolReducesSmokingof Both Nicotine-containing
DenicotinizedCigarettes,159 Psychopharmacology31, 34-35 (2001) (discussingexperimental
resultswhere haloperidol,a dopamine-receptorantagonist,was administeredand significantly
reducedsmokingbehaviorbut did not affecthow muchthe subjectslikedsmoking).
22 See BerridgeandRobinson,26 TRENDS in Neurosciencesat 508 (citedin note 11).
23 See id at 510 (containinga schematicexplanationof regionsof the brainthat are linked
to wanting,liking,and learning).Theiranalogoustermsare motivation(wanting)and emotionor
affect(liking).Id at 508.

This content downloaded from 190.232.56.220 on Thu, 2 Oct 2014 01:48:47 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

96

The Universityof ChicagoLaw Review

[73:87

understandingof wanting,learning,and liking could emerge for humans,probablyat firstfor a specializeddomainlike food.24
Having separate systems for wanting,learning,and liking makes
sense from an evolutionarypoint of view.Take food as a simple case.
First note that unless tastes for specific foods are truly genetically
hardwired,some kind of learning system is necessary to connect the
sensory properties of food-how it smells, feels, and looks-to how
much an animallikes specific foods.This basic learningis what infants
do for months-putting everythingin sight in theirmouths to see how
things taste.An infant who tastes dirt doesn't anticipateliking dirtshe just exhibits wanting,which is really just wanton exploration (to
create inputs for the learning system).Then she graduallylearns the
difference between brown, crumbly stuff that tastes bad-dirt-and
brown,crumblystuff that tastes good - gooey brownies.
The fact that the learning system exists at all is prima facie evidence that wanting and liking are not automaticallylinked at birth;
learningis there for a reason,and the reason is to educate the wanting
system about what is liked. But why would wantingand likingoccur in
separatebrainregions?Berridgeand Robinsonpropose that likingfor
food, sex, and warmthrely, at least to some extent, on quite different
sensory systemsfor processingsmell, heat, and taste.A separatewanting system is needed to combine these signals into a "common currency,"25in order to make tradeoffs between goods that are liked in
(sensorily)differentways.
Wantingand liking may also deviate, usefully,in the special case
of pregnancy.When my wife was pregnant,she had a fierce cravingfor
lamb-one of her favorite foods-then almost vomited after taking
one bite. Her wantingsystem had tuned to her own tastes but the circuitryprotectingthe delicate fetus registeredrapiddislike.
Learningis the mechanismthat trainswantingabout what is actuliked
However,in the modem economy,manyof
ally
by trial-and-error.
the goods people purchaseare muchmore complexto processand rep24 A similarbody of researchin humansfocuses attentionon "actor-critic"
modelsof temporal difference(TD) learning.In TD learning,an organismlearnsa value functionaccordingto
an adaptive updatingequation driven by the predictionerror (or temporaldifference).John
O'Doherty and colleagues have located areas of striatum(in the brain'stemporallobe) that
correspondto "critic"temporal differences,and other areas that correspondto an "actor's"
expectedrewardor forecast.JohnO'Doherty,et al, DissociableRoles of Ventraland DorsalStriatum in InstrumentalConditioning,304 Science 452 (2004). In terms of this Essay,the actor is
wanting,andthe criticsystemis learning,whichadjustswantingso it learnsthe truevalue(liking).
25 See Peter Shizgal,On the Neural Computationof Utility:Implicationsfrom Studiesof
Brain StimulationReward,in Daniel Kahneman,Ed Diener, and Norbert Schwarz,eds, WellBeing:The Foundationsof HedonicPsychology500, 509-10 (RussellSage 1999) (discussingthe
necessity and existence of a currencyfunction to break down differentstimuli into decision
utility(wanting)).

This content downloaded from 190.232.56.220 on Thu, 2 Oct 2014 01:48:47 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Neuroscienceand Paternalism

2006]

97

resent than are simple foods. The learningnecessary to link wanting

and liking of such goods through trial-and-errorreinforcementis either impossible (planning the perfect once-in-a-lifetimewedding) or
very slow.
Other mechanismsmay substitutefor direct learningabout complex choices (personaladvice,imitation,advertising).But it is not likely
that the humanbrainhas developed a special patch for unique important decisionsthat links imitationdirectlyto actualliking.At best, humans would have a capacityto learn at a young age whose advice to
take (i.e., they develop a tightly coupled wanting-likingloop for good
advice;and advicethat is taken then triggerswantingfor a good, which
is a sensible forecastof later liking because that's what "good advice"
means).Such a systemmightworkwell, but probablynot perfectly,and
mightbe vulnerableto exploitationby profit-maximizingfirms(for example,celebrityendorsementsmighthijacksuch a system).
II. HUMAN MISFIRESIN WANTING AND LIKING

A. Disorders
The most compellingexamples of wanting-likinggaps are pathological disordersthat people clearlywould like to changeif they could.
Obsessive-compulsivedisorder (OCD) is a psychiatricdisorder
characterizedby obsessive thoughts and compulsive actions,such as
cleaning, checking, counting, or hoarding.26"Cleaners"report an intense feeling that their hands are not clean, and must be washed over
and over to reduce that feeling. "Checking"is similar.My father used
to compulsivelycheck the four oven stove dials in our house before
leaving the house-he would point to each and say "off, off, off, off,"
partly coping with embarrassmentby makingfun of his mild checking
compulsion.Sometimes he would stop the car, halfwayout the driveway,and get out to double-checkthat the front door was locked.
In the revealed-preferencesapproach,we wouldinfer that compulsive cleanershave a high utilityfor clean hands.Some sensiblepredictions may come from this inference--for example,cleanersspend a larger incomeshareon cleaningthannoncleanersdo.
But the revealed-preferencesview only gets you so far. If you
give compulsive cleaners a serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) like
fluoxetine (Prozac) or paroxetine (Paxil), a majorityof cleaners find
26 Note that the DAT knockdownmutant mice exhibit "sequentialsuper-stereotypy"
in
groomingthat is remarkablysimilarto OCD cleaningin humans.See Kent C. Berridge,et al,
Mutant
of an InstinctiveFixedAction Patternin Hyper-dopaminergic
SequentialSuper-stereotypy
Mice:A Model of ObsessiveCompulsiveDisorderand Tourette's,3(4) BMC Biology (2005),
online at http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1741-7007-3-4.pdf
(visitedJan17,2006).

This content downloaded from 190.232.56.220 on Thu, 2 Oct 2014 01:48:47 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

98

The Universityof ChicagoLaw Review

[73:87

that their symptomsare diminished.Of course, we can easily stretch

revealed-preferencelanguage to allow "state-dependence"of cleaning-utility,which is altered by these drugs.But patients actively seek
out these drugsto change theirpreferences.To talk about the demand
for a cure,we need to posit a "metapreference"in which cleanersprefer to be symptom-freethan to be compulsive.Theirmetapreferenceis
expressedin demandfor Prozacor Paxil.
A big advantageof revealed-preferencetheory is simplicity.But
addingconceptsof state-dependenceand metapreferencequicklymakes
the theory complicated,not simple.And even if enriched revealedpreferencetheory can accommodatethese phenomena,the details of
how preferences are linked to genes and childhood behavior,how
"states"like SSRIdrugswork,andwhetheragentsunderstandthe source
of their behaviorand the state-dependence,which all matterfor good
prediction,requirea lot of empiricalinputfromoutsideeconomicsper se.
The language of wanting and liking could be even simpler. In
wanting-likingterms,an OCD patient wants to clean but does not like
it. Most say that they do not like cleaningper se - it can be very timeconsuming, doesn't bring pleasure, and direct measurement (facial
expressions,self-report,imaging of striatumactivity) would probably
show that liking is low. But such a patient is motivated,compulsively,
to clean (she "wants"to). SSRI drugs reduce wanting.Patients take
medicationto overridetheirwantingsystem.
The OCD example is a relatively easy one. Of course, the wanting-likingframeworkis useful only if there are more common behaviors, with substantialeconomic consequences,that can be seen as reflecting wanting-likinggaps.Most of the obvious exampleshave to do
with time preference,which I'll discussin the next Part.
Another interesting example is the behavior of "shopaholics."
Compulsiveshoppingis a disorderwithformaldiagnosticcriteriaanalogous to those for compulsivedrug use or gambling.27I will use it as a
casual examplejust because it is a name for a possible disconnectbetween the transitorypleasurefrombuyinggoods and the later pleasure
from consumption.A differentclass of behaviorinvolves "virtuousintentions"like buyingexerciseequipmentor a healthclubplan."8

27 See LorrinM. Koran,et al, CitalopramTreatmentof CompulsiveShopping:An OpenLabel Study,63 J Clin Psychiatry704, 704 (2002) (showingthat treatmentwith the antidepressantcitalopram(Celexa)reducesshoppingcompulsion).
28 StefanoDella Vigna and Ulrike Malmendier,PayingNot to Go to the Gym22 (unpublished manuscript2005), online at http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/sdellavi/wp/gymemp05-0420.pdf (visited Jan 17, 2006) (explainingthe irrationalbehaviorof gym users' contractchoices
basedon theiroverestimationof futureefficiencyor self-control).

This content downloaded from 190.232.56.220 on Thu, 2 Oct 2014 01:48:47 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

2006]

Neuroscienceand Paternalism

99

An economist'sdefinitionof shopaholismis systematicallybuying

goods that are not later consumed.9 Such a disordercould result from
a wantingsystem buying goods that the liking system doesn't appreciate (like closets full of shoes that are never worn). Of course, in the
language of belief and preference,one could argue that shopaholics
are mistakenin theirbeliefs aboutfutureconsumption(or theirbudget
of time to use goods).Then the challengeis explainingwhy they don't
learnfrom a chronicpatternof purchaseand disuse.
An extremeform of shopaholismis an OCD disordercalled "collecting"or "hoarding"in which people collect items to an extreme.A
milderformis probablypresentin all of us:mostpeople have at leastone
class of goods or servicesthey enjoy shoppingfor, but they don't have
enough time or inclinationto actuallyconsume.Mine is books-I love
gettingbooks,but never get aroundto readingthem all. My wife is obWe have aroundtwenty,whichare invariasessedwithbuyingmarinades.
sit
full.
once
and
then
patientlyfor years,three-quarters
bly opened
B. Wantingand Integrationof MomentaryLikingover Time
Food is a useful kind of good for exploring the neural basis of
wanting and liking, because mechanismsare common across species
and consumption is immediate.But for most goods and services of
economic interest to humans-education, savings,durables,credit card
use-costs and benefits are spread out over time. It may be very uncomfortable to learn to windsurfor to struggle through college (the
liking system is not happy duringthe learning),but rewardscome in
the form of later liking (windsurfing)or futureliking of goods that can
be bought with increasedwages from a college education.The wanting
system has to integratethese likes and dislikesover time to determine
overall liking.
One method for integratingliking is exponential discountingof
future rewards,which correspondsto dynamic consistency in choice
and has much normativeappeal.30A more general approachis models
of present-biasedpreferences(for example,quasihyperbolicdiscounting)," which splice a preference for immediacyand conventional dis29 The closest clinicianscome to an economicdefinitionis the "[f]requentbuyingof more
than can be afforded,more than is needed, or for longer periods of time than intended."Kim
Bullockand LorrinKoran,Psychopharmacology
of CompulsiveBuying,39 Drugs of Today695,
696 (2003).
30 For short-livedepisodeswhere discountingis likely to be weak (for example,evaluating
an operation,a movie or a weekendgetaway),Kahneman,Wakker,and Sarinproposeand axiomatizea rule that takes the integralof momentarylikingover time.112 Q J Econ at 390 (citedin
note 8).
31 See TedO'DonoghueandMatthewRabin,Doing It Now or Later,89 Am Econ Rev 103,
106 (1999) (discussingpreferencesas time-inconsistentor present-biased,meaningthat a per-

This content downloaded from 190.232.56.220 on Thu, 2 Oct 2014 01:48:47 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

100

The Universityof ChicagoLaw Review

[73:87

countingof futurerewards.32These preferencescan be characterizedas

reflectingbehaviorof a wantingsystem that weightscurrentliking too
heavily,compared to exponential discounting.Let's consider two examples:addictivedrugsand creditcardspending.
1. Addictive drugs.
The hallmarksof addictive drugs are tolerance (largerdoses are
needed to produce equal hedonic sensations) and withdrawal(unpleasant physicalsensationsduringabstinence).A naturaland fruitful
way to model these effects is through state-dependence of current
or a richerview in which states are nuutility on past consumption;"3
merical summariesof use histories that go up or down when addicts
use or abstain.4 In any case, a centralissue is whetherpotential addicts
rationally anticipatehow current consumptioncreates tolerance and
possible future withdrawal.A key predictionof the rationaladdiction
model is that currentconsumptionresponds to expected future price
changes,as it appearsto do."Aggregateddata are too coarse,however,
to tell whether some potential addicts refuse to start,or whether active users quit,in the face of futureprice increases.
In the wanting-likingview, addictionmeans that wanting can be
created by a desire to avoid the pain of withdrawal,or is triggeredby
craving("self-medication"),but the drugadministrationis not actually
son's relativepreferencefor well-beingat an earlierdate versusa laterdate will changedepending on whenhe or she is asked);David Laibson,GoldenEggsand HyperbolicDiscounting,112 Q
J Econ 443,445-46 (1997) (discussinghow decisionmakersforesee theirown dynamicallyinconsistent discountrates over short horizons(high) and long horizonsand commit themselvesto
nonliquidassetsto constraintheirfutureselves).
32 See SamuelM. McClure,et al, SeparateNeuralSystemsValueImmediateand Delayed
MonetaryRewards,306 Science503, 506 (2004) (describinghow separatefunctionsexist in the
brainassociatedwith immediatepreferences(possiblyreflectingevolutionaryadaptations)and
abstractfuturepreferencesand how these separatefunctionsmay explainthe idiosyncrasiesof
humanpreferences).
33 See generallyGaryS. Beckerand KevinM. Murphy,A Theoryof RationalAddiction,96
J PolitEcon 675 (1988) (describinga theoryof rationaladdictionthat is partiallybased on what
state of addictionan addictis in).
34 See Bernheimand Rangel,94 Am Econ Rev at 1565 (cited in note 1) (modelingaddictive states by incrementingor decrementingthe state of addictionbased on decisionsto use or
not to use-a higherstate correspondsto greateraddiction,for example,someone in state 8 is
moreaddictedthansomeonein state 5).
35 See GaryS.Becker,MichaelGrossman,andKevinM.Murphy,An EmpiricalAnalysisof
CigaretteAddiction,84 Am Econ Rev 396, 397 (1994) (discussinghow a one-periodprice increase of 10 percentreducesconsumptionin the previousperiodby 0.6 percent).See also Jonathan Gruberand Botond Kbszegi,Is Addiction"Rational"?Theoryand Evidence,116 Q J Econ
1261,1273 (2001) (showingthat consumersincreaseconsumptionby hoardingcigarettesin anticipationof futuretax increases);AngelaA. Hung,A Theoreticaland EmpiricalStudyofAddiction 86-87, unpublishedPhD dissertation,CaliforniaInstituteof Technology(2001) (findingthat
in respectto prices).
cigaretteconsumersare forward-looking

This content downloaded from 190.232.56.220 on Thu, 2 Oct 2014 01:48:47 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

2006]

Neuroscienceand Paternalism

101

pleasurable. (At best, it cures the withdrawalsymptoms;but other

cures,like rehabilitationor methadone,which do not feed the addiction as self-medicatingdoses do, may be available.)As Bernheim and
Rangel suggest, it is sensible to entertain the idea that when craving,
addicts'wantingsystems are not fully accountingfor the future dislike
(or internality)created by currentuse. This phenomenon is not easily
explained by hyperbolic discounting,because exogenous cues--like
seeing druguse in a film--can triggercraving.36
2. Creditcardspending.
For the sake of argument,suppose that at least some consumers
chargetoo muchon their credit cards,in the sense of revealinga wanting-likinggap (at least ex post). This may be due to poor understanding of how interest rates work (for example,how rapidlyinterest compounds) or insufficientappreciationfor the status quo bias of sticking
with one card after an introductory"teaserrate"period lapses."
Another possibility,in wanting-likingterms,is that the brain likes
walkingout of a store (or clicking an internet radio button,or calling
an 800-numberand imagininggoods being shipped), but the wanting
system does not anticipatethe "pain of paying"when the credit card
statement arrives."That is, currentwanting does not integrate future
dislike.
III. PATERNALISM
I adopt the textbook definition of paternalismas "the interference of a state or an individualwith another person, against his will,
and justified by a claim that the person interferedwith will be better
off or protectedfrom harm."39
In my terms,paternalismcould be justified,in terms of a person's
own welfare,if the wanting system does not produce what the liking
36 See David Laibson,A Cue-Theoryof Consumption,116 Q J Econ 81, 82-83 (2001) (explaininga cues model that assumesthat the presence of cues (sensory inputs) linked to past
consumptionaffectshabitformation).
37 See HaiyanShui and LawrenceM.Ausubel,TimeInconsistencyin the CreditCardMarket 1, 27-28 (14th Annual Utah Winter Finance Conference,May 2004), online at http://
(visited Jan 17, 2006) (explainingthat a
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers?.cfm?abstract_id=586622
hyperbolicmodelis necessaryto explainconsumerbehaviorin the creditcardmarket).
38 See DrazenPrelecand George Loewenstein,TheRed and the Black:MentalAccounting
of Savingsand Debt, 17 MarketingSci 4, 23 (1998) (describingmental methods includingprospectiveaccountingand decouplingthat allow consumersto enjoy acquisitionsat the momentof
purchasewith a credit card withoutconsideringthe unpleasantnessof payingtheir credit card
bill whenit comes due).
39 GeraldDworkin,Paternalism,EdwardN. Zalta,ed, TheStanfordEncyclopediaof Phi(visitedJan17,2006).
losophy(2006),onlineat http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paternalism

This content downloaded from 190.232.56.220 on Thu, 2 Oct 2014 01:48:47 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

102

The Universityof ChicagoLaw Review

[73:87

system likes and if the interventioncreates more liking than the person would achieve on his own or with market-suppliedhelp.40
Ideally,such paternalismwould be "libertarian"in the sense that
it would only intervenein choice when some kind of regulationis necessary (for example,setting a default),4'and would be "asymmetric"in
the sense that little harmwould be done to people whose wantingand
likingsystemsare well-synched.42
Paternalismcould take two mild forms,licensingand dramatizing.
"Licensing"is checkingwhetherwantingand likingare sufficientlysynchronizedto permit a person to make choices on his own (presumably
in a particulardomain)."Dramatizing"is using mechanismsto remind
the wantingsystem,at the time of choice,aboutlikingthat may be overlooked or missynchronizedwithwanting.
A. Licensing
Driving tests provide a model for how licensingmight occur,as a
way to certify sufficient education of the wanting system. Because
adolescents develop the hand-eye coordinationand patience to drive
safely at different ages, and learningto drive takes time and supervision, the currentpolicy makes sense: prohibit drivingby all children
up to a certain age;43 issue learner's permits that allow driving only
when a supervisingadult is present (so the learnerscan learn); then
force would-be driversto pass written and physicaldrivingtests,preferably with periodic retesting and other constraints(such as license
suspensionafter accidents).
One can imagine a "credit-cardpermit"test that is conceptually
similarto a drivingtest.Treata creditcardas a piece of equipmentthat
40 A shadowis alwayscast on this
type of analysisby the naggingquestion,"Howcan we
be so sure that theywon'tlike it?"Thereare two centralproblems:a slipperyslope,and capture.
The slipperyslope argumentis that interferingwith OCD patientsmightmake it legally or politicallyeasier for more interferencein similarbehaviorsthat are less scientificallygroundedas
disorders.The captureconcernis that paternalisticpolicies will be guided or shaped (in their
detail) by special interestswho either profit from interference(for example,prohibitingprice
advertisingfor eyeglasses)or who want to "saveothers"(for example,religiousfanatics).A full
analysisof any policyshould,of course,anticipateboth slipperyslope escalationandcapture.It is
too muchto ask at this earlystage,however,when detailsof even a singlepolicy are speculative,
to anticipatethese problemsandrespondto them,at least in this shortEssay.
41 See generallyRichardH. Thalerand Cass R. Sunstein,LibertarianPaternalism,93 Am
Econ Rev 175 (2003);CassR. Sunsteinand RichardH. Thaler,LibertarianPaternalismIs Not an
Oxymoron,70 U Chi L Rev 1159(2003).
42 See generallyColin
BehavioralEconomics
Camerer,et al, Regulationfor Conservatives:
and the Casefor "Asymmetric
151 U Pa L Rev 1211(2003).
Paternalism,"
43 Some states have a "farmlicense"that allows very young childrento drive in certain
situations.For example,in North Dakota,fourteen-year-olds
can drive farmvehicleswithin150
miles of their farm.LicenseClassifications(North Dakota Dept of Transportation
2005), online
at http://www.state.nd.us/dot/dlclass.html
(visitedJan17,2006).

This content downloaded from 190.232.56.220 on Thu, 2 Oct 2014 01:48:47 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Neuroscienceand Paternalism

2006]

103

a user should know how to operate. Require potential borrowersto

take a quiz with some basic questions,like how rapidlyinterest compounds and how long it takes to pay off a $1,000balance if minimum
paymentsare made and interestaccumulates.Perhapshave them speak
with a counseloror with experiencedadults,some of whom used cards
wisely and otherswho declaredbankruptcyand regretit. The test could
also use the opportunityto educatepotentialborrowersaboutbasicborrowing rates and phenomena(much as drivingtests remindpeople of
trafficlaws and some facts).The paternalismhere is asymmetricbecause
if borrowersknowthesefacts,the test canbe designedto be easy to pass.
B. Dramatizing
Another mild paternalisticintervention could be used in cases
where one suspects the wanting system is not accountingfor future
liking or dislikingcorrectly,by bringingfuture liking and dislikingvividly into the present.This is often done in "scaredstraight"films and
talk-showinterventionsthat show juvenile delinquentswhat prison is
like.44
Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) (one of the more successfultreatment programs)uses vivid testimonials by other AA members that
remind sober alcoholics of all the crazy and destructive things that
alcoholics do when they are drinking. Teenagers in high school
programscan be made to carryarounda baby who periodicallysimulates an infant'stypicalneeds (crying,changing,nursing),to dramatize
the constraintthat resultsfrom earlyparenthood.
A combinationof nutritionalmodeling and computer morphing
of a body image could be used to show a person, for example, what
they would look like in one year if they continue their steady diet of
fast food or, oppositely,if they stuck with their personal trainerthree
times a week for a year.
C. Calibration
A strong paternalisticinterventionis to try to calibrateliking directly,and then require choosers to considertheir liking ratingswhen
making choices (weak form) or to force them to choose the goods
they liked most (strongform). Of course,the success of this technique
depends on how well likingis measured.

44 Unfortunately,the availableevidencesuggeststhese programsdon'tworkvery well. See

Surgeon General, Youth Violence:A Report of the Surgeon General 95 (2001), online at
(visited Jan 17, 2006) (discussingresults that show
http://media.shs.net/ken/pdf/surgeon/SG.pdf
shockprogramssuch as ScaredStraighthave equal or higherrearrestrates than exposureto no
programat all).

This content downloaded from 190.232.56.220 on Thu, 2 Oct 2014 01:48:47 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

104

The Universityof ChicagoLaw Review

[73:87

The kind of thing I have in mind is a blind taste test-tasters rate

objects,and then automaticallychoose the one they rated most highly.
This could improve choice if there is a component of wanting,like a
brandname, that is not a genuine component of liking.But of course,
if taste is not the only component of liking, then true liking is mismeasuredby this kind of calibration.
D. Delegating Choice
When there are wanting-likinggaps,it is possible that somebody
else knows more about what you would really like than you do. Having the local wine connoisseurat dinner choose the wine for the table
is a common and good practice.From our point of view, delegating
choice is wise if the expert knows about typicalpatternsof mistakes-commonly wanted choices that are typicallydisliked later ("don't fill
up on bread;save room for dessert").Allowing experts some say in a
person'schoice is a form of paternalism;in the weak form,the chooser
is forced to hear an expert opinion (for example, a marriagecounselor's report);in the strong form, the expert can overrule the choice
or impose a choice.4"
Arrangedmarriagesare an interestingexampleof variousdegrees
of this sort of delegation.Ignoringexternalitieslike family pride and
businessconnectionscementedby marriage,the argumentfor arranging
a marriageis that membersof a prospectivecouple know less about
what kind of people they will truly like in the long run than a matchmaker (often a parent) does. The couple'sjudgments might naturally
overweighobservableshort-runattributes(for example,attractiveness
and sex appeal)andunderweighless observablelong-runattributes(for
example,fidelityor good parenting),while wiser and older matchmakers weightthese attributesmore accurately.
Indeed,a smallpartof thisconceptis alreadybuiltinto law:in all but
three Americanstates,minimummarriageages are lower with parental
consentthan withoutconsent.This gap in consentages can be seen as a
policy that permitsmarriageat age fifteen (in Utah, for example),but
witha parentalveto thatcan delaymarriageuntilage eighteen.46
E. PromotingLearning
In the face of status quo bias, a common type of wanting-liking
mistake might be underexperimentingto find out what you really like
most. If this is so, a paternalistic policy that subsidizes or forces experi45 One argumentaboutthe influenceof defaultsis that they implicitlyconvey information
aboutthe best choices.
46 Utah CodeAnn ? 30-1-9(2005).

This content downloaded from 190.232.56.220 on Thu, 2 Oct 2014 01:48:47 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

2006]

Neuroscienceand Paternalism

105

mentation could be justified,especiallyfor momentousdecisions with

irreversibleconsequences-like choosinga profession,or a spouse.
Another example is hospital rotations,in which interns are exposed to many differenttypes of medicine (presumablyto help them
learn what specialtyappealsto them most).
The Amish tradition of "rumspringa"is a model for forced experimentation(although it serves a different purpose than I have in
mind).At the age of sixteen,Amish youths are released from the strictures of the churchand allowed to "runaround"(which is the meaning of the PennsylvaniaDutch term). After some months or years,
they can choose to be baptized and enter the church as an adult,but
must then accept restrictionson behaviorand dress;if they don't,typically the disappointedAmish family cuts off all contact. (Around 90
percent return to the church.) The philosophybehind rumspringais
that paternalismis acceptableuntil sixteen,but afterthat point,a young
adult should be entitled to make an informeddecision about lifelong
membership,and can only do so by exploringthe "Devil'sPlayground"
(Amish slang for the decadent outside world--such as my neighborhood in Los Angeles, where the realityTV show "Amishin the City"
was filmed).
A "minirumspringa"
could include mandatoryfield trips to forfor
school
countries
students,so they can see anotherpart of
high
eign
the world, exposure to arts and sports they are unfamiliarwith, and
"internationalday"food smorgasbords.This kind of experimentation
could be bundled into educational experiences in public schools or
universities.
F.

Can MarketsEquateWantingand Liking?

Of course,paternalismmay be unnecessaryif privatemarkettransactionspromote learning,or bringwantingand liking together.So it is

importantto ask whethermarketscan equate wanting-likinggaps.The
answeris likely to depend on details of the phenomenonand on some
aspectsof industrystructureandtechnology.
A crucial feature is self-awareness:Do people know they want
what they don't like (or vice versa)? Put differently,do they have a
metapreferencefor restrainingwanting (do they want not to want)?
In cases like addiction,individualsseem to vary on this dimension.So
there is a hope for at least some people to contractprivatelyfor help
(for example, voluntary drug rehab, or gastric bypass "stomach stapling"surgeryfor obesity).47
47 Stomachstaplingis an interestingcase.It is an extremesurgeryin whichthe stomachis
"stapled"down to the size of a shot glass,and part of the duodenumis removedto create a di-

This content downloaded from 190.232.56.220 on Thu, 2 Oct 2014 01:48:47 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

106

The Universityof ChicagoLaw Review

[73:87

In general,when consumershave limitedrationalityor willpower,

there will be a tug-of-warin which firms compete to profit from "exploiting"them-for example,showing tempting hamburgercommercials-and to profit from protecting them. What happens in equilibriumwill take some carefulthoughtand a lot of informationabout the
nature of the wanting-likinggap, consumer self-awareness,and other
details.
For example,firmscould profitablyexploit shopaholicsby making
it very easy to feel the pleasure of buying (for example,QVC home
shoppingnetwork-"operators standingby!"),or by creatingstringent
return policies.Alternatively,firms could help shopaholicswith other
institutionalfixes: rental markets for goods that are often little-used,
like gym equipment;and low-cost tradinginstitutionsfor getting rid of
unusedgoods,like flea marketsand eBay (and eBay consignmentfirms
that sell on eBay for you).48The latterinstitutionsenable economicbulimia-shopaholics can enjoy the pleasure of buying goods, while disgorgingthe goods laterif they are unused.
IV. TOWARDA POSITIVEWANTING-LIKING
THEORY OF PATERNALISM

The argumentsabove are a very rough sketch-science fiction, at

this point-of how neuroscientificunderstandingof wanting and liking could eventuallyinforma reasoned approachto selective paternalism. But this frameworkmight also have some value as a positive theory to explain paternalismthat is widely accepted, and also explain
differencesin paternalismacrosshistoryand cultures.
Below are some examples of where paternalisticrestrictionsare
alreadyin place.I know too little about any of these domainsto do the
proper scholarship,but the ideal positive analysiswould work like so:
ask whetherregulationsare justifiedin wanting-likingterms,and look
gestive shortcut.Postsurgerypatientsreporthavingto eat smallamountsregularly.A large majority lose a large amountof weight and keep it off. Some are such compulsiveeaters that they
eat too much and bust the staples.Interestingly,the large majorityof patientsare female.It is
also notable that these $25,000surgeriesare very profitable.So hospitalsare eager to do the
surgery,which shows how supply-sideconsiderationsare importantin determiningwantinglikinggaps in equilibrium.See Lisa Girion,HospitalsHungerfor Losses,LA TimesAl (June7,
2005) (discussingthe popularity,profitability,and potentialrisks of stomachstaplingsurgery).
See also Atul Gawande,Complications:ASurgeon'sNotes on an ImperfectScience178-79 (Metropolitan2002) (notingthat gastric-bypasssurgeryis effective for more than 80 percentof patients).
48 In the revealed-preference
approach,generousreturnpolicies presumablyindicatethat
returnsare rare,or that returnedgoods are randomforecastingmistakes(whichis consistent
witha view of rationalchoicein whichpeople can'talwaysguessperfectlywhatthey'lllike).

This content downloaded from 190.232.56.220 on Thu, 2 Oct 2014 01:48:47 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

2006]

Neuroscienceand Paternalism

107

for historical or cross-sectionalvariations in wanting-likinggaps as

justificationfor differentregulations.
A. Minors
People under the age of eighteen are restricted from a great
many activities.In the United States,differentstates have variousages
at which minors can legally drive cars, buy cigarettes,drink alcohol,
consent to sex, quit school, and get married.I'm not an expert on the
history and basis for these restrictions,but presumablythey are all at
least loosely grounded in some presumptionthat wanting and liking
systemsin minorsare not fully connectedby learning(and in concerns
for externalities,such as those causedby recklessteenage drivers).
As the brain develops, it is very unlikely that all minors develop
wanting-likingsynchronyat the same rate. Of course, there is obviously an advantage to having an easily enforced step function rule,
like prohibitingalcohol use by people under twenty-one,even if it is
understood that some teenagers are able to "handle it" (and some
adults over twenty-one are not). Nonetheless, a litmus test for wanting-likingsynchronycould conceivablybe used as a substitutefor uniform rules based on age.
B. SexualAge of Consent
Sex is a challengefor paternalism.Because there is little externality (other than potential pregnancy,family honor, and so forth), consent age restrictionsmust have to do with either limitingcompetition
or pure paternalism. Legal consent ages are remarkably similar
worldwide,averagingsixteen years old.49In the United States,consent
ages vary,and the minimumages across the world range from twelve
(Mexico, the Philippines,Panama, and Zimbabwe) to twenty (Tunisia).50
C. Mental Incompetence
Tests of mental competence might be understoodin this way.A
typical criterionin psychiatricevaluation of involuntarycommitment
is whether a patient is a "dangerto self and others."A danger to self
can easily be construedas the capacityto choose (want) what is harmful (disliked).
(vis49 WorldwideAges of Consent(2005), online at http://www.avert.org/aofconsent.htm
ited Jan17,2006).
50 Few partsof the worldhave differentages for boys and girls (despite strikingevidence
of differencesin teenage development,or perhapsbecause of that evidence). Bolivia, Hong
Kong,and Iranhave lowerages for girls,andBotswanahas a lowerage for boys.Id.

This content downloaded from 190.232.56.220 on Thu, 2 Oct 2014 01:48:47 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

The Universityof ChicagoLaw Review

108

[73:87

An interestingexample,althoughnot intended as paternalismper

se, comes from a most unlikely source-Judge RichardPosner'sblog.
In thinkingabout mandatoryretirement,Posnerwrote,
I wish to make a suggestionthat would achievethe principalbenefits of mandatoryretirementwithout the principalcosts.It is simply this:beginningat age 70, requireevery life-tenuredprofessor
and every life-tenuredjudge to take a test of mental acuityevery
five years. (I use these simply as examples of "light"jobs from
which the occupant is unlikely to be forced to retire by the demands that the job places on him.) The test results would be
available to the members of the professor'sdepartmentor the
judge'scourtbut to no others.The resultswould not be a basis for
a determinationof incapacity;they would not even be admissible
in a competence hearing.The expectation rather is that a poor
test result would persuadethe individual,perhapsby persuading
his colleagueswho wouldin turnpersuadehim,or persuademembers of his familyto persuadehim,to retirevoluntarily.1
As he notes, Posner is not eager to use such tests paternalistically
to restrict a person's employment opportunities,but one could imagine doing so in extreme cases or in conjunctionwith other measuresof
workplacecompetence.
D. Cooling Off
"Coolingoff" laws allow consumersto breach contractsfor purchases within some period (typicallyshort, such as three days).52Such
laws are easily understoodas an expressionof the belief that consumers in a "hot"emotional state may want something,but later realize
they don't need it, can't afford it, or won't like it. (Such laws might
also help in resolvinghousehold disputes,but the law typicallymakes
no restrictionson marriedcouples.)
E. Sin Taxes
"Sin taxes"are designed to internalizeexternalities,and possibly
"internalities"from consumptionof sinful goods like alcohol and cigarettes. Obviously, an ideal policy should be grounded in a specific
51 RichardPosner,Refusingto Retire:WhatCan Be Done WhenPeople OverstayTheir
Welcome,The Becker-Posner Blog (June 5, 2005), online at http://www.becker-posner(visitedJan17,2006).
blog.com/archives/2005/06/refusingtoret.html
52 See, for example.Camerer,et al, 151 U Pa L Rev at 1238-47 (cited in note 42) (discussing "coolingoff"in regardsto consumerprotection,familylaw,settlementagreements,and other
potentialapplications).

This content downloaded from 190.232.56.220 on Thu, 2 Oct 2014 01:48:47 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

2006]

Neuroscienceand Paternalism

109

model of how much taxes will reduce consumption,and how large

externalitiesand internalitiesare.Gruberand KOszegi's"approachis a
good modern example that computes an optimal sin tax from a particularmodel. It is easy to quibblewith the details of their work or the
(large) sin tax they deduce.The point, however, is that sin taxes do
exist. In the wanting-likingframework,they are a blunt instrument
that substitutes a wanting-systemforecast of future-dislikingwith a
currentbudget constraintthatpresumablyenters into wanting.
CONCLUSION

The idea in this highly speculativeEssay is simple:there is evidence from mice with gene "knockdowns"that wanting (choice) and
liking (hedonic reaction) are dissociated.There are many types of evidence with humanstoo--like addictswho report a compulsionto use
drugs,but say they get no pleasure (admittedly,all this evidence relies
on directmeasurementof liking).
This type of evidence invites a wanting-learning-liking
interpretais
and
tion of choice and utility.Wantingguides choice,
liking the same
as the hedonic (Benthamite)conceptof utility.Learningis a processby
whichthe wantingsystemcomes to know whatthe likingsystemlikes.
A historicaldiscursionon the developmentof revealed-preference
theory54is a reminderthat equating unobservedutility with observed
choice--assuming wanting forecasts liking correctly--was a conventional simplification,not the result of any proof or data. At the same
time, Pareto, who advocated such a simplification,readily admitted
that assumingthat choices match the "subjectivefact"of utility is justified by restrictingattention to repeated actions,where learning has
had a chance to work. (His view is echoed by recent advocates of a
"discoveredpreference hypothesis.")By emphasizingrepetition and
learning as the conditions under which wanting and liking coincide,
Pareto is actuallya surprisingprogenitorfor the ideas in this Essay.
Distinguishingwanting, liking, and learning does two things: It
generalizesrevealed-preferencetheory,because conventionalrevealedpreferenceis the specialcase where learninghas taughtwantingwhat is
liked. And it provides a languagefor talkingabout paternalism.Government paternalismis justified if there is a verifiable gap between
wantingand liking,marketsdo not close the gap, and no other harms
are created.
Here are a few very roughwayspaternalismmightwork to equate
wantingand liking:
53 See GruberandKoszegi,116 Q J Econ at 1285-93(citedin note 35).
54 See Bruniand Sugden,TheRoadNot Taken1 (citedin note 2).

This content downloaded from 190.232.56.220 on Thu, 2 Oct 2014 01:48:47 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

110

The Universityof ChicagoLaw Review

[73:87

* Licensing--checkingthat a person has informedbeliefs that influenceexpectedliking(for example,a "creditcarddriver'stest");

* Dramatizing--makingfuturecomponentsof likingvivid;
* Calibrating--seeingif a person'swantingand likingare matched,
and if not, forcingchoicebased on measuredliking;
* Delegating choice--allowing an expert who can forecast liking
to make or constraina choice (for example,matchmaking);and
* Promotinglearning--preventingnonwantingof goods that people would actuallylike by forcing experimentation(A la Amish
rumspringa).
Finally,paternalisticpolicies are already in place regulatingthe
minimum age of marriage and sexual consent, judgment of mental
competence,cooling off provisionsin sales,and prohibitionor sin taxation of drugsand alcohol.The wanting-liking-learning
frameworkcould
be used positively to understandhow these policies came about, and
why they varyhistoricallyand acrossjurisdictions.

This content downloaded from 190.232.56.220 on Thu, 2 Oct 2014 01:48:47 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions