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document without their understanding it. They added, they did not have any
complaint against their employer. Despite such withdrawal, respondent still
called Lim threatening the latter that he would pursue the case, have his
establishment closed and he would be jailed if he did not come up
with P20,000.00 as settlement. In the evening of August 14, 2000, respondent
reiterated his demand for P20,000.00, again with the threat of closure of the
billiard center and putting Lim in jail.
DAN JOEL V. LIM* and RICHARD C. TAN, complainants, vs. ATTY. EDILBERTO
BARCELONA, respondent.
Complainant Lim said that after his meeting with respondent, he agreed to
give the amount but did not fix any date when payment would be made,
whereupon, respondent gave notice that he would drop in at around 7:00 in the
evening, on August 16, 2000, to pick up the money.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On May 9, 2001, Dan Joel V. Lim and Richard C. Tan, [1] both businessmen,
filed a complaint for alleged robbery or extortion and violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act against Atty. Edilberto Barcelona, a lawyer formerly
employed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The complaint
was simultaneously filed with this Court and the Integrated Bar of
thePhilippines.[2]
Complainant Lim alleged that on the first week of August 2000, respondent
phoned him and introduced himself as a lawyer and chief of
the Public Assistance Center, NLRC. Respondent informed him that his
employees filed a labor complaint against him in his office and it was necessary
for him to see and talk with respondent. From then on respondent would often
call him. Respondent visited him in his office and told him to settle the case or
else his business, Top Gun Billiards, would be shut down. Lim recalled that
on August 14, 2000, at around 7:30 p.m., respondent again visited his
establishment and told him to settle the case for P20,000.00.
Notably, almost nine months before the filing of his complaint, or on August
14, 2000, complainant Lim personally submitted a letter to the NBI requesting
the NBI to investigate respondent Atty. Edilberto Barcelona.[4] According to the
NBI report, after due investigation, it decided to conduct an entrapment
operation. On August 15, 2000, Special Investigator Marvin de Jemil, sent nine
five hundred peso bills and five one hundred peso bills for fluorescent powder
dusting to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Division. Further, the NBI reported that
thru the NBI Identification and Records Division, it found no record of such
person named Edilberto Barcelona.
The NBI report also stated that on August 16, 2000, Lim informed the NBI
operatives that at around 7:00 p.m. respondent would drop by his pool house to
collect the money. At around 6:30 p.m., the operatives went to the pool house
and strategically positioned themselves and posed as pool players. At about 7:20
p.m., respondent arrived, sat on a plastic chair and talked to complainant Lim. At
around 7:30 p.m., Lim handed the marked money to the respondent who, in turn,
received it. While respondent was counting the money and about to place it
inside his bag, he was immediately arrested. The respondent initially resisted and
tried to create scandal but was later pacified.
of billiards. Tan said he did not consent to the employees playing because they
had work. On July 31, 2000, respondent went to him a third time and asked for an
additional P10,000.00 allegedly for his employee, Tellen, since the P15,000.00
Tan gave earlier was for respondent only. After a few more visits by respondent,
Tan finally told the respondent to show him the formal complaint and he would
just get himself a lawyer.[6]
The NBI averred that the respondent was informed of his constitutional
rights and was brought to the NBI office where he was booked and
fingerprinted. In his fingerprint chart, the respondent indicated that he was a
government
lawyer
and
assigned
at
the
office
of
the
Chief, Public Assistance Center, NLRC, Banawe, Quezon City. He showed his
identification card. Later he was brought to the Forensic Chemistry Division for
ultraviolet examination. The certification issued by Forensic Chemist Loren G.
Janobas stated that there were yellow fluorescent specks and smudges on the
back and palm of the left and right hand of the respondent. On August 17, 2000,
the NBI turned over respondent to the City Prosecutor of Manila who eventually
indicted him for robbery/extortion.[5]
The Joint Affidavit of Arrest, signed on August 17, 2000 by Agent Don R.
Hernandez, SI Felix O. Senora and SI Marvin de Jemil, cited complainant Tans
allegations.[7]
Respondent Atty. Barcelona filed his Comment[8] on December 10, 2001,
praying for the dismissal of the complaint against him. Respondent, in his
defense, alleges that he normally played billiards at the Top Gun Billiard Center
where he would drop by from his office before going to his residence; that when
certain employees of the billiard center learned that he was a lawyer and Chief of
the Public Assistance Center of the NLRC, they confided in him their grievance
against their employer, Lim, for alleged violation of labor laws, there respondent
gave them assistance; that with the proper complaint and required
documentation accomplished, respondents office scheduled the case for a
dialogue-conference between the complaining workers and their employer; that
on instigation and coercion of complainant Lim, respondent became a victim of
theft, billiard hustling, swindling and syndicated gambling on August 9, 2000;
that on or about August 9, 2000, respondent filed a complaint for theft of
cellphone and pack of cigarettes, billiard hustling, syndicated gambling, and
swindling against Lim and his three workers, eventually docketed as I.S. No.
38251 to 53.[9]
Complainant Richard Tan, owner of Tai Hing Glass Supply, a co-signee in the
herein complaint, executed a sworn statement dated August 16, 2000. In it he
alleged that he went to the Criminal Intelligence Division, Intelligence Service of
the NBI to complain about respondent Barcelona. He said that sometime during
the last week of July, respondent called him, introduced himself and informed
him that one of his employees filed an illegal dismissal case against him. He
remembered that before respondents call, he had suspended an employee,
Bryan Tellen, for leaving his workplace without permission. Tellen received
several warning letters from him regarding his misdemeanors. Tan remembered
that Tellen once hinted that he knew someone in the Department of Labor, who
turned out to be herein respondent, Atty. Barcelona. Before Tan sent his
accountant, Ditas Guitierrez, to respondents office to represent him, he told her
to bring a copy of Tellens suspension letter and to inform respondent that Tellen
had not been dismissed. When Guitierrez returned, she told him that respondent
wanted him to pay his employee. She added that respondent did not give her any
copy of a formal complaint on the alleged illegal dismissal. After two days,
according to Tan, respondent went to his office, showed him an identification
card and gave him a handwritten calling card. Respondent told him to pay his
employee P20,000.00 to P30,000.00, otherwise respondent would go on
with the filing of the illegal dismissal case. When he said he did not have that
kind of money, respondent lowered the amount to P15,000.00. Complainant Tan
added that when he gave respondent the money, the latter promised to take
care of the illegal dismissal complaint. On July 29, 2000, according to Tan,
respondent came to see him again. Respondent appeared drunk and told Tan to
go to the respondents office because a problem regarding the case arose. Tan
stated that before respondent left, respondent invited his employees to a game
Gumban,[11] continuously refusing to accept, much less count, the offered wad
of money. Respondent added that when Lim realized that he could not be
prevailed upon to accept it, he placed and inserted the wad of money in the open
side pocket of respondents shoulder bag that respondent normally carried,
again pleading to respondent that he should count the money. Respondent
added that Lims behavior was rude and intimidating so much so that respondent
protested such rudeness. But respondent said while he was trying to retrieve
the wad of money to throw it back to Lim, about five or seven burly men
accosted respondent and handcuffed him over his vehement protestations. [12]
Based on its own evaluation and the NBI Report, the Investigating
Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the
suspension of respondent from the practice of law for a period of two years.[16]
In the final resolution dated September 27, 2003, the Board of Governors of
the IBP imposed the penalty of disbarment for the reason that respondent in fact
attempted to extort money as Chief of the Public Assistance Center of the NLRC
to threaten/coerce Lim and that no less than the NBI caught him in the act of
receiving and counting the money extorted from Lim.[17]
Respondents version seeks to discredit the NBI report to the effect that
respondent accepted the marked money which Lim handed to him. His version,
however, fails to explain why he was found positive for yellow fluorescent
specks and smudges in his dorsal and palmar aspects of the left and right hands
by the Forensic Department of the NBI.
The grounds for disbarment or suspension of an attorney are: (1) deceit; (2)
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4)
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyers oath;
(6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party without authority.[18]
The NBI found that respondents hands had yellow fluorescent specks and
smudges with which the money used for the entrapment of the respondent had
been powdered. We find no reason to doubt the NBI report. Also, we see no
basis to overturn the presumption that the NBI had done its duty regularly.
Respondent would make us believe that the specks and smudges of yellow
fluorescent were in his hands because Lim offered him what was allegedly the
payment for the stolen cellphone by a certain Gonvan. Regrettably, there is no
corroboration from Gonvan nor anyone else on this matter. Thus, respondents
story appears to us entirely self-serving.
Needless to say, lawyers owe it to the court and to society not to stir up
litigations. Employees of the billiards hall, Ditan and Ubante, swore that
respondent public officer encouraged complainant Lims workers to file a case
against the latter. Rule 1.03 of the same Code states that a lawyer shall not, for
any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any
mans cause.
SECOND DIVISION
Time and again, we have declared that the practice of law is a noble
profession. It is a special privilege bestowed only upon those who are
competent intellectually, academically and morally. A lawyer must at all times
conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients and the public at large,
with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. He must faithfully
perform his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. A
violation of the high standards of the legal profession subjects the lawyer to
administrative sanctions which includes suspension and disbarment.[21] More
importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous as a
requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice; otherwise, the
loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege.[22]
Indeed, the primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not
only to punish and discipline the erring individual lawyers, but also to safeguard
the administration of justice by protecting the courts and the public from the
misconduct of lawyers and to remove from the legal profession persons whose
utter disregard of the lawyers oath has proven them unfit to continue
LYDIA CASTRO-JUSTO,
Complainant,
Present:
estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 before the Office of the City
CARPIO,
Chairperson,
BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.
- versus -
Prosecutor of Manila.[4]
On 27 July 2003, she received a copy of a Motion for Consolidation [5] filed by
respondent for and on behalf of Ms. Koa, the accused in the criminal cases, and
the latters daughter Karen Torralba (Ms. Torralba). Further, on 8 August 2003,
Promulgated:
respondent appeared as counsel for Ms. Koa before the prosecutor of Manila.
DECISION
admitted that he drafted a demand letter for complainant but argued that it was
PEREZ, J.:
made only in deference to their long standing friendship and not by reason of a
professional engagement as professed by complainant. He denied receiving any
[1]
[2]
Galing.
Complainant Justo alleged that sometime in April 2003, she engaged the
To bolster this claim, respondent pointed out that the complaint filed by
complainant against Ms. Koa for estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was based
by Manila City Councilor Arlene W. Koa (Ms. Koa). After she paid his professional
not on the demand letter he drafted but on the demand letter prepared by Atty.
fees, the respondent drafted and sent a letter to Ms. Koa demanding payment of
Manuel A. Ao.
the checks.[3] Respondent advised complainant to wait for the lapse of the
period indicated in the demand letter before filing her complaint.
for his daring audacity and for the pronounced malignancy of his act. It was
the criminal cases. He further contended that complainant Justo and Ms. Koa
recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year
are likewise long time friends, as in fact, they are comares for more than 30
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.[8]
claimed that it is in this light that he accommodated Ms. Koa and her daughters
request that they be represented by him in the cases filed against them by
Koa.
the parties.
It was also established that on 25 July 2003, a Motion for Consolidation was
He insisted that his actions were merely motivated by an intention to help
filed by respondent in I.S. No. 03G-19484-86 entitled Lydia Justo vs. Arlene Koa
and
I.S.
No.
03G-19582-84
entitled
Lani
C.
Justo
vs.
Karen
reported that his efforts proved fruitful insofar as he had caused Ms. Koa to pay
Torralba. Respondent stated that the movants in these cases are mother and
daughter while complainants are likewise mother and daughter and that these
cases arose out from the same transaction. Thus, movants and complainants will
be adducing the same sets of evidence and witnesses.
Respondent averred that the failure of Ms. Koa and Ms. Torralba to make
good the other checks caused a lot of consternation on the part of complainant.
This allegedly led her to vent her ire on respondent and file the instant
and complainant because there was no professional fee paid for the services he
We
are
not
persuaded. A
lawyer-client
relationship
can
exist
Commissioner. They found respondent guilty of violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of
relationship was established the moment complainant sought legal advice from
relationship, the lawyer learns of the facts connected with the clients case,
respondent further affirmed such relationship. The fact that the demand letter
including the weak and strong points of the case. The nature of the relationship
was not utilized in the criminal complaint filed and that respondent was not
is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. [15]
It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but
also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can
[10]
debtor
respondent
admitted
the
existence
of
the
lawyer-client
lawyers from complying with the prohibition against pursuing cases with
conflicting interests. The prohibition attaches from the moment the attorneyclient relationship is established and extends beyond the duration of the
professional relationship.[11] We held in Burbe v. Atty. Magulta[12] that it is not
necessary that any retainer be paid, promised or charged; neither is it material
that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his
service had been sought.[13]
The excuse proffered by respondent that it was not him but Atty. Ao who
The prohibition against representing conflicting interest is founded on
principles of public policy and good taste.
[14]
was eventually engaged by complainant will not exonerate him from the clear
violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The take- over
Complainant,
of a clients cause of action by another lawyer does not give the former lawyer
the right to represent the opposing party. It is not only malpractice but also
Present:
Chairperson,
- versus -
BRION,
Governors of the IBP, the suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year is
PEREZ,
warranted.
SERENO, and
Accordingly, the Court resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Rodolfo T. Galing from
REYES, JJ.
the practice of law for one (1) year, with a WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty. Let copies of this
Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. The Office
Promulgated:
Respondents.
SO ORDERED.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
DECISION
SECOND DIVISION
BRION, J.:
ROGELIO F. ESTAVILLO,
The MTCC noted that the summons was served on the Estavillos
The Case
on March 18, 2005, leaving them until March 28, 2005 within which to file their
answer to the complaint. The respondents filed the answer only on April 4, 2005,
or seven (7) days beyond the ten (10)-day period under the Rules. For this
reason, the court, upon Guerreros motion, issued an order striking the answer
complaint[3] with the Office of the Bar Confidant, charging the respondents
with gross negligence. The complainant and his son, Dexter, engaged the
services of the respondents in Civil Case No. 3183[4] for Forcible Entry and
Damages, filed against them by Teresita A. Guerrero with the Municipal Trial
The complainant further claimed that the respondents did not inform
him or his son of scheduled hearings and incidents related to the civil case,
notably the following:
1)
Guillermo finally arrived; they told the lawyer about their discovery of the May 31,
2005 order; when they asked him why they were not advised of the judgment,
2)
who undertook to show them the draft of the notice of appeal of the May 31,
2005 order. Instead of Atty. Labayog, a new member of the law firm, a certain
Atty. Janapin, came and could only say that she was sorry for what had
happened.
that they had been grossly negligent. They alleged that the complainant
conferred with Atty. Guillermo regarding the civil case. They learned that
Guerrero, the plaintiff, is the former owner of the property in dispute and is
residing at a house built on the property. The Estavillos acquired the property
and they wanted to get rid of Guerrero. One way of doing it, they thought, was
to build a fence on the lot, thereby substantially reducing Guerreros passageway
4)
as
moral
damages, P30,000.00
damages,P20,000.00
as
attorneys
as
fee,
To
the
respondents
mind,
Guerreros
case
was
actually
for possession despite its title for Forcible Entry based on the allegations of
the complainant. They, therefore, waited for the order of the court, before they
Still further, the complainant bewailed that at 5:00 p.m. on June 24,
filed the answer to the complaint. They relied on Section 4, par. 2 of the 1991
2005, as he and his son were waiting at the respondents law office, Atty.
10
dismissal is found by the court, it shall forthwith issue summons stating that the
summary procedure under the Rule shall apply. Unfortunately, the court did not
issue any order so they presumed that the regular rules apply and that the time
to file an answer is fifteen (15) days. This notwithstanding, they vehemently
opposed Guerreros motion to strike out the answer, but the court ruled in
Guerreros favor and struck out the answer they filed in behalf of the Estavillos.
11
answer the complaint served upon you within the period fixed
by the Rules of Court. (Exh. 3)
On February 22, 2006,[15] the Court referred the complaint to the IBP for
In
2008,
[16]
Report
and
Recommendation
dated November
11,
It behooves or is incumbent upon respondent[s] to be
knowledgeable of the periods within which to file a pleading. In
this particular [instance], Rule 70, governing forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases which is incorporated in the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure[,] has been in effect for almost eight (8) years
when this complaint was instituted by plaintiff Guerrero against
respondents clients. It is the bounden duty of counsel in the
active practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme
Court and changes in the law (De Roy v. Court of Appeals, 157
SCRA 757).
12
TSN
[20]
of
the
hearings
of
March
22,[18] April
6,
complaint was filed late or beyond the reglementary period of 10 days prescribed
under the Rules of Court.[21]
13
On June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors passed the Resolution under
review, Resolution No. XIX-2011-503.[24] To reiterate, it modified its Resolution No.
XVIII-2009-07 dated February 19, 2009, lowering the recommended penalty of
On February
19,
Resolution[22] adopting
2009,
and
the
IBP
Board
approving
of
Governors
Commissioner
passed
Magpayos
recommendation.
The Courts Ruling
that they filed all the required pleadings for the Estavillos the answer,
respondents, principally for their failure to file an answer for the Estavillos in the
oppositions, appeals and memoranda. Except for one oral argument where Atty.
civil case, was a three-month suspension from the practice of law. The
attended to all the hearings. They maintained that if there had been negligence
at all, it was not gross as it was brought about by the difficult appreciation of the
Rules. They further argued that the penalty of suspension for their negligence, if
any, is not in accord with jurisprudence.
filed beyond the reglementary period. Nonetheless, they submit that if there
had been any negligence at all, it was not gross as it was due to a difficult
reasoning of respondents that the trial court should have issued an order fixing
appreciation of the Rules. In any event, they submit that their clients really had a
the period to file an answer is a subterfuge, if not a lame excuse, for their gross
losing case and there was nothing they could do about it. They further argue that
14
Rule 18.03 cited by the complainant, A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.
of dismissal. They waited and when no order issued from the court, they again
incorrectly assumed that the regular rules apply without seeking a clarification
for their mishandling of the Estavillos civil case. Although they filed the answer,
from the court or ascertaining exactly when the answer should be filed. With this
it could no longer serve its purpose as it was filed late (i.e., seven days beyond
rationalization, they then shifted the blame for their failure to file the answer on
time to the court. We cannot allow this kind of response in the handling of cases
the answer was stricken off the record[26] to the detriment of the complainant
as the terms of the Rules of Court are sufficiently clear in their requirements to
the average lawyer. The terms of the summons were also clear; as the court aptly
stated:
claiming that, to their mind, the civil case was actually for possession,
notwithstanding that its title is forforcible entry. They thus waited for an order
from the court pursuant to Section 4 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure which provides that If no ground for dismissal is found it shall
forthwith issue summons which shall state that the summary procedure under
this Rule shall apply. They did not receive a court order so they presumed that
the regular rules apply, under which, the answer shall be filed within fifteen (15)
days.
Thus, the respondents had in fact been negligent, or worse, had failed to
exercise the required competence and diligence in filing the Estavillos answer to
the complaint.
15
FIRST DIVISION
SHIRLEY LORIA TOLEDO and ROSIE LORIA DAJAC, complainants, vs. JUDGE
ALFREDO E. KALLOS, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
For our resolution is the verified complaint, written in the vernacular and
dated 21 August 2002, of siblings Shirley Loria Toledo and Rosie Loria Dajac
against respondent Judge Alfredo E. Kallos, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Legazpi City, Branch 10, for violation of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Article 1491 (5) of the Civil
Code.
Prior to his appointment as a judge in March 1995,[1] Judge Kallos was
complainants counsel of record in Civil Case No. 4879 filed with the RTC of
Legazpi City, Branch 4, involving the recovery of hereditary shares with
damages. On 25 March 1979, a judgment was rendered ordering the defendants
to, among other things, turn over to herein complainants, the plaintiffs therein,
the possession and ownership of the total area of 4,514 square meters of lot
2082 Albay Cadastre. On appeal, the decision was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals and became final and executory on 16 December 1985. [2]
Several years thereafter, or in February 2002, the respondent filed in the
same action, Civil Case No. 4879, before the RTC of Legazpi, Branch 4, an
Omnibus Motion[3] praying, inter alia, for the issuance an order constituting in his
favor an attorneys lien to the extent of one-third over the lot awarded in favor
of the complainants representing his attorneys fee. He based his motion on a
written contingency agreement on attorneys fees for professional services
rendered whereby he is entitled to one-third share of what would be awarded to
the complainants. He claimed that this agreement had already been
implemented when one of the three (3) lots levied upon by the sheriff to
answer for the award of damages was given to (him) as his one-third share while
the other two lots went to the plaintiffs as their two-third share [as]
evidenced by the Definite Deed of Sale and Transfer Certificate of Titles Nos. T-
SO ORDERED.
16
execution to satisfy the judgment. He insists that he was never remiss in the
performance of his duties and responsibilities as complainants counsel.
The complainants thus seek, as their second prayer, the recovery of the
property involved in said Deed of Absolute Sale. They argue that pursuant to
Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, lawyers are prohibited from buying their clients
properties when the same are still the object of litigation. To prove that the
respondent was still their counsel when the sale took place, the complainants
attached to their complaint the Motion to Terminate Services dated 23 June
1994, which was based on respondents being remiss in his duties and
responsibilities as their lawyer, and the Order of the court dated 29 June 1994,
approving the termination.
In their Rejoinder dated 7 January 2003, the complainants insist that there is
no basis for respondents claim for attorneys fees for the following reasons: (1)
the respondent failed to present the agreement on attorneys fees; (2)
attorneys fees were not awarded by the RTC or the Court of Appeals; and (3)
Civil Case No. 4879 is in its execution stage.
After evaluating the pleadings submitted by the parties, the Court
Administrator found[5] that respondent was, indeed, complainants counsel in
Civil Case No. 4879, and he should therefore be compensated for his services.
The act of demanding payment for his attorneys fees is not a ground for
administrative liability. However, he can be allowed only fair and reasonable
attorneys fees under Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As to
this, the Court Administrator stated:
Third, the complainants pray for the removal of the respondent from his
position as RTC judge for his alleged abusive conduct unbecoming a judge.
In his Comment dated 25 November 2002, the respondent denies the
allegations against him and asserts that he is only claiming what is due him. He
vehemently denies that he appeared in the case only during the execution stage,
pointing to the Minutes of Hearing and the Order, both dated 05 October 1973,
which show that he entered his appearance as counsel for the complainants as
early as 5 October 1973, or two months after the complaint was filed. He
continuously handled the case from then on, as shown by copies of the minutes
of the hearings and orders issued by the RTC, until a favorable judgment was
rendered on 25 March 1979 and the subject properties were levied upon on
17
As the said issue is still being litigated in the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No.
4879, it is the view of the undersigned that the complaint is still premature .
In other words, the complaint is not yet ripe for administrative evaluation. The
hearing on the matter being conducted by the court below should be allowed to
run its course as that court is the appropriate forum for a ruling on the dispute.
To make a determination at this time on whether the respondent violated
Article 1491 (A) would be to preempt the lower court in its resolution of the
issue. Any recommendation by the undersigned in this administrative case and
subsequent resolution by the Honorable Supreme Court on the matter would
certainly affect or influence the thinking of the trial court before which the
matter is pending. In such a case, it will be unfair to either party. At any rate, the
party who would feel aggrieved might still elevate the decision to the higher
courts.
But while we give deference to the wisdom of the trial court to initially
decide respondents claim for attorneys fees, we deem it appropriate to
reiterate certain principles governing the payment of attorneys fees and impart
our observations on the instant claim. Foremost of these principles is that the act
of demanding attorneys fees for services rendered is not a ground for an
administrative sanction. On the contrary, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional
In this case, the respondent is not being charged for his acts or decisions as a
judge. Rather, he has been charged for dealing with the property of his client
which is prohibited by law. Nevertheless, the principle is the same, in that, the
matter is still judicial in nature.
18
[1]
19
Rollo, 278.