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ROMERO, J.:
[15]
2.
3.
That after the death of Pastor Pacres, the abovenamed children declared themselves extra-judicially as
heirs of Pastor Pacres and they likewise adjudicated unto
themselves the above described lot and forthwith MADE
AN ORAL PARTITION;
4.
6.
2.
3.
4.
Present case:
1. Defendant purchased from plaintiffs 20 parcels of
land located in Quezon City and covered by TCTs
for the amount of P235,056.00 of which only the
amount of P35,056.00 was paid on the date of sale,
the balance of P200,000.00 being payable within
two years from the date of sale.
2. To secure the payment of the balance of
P200,000.00 defendant executed a mortgage in
favor of plaintiff upon the 20 parcels of land sold and
on a half interest over a parcel of land in Bulacan
which was embodied in the same deed of sale;
registered in the Office of the Registers of Deeds of
Quezon City and Pampanga;
GUTIERREZ, JR., J p:
1. Petitioners-spouses Meynardo C. Policarpio and
Lourdes Policarpio and private respondents
Evelyn Romulo and Clemente, all surnamed
Catabas executed a "Contract to Sell" whereby
the private respondents agreed to buy and the
petitioners-spouses to sell a residential lot of
about 300 square meters with a house and other
improvements located at Servillana Street, UE
Village, Cainta, Rizal.
2. The property is covered by TCT No. 501812
Registry of Deeds, Province of Rizal. The
agreed purchase price was the amount of
P270,000 payable as follows: (1) P10,000.00
upon signing of the Contract to Sell; and (2) the
balance of P260,000.00 to be paid from the
proceeds of the private respondents' PAG-IBIG
loan thru its designated bank, the Urban Bank
and which they guarantee and warrant to be
approved and thereafter release on or before the
first week of December 1983; and to deliver to
the petitioners-spouses the whole amount of
P260,000.00 on or before the first week of
December 1983.
3. The "Contract to Sell" also provides that failure
on the part of the vendees to pay the balance on
the first week of December, 1983 will
automatically annul the contract and the vendors
shall immediately return the downpayment and
that after full payment of the purchase price the
The appellate court's conclusion that the petitionersspouses were at fault in the non-release of the private
respondents' PAG-IBIG loan thru Urban Bank, has no
factual basis.
compel
now
(b)
When there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the
writing.
The mistake contemplated as an exception to the parol
evidence rule is one which is a mistake of fact mutual
to the parties, which is not present on this case.
Moreover, in view of the parties' conflicting claims
regarding the true nature of the agreement executed by
them, SC finds the version of the private respondent
more credible for the terms of said agreement are clear
and require no room for interpretation since the intention
of the parties, as expressly specified in said agreement,
do not contradict each other.
The fact that the agreement was prepared and written by
petitioner himself further indicated that said agreement
was entered into by the parties freely and voluntarily
which renders petitioners' claim of fraud in the execution
of the agreement unbelievable.
In the instant case, it is highly improbable that
petitioner's consent was given through fraud since the
document was prepared and executed by petitioner
himself. Therefore, the agreement is valid and binding
upon petitioner and respondent.
NOCON, J.:
Issue/Held:
additional
amount
of
P320,550.00.
(Memorandum, p. 4, Record, p. 86).
The argument is repeated, almost verbatim, in the brief
(at p. 16).
The fallacy of the argument is readily apparent.
The first of the two mortgages was executed on
October 28, 1986, the second, on January 15,
1987. The deed of sale was executed on
September 29, 1987. Both mortgage accounts
therefore were not yet due on the date of the
deed of sale, consequently the motivation for the
sale stated by the appellee is not true.
2. Appellee says in her brief
The consideration of P320,550.00 stated in
the deed of sale is more consistent with the
claim of the appellee that it is in addition to
the previous loans of appellants in the
aggregate amount of P500,000.00 (at pp. 1314).
In the course of her testimony however, the
appellee said the only consideration for the deed
of sale was the P320,550.00 'because the
P500,000.00 is considered as a mortgage.' (tsn,
January 4, 1990, p. 7)
3. Appellee herself revealed the true
nature of the deed of sale when she
said, on cross-examination, that the
intention was merely to secure a loan of
P1M on the property, on her credit as a
businesswoman and that whatever the
appellants owed her would be deducted
from the proceeds, to be paid to her, the
appellants to assume the P1M mortgage
(ibid., pp.10-11). Additionally, as stated
earlier, the P1M mortgage loan never
materialized.
Finally, having ostensibly acquired full
ownership of the land on September 29,
1987, appellee has not taken any step
to get possession, although the
appellants stay on the premises. As a
matter of fact, her answer dated
November 22, 1988 did not even
interpose
any
counterclaim
on
possession.
These circumstances taken together
lead to the conclusion espoused by the
appellants, that the deed of sale is a
sham transaction, not representing the
true intent of the parties and that no
consideration passed or was received. .
G.R. No. 138941. October 8, 2001]
[6]
PUNO, J.:
Before
us
is
a
Petition
for
Review
on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52221 promulgated on
January 14, 1999, which affirmed in toto the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Lucena City in Civil
Case No. 92-51 dated October 16, 1995.
Respondent Tantuco Enterprises, Inc. is engaged in
the coconut oil milling and refining industry. It owns two
oil mills. Both are located at its factory compound at
Iyam, Lucena City. It appears that respondent
commenced its business operations with only one oil
mill. In 1988, it started operating its second oil mill. The
latter came to be commonly referred to as the new oil
mill.
The two oil mills were separately covered by fire
insurance policies issued by petitioner American Home
[1]
Assurance Co., Philippine Branch. The first oil mill was
insured for three million pesos (P3,000,000.00) under
Policy No. 306-7432324-3 for the period March 1, 1991
[2]
to 1992. The new oil mill was insured for six million
pesos (P6,000,000.00) under Policy No. 306-7432321-9
[3]
for the same term. Official receipts indicating payment
for the full amount of the premium were issued by the
[4]
petitioner's agent.
A fire that broke out in the early morning of
September 30,1991 gutted and consumed the new oil
mill. Respondent immediately notified the petitioner of
the incident. The latter then sent its appraisers who
inspected the burned premises and the properties
destroyed. Thereafter, in a letter dated October 15,
1991, petitioner rejected respondents claim for the
insurance proceeds on the ground that no policy was
issued by it covering the burned oil mill. It stated that the
description of the insured establishment referred to
another building thus: Our policy nos. 306-7432321-9
(Ps 6M) and 306-7432324-4 (Ps 3M) extend insurance
coverage to your oil mill under Building No. 5, whilst the
[5]
affected oil mill was under Building No. 14.
A complaint for specific performance and damages
was consequently instituted by the respondent with the
RTC, Branch 53 of Lucena City. On October 16, 1995,
after trial, the lower court rendered a Decision finding the
petitioner liable on the insurance policy thus:
[7]
Left:
4.
Rear:
to the other mill. In other words, the oil mill gutted by fire
was not the one described by the specific boundaries in
the contested policy.
What exacerbates respondents predicament,
petitioner posits, is that it did not have the supposed
wrong description or mistake corrected. Despite the fact
that the policy in question was issued way back in 1988,
or about three years before the fire, and despite the
Important Notice in the policy that Please read and
examine the policy and if incorrect, return it immediately
for alteration, respondent apparently did not call
petitioners attention with respect to the misdescription.
By way of conclusion, petitioner argues that
respondent is barred by the parole evidence rule from
presenting evidence (other than the policy in question) of
its self-serving intention (sic) that it intended really to
insure the burned oil mill, just as it is barred
by estoppel from claiming that the description of the
insured oil mill in the policy was wrong, because it
retained the policy without having the same corrected
before the fire by an endorsement in accordance with its
Condition No. 28.
These contentions can not pass judicial muster.
In construing the words used descriptive of a
building insured, the greatest liberality is shown by the
[11]
courts in giving effect to the insurance. In view of the
custom of insurance agents to examine buildings before
writing policies upon them, and since a mistake as to the
identity and character of the building is extremely
unlikely, the courts are inclined to consider that the
policy of insurance covers any building which the parties
manifestly intended to insure, however inaccurate the
[12]
description may be.
Notwithstanding, therefore, the misdescription in the
policy, it is beyond dispute, to our mind, that what the
parties manifestly intended to insure was the new oil
mill. This is obvious from the categorical statement
embodied in the policy, extending its protection:
On machineries and equipment with complete
accessories usual to a coconut oil mill including stocks of
copra, copra cake and copra mills whilst contained in
the new oil mill building, situate (sic) at UNNO. ALONG
NATIONAL HIGH WAY, BO. IYAM, LUCENA CITY
[13]
UNBLOCKED. (emphasis supplied.)
If the parties really intended to protect the first oil
mill, then there is no need to specify it as new.
Indeed, it would be absurd to assume that
respondent would protect its first oil mill for different
amounts and leave uncovered its second one. As
mentioned earlier, the first oil mill is already covered
under Policy No. 306-7432324-4 issued by the
petitioner. It is unthinkable for respondent to obtain the
other policy from the very same company. The latter
ought to know that a second agreement over that same
realty results in its overinsurance.
A:
Q:
A: