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Stuart Lenig
Comparative Politics POLS 7100
UNG
Fall 2014
must examine the contrasting historical and political relationships between these
separate states and the colonial role of the United Kingdom. Then, (2) we need
to see the role of each player in this act of international divorce. Are such
separations always prone to violence, hatred, and trauma or do such departings
have the possibility of better relations in future dealings? A third issue, (3) is the
economic challenges for such new nation states. Can the parent and the child
have separate, strong, and vibrant economies that can reap rewards for both
parties, and will these parties maintain positive interaction and supportive
economic potential after, even an amicable split. Finally, (4) what role do
institutions in both nations play in securing a certain or dubious future for both
parties as they journey forth after their united period. Can institutions work to restabilize such cultures after domestic and internal institutions managed under
colonial conditions have held sway for so long? Are these two breakaway
territories likely to emulate their captor in the way they pursue their freedom? Will
these societies be able to develop capable and substantial economic markets to
cope with the demands of statehood? Do either of these countries contain an
internal infrastructure that can produce effective institutions capable of helping
their respective states govern their territory? These are complex and longitudinal
questions that cannot be answered in such a brief and cursory study as this, but
we can perhaps begin to see the complexities of nation building in this postcolonial era as maybe more complex and in some ways (at least for Scotland and
presently Northern Ireland) as perhaps more evolutionary and less revolutionary
a process.
peace deal brokered by the Clinton administration has brought a period of calm
and shared governance that has reformed the once grim landscape into a more
civilized, settled, prosperous and thankfully peaceful territory. Marc Mulholland
remarked that, largely through the efforts of the British government, but also
helped by intellectual revisionism, demographic changes, rising prosperity, the
entry of republicanism into electoral politics, and the end to the Cold War, the
language of the Northern Ireland conflict slowly mutated. (Mulholland, 2002,
150) The change did not come without a steep price. Over 3000 people died and
over 47,000 were injured in the long reign of violence. (Cain, 2014)
Divorce- Irish Style.
In Northern Ireland the divorce from England was a violent battle for
supremacy involving many in a protracted struggle. The separation of the
Republic of Ireland from the main body of Great Britain was a long and bloody
war. The final conflict, the rebellion that led to Irish independence in 1922 was a
complex conflict involving centuries of British usurpation, religious intolerance,
cultural, linguistic, and military imperialism, and an attitude of abuse. The
Protestant stronghold of Northern Ireland was retained by the British but
rancorous ethnic and religious divisions kept Northern Ireland in a state of siege
for much of the twentieth century.
Extremists on both sides refused to give ground. On the Protestant side
the, Orange order, so called because Protestant British King William of Orange
defeated King James at the Battle of Boyne, and crushed once and for all the
idea of a Catholic united British state. Members of the Orange order upheld the
The roots of the Scottish struggle for independence lay in a different form
of relationship with England. Scotland is a relatively small province north of
England proper and only amounting to around 200 hundred miles of territory
north to south. While the Scottish kings briefly ruled England after Queen
Elizabeth, (1603-89) they were inept and wayward politicians of little skill and
less political savvy. Elizabeth died childless and made the bargain with Mary,
Queen of Scots, that she would allow Marys son, James to rule. James hoped to
unite British and Scottish institutions but achieved little. His son, Charles the First
was a disastrous manager, insulted parliament, and largely caused the
conditions for republican unrest to explode into the English Civil War of 1642 that
resulted in the 18-year-reign of the Interregnum, the period of the short-lived
English Republic. Charles himself was beheaded, but the rampant unpopularity
of Puritan rule under Oliver Cromwell, resulted in the Restoration of the
monarchy and the return of Charles son, Charles II from France.
The restoration went well enough for a few decades, but Charles IIs quarrelsome
son, James II led to the glorious revolution (largely bloodless) of 1689 in which
William of Orange and later his popular wife (and later monarch) Mary secured a
Protestant throne. Rab Houston writes, that, now seen as a sort of emotive
nationalism or a doomed romantic anachronism, post-1689 Jacobitism was a
mainstream but elite political and religious movement based on divine-right
succession and close dynastic loyalty. (Houston, 2008, 15) The hopes that
there could be a revived Scottish monarchy was marginal, and though there have
been prominent Scottish politicians, Scotland has more often been regarded as
an unruly, rough hewn child than as a true rival for supremacy at Downing Street.
In recent years, the stubbornness of Scottish character, the sense that
nationhood would provide more political, linguistic, economic, and social
freedoms for the Scottish people, and the discovery of new wealth in the
exploration of North Sea oil has reinvigorated the debate about independence.
Major political events precipitated a sense of urgency. A vote for a
devolved Scottish government succeeded in 1997. The success of the Scottish
National Party in the elections of 2007, and the promise of a national referendum
by 2010 (that actually happened in 2014) prompted calls for greater autonomy.
Though the vote on September 18, 2014, was close, (45% for, to 55% against)
Scots decided to remain in the UK bowing to promises of increased autonomy,
more authority over the wealth of Scottish oil, and more freedom over national
matters of culture and education. (Keating, 2009, vi) Scotlands victories were
won in a bloodless democratic process. The long term slights and disappoints,
though not negligible were not at the level of the grievances and the severe
deprivation and poverty that had haunted the people of Ireland.
Critic Michael Keating argues that the work of uniting the cultures faltered,
and that Scots were never truly integrated into the union. As Keating explains,
nation-building never took place, and the Union remained a marriage of
convenience. (Keating, 2009, 20) More importantly, the roots of modern Scottish
factionalism isnt as antagonistic as the strongly anti-British stance of many Irish
people. Keating argues that while the sense of a national identity is blunted, total
independence may not be a replacement goal. He writes that, while unionism
may have faded, it is not giving way to a hegemonic Scottish counter project for a
smaller nation-state. (Keating, 46) The Scots seem to understand in a larger
geo-political sense that many smaller nation states may weaken the negotiating
power they currently enjoy as part of the larger entity of Great Britain.
The Economics of Disentanglement.
Another issue that plagues the arrival of new states in an international
economy is (1) the ways that a new nation might either create a viable GNP or
(2) how such emerging states can struggle to produce goods and services. The
Republic of Ireland blamed its long, languid, lack of productivity on its time as a
captive colony of the United Kingdom, but independence did little to produce a
vibrant economy. Flirtations with communism, a lack of indigenous industries,
and no national plan for an emerging economy gave the fledging republic the
economic doldrums for the better part of the century. Paseta writes that
immigration from Ireland reached an all time high by 1961 with only 2.6 million
people left in residence and 4 out of 5 children born in the 1930s having
immigrated by 1960. Paseta writes that the problem was simply, a dearth of
opportunity and work. (Paseta, 2003, 131)
Likewise, Northern Ireland has suffered from high unemployment and
inequality where a disproportionate share of advantages were distributed to
Protestants over Catholic citizens. Despite these horrible conditions (compared
to England) things were even worse in the Republic of Ireland. Mulholland writes
that, in 1990, standards of living were still around 40 percent higher in the North
than in the Republic of Ireland. Consumer spending in the North was one third
above the southern level, government spending per head on public services two
thirds higher. (Mulholland, 2002, 43) So despite the deprivation of Northern
Ireland, under British rule, it shared more of the wealth of Britain than its southern
neighbor.
Other changes have re-configured the economics of the culture. Upon the
transformation to shared rule tighter integration with the Republic of Ireland
ensued which has helped to bolster the Northern Irish economy (as well as
stimulate the Souths economy). Still, Northern Irelands continuing link to the UK
makes it more dependent on the British economy and also the beneficiary of
continuing British national benefits. The Republic of Ireland, despite phenomenal
growth in the nineties is still an independent and in some ways, a more
dependent economy regularly needing to find and maintain new trade partners
and advantages to fight continued regions of continuing and unrelenting poverty.
The conditions in the North for a fruitful economy were often offset by the
continued long war waged by the IRA to destabilize the country. Senia Paseta in
her history of Modern Ireland writes that, the IRAs strategy was chillingly simple;
bomb, murder, and cause enough damage to force the British to withdraw from
Northern Ireland. (Paseta,2003, 117) Despite the constant presence of IRA
terrorists throughout the thirty-year long war, it is remarkable that Northern
Irelands economy survived, and perhaps it is even harder to explain its recent
record of advances. The disturbing cycle of violence plagued the search for
freedom and independence, providing deep divisions in the society and
damaging the possibility for productive work arrangements to flower create the
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capitalism and self interest and assure the maintenance of structures that keep
society in motion. Hall and Taylor describe the value of institutions as similar to a
Nash Equilibrium from game theory, saying that, individuals adhere to those
patterns of behavior because deviation will make the individual worse off than will
adherence. It follows that the more an institution contributes to the resolution of
collective action dilemmas or the more gains from dilemmas it makes possible
the more robust it will be. (Hall/Taylor, 1996, 8) In essence institutionalism
assures a greater degree of certainty about actions and outcomes, increases
potential positive outcomes, and provides a playing field where rules,
conventions, and actors are known and more reliable.
Institutionalism effects statehood in many different ways. For example, in
the case of the United States, institutions such as the Federal Reserve provide
assurances and certainty about the money supply, financial investment
environments, and their safety. Though by no means a perfect system, and often
one that is criticized for insiders, cronyism, and corruption, it does serve to
assure investors that there are some safeguards about liquidity in American
investment procedures. A fear for many emerging nations, is the lack of
institutions and particularly a lack of interface between domestic institutions and
international ones. Needless to say, such reciprocal relationships are necessary
for international economic business to remain aloft and confidence to be shared
across borders.
In the case of Northern Ireland, the paternal relationship with Great Britain
has allowed it to achieve a higher level of internal institutionalism than many new
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UK and benefits from the British financial institutions such as the pound monetary
system and the Bank of England and commercial banks in the UK.
However, institutional preference and prejudice has played a role in the
development of Northern Irelands unequal economy historically favoring
Protestants and disadvantaging Catholic residents. McGee writes that,
economic development.especially in the nineteenth century tended to
separate the province from the rest of Ireland so that by 1880 the Belfast area
could be fairly accurately described as an outpost of industrial Britain attracting
capital, raw materials, and skilled labor from England and Scotland, and finding
markets for its products in all parts of the world. (McGee, 1974, 41) So despite
the fact that Northern Ireland tended to marginalize and punish its Catholic
minority, Englands economic might brought industry to the island.
Despite these historical shortcomings, contemporary Northern Ireland is
significantly healthier than its recent past incarnation. In Max Hastings angry
1970 text, Barricades in Belfast, he describes the economic conditions as
mournful saying, shipbuilding, textiles, farming and fishing have been the major
businesses for many years, and although successive governments have made
strenuous efforts for years to bring in new industry, still they are not keeping
pace. (Hastings, 1970, 32) The conditions for the residents of Northern Ireland
have improved. Author Martin McGuiness speaking in Belfast in 2012 said, we
can never forget our history, but I am interested in writing a new history for future
generations, one that is inclusive and prosperous for all our people. (Cochrane,
2013, 283) While history has shown negative and prejudicial management of
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Ireland, hopes are high that a future Northern Ireland will become less prejudicial
and less bound to historical antagonisms of church and lineage.
Another form of institutionalism has arisen to confront the reassertion of
violence in Northern Ireland. Hall and Taylor refer to this sort of institutionalism
as sociological in nature saying, that many of these forms and procedures
should be seen as culturally specific practices, akin to the myths and ceremonies
devised by many societies, and assimilated into organizations, not necessarily to
enhance their formal means-ends efficiency, but as a result of the kind of
processes associated with the transmission of cultural practices more generally.
(Hall/Taylor, 1996, 14) Feargal Cochrane in his Northern Ireland, The Reluctant
Peace explains how some of these post-paramilitary institutions are starting to
function to mitigate sectarian clashes. Not all of these sociological forms of
institutions are especially healthy, but they are active. One of the most notorious
groups is RAAD, the Republican Action Against Drugs. Mothers take their drugdealing sons out to alleys to be knee-capped, literally to be shot in the knees to
prevent the proliferation of drug dealers. It is a dubious claim to social activism,
but it seems to help reduce drug violence, if indeed it introduces a new level of
civic vigilantism, itself a disagreeable and continuing problem in the polis.
Another, more optimistic, example of civic institutionalism is MOVEON,
Mothers Opposed to Violence Everywhere in Our Neighborhoods. This group has
arisen from moms who wish to end the continuing cycles of violence that still
haunt certain neighborhoods of Northern Ireland. They protest these clandestine
shootings, and while like the RAAD adherents, they abhor drugs and the violence
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it does to society, they cannot condone vigilante justice. Northern Ireland still
struggles to create fair institutions that serve its complex mixed population. A
hopeful sign is the devolved power awarded to the OFMDFM (the Office of the
First Minister and the Deputy First Minister) that has allowed more decisions to
be handled locally and requires separate groups to meet and work out problems.
An example is the Girdwood Barracks settlement project. As the British Army
decamped from Belfast, and as their need to keep order declined, they left
behind several acres of Army Barracks in the center of Belfast. While sectarian
groups wrangled about who was to get new housing proposed for the contested
section of the city (five years), the Protestants and Catholics eventually were
compelled by a deadline for an EU development grant to arrive at a decision.
Trust comes slowly, but compelled by institutions like the OFMDFM and the EU
the Northern Ireland government is making slow, fitful, but regular progress.
Institutionalism is something problematic in Scottish society as well. The
Scots are a diverse people and Highlanders are a particularly complicated
subgroup. Houston writes, more importantly than language, ethnicity, or religion
to Highlanders identity was their emotional and material relationship to family,
community, and land. (Houston, 2009, 96) The forging of Scottish identity was
as much marketing as reality. Clan loyalties and a Gaelic sense of individuality
propelled the mythic sense of the highlander. Another fruitful association was the
patronage of royalty who added their imprinter on Scottish society. Queen
Victoria and her husband Prince Albert bought Balmoral castle in Scotland, lived
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there often, and adopted Scottish dress (tartan and kilt) to accommodate their
new address.
While largely symbolic, the Tartan, proclaiming the colors of clan identity,
provided a rallying cry for Scotch life. The Kilt itself was also an adopted tradition.
The British, not the Scots, invented the kilt in the eighteenth century, and
imported it to Scotland where it was quickly adopted. Sir Walter Scot popularized
the wild and adventurous Highlander in his popular Ivanhoe and Rob Roy novels
that turned Scots into crusading superheroes. More recently the Highlander
series of films and television programs and Starz networks Outlander series,
based on the popular novels of Diana Gabaldon has raised the public profile of
the Scotch mythic character even further.
At the same time, it was a freedom from too much government, too much
institutionalism, and too little oversight that created the roots of the Scottish
Enlightenment in the eighteenth century and precipitated the fierce desire for
Scots to be free in the last century. Arthur Herman in his, How the Scots Invented
the Modern World, remarks that, by the act of union, Scotland found itself yoked
to this powerful engine for change, which expanded mens opportunities at the
same time as it protected what they held dear: life, liberty, and property.
(Herman, 2001, 50) For Herman the neglect the allowed the Scottish to
experiment and to innovate fostered a stronger economy and engaged a people
that had previously been victims of weak, but interfering government. Under
British rule, the Scottish had the benefits of strong central authority, but little
direct interference. In a sense, this sort of institutional benign neglect benefited
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relationship with England, vie for centrality. Herman douses the claims for
independence with a dose of reality saying, the notion that its history as part of
the British empire is one of systematic abuse and exploitation is absurd: if
anything Scots have been overrepresented as part of the ruling establishment.
(Herman, 2001, 361) Herman further rails against the idea that Scotland and the
Scottish are and were treated like the Irish. Herman rejects this callous rewriting
of Scottish history saying it, does a disservice to not only to historical truth, but
to Scotland itself. (Herman, 361)
The truth of such independence movements is decidedly mixed. While
abuses during colonial periods did occur, the twentieth century saw laborious
efforts to extricate colonial powers from the fates of former colonies. While
beleaguered former colonies can live in a state of victimization by their former
captors, the world community will only allow such issues to color the outlook for
national restitution and global help for so long. At some point, nations, or the
people that comprise such nations must exhibit a will to govern and create the
governments they need to effect positive change and the modernist notion of
industrial/economic/living standards progress. Both Scotland and Northern
Ireland have scapegoated the United Kingdom for centuries, but the historical
record is starting to recognize that the former colonial powerhouse is exercising
restraint in dealing with troubled regions that perceive the binding union as an
evil adversary and not a fair dealing broker of an even-handed confederation.
Diehl and Frederking in their Global Governance anthology remarked that, while
international organizations continue to play a greater role than they ever have,
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state sovereignty and lack of political will continue to inhibit the long-term
prospects of those organizations for creating effective structures of global
governance. (Diehl, 2010, 4) Global governance cannot effectively handle all
local problems as Diehl and Frederking have pointed out. Further, blaming a
former parent as the nexus of all contemporary internal problems is simply
blaming without reason. In the road to independence or the seemingly preferable
option of devolution, aspiring new nations, or invigorated regional government
schemes will, like American big city mayors, have to start looking for local,
partnership, cooperative, and negotiated solutions to the peoples problems, and
avoid the colorful, but often pointless rhetoric of holding former colonialists
responsible. They may find that the best solution to post-colonial malaise is to
de-emphasize historical wrongs, and like, South Africa, begin again.
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References
BBC. (2014) Doctor Who. Wales, United Kingdom.
BBC News. July, 4, 2001. Profile: The Orange Order. Web.
Cain Web Service. Background Information on Northern Ireland Society:
Security and Defence. University of Ulster, Northern Ireland. 2014. Web.
Coakley, John. (2004) Ethnic Conflict and the Two State Solution: The Irish
Experience. Passia Seminars 2004. Web.
Cochrane, Feargal. (2013) Northern Ireland, The Reluctant Peace. New Haven:
Yale UP.
Diehl, Paul and Brian Frederking. (2010) Global Governance. (eds) Boulder, CO.:
Lynne Rienner.
Hall, Peter A. and Rosemary Taylor. (May, 9, 1996) Political Science and Three
New Institutionalisms. Paper presented at the MPIFG. MPIFG Discussion
Paper 96/6.
Hastings, Max. (1970) Barricades in Belfast. NY: Taplinger Publishing.
Houston. Rab. Scotland, A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford UP.
Keating, Michael. (2009) The Independence of Scotland. Oxford: Oxford UP.
Mulholland, Marc. 2002, Northern Ireland, a Very Brief Introduction. Oxford:
Oxford UP.
Murkens, Jo Eric. (2002) Scottish Independence. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP.
Paseta, Senia. (2003). Modern Ireland, A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford
UP.
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