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doi:10.1093/jis/etp026
INTRODUCTION
The topic of Islamic education in southern Thailand has been the subject
of relatively extensive academic inquiry. However, most of this scholarship has centred on the relationship between the Thai state and the
Malay community of Pattani,1 Yala, and Narathiwat, commonly referred
to in the literature as the southernmost border provinces of Thailand.
From the prevailing literature, a number of assumptions can be gleaned
that inform the states perception of the Islamic schools in these
provinces.2 First, schools are often seen to encourage separatism by
perpetuating Malay culture in an insular and exclusivist manner. Second,
the system of Islamic education privileges religious over academic and
vocational training, and by that token does not prepare students for
modern Thai society. Concomitantly, this has resulted in the widening of
the gulf between communal and national identities. Finally, many
30
j o s e p h c hi ny o ng l i ow
it is only in recent times that the Thai language has been elevated as the language
of Islam in Thailand. Consequently, there is a growing corpus of Islamic religious
literature in Thai. There have already been a few versions of translations of the
Qur8:n. Collections of Hadiths too have been translated into Thai. The
expanding role of the Thai language within Thailands Muslim public sphere,
however, has not dislodged the entrenched position of Malay as the traditional
language of Islam, especially among the Malay Muslims of Thailand.4
31
Historically, the Patani Sultanate consisted of the area that today more or
less corresponds geographically to the provinces of Pattani, Yala, and
Narathiwat in southern Thailand, and was known between the sixteenth
and eighteenth centuries as a d:r al-Isl:m. At the same time, Patani was
also a flourishing centre of commerce and trade, where traders from
Southeast Asia met and transacted with counterparts from elsewhere on
the Asian continent as well as Europe.6
More specifically for our purpose here, it is important to note that
Patani was during this time emerging as a major centre for Islamic
learning in Southeast Asiato the extent that scholars would later
describe it as the cradle of Islam in Southeast Asia, not unlike Aceh or
Melaka.7 The pondok schools of southern Thailand and particularly the
5
This paper is cognizant of the fact that ethnic Malays are not solely
congregated in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. For instance, Satun, another
province in what is broadly known as southern Thailand or even a southern
border province, has a large number of ethnic Malays who nevertheless have
been assimilated into Thai culture, as indicated by the popularity of the Thai
language, as opposed to Malay, in the province. That said, the focus of the paper
is on Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, where most Islamic schools are found, and
where tension remains between Thai and Malay cultural practices and identity
markers.
6
One of the foremost progenitors of this nationalist narrative of Patani
history is Ibrahim Syukri. See History of the Malay Kingdom of Patani (Sejarah
Kerajaan Melayu Patani), transl. Conner Bailey and John N. Miksic (Bangkok:
Silkworm Books, 2005).
7
In this respect, Patani competed with Aceh, Kelantan, and Melaka for the
mantle of Serambi Mekkah or the Veranda of Makka.
32
j o s e p h c hi ny o ng l i ow
33
During his visit to Mecca in the 1880s, Snouck Hugronje had occasion to have
extensive contacts with the Malay community there, and to observe who were
the most influential writers living in the community at the time. One of his
interesting observations was that the writings of scholars originating from the
Patani area were significant, as measured by the regularity of their publication by
Meccan presses. Thus those Patani thinkers who made a mark in Mecca must
have left a legacy throughout the Malay world via returning students.13
34
j o s e p h c hi ny o ng l i ow
14
The traditionalists however, had insisted that the language of the Qur:n
and the khu3ba remain Arabic, the original language of Islam. The debate over
translation and the khu3ba was won by the reformists. Today, sermons are
conducted in the vernacular: Thai in Bangkok and the north as well as in the
upper southern region, and Malay in the southern border provinces. These were,
however, until more recently, two of the rare victories for the reformists.
15
This contention will be expanded in greater detail below.
16
Muhammad Kamal K. Zaman, Fatani 13 Ogos [Pattani 13 August] (Kota
Bahru: n.p, 1996), 1.
35
17
Ibid, 2.
Hayimasae, Hj Sulong Abdul Kadir, 83.
19
Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 115.
20
With the outbreak of the First World War (191418) and its expansion into
the Arab world, Haji Sulong decided to return to Patani, which he did towards
the end of 1915. On his overland journey home, he made a stopover at Kampung
Cham in Cambodia and spent time among the local Muslim community. During
his sojourn at Kampung Cham he was arrested by the French colonial
administration in Indochina on suspicion of being a Turkish spy. Though the
charges quickly proved unfounded and he was released a few days later, the
incident may well have had a profound effect on his political outlook and ignited
in him strong anti-colonial sentiments, which further resonated with his interest
in the modernist religio-political thought of 6Abduh and Rash;d Ri@:, both not
only renowned scholars of Islam but also staunch anti-colonialists.
18
Sulong was a gifted and intelligent student who memorized the entire
Qur8:n by the tender age of eight.17 Haji Sulong attended Pondok Haji
Abdul Rashid in Kampung Sungei Pandang, Patani, for his early Islamic
education before proceeding to Makka Ma8had D:r al-6Ul<m, then a
well-known institution popular among Malay-speaking students in the
vicinity of the Ka6ba.18 The years which followed were possibly the most
consequential and formative for Haji Sulong in terms of pursuit of
Islamic knowledge and his subsequent emergence as the progenitor of
reformist Islamic education and thought in the border provinces. It was
during these early years in Makka that he established a firm grounding in
formal religious studies, particularly in the classical texts. At Ma8had
D:r al-6Ul<m, Haji Sulong was trained in tafs;r (Qur8:nic exegesis),
Aad;th, uB<l al-fiqh (principles of jurisprudence) and nahw (Arabic
grammar).19 However, it was also during this time that he was exposed
to, and began to explore, reformist ideas as a result of the normative
influences through socialization, interaction, and discussions with
eminent Arab 6:lims who were followers of the Egyptian reformist
MuAammad 6Abduh.
Haji Sulongs return to Patani in 1915 was shortlived, and he went
back to Makka a year later.20 There, he was introduced by Malay 6:lims
to, and subsequently joined, the Malay-speaking Aalaqa in the Masjid alEaram. Among the 6:lims to whom he was closest were Syeikh Wan
Ahmad bin Mohamed Zain al-Fatani, a famous Patani scholar, and Tok
Kenali, a renowned Islamic scholar from the northern Malayan state of
Kelantan, which bordered Patani. Both Syeikh Wan Ahmad and Tok
Kenali were by then already prominent 6ulam:8 J:w;, a title that
recognized their stature as distinguished scholars of Islam from the
Malay world. In 1927, Haji Sulong joined the ranks of his distinguished
mentors and became a junior lecturer on Islamic jurisprudence of the
36
j o s e p h c hi ny o ng l i ow
37
23
For instance, if a particular tok guru was learned in fiqh, most likely the
pondok would focus the majority of its syllabus on the study of fiqh.
38
j o s e p h c hi ny o ng l i ow
24
growing popularity met with not a small degree of disdain from them.24
They opposed Haji Sulongs reformist religious outlook, which
invariably undermined their religious authority and status within the
strictly hierarchical Malay community. Furthermore, his ideas were
construed as an attempt to undermine the centuries-old institution of the
pondok. At the height of this opposition from traditionalist quarters, the
pondok religious elite accused Haji Sulong of undermining established
authority, dividing the Malay community, fostering instability, and
threatening the peace in the region.25 They subsequently mobilized their
considerable influence to repel the reformist vision of a new Malay
religious identity. Complaints were registered with local government
authorities, and Haji Sulongs activities came under intense scrutiny.26
Though Haji Sulong was summoned for investigation as a result of these
complaints, he was released soon after as the charges made against him
by the traditional religious elite could not be substantiated. Needless to
say, this experience only served to further inspire Haji Sulong and
convince him of the need to push through Islamic education reforms.
At the same time that he had evoked the ire of the traditional religious
leadership, Haji Sulong also enjoyed significant popular support from
various segments of the local community.27 With this support, Haji
Sulong established Patanis first private Islamic school, Madrasah alMaarif al-Wataniah Fatani, in 1933.28 Madrasah al-Maarif was a
modern Islamic school which sought to craft a curriculum around
religious, academic and vocational education, and to introduce
systematic evaluation to replace the arbitrary assessment of traditional
pondok. The curriculum at the madrasa spanned both Islamic and
secular sciences and humanities. Under Islamic science, the subjects
taught were qir:8:t (recitation of the Qur8:n), tafs;r, Aad;th, fiqh, nahw
39
29
40
j o s e p h c hi ny o ng l i ow
33
34
35
Ibid, 146.
Hayimasae, Hj Sulong Abdul Kadir, 146.
Aphornsuvan, Origins of Malay Muslim Separatism, 22.
his agenda of reform and his establishment of the madrasa were seen as
an attempt to undermine the traditional primacy of the pondok and
challenge the revered status of the tok guru. Not only did Haji Sulong
anticipate these objections, he attempted to pre-empt them by embarking
on a public campaign to persuade the tok guru of the traditional pondok
of the benefits of his modern conception of Islamic education. These
attempts received an initial boost when Haji Sulongs efforts were
endorsed by several of Patanis more prominent educators like Haji
Mohammad Idris, a widely respected scholar of Islam, popularly known
as Tok Guru Bermin, Jambu.33
Support for Haji Sulongs education reform initiative was however
short-lived. As anticipated, his efforts were paradoxically undone not by
elements from within the state but by members of the Malay community
itself, the very community he sought to uplift. The reservations of tok
guru towards Haji Sulongs reformist agenda persisted despite his
attempts to win them over, and they continued to view his initiatives not
only as a threat to the status quo, but also as an attempt to undermine
their longstanding authority and influence over the local community.34
The response was the initiation of yet another round of concerted
attempts to discredit Haji Sulong in the eyes of the Thai state by calling
his loyalty into question. Efforts were made to sow suspicion in the
minds of government officials with vivid depictions of Haji Sulongs
megalomania. Thanet Aphornsuvan describes one such attempt: the
followers [of Haji Sulong] even knelt down to take off Haji Sulongs
shoes and clean his feet for him before entering a masjid. Others were
ready to carry the umbrellas to protect [him from] the sun when he
visited the Muslim communities in the four southern provinces including
some districts in Songkhla.35 Given the fact that by then Haji Sulong
possessed the credentials of a prominent Islamic scholar and eloquent
speaker with a wide following among the local population, and also
enjoyed a political base by virtue of his position as Chairman of the
Pattani Provincial Islamic Council, it was not difficult to see how a
whispering campaign of the above nature could resonate with detractors
who had been carefully scrutinizing his movements.
Viewed with some consternation by a state not entirely comfortable
with his transformative agenda, and unable to harness extensive support
from the traditional religious elite, Haji Sulongs madrasa was closed
down in 1935 on suspicions that it was operating as a political
organization. This act of closing down the modernist school however,
41
36
For a list of the demands, see Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 152.
To be fair, it was not Madmarns intention to deal substantively with Haji
Sulongs legacy in Islamic education. Be that as it may, because he does address
the issue of curricula it is important to consider this particular aspect of the
historical context behind various attempts, including Haji Sulongs, to transform
and improve the system.
37
only served to further harden the madrasa as a symbol of the MalayMuslim struggle, around which resistance would later coalesce when its
premises became the covert base for meetings and assemblies among the
Malay political leadership. The most significant event hosted by the
madrasa was the meeting of Malay elders convened by Haji Sulong to
chart the future of Greater Patani that culminated in the historic sevenpoint demand for autonomy presented by the Malay leadership to the
government in July 1947. Among other things, this document called for
the appointment of local Malays as governors of the Malay provinces,
the reservation of up to eighty percent of government administrative
positions in the region for Malays, and the creation of a Muslim board to
govern religious affairs.36 Hence, while not originally intended to be a
centre of subversive activity, Madrasah al-Maarif nevertheless became
an important symbol of resistance, as did its founder Haji Sulong.
It is important to note here that despite the closure of Madrasah alMaarif and the circumspection towards Haji Sulongs attempts at
reform, the momentum of change had, to certain extent, already been set
in motion. Gradually, more and more pondoks began to introduce the
reform curriculum conceptualized by Haji Sulong into their syllabuses, in
so doing transforming the pondok into an institution of systematic
education. This, however, was not captured in Hasan Madmarns major
study on the transformation of pondok education.37 In Pondok and
Madrasah in Pattani, Madmarn attributed the transformation to changes
in government educational policies which began in the 1960s and gained
momentum in the 1970s. He reasoned that the pondoks were compelled
to change or face the threat of irrelevance and extinction, and even
demonization, when new legislation enforced the teachings of general
and academic subjects in all Islamic educational institutions. Though
legislative pressure was undoubtedly one of the catalysts that precipitated change, the study of the evolution of Islamic education systems in
the southern border provinces needs also to appreciate and acknowledge
Haji Sulongs contributions in generating the subterranean momentum
for change, particularly since this occurred well before the advent of state
legislation to regulate education in the southern provinces with the
creation of the Islamic private school.
42
j o s e p h c hi ny o ng l i ow
38
Tension between traditionalists and reformists that echo the Kaum Tua
Kaum Muda contestations in the pre-war Malay world, and which were
illustrated by Haji Sulongs attempt to transform Islamic education, have
surfaced again in Thailands southern border provinces.38 This time, the
contestation finds expression in the form of the threat posed by Salafi
reformists to mainstream traditionalist Islamic education. This challenge
echoes in part Haji Sulongs previous attempts at transforming Islamic
education and takes the familiar form of a movement seeking to reform
Islamic education through the introduction of academic and general
subjects into the curriculum of Islamic schools, yet with a distinct
emphasis on the need to Islamize epistemology and pedagogy. In the
minds of this new generation of reformists, it is in Islam (and specifically,
the Qur8:n) that Muslims will find the resources to address the many
problems they face as they struggle to find their place in the modern
world. How the reformists attempt and explain this reconciliation of
knowledge and faith will be addressed later in a discussion on the
curriculum of the Yala Islamic University. Suffice for now to note that for
these reformist intellectuals, this could be accomplished by combining
Islamic knowledge with familiarity with Western scholarship in sciences,
whilst at the same time advocating a return to a Salafist interpretation of
pristine Islam.39
Echoing the logic of those who came before, this move was described
by reformists as stemming at least in part from the realization that
traditional institutions of Islamic learning required urgent reform.
Additionally, it was also largely a consequence of the perceived
failure of traditionalists and secularists from the Islamic educational
43
40
44
j o s e p h c hi ny o ng l i ow
43
45
46
j o s e p h c hi ny o ng l i ow
Technology. This second phase reminds us of the task of the Prophets Madinan
period while the first phase of the college presents a picture of the first period of
Islam in Makkah. The categories of fardain and fard kifayah are integratively
[sic] blended into the YICs curriculum in order to do justice to each individual by
respecting ones unique capacities and interests. Fardain knowledge is religiously
obligatory. It is to be studied and mastered by all mature and free Muslims,
whereas fard kifayah is obligatory not for all, but for a sufficient number of such
Muslims in the community.48
47
The conflict usually arises when those in masyarakat bawahan [grassroots] that
accept these new teachings through an interlocutor who himself does not have indepth knowledge, is biadat [lacking in courtesy], and who claims that Kaum Tua
are not adhering to the correct Islamic teachings. Likewise, those who reject the
Salafi-Wahhabi movement do so in a harsh manner as well. Usually, the conflicts
arise due to trivial comparative religious issues such as the prohibition of
weaving a three-sided ketupat [rice dumpling] because it is associated with
Hinduism and the worship of Hindu idols, the recitation of qunut [special
prayers] during subuh [dawn prayers], celebrating mawlud nabi [the Prophets
birthday], and others. The Salafi-Wahhabi movement always rejects such
observances which have become customary to the local population without
considering the positive or negative aspects of these issues, and whether it is
really against religious teachings or not. But we [Kaum Tua] see that if such
observances do not contradict the religion, then it should be protected, but the
Salafi-Wahhabi movement view it categorically as bid6a which is prohibited in
religion.51
48
j o s e p h c hi ny o ng l i ow
53
Ibid. In the course of my interview I had used the term traditional Islam to
refer to the predominant Shafi6i-Sunni as well as Sufi Islam that continues to be
widely practised in southern Thailand.
54
Interview at Sad Samaki School, Pattani, 16 January 2006.
55
Interview at Chongraksat Witthaya, Pattani, 14 February 2006.
56
Interview with Ismail Lutfi, Pattani, 14 January 2006.
49
The Wahhabi [i.e. Ismail Lutfi and his followers] understanding which brushes
aside generations of amalan sunnah [traditional religious practice] of the Islamic
ummah in this country can be said to be spreading among the educated and
young intellectuals. They reject the rituals of reading the Qur8:n for the dead,
recitation of Yasin, qunut, tahil, berdoa, berzikir [different types of formal
prayers], ziarah kubur [visiting of graves], and other rituals of the Ahli Sunnah
Wal Jamaah which have been allowed and encouraged.61
57
Interview with Nidae Waba, Pattani, 14 January 2006; interview with
Hasan Madmarn, Pattani, 16 January 2006.
58
Interview at Darunsat Witthaya School, Pattani, 5 February 2005.
59
Interview at Saiburi Islam Witthaya School, Pattani, 24 February 2005.
60
Interview at Aliman Foundation, Narathiwat, 18 January 2006.
61
Interview with Abdul Aziz Yanya, Pattani, 17 May 2008.
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I am not against the ideology of the Wahhabi movement under the leadership of
Dr. Ismail Lutfi and his companions as they teach and preach the Islamic ummah
to stay within the boundaries of the religion; I am less agreeable with their
approach that mengumpaskan [deliberates on] khil:fiyya [comparative
religious issues], which can result in conflict between Muslims and the public
62
51
POINTS OF AMBIVALENCE
Despite his message on the need to transform Islamic knowledge, which
would no doubt resonate with government authorities who have always
been of the view that resistance to change on the part of Islamic schools
in the south has been a constant source of provocation, Ismail Lutfi has
been demonized in some (primarily Western) media and counterterrorism circles as a hardline Wahhabi cleric, as some pundits and
analysts have taken to calling him; his agenda for the transformation of
Islamic education in Thailand has likewise been dismissed as nothing but
a cover for a more insidious programme to radicalize the Muslim
population of southern Thailand.69 Many of these allegations come from
sceptics who cast a suspecting eye on Salafism, often equating it to
Wahhabism, the highly politicized fundamentalist offshoot of broader
Salafi dogma which has admittedly enjoyed a chequered history both as a
reformist as well as militant movement, and which has captured the
attention of the terrorism studies community since 9/11 with fairly
67
Interview with Nidir Waba, Pattani, 20 May 2008. Nidir Waba is the
Chairman of the Islamic Private School Association and a highly-respected 6:lim
in southern Thai Muslim circles.
68
Interview, Pattani, 20 May 2008.
69
See for example, Jane Perlez, Cracks in Thailands Peace, New York
Times, 8 March 2004; John Bradley, Waking Up to the Terror Threat in
Southern Thailand, www.yaleglobalonline.com, 27 May 2004. Accessed at
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=3985.
I, as a student of Dr. Ismail [Lutfi], want to state that he never taught his students
to create divisions, but taught them to hold firmly to al-Qur8:n and Sunnat alNab; [tradition of the Prophet]. Everyone loves him and he is our :bi [father or
teacher] even when some parties despise, hate, and create lies about him. I am
sure Allah will protect and guard him and his message will take us to the right
path. Those who blame him should repent and use their free time to seek
knowledge so as to understand the teachings of Dr. Ismail correctly.68
52
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70
The problems inherent in how terrorism analysts have attempted to study
the southern provinces have been ably demonstrated in Michael Connors, War
on Error and the Southern Fire: How Terrorism Analysts Get It Wrong in
Duncan McCargo (ed.), Rethinking Thailands Southern Violence (Singapore:
Singapore University Press, 2006).
71
I would like to thank Muhammad Hanif Hassan for alerting me to this fact.
For information about Shaykh Sa6id Eaww:, see Al Mustasyar Abdullah al Aqil,
Mengenang Said Hawwa, www.boemi-islam.com, 27 May 2004. While he was
undoubtedly a Salafi, Sa6id Eaww:8 was also known to be sympathetic towards
Sufism, and this put him at loggerheads with Wahhabis under King Fahd,
resulting in his being expelled from Saudi Arabia.
72
See Ismail Lutfi Fatani, Ikhtil:f al-d:rayn wa :th:ru-hu f; aAk:m almunakah:t wa-l-mu6:mal:t [The Effect of theTwo D:rs (d:r al-Isl:m and d:r alAarb) on Islamic Personal and Transaction Laws] (Cairo: D:r al-Sal:m, 2nd edn.,
1998). For a detailed analysis of the text, see Joseph Chinyong Liow, Islam,
Education, and Reform in Southern Thailand: Tradition and Transformation
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Press, forthcoming).
53
73
at least on the surface to echo what many Muslim scholars who are
today deemed progressive are propounding when discussing the
question of rigidity in the application of Islamic law, though the actual
substance of Ismail Lutfis personal understanding of jurisprudence itself
may, at the end of the day, depart fundamentally from the views of some
liberal-progressive Islamic scholars. Given Lutfis perceived Wahhabi
credentials, it is perhaps apropos to note here that while many have
criticized Wahhabism for its doctrinal conservatism and rigidity, we
should note that the importance of context is also a typical intellectual
trait of Wahhabi thought which believes, at least in theory, that the doors
of ijtih:d remain open.73 What is perhaps more important to register
though is the fact that, whether Lutfi is indeed a scripturalist, literalist
Muslim scholar, his emphasis on context speaks of an appreciation of the
complex and multifaceted nature both of the challenges confronting
Islam, and the avenues of response available to the Muslim community.
Some other aspects of Ismail Lutfis activities draw into further
question his Wahhabi credentials. For instance, while mainstream
Wahhabism rejects mawl;d (celebration of the Prophets birthday), the
fact is that in the past two years Lutfi has contributed to an annual
collection of essays compiled by Thai Muslim scholars and published by
the Islamic Centre of Thailand on the occasion of the Prophets birthday
to propagate the valuable teachings of the great Prophet [. . .] to all
human beings.74 Luftis contribution to the 2006 volume is titled The
Status and Roles of the Ulema in the Holy Qur8:n and Sunna, and is
remarkable both for its reiteration of distinctively Salafi beliefs and
practices as well as departure from patently orthodox Wahhabi
perspectives. In his discussion on the role and status of 6:lims in
Muslim society for instance, while acknowledging that they are to be
respected and sought out for their wisdom, Lutfi also cautioned, in
characteristic Salafi fashion, that esteem and respect from any society
for an 6:lim should not be frenetic and indulgent. The love and respect
has to be based on the foundation of the Qur8:n and Sunna and in
accordance with the level of his ;m:n to Allah and His Messengers.75 He
goes on further to elaborate that this is because however high the status
54
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They try to propagate the errors of the 6:lim, try to dramatize small errors and
amplify them. They further try to destroy the dignity and fame of the 6:lim in
vicious ways. This is a root of catastrophes and fitna [conflict] that is traceable to
the past, such as fitna from those who disagreed with 6Al; in the armistice with
Mu6:wiya, fitna from the group of Khaw:rij [the group that protested both 6Al;
and Mu6:wiya and their respective supporters], and others because the attitude
and positions of these two groups is not based on knowledge and justice, but on
ignorance and bigotry, which cause extremism.77
Ibid, 23.
Ibid, 234.
78
Although Wahhabi Islam played a special role in the establishment of the
nation-state of Qatar and the coming to power of its ruling familyAl Thaniin
the early 1970s, it has been used primarily as a legitimizing ideology rather than
enforced as a way of life. The Qatar Constitution recognizes Islam as the religion
77
of an :lim, he is also a human being who will have defects and errors.76
Lutfis view here accords with the practice of Salafi teachings to caution
against excessive celebration of human capabilities, even those of noted
religious scholars.
Again, compared to some Wahhabi and Salafi scholars, Lutfi appears
to demonstrate a more sophisticated appreciation for nuances in the
Islamic faith; his approach to Shi6ism departs from conventional
Wahhabism, and in so doing draws attention once again to his ambiguity.
While more orthodox Salafi and Wahhabi scholars tend to make
sweeping accusations of Shi6ism as apostasy, and of Shi6i Muslims as
heretics, in his discussion on bad and wicked ulema and the act of
fitna, where he alludes to key events in Islamic history associated with
the rise of Shi6ism, Lutfi reserves the harshest criticism for the Khaw:rij
as well as those who rejected the peace treaty between 6Al;, whom some
Muslims believe to be the fourth Rightly Guided Caliph, and
Mu6:wiya:
55
of the state and the Shar;6a as the primary source of law, but also provides
underpinnings for the existence and functioning of secular courts as well. In this
regard, Qatars legal system can be characterized as dual. It recognizes the
jurisdiction of both Shar;6a courts and 6adliyya courts (secular courts responsible
for conflicts/issues in labour, trade, business, criminal law, etc.). This dualism is
also exemplified by the emergence of a new legal elitemostly educated abroad
either in the West or Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordanvis-a`-vis the traditional array
of muftis and q:@;s. Furthermore, though Qatar and Saudi Arabia have
Wahhabism in common, Qatar is wary of its powerful neighbours ambition.
Al Jazeeras criticism of the Saudi monarchy has already led to a serious
diplomatic spat between the countries.
79
Interview at Asia Foundation Thailand Office, Bangkok, 17 January 2006.
80
See for example, Ismail Lutfi, Penyebaran Ilmu Salafi Khususnya Penulis
Syeikh Muhammad Abdul Wahab [The Expansion of Salafi Knowledge in the
Writings of Shaykh MuAammad 6Abd al-Wahh:b], paper presented at Seminar
Antarabangsa Shaykh MuAammad 6Abd al-Wahh:b in Perlis (Malaysia), 1617
March 2006.
even more astonishing is the fact that the University had previously
applied to the U.S.-linked Asia Foundation for a grant in support of
English language training for its faculty and study trips to Malaysia.79
While this is not the place to engage in a detailed discussion of
variations within Wahhabi ideology, due account must be taken of the
fact that if Ismail Lutfi is indeed a Wahhabi (and not just a Salafi, as he
himself claims), there are clearly aspects to his brand and practice of
Islam that deviate from the dictates of Wahhabism as commonly
understood. In trying to reconcile this discrepancy, it bears recalling
conventional wisdom on Islams arrival in the region, and how it had
adjusted itself to suit local cultures and belief systems when it arrived on
Southeast Asian shores, thereby giving rise to the syncretic Islam that has
become its trademark. Perhaps what we see in Lutfi is somewhat
analogous to thathis brand of Wahhabism might have undergone a
similar process of localization that has finessed it to an extent that some
of its features in effect differ from what we might commonly associate
with mainstream Wahhabi thought and praxis. It should be noted that
Lutfi himself refuses to acknowledge the term Wahhabi, but has
accepted the label of Salafi. This is not to suggest that Lutfis Islamic
thought is entirely devoid of explicit connections to Wahhabism, for he
has on other occasions also defended the teachings of Ibn 6Abd alWahh:b as well, and he does share in Wahhabisms traditional
apprehension of Sufi practices.80 Indeed, it is likely that, at the end of
the day, concern for the negative reputation that Wahhabism has accrued
recently, not to mention the unsubstantiated yet persistent links being
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CONCLUSION
57
the visit of the Crown Prince to the Yala Islamic University as well as the
Thai flag displayed proudly at the entrance to the university grounds.
In other words, regardless of Haji Sulongs contributions as an Islamic
scholar, it is his political contributions that have been etched in Patani
memoryhow he had agitated for greater autonomy for the Malay
people. Ismail Lutfi was far less prominent, though no less active, a
political personality. Instead, what is striking about Ismail Lutfis
politics, as opposed to Haji Sulongs, is how closely aligned it is with
the Thai state. Indeed, if Haji Sulong had provoked suspicion in Bangkok
circles, Ismail Lutfis active criticism of ongoing violence in the southern
provinces and his attempt to refashion the curriculum of Islamic
education in the provinces towards a more modernist orientation has
won the support and endorsement of the state.
Second, unlike the movement that Haji Sulong set in motion but which
effectively petered out upon his demise, the contemporary reform
movement appears not only to be resilient, but to have grown noticeably
in strength, facilitated no doubt by his accommodating relationship with
the Thai state. As a consequence, it has gained a foothold in the southern
provinces on the back of immense financial support that in all likelihood
was never available to Haji Sulong. This is expressed in the fact that the
Yala Islamic University, and the College of Islamic Studies at the Prince
of Songkhla University (which, under Ismail Ali, has taken on a reformist
bent as well), are now firmly entrenched in the terrain of Islamic thought
in the provinces.
This is not to say, however, that the rise of the reformist movement in
the southern border provinces has not generated tensions within the
Malay community. In fact, the resurgence of this Salafist genre of
reformist Islam has in many respects led to a reprise of the Kaum Tua
Kaum Muda that characterized intra-Muslim tensions across the Malay
world in the early twentieth century, and from which southern Thailand
was not immune. Reformist ideas on epistemology, methodology,
culture, and identity have been greeted with circumspection, if not
outright hostility, in many traditionalist quarters that harbour misgivings
about reformist dogma. Beyond the immediate tensions generated by this
contest on the local terrain of Islamic thought and practice lies the deeper
question of why the disjuncture exists between Patanis much-vaunted
traditional reputation of excellence in Islamic studies on the one hand,
and its resistance to change on the other. Perhaps, it is a function of the
highly-securitized environment, where the backdrop of Malay separatism and ethno-nationalism has overshadowed the development of
Islamic thought in the region (particularly when Islamic schools have
historically been viewed with hostility and suspicion by the Thai
government); or perhaps the emaciation of religious knowledge as a
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