G.R. No.

L-51278 May 9, 1988

HEIRS OF RAMON PIZARRO, SR., petitioners,
vs.
HON. FRANCISCO Z. CONSOLACION, CFI of Davao and LUIS TAN alias CHEN YEH-AN, respondents.
Rogelio A. Barba for petitioners.
Oscar Breva for private respondent.

FACTS:
Petitioners are the oppositors in Special Proceeding No. 2116 in the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Davao City Branch II, for
settlement of the estate of the deceased Dominga Garcia, filed by private respondent herein, Luis Tan alias Chen Yeh-An.
The records disclose that on August 12,1977, Luis Tan filed a verified petition with the CFI of Davao for the issuance of letters of
administration in favor of a certain Alfonso Atilano.
On October 4, 1977, petitioners filed an opposition to the said petition claiming that they are the heirs of Ramon Pizarro who died
intestate on June 16, 1974; and that the deceased was the vendee of one-half (1/2) of the aforementioned lot by virtue of an
extrajudicial settlement of estate and deed of absolute sale executed by Vicente Tan in Hongkong on May 27, 1966. Petitioners
prayed that letters of administration of Dominga Garcia's estate be issued in favor of anyone of them.
Accordingly, on March 27, 1978, after the judicial administrator had qualified and his inventory of the assets of the late Dominga
Garcia was approved, respondent court issued an order requiring the filing of creditors' claim against the said estate within the
period of six (6) months from the date of the first publication.
Meanwhile, on January 23,1979, private respondent and the City of Davao filed a joint motion asking respondent court to take
notice of their agreement which in substance provides for an agreement to file a joint motion in the CFI of Davao to proceed with the
determination of the heirs of the deceased Domingao Garcia which shall be determinative of their respective claims against the
estate. On February 19, 1979, petitioners filed their opposition to the said joint motion on the sole ground that it is without procedural
basis. Private respondent filed his reply thereto on February 21, 1979.
On February 28, 1979, private respondent filed a motion to drop and exclude the petitioners on the ground that they do not even
claim to be the heirs of the deceased Dominga Garcia and that the extrajudicial deed of partition and deed of absolute sale allegedly
executed in Hongkong in favor of the petitioners' deceased father is spurious and simulated. On March 5, 1979, petitioners filed their
opposition to said motion.
They likewise filed a claim against the estate of the deceased Garcia in the amount of P350,000.00 representing services allegedly
rendered by their deceased father in favor of Vicente Tan. On March 8, 1979, private respondent filed a reply to petitioners'
opposition and a motion to strike out or dismiss the claim on the ground that it is spurious and barred for having been filed beyond
the six (6) month period set in the notice for the filing of creditors' claim.
On March 29, 1979, petitioners filed another claim against the estate for P200,000.00 allegedly advanced by their deceased father
for the payment of realty and income taxes of the said lot sometime in 1936, to which claim private respondent filed an opposition on
the ground that it is barred for having been filed beyond the six (6) month period and that it was merely intended to delay the
proceedings.
In the Order of June 1, 1979, respondent court dismissed both claims of the petitioners on the ground that they are barred for having
been filed out of time. On June 26, 1979, petitioners filed a notice of appeal stating that they are appealing the order of June 1, 1979
to the Court of Appeals in so far as it declared their claims barred.
On July 5, 1979, private respondent filed an opposition to the projected appeal on the ground that the appeal involves a pure
question of law and thus, the same should be directed to the Supreme Court. On July 17, 1979, respondent court issued an order
dismissing petitioners' appeal and directed petitioners to file instead a petition for review on certiorari before this Court.
It is the position of the petitioners that the order of June 1, 1979 of the respondent court, which directed that the filing of claims
against the estate of the late Dominga Garcia be filed within six (6) months after the first publication of the notice thereof, is null and
void in that it is violative of Section 2, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court. They contend that said provision mandates that the
filing of such claims should be for a period of six (6) months starting from the sixth month after the date of the first publication of the

notice down to the twelfth month. They argue that to require filing of claims within the sixth month from publication of notice will
shorten the period in violation of the mandatory provisions of Section 2, Rule 86, which provides:
Sec. 2. Time within which claims shall be filed. In the notice provided in the preceding section, the court shall
state the time for the filing of claims against the estate, which shall not be more than twelve (12) nor less than
six (6) months after the date of the first publication of the notice. However, at anytime before an order of
distribution is entered, on application of a creditor who has failed to file his claim within the time previously
limited, the court may, for cause shown and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be filed within a
time not exceeding one (1) months.
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of claims within the sixth month from publication of notice will shorten the period in violation of the
mandatory provisions of Section 2, Rule 86?
RULING:
We agree. The range of the period specified in the rule is intended to give the probate court the discretion to fix the period for the
filing of claims. The probate court is permitted by the rule to set the period provided it is not less than six (6) months nor more than
twelve (12) months from the date of the first publication of the notice thereof. Such period once fixed by the court is mandatory.
The purpose of the law, in fixing a period within which claims against an estate must be presented, is to insure a speedy settlement
of the affairs of the deceased person and the early delivery of the property to the person entitled to the same.
In Sikat vs. Vda. Mafincode Villanueva, this Court ruled that the speedy settlement of the estate of deceased persons for the benefit
of creditors and those entitled to the residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of administration have
been paid is the ruling spirit of our probate law.
However, in this case the trial court set the period for the filing of the claims within six (6) months from the date of the first
publication of the notice. It was obviously short of the minimum limit of six (6) months provided for by the law. Petitioner correctly
observed that the trial court thereby shortened the period set by the law.
Since the notice issued and the period set by the trial court was not in accordance with the requirements of Section 2, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court, what should then apply is the period as provided for by the rules which is not less than six months nor more than
twelve (12) months from the date of first publication of notice. The first publication of the notice in the Mindanao Times was on
March 30, 1978. Thus the two claims of petitioners against the estate which were filed on March 5, 1979 and March 29, 1979
respectively were filed on time.
In the present case, when the lower court found that the order sought to be appealed was its order of June 1, 1979, wherein it held
that the claims filed by petitioners against the estates were barred having been filed beyond the period fixed by the trial court in the
notice, which appeal involves an interpretation of Section 2, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, instead of giving due course to the notice
of appeal to the Court of Appeals filed by petitioners, the petitioners were instructed to file a petition for review with this Court as the
issue is a pure question of law.
We find the action taken by the trial court to be well-taken. Certainly, it is within the competence and jurisdiction of the trial court to
determine whether the appeal interposed was based on pure questions of law or involves both questions of law and facts in
considering the appeal. It must be noted that in the notice of appeal it is not even required that the appellant indicate the court to
which its appeal is being interposed. The requirement is merely directory and failure to comply with it or error in the court indicated is
not fatal to the appeal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the orders of the respondent court of June 1, 1979 and July 17, 1979 are reversed
and set aside in so far as the claims filed by petitioners were found to be barred, the same having been timely filed, without
pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. L-51278 May 9, 1988

HEIRS OF RAMON PIZARRO, SR., petitioners,
vs.
HON. FRANCISCO Z. CONSOLACION, CFI of Davao and LUIS TAN alias CHEN YEH-AN, respondents.
Rogelio A. Barba for petitioners.
Oscar Breva for private respondent.

FACTS:
Petitioners are the oppositors in Special Proceeding No. 2116 in the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Davao City Branch II, for
settlement of the estate of the deceased Dominga Garcia, filed by private respondent herein, Luis Tan alias Chen Yeh-An.
The records disclose that on August 12,1977, Luis Tan filed a verified petition with the CFI of Davao for the issuance of letters of
administration in favor of a certain Alfonso Atilano.
On October 4, 1977, petitioners filed an opposition to the said petition claiming that they are the heirs of Ramon Pizarro who died
intestate on June 16, 1974; and that the deceased was the vendee of one-half (1/2) of the aforementioned lot by virtue of an
extrajudicial settlement of estate and deed of absolute sale executed by Vicente Tan in Hongkong on May 27, 1966. Petitioners
prayed that letters of administration of Dominga Garcia's estate be issued in favor of anyone of them.
Accordingly, on March 27, 1978, after the judicial administrator had qualified and his inventory of the assets of the late Dominga
Garcia was approved, respondent court issued an order requiring the filing of creditors' claim against the said estate within the
period of six (6) months from the date of the first publication.
Meanwhile, on January 23,1979, private respondent and the City of Davao filed a joint motion asking respondent court to take
notice of their agreement which in substance provides for an agreement to file a joint motion in the CFI of Davao to proceed with the
determination of the heirs of the deceased Domingao Garcia which shall be determinative of their respective claims against the
estate. On February 19, 1979, petitioners filed their opposition to the said joint motion on the sole ground that it is without procedural
basis. Private respondent filed his reply thereto on February 21, 1979.
On February 28, 1979, private respondent filed a motion to drop and exclude the petitioners on the ground that they do not even
claim to be the heirs of the deceased Dominga Garcia and that the extrajudicial deed of partition and deed of absolute sale allegedly
executed in Hongkong in favor of the petitioners' deceased father is spurious and simulated. On March 5, 1979, petitioners filed their
opposition to said motion.
They likewise filed a claim against the estate of the deceased Garcia in the amount of P350,000.00 representing services allegedly
rendered by their deceased father in favor of Vicente Tan. On March 8, 1979, private respondent filed a reply to petitioners'
opposition and a motion to strike out or dismiss the claim on the ground that it is spurious and barred for having been filed beyond
the six (6) month period set in the notice for the filing of creditors' claim.
On March 29, 1979, petitioners filed another claim against the estate for P200,000.00 allegedly advanced by their deceased father
for the payment of realty and income taxes of the said lot sometime in 1936, to which claim private respondent filed an opposition on
the ground that it is barred for having been filed beyond the six (6) month period and that it was merely intended to delay the
proceedings.
In the Order of June 1, 1979, respondent court dismissed both claims of the petitioners on the ground that they are barred for having
been filed out of time. On June 26, 1979, petitioners filed a notice of appeal stating that they are appealing the order of June 1, 1979
to the Court of Appeals in so far as it declared their claims barred.
On July 5, 1979, private respondent filed an opposition to the projected appeal on the ground that the appeal involves a pure
question of law and thus, the same should be directed to the Supreme Court. On July 17, 1979, respondent court issued an order
dismissing petitioners' appeal and directed petitioners to file instead a petition for review on certiorari before this Court.
It is the position of the petitioners that the order of June 1, 1979 of the respondent court, which directed that the filing of claims
against the estate of the late Dominga Garcia be filed within six (6) months after the first publication of the notice thereof, is null and
void in that it is violative of Section 2, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court. They contend that said provision mandates that the
filing of such claims should be for a period of six (6) months starting from the sixth month after the date of the first publication of the

notice down to the twelfth month. They argue that to require filing of claims within the sixth month from publication of notice will
shorten the period in violation of the mandatory provisions of Section 2, Rule 86, which provides:
Sec. 2. Time within which claims shall be filed. In the notice provided in the preceding section, the court shall
state the time for the filing of claims against the estate, which shall not be more than twelve (12) nor less than
six (6) months after the date of the first publication of the notice. However, at anytime before an order of
distribution is entered, on application of a creditor who has failed to file his claim within the time previously
limited, the court may, for cause shown and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be filed within a
time not exceeding one (1) months.
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of claims within the sixth month from publication of notice will shorten the period in violation of the
mandatory provisions of Section 2, Rule 86?
RULING:
We agree. The range of the period specified in the rule is intended to give the probate court the discretion to fix the period for the
filing of claims. The probate court is permitted by the rule to set the period provided it is not less than six (6) months nor more than
twelve (12) months from the date of the first publication of the notice thereof. Such period once fixed by the court is mandatory.
The purpose of the law, in fixing a period within which claims against an estate must be presented, is to insure a speedy settlement
of the affairs of the deceased person and the early delivery of the property to the person entitled to the same.
In Sikat vs. Vda. Mafincode Villanueva, this Court ruled that the speedy settlement of the estate of deceased persons for the benefit
of creditors and those entitled to the residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of administration have
been paid is the ruling spirit of our probate law.
However, in this case the trial court set the period for the filing of the claims within six (6) months from the date of the first
publication of the notice. It was obviously short of the minimum limit of six (6) months provided for by the law. Petitioner correctly
observed that the trial court thereby shortened the period set by the law.
Since the notice issued and the period set by the trial court was not in accordance with the requirements of Section 2, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court, what should then apply is the period as provided for by the rules which is not less than six months nor more than
twelve (12) months from the date of first publication of notice. The first publication of the notice in the Mindanao Times was on
March 30, 1978. Thus the two claims of petitioners against the estate which were filed on March 5, 1979 and March 29, 1979
respectively were filed on time.
In the present case, when the lower court found that the order sought to be appealed was its order of June 1, 1979, wherein it held
that the claims filed by petitioners against the estates were barred having been filed beyond the period fixed by the trial court in the
notice, which appeal involves an interpretation of Section 2, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, instead of giving due course to the notice
of appeal to the Court of Appeals filed by petitioners, the petitioners were instructed to file a petition for review with this Court as the
issue is a pure question of law.
We find the action taken by the trial court to be well-taken. Certainly, it is within the competence and jurisdiction of the trial court to
determine whether the appeal interposed was based on pure questions of law or involves both questions of law and facts in
considering the appeal. It must be noted that in the notice of appeal it is not even required that the appellant indicate the court to
which its appeal is being interposed. The requirement is merely directory and failure to comply with it or error in the court indicated is
not fatal to the appeal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the orders of the respondent court of June 1, 1979 and July 17, 1979 are reversed
and set aside in so far as the claims filed by petitioners were found to be barred, the same having been timely filed, without
pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. L-46095 November 23, 1977

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION, FABAR INCORPORATED, JOSE MA. BARREDO, CARMEN B. BORROMEO and TOMAS
L. BORROMEO, respondents.
FACTS:
Philippine National Bank (hereafter referred to as the petitioner), on January 16, 1963, granted in favor of respondent Fabar
Incorporated various credit accommodations and advances in the form of a discounting line, overdraft line, temporary overdraft line
and letters of credit covering the importation of machinery and equipment. Petitioner likewise made advances by way of insurance
premiums covering the chattels subject matter of a mortgage securing the aforementioned credit accommodations. Said credit
accommodations had an outstanding balance of P8,449,169.98 as of May 13, 1977.
All of the above credit accommodations are secured by the joint and several signatures of Jose Ma. Barredo, Carmen B. Borromeo
and Tomas L. Borromeo (private respondents herein) and Manuel H. Barredo- For failure of private respondents to pay their
obligations notwithstanding repeated demands, petitioner instituted a case for collection against all private respondents and Manuel
H. Barredo in a complaint dated October 31, 1972, and which was filed before the sala of the Honorable Elias B. Asuncion, Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XII (hereafter referred to as the respondent Court).
On May 19, 1975, before the case could be decided, Manuel H. Barredo died. In a Manifestation dated June 6, 1975, counsel for
private respondents informed the respondent Court of said death.
Subsequently, respondent Court issued an Order of dismissal dated November 29, 1976, which is hereinbelow quoted as follows:
In view of the death of defendant Manuel Barredo, the Court hereby dismisses this case since the present suit is for a money claim
which does not survive the death of said defendant. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which provides:
Where the obligation of the decedent is solidary with another debtor, the claim shall be filed against the decedent as if he were the
only debtor, without prejudice to the right of the estate to recover contribution from the other debtor ...the claim of plaintiff may be
filed with the estate proceedings of the decedent.
Petitioner thereupon filed a Motion dated December 14, 1976 praying for the reconsideration of respondent Court's Order dismissing
the case as against all the defendants, contending that the dismissal should only be as against the deceased defendant Manuel H.
Barredo.
In an order dated January 26, 1977, respondent Court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of meritorious grounds.
Hence, this instant petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not Respondent Court's reliance on Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court was erroneous?
Ruling:
Petitioner, in its lone assignment of error, alleged that the respondent Court erred in dismissing the case against all the defendants,
instead of dismissing the case only as against the deceased defendant and thereafter proceeding with the hearing as against the
other defendants, private respondents herein.
Petitioner's contention is well taken. Respondent Court's reliance on Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court was
erroneous.
A cursory perusal of Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court reveals that nothing therein prevents a creditor from
proceeding against the surviving solidary debtors. Said provision merely sets up the procedure in enforcing collection in case a
creditor chooses to pursue his claim against the estate of the deceased solidary debtor. The rule has been set forth that a creditor
(in a solidary obligation) has the option whether to file or not to file a claim against the estate of the solidary debtor. In construing
Section 6, Rule 87 of the old Rules of Court, which is the precursor of Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court
said, in the case of Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Villarama, et al. (107 Phil. 891) that:

It is evident from the foregoing that Section 6 of Rule 87 (of the Old Rules of Court) provides the procedure
should the creditor desire to go against the deceased debtor, but there is certainly nothing in the said provision
making compliance with such procedure a condition precedent before an ordinary action against the surviving
debtors, should the creditor choose to demand payment from the latter, could be entertained to the extent that
failure to observe the same would deprive the court jurisdiction to 'take cognizance of the action against the
surviving debtors. Upon the other hand, the Civil Code expressly allow the creditor to proceed against any one
of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously.
It is crystal clear that Article 1216 of the New Civil Code is the applicable provision in this matter. Said provision gives the creditor
the night to "proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. "The choice is undoubtedly left to
the solidary creditor to determine against whom he will enforce collection. In case of the death of one of the solidary debtors, he (the
creditor) may, if he so chooses, proceed against the surviving solidary debtors without necessity of filing a claim in the estate of the
deceased debtors. It is not mandatory for him to have the case dismissed as against the surviving debtors and file its claim against
the estate of the deceased solidary debtor, as was made apparent in the aforequoted decision. For to require the creditor to proceed
against the estate, making it a condition precedent for any collection action against the surviving debtors to prosper, would deprive
him of his substantive rights provided by Article 1216 of the New Civil Code.
As correctly argued by petitioner, if Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court were applied literally, Article 1216 of the New
Civil Code would, in effect, be repealed since under the Rules of Court, petitioner has no choice but to proceed against the estate of
Manuel Barredo only. Obviously, this provision diminishes the Bank's right under the New Civil Code to proceed against any one,
some or all of the solidary debtors. Such a construction is not sanctioned by the principle, which is too well settled to require citation,
that a substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural rule. Otherwise stated, Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court
cannot be made to prevail over Article 1216 of the New Civil Code, the former being merely procedural, while the latter, substantive
Moreover, no less than the New Constitution of the Philippines, in Section 5, Article X, provides that rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court should not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT IS HEREBY RENDERED MODIFYING THE APPEALED ORDERS OF RESPONDENT COURT
DATED NOVEMBER 29, 1976 AND JANUARY 26, 1977 IN THE SENSE THAT AS AGAINST THE DECEASED MANUEL H.
BARREDO, THE CASE IS DISMISSED, BUT AS AGAINST ALL THE OTHER SOLIDARY DEBTORS, THE CASE IS REMANDED
TO RESPONDENT COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ALLAN M. CHUA as Special Administrator of the Intestate
Estate of the late ANTONIO M. CHUA and Mrs. ASUNCION M. CHUA, G.R. No. 121597, June 29, 2001

Facts:
Spouses Antonio and Asuncion Chua were registered owners of a certain parcel of land. Upon the death of Antonio, his son Allan,
herein respondent was appointed by the probate court as special administrator. With the courts authority, Allan obtained a loan in
the amount of Php 450,000.00, payable one year thereafter and with interest 18.8% per annum from petitioner PNB, secured by a
real estate mortgage instituted on the said land owned by the spouses. However, upon the loan maturity, Allan was unable to pay
the loan. Thus, PNB extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and subsequently conducted a public auction. PNB emerged as the
highest bidder with a bid price of P306,360.00. However, the outstanding loan payable as of auction date had already ballooned to
Php 679,185.63, leaving a deficiency payable of Php 372,825.63. Petitioner filed a civil case for the recovery of said deficiency
against Asuncion and Allan Chua, the latter in his capacity as special administrator of his fathers estate.
Petitioner contended that under prevailing jurisprudence when proceeds of sale are insufficient to satisfy the debt, mortgagee has
the right to recover balance from debtor and that the applicable law in the case at bar is Act 3135 and not Sec. 7 of Rule 86(Rules of
Court). The respondent contended on the other hand that since the remedy of extrajudicial foreclosure was availed of, PNB is
precluded from filing an action to recover the balance pursuant to Sec. 7 of Rule 86.
The RTC rendered a decision dismissing the petitioner PNBs complaint. On appeal, CA affirmed the dismissal for lack of merit.
Thus, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with the SC.
Issue: Whether or not PNB can recover the deficiency
Ruling:
Petitioner PNB can no longer recover deficiency.
However, it must be pointed out that petitioners cited cases involve ordinary debts secured by a mortgage. The case at
bar, we must stress, involves a foreclosure of mortgage arising out of a settlement of estate, wherein the administrator mortgaged a
property belonging to the estate of the decedent, pursuant to an authority given by the probate court. As the Court of Appeals
correctly stated, the Rules of Court on Special Proceedings comes into play decisively.
To begin with, it is clear from the text of Section 7, Rule 89, that once the deed of real estate mortgage is recorded in the
proper Registry of Deeds, together with the corresponding court order authorizing the administrator to mortgage the property, said
deed shall be valid as if it has been executed by the deceased himself. Section 7 provides in part:
Sec. 7.Rule 89. Regulations for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber estate The court having jurisdiction of
the estate of the deceased may authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage, or otherwise
encumber real estate, in cases provided by these rules when it appears necessary or beneficial under the following regulations:
(f) There shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the province in which the real estate thus sold, mortgaged, or otherwise
encumbered is situated, a certified copy of the order of the court, together with the deed of the executor or administrator for such
real estate, which shall be valid as if the deed had been executed by the deceased in his lifetime.
In the present case, it is undisputed that the conditions under the aforecited rule have been complied with. It follows that
we must consider Sec. 7 of Rule 86, appropriately applicable to the controversy at hand.
Case law now holds that this rule grants to the mortgagee three distinct, independent and mutually exclusive remedies
that can be alternatively pursued by the mortgage creditor for the satisfaction of his credit in case the mortgagor dies, among them:
(1) to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim;
(2) to foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency as an ordinary claim; and
(3) to rely on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the same at any time before it is barred by prescription without right to file a claim
for any deficiency.
In Perez v. Philippine National Bank,10 reversing Pasno vs. Ravina,11 we held:
The ruling in Pasno vs. Ravina not having been reiterated in any other case, we have carefully reexamined the same, and after
mature deliberation have reached the conclusion that the dissenting opinion is more in conformity with reason and law. Of the three
alternative courses that section 7, Rule 87 (now Rule 86), offers the mortgage creditor, to wit, (1) to waive the mortgage and claim
the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim; (2) foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency
as an ordinary claim; and (3) to rely on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the same at any time before it is barred by prescription,
without right to file a claim for any deficiency, the majority opinion in Pasno vs. Ravina, in requiring a judicial foreclosure, virtually
wipes out the third alternative conceded by the Rules to the mortgage creditor, and which would precisely include extra-judicial
foreclosures by contrast with the second alternative.
The plain result of adopting the last mode of foreclosure is that the creditor waives his right to recover any deficiency from
the estate. Following the Perez ruling that the third mode includes extrajudicial foreclosure sales, the result of extrajudicial
foreclosure is that the creditor waives any further deficiency claim.