Rules 74-80

RULE 74
of the hearing for probate either personally or by mail. Jurisprudence provides that
service of notice on individual heirs, legatees or devisees is a matter of
procedural convenience and is not a jurisdictional requisite.
Abut v. Abut
Special Proceedings Rule 76- Proceedings (focus on Sec. 3-4)
Facts:
CIPRIANO Abut had married twice.

Marriage 1- he had 3 children, (oppositor-appellees).
Marriage 2 he had 2 children, GENEROSO and GAVINA (petitioners)
Upon the death of Cipriano, Generoso filed a petition with the probate court
praying that after due notice and hearing, letters testamentary be issued in his
favor as he was named executor in the will.
The court then gave an amended order to set the hearing only AFTER
compliance with Sec. 3 and 4 of Rule 76 1 have been complied with.
These steps were complied with. (this is IMPORTANT!)
The children of the first marriage opposed the probate.
Generoso died before a formal hearing could begin, prompting Gavina to ask
the probate court to substitute her in lieu of her brother, and to admit the
amended petition2 praying for the probate of the will and that letters of
administration be executed in her favor.
The court then dismissed the petition originally filed by Generoso without
prejudice to filing another petition pursuant to the rules of court.
In other words, the petition was dismissed because Gavina did not comply with
the notice and publication requirements, since new heirs were added in the
amended petition; and because the probate court was divested of jurisdiction
when Generoso died.
Issue/Held:
w/n the probate court correctly dismissed the petition, simply because the the
original petitioner- who was the executor named in the will- died before the petition
could be heard/terminated NO, the probate court was incorrect in dismissing
the petition
Jurisdiction, once acquired by the court, continues until the case

terminates, and remains unaffected by subsequent events. The court was
not divested of jurisdiction simply because the original petitioner died
before the petition could be heard. The oppositors to the probate could still
come and oppose the amended petition because they were already notified of the
pendency of the proceeding.
The admission of the amended petition does not mean that Gavina is
already appointed as the administratrix. Such admission recognizes that the probate
court has jurisdiction over the res, such jurisdiction continues until termination of
the case.
The case is remanded to the lower court for probate of the will and after,
the determination of the propriety of appointing Gavina as the administratrix as
provided in sec. 6, Rule 78.
ANCOG vs. CA
Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs
FACTS
Land with improvements was formerly conjugal property of spouses Gregorio

Yap and Rosario Yap.
Gregorio died leaving his wife and his children, Jovita Yap-Ancog and
Gregorio Yap, Jr. and Caridad Yap as heirs.
Rosario obtained loans from Bank of Calape, secured by a mortgage on the

land.
When Rosario again applied for a loan, offering the land as security, the
banks lawyer, Atty. de la Serna suggested that she submit an extrajudicial
settlement covering the land to facilitate the approval of her loan application.
Rosario accepted the suggestion and Atty. de la Serna prepared the

extrajudicial settlement, which the heirs, except Gregorio Jr. who was only
15yrs old, signed. The document was notarized.
Rosario exercised rights of ownership over the land.
Rosario brought an ejectment case against Jovitas husband and son to evict
them from the 1st floor of the bldg on the land for failure to pay rent.
Jovita and Gregorio Jr. filed an action for partition. Caridad was unwilling to
join in the action so she was impleaded as a defendant.
Jovita and Gregorio Jr. allege that the extrajudicial settlement was simulated
and therefore void. They claimed that they did not intend to convey their
interest in the property to their mother, but only to enable her to obtain a
loan on the security of the land to cover expenses for Caridads school fees
and for household repairs.
Ratio:
The jurisdiction of the probate court became vested upon the filing
of the original petition and compliance with Sec. 3 and 4 of Rule 76. A
proceeding for probate is one in rem, such that with the publication of the
petition, the courts jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in the will,
or in the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
The fact that the amended petition named additional heirs not included in
the orig. petition did not require that notice of the amended petition be published
again (see footnote 3!). All that Sec 4 Rule 76 requires is that the heirs be notified
1
Rule 76 Sec. 3 states the requirement of publication of the place and time wherein the proving of the will shall take place 3
successive weeks before the actual date of such.
Sec. 4 states the requirement that notice of time and place for proving the will to be caused to all designated/known heirs, legstees,
devisees of the testator in the Phils. To be given either 20 days before by post or 10 days before if by personal service.
2
The amended petition included additional heirs to the estate of Cipriano; who are the widow and children of Generoso
3A Digestgroup*SpecPro* 2008-2009
TC: dismissed action for partition. Petitioners failed to overcome the

presumptive validity of the extrajudicial settlement as a public instrument.
Also, the action for partition had prescribed.
CA: upheld validity of the extrajudicial partition and sustained dismissal of

the case.
Judge then issued the assailed Order (conversion into judicial partition of
estate) and directed the parties to submit complete inventory of all the real
and personal properties left by the deceased. Ma. Socorro filed an MR w/c
was denied.
Ma. Socorro filed before the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus alleging GADALEJ on the part of the trial court, in granting
motion to convert the judicial proceeding for the issuance of letters of
administration to an action for judicial partition. CA denied the petition and
MR hence present petition.
Whether the extrajudicial settlement is valid. YES
There was no evidence to show that extrajudicial settlement was required to

enable Rosario to obtain the loan.
That Jovita and Gregorio Jr. meant the settlement to be fully effective is
shown by the fact that Rosario performed acts of dominion over the entire
land without any objection from them. Instead, Jovita agreed to lease the
land from her mother and accepted from her a special power of attorney to
use the land as collateral for a loan.
Jovita contends that she could not have waived her share in the land because
she was landless. For that matter, Caridad is also landless but she signed the
agreement.
What the records reveal is the intention of Jovita to cede their interest in the
land to Rosario. It is immaterial that they had been initially motivated by the
desire to acquire a loan. Under Art. 1082 of the Civil Code, every act which is
intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs is deemed to be a
partition even though it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, or any
other transaction.
Whether Gregorio Jr. was barred by laches from recovering his share in the
land. NO
The registration of the land in Rosarios name created an implied trust in his
favor by analog to Art. 1451 of the Civil Code.
For prescription to run in favor of the trustee, the trust must be repudiated
by unequivocal acts made known to the cestui que trust and proved by clear
and conclusive evidence.
Ma. Socorro contends:
Partition of the estate is not possible as there has been no determination of

the character and extent of the decedent's estate. She cites Arcilles v.
Montejo, 26 SCRA 197 (1969), where Court held that when the existence
of other properties of the decedent is a matter still to be reckoned w/,
administration proceedings are the proper mode of resolving the same. In
addition, petitioner contends that the estate is in danger of being depleted
for want of an administrator to manage it.
Rules of Court doesnt provide for conversion of a motion for the issuance
of letters of administration to an action for judicial partition. The
conversion of the motion was procedurally inappropriate and should be
struck down for lack of legal basis.
ISSUES / HELD
W/n CA committed an error of law and GAD in upholding TC finding (basically w/n
partition is proper)? No GAD on part of CA, partition is proper.
RATIO
-
When a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his
will or the executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails to
furnish the bond required by the Rules of Court, then the decedent's estate
shall be judicially administered and the competent court shall appoint a
qualified administrator in the order established in Section 6 of Rule 78. The
exceptions to this rule found in Sections 13 and 2(summary settlement of
estates of small value) of Rule 74.
Section 1, Rule 74 allows heirs to divide the estate among themselves

without need of delay and risks of being dissipated. When a person dies
without leaving pending obligations, his heirs are not required to submit the
property for judicial administration nor apply for the appointment of an
administrator by the court. In this case, the Court of Appeals found that "the
AVELINO vs. COURT OF APPEALS (2000)

Rule 74 A: Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs
FACTS
Petitioner: Maria Socorro Avelino (daughter and compulsory heir of the late Antonio
Avelino, Sr. and 1st wife Angelina Avelino)
Private respondents: Sharon (2nd wife of Avelino), Antonio Jr., Tracy, Patrick and
Mark Anthony Avelino (compulsory heirs, siblings of Ma. Socorro)
-
Ma. Socorro filed before the RTC a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration of the estate of Antonio Avelino, Sr., who died intestate on
April 10,1989 (Sp. Proc. No. Q-91-10441). She asked to be appointed
administrator of the estate. Angelina and the siblings filed opposition, a
motion to convert the judicial proceedings to an action for judicial partition.
Sec. 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. If the decedent left no will and no debts
and the heirs are all of age or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly
authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among
themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should
they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition
decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age," and Sec. 1,
Rule 74 is applicable.
In response to Socorros contentions:
(1) That there is nothing to partition: the Court ruled that a complete inventory of
the estate may be done during the partition proceedings, especially since the estate
has no debts. CA committed no error when it upheld TC finding;
(2) That conversion procedurally inappropriate and not provided by Rules of Court:
The basis for the trial court's order is Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court which
provides that in cases where the heirs disagree as to the partition of the estate and
no extrajudicial settlement is possible, then an ordinary action for partition may be
resorted toas the heirs disagreed in this case, applicable
The Court has held that where the more expeditious remedy of partition is available
to the heirs, then the heirs or the majority of them may not be compelled to submit
to administration proceedings.
Because of this, the sale of the property was done without authority, and therefore
null and void as well.
But the Domingo Spouses, the buyers, contended that despite the annotation of the
provision of Rule 74, they were buyers in good faith, and by that very fact, in addition
to the siblings being in estoppel and guilty of laches, the sale was valid.
ISSUES / HELD
Could the sale have been valid, in light of a fact that the Spouses Domingo were not
covered by the Rule 74 annotation? In other words, were they buyers in good faith?
Certainly not.
RATIO
Rule 64 clearly covers transfers of real property to any person.
1.
2.
Contrary to petitioners contention, the effects of this provision are not confined to the
heirs or original distributes of the estate properties;
As the provision provides, such effects affect any transferee of the property. There is
no doubt the Spouses Domingo were covered by anuy transferee;
DOMINGO vs. ROCES

Rule 74 Summary Settlement of Estates Liability of heirs and distributees
3.
Therefore, buyers of real property the title of which contains an annotation pursuant to
Section 4, Rule 74 cannot be considered innocent purchases for value;
FACTS
4.
The presence of an irregularity in the title which excites or arouses suspicion should
prompt the buyer to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor;
5.
This the spouses did not do, and hence cannot at all be considered buyers in good faith.
Cesar and Lilia Roces were owners of two contiguous parcels of land. In 1962, the
GSIS caused the annotation of an adverse claim on their titles, alleging that the
spouses had mortgaged the same to it. Later on, when the titles were to be
surrendered to GSIS, the spouses failed to do so, and the GSIS had such title
duplicates in their possession declared null and void.
In 1992, a certain Reynaldo Montinola, a nephew of Lilia Roces, executed an
affidavit of self-adjudication over the subject properties. A year later, he filed a
petition against GSIS for the cancellation of the title which was in the possession
of GSIS. GSIS lost the case, and its titles were cancelled, and ownership awarded
to Montinola.
Later in the same year, Montinola sold the property in favor of the Petitioners, the
Domingo Spouses. Such sale was subject to the provision of Section 4 of Rule 74:
If it shall appear at any time within two (2) years after the settlement
and distribution of an estate x x x that an heir or other person has been
unduly deprived of his lawful participation in the estate, such heir or such
other person may compel the settlement of the estate in the courts in
the manner herinafter provided for the purpose of satisfying such lawful
participation x x x. Such bond and real estate shall remain charged with
a liability to creditors, heirs, or other persons x x x notwithstanding any
transfers of real estate that may have been made.
Now came the Defendants Roces siblings. They alleged that the affidavit of selfadjudication Montinola executed was null and void for Lilia Roces was not even dead.
Ermac v. Medelo
Summary settlement of estates of small value
FACTS:
Potenciano Ermac and spouse Anastacia Mariquit died leaving only one parcel of land
in Iligan City with an assessed value of Php 590.00.
Cenon Medelo, one of the grandchildren, filed a petition for summary settlement of
said estate.
All requirements having been complied with and there being no oppositions thereto,
the petition was granted, enumerating the heirs entitled to participate in the
inheritance and ordering Medelo to present the proper project of partition of the lot.
Pedro Ermac, one of the children of the spouses, moved for reconsideration claiming
that the lot belongs to him and his wife. This motion was denied with the court ruling
that a separate suit is the proper remedy and accordingly, Ermac instituted a
separate civil case.
The court then approved the project of partition submitted by Medelo. Ermac objected
to this on the ground that the lot is subject of a pending case.
ISSUES / HELD
Whether or not the project of proposal can be approved by the court,
notwithstanding the fact that the lot is being claimed in a separate civil
action. Yes, small estates call for summary proceedings. The proper remedy is to
annotate lis pendens on the TCT.
RATIO
The policy of the law is to terminate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
deceased persons with the least loss of time.
This is especially true with small estates for which the rules provide precisely a
summary procedure dispensing with the appointment of an administrator together
with the other cumbersome steps ordinarily required in determination of assets and
persons to inherit therefrom and the payment of obligations.
The probate court is not the forum to resolve adverse claims of ownership. It is not
proper to delay the summary settlement for such.
Such claim must be ventilated in an independent action and the probate court should
proceed to the distribution of the estate. After all, such distribution will always be
subject to the result of the suit.
and Jocelyn were not blood relatives, thus, were not entitled to any share in the
estate.
Ma. Elena then filed a petition to annul Settlement 2. This was dismissed by the
RTC, such dismissal was affirmed by the CA citing that she was already
estopped; thus this appeal to the SC.
Issue/Held4:
w/n the complaint for the annulment of the ESP (settlement 2) had already
prescribed NO
Ratio:
The main issue in this case deals with which prescriptive period will apply,
whether it is the 2 year period as provided in Sec 4 of Rule 74, or the 4 year period
in cases of fraud. In this case, the Court ruled that the 4-year prescriptive
period is applicable.
Section 4, Rule 74 provides for a two year prescriptive period
(1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the
extrajudicial partition, and in addition
(2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with,
i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial
settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians.
The records show that Ma. Elena did not participate in the extra judicial
partition (settlement 2), thus the 2 year prescriptive period is not
applicable in her case.
Proper annotation of lis pendens can protect the claimant.

Petition dismissed without prejudice to the annotation of lis pendens.
Pedrosa v. CA
Spec Pro Rule 74, Sec 4: 2 year prescriptive period
Facts:
Miguel and Rosalina Rodriguez initiated proceedings in the CFI of Ozamiz for
the adoption of herein petitioner Maria Elena Rodriguez-Pedrosa; such was
subsequently granted.
Almost 30 years later, Miguel died intestate. Being the only 2 heirs, Rosalina
and Ma. Elena entered into an extrajudicial settlement (settlement 1) of the
estate of Miguel, each getting half of the entire estate.
A few months later, respondents Rodriguez Siblings, siblings of Miguel, filed an

action to annul the adoption of Ma. Elena, but such was denied and the validity
of her adoption was upheld by the CFI.
The case was then appealed to the CA, and while on appeal, the Rodriguez
Siblings and Rosalina entered into an extrajudicial settlement of the
estate of Miguel and of his deceased sister Pilar. (settlement 2) Pilar had
no other heirs except her siblings.
The deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition (ESP) covered 14 parcels of

and the Rodriguez siblings were able to get TCTs for such parcels. With these
TCTs the Rodriguez siblings were able to transfer some parcels of land to the
other respondents herein (allegedly buyers in good faith of the properties in the
ESP).
Later on, Ma. Elena sent her daughter Jocely to claim their share of the
properties from the Rodriguezes, who refused to do so, saying that Ma. Elena
The applicable prescriptive period in this case is 4 years, and as stated in

Gerona v. De Guzman:
The action to annul a deed of "extrajudicial settlement" upon the ground of
fraud may be filed within four years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery
is deemed to have taken place when said instrument was filed with the Register of
Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents
exclusively.
The complaint was filed 3 years and 10 mos. After the questioned
settlement was executed, thus, Ma. Elenas action on the basis of fraud has not yet
prescribed.
Quoting from jurisprudence, the Court stated that the 2-year prescriptive
period will not apply when the ground for annulment of ESP is fraud, because A
deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who
had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious.
Ma. Elena was an heir to Miguels estate, together with her adopting
mother, Rosalina. Thus, being the lone descendant, she excludes the collateral
relatives of Miguel (the Rodriguez Siblings) from participating in the estate. The
Rodriguez Siblings cannot belatedly claim that they were not aware of the adoption
of Ma. Elena for they in fact petitioned for the annulment of the decree of her
adoption. It is clear that such complaint, made only 2 years after the actual
adoption, was made only to exclude her from the inheritance.
4
Issues not related to the topic are not discussed but merely incorporated in the ratio
The argument that Ma. Elena was represented by her adoptive mother in
Settlement 2 is imprecise because at the time settlement 2 was made, Ma. Elena
was no longer a minor, thus, Rosalina represented only her own personal interests.
Since Miguel predeceased his sister Pilar, his estate automatically vested upon Ma.
Elena, his child and his widow Rosalina. The Rodriguez Siblings ad no right to a
share in the estate of Miguel.
The next question is this: can Ma. Elena still redeem the parcels of land
now in the hands of buyers in good faith? The Court said that since such lands are
covered by torrens titles, such cannot be collaterally attacked in this proceeding,
thus the Court may not rule on that issue at this point. The validity of those titles
can only be questioned in an action expressly instituted for that purpose.
The SC awarded nominal damages of 100k to ma. Elena as a recognition of the
existence of the technical injury suffered by her.
PEREIRA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Special Proceedings
FACTS:
ANDRES PEREIRA passed away without a will. He was survived by his legitimate
spouse of ten months, petitioner VICTORIA PEREIRA, and his sister RITA NAGAC,
private respondent.
RITA instituted a Special Proceeding case for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor pertaining to the estate of the deceased ANDRES. She
alleged that she and VICTORIA are the only surviving heirs of the deceased; that
the deceased left no will; that there are no creditors of the deceased; that the
deceased left several properties.
VICTORIA filed her opposition and motion to dismiss the petition of RITA alleging
that there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes of administration and
praying in the alternative, that if an estate does exist, the letters of administration
relating to the said estate be issued in her favor as the surviving spouse.
The RTC appointed RITA administratrix of the intestate estate of ANDRES. VICTORIA
brought the case to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the appointment of RITA
as administratrix.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a judicial administration proceeding is necessary where there are no
debts left by the decedent.
RATIO:
NO, because of the absence of good reasons.
The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the same should be
judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified
administrator, in the order established in Section 6, Rule 78, in case the deceased
left no will, or in case he had left one, should he fail to name an executor therein.
An exception to this rule is established in Section 1 of Rule 74, wherein all the heirs
are of lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in
writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial administration or
applying for the appointment of an administrator.
Section 1, Rule 74 however, does NOT preclude the heirs from instituting
administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligations, if they do
not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action for partition. While
Section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see
fit, or to resort to an ordinary action for partition, the said provision does not
compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a different course of action.
It should be noted that recourse to an administration proceeding even if the estate
has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for not resorting to
an action for partition. Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the
estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good and
compelling reasons.
What constitutes "good reason" to warrant a judicial administration of the estate of
a deceased when the heirs are all of legal age and there are no creditors will depend
on the circumstances of each case.
There is no reason to apply this doctrine to the case at bar. There are only two
surviving heirs, both of age. The parties admit that there are no debts of the
deceased to be paid. What is apparent is that these two heirs are not in good terms.
The only conceivable reason why RITA seeks appointment as administratrix is for
her to obtain possession of the alleged properties of the deceased for her own
purposes, since these properties are presently in the hands of VICTORIA who
supposedly disposed of them fraudulently. This is not a compelling reason which will
necessitate a judicial administration of the estate of the deceased. To subject the
estate of ANDRES, which does not appear to be substantial especially since the only
real property left has been extrajudicially settled, to an administration proceeding
for no useful purpose would only unnecessarily expose it to the risk of being wasted
or squandered. The claims of both parties as to the properties left by the deceased
may be properly ventilated in simple partition proceedings where the creditors,
should there be any, are protected in any event.
BUENA 3A
PEZA v Fernandez
Facts:
The subject of the present controversy is Lot No. 4673 of the Opon
Cadastre situated in Lapu-Lapu City, covered by OCT in the names of 16
persons.
Jorgea Igot-Soroo, Frisca Booc and Felix Cuizon executed an

Extrajudicial Partition, in which they declared themselves as the only
surviving heirs of the registered owners of the aforesaid lot. Consequently,
they were issued a TCT.
The lot was subject of expropriation proceedings initiated by PEZA
pending before the RTC of Lapu Lapu City which rendered a partial decision
approving the Compromise Agreement between PEZA and the new
registered owners of the lot. In accordance with the approved Compromise
Agreement, PEZA would pay P68,070 as just compensation for the
expropriation of the subject property, which was to be used for an export
processing zone to be established in Lapu-Lapu City. Hence, a TCT was
issued in the name of PEZA.
The heirs of the deceased spouses Juan Cuizon and Florentina Rapaya
(private respondents) filed with the same RTC a Complaint for Nullity of
Documents, Redemption and Damages against PEZA and Soroo et al. for
having been excluded in the extrajudicial settlement of the estate. It
likewise sought the nullification of PEZAs TCT.
PEZA filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of prescription which was
denied by the RTC. CA likewise dismissed PEZAs petition. Accdg to the CA:
o
The Complaint for Nullity of Documents, Redemption and
Damages is in effect an action for reconveyance of the property to
the heirs of the deceased spouses of the portion which rightfully
belongs to them. Soroo et al. ommitted a breach of trust which
enabled them to execute a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, Special
Power of Attorney and Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of PEZA to
the prejudice their co-heirs. They falsely represented themselves
to be the only heirs.
o
This way of acquiring title creates a constructive trust in favor
of the defrauded party and grants the latter the right to vindicate
itself regardless of the lapse of time. In fact, it has long been held
that a co-heir who through fraud, succeeds in obtaining a
certificate of title in his name to the prejudice of his co-heirs, is
deemed to hold the land in trust for the latter. The excluded heirs
action is imprescriptible. Art. 1401 of the NCC declares that
the action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a
void contract does not prescribe.
o
As to the constructive notice rule, the CA said that such does
not apply when the purpose of the action is to compel a trustee to
convey the property registered in his name for the benefit of the
cestui que trust. In other words, the defense of prescription
cannot be set up in an action whose purpose is to recover
property held by a person for the benefit of another.
or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful

participation in the estate, such heir or such other person
may compel the settlement of the estate in the courts in
the manner hereinafter provided for the purpose of
satisfying such lawful participation. And if within the same
time of two (2) years, it shall appear that there are debts
outstanding against the estate which have not been paid, or that
an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful
participation payable in money, the court having jurisdiction of the
estate may, by order for that purpose, after hearing, settle the
amount of such debts or lawful participation and order how much
and in what manner each distributee shall contribute in the
payment thereof, and may issue execution, if circumstances
require, against the bond provided in the preceding section or
against the real estate belonging to the deceased, or both. Such
bond and such real estate shall remain charged with a liability to
creditors, heirs, or other persons for the full period of two (2)
years after such distribution, notwithstanding any transfers of real
estate that may have been made."
Issue/Held: W/n the complaint filed by the private respondents has

prescribed- YES
Ratio:
The pertinent provisions of Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, are

reproduced for easy reference, as follows:
o
Section 4. Liability of distributees and estate. - If it shall appear
at any time within two (2) years after the settlement and
distribution of an estate in accordance with the provisions
of either of the first two sections of this rule, that an heir
A perusal of the foregoing provision will show that persons unduly deprived
of their lawful participation in a settlement may assert their claim only
within the 2-year period after the settlement and distribution of the estate.
This prescription period does not apply, however, to those who had no part
in or had no notice of the settlement. Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court, is not meant to be a statute of limitations. An extrajudicial partition,
being merely an ex parte proceeding, would not affect third persons who
had no knowledge thereof. Be that as it may, it cannot be denied,
either, that by its registration in the manner provided by law, a
transaction may be known actually or constructively.
In the present case, private respondents are deemed to have been
constructively notified of the extrajudicial settlement by reason of its
registration and annotation in the certificate of title over the subject lot.
From the time of registration, private respondents had 2 years within which
to file their objections or to demand the appropriate settlement of the
estate.
"While it may be true that an extrajudicial partition is an ex parte
proceeding, yet after its registration under the Torrens system and the
annotation on the new certificate of title of the contingent liability of the
estate for a period of two years as prescribed in Rule 74, Section 4, of the
Rules of Court, by operation of law a constructive notice is deemed made
to all the world, so that upon the expiration of said period all third persons
should be barred from going after the particular property, except where
title thereto still remains in the names of the alleged heirs who
executed the partition tainted with fraud, or their transferees who
may not qualify as innocent purchasers for value. If the liability of the
registered property should extend indefinitely beyond that period, then
such constructive notice which binds the whole world by virtue of
registration would be meaningless and illusory. (Pea)
In this regard, title to the property in the present case was no longer in the
name of the allegedly fraudulent heirs, but already in that of an innocent
purchaser for value the government. Moreover, the government is
presumed to have acted in good faith in the acquisition of the lot,
considering that title thereto was obtained through a Compromise

Agreement judicially approved in proper expropriation proceedings.
Even assuming that there was in fact fraud on the part of the other heirs,
private respondents may proceed only against the defrauding heirs, not
against PEZA which had no participation in or knowledge of the alleged
fraud. The remedy of an owner alleged to have been prejudiced or
fraudulently deprived of property that was subsequently sold to an
innocent purchaser for value is an action for damages against the person
or persons who perpetrated the fraud.
Issue/Held: W/n reconveyance still lies against expropriated property-NO
An action for reconveyance resulting from fraud prescribes four years from
the discovery of the fraud; such discovery is deemed to have taken place
upon the issuance of the certificate of title over the property. Registration
of real property is considered a constructive notice to all persons
and, thus, the four-year period shall be counted therefrom. Clearly
then, private respondents action for reconveyance based on fraud has
already prescribed, considering that title to said property had been issued
way back on August 11, 1982, while the reivindicatory suit was instituted
only on July 29, 1996.
Even an action for reconveyance based on an implied or a constructive
trust would have already prescribed just the same, because such action
prescribes 10 years from the alleged fraudulent registration or date
of issuance of the certificate of title over the property. The
imprescriptibility of an action for reconveyance based on implied or
constructive trust applies only when the plaintiff or the person enforcing
the trust is in possession of the property. In effect, the action for
reconveyance is an action to quiet the property title, which does not
prescribe.Undisputedly, private respondents are not in possession of the
disputed property. In fact, they do not even claim to be in possession of it,
even if to do so would enable them to justify the imprescriptibility of their
action.
Finally, it must be remembered that reconveyance is a remedy of those
whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name
of another. Such recourse, however, cannot be availed of once the
property has passed to an innocent purchaser for value. For an action for
reconveyance to prosper, the property should not have passed into
the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. (PEZA in this case)
Hence, private respondents action to recover the subject property from the
government cannot be maintained, not only because of the prescription of
the action, but on account of the protection given to innocent purchasers
for value granted under our land registration laws.
Title: Rebong vs. Ibanez

Subject: Liability of Heirs and Distributees
Facts:
The annotation was pursuant to Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 74 of the

Rules of Court (on settlement of estate) to the effect that the property is
still subject to any claim by creditors and other heirs of his deceased
parents within 2 years from settlement of estate.5
Petitioner based her petition for cancellation on section 112 of Act no. 496.
HOWEVER, Respondent Judge denied her petition. She now claims that
Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion.
Issue/Held:
Whether the petition to cancel annotation should be allowed. NO

Ratio:
The annotation could NOT be cancelled because the registered interests

have not yet terminated and ceased.
The two year period required by Rule 74 has not yet lapsed when the
petition for cancellation was filed.
Neither section 4, Rule 74 nor Act 496 authorizes the substitution of a bond
for a lien or registered interest, whether vested, expedient, inchoate or
contingent, which have not yet terminated or ceased.
- Jared Amoroso
PADA-KILARIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS (2000)
This is a case for ejectment filed by PADERES against PADA-KILARIO.

Jacinto Pada owned a land in Leyte (LEYTE LAND), part of which was the
DISPUTED LAND. He allowed his half-brothers family, one of whom is respondent
PADA-KILARIO to build a house and live in the DISPUTED LAND. Jacinto Pada died
intestate leaving the LEYTE LAND to his SIX CHILDREN (HEIRS OF PADA).
The HEIRS OF PADA executed a private document embodying the extrajudicial partition of the estate, which was never registered in the Office of the
Registrar of Deeds of Leyte. The DISPUTED LAND was adjudicated to ANANIAS
and MARCIANO. Only Ananias was present while Marciano an the other heirs were
represented by their children without a special power of attorney.
Sec. 4 Rule 74: such real estate shall remain charged with a
liability to creditors, heirs, or other persons for the full period of
two years after such distribution, notwithstanding any transfers of
real estate made.
5
Said law provides that a petition to cancel any annotation on a

certificate of title may be granted upon posting of security,
provided that the registered interests have already terminated
and ceased. (paraphrased)
6
Petitioner Rebong applied for a petition to cancel the annotation on the

certificate of title of a land which he inherited from his parents.
44 years after the extrajudicial partition was made the HEIRS OF AMADOR, ONE
OF THE HEIRS OF PADA donated the DISPUTED LAND to PADA-KILARIO (NOTE that
neither Amando nor his heirs owned the DISPUTED LAND because the same was not
adjudicated to Amando).
Later, the HEIRS OF ANANIAS AND MARCIANO sold the property to PADERES,
herein respondent. PADERES filed in the MTC a complaint for ejectment with prayer
for damages against PADA-KILARIO. In her Answer, PADA-KILARIO claims that:
1.
2.
The property was donated to her by the HEIRS OF ANANIAS AND

MARCIANO;
The extrajudicial partition was invalid as the same was executed a) without
SPA granted to the children of the HEIRS of PADA; and b) the same was
not registered in the Register of Deeds.
MTC- ruled in favor of PADA-KILARIO; RTC and CA- PADERES
THIRD, PADA-KILARIO is estopped from impugning the extrajudicial

partition after explicitly admitting in theAnswer that they had been occupying the
subject property since 1960 without ever paying any rental as they only relied on
the liberality and tolerance of the Pada family. Their admissions are evidence of a
high order and bind them insofar as the character of their possession of the subject
property is concerned.
* RTC and CA decision upheld; PADA-KILARIO ejected!
TORRES v. TORRES
FACTS:
Alberto claims to be one of the 4 legitimate children of Paz who died intestate
He prayed in his petition that letters of administration be issued to him in

connection with the properties of the deceased and alleged that he was
unaware of any existing debt contracted by the deceased or her estate from
any of the heirs or from 3rd persons.
Conchita opposed this on the ground that the appointment of an administrator

was no longer necessary since the heirs had already entered into an
extrajudicial partition and settlement of the estate.
Alberto admitted the extrajudicial partition but claims that the actual
designation of their respective shares failed thus requiring court intervention.
He also claims that some properties were not included in the partition and in his
Supplemental Answer, alleged that the estate has an existing debt of P50, 000
from a 3rd person and this was not alleged before due to oversight.
Court dismissed the petition since it found that there was already an
extrajudicial settlement entered into by the heirs.
ISSUE/RATIO/HELD
FIRST, no law requires partition among heirs to be in writing and be
registered in order to be valid.
The requirement in Sec. 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court that a
partition be put in a public document and registered, has for its purpose the
protection of creditors and the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of
registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It follows then that the
intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities is not
undermined when no creditors are involved. Without creditors to take into
consideration, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement
for distribution thereof in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided
by the rules from which, in the first place, nothing can be inferred that a writing or
other formality is essential for the partition to be valid.
The partition of inherited property need not be embodied in a public
document so as to be effective as regards the heirs that participated
therein.
SECOND, the extrajudicial partition which the HEIRS OF PADA executed
voluntarily and spontaneously has produced a legal status. When they
discussed and agreed on the division of the estate, it is presumed that they did so in
furtherance of their mutual interests. As such, their division is conclusive, unless
and until it is shown that there were debts existing against the estate which had not
been paid.
The belated of donating the subject property to PADA-KILARIO after 44 years of
never having disputed the validity of the extrajudicial partition that allocated the
subject property, produced no legal effect. In the said partition, what was allocated
to Amador Pada was NOT the DISPUTED LAND. The donation made is void for they
were not the owners thereof.
ISSUE / HELD:
1.) W/N a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate was
necessary? NO
RATIO:
The main contention of Alberto was that the heirs failed to agree on the
physical division of the properties.
The extrajudicial settlement states that due to the difficulty of making a

physical division of the properties, the parties have agreed to continue the
co-ownership and their respective proportion was designated as undivided
interest.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, provides that:
At any rate it is too late in the day for the HEIRS OF AMADOR to repudiate the
legal effects of the extrajudicial partition as prescription and laches have equally set
in.
If the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of
age or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the
parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the

estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public
instrument filed in the office of the Register of Deeds, and should
they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition.
Utolo insists that he has a right to be administrator. He lost to his mother-in-law. He

appealed.
Where the decedent left no debts and heirs or legatees are all of
age, as in this case, there is no necessity for the institution of
special proceedings and the appointment of an administrator for
the settlement of the estate, because the same can be effected
either extrajudicially or through an ordinary action for partition.
Who has the better right to the share? - There is no need to determine which of
the parties has a preferential right to be administrator. Appealled order
reversed. (no mention of who became administrator)
If there is an actual necessity for court intervention, due to the heirs'

failure to reach an agreement as to how the estate would be divided
physically, Alberto, under the Rule, still has the remedy of an ordinary
action for partition.
The allegation that the estate has an outstanding obligation of

P50,000.00 seems to be a mere afterthought. He did not specify from
whom and in what manner the said debt was contracted, thus
cannot be considered as concise statement to constitute a cause of action
The unverified statement that there are other properties not included
in the deed of extrajudicial partition will NOT justify the institution of
an administration proceeding because the same questions that may arise
as to them, viz, the title and their partition, if proven to belong to the
intestate, can be properly and expeditiously litigated in an ordinary
action of partition.
ISSUES / HELD
RATIO
The Civil code provides that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of death. The heirs succeeded immediately to all the property of the
deceased ancestor. They instantly become co-owners of the property.
From their Old Code of Civil Procedure: When all the heirs are of lawful age, and
when there are no debts due from the estate, the heirs may agree to partition the
property without instituting the judicial administration or applying for the appointment
of an administrator. The heirs may apply to the court for summary partition. (The
Court cites numerous cases which say the same thing)
Requisites for a valid extrajudicial partition of property (or at least this was the
consistent theme in the cited cases):
1. All the heirs are of legal age, and
2. There are no debts due from the estate
(Utulo tried to argue as well that appointment as judicial administrator was necessary
so that he may have legal capacity to appear in the intestate proceedings of his
father-in-law. SC said this was unnecessary since he could have just alleged that he
was a usufructuary.)
RULE 75
ALABAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS (2005)
Rule 75 Nature of Proceedings
Utulo vs. vda. De Garcia (1938)

Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate Between Heirs
FACTS
Provido filed a petition for probate of the last will and testament of the late
Soledad who died in Iloilo. He alleged that he was an heir and executor of the will.
RTC allowed the probate of the will and directed the issuance of letters
testamentary on 30 May 2001.
Four months later, 4 October 2001, Alaban et.al. claiming as intestate heirs,
filed a MOTION FOR THE REOPENING OF THE PROBATE PROCEEDINGS and
an OPPOSITION to the allowance of the will on the following grounds: lack of
jurisdiction for non-payment of correct docket fees, defective publication and lack
of notice to the other heirs among others.
RTC denied the motion and held that Alaban was deemed notified by publication
and that deficiency in payment of docket fees is not a ground for outright
FACTS
Juan Garcia Sanchez died. His 3 children and widow Vda. De Garcia succeeded him.
One of the children, Luz Garcia, married Pablo Utolo (the plaintiff). Luz Garcia died
during the pendency of the administration proceedings of her father. Luz had no
legitimate heirs aside from her husband Utolo and her mother Vda. De Garcia.
Utolo (now a widower) asked to be appointed administrator of the property of Luz,
since there were only 2 heirs anyway: him and his mother-in-law. And that it was just
Luzs share in the fathers original inheritance to be administered.
dismissal as Provido may pay still the same. The decision was already final and
executory.
Alaban then filed an APPLICATION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION with the

CA claiming that:
o
Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its
object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection
of any sort against the right sought to be established.
There were several conferences held discussing the division of the estate of
the decedent. Alaban drafted a compromise agreement where they agreed
that 1/6 would go to Alaban. Provido, however, allegedly refused to sign it.
Alaban learnt of the probate proceedings only on July 2001.
The RTC decision should be annulled on the ground of extrinsic fraud an lack
of jurisdiction.
It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a

party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide
it.
Thus, Alaban could have validly availed of the ordinary remedies. In fact,
they filed a motion to reopen, which is essentially a motion for new trial,
which was, however, denied for having been filed out of time.
They claimed that they learned of the decision only 4 months after it became
final. But they failed to avail of the remedy w/o sufficient justification. They
cannot benefit for their own inaction.
Also, an action for annulment of judgment is resorted to in cases where the

ordinary remedies are no longer available w/o fault and the grounds are extrinsic
fraud, lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. Here, a person need not be a
party to the case.
In this case, it was alleged that the omission of their names, ages and residences
of Alaban and others which resulted to their being not notified is extrinsic fraud.
The Court held that notice is not required to be given to Alaban since they were
neither compulsory nor testate heirs. And even if notice is required, the infirmity
was cured by publication. Personal notice is only a matter of procedural
convenience and not jurisdictional.
CA dismissed the petition. MR was also denied.

o
No showing that Alaban failed to avail of ordinary remedies such as new trial,
appeal, pet for relief from judgement or other appropriate remedies thru no
fault of their own.
No showing that Alaban availed of extrinsic fraud in a motion for new trial or
pet for relief from judgment.
ISSUES / HELD
W/N Alaban and the other heirs had notice of the probate proceeding? YES
RATIO
It appears that Flores, one of the petitioners, filed a petition for letters of
administration with the RTC of GenSan. This was dismissed since it was the Iloilo
court which had jurisdiction venue is the place where the decedent died. This is
in accordance with the rule that the 1st court acquiring jurisdiction shall continue
hearing the case to the exclusion of others.
Alaban maintains that they could not avail of the ordinary remedies since they
were not made parties to the case.
o
Rule 37 provides that motion for new trial OR MR on ground of excessive

award of damages, insufficiency of evidence, or decision contrary to law
should be filed w/n 15 days from notice.
Rule 38 provides that a petition for relief from judgment on the ground of
FAME w/n 60 days.
Under the ROC, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will or any other
person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death, petition the
court having jurisdiction.
AVERA VS. GARCIA (1921)

Rule 75: Subscribing Witnesses
FACTS:
Notice of the time and place for proving the will must be published for 3
consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province,
as well as furnished to the designated or other heirs, legatees, and devisees.
Thus, the proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the
publication, the courts jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in the will
and the settlement.
Eutiquia Avera instituted proceedings for the probate of Esteban Garcias will.
The probate was opposed by Marino Garcia & Juan Rodriguez, the latter as
guardian for the minors Jose Garcia & Cesar Garcia.
Avera, during the hearing, introduced one of the 3 attesting witnesses who
testified that the will was executed with all the necessary external formalities
and Esteban Garcia was at the time capacitated to execute the will. This was
corroborated by the person who wrote the will at the Estebans request.
Two of the attesting witnesses were not introduced nor was their absence
explained by Avera.
The oppositors, on the other hand, presented a witness who testified on the fact
that at the time the will was made, Esteban was so debilitated as to be unable
to comprehend what he was about.
The probate judge ruled in favor of Avera holding that Esteban was of sound
mind and disposing memory when the will was executed. The judge admitted
the will to probate.
The oppositors now appeal from the ruling made by the probate court.
ISSUE/HELD: (there are two but only this one is relevant to the topic)
Can an opposed will be admitted to probate upon the proof of only one of the attesting
witnesses (minimum of 3, remember?), without presenting or explaining the absence
of the other two? NO.
(But the petition still fails since this issue was not raised before the lower court and
only on the first instance on appeal. Tsk tsk.)
RATIO:
Uncontested Will: one witness is enough
Contested Will: ALL of the witnesses must be examined
(What if there are more than 3, is presentation of at least 3 enough? Succession issue,
hehehe.)
The Supreme Court based its ruling on a previous case: Cabang vs. Delfinado (34 Phil
291) where it held that an uncontested will may be proved by the testimony of only
one of the attesting witnesses. BUT WHEN THE WILL IS OPPOSED, ALL OF THE
ATTESTING WITNESSES MUST BE EXAMINED, IF ALIVE AND WITHIN REACH
OF THE PROCESS OF THE COURT.
(So when the will is opposed its either: you present all the witnesses or prove that
they cannot be produced)
The probable reason of Averas failure to present all the witnesses was the late filing
of the opposition by Garcia, et al (oppositors). The contest was filed only on the date
of hearing. In short, just when Avera thought they wont need to present all witnesses
and that one will be enough; they suddenly find out that an opposition has been made
and that they need the two other witnesses. But Averas counsel still incautiously
proceeded with the case without asking for postponement in order to produce all
attesting witnesses.
But the SC said that this reason cannot defeat the ruling already made in
Cabang vs. Delfinado.
(Sadly for the oppositors, the Supreme Court still denied the petition because they
failed to raise the issue in the lower court and only did now on appeal.)
MINOR ISSUE: Is a will invalid because the testator and the attesting witnesses signed
every page of it on the right margin instead of the left margin?
HELD: NO. Every page was signed; its just that the signatures were placed on wrong
spot. But that doesnt matter because the will is still protected from fraud. (as we
learned from Balane)
BALANAY Jr. vs. MARTINEZ (1975)

RULE 75: MEANING OF PROBATE
Leodegaria died leaving as heirs her husband Felix Balanay Sr.(Felix Sr.) and
their 6 children, two of them being Felix Jr. (Petitioner) and Avelina.
Felix Jr. filed a petition for the probate of the will of his mom Leodegaria with the
CFI. The will contained the following, among other things:
- she, Leodegaria, was the owner of the southern half of 9 conjugal lots
- her properties should not be divided among her heirs during the lifetime of her
husband and their legitimes should be satisfied from the fruits of her properties
- That all her paraphernal lands and all conjugal lands should be divided
according to the manner set forth in her will
Felix Sr. and Avelina opposed the probate of the will. But later on Felix Sr. changed
his mind, waived and renounced his hereditary rights in her estate in favor of
their 6 children out of respect for his wifes will.
So, the CFI set a hearing for the probate of the will and appointed its branch
clerk of court as special administrator of the decedents estate.
Subsequently, another lawyer Montaa, claiming to be the lawyer of Felix Jr.7 filed
a motion to withdraw probate of the alleged will, requested to proceed by
intestate proceeding, and asked that notice to creditors be issued. Montana assailed
the provision of the will which partitioned conjugal assets.
So the CFI dismissed the petition for probate, converted the proceeding into an
intestate proceeding, and ordered the issuance of a notice to creditors.
Felix Jr, through new counsel, asked the CFI to reconsider such order claiming that
Montana asked for the withdrawal of the petition to probate without consent
The CFI declared that the will was void
MAIN ISSUE/HELD: W/N the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic
validity of the will and declaring it void, before ruling on its allowance or
formal validity NO, the probate court did not err
GENERAL RULE: it is the probate court's duty to pass first upon the formal validity
of the will. Generally, the probate of the will is mandatory.
EXCPETION: In an extreme case where the will on its face is intrinsically void.
In view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality, and
because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate (which the CFI assumed
to have been filed with Felix Jrs authorization), the trial court acted correctly in
passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had
been established.
The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it
appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the
intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court
should do so.
ISSUE/HELD: W/N the probate court erred in converting the testate
proceeding to intestate proceeding YES, the probate court erred
The invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not
result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed
that the testator would not have made such other dispositions if the first
invalid disposition had not been made8.
FACTS
7
8
Felix Jrs counsel of record was Atty. Cabreros

Art. 792, Civil Code
The valid parts will be upheld if they can be separated from the invalid without
defeating the intention of the testator or interfering with the general testamentary
scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries.
The statements of testatrix Leodegaria which are contrary to law:
- That she owned the southern half of the conjugal lands: because, although she
was a co-owner thereof, her share was inchoate and proindiviso9
- That her properties should not be divided among her heirs during her husband's
lifetime but should be kept intact and that the legitimes should be paid in cash is
contrary to Art. 1080 of the Civil Code.10 Since she did not assign the whole estate
to one or more children as envisaged in said article, she had no right to require that
the legitimes be paid in cash.
Subject to the foregoing observations and the rules on collation, the will is
intrinsically valid. The illegal provisions do not nullify the entire will. Such
may be disregarded.
The partition therein may be given effect if it does not prejudice the creditors and
impair the legitimes. The distribution and partition would become effective upon the
death of Felix Sr as provided in the will.
Also, by reason of Felix Srs conformity to his wife's will and his renunciation of his
hereditary rights, his one-half conjugal share became a part of his deceased wife's
estate. His conformity validated the partition made in the will without prejudice to
the rights of the creditors and the legitimes of the compulsory heirs
In the Nuguid case, the whole will was intrinsically void since it preterited
compulsory heirs in the direct line, therefore total intestacy resulted. But in the
present case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His preterition did not
produce intestacy.
ISSUE/HELD: W/N the probate court erred in issuing a notice to creditors
though no executor/regular administrator was appointed YES, it erred
The probate court appointed a special administrator. A notice to creditors is not in
order if only a special administrator has been appointed.
Sec. 1, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court,11 clearly contemplates the appointment of an
executor or regular administrator and not that of a special administrator.
It is the executor or regular administrator who is supposed to oppose the claims
against the estate and to pay such claims when duly allowed12
ISSUE/HELD: W/N probate court erred in appointing its branch clerk of court
as special administrator YES, it erred
A court employee should devote his official time to his official duties and should not
have as a sideline the administration of a decedent's estate.
It might raise suspicion that the probate Judge and his clerk of court are conspiring
in extracting from the decedent's estate. The probate Judge might find it difficult to
hold the branch clerk of court to a strict accountability.
Art. 143 of the Civil Code

ART. 1080 (par 2). A parent who, in the interest of his or her family, to keep any agricultural, industrial, or
manufacturing enterprise intact, may avail himself of the right granted him in this article, by ordering that the
legitime of the other children to whom the property is not assigned be paid in cash. (1056a)
11
Immediately after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, the court shall issue a notice
requiring all persons having money claims against the decedent to file them in the office of the clerk of said
court
12
Sec. 10, Rule 86 and Sec. 1, Rule 88 of Rules of Court
10
CORONADO V. CA (1990)
FACTS:
The property subject of this case is a parcel of land situated in Nagcarlan,
Laguna containing 277 square meters.
The parcel of land is being contested by Juana Albovias on the one hand
and Leonida Coronado, Felix Bueno, Melania Retizos, Bernardino Buenseda,
and Jovita Montefalcon.
Juana claims that the property in question is a portion of a bigger lot
referred to as parcel G in the last will and testament executed in 1918
by Melecio Artiaga, Juanas grandfather.
The bigger lot was inherited under that will by Juana, her brother Domingo,
and 2 grandchildren, Bonifacio and Herminigildo.
Juana claims that sometime in 1925 or 1926, C. Lirio St. was created by
the Municipality of Nagcarlan traversing said parcel G.
Parcel G was thus divided into 2 portions, the west and the east.
The heirs divided the property by giving the northern portion to Bonifacio
and Herminigildo.
The southern portion was given to Juana and Domingo. The southern
portion was then partitioned between them.
Juana got the northern lot adjoining the lot of the Formenteras and
Domingo got the southern portion which adjoins the lot of Perfecto
Nanagas.
The part allocated to Domingo was later sold by him to Dalmacio
Monterola, owner of the adjoining property.
Juana claims that her property was included together with the two parcels
of land owned by Dalmacio Monterola, which were sold by Monterolas
successor-in-interest Leonida Coronado to Melania Retizos on 18 April
1970.
Retizos in turn sold the lots including the one being claimed by Juana, to
the spouses Buenaseda and Jovita Montefalcon, now the present
possessors thereof sometime in 1974.
On the other hand, Leonida Coronado and her co-petitioners claim that the
property in question was bequeathed to Leonida Coronado under a
Will executed by Dalmacio Monterola, who was allegedly in possession
thereof even before the outbreak of World War II.
The will was probated which was opposed by Juana together with her
husband. The will was however allowed by the lower and court and
affirmed on appeal.
As a result of the conflicting claims over the property in question, Juana
filed an action for quieting of title, declaratory relief and damages against
Coronado and co.
ISSUE/HELD: W/N the will under which Juana inherited the property in
question from her grandfather could pass property even if there was no
evidence to show that said will had been probated YES
While it is true that no will shall pass either real or personal property
unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court, the questioned will,
however, may be sustained on the basis of Article 1056 of the Civil Code of
1899, which was in force at the time said document was executed by
Melecio Artiaga in 1918.
Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his properties by an act inter
vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the
legitime of the forced heir.
-
Nowhere was it alleged nor shown that Leonida Coronado is entitled to

legitime from Melecio Artiaga.
The record is bereft of any showing Leonida Coronado and Melecio Artiaga
were related to each other.
ISSUE/HELD: W/N Juana is in estoppel from questioning the ownership of

Coronado and co. over the land in question having failed to raise the same
in the estate proceedings in thee trial court and even on appeal NO
Normally, the probate of a will does not look into its intrinsic validity.
The authentication of a will decides no other questions than such as touch
upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those
requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of the
wills.
It does not determine nor even by implication, prejudge the validity
or efficacy of provisions of the will, thus may be impugned as being
vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication.
The question relating to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may
be raised even after the will has been authenticated.
Juana is NOT estopped from questioning the ownership of the property in
question, notwithstanding her having objected to the probate of the will
executed by Monterola under which Leonida Coronada is claiming title to
the said property.
CUENCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS (1973)

Rule 75 Discovery of a Will During Intestate Proceedings
Note: This is the same Cuenco case in Rule 73. Since maam said we read the original,
Im assuming all of you did. This particular digest is for those i-might-be-the-nextone-to-be-called-so-help-me-God cases only. In short, a QUICKIE; Other issues not
discussed
SUMMARY:
Despite being filed a week later than the INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS in Cebu, the
PROBATE PROCEEDINGS filed in the CFI of Rizal (QC) can still take PRECEDENCE
because (1) when the Cebu Court learned of the petition for probated filed in QC, (2)
and that there was an allegation in the INTESTATE petition that the decedent died
intestate, (3) the CFI of Cebu chose to decline to take cognizance of the intestate
petition and hold such in abeyance. If the will is admitted to probate, then implicitly,
the intestate petition would be deemed false and improper. This is because in
Succession, testacy is preferred over intestacy, the former being the express will of
the decedent.
FACTS:
Senator Mariano Cuenco died at Manila and was survived by his widow, petitioner
Rosa Cuenco, and 2 minor sons, all residing at QC, and by his children of the 1st
marriage, respondents Lourdes et.al. all residing in Cebu.
Respondent Lourdes filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the

CFI of Cebu alleging that decedent died intestate in Manila, that he was a
resident of Cebu at the time of his death; and that he left properties in Cebu and
QC.
The Cebu court issued an order setting the petition for hearing and ordering the
publication at a newspaper of gen. circulation in Cebu. It was modified stating that
it will be premature it to act since the publication and notice requirements have not
been completed.
In the meantime, Rosa filed a petition with the CFI of Rizal (QC) for the
probate of the last will and for the issuance of letters testamentary in her
favor. Having learned of the intestate proceeding in Cebu, Rosa filed an Opposition
and MTD as well as an Opposition to Petition for Appointment of Special
Administrator for which an order holding in abeyance its resolution on the MTD until
after the CFI of QC shall have acted on the petition for probate. No MR or appeal
was filed.
Instead, respondents filed in the QC court an Opposition and Motion to
Dismiss opposing probate and assailing its jurisdiction to entertain petition
for probate in view of the alleged exclusive jurisdiction vested by her
petition in the Cebu court.
The QC court denied the motion, giving as a principal reason the
"precedence of probate proceeding over an intestate proceeding." It further
found that the residence of the senator at the time of his death was at QC. If a
party has two residences, the one which he himself selects or considers to be his
home or which appears to be the center of his affairs will be deemed his domicile.
The petitioner, in filing in QC, follows the first choice of residence of the decedent
and once the QC court acquires jurisdiction, it is to the exclusion of all others.
Lourdes' two MRs were denied.
Instead of appealing from the QC court's order admitting the will to probate and
naming Rosa as executrix thereof, Lourdes filed an SCA of certiorari and prohibition
with PI with the CA which rendered a decision against Rosa and held that Section 1,
Rule 73, which fixes the venue for the settlement of the estate of a deceased,
covers both testate and intestate proceedings. Cebu case having been filed ahead, it
is that court whose jurisdiction was first invoked and which first attached. MR was
denied, thus, Rosa filed with the SC a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: w/n the probate proceedings in the QC Court, despite being filed
later than the intestate proceedings in Cebu, should be given preference YES
RATIO: A fair reading of the Rule since it deals with venue and comity between
courts of equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction indicates that the court with whom the
petition is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate
in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.
Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the
decedent's last will has been presented in another court where the
decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his
surviving widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of the
intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate may be
actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the
petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which
has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last will.
This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner's filing with it a motion to
dismiss Lourdes' intestate petition, it issued its order holding in abeyance its action
on the dismissal motion and deferred to the QC court, awaiting its action on the
petition for probate before that court.
Implicit in the Cebu court's order was that if the will was duly admitted to
probate, by the QC court, then it would definitely decline to take
cognizance of Lourdes' intestate petition which would thereby be shown to
be false and improper, and leave the exercise of jurisdiction to the QC
court, to the exclusion of all other courts.
The Cebu court thus indicated that it would decline to take cognizance of the
intestate petition before it and instead defer to the Quezon City court, unless the
latter would make a negative finding as to the probate petition and the residence of
the decedent within its territory and venue.
The Court therefore holds under the facts of record that the Cebu court did not
act without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in declining to
take cognizance of the intestate petition and instead deferring to the
testate proceedings filed just a week later by petitioner as surviving widow and
designated executrix of the decedent's last will, since the record before it
showed the falsity of the allegation in the intestate petition that the
decedent had died without a will.
For the same reasons, neither could the Quezon City court be held to have acted
without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in admitting the decedent's
will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix in accordance with its
testamentary disposition, in the light of the settled doctrine that the provisions of
Rule 73, section 1 lay down only a rule of venue, not of jurisdiction.
Thank you Ava for your digest.
Case: Fernandez v. Dimagiba (Full title of the cases: Fernandez, Eusebio

Reyes and Luisa Reyes v. Dimagiba; Reyes, Reyes, Reyes, and Reyes v.
Dimagiba)
Facts:
Benedicta delos Reyes is the decedent in this case.
Dimagiba (proponent) submitted to the CFI a petition for the probate of the
purported will of the decedent executed on Oct 22, 1930
o
The will instituted her as the sole heir of the deceased
o
Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes, and Luisa Reyes and one month later
Mariano, Cesar, Leonor Paciencia, all surnamed Reyes (intestate heirs
for brevity) claim to be heirs intestate of the decedent and filed
oppositions to the probate asked.
Grounds advanced for the opposition were forgery, vices of

consent, estoppel by laches of the proponent, and revocation
of the will by 2 deeds of conveyance of the major portion of
the estate made by the testatrix
CFI (June 20, 1958): found that the will was genuine and properly executed but
deferred the resolution on the questions of estoppel and revocation "until such
time when we shall pass upon the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will
or when the question of adjudication of the properties is opportunely
presented."
o
Intestate heirs petitioned for reconsideration(MR), and/or new
trial(MNT), insisting that the issues of estoppel and revocation be
considered and resolved
o
CFIs ruling over the MR/MNT: overruled the claim that Dimagiba was
in estoppel to ask for the probate of the will, but: "reserving unto the
parties the right to raise the issue of implied revocation at the
opportune time." [note that this decision denying the MR/MNT is not
appealed]
After receiving further evidence on the issue whether the execution by the
decedent of deeds of sale of the larger portion of her estate in favor of
Dimagiba made in 1943 and 1944 subsequent to the execution of her 1930
testament had revoked the 1930 testament
CFI (Feb 27, 1962): resolved against the oppositors and held the will of the
decedent to be unaffected and unrevoked by the deeds of sale.
CA: held that the decree last June 20, 1958 admitting the will to probate had
become final for lack of opportune appeal;
o
It further held: that such decision was appealable independently of the
issue of implied revocation, hence this appeal to the SC
Issue-Held: W/N the order allowing the will to probate should be

considered interlocutory No. Such decision allowing the will is
independent and final.
Ratio:
The argument of the intestate heirs that the order allowing probate is
interlocutory is untenable.
o
It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all
questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution
and witnessing of his last will and testament, irrespective of whether
its provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise.
o
Thus: the probate order is final and is a proper subject of an appeal
o
It is so recognized by express provisions of Section 1 of Rule
109[appeals in special proceedings], that specifically prescribes that
"any interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an
order or judgment . . . where such order or judgment: (a) allows or
disallows a will."
Intestate heirs further argue that they were entitled to wait the trial courts
resolution on the other ground of their opposition because if not, there will be a
multiplicity of recourses to the higher courts untenable because Rule 109
allows appeal to the allowance or disallowance of a will
There being no controversy that the probate decree of the Court below was not
appealed on time, the same had become final and conclusive. The appellate
courts may no longer revoke said decree nor review the evidence upon which it
is made to rest. Thus, the appeal belatedly lodged against the decree was
correctly dismissed
The alleged revocation implied from the execution of the deeds of convenience
in favor of Dimagiba is plainly irrelevant to and separate from the question of
whether the testament was duly executed.
o
The court reasons that if the will is not entitled to probate, then there
is nothing to revoke
o
And: the revocation invoked by the intestate heirs is not express: but
such is an implied revocation which flows from the acts of the
decedent allegedly of selling the properties which are subject of the
will as such the revocation will not affect the will itself but only the
particular devise or legacy. Only total and absolute revocation can
preclude probate of the revoked testament
o
[Random thoughts again: relate this with what we learned in
Succession. In probate, it is the extrinsic validity that the court is
concerned in the stage of allowing the will for probate. Intrinsic
matters should be looked upon in the subsequent stages of the
proceedings.]
Side issue: W/N the will was revoked by the act of the decedent of making deeds
of sale involving a larger part of her estate to Dimagiba. No. The existence of any
such change or departure from the original intent of the testatrix, expressed in her
1930 testament, is rendered doubtful by the circumstance that the subsequent
alienations in 1943 and 1944 were executed in favor of the legatee herself,
Dimagiba. Also, Dimagiba did not pay for the land sold to her. Revocation being an
exception, SC believes that in the circumstances of the particular case, Article 957
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, does not apply to the case at bar.
Super summary for cramming:
In 1903, Johnson procured a certificate of Naturalization in Chicago. Thereafter,

Johnson returned to Manila, where he continued to live until his death.
In Manila, he entered into marital relations with Alejandra Ibaez by whom he
had 3 children, Mercedes, Encarnacion, and Victor. Two other children, Eleonor
and Alberto were borne to the deceased by Simeona Ibaez.
Johnson left a holographic will leaving sums of money and property to all his
children. The will was signed by the testator and 2 witnesses only, instead of 3
witnesses as required by Sec. 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The will was
therefore not executed in conformity with the provisions of law generally
applicable to wills executed by inhabitants of the Philippines, and hence could not
have been proved under Sec. 618.
A petition was presented in the CFI of Manila for the probate of the will, on the
ground that Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of the State of Illinois,
USA; that the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of the state;
and hence could be probated under Sec. 638 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
3 months after the will was had been probated, Ebba Ingeborg Johnson moved to
annul the decree of probate.
The grounds upon which Ebba seeks to avoid probate are:
The order admitting the will to probate was beyond the jurisdiction of the
court and void because it was made without notice to Ebba
The order should be set aside because the testator was not a resident of
Illinois and the will was not in conformity with the laws of Illinois.
ISSUES/HELD
W/N the will should have been admitted to probate. YES
Proponent for will asked court to accept will for probate. The intestate heirs opposed
such saying that the will is forged, consent of decedent vitiated, will revoked. Trial
court accepted will for probate but left the issue of revocation for later. Trial court
said later that the will is unrevoked. CA said that the appeal regarding the
acceptance of the probate was not filed on time. SC agreed with CA saying that the
appeal was not filed on time because it should have been appealed during the
proper periods after the decision accepting the will for probate. The oppositors
should not have waited for the decision regarding revocation before it appealed.
IN RE ESTATE OF JOHNSON (1918)

Meaning of Probate
Emil Johnson, a native of Sweden, he emigrated to the US and lived in Illinois. In

Illinois, Johnson married Rosalie Ackeson, by whom he had a daughter named
Ebba Ingeborg.
RATIO
The proceedings for the probate of the will were regular and the publication was
sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding and to allow the will
to be probated.
The proceeding as to the probate of a will is one in rem, and the state is
allowed wide latitude in determining the character of the constructive notice
in a proceeding where it was absolute possession of the res.
Under the Code of Civil Procedure, the court may relieve a party from an order taken
against him through mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; provided
that an application therefore be made in no case exceeding six months after the order
was taken.
FACTS
Although the time allowed for making of such application was short, the remedy
existed, and the possibility of its use is proved in this case by the circumstance that
within such time, Ebba in fact appeared and excepted to the order admitting the will
to probate.
The lower court correctly found, according to the evidence, that the testator was a
citizen of the state of Illinois.
The allegation of Ebba is insufficient as she only asserts that the testator was a
resident of the Philippines, but does not deny his citizenship in Illinois.
As to whether the will was executed in conformity with the laws of Illinois, it does not
appear that any witness was examined with reference to the law of Illinois. However,
such error is not now available because Ebba never alleged that the law of Illinois is
different from what the court found, and never raised such error.
Under the Code of Civil Procedure, the allowance of by the court of a will of real or
personal property shall be conclusive as to its due execution.
Due execution involves conditions relating to a number of matters, such as the age
and mental capacity of the testator, the signing of the document by the testator,
or by someone in his behalf, and the acknowledgment of the instrument by him in
the presence if the required number of witnesses who affix their signatures to the will
to attest the act.
A will which has been probated according to law and without fraud, cannot
be annulled, in any other proceeding whatever, on account of any irregularity
or defect in the execution of a will, or on account of any error in the action of
the court.
Ebba insists that the will should not have been admitted to probated, because it
containts provisions which cannot be given effect consistent with the laws of the
Philippines. She alleges that as a legitimate heir of the testator she cannot be
deprived of her legitime. However, the probate of the will does not affect the intrinsic
validity of its provisions, the decree of probate being conclusive only as regards the
due execution of the will.
TIBURCIA MANAHAN v. ENGRACIA MANAHAN

Rule 75 - Meaning of Probate
FACTS:
One year and seven months later, Engracia Manahan (Donatas sister) filed a
motion for reconsideration and a new trial, praying that the order admitting the
will to probate be set aside and the authenticated will declared null and void.
Tiburcia filed her opposition to this petition. After hearing, the trial denied
Engracias motion.
On appeal of the order denying her motion, Engracia claims that13:
1.
Being Donatas sister, she was an interested party in the testamentary

proceedings and thus, was entitled to and should have been notified of the
probate of the will;
2.
The CFI did not really probate the will but limited itself to decreeing its
authentication; and
3.
The will is null and void for non-compliance with the external formalities
prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure.
ISSUE/ HELD:
W/N Engracia is an interested party and thus entitled to notice of the probate
proceedings. - NO
RATIO:
Engracia was not entitled to notification of the probate of the will since she was
not an interested party, not having filed an opposition to the petition for the
probate thereof. Engracia was not instituted heir. And, she is not a compulsory
heir. Thus, she did not acquire any successional right.
ISSUE/ HELD:
W/N Donatas will was really probated. - YES
RATIO:
The CFI really decreed the authentication and probate of Donatas will, which is
the only pronouncement required of the probate court by the law in order that
the will may be considered valid and duly executed in accordance with the law.
In the phraseology of the procedural law, there is no essential difference
between the authentication of a will and its probate. The words authentication
and probate are synonymous in this case. All the law requires is that the
competent court declared that in the execution of the will the essential external
formalities have been complied with and that, in view thereof, the document, as
a will, is valid and effective in the eyes of the law.
ISSUE/ HELD:
Donata Manahan died in Bulacan, Bulacan on 3 August 1930. Tiburcia Manahan

(Donatas niece) instituted special proceedings No. 4162 for the probate of
Donatas will. Tiburcia was named the executrix in said will.
The CFI set the date for the hearing and the necessary notice was published.
On the day of the hearing of the petition, no opposition was filed and evidence
was presented. The CFI of Bulacan admitted the will to probate.
W/N the SC can still entertain Engracias third contention. - NO

RATIO:
Once a will has been authenticated and admitted to probate, questions relative
to the validity thereof can no longer be raised on appeal. The decree of probate
is conclusive with respect to the due execution of the will and it cannot
The CFI appointed Tiburcia executrix, and likewise appointed the Committee on
Claims and Appraisal.
13
Note that Engracia is indirectly contesting the order admitting Donatas will to probate.
impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any
separate or independent action or proceedings14.
Testamentary proceedings are in rem. Thus, the CFI's decree admitting the will
to probate was effective and conclusive against Engracia. Section 306 of the
Code of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 306. EFFECT OF JUDGMENT.
1. In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in respect to
the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased
person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or relation
of a particular person the judgment or order is conclusive upon the title of
the thing, the will or administration, or the condition or relation of the
person: Provided, That the probate of a will or granting of letters of
administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the
testator or intestate;
The SC said that the order denying Engracias MR/ MTR was interlocutory in
character. By appealing such order, Engracia was indirectly appealing the order
admitting the will to probate entered one year and seven months ago.
It is now too late to contest the validity and sufficiency of the execution of
Donatas will. After due hearing, the CFI found that the will was valid and
effective and the order admitting it to probate, thus promulgated, should be
accepted and respected by all.
MANINANG v. COURT OF APPEALS
RULE 75Production of Will: Allowance of Will NecessaryMeaning of probate
FACTS:
On 21 May 1977 Clemencia Aseneta died at the age of 81, leaving behind a
holographic will which left all of Clemencias real and personal properties to
Dra. Soledad Maninang and her family (SOLEDAD). Said will also contained
a statement that Clemencia does not consider Bernardo Aseneta (BERNARDO)
as her adopted son.
In June that year, SOLEDAD filed a Petition for the Probate of the Will of
Aseneta in CFI-Branch 4 in QC (Sp. Proc. No. Q-23304)
Sometime thereafter, BERNARDO instituted Intestate Proceedings before
CFI-Branch 11 in Pasig.
The Testate and the Intestate Proceedings were consolidated before Branch
11.
BERNARDO filed a Motion to Dismiss the Testate case on the ground that
the holographic will was null and void on the ground that he was preterited.
In her Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, SOLEDAD said that in a case
for the probate of a will, the Courts inquiry is limited to an examination of
and resolution on the extrinsic validity of the will and that BERNARDO was
effectively disinherited by Clemencia.
The Lower Court ordered the dismissal of the Petition for Probate and
appointed BERNARDO as Administrator of the intestate estate of
Clemencia.
14
SOLEDAD then filed a Petition for Certiorari before respondent Court of

Appeals alleging GADALEJ on the part of the Lower Court.
The CA affirmed the Lower Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it dismissed the
Petition for Probate.
HELD:
YES.
RATIO:
Generally, the probate of a will is mandatory. The law enjoins the
probate of the will and public policy requires it, because unless the will is
probated and the notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a
person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory.
Normally, the probate of a will does not look into its intrinsic validity.
Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the
will cannot be entertained in probate proceedings because its only
purpose is merely to determine of the will has been executed in
accordance with the requirements of the law.
BERNARDO relies upon the rulings in Nuguid v. Nuguid and Balanay v. Hon.
Martinez in that where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic
validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the Court
should meet that issue.
These rulings however are more the
exceptions rather than the rule. No such practical considerations are
present in this case.
Because of the dismissal of the controversial issue of preterition has not been
thoroughly considered. The Lower Courts conclusion was that BERNARDO
has been preterited. That conclusion, according to the Supreme Court is not
indubitable.
The case is REMANDED for consolidation with the Intestate Proceedings.
Pascual v. CA
FACTS:
Petitioner Consolacion Sison and respondent Remedios Eugenio-Gino are

the niece and granddaughter respectively of the late Canuto Sison.
Canuto was a co-owner of Lot 2 in Navotas, Metro Manila.
Canuto and Consolacion executed a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan

(Kasulatan), where Canuto sold his share in Lot 2 to Consolacion.
Consolacion immediately took possession of Lot 2 (Lot 2-A and 2-E).
Surviving children of Canuto executed a joint affidavit affirming the

Kasulatan in favor of Consolacion.
TCT was issued in Consolacions name.
About 20 years later, Remedios filed a complaint against Consolacion and

her spouse Pascual in RTC of Malabon for Annulment or Cancellation of TCT
and Damages.
Sec. 625 Code of Civil Procedure

Remedios claimed she is owner of Lots 2-A and 2-E because

Catalina (sister of Canuto) devised these lots to her in Catalinas
will and testament.
o
Remedios added that Consolacion obtained ttile to the lots thru
fraudulent means.
Petitioner sought to dismiss the complaint on the ground of prescription.
TC denied petitioners MTD, ruling that the action filed by Remedios is
based on fraud, covered by 4-year prescriptive period and thus complaint
had already prescribed.
TC further ruled that Remedios has no right of action against
petitioners because Catatlinas last will from which Remedios
claims to derive her title has not been admitted to probate.
CA reversed TCs decision, ruling that what Remedios filed was a suit to
enforce an implied trust and thus had a 10-year prescription which had not
expired yet.
o
ISSUE:
1. W/N prescription bars the action filed by Remedios. YES
2. W/N Remedios is a real-party-in-interest. NO
RULING:
1. The action is barred by prescription.
What Remedios filed was an action to enforce an implied trust but the
same is barred by prescription.
Prescriptive period is 10 years counted from the date the adverse party
repudiates the implied trust.
Remedios filed her complaint more than 19 years after Consolacion

registered her title to the lots, thus action has already been barred by
prescription.
Also, the allegations of fraud were not proved by clear and convincing
evidence.
2. Remedios is not a party in interest who can file the complaint.
Probate court did not issue any order admitting the last will to probate.
Remedios does not even contest to this finding.
Civil Code provides that No will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules
of Court.
Court has interpreted this provision to mean, until admitted to

probate, a will has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed
thereunder.
Thus, since probate court has not admitted Catalinas last will,
Remedios is thus without any cause of action either to seek
reconveyance of the lots or to enforce an implied trust over such lots.
Pastor v. CA
24 June 1983
Definition of Probate
Facts:
Alvaro Pastor Sr. was a Spanish subject who died and was survived by his
widow Sofia Bossia who died subsequently. They had 2 legitimate children
Alvaro Pastor Jr. and Sofia Pastor, and an illegitimate child Barlito
Quemada.
QUEMADA filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged
holographic will of PASTOR, SR. (CASE1) with the Court of First Instance of
Cebu (probate court). After hearing, probate court appointed Quemada as
special administrator of the entire estate.
QUEMADA as special administrator, instituted against PASTOR, JR. and his
wife an action for reconveyance of alleged properties of the estate
in another branch of CFI (CASE 2), which included the properties subject
of the legacy and which were in the names of the spouses PASTOR, JR. and
his wife, Maria Elena Achaval de Pastor, who claimed to be the owners
thereof in their own rights, and not by inheritance.
Pastor Jr. and Sofia filed their opposition to the appointment of Quemada
as special administrator.
The probate court admitted the will to probate. (Order 1)
The case reached the SC which ordered the remand of the case to the
probate court.
For two years after remand of the case to the PROBATE COURT, QUEMADA
filed pleading after pleading asking for payment of his legacy and seizure of
the properties subject of said legacy. PASTOR, JR. and SOFIA opposed
these pleadings on the ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit with
another branch of the Cebu Court.
The probate court set the hearing for the intrinsic validity of the will in
CASE 1 but no hearing was made due to the opposition of SOFIA and
PASTOR, JR. on the ground of the pendency of CASE 2.
One of the properties included in the estate is 60% shares in the ATLAS
Mining Company. By virtue of a statement submitted by ATLAS to the
probate court, it was found that it had paid legacies to QUEMADA in the
amount of 4.5% of the 60%. SOFIA and PASTOR, JR. also submitted their
position papers on how much share QUEMADA should receive
Probate court issued an order of execution (purportedly an
execution of Order 1) and garnishment ruling that the legacy paid
to QUEMADA was not inofficious. (Order 2)
The order of execution was issued without a statement on the intrinsic
validity of the will and the ownership of the subject mining claims.
SOFIA and PASTOR,JR. sought reconsideration thereof primarily on the
ground that the PROBATE COURT gravely abused its discretion when it
resolved the question of ownership of the royalties and ordered the
payment of QUEMADA's legacy after prematurely passing upon the intrinsic
validity of the will. In the meantime, the PROBATE COURT ordered
suspension of payment of all royalties due PASTOR, JR. and/or his
assignees until after resolution of oppositors' motion for reconsideration.
Without awaiting the resolution of the motion for reconsideration, PASTOR,
JR. and his wife file a petition for certiorari in the CA.
CA: denied the petition on the ground that the MR was still pending.
ISSUE: Whether the CFI committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
ORDER OF EXECUTION AND GARNISHMENT without resolving 1st the
intrinsic validity of the will and the ownership of the subject mining claims.
YES.
RATIO:
In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is
restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator,
being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by law. As a rule, the question of ownership is an
extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for
the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be
included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the
title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to
the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.
The rule is that the execution must conform to the dispositive portion, which it
purports to execute. In this case the Order 1 was sought to be executed by the
probate courts ORDER OF EXECUTION AND GARNISHMENT. However, this
order was premature since Order 1 was confined to the extrinsic validity of
the will and the propriety of appointing a special administrator. There was
no ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will nor the ownership of the
subject mining properties. Order 1 even stated that it is Subject to the
outcome of the suit for reconveyance of ownership and possession of real
and personal properties pending in another branch.
The net assets of the estate not having been determined, the legitime of the forced
heirs in concrete figures could not be ascertained. It was then not possible to
determine whether the legacy of QUEMADA - a fixed share in a specific property
rather than an aliquot part of the entire net estate of the deceased - would produce
an impairment of the legitime of the compulsory heirs. (remember that Order 2
ruled that the legacies paid to Quemada were not inofficious)
The circumstances of this case constitute an exception to the rule that and MR is a
precondition to the filing of a petition for certiorari. It is within a court's competence
to order the execution of a final judgment; but to order the execution of a final
order (which is not even meant to be executed) by reading into it terms that are not
there and in utter disregard of existing rules and law, is manifest grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, the rule that certiorari
may not be invoked to defeat the right of a prevailing party to the execution of a
valid and final judgment, is inapplicable. For when an order of execution is issued
with grave abuse of discretion or is at variance with the judgment sought to be
enforced certiorari will lie to abate the order of execution.
Rodriguez v. Borja
Special Proceedings
Rule 75 B. Nature of Proceedings
FACTS:
Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on in the City of Manila.
On March 4, 1963, Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan (PANGILINAN)
delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr.
Rodriguez.
Rodriguez filed a petition for leave of court to allow them to examine the alleged
will. But before the court could act on the petition, the same was withdrawn.
On March 12, 1963 (8:00 AM), Rodriguez filed before the CFI of Rizal a petition
for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging that the deceased
was a resident of Paranaque, Rizal, and died without leaving a will.
On March 12, 1963 (11:00 AM), Pangilinan filed a petition in the CFI of Bulacan
for the probation of the will delivered by them on March 4. It was stipulated that Fr.
Rodriguez was Parish priest of the Catholic Church of Hagonoy, Bulacan for 33
years.
Rodriguez contended that since the intestate proceedings in the CFI of Rizal was
filed ahead of the petition for probate in the CFI of Bulacan, the CFI of Rizal has
jurisdiction.
Pangilinan argued that the CFI of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over the case upon
delivery by them of the will to the Clerk of Court on March 4, and that it has
precedence over the case filed in Rizal on March 12.
The CFI of Bulacan denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that Rodriguez was
aware of the existence of the purported will since they filed a petition to examine
the same, and that the filing of the intestate proceedings in Rizal was only to
prevent the Court of Bulacan from exercising jurisdiction over the probate
proceedings.
ISSUE 1: Which CFI has jurisdiction? BULACAN or RIZAL?
HELD: BULACAN
RATIO:
The jurisdiction of the CFI of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery
thereto of the will of the late Fr. Rodriguez on March 4, even if no petition for its
allowance was filed until later, because upon the will being deposited the court
could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will,
and issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section
3, Rule 76:
SEC. 3. Court to appoint time for proving will. Notice thereof to be
published. - When a will is delivered to, OR a petition for the allowance of a will is
filed such court shall fix a time and place for proving the will and shall cause
notice of such time and place to be published ...
The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR a
petition for the allowance of a will is filed" plainly indicates that the court may act
upon the mere deposit therein of a decedent's testament, even if no petition for its
allowance is as yet filed.
Where the petition for probate is made after the deposit of the will, the
petition is deemed to relate back to the time when the will was delivered. Since the
testament of Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and delivered to the Court of Bulacan on
March 4, while petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in the CFI of Rizal only on
March 12, eight days later, the precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan
court is incontestable.
ISSUE 2: W/N the CFI acquired jurisdiction because the decedent was domiciled in
Rizal province (according to Rodriguez).
HELD: YES, CFI of Bulacan has acquired jurisdiction.

RATIO:
A) Fr. Rodriquez resided in Hagonoy, Bulacan for 33 years as its parish priest.
B) The power to settle decedents estates is conferred by law upon all CFIs and the
domicile of the testator affects only the venue and not jurisdiction of the court.
The law of jurisdiction confers upon CFIs jurisdiction over all probate cases
independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Since, however, there are
many CFIs, the Law of Procedure fixes the venue or the place where each case shall
be brought. Thus, the place of residence of the deceased is not an element of
jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue.
The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan CFI ahead of
any other, that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts, even if it were a case of wrong venue by express provisions of Rule 73.
Other matters that militate against the success of Rodriguez:
1) The commencing of intestate proceedings in Rizal by Rodriguez was in bad faith,
patently done with a view to divesting the Bulacan court of the precedence awarded
it by the Rules.
2) In our system of civil law, intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate
to the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid operative
will. The institution of intestacy proceedings in Rizal may not thus proceed while the
probate of the purported will of Father Rodriguez is pending.
SEANGIO VS. REYES

Summary: Testator disinherited Seangio.
Seangio commenced intestate
proceedings. However, the intestate proceeding was suspended and testate
proceedings were commenced. This was because the disinheritance was treated as
a will and thus had to undergo probate.
FACTS:
Alberto Seangio filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the
late Segundo Seangio (his father) and praying for the appointment of Elisa D.
Seangio-Santos as special administrator and guardian ad litem of Dy Yieng
Seangio (his sister).
Dy Yieng, Barbara, & Virginia (all heirs of Segundo- I assume theyre sisters)
opposed the petition contending that Dy Yieng does not need a guardian
because shes still very healthy, that a general power of attorney was
executed by the deceased Segundo in favor of Virginia to exercise control and
supervision over his business in the Philippines, and that Segundo left a
holographic will disinheriting Alfredo and that the intestate
proceedings must automatically be suspended and replaced by the
proceedings for the probate of the will since testate proceedings take
precedence and enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.
Alfredo filed a motion to dismiss the probate proceedings arguing that the
will is not a will under Art. 783 of the Civil Code since it does not contain
any disposition of the estate of the deceased as it only shows an act of
disinheritance.
Dy Yieng, et al filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss arguing that the
authority of the probate court is limited only to the determination of the
extrinsic validity of the will and what is being questioned by Alfredo is the
intrinsic validity of the will. They also argue that disinheritance
constitutes disposition of the estate of a decedent
The RTC dismissed the probate proceedings sustaining Alfredos argument
that the will is not a will as defined by law. The RTC also denied the MR filed
by Dy Yieng.
ISSUE/HELD (Only that which is related to Art. 783):

Whether or not the disinheritance is a holographic will as defined
by law AND THUS MUST BE PROBATED. YES.
RATIO:
The court took notice of the fact that the document was dated, signed, and
written by Segundo (the decedent) in his own handwriting. No issue as to its
authenticity was raised by Alfredo. (The courts like saying that Alfredo never said
the document is false)
The court also said that the disinheritance here is valid since it was based
on a valid cause as provided by law which is maltreatment by the child or
descendant of the testator.
A holographic will under Art. 810 of the Civil Code must be entirely written,
dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself (handwritten). It is subject to
no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be
witnessed.
Segundos document may seem to be a mere disinheritance instrument but
it actually satisfies the requirements of law as to the formalities of a holographic
will. There is intent to dispose mortis causa of his estate as may be deduced from
the terms of the document. There may be no affirmative disposition of the
property of Segundo but the disinheritance of Alfredo is actually an act of
disposition in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.
Holographic wills, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in law,
should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into
account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the
intention of the testator. The document was actually intended by Segundo to be his
last testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in the form
of a holographic will. The will must therefore be probated for the disinheritance
(which is a disposition of the property of Segundo, as said earlier) to be given
effect. The probate proceedings must therefore be resumed and must take
precedence over intestate proceedings as the law favors testacy over intestacy.
DOROTEA CABANG vs. MARTIN DELFINADO

FACTS:
Dorotea Cabang filed a case for the probate of a document purporting to be the last
will and testament of Celestino Delfinado. Martin Delfinado appeared filed an
opposition to the allowance of the will, alleging that the will was not signed by the
deceased, nor by any other person, in his presence and by his express direction,
and that the attestation does not comply with law.
Dorotea Cabang, widow of the testator, testified that her deceased husband,
Celestino Delfinado, could neither read nor write. Antonio Flor Mata, Justice of the
peace of Tayug testified that the deceased Celestino Delfinado requested him to
write a will for the latter and that the testator was not known to him to be able to
read and write. Paciano Romero, clerk by profession, one of the subscribing
witnesses testified that the testator stated that he could not read or write and
requested a certain person to sign his name to the will. Martin Delfinado, a
contestant testified that, he is a son by the 1st marriage of the testator; that he
does not know whether his father made a will or not; that father could read, write,
and sign his name and that he knows the latters signature.
The following agreement appears in the record: it was admitted by the counsel for
both sides that the document, which is marked 'Contestant's Exhibit No. 1,' and
which is now offered in evidence, was signed by the deceased Celestino Delfinado.
Exhibit No. 1 was admitted without objection. The last clause in the will reads:
In testimony whereof I place a cross between my name and surname as I am
unable to sign. Tayug, this 31st day of August, 1909.
CELESTINO (X) DELFINADO.
Signed in the presence of:
A. ABAYA, PABLO DEL ROSARIO, PACIANO ROMERO
ISSUE:
WON the court erred in admitting the will to probate without having 2 of the
subscribing witnesses called, although they were living within the jurisdiction of the
court, or for not requiring any showing why they were not produced. ~ YES.
RATIO:
Our statute requires wills to be attested by three witnesses, but is silent as to the
manner in which they shall be proved when contested. When not contested the
statute provides, that they may in the discretion of the judge be admitted to
probate upon the testimony of one of the subscribing witnesses.
The court observed that the legislature, in requiring three subscribing witnesses to a
will, did not contemplate the mere formality of signing their names. An idiot might
do this. These witnesses are placed round the testator to ascertain and judge of his
capacity, and the heir has a right to insist on the testimony of all the three
witnesses, to be given to the jury. They must therefore all be produce, if living, and
under the power of the court. If it be impossible to procure any one of them, the
court will proceed without him ex necessitate rei. But no such impossibility appears
in this case. For anything that appears, the absent witness might, with due
diligence, have been found and summoned. The not producing of him may lead to a
presumption that his testimony, if produced, would be unfavorable to the probate of
the will. At any rate, the rule is too important and too explicit to be dispensed with
on light grounds.
We are inclined to hold that no will can be proved, unless all the subscribing
witnesses, alive and within the control of the process of the court, are produced to
testify.
The rule that no will shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, unless
"attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses," is a matter of
substantive law and an element of the will's validity. The rule that the attesting
witnesses must be called to prove a will for probate is one of preference made so by
statute. This rule of evidence is not to be confused with rules of quantity.

There have been several reasons given for this rule of preference for the attesting
witnesses, one reason being that the party opposing the claim of proper execution
of the will has a right to the benefit of cross-examining the attesting witnesses as to
fraud, duress, or other matters of defense. The law places these witnesses "around
the testator to ascertain and judge of his capacity" for the purpose of preventing
frauds.
The soundness of the rule is well illustrated in the case under consideration. Here
the attesting clause was omitted and the testator signed by mark. The petitioner
produced only one of the attesting witnesses. Had there not been a contest, this
would have probably been sufficient under section 631. While there is no testimony
in the record to the effect that the testator could neither read nor write, there is
conclusive evidence that he could sign his name. This fact is established by the
production of Exhibit 1, which all agree the testator did sign. The testator's
signature to the document shows that he could write, at least his name, in a plain,
clear manner, indicating a fairly good knowledge of writing. Had the proponent
shown that the other two subscribing witnesses were not within the jurisdiction of
the court and could not, therefore, be called, the due execution of the will would still
be very doubtful.
Believing, as we do, that it was the intention of the Legislature that the subscribing
witnesses must be called or good and sufficient reason shown why they could not be
had, and being supported by the authorities above cited and quoted, we must
conclude that the proponent did not comply with the provisions of the law in the
presentation of her case.
CASIANO V. MALOTO, 79 SCRA 232 (1977)
RULE 75 DISCOVERY OF WILL DURING INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS
FACTS
Adriana Maloto died on 20 October 1963 in Iloilo City, her place of

residence.
In the belief that Adriana died intestate, her nieces and nephews Aldina,
Constancio, Panfilo, and Felino commenced intestate proceedings.
They subsequently executed an extrajudicial partition of the estate in
1964. This was approved by the court.
In 1967, however, a document dated 3 January 1940, purporting to be the

last will and testament of Adriana, was delivered to the clerk of court of the
CFI where the intestate proceeding was filed.
It appears that Aldina, Constancio, Panfilo, and Felino were all heirs in the
will, but Aldina and Constancio had bigger, different, and more
valuable portions than what they obtained in the extrajudicial partition.
The will also made other dispositions.
Aldina and Constancio thus filed a motion for reconsideration, annulment of

the proceedings, and allowance of the will.
The motions were denied by the court in 1968 for being filed out of
time.
The SC dismissed the petition for certiorari and mandamus, holding that
the appropriate remedy of the petitioners is for them to initiate a
separate proceeding for the probate of the will in question. The
petitioners therefore commenced probate proceedings.
Panfilo and Felino opposed the probate, contending that the will had been
destroyed and revoked by Adriana, and that the petition is now barred by
prior judgment or order. They also alleged that there already is no estate
to distribute, and that Aldina and Constancio are estopped from seeking
the remedy of probate.
The court dismissed the petition for probate, citing as grounds the
first two contentions of the oppositors.
Vicente Teotico filed a petition for probate of the will. Ana del Val Chan (Ana), claiming
to be Franciscas (the sister of Maria) adopted child, filed an opposition for probate
based on the following grounds:
1. The will was not executed in accordance with law,
2. Maria was physically and mentally incapable of executing a will at the time of
its execution,
3. The will was executed under duress, threat or influence of fear.
ISSUE(S) / RATIO
Did the court err in dismissing the petition for probate of the will of Adriana
Maloto? YES
The probate court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate
of the alleged will in the intestate proceedings. It is not proper to make
a finding in an intestate estate proceeding that the discovered will
has been revoked.
The court as a matter of fact stated in its order that the movants should
have filed a separate action for the probate of the will, and this Court has
already held that the appropriate remedy of the petitioners is for
them to initiate a separate proceeding for the probate of the will in
question.
In view of the foregoing, the order of 1968 denying the motions is not a
bar to the present petition for the probate of the alleged will of
Adriana.
Vicente filed a MTD claiming that Ana had no legal personality to intervene. The
probate court, however, allowed the opposition. Consequently, Ana added a ground
for opposing the will: that the will was inoperative as to the share given to Rene
because he was the doctor during Marias last illness.
ORDER DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR PROBATE IS SET ASIDE.

TEOTICO V. DEL VAL (1965)
Rule 75 Meaning of Probate
FACTS
Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre (Maria) died on July 14, 1955 in the City of
Manila leaving properties worth P600,000.00. 15 She left P20,000 to Rene Teotico
(Rene), the husband of Marias niece Josefina. She also left the usufruct of a certain
building to them, with the naked ownership of the building to her grandnieces and
nephews (the children of Rene and Josefina). She left the remainder of her properties
to Josefina.
15
The court admitted the will to probate but declared the portion set for Rene to be
inoperative, with the statement that that portion shall go by intestate succession.
Both parties appealed: Rene as to the declaration that his portion in the will is
vacated, and Ana as to the allowance of the will. Both MRs were denied.
ISSUES / HELD
1.
2.
3.
RATIO
1.
Does Ana have personality to intervene? NO.

Has the will been duly admitted to probate? YES.
Should the court have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will? NO.
Only an interested party has a right to intervene in an intestate proceeding. An

interested party is one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or
one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. His interest must be
must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent.
Ana has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the estate either as
heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property
affected by the will, because it nowhere appears therein any provision designating
her as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no
interest in the will either as administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim
against any portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof, and while
she previously had an interest in the Calvo building located in Escolta, she had
already disposed of it long before the execution of the will.
Even if the will is denied probate, Ana would still not have an interest because she
is not a legal heir of Maria. Her claims of being Joses (Marias brother) natural
child and Franciscas adopted child do not make her Marias legal heir.16
The circumstances surrounding the execution of the will are: She left a will written in Spanish,
executed at her residence at Quiapo, Manila. She affixed her signature at the bottom of the will
and on the left margin of each and every page thereof in the presence of Pilar Borja, Pilar C.
2. Ana claims that the will was not properly attested to and that it was procured thru
Sanchez, and Modesto Formilleza, who in turn affixed their signatures below the attestation clause
undue pressure and that Maria affixed her signature thereto believing that the
and on the left margin of each and every page of the will in the presence of the testatrix and of
document contained her true intentions.
each other. The will was acknowledged before Notary Public Niceforo S. Agaton by the testatrix
and her witnesses.
In her will, Maria said that she was possessed of the full use of her mental faculties; that she was
free from illegal pressure or influence of any kind from the beneficiaries of the will and from any
influence of fear or threat; that she freely and spontaneously executed said will and that she had
16
neither ascendants nor descendants of any kind such that she could freely dispose of all her
(remember reasons in succession? Illegitimate child disgracefully looked upon by the family,
estate.
etcrelationship of the adopted does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parent).
The claim that the will was not attested to, however, is belied by the testimonies
of the wills instrumental witnesses.17
The claim of improper pressure was also belied by evidence. Ana claimed that
since Rene lived Maria, he must have been able to exercise influence over her.
This was not sufficiently proven by Ana. The exercise of improper pressure and
undue influence must be supported by substantial evidence and must be of a kind
that would overpower and subjugate the mind of the testatrix as to destroy her
free agency and make her express the will of another rather than her own. The
burden is on the person challenging the will that such influence was exerted at
the time of its execution, a matter which here was not done, for the evidence
presented not only is insufficient but was disproved by the testimony of the
instrumental witnesses.
3.
Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be
entertained in probate proceedings because its only purpose is to determine if the
will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law. It does
not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the
provisions. These may be impugned as being null, notwithstanding its
authentication. The questions relating to these points remain entirely unaffected
and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated.
To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a
will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator was in
a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of probate proceedings. The
judgment determines and can determine nothing more. The court has no power to
pass upon the validity of any provisions made in the will. It cannot decide, for
example, that a certain legacy is void and another one is valid.
Moreover, Rene was not given an opportunity to defend the validity of the legacy.
Thus, the order allowing the will to probate is upheld. The rest of the order is set
aside.
Vda. De Kilayko v. Tengco

Special Proceedings
Rule 75: Meaning of Probate
Facts:
17
Maria Lizares y Alunan died without any issue leaving her "testamento" in
the possession and custody of her niece, Eustquia Lizares. 3
Eustaquia filed a petition for the settlement of the testate estate of

Maria Lizares y Alunan, (Special Proceedings No. 8452.)
The will was probated and Eustaquia was appointed as administratrix.
Eustaquia filed a project of partition 6 which was granted by the
probate court. Simultaneously, said court declared the heirs,
devisees, legatees and usufructuaries mentioned in the project of
partition as the only heirs, devisees, legatees and usufructuaries of
the estate; adjudicated to them the properties repectively assigned
to each and every one of them.
The heirs of Maria Lizares, namely: Encarnacion L. Vda. de Panlilio,
Remedios L. Vda. de Guinto, Felicidad Paredes Llopez, Rosario Paredes
Mendoza and Eustaquia Lizares executed an agreement of partition
and subdivision, thereby terminating their co-ownership over several
lots.
A year later Eustquia Lizares died single without any descendant. Rodolfo
Lizares and Amelo Lizares were appointed joint administrators of Eustquia's
intestate estate.
On the strength of the testamentary provisions contained in
paragraphs 10 and 11 of the will of Maria Lizares, which were
allegedly in the nature of a simple substitution, Celsa Vda. de
Kilayko, Encarnacion Vda. de Panlilio, and Remedios Vda. de Guinto
(hereinafter collectively referred to as Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et
al.) filed a motion in Special Proceedings No. 8452 to reopen once
again the testate estate proceedings of Maria Lizares.
o
They prayed among others that a substitute administrator be
appointed;
o
That the order in S.P. NO 8452 be reconsidered and amended by
declaring them as heirs to 1/3 of 1/14 of Hda. Minuluan and to
1/6 of Hda. Matab-ang, both of which form an aggregate area of
33 hectares
Two (2) sets of intestate heirs of the deceased Eustaquia Lizares namely:
Socorro L. Vda. de Escario, Rodolfo Lizares, Mario Lizares, Lucrecia Gustilo,
and Aurora Lizares Wagner opposed the aforesaid motion.
Motion to reopen DENIED. MR DENIED.
Vda. De Kilayko filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and
possession of real property against the joining administrators of the
estate of Eustaquia Lizares, Rodolfo and Amelo Lizares. It was docketed as
Civil Case No. 11639
o
Joint administrators filed motion to dismiss on the ground of
lower court had no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 11639 as it
involves the interpretation of the will of Maria Lizares, its
implementation and/or the adjudication of her properties.
o
They assert that the matter had been settled in Special
Proceedings No. 8452 and had become final and
unappealable long before the complaint in Civil Case No.
11639was filed, and therefore, the cause of action in the
latter case was barred by the principle of res judicata.
Pilar Borja testified that Maria was in perfect state of health at the time she executed the will for
she carried her conversation with her intelligently; that she signed immediately above the
attestation clause and on each and every page thereof at the left-hand margin in the presence of
the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public; that Maria asked her and the other
ISSUE: W/N THE LOWER COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL CASE NO.
witnesses to act as such; that Maria was the first one to sign and later she gave the will to the
11639.
witnesses who read and signed it. Pilar G. Sanchez said the same thing. Modesto Formilleza
testified that he was asked by the testatrix to be one of the witnesses to the will; that he read and
understood the attestation clause before he signed the document, and all the witnesses spoke
HELD: NO. ACTION BARRED BY RES JUDICATA.
either in Spanish or in Tagalog. He finally said that the instrumental witnesses and the testatrix
signed the will at the same time and place and identified their signatures.
Pertinent to the issue interposed by the petitionersis Section 1, Rule 90 of

the Rules of Court18
Applying this rule, in the cases of De Jesus v. Daza, 33 and Torres v.
Encarnacion, 34 the Court said:
(T)he probate court, having the custody and control of the entire estate, is the
most logical authority to effectuate this provision, within the estate proceeding, said
proceeding being the most convenient one in which this power and function of the
court can be exercised and performed without the necessity of requiring the parties
to undergo the incovenience and litigate an entirely different action.
Some decisions of the Court pertinent to the issue that the probate court
has the jurisdiction to settle the claims of an heir and the consequent
adjudication of the properties, are worth mentioning. In the cases of
Arroyo v. Gerona, 35 and Benedicto v. Javellana, 36 this Court said:
. . any challenge to the validity of a will, any objection to the

authentication thereof, and every demand or claim which any heir, legatee
or party interested in a testate or intestate succession may make, must be
acted upon and decided within the same special proceedings, not in a
separate action, and the same judge having jurisdiction in the
administration of the estate shall take cognizance of the question raised,
inasmuch as when the day comes he will be called upon to make
distribution and adjudication of the property to the interested parties. . . .
(Emphasis supplied)
The probate court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to distribute

the estate, has the power to determine the proportion or parts to
which each distributee is entitled .
A project of partition is merely a proposal for the distribution of the
heredity estate which the court may accept or reject.
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue made. When the debts, funeral charges, and
expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable
to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on application of the executor
or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall
assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the
proportions or parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their
respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in
his possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law,
the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
18
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above-mentioned has been
made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them give a bond, in a sum to be fixed
by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court
directs.
It is the court that makes that distribution of the estate and determines the
persons entitled thereto
In the instant case, the records will show that in the settlement of the
testate estate of Maria Lizares, the executrix, Eustaquia Lizares
submitted a project of partition (in which the parcels of land,
subject matters of the complaint for reconveyance, were included
as property of the estate and assigned exclusively to Eustaquia)
which was approved by the probate court, and based upon which
the heirs of Lizares (including Vda de kilayko et al.) executed an
Agreement of Partition and Subdivision
These facts taken altogether show that the Lizares sisters
recognized the decree of partition sanctioned by the probate court
and in fact reaped the fruits thereof.
Hence, they are now precluded from attacking the validity of the
partition or any part of it in the guise of a complaint for
reconveyance.
A party cannot, in law and in good conscience be allowed to reap the fruits
of a partition, agreement or judgment and repudiate what does not suit
him. 39
The question of private respondents title over the lots in question
has been concluded by the partition and became a closed matter.
It cannot be denied that when Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al.
moved for the reopening of the testate estate proceedings of Maria
Lizares, the judicial decree of partition and order of closure of such
proceedings was already final and executory, then reglementary
period of thirty (30) days having elapsed from the time of its
issuance, with no timely appeal having been filed by them.
Therefore, they cannot now be permitted to question the
adjudication of the properties left by will of Maria Lizares, by filing
an independent action for the reconveyance of the very same
properties subject of such partition.
A final decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person
vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees. If the
decree is erroneous, it should be corrected by opportune appeal,
for once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other
judgment in rem, unless properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction
or fraud. Where the court has validly issued a decree of distribution
and the same has become final, the validity or invalidity of the
project of partition becomes irrelevant
It is a fundamental concept in the origin of every jural system, a principle
of public policy, that at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts
should become final at some definite time fixed by law, interest rei publicae
ut finis sit litum. "The very object of which the courts were constituted was
to put an end to controversies."
The only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding
may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by
reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or
inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better
practice to secure relief is the opening of the same by proper
motion within the reglementary period, instead of an independent
action, the effect of which if successful, would be for another court
or judge to throw out a decision or order already final and executed
and reshuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of.
All the requisites for the existence of res judicata are present.
RULE 76
disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionably

handwritten by the testator.
The lists found in the Rules of Court21 and the Civil Code22 are
exclusive. No other grounds can serve to disallow a will. (I dont know
why this was cited since it wasnt instrumental in resolving the case)
Title: Ajero vs. Court of Appeals & Sand

Summary: CA disallowed a will on the ground that there were unauthenticated
alterations. SC reversed. No other formal requirements are needed other than
being written, dated and signed by the testator.
Facts:
Petitioner instituted a special proceeding for the allowance of decedents

holographic will.
Respondent opposed the probate on the ground, among others, that it
contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by
decedent.
The Trial Court admitted the said will to probate, reasoning that it was
enough that the will be entirely written, dated and signed by the testator.
The Court of Appeals reversed, and disallowed the will, arguing that it did
not comply with articles 813 and 814 of the NCC. 19
Hence this appeal.
Issue/Held:
Whether the formalities in 813 and 814 are valid grounds for disallowance
of probate. NO.
Ratio:
A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement
affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic
will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the
dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated.
Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate,

notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814. Unless
the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on
the date of the holographic will or on testator's signature, their presence
does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication will only result
in disallowance of such changes.
Holographic Wills only need to conform with Art. 810 of the NCC.20
Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the
19
Art. 813: When a number of dispositions appearing in a holographic will are signed without
being dated, and the last disposition has a signature and date, such date validates the
dispositions preceding it, whatever be the time of prior dispositions.
Art. 814: In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will, the testator
must authenticate the same by his full signature.
20
A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by
the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the
Philippines, and need not be witnessed. (Emphasis supplied.)
Aranz v. Galing
Allowance or Disallowance of Wills; Proceedings
FACTS:
Joaquin Infante (Joaquin) filed with the RTC of Pasig a petition for the probate
and allowance of the will of Montserrate Infnate y Pola and this is opposed by
Joaquina Infante (Joaquina) et al.
The petition of Joaquin specified the names and addresses of Joaquina and the
rest of the petitioners (11 in total) as named legatees and devisees.
The petition was set for hearing and was published in a newspaper of general
circulation (Nueva Era) in Metro Manila once a week for three consecutive weeks.
On the date of hearing, no oppositor appeared and it was reset on another date,
on which date, an order was issued allowing Joaquin to present evidence exparte.
On the same date as the order, Joaquin presented evidence and was appointed
executor.
Joaquina, et al filed a motion for reconsideration of the order allowing ex-parte

presentation of evidence and prayed that they be allowed to file their opposition
to the probate of the will. This was denied.
Joaquina, et al are contending that as named legatees and devisees, they were
supposed to have been notified of the proceedings as mandated by Rule 76 Sec.
21
Section 9, Rule 76: A will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:
(a) If not executed and attested as required by law;
(b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will, at the time of its
execution;
(c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
(d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the
beneficiary, or of some other person for his benefit;
(e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not intend that the
instrument should be his will at the time of fixing his signature thereto.
22
Art. 839: The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases;
(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the time of its
execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the
beneficiary or of some other person;
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his
will at the time of affixing his signature thereto.
4.23 Publication was not enough and for this reason, the assailed order must be
set aside.
ISSUES / HELD:
W/n publication is enough to notify all parties concerned. No, notices

mustve been sent to the legatees and devisees.
RATIO:
It is clear from the rule that notice of the time and place of the hearing for the
allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the designated or other known heirs,
legatees, and devisees residing in the Philippines at their places of residence, if
such places of residence be known.
In this case, Joaquin, obviously knows the residence of the legatees and devisees
as they were enumerated in his petition.
Despite such knowledge, the probate court did not cause copies of the notice to
be sent to the petitioners (Joaquina, et al).
Such requirement is now satisfied by mere publication.
The case of Joson v. Nable cited by the CA is not applicable
o
In this case, publication was deemed enough.
o
Whats different in this case is that though the petition included the residence
of the heirs, such addresses turned out to be erroneous.
o
That being the case, they didnt receive the notices.
o
The court said that, obviously, the petitioner didnt know the residence of the
heirs. Thus, notice to them need not be had.
o
Doctrine: If the allegation of the petition was wrong and the true residence
of petitioners was not known, then notice upon them individually was not
necessary.
Under the provision, individual notice upon heirs, legatees and devisees is
necessary only when they are known or when their places of residence are
known. In other instances, such notice is not necessary.
In Re: Testate Estate of Suntay:
o
It is a proceeding in rem and for the validity of such proceedings, personal
notice or by publication or both to all interested parties must be made.
o
The interested parties residing in the Philippines were not notified.
o
There were proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy, China
and the court likened it to a deposition or to a perpetuation of testimony, and
even if it were so it does not measure or come up to the standard of such
proceedings in the Philippines for lack of notice to all interested parties and
the proceedings were held at the back of such interested parties.
o
Thus, the alleged probate of the will cannot be said to have been done in
accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles
followed in the probate and allowance of wills.
o
Authenticated transcript of proceedings held in China cannot be deemed and
accepted as proceedings leading to the probate or allowance of a will.
Order is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Case remanded to trial court.
AZUELA V. CA (2006) Articles 805 and 809

FACTS:
Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate the notarial will of Eugenia Igsolo
(decedent). Azuela is the son of the cousin of the decedent.
The three named witnesses to the will affixed their signatures on the left-hand
margin of both pages of the will, but not at the bottom of the attestation
clause.
The probate petition adverted to only 2 heirs: Felix Azuela and Irene Igsolo,
who was alleged to have resided abroad. Azuela prayed that the will be allowed
and that the letters testamentary be issued to the designated executor.
The petition was opposed by Geralda Castillo who represented herself as the
attorney-in-fact of the 12 legitimate heirs of the decedent. Castillo claimed the
following:
o
The will is a forgery and that the purpose of its emergence was so it
could be utilized as a defense in the forcible entry and usurpation of
real property cases they filed against Azuela.
The will was not executed and attested to in accordance with law. The
decedents signature did not appear on the second page of the will and
the will was not acknowledged.
RTC: Admitted the will to probate the modern tendency in respect to the
formalities in the execution of a will with the end in view of giving the testator
more freedom in exercising his last wishes.
CA: Reversed the RTC and ordered the dismissal of the petition for probate
the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in the will.
ISSUE AND HELD: W/N the will is deserving of probate. No.
SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally. The court shall also
cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the
designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines
at their places of residence, and deposited in the post office with the postage thereon prepaid at
least twenty (20) days before the hearing, if such places of residence be known. A copy of the
notice must in like manner be mailed to the person named as executor, if he be not, the
petitioner; also, to any person named as co-executor not petitioning, if their places of residence be
known. Personal service of copies of the notice at least ten (10) days before the day of hearing
shall be equivalent to mailing.
23
RATIO:
Article 805 of the Civil Code states:
Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof
by the testator himself or by the testators name written by some other person in
his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or
more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the
instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page
thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered
correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is
written, and that fact that the testator signed the will and every page, thereof, or
caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the
presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed
the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
An unsigned attestation clause results in an unattested will. Even if the

instrumental witnesses signed the left-hand margin of the page containing the
unsigned attestation clause, such signatures cannot demonstrate these
witnesses undertakings in the clause, since the signatures that do appear on
the page were directed towards a wholly different avowal.
The Court may be more charitably disposed had the witnesses in this case
signed the attestation clause itself, but not the left-hand margin of the page
containing such clause. Without diminishing the value of the instrumental
witnesses signatures on each and every page, the fact must be noted that it is
the attestation clause which contains the utterances reduced into
writing of the testamentary witnesses themselves.
It is the witnesses, and not the testator, who are required under Article 805 to
state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, the fact that the
testator had signed the will and every page thereof, and that they witnessed
and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and
of one another. The only proof in the will that the witnesses have stated these
elemental facts would be their signatures on the attestation clause.
There is another fatal defect to the will on which the denial of this petition
should also hinge. The requirement under Article 806 that every will must be
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses has
also not been complied with.
An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before
some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It
involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signor actually declares to the
notary that the executor of the document has attested to the notary that the
same is his/her own free act and deed.
A notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator
and the witnesses is fatally defective, even if it subscribed and sworn to before
a notary public.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be

interpreted to them.
Article 806 of the Civil Code states: Every will must be acknowledged before a
notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be
required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk
of Court.
Article 809 of the Civil Code states: In the absence of bad faith, forgery, fraud,
undue and improper pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in the
form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will
invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in
substantial compliance with all the requirements of Article 805.
A failure by the attestation clause to state that the testator signed every page
can be liberally construed, since that fact can be checked by a visual
examination, while a failure by the attestation clause to state that the
witnesses signed in one anothers presence should be considered a
fatal flaw since the attestation is the only textual guarantee of
compliance.
The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on

which the will was written remains a fatal flaw, despite Article 809. The
purpose of the law in requiring the clause to state the number of pages
on which the will is written is to safeguard against possible
interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and to prevent
any increase or decrease in the pages. There is substantial compliance
with this requirement if the will states elsewhere in it how many pages
it is comprised of.
However, in this case, there could have been no substantial compliance with
the requirements under Article 805 since there is no statement in the
attestation clause or anywhere in the will itself as to the number of pages which
comprise the will.
Article 805 particularly segregates the requirement that the instrumental

witnesses sign each page of the will, from the requisite that the will be
attested and subscribed by the instrumental witnesses. The respective intents
behind these 2 classes of signature are distinct from each other.
The signatures on the left-hand corner of every page signify, among

others, that the witnesses are aware that the page they are signing
forms part of the will. On the other hand, the signatures to the
attestation clause establish that the witnesses are referring to the
statements contained in the attestation clause itself. Indeed, the
attestation clause is separate and apart from the disposition of the will.
LESSON IN A NUTSHELL:
A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages
on which the will is written is fatally defective. A will whose attestation
clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is fatally defective.
And more importantly, a will which does not contain an
acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these
defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial will with all three defects is just
aching for judicial rejection.
GUEVARA V. GUEVARA (1956)

Who and when to file Rule 76 (Allowance or Disallowance of Will)
FACTS:
Victorino Guevara executed an ante-mortem will leaving movables and a 259

ha lot to his children, stepchildren and second wife. In the will, the northern
half of the 259 ha lot was reserved for Ernesto Guevara, who was appointed
executor while 21 ha was reserved for Rosario Guevara, whom Victorino

recognized as his natural child.
Later on, Victorino sold the southern half of the 259 ha lot to Ernesto and
Ernesto was able to have the entire 259 ha lot issued in his name. Victorino
died but his will was not filed for probate.
4 years later, Rosario brought suit against Ernesto to recover the portion that
should correspond to her by way of legitime on the assumption that Victorino
had died intestate. Rosario lost because the court found out that a will existed
and ordered the parties to present the will for probate.
Rosario instituted an action for the probate of Victorinos will but Ernesto
opposed the probate because he claims that (1) Rosarios petition did not ask
for probate in toto of the will but only to declare her as an acknowledged
natural child of Victorino and (2) whatever right to probate the parties may
have had has already prescribed.
It is true that the rights of the parties should not be left hanging for a
unreasonable amount of time but the obvious remedy is for the other interested
persons to petition for the production of the will and for its probate or to inflict
upon the guilty party the penalties prescribed in Rule 76 or declare the
unworthiness of the heir for concealing or suppressing the testament; but not
to dismiss the petition for probate, however belatedly submitted, and thereby
refuse sanction to testamentary dispositions executed with all the formalities
prescribed by law, incidentally prejudicing also those testamentary heirs who do
not happen to be successors ab intestato.
Even if the decedent left no debts and nobody raises any question as to
the authenticity and due execution of the will, none of the heirs may
sue for the partition of the estate in accordance with that will without
first securing its probate by the court.
ISSUE & HELD: W/N the petition for probate of the will is barred by the statute of
limitations because it was only filed 12 years after Victorinos death. No.
First, because the law expressly provides that no will shall

pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and
allowed in the proper court.
Second, because the probate of a will, which is a proceeding in

rem, cannot be dispensed with and substituted by any other
proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial, without offending against
public policy designed to effectuate the testators right to
dispose of his property by will in accordance with law and to
protect the rights of the heirs and legatees under the will thru
the means provided by law, among which are the publication
and the personal notices to each and all of said heirs and
legatees.
RATIO:
If the decedent left a will and no debts and the heirs and legatees
desire to make an extrajudicial partition of the estate, they must first
present that will to the court for probate and divide the estate in
accordance with the will. They may not disregard the provisions of the
will unless those provisions are contrary to law. Neither may they do
away with the presentation of the will to the court for probate because
such suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy.
The law enjoins the probate of the will and public policy requires it because
unless the will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right
of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. Absent
legatees and devisees, or such of them as may have no knowledge of the will,
could be cheated of their inheritance thru the collusion of the some of the heirs
who might agree to the partition of the estate among themselves to the
exclusion of others.
It is not without purpose that Rule 77 prescribes that any person interested in
the estate may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court
having jurisdiction to have the will allowed. This provision has been interpreted
as meaning that the statute of limitations has no application to probate of wills.
The statute of limitations undertakes to fix limits for the filing of civil actions
but not for special proceedings of which probate is admittedly one. Why?
o
Because probate proceedings are not exclusively established in

the interest of the surviving heirs but primarily for the
protection of the testators expressed wishes that are entitled
to respect as an effect of his ownership and right of disposition.
Inasmuch as the probate of wills is required by public policy,
the State could not have intended to defeat the same by
applying thereto the statute of limitations.
HEIRS OF THE LATE JESUS FRAN V. SALAS (1992)

RULE 76 A. Who and when to file
FACTS
Remedios Vda. de Tiosejo died and left a will bequeathing to her collateral relatives
(brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces) all her properties and designating Jesus
Fran as executor. Fran file a petition with CFI of Cebu for probate of the will.
Private (Salas was the judge) respondents (PR) who are sisters of the deceased
filed a Withdrawal of Opposition to the Allowance of Probate of the Will where they
manifested that they have no objection over the allowance of the will and over the
issuance of letters testamentary to Fran.
In 1972, the probate court rendered a decision admitting to probate the will and
appointing Fran as executor. No claim was presented against the estate. In 1973,
the court approved the Project of Partition.
(NOTE: The following allegations are not crucial to the issue as the relevant issue is
WHEN TO FILE. I included them for recit purposes. Basically, the SC favored Frans
contentions but also in the end simply ruled that the action of PR is time-barred)
In 1979, PR filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the probate
judgment asking the court to declare the proceedings still open and admit their
opposition to the allowance of the will. They alleged that (a) they were not
furnished a copy (b) the will is a forgery (c) they were not notified of any resolution
or order on filing of their opposition nor of the authorization for the clerk of court
to receive the evidence (d) the reception of evidence by the clerk of court was void
(e) the project of partition contains no notice of hearing and they were not notified
(f) Fran signed the partition as administrator an not as executor (g) Fran did not
submit any accounting as required and (h) Fran never distributed the estate (in
general, fraud attended the proceedings)
Fran refuted all these protestations (a) PR are in estoppel because they filed the
said Withdrawal; the order directing the Clerk of Court to receive evidence was read
in open court; PR Gandiongco signed the Partition and PR Espina submitted a
certification that she received notice of hearing therefore and has no objection (b)
there was an actual distribution of the estate. To top it all, PRs children mortgaged
their respective shares in favor of a bank.
Respondent Judge (RJ) declared the will void finding that the signature of
Remedios was a forgery and reopened the proceedings. This was issued before the
restraining order applied by Fran from the SC was served on RJ.
PR Gandiongco filed an affidavit admitting that she received notice of hearing and
her share of the estate and that she signed the Omnibus Motion without reading it
and that she wished to withdraw her participation in the Omnibus Motion and in the
Opposition, only to withdraw such through a Joint Manifestation with PR Espina.
However, PR Gandiongo again filed a second affidavit confessing that she signed
the Joint Manifestation only upon PR Espinas request.
ISSUE / HELD
W/N private respondents Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration can prosper NO
RATIO
The following courses of action are open to an aggrieved party to set aside or
attack the validity of a final judgment:
(1) Petition for Relief under Rule 38 if the RoC which must be filed within 60 days
after learning of the decision, but not more than 6 months after such decision is
entered;
(2) By direct action, via a special civil action for certiorari; or by collateral attack,
assuming that the decision is void for want of jurisdiction;
(3) By an independent civil action under Art. 1114 of the CC, assumning that the
decision was obtained through farud and Rule 38 cannot be applied.
PR had lost their right to file a petition for relief from judgment, it appearing that
their omnibus motion for reconsideration was filed exactly 6 years 10 months and
22 days after the rendition of the decision, and 6 years 1 month and 13 days after
the approval of the Project of Partition to which they voluntarily expressed their
conformity through their respective certifications, and closing the testate
proceedings.
PR did not avail of the other 2 modes of attack.
The probate judgment of November 1972, long final and undisturbed by any
attempt to unsettle it, had passed beyond the reach of the court.
The decree of probate is conclusive upon the due execution of the will and it cannot
be impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any
separate or independent action or proceeding.
Other matters:
The Project of Partition was signed by PR Gandiongco proving it had actual
knowledge thereof.
PR were present when the order authorizing the Clerk of Court to receive evidence
was read in court.
The Clerk of Court can receive evidence as laid down by jurisprudence, and it is not
necessary for the Clerk to take an oath.
It is not necessary that the original of the will be attached, as clear from the Rules
of Court. Given this, it is found that a copy of the original will was attached in the
petition and it is not disputed that the original of the will was submitted in
evidence.
The availability of the will since 1972 for PRs examination renders completely
baseless their claim of fraud on Frans part. Assuming arguendo that there was
fraud, such fraud is not of the kind which provides a sufficient justification for a
Motion for reconsideration or a Petition for Relief from Judgment. Such fraud must
be extrinsic or collateral to the matters involved.
Petition granted.
IN RE ESTATE OF DECEASED JOSE B. SUNTAY (1954)

RULE 76 C. Proceedings and RULE 77 (Suntay vs. Suntay)
FACTS
[This is an appeal from the CFI Bulacan that disallowed the alleged will executed in
Manila on Nov 1929 and the alleged last will executed in Amoy, China on Jan 1931 by
Jose B. Suntay. The value of the estate left is more than P50,000]
Jose B. Suntay, Filipino citizen and resident of the Philippines, died in the city of
Amoy, Fookien province, China leaving real and personal properties in the
Philippines and a house in China. Children from 1st marriage (w/ late Manuela
Cruz): Apolonio, Concepcion, Angel, Manual, Federico, Ana, Aurora, Emiliano, Jose, Jr
and from 2nd marriage (wife: Maria Natividad Billian), a child named Silverio.
Intestate proceedings were instituted at RTC. Federico Suntay was appointed
administrator of the estate. While Maria Natividad filed for probate of a will
claimed to have been executed and signed in the Philippines on November
1929 by Jose B. Suntay. This petition was denied because the will was lost
after the filing of the petition and before hearing (there was also insufficiency of
evidence to establish loss of will). An appeal was made, case remanded back to RTC
(probate court) and then the probate court denied motion for continuance sent by
Maria Natividad from China and dismissed the petition.
After liberation (post Pacific War), Silvinio filed a petition in the intestate
proceedings praying for probate of the will (that he found among files of Jose
Suntay, written in Chinese characters, executed and signed on Jan 1931). This
will was filed, recorded and probated in the Amoy district court, China. The attesting
witnesses who testified to the provisions:
(1) Go Tohcontents of lost will written in Spanish; informed by Jose Suntay of
contents; saw the will in office of Alberto Barretto when it was signed
(2) Anastacio Teodoroon the day before last postponement of hearing, Go arrived at
his law office and left an envelope; checked the signatures on envelope and those
on will left inside the envelope;
(3) Ana Suntaylearned of will when Manuel brought the document to the house of
Apolonio; after Apolonio read portion of will, he left it to Manuel;
ISSUES / HELD
W/n provisions of the will were proved by competent witnesses? No
W/n will was validly probated in the district court of Amoy, China? No.
RATIO
As to the lost will, Sec 6, Rule 76 applies24.
As to testimonies:
(1) Gohearsay because he learned of them only from information given by Jose
Suntay and from reading the translation of the draft;
(2) Anainconsistent testimony (she said she read only adjudication and not whole
will but also said Apolonio read part and handed doc to Manuel; If the will was
snatched after delivery by Go to Anastacio, then the testimony of Ana is not true (b/c
delivery of will later than date she said she read will).
(3) Anastaciofalls short of requirement that provisions of lost will must
clearly and distinctly proved by at least 2 witnesses. Credible witnesses mean
competent witnesses and those who testify upon hearsay are not competent
nor credible.
Alberto Barretto testified that he prepared two wills at the request of Jose Suntay;
that the final draft was signed in his office and that the will was placed inside the
envelope; that the envelope was in possession of Go and not left with Barretto. But
the Court still ruled that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the
envelope seized from Go contained the will of the deceased and that it was executed
with all the essential and necessary formalities required by law for its probate.
As to the will claimed to have been executed in China, Sec 1, Rule 77 applies 25. First,
the fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China is a probate court
must be proved. The law of China on procedure in probate of wills must also be
proved and legal requirements established by competent evidence. Here, no proof
was presented. Unverified answers from office of Consul General doesnt qualify as
such is not an expert on Chinese law on procedure of probate matters. Proceedings in
Amoy were for purpose of taking testimony of 2 witnesses to the will and the order of
such court doesnt purport to probate the will.
In the absence of proof that the court is a probate court and on the Chinese
law on probate procedure, presumed that proceedings are the same as that
in the Philippines. It is a proceeding in rem and for the validity of such
proceedings personal notice or publication to all interested parties must be
made. The interested parties in the case resided in the Philippines and yet no notice
was received.
The proceedings in China may be likened to a deposition or to a perpetuation of
testimony and does not come up to standard of proceedings in the Philippines
for lack of notice to all interested parties. The order of the municipal district
court of Amoy, China doesnt purport to probate or allow the subject will.26
Hence, the will and the alleged probate not done in accordance w/ basic and
fundamental concepts followed in probate and allowance of wills.
No will shall be proved as lost or destroyed unless execution and validity established, and will is proved to
exist at time of death of testator or shown to have been fraudulently or accidentally destroyed in the lifetime of
the testator w/o his knowledge, unless provisions are clearly proved by at least 2 credible witnesses. When lost
will proved, provisions must be certified by judge, and filed and recorded
25 Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of such country, may be allowed, filed
and recorded by the proper Court of First Instance in the Philippines
26 Order: the above minutes were confirmed by parties who declare there are no errors after minutes were
loudly read and announced in court.
24
The authenticated transcript of proceedings held in China cannot be accepted

as proceedings leading to probate or allowance of will and the will referred to
cannot be allowed, filed, and recorded by a competent court in the
Philippines [decree of CFI disallowing alleged will executed in Manila and
alleged will executed in China affirmed].
As to the contention that estoppel applies, the Court ruled that Silvino and Maria are
not estopped from asking for probate of the lost will or foreign will because of the
assignment of right and interest in the estate of Jose Suntay to Jose Gutierrez and
subsequent assignment to Pascual and then to Federico Suntay. The validity of
assignments cannot be thresed out in proceedings only concerned with probate of the
will executed in the Philippines or of foreign will executed in Amoy.
MR
In commenting unfavorably upon the decree disallowing the lost will, Silvino is under a
mistaken premise that all conclusions made by the probate court in first decree w/c
allowed the probate of lost will, must be accepted. This is not a writ of certiorari to
review judgment of CA but an appeal from the probate court, the SC must review
evidence and findings of fact made by probate court (erroneous conclusion must be
corrected). The Court found that provisions of the will not established clearly
by at least 2 credible witnesses and conclusion is unassailable b/c it is solidly
based on established facts.
Appellant also brings up a pleading made by children from 1st marriage of Jose stating
that they seek to put into effect testamentary disposition of Jose and that they have
no opposition. The Court ruled that such pleading doesnt mean they accept the
draft as the exact copy of the lost will and consent to probate. The fact is,
that due execution of the lost will must still be established and provisions
clearly provedw/c was not done [MR DENIED].
MALOLES II VS. PHILLIPS
Rule 76 Allowance and Disallowance of Will
FACTS
On July 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos filed a petition of probate of his will with
Branch 61 of RTC of Makati City. He named in his will as sole legatee and
devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc. and that he disposed by his will
his properties with an approximate value of not less than P2M.
Judge Gorospe of Branch 61 granted the petition and allowed the will for
probate.
In Feb.1996, Dr. De Santos passed away.
In April 1996, Octavia Maloles II filed a Motion for Intervention claiming that:
(1) as the only child of the testator's sister, he was the sole full-blooded
nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos; and (2) he was a creditor of the
testator. He thus prayed for the reconsideration of the probate order and the
issuance of letters of administration in his name.
Meanwhile, Pacita Phillips, the executrix named in the will, filed a motion for the
issuance of letters testamentary with Branch 61 which she later on withdrew.
Phillips then refiled the same through a petition for the issuance of letters
testamentary. This was raffled to Branch 65 of RTC of Makati. Judge Abad
Santos granted her petition and made her the estates special administrator.
Maloles also sought to intervene in the appointment proceedings and to set

aside the appointment of Phillips. He reiterated he was the nearest of kin of the
testator and was fit to be the special administrator.
Judge Abad Santos then issued an order transferring the appointment
proceeding to Branch 61 since the probate proceeding is still pending before it.
However, Judge Gorospe refused to admit the appointment proceeding claiming
that there is no estate proceeding pending before it. Judge Abad Santos was
then forced to continue the administration proceedings. Judge Abad Santos
eventually granted Maloles petition to intervene. This was, however, set aside
by the CA.
ISSUES / HELD
W/N Maloles has the right to intervene in and oppose the petition for issuance of
letters testamentary filed by Phillips. (Maloles argues that, as the nearest next of kin
and creditor of the testator, his interest in the matter is material and direct.) NO.
W/N Phillips is guilty of forum shopping. NO.

RATIO
The petition for probate was filed by Dr. De Santos, the testator, solely for the
purpose of authenticating his will. Upon the allowance of his will, the
proceedings were terminated.
On the other hand, the petition for issuance of letters testamentary was filed by
Phillips, as executor of the estate, for the purpose of securing authority from
the Court to administer the estate and put into effect the will of the testator.
The estate settlement proceeding commences by the filing of the petition and
terminates upon the distribution and delivery of the legacies and devises to the
persons named in the will.
There is no identity between the two petitions, nor was the latter filed during
the pendency of the former.
RATIO
Section 1 of Rule 79 provides:
Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary. Simultaneous petition for
administration. Any person interested in a will may state in writing the
grounds why letters testamentary should not issue to the persons named
therein as executors, or any of them, and the court, after hearing upon notice,
shall pass upon the sufficiency of such grounds. A petition may, at the same
time, be filed for letters of administration with the will annexed.
An interested person is one who would be benefited by the estate, such
as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor, and whose interest is material and direct, not merely
incidental or contingent.
Maloles, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have
been preterited in the testator's will. Even if he is the nearest next of kin of Dr.
De Santos, he cannot be considered an "heir" of the testator. It is a
fundamental rule of testamentary succession that one who has no compulsory
or forced heirs may dispose of his entire estate by will. Dr. de Santos did just
that, in favor of a Foundation.
Maloles has no right to intervene in the settlement proceedings based on his
allegation that he is a creditor of the deceased. Since the testator instituted or
named an executor in his will, it is incumbent upon the Court to respect the
desires of the testator.
Generally, the choice of executor is a prerogative of a testator, a necessary
concomitant of his right to dispose of his property in the manner he wishes. It
is natural that the testator should desire to appoint one of his confidence, one
who can be trusted to carry out his wishes in the disposal of his estate. Curtail
this right and you curtail the testators right to dispose.
There are exceptions when the court may appoint other persons to administer
the estate: (1) if the appointed executor is incompetent, (2) he refuses the
trust, or (3) he fails to give bond. None of these exceptions are present in this
case.
ISSUE/ HELD
SALAZAR v. CFI
Rule 76: Contents of Petition
FACTS:
Salazar instituted a special proceeding praying for the probate of the will of
hi deceased mother allegedly made on May 13, 1924.
Rivera filed a pleading Opposition and Counter-Petition opposing the

probate and prayed for the probate of the will made on May 11, 1930,
copy of which was attached thereto.
Rivera also prayed that it be set for hearing and for directing publications
as required by law.
Court denied the motion and ordered Rivera to institute another proceeding
and apply separately for the probate of the will.
Rivera filed a MR, so the court set aside its former order and set it for
hearing, directing the publications required and that said that the will be
jointly heard with the will presented by Salazar.
Salazar filed a MR which were denied, so he filed this certiorari.
ISSUE / HELD:
1.) W/N the court had acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
counter-petition for the probate of the second (will to he held jointly
with the first will,) on the ground that Rivera has not previously filed
her pleading nor paid the fees of the clerk of court? YES
RATIO:
The rules provide that the court acquires jurisdiction to probate a will when
it is shown by evidence before it: 1.) that a person has died leaving a will,
2,) if he is a resident, that he died in the province where the court sit, 3.)
or if he is an alien, that he left an estate in such province, and 4.) the last
will has been delivered to the court and is in the possession thereof.
3) Rule 77: Allowance of a will proved outside the Philippines and Admin of estate
thereunder
The law is silent as to the specific manner of bringing the

jurisdictional allegations before the court, however practice and
jurisprudence that it should be made in the form of an application
and filed with the original will attached thereto.
FACTS
Some courts allow mere copy to be attached to the application, without

prejudice to producing the original at the hearing when court requires so,
to avoid disappearance.
Payment of the fees of the clerk for the services rendered by him is
not jurisdictional such that its omission does not deprive the court
of its authority to proceed with the probate.
Dr. Jose Cunanan executed a last will and testament where he bequeathed everything
to his wife. The will stated: in case they both die and it cannot be determined who
died first, it shall be presumed that he died before his wife. Dr. Evelyn made a will
with similar provisions in favor of her husband Jose (if in doubt, presume that she died
first.)
Because it is the duty of the court, when a will is presented to it, to

appoint it the hearing for its allowance and to cause notice be
given by publication. This duty is imperative otherwise,
noncompliance will be a mockery of the law and of the last will.
MINOR ISSUE / HELD:
RATIO:
3 ways of consolidation:
1.) recasting the case already instituted, conducting only one hearing
and rendering only 1 decision;
2.) existing cases consolidated, 1 hearing and 1 decision made; or
3.) principal one is heard, while others are suspended until judgment
is rendered in the 1st case.
The court may adopt any of these in its discretion when the parties and the
issues are the same, for the convenience of the parties.
The court acquired jurisdiction from the moment the counterpetition was presented and the 2nd will came to be in its possession
and under its control, and consequently had full discretion to order
its probate in the proceeding already instituted for the purpose of
rendering only 1 decision.
Consolidating the 2 was the most convenient to the parties because if the
1st will was indeed revoked by the 2nd will, the best evidence of the
revocation is the 2nd will and if the 2nd will is found to be executed in
accordance with the formalities required by law, then the court can order
its probate without the necessity of a new proceeding.
Vda. De Perez vs Judge Tolete (1994)

Rule 76 and 77: (under 3 topics)
1) Rule 76: Allowance and Disallowance of Will: Who and When to File
2) Rule 76: Proceedings
Ironically, both spouses-doctors died in a fire with their family. Dr. Rafael Cunanan
Jr. (brother ata ni Jose) filed probate proceedings in New York. He was issued letters
testamentary. (He thought he was the only administrator.)
The mother of the deceased Evelyn, Salud Perez (petitioner) filed a petition for
reprobate in RTC Malolos. She asked to be appointed administratix of the couples
farm in San Miguel Bulacan. She became administratix as well.
As administratix, Salud Perez asked for delivery of the 50k life insurance proceeds
from Philippine Life Insurance company. She also asked money from the father of Jose
Cunanan - a passbook and time deposit certificates.
2.) W/N the consolidation was proper? - YES
Drs. Jose Cunanan and Evelyn Perez-Cunanan were naturalized American

Citizens. They lived in New York with their 3 kids.
Rafael Cunanan and the other heirs found out and intervened - that they were not
notified of the filing of the estate case. This intervention was opposed by Salud.
SALUD PEREZ Arguments
The Cunanan collaterals are not heirs
nor creditors. They cannot be parties
to the probate.
The husband died first! I am the sole
heir of my daughter!
The wills of the spouses have
already been probated under
American courts. I have evidence!
CUNANAN heirs replies

We are brothers and sisters of the
decedent. Why werent we
notified of the proceedings?
The wife could have died first!
(Court will deny reprobate on
ground of lack of evidence of
foreign law)
As to Argument 3, Perez had lots of evidence: copy of the wills, authority of the
foreign judge, decree of probate, certificate from the Philippine consul, BUT NO
EVIDENCE AS TO NEW YORK LAWS.
The Court denied reprobate on the ground that Perez failed to produce evidence to
prove the laws of New York on allowance of wills. The Case was reassigned to Judge
Tolete who affirmed the ruling of the other judge.
Perez files Certiorari 65.
ISSUES / HELD
1.
For Rule 76 (2 topics): Were the Cunanan heirs entitled to notice of the
proceedings? YES
2.
For Rule 77: Was the probate of the will abroad sufficiently proven by Perez? NO,
BUT SHE SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO SUBMIT EVIDENCE.
Spouses Audrey ONeil and Richard Guersey were American citizens who lived in the
Philippines for about 30 years. They had an adopted daughter named Kyle.
RATIO 1: Salud was not the only one entitled to the proceedings. Notice
should have been given to the other heirs.
In 1979, Audrey died, and in a will left her entire estate to Richard. This will was
admitted to probate in a court in Maryland, USA. The foreign court named Petitioner
Atty. Ancheta as ancillary administrator of Audreys estate.
Salud thought she was the only heir to her daughter Evelyn. She failed to consider
that her son-in-law Jose had his own heirs. Contrary to Perezs allegations, the
collateral heirs had a right to intervene as parties interested in the estate. They are
even entitled to notice under Section 4 of Rule 76.
In 1981, Richard married Respondent Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon. The following

year, the same will of Audrey was admitted to probate here in the Philippines by the
CFI of Rizal.
SECTION 1. Who [and when] may petition for the allowance of will. Any executor,
devisee, or legatee or any other person interested in the estate at any time after
the death of the testator
In 1984, Richard died. In his will, he left likewise his entire estate to Respondent
Guersey-Dalaygon. The will was first admitted to probate by another court in
Maryland, USA.
SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally.

The court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving
the will to other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator A copy of the
notice must in like manner be mailed to the person named as executor, if he be not
the petitioner, also, to any person named as co-executor not petitioning, x x x.
Entered the problem: Atty. Ancheta filed a project of partition in which Richard was to
be given a undivided interest in a Makati property, and the remaining to Kyle,
the adopted daughter. This was contrary to Audreys will in which she bequeathed not
only of her estate to Richard, but the whole of it. What was so wrong with this? It
meant that Respondent Guersey-Dalaygon, Richards second wife, was going to
receive less, despite having been given by Richard the whole of his estate in his will.
RATIO 2: There are additional evidence needed for allowance of a will Proved
outside the Philippines and Perez should be allowed to submit them.
Even though we have Civil Code Art. 816, 27 courts still cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws. It is therefore necessary to present evidence on such laws, such as:
1) due execution of the will in accordance with foreign laws
2) testator was domiciled outside the Philippines
3) the will was admitted to probate in such other domicile country
4) the foreign tribunal is a probate court
5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills.
Furthermore, a will which is to be RE-probated will be treated as if it were an original
will or a will that is presented for the first time. Notice to all interested parties is
therefore still necessary. (Rule 77, Sec.2)
According to the Respondent, the law in Maryland states that

A legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in
the property subject of the legacy.
The trial court still awarded only Richards interest to the Respondent.
She then filed an appeal with the CA, and additionally contended that Petitioner
Ancheta breached his fiduciary duty as ancillary administrator in transgressing the
duly-probated will of Audrey. This to her was tantamount to fraud. The CA took this
contention well and nullified the Orders of the trial court giving only to the
respondent.
TOLETES ORDER SET ASIDE. HE SHOULD ALLOW PEREZ TO SUBMIT EVIDENCE

NEEDED FOR JOINT PROBATE OF THE WILLS AND SEE TO IT THAT ALL SIBLINGS OF
JOSE CUNANAN ARE GIVEN NOTICES.
ISSUES / HELD
RULE 77
Was the distribution of Audreys estate in a - manner in accordance with Anchetas

project of partition and in contradiction of Audreys will in accordance with law? No, it was
not.
ANCHETA vs. GUERSEY-DALAYGON (2006)

Rule 77 Allowance of will proved outside of the Philippines and the administration of
estate thereunder
FACTS
27
Civil Code, Article 816 A will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the
Philippines if made with formalities prescribed by residence, domicile, or Philippine
law.
The Order of the trial court had already been final and executory. Can this till be set
aside? Yes, it can.
RATIO
Once a decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased its binding effect is likae any other
judgment in rem. As an exception, such judgment may be set aside on grounds of lack of
jurisdiction or fraud.
1.
2.
The petitioner is the ancillary administrator of Audreys estate. He occupies a
position of the highest trust and confidence, and he is required to exercise

reasonable diligence and act in entire good faith in the performance of that trust;
Issue:
His failure to proficiently manage the distribution of the estate according to the
terms of the will amounted to extrinsic fraud.
The contravention of the tenor of the will was certainly not in accordance with law. Petitioner
Ancheta breached his fiduciary duty.
1.
Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audreys will is governed by her
national law, that is, that of the State of Maryland;
2.
Article 16 of our Civil Code provides that Real property, as well as personal
property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated;
3.
HOWEVER, intestate and testamentary success, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law
of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found (Audreys, in this case);
4.
Moreover, Art. 1039 of the Civil Code provides that capacity to succeed is governed
by the law of the nation of the decedent;
5.
Lastly, Rule 77 corollarily states that
When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters testamentary x x x
and such letters shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the
Philippines. Such estate, after the payment of just debts and
expenses of administration, shall be disposed of according to such
will x x x.
6.
Petitioner as ancillary administrator was duty-bound to introduce in evidence

the pertinent law of the State of Maryland.
Fluemer v Hix (1930)

Note: EN BANC DECISION
W/n the disallowance of the will is correct- YES

The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our
courts. Philippine courts are not authorized to take American
Union. Such laws must be proved as facts.
o
There was no was printed or published under the authority of the
State of West Virginia, as provided in section 300 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.
o
Nor was the extract from the law attested by the certificate of the
officer having charge of the original, under the sale of the State of
West Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
o
No evidence was introduced to show that the extract from the
laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was
executed.
In addition, the due execution of the will was not established. The
only evidence on this point is to be found in the testimony of the Fluemer.
Aside from this, there was nothing to indicate that the will was
acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two competent witnesses,
of that these witnesses subscribed the will in the presence of the testator
and of each other as the law of West Virginia seems to require. On
the supposition that the witnesses to the will reside without the Philippine
Islands, it would then the duty of the Fluemer to prove execution by some
other means.
It was also necessary for Fluemer to prove that the deceased had his
domicile in West Virginia and not establish this fact consisted of the recitals
in the CATHY will and the testimony of Fluemer. (I dont understand what
this CATHY will is. Biglang sumulpot!)
The application for the probate of the will in the Philippines was filed on
February 20, 1929, while the proceedings in West Virginia appear to have
been initiated on June 8, 1929.
These facts are strongly indicative of an intention to make the Philippines
the principal administration and West Virginia the ancillary administration.
However this may be, no attempt has been made to comply with
Civil Procedure, for no hearing on the question of the allowance of
a will said to have been proved and allowed in West Virginia has
been requested. There is no showing that the deceased left any
property at any place other than the Philippines and no contention
that he left any in West Virginia.
Issue/Held: W/n Annie Coushing Hix is the proper party to appeal the
disallowance of the will-NO
Facts:
Annie Coushing Hix (respondent, wife of deceased), appealed the denial of

the probate of the will
Accdg to Fluemer (petitioner), Edward Randolph Hix (deceased) executed a

will in Elkins, West Virginia, on November 3, 1925 where he was then
residing.
He presented such will for probate to the CFI presided by Judge Tuason.
Fluemer merely claimed that the will was executed in accordance with the
laws of West Virginia as certified by the Director of the National Library.
The will was denied probate because the requirements of Philippine law
were not complied with.
Ratio:
Fluemer is the person interested in the allowance/disallowance of the

will as he was the moving party in the proceedings.
been requested. There is no showing that the deceased left any

property at any place other than the Philippines and no contention
that he left any in West Virginia.
Fluemer v Hix (1930)

Note: EN BANC DECISION
Issue/Held: W/n Annie Coushing Hix is the proper party to appeal the
disallowance of the will-NO
Facts:
Accdg to Fluemer (petitioner), Edward Randolph Hix (deceased) executed a

will in Elkins, West Virginia, on November 3, 1925 where he was then
residing.
He presented such will for probate to the CFI presided by Judge Tuason.
Fluemer merely claimed that the will was executed in accordance with the
laws of West Virginia as certified by the Director of the National Library.
The will was denied probate because the requirements of Philippine law
were not complied with.
Annie Coushing Hix (respondent, wife of deceased), appealed the denial of
the probate of the will
Issue: W/n the disallowance of the will is correct- YES
The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our

courts. Philippine courts are not authorized to take American
Union. Such laws must be proved as facts.
o
There was no was printed or published under the authority of the
State of West Virginia, as provided in section 300 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.
o
Nor was the extract from the law attested by the certificate of the
officer having charge of the original, under the sale of the State of
West Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
o
No evidence was introduced to show that the extract from the
laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was
executed.
In addition, the due execution of the will was not established. The
only evidence on this point is to be found in the testimony of the Fluemer.
Aside from this, there was nothing to indicate that the will was
acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two competent witnesses,
of that these witnesses subscribed the will in the presence of the testator
and of each other as the law of West Virginia seems to require. On
the supposition that the witnesses to the will reside without the Philippine
Islands, it would then the duty of the Fluemer to prove execution by some
other means.
It was also necessary for Fluemer to prove that the deceased had his
domicile in West Virginia and not establish this fact consisted of the recitals
in the CATHY will and the testimony of Fluemer. (I dont understand what
this CATHY will is. Biglang sumulpot!)
The application for the probate of the will in the Philippines was filed on
February 20, 1929, while the proceedings in West Virginia appear to have
been initiated on June 8, 1929.
These facts are strongly indicative of an intention to make the Philippines

the principal administration and West Virginia the ancillary administration.
However this may be, no attempt has been made to comply with
Civil Procedure, for no hearing on the question of the allowance of
a will said to have been proved and allowed in West Virginia has
Ratio:
Fluemer is the person interested in the allowance/disallowance of the

will as he was the moving party in the proceedings.
SILVINO SUNTAY vs. FEDERICO SUNTAY

Rule 77: Allowance
FACTS:
Jose B. Suntay died in Amoy, China, leaving several properties in the

Philippines and a house in China.
He married twice, the first time to Manuela Cruz with whom he had several
children and the second time to Maria Natividad Lim Billian whom he had a
son, Silvino.
His eldest son, Apolonio, filed Joses intestate in the CFI of Bulacan.
Federico Suntay was appointed administrator of the estate.
In the same court, Maria instituted proceedings for the probate of a will
allegedly left by Jose. This was denied because of the loss of the will after
the filling of the petition and before hearing and because of lack of
evidence to establish loss of the will.
According to Maria, before Jose died he left with her a sealed envelope
containing his will and another document said to be a true copy of the
original contained in the envelope. The will was executed in the Philippines,
with Go Toh, Alberto Baretto and Manuel Lopez as attesting witnesses.
The will was entrusted Go Toh for the probate proceedings but it was
snatched from him by Manuel and Jose Jr., Joses sons from the first
marriage.
A will written in Chinese executed in Amoy, Fookien, China was discovered

in China, among the papers left by Jose Suntay and such was allowed
probate in the Amoy District Court, China. Silvino presented the Chinese
will to the Philippine court for allowance and recording.
Federico opposed on the main ground that Maria and Silvino have no more
interest in the properties of Jose, because they have already sold their
respective shares, interests and participations. But such a ground of
opposition is not of moment in the instant case, because the proposition
involved herein in the legalization of the lost will or the allowance and
recording of the will which had been probated in Amoy, China.
Are Maria and Silvino Estopped from asking probate of the lost will or the
foreign will because of their transfer of their interest in the estate to third
persons? NO
validity and legality of such assignments cannot be threshed out in this

proceedings which is concerned only with the probate of the will and
testament executed in the Philippines or of the foreign will executed in

Amoy.
Are they barred by prescription? NO
DISSENTING OPINION:
It is very noteworthy that out of the nine children of the first marriage,
only Angel, Jose and Federico Suntay had opposed the probate of the will
in question; the rest having expressly manifested in their answer that they
had no opposition thereto, since the petitioner's alternative petition "seeks
only to put into effect the testamentary disposition and wishes of their late
father."
This attitude is significantly an indication of the justness of petitioner's

claim, because it would have been to their greater advantage if they had
sided with oppositor Federico in his theory of equal inheritance for all the
children of Jose Suntay. Under the lost will or its draft, each of the Suntay
children would receive only some P 25,000.00, whereas in case of intestacy
or under the alleged will providing for equal shares, each of them would
receive some P100,000.00. And yet the Suntay children other than Angel,
Jose and Federico had chosen to give their conformity to the alternative
petition in this case.
Another unequivocal confirmation of the lost will is the will which Jose
Suntay executed in Amoy, Fookien, China and probated in Amoy District
Court, China, containing virtually the same provisions as those in the draft.
What better evidence is there of an man's desire or insistence to express
his last wishes than the execution of a will reiterating the same provisions
contained in an earlier will. Assuming that the Chinese will cannot be
probated in the jurisdiction, its probative value as corroborating evidence
cannot be ignored.
Oppositor himself had admitted having read the will in question under
which the widow Maria was favored and this again in a way goes to
corroborate the evidence for the petitioner as to the contents of the will
sought to be probated.
10year prescription has not yet prescribed.
Can the lost will be legalized/probated? NO
Section 6, Rule 7728
The testimonies of witnesses failed to comply with the legal requirement

that the provisions of the lost will must be proved by at least to credible
witnesses. Ex:
o
Testimony of Ana Suntay: her testimony during cross-examination

that she read the part of the will on adjudication is inconsistent
with her testimony in chief that after Apolinario read that part he
handed the document to Manuel who went away.
Testimony of Go Toh: all of his testimony is hearsay, because he

came to know or he learned of them from information given him
by Jose B. Suntay and from reading the translation of the draft
into Chinese.
Testimony of Federico Suntay: whether he read the original will or

just a copy is not clear.
Can the foreign will be admitted to probate? NO
Applicable law is Rule 78. (sections 1, 2 & 3)
The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate court
must be proved. The law of China on procedure in the probate or allowance
of wills must also be proved. The legal requirements for the execution of a
valid will in China in 1931 should also be established by competent
evidence. There is no proof on these points.
In the absence of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy is a

probate court and on the Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it
may be presumed that the proceedings in the matter of probating or
allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the a deposition or to a
perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were so it does not measure same
as those provided for in our laws on the subject. It is a proceeding in rem
and for the validity of such proceeding, personal notice or by publication or
both to all interested parties must be made.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION: Denied

The appellant invokes Rule 133 to argue that Rule 77 should not have been applied
to the case but the provisions of section 623 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No.
190), for the reason that this case had been commenced before the Rules of Court
took effect. But Rule 133 cited by the appellant provides:
These rules shall take effect on July 1, 1940. They shall govern all cases
brought after they take effect, and also all further proceedings in cases
then pending, except to the extent that in the opinion of the court their
application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event
the former procedure shall apply.
The evidence shows that no notice was received by the interested parties
residing in the Philippines. The proceedings in the municipal district court
of Amoy, China, may be likened toe or come up to the standard of such
proceedings in the Philippines for lack of notice to all interested parties and
the proceedings were held at the back of such interested parties.
28
No will shall be proved as a lost or destroyed will unless the execution and validity of the same be
established, and the will is proved to have been in existence at the time of the death of the testator,
or is shown to have been fraudulently or accidentally destroyed in the lifetime of the testator
without his knowledge, nor unless its provisions are clearly and distinctly proved by at least two
credible witnesses. When a lost will is proved, the provisions thereof must be distinctly stated and
certified by the judge, under the seal of the court, and the certificate must be filed and recorded as
other wills are filed and recorded.
Rule 77 applies to this case because it was a further proceedings in a case

then pending.
Even if section 623 of the Code of Civil Procedure were to be applied, still
the evidence to prove the contents and due execution of the will and the
fact of its unauthorized destruction, cancellation, or obliteration must be
established "by full evidence to the satisfaction of the Court." This
requirement may even be more strict and exacting than the two-witness
rule provided for in section 6, Rule 77.
The underlying reason for the exacting provisions found in section 623 of
Act No. 190 and section 6, Rule 77, the product of experience and wisdom,
is to prevent imposters from foisting, or at least to make for them difficult
to foist, upon probate courts alleged last wills or testaments that were
never executed.
RULE 78
ANGELES v. MAGLAYA
Rule 78 Order of Preference
Note: Refer to facts, issue, and ratio for the story. But the doctrine is at the last part
and can go independent of the whole digest.
FACTS:
Aleli Angeles Maglaya (ALELI) applied in the RTC of Caloocan for the issuance of
letters of administration and her appointment as administratrix of the intestate
estate of Francisco Angeles (FRANCISCO).
She alleged that she is the sole legitimate child of the deceased and one
Genoveva Mercado, and together with Belen Angeles (BELEN), are the surviving
heirs of Francisco.
The birth certificate states that Aleli is the daughter of Francisco and the physician
attending the birth indicated that the parents were married. However, Francisco
didnt sign this so legitimacy cannot be inferred.
At most, only filiation was proved.
Since the marriage of Genoveva and Francisco has not been proved, such
presumption does not arise. Hence, there is nothing for Belen to rebut.
It may be argued that the pictures, school and service records and testimonies of
witnesses lend support to the claim of enjoying an open and continuous
possession of the status of a child of Francisco. However, that is not at issue in
this case. The petition is predicated on Aleli being a legitimate child of Francisco
who was legally married to her mother.
Also, in Alelis pleadings, she averred that Belen is the surviving spouse of
Francisco. Hence, Belens capacity to be administratrix is admitted.
Moreover, in a separate case, the Court of Appeals ruled that Aleli is no a

legitimate daughter of Francisco nor a child of a lawful wedlock between Francisco
and Genoveva. Conclusiveness of judgment applies.
SPEC PRO TOPIC (Verbatim):
Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of

the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin
of the decedent.
Belen opposed Alelis petition and prayed that she be appointed administratrix
instead of Aleli. In her petition she alleged her marriage with Francisco and to
support it, presented their marriage contract.
Belen further argued that Aleli isnt the daughter of Francisco for although she
was recorded as Franciscos legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth
certificate wasnt signed by him.
When the law speaks of next of kin, the reference is to those who are entitled,
under the statute of distribution, to the decedents property.
Furthermore, she also alleged that Aleli didnt present the marriage contract of
her supposed parents. She also argued that Aleli isnt the sole legitimate child of
Francisco since Belen and Francisco adopted a child.
In resolving therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for letters of

administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent, the probate court
perforce has to determine and pass upon the issue of filiation.
In reply, Aleli averred and presented proof that the records of the 1938 wedding
of Genoveva and Francisco were destroyed. Also, she stated that she already filed
a petition to nullify the aforementioned adoption.
A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits. Upon this consideration,
the trial court acted within bounds when it looked into and passed upon the
claimed relationship of respondent to the late Francisco Angeles.
Belen then filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Aleli failed to state or
prove a cause of action since he failed to establish her filiation vis--vis the
decedent. TC granted this motion and dismissed Alelis petition.
CA reversed TCs decision ruling that Aleli proved her filiation with the decedent.
ISSUE / HELD:
w/n Aleli should be appointed administratrix based on her alleged
legitimate filiation with the decedent. No.
RATIO:
A legitimate child is a product of a valid and lawful marriage.
Legitimacy is presumed when a child is born in wedlock (valid marriage). This fact
must be proven for the presumption to arise.
In this case, no marriage certificate or marriage contract has been presented as

proof of said marriage. No solemnizing authority was called as witnessed.
BALUYUT vs. PAO (1959)

Rule 78: Procedure
FACTS
Sotero Baluyut died in Manila on 1976. His nephew Alfredo Baluyut filed a verified
petition for letters of administration. He alleged that the widow, Mrs. Baluyut, was
mentally incapable to act as administratrix and he surmised that the decedent left a
will. He prayed to be appointed administrator. The lower court appointed him
special administrator.
Mrs. Baluyut opposed this and alleged that she was unaware that her husband
left a will and that the allegation that she was mentally incapable was libelous. She
prayed to be named administratrix. The lower court cancelled Alfredos
appointment and in the same order, found Mrs. Baluyut as healthy and mentally
qualified after asking her a series of questions while on the witness stand.
Alfredo moved for reconsideration. The lower court again appointed Alfredo
and also, Jose Espino, an alleged acknowledged natural child of Sotero, as special
administrators.
Mrs. Baluyut filed an urgent motion that she be appointed administratrix which
Alfredo opposed. At the hearing, no oral and documentary evidence was presented.
The lower court merely examined Mrs. Baluyut with few basic questions such as her
year of birth, school she attended, year of her marriage, and her relationship with
Espino.
The probate court terminated the appointments of Espino and Alfredo and
appointed instead Mrs. Baluyut based on the fact that as surviving spouse she
has a preferential right to be appointed as administratrix and that the court was
convinced of her capacity.
Alfredo filed this special civil action for certiorari in order to set aside the
appointment. Alfredo in his manifestation disclosed that Sotero executed a notarial
will and bequeathed to Mrs. Baluyut his one-half share in certain conjugal assets
and one-fourth of the residue of his estate. The remaining three-fourths were
bequeated to his collateral relatives including Alfredo. The testator designated Mrs.
Baluyut as executrix.
ISSUE / HELD
Whether the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion in appointing Mrs.
Baluyut as admnistratrix? YES
RATIO
While the surviving spouse enjoys preference in the granting of letters of
administration, it does not follow that she should be named administratrix without
conducting a full-dress hearing on her competency.
Even the directive of the testator in his will designating that a certain person should
act as executor is not binding on the probate court and does not automatically
entitle him to the issuance of letters testamentary. A hearing has to be held in
order to ascertain his fitness to act as executor. He might have been fit to act as
executor when the will was executed but supervening circumstances might have
rendered him unfit for that position.
Thus, it was held that a hearing is necessary in order to determine the suitability of
the person to be appointed administrator by giving him the opportunity to prove his
qualifications and affording oppositors a chance to contest the petition.
In this case, the probate court briefly and perfunctorily interrogated Mrs. Baluyut in
order to satisfy itself on her mental capacity. The court did not give Alfredo a
chance to contest her qualifications even though he had squarely raised the issue
as to her competency.
The lower court departed from the usual course of probate procedure in summarily
appointing Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix on the assumption that Alfredo was not
an interested party. That irregularity became more pronounced after Alfredo's
revelation that the decedent had executed a will. He anticipated that development
when he articulated in his petition his belief that Sotero Baluyut executed wills
which should be delivered to the court for probate. As it now turned out, he is one
of the legatees named in the decedent's alleged will.
It is necessary to convert the proceeding in the lower court into a testamentary
proceeding. The probate of the will cannot be dispensed with and is a matter of
public policy.
Case: Capistrano et al v Nadurata et al (1922 case)

Facts:
This proceeding is commenced by Capistrano et al for the appointment of Justo

Buera as administrator of the deceased Petra delos Santos
Such application was opposed by Pedro and Juan delos Santos [they claim to be
Petras nearest relatives] who prayed that Pedro be appointed administrator
Leon Nadurata intervened asserting himself to be the surviving spouse of Petra

and prayed therefore that letters of administration be issued to him
Lower court: appointed Justo Buera as special administrator. It ruled the

following:
o
Leon Nadurata is not the surviving spouse of Petra
o
Pedro and Juan are not the nearest relatives
o
Declared that the nearest relatives are Capistrano et al who are Petras
true brothers by the same mother.
From this judgment, Nadurata, Pedro and Juan appealed assigning as errors: 1)
the overruling of the opposition to be the administrator, 2) the declaration of
Capistrano et al as the sole heirs, 3) ordering of prosecution of certain persons
in the lower courts decision for falsification of public document and perjury
Issue-Held: W/N the lower court committed error. No error in assignment of
administrator. Error only in premature declaration of heirs.
Ratio:
There was no error in the selection of Justo Buera as administrator. The

selection of an administrator of the estate of a deceased lies within the
discretion of the court
The act of the lower court in overruling the objection of the opponents and
confirming the appointment as administrator of the person proposed by the
applicants is not only indicative of sound discretion, but is right and just
because the evidence shows that Leon Nadurata is not the surviving spouse of
Petra de los Santos [evidence showed na deads na ang true husband nya when
she died] and that the oppositors Pedro de los Santos and Juan de los Santos
are not, as they pretend to be, brothers of the aforesaid deceased
However, lower court erred when it declared the heirs of the deceased. Such is
a premature declaration even though the evidence sufficiently shows who are
entitled to succeed the deceased. The estate had hardly been judicially opened,
and the proceeding has not as yet reached the stage of distribution of the
estate which must come after the inheritance is liquidated
No error regarding the order in the lower courts judgment directing the
prosecuting officer to prosecute certain persons for falsification and perjury.
Such is supported by evidence.
Lower courts order set aside.

Delgado vs. Rustia29

Spec Pro: Rule 78- Order of Preference
2.
* for cramming purposes: just read this and the last issue:
Guillermo and Josefa died intestate and several groups were claiming shares to their
estates. Luisa, the niece of Guillermo applied for letters of administration, such was
granted to her sister Carlota because Luisa died before the case was terminated.
The other claimants contested this appointment all the way up to the SC.
3.
Ratio:
Facts:
GUILLERMO RUSTIA and JOSEFA DELGADO lived together as husband ad wife

and had no children but had an ampun-ampunan (informal adoption) named
GUILLERMINA Rustia. Both had died intestate.
As to the heirs of the spouses

Luis, Josefas illegitimate half-blooded brother may inherit from Josefa. What the
law prohibits is a legit. Inheriting from an illegit and vic-versa. If the children are
both illegitimate, even if they have different fathers (as in this case) they are not
barred by the law from inheriting from one another.
Josefa died before her husband, thus Guillermo executed an affidavit of selfadjudication of her entire estate.
Upon Guillermos death, several parties then claimed a right over the estates of
the spouses, these parties may be summed up into 3 groups:
o
The RUSTIA HEIRS- these are the surviving siblings of Guillermo
o
The DELGADO HEIRS- Josefas 4 full blooded siblings, they are all
illegitimate (Josefas parents NEVER MARRIED). Josefas half brother
LUIS DELGADO is the child of Josefas mother and another man. He is
claiming that his parents were never married (meaning hes also
illegit.); thus he is not barred from inheriting from Josefa because of
the iron curtain rule30
o
GUILLERMA Rustia- the illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia. She
claims she is a recognized illegitimate child.
The affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Guillermo was rendered invalid by

the courts.
LUISA Delgado, the daughter of LUIS (under the Delgado heirs) filed a petitition
for the issuance of letters of administration over the estate of the spouses. The
Rustia heirs opposed saying that Luisa was barred from inheriting since she was
the daughter of Josefas illegitimate brother Luis who could not inherit from her.
The court granted her petition and letters of administration were granted in her
favor. But since Luisa had died, the administrator is was now CARLOTA
Delgado, her sister.
The Rustia Heirs appealed but such was dismissed for failure to file record on
appeal within the reglementary period. The CA overturned such on the grounds
of substantive justice. The Delgado heirs questioned the decision in the SC
raising 3 issues.
who are their respective legal heirs- All the Rustia and Delgado Heirs
mentioned above EXCEPT Gullerma and Guillermina (the illegitimate
daughter and the ampun-ampunan)
who should be issued letters of administration- there should be 2
administrators representing the Delgado and the Rustia heirs
respectively
Guillerma, the illegitimate child of Guillermo, claims that she was voluntarily
recognized by her father, yet she made this claim only after he died. Thus, the SC
did not recognize her claim of voluntary recognition; excluding her from the
inheritance. Also, the ampun-ampunan Guillermina was not formally adopted so she
cant inherit as well.
The lawful heirs of the deceased spouses are their respective brothers, sisters,
nephews and nieces.
As to who is entitled to be issued letters of administration
An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate
estate of a deceased person. Rule 78 Sec 6. Provides for a preference is the
appointment summarized as:
a. Surviving spouse, next of kin or a person selected by the surviving spouse
or next of kin.
b. If any in (a) are incompetent or unwilling or do not apply for administration
within 30 days from the decedents death then it will be one of the principal
creditors of the deceased
c. If principal creditor is unwilling/incompetent, then any other person the
court selects.
In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in
the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the
appointment of co-administrators, especially in cases where justice and equity
demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the
estates, such as in this case.
The SC appointed joint administrators, Carlota Delgado representing the Delgado
Heirs and a person to be nominated by the Rustia Heirs, subject to the approval of
the court.
Issues/Held:
1. w/n there was a valid marriage between Guillermo and Josefa YES there
was. (not discussed)
29
Facts are so long and complicated. Ive tried to make it as simple as possible. And ratio is literally a repetition
of the code. Useless! Dont ever be like this family!
30
Remember in succession, legit. Children cannot inherit from illegit. Children and vice-versa
NILDA GABRIEL, ET AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS and ROBERTO GABRIEL

Rule 78 Order of Preference
FACTS:
On May 12, 1988, or (9) months after Domingo Gabriel died, Roberto filed with
the RTC of Manila a petition for letters of administration alleging, among others,
that he is the son of the decedent, a college graduate, engaged in business,
and is fully capable of administering the estate of the late Domingo. He
mentioned eight (8) of herein petitioners as the other next of kin and heirs of
the decedent.
An order setting the petition for hearing was issued and publication of such was
made. Since there were no opposition, Roberto presented his evidence ex-parte
and was subsequently appointed as the administrator of the estate.
Subsequently, a notice to creditors for the filing of claims against the estate of
the decedent was published. As a consequence, Aida Valencia, mother of
Roberto (Roberto = bastardo haha!) filed a Motion to File a Claim from the
Estate alleging that the decision in a civil case between her and the deceased
remained unsatisfied and that she thereby had an interest in said estate.
Petitioners, who are the legitimate children of the deceased, filed an
"Opposition and Motion" praying for the recall of the letters of administration
issued to private respondent and the issuance of such letters instead to
petitioner Nilda, as the legitimate daughter of the deceased, or any of the other
oppositors who are the herein petitioners.
Nilda contends, among others, that being the legitimate daughter, she should
be preferred over Roberto who is an illegitimate child and that the latter has a
conflicting and/or adverse interest against the estate because he might prefer
the claims of his mother.
Nildas Opposition and Motion was denied mainly because there was no proof to
show that Roberto the administrator is unworthy, incapacitated or unsuitable to
perform the trust as to make his appointment inadvisable under these
circumstances.
The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by Nilda on the ground that the
appointment of an administrator is left entirely to the sound discretion of the TC
which may not be interfered with unless abused. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: w/n the CA was correct in dismissing the petition and upholding the
appointment of Roberto YES
creditors, and requires that sequence to be observed in appointing an administrator.

It would be a grave abuse of discretion for the probate court to imperiously set
aside and insouciantly ignore that directive without any valid and sufficient reason
therefor.
In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person,
the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of
the one to be appointed as administrator. This is the same consideration in
establishing the order of preference in the appointment of administrators
for the estate.
The underlying assumption behind this rule is that those who will reap the benefit of
a wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate, or, on the other hand,
suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the
highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate correctly.
ISSUE: w/n the widow can still be appointed as administratrix by reason of
her failure to apply for letters of administration within thirty (30) days
from the death of her husband, as required under the rules YES
It is true that Section 6(b) of Rule 78 provides that the preference given to the
surviving spouse or next of kin may be disregarded by the court where said persons
neglect to apply for letters of administration for thirty (30) days after the decedent's
death. However, it is our considered opinion that such failure is not
sufficient to exclude the widow from the administration of the estate of her
husband. There must be a very strong case to justify the exclusion of the
widow from the administration
The consideration which the law takes into account in establishing the preference of
the widow to administer the estate of her husband upon the latter's death is her
supposed to interest therein as a partner in the conjugal partnership.
Under the law, the widow would have the right of succession over a portion of the
exclusive property of the decedent, aside from her share in the conjugal
partnership. For such reason, she would have as much, if not more, interest in
administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin.
Section 6, Rule 7831 prescribes the order of preference in the issuance of letters of
administration, categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the
31
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the
will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a
person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such husband or wife, as the case may be, or the next of kin, or the person selected by
them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty
(30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other
person as the court may select.
On this ground alone, petitioner Felicitas, the widow of the deceased Domingo, has
every right and is very much entitled to the administration of the estate of her
husband since one who has greater interest in the estate is preferred to another
who has less.
There is no compelling reason sufficient to disqualify Felicitas from appointment as
administratrix of the decedent's estate.
Moreover, just as the order of preference is not absolute and may be
disregarded for valid cause despite the mandatory tenor in the opening
sentence of Rule 78 for its observance, so may the 30-day period be
likewise waived under the permissive tone in paragraph (b) of said rule
which merely provides that said letters, as an alternative, "may be granted
to one or more of the principal creditors."
ISSUE: Since Felicitas the widow is entitled to become the administrarix,
does this mean that Robertos appointment should be nullified NO
The determination of a person's suitability for the office of judicial administrator

rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the
power of appointment and said judgment is not to be interfered with on
appeal unless the said court is clearly in error.
Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence, the appointment of coadministrators has been upheld for various reasons, viz:
(1) to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different
interests represented;
(2) where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be
represented in the management of the estate of the deceased;
(3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to
settle;
(4) to have all interested persons satisfied and the representatives to work in
harmony for the best interests of the estate;
and (5) when a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to have
another competent person associated with him in the office.
Judgment of CA is MODIFIED by AFFIRMING the validity of the appointment of
respondent Roberto as judicial administrator and ORDERING the appointment of
petitioner Felicitas as co-administratrix.
While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample discretion in the removal
of an administrator, it must, however, have some fact legally before it in order to
justify such removal. There must be evidence of an act or omission on the
part of the administrator not conformable to or in disregard of the rules or
the orders of the court which it deems sufficient or substantial to warrant
the removal of the administrator.
***SHEANOTE: theres actually ONE ISSUE in this case, i.e. the first issue. I made
the subsequent issues for easier reading and understanding. I hope it worked!
In the instant case, a mere importunity by some of the heirs of the deceased, there
being no factual and substantial bases therefor, is not adequate ratiocination for the
removal of private respondent. In addition, the court may also exercise its
discretion in appointing an administrator where those who are entitled to letters fail
to apply therefor within a given time.
FACTS
On August 20, 1965 Carlos S. Matute, one of the Matute heirs and a full-blood
brother of both petitioner Jose S. Matute and respondent Matias S. Matute, filed a
petition praying for the removal of Matias as co-administrator and his (Carlos')
appointment.
ISSUE: Can there be two administrators at the same time YES
Carlos alleged that for more than two years from the date of his appointment,
Matias has neglected to render a true, just and complete account of his
administration, and that he is not only incompetent but also negligent in his
management of the estate on account of a criminal charge for murder filed against
him.
Matias filed an opposition and a memorandum in support thereof.
On September 21, 1965 the heirs of Agustina Matute Candelario et.al. moved for
the immediate appointment of Agustina, Carlos and Jose as joint co-administrators
or anyone of them in place of Matias, whose removal they also sought together
with the ouster of the general administrator Carlos.
For the benefit of the estate and those interested therein, more than one
administrator may be appointed since that is both legally permissible and
sanctioned in practice. Section 6(a) of Rule 78 specifically states that
letters of administration may be issued to both the surviving spouse and
the next of kin.
Also, co-administration herein will constitute a recognition of both the extent of the
interest of the widow in the estate and the creditable services rendered to and
which may further be expected from Roberto for the same estate.
MATUTE vs. CA (1969)

RULE 78 - Procedure
It appears that during the reception of evidence, Carlos and the Candelario-Matute
heirs submitted respective lists of exhibits in support of their motion to oust
Matias.
On Jan8, 1966 Matias filed a written objection to the admission of the exhibits on
the ground that the same were hearsay, self-serving, irrelevant and/or mere
photostatic copies of supposed originals which were never properly identified nor
shown in court.
Four days later, the counsel for Matias filed with leave of court a "Motion to
Dismiss and/or Demurrer to Evidence" which avers that "there is no sufficient
evidence on record to justify and support the motions. In the same motion, said
counsel reserved the right to introduce evidence in behalf of his client should
motion be denied.
On Jan31, 1966 the probate court issued an order removing Matias, as such coadministrator of the estate and ordering him to submit a final accounting of his
administration and, in his stead appointing Jose.
Forthwith, Matias interposed with the CA a petition for certiorari with preliminary
mandatory injunction. The CA resolved to grant a writ of PI. Then, Jose moved for
the dismissal of the motion on the ground that the CA does not have jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the same since the value of the estate involved is more than
P200,000.
Despite repeated urgent motions, CA instead required Jose to answer, which he

did. However, Jose filed a petition for certiorari with PI against the CA and Matias.
Matias does not controvert the claim that the value of the estate of their deceased
father exceeds P200,000. He maintains, however, the CA has jurisdiction because
the subject matter involved is merely the right to collect the (monthly) rentals due
the Estate in the sum of P5,000.00 pursuant to a contract of lease which he
executed in favor of one Mariano Nasser covering five haciendas.
ISSUES / HELD
W/N THE REMOVAL OF MATIAS AND CONSEQUENTLY, THE APPOINTMENT OF
JOSE WAS ADMINISTRATOR WAS VALID? NO
RATIO
A review of the record reveals no single pleading, statement, contention, reference or
even inference which would justify the that the controversy is a mere contest over the
right to collect a P5,000 rental. In contrast, the record vividly chronicles the
controversy as a bitter fight for co-administration: the removal of the Matias and the
appointment of anyone of the movants and Jose as new co-administrator.
This intra-fraternal controversy involves a contest over administration, an
incident in the settlement of the estate. Considering the value of the estate
is more than P200,000, and as enunciated in the Maravilla case the total
value of the subject estate determines the jurisdictional amount anent
disputes over administration arising as incidents in a probate or settlement
proceeding, CA does not have jurisdiction nor the authority to grant the
writs of certiorari and prohibition.
Matias insists, however, that even granting that the controversy pertains to
administration, such contested administration does not encompass the whole estate
but is limited to the collection of a P5,000 monthly rental, which sum should be the
basis of the jurisdictional amount, not the value of the whole estate.
The scope of a co-administrator's trust encompasses the entire estate and is coextensive in effect with those of the other administrators; consequently, the value
of the entire estate should be the proper basis of the jurisdictional amount
irrespective of the value of the particular property which are the objects of a
separate administration pending the settlement proceedings.
REMOVAL OF MATIAS
The settled rule is that the removal of an administrator under section 2 of Rule 82
(OLD RULE)lies within the discretion of the court appointing him. The sufficiency of
any ground for removal should be determined by the said court, whose sensibilities
are, in the first place, affected by any act or omission on the part of the
administrator not conformable to or in disregard of the rules or the orders of the
court. Appellate tribunals are disinclined to unless positive error or gross abuse of
discretion is shown.
It appears that shortly after the reception of evidence for the movants Carlos
Matute and the Candelario-Matute heirs, Matias filed a verified objection to the
admission in evidence on the ground that the same were hearsay, self-serving,
irrelevant and/or mere photostatic copies. Thereafter, he filed with leave of court a
MTD and/or Demurrer and further averred that Matias expressly reserves his right
to present his own evidence ... at least five (5) days from the receipt of said denial.
Instead of resolving the motion, the probate judge issued the controverted order
removing him without giving him the opportunity to adduce his own evidence
despite his reservation that he be afforded the chance to introduce evidence in his
behalf in the event of denial of his motion to dismiss and/or demurrer to evidence.
But what is patently censurable is the actuation of the probate judge in removing
the respondent, not on the strength of the evidence adduced by the movants but on
the basis of his findings, which he motu propio gleaned from the records, without
affording the respondent an opportunity to controvert said findings or in the very
least to explain why he should not be removed on the basis thereof.
It must be noted that the movants did not specifically invoke the grounds
mentioned by the judge in support of their petition. All of the said grounds are
based on alleged defects of the respondent's 1964 account.
It is conceded that the judge enjoys wide latitude of discretion in the
matter of the removal of executors and administrators and he can cause
their ouster at his own instance. However, before they are deprived of their
office they must be given the full benefit of a day in court, an opportunity
not accorded to the respondent herein.
However, two days before the issuance of the order removing him as coadministrator, Matias filed an MR on the ground that his failure to personally attend
the scheduled hearing was due to illness on his part. Evidently, when the probate
court decreed the removal of Matias, the order disapproving his 1964 account,
which was used as one of the principal justifications for his removal as coadmininistrator, was not yet final as it was still subject to possible reconsideration.
As a matter of fact, the same judge set aside the order of January 5, 1966.
With the order thus revoked, the probate judge's conclusion that Matias was
"indifferent" to his duties as co-administrator as evidenced by the disapproval of his
1964 account loses its principal basis.
Since the removal was done with haste and without due process, aside from the fact
that the grounds have no evidentiary justification, the same is void, and,
consequently, there is no vacancy to which the petitioner could be appointed.
APPOINTMENT OF JOSE
The record does not disclose that any hearing was conducted, much less that
notices were sent to the other heirs and interested parties, anent the petition for
the appointment of Jose S. Matute as co-administrator. The prayers contained in the
same petitions for the appointment of Carlos, Jose and Agustina or anyone of them
as co-administrator were never even considered at any of the hearings.
The requirement of a hearing and the notification to all known heirs and
other interested parties as to the date thereof is essential to the validity of
the proceeding for the appointment of and administrator "in order that no
person may be deprived of his right or property without due process of
law."
Moreover, a hearing is necessary in order to fully determine the suitability of the
applicant to the trust, by giving him the opportunity to prove his qualifications and
affording oppositors, if any, to contest the said application.
The provision of Rule 83 that if "there is no remaining executor or administrator,
administration may be granted to any suitable person," cannot be used to justify
the institution of Jose even without a hearing, because such institution has no
factual basis considering that there was a general administrator (Carlos) who
remained in charge of the affairs of the Matute estate after the removal of Matias.
The abovecited provision evidently envisions a situation when after the removal of
the incumbent administrator no one is left to administer the estate, thus
empowering the probate court, as a matter of necessity, to name a temporary
administrator (or caretaker), pending the appointment of a new administrator after
due hearing. Such circumstance does not obtain in the case at bar.
Issue:
W/n Gonzales had inconsistent positions- YES
Ratio:
MEDINA v. CA
Facts:
The lower court approved and confirmed the deed of sale executed on
May 8, 1969 by then special administrator Demetrio Encarnacion of the
intestate estate of the decedent Agustin Medina covering the sale of its
property known as "Bitukang Manok" for 24 K to Rosalia M. del Carmen,
a daughter-heir of the decedent.
Uldarico Medina and Beda Gonzales opposed such. Medina claims that he
has an interest over the estate as certain heirs have sold their interest to
him. Gonzales on the other hand claims to have a better right over del
Carmen. Such oppositions were overruled by the lower court.
The court then designated its clerk of court Atty. Pastor de Castro, Jr. as
special administrator and to qualify immediately as such in lieu of
Encarnacion.
No regular administrator to settle the estate once and for all
appears to have ever been appointed by respondent lower court
during the period of over 13 years that the estate has been pending
settlement.
Almost a year later, acting on the motion of Gonzales for appointment as
regular administrator of the estate, the lower court appointed him "not
as a regular administrator but only as special administrator for the
intestate estate of the deceased Agustin Medina" and he qualified as such
upon posting of the bond in the amount of 5 K and replaced Atty. Pastor.
An urgent motion to revoke Gonzales' appointment as special
administrator on the ground that by said order, Beda Gonzales is now
assuming the inconsistent positions of administering the estate
especially the Bitukang Manok property and at the same time
appealing from the order approving the sale of that property. The
motion was denied.
The lower court also rejected del Carmens petition for the appointment of
a regular administrator since the special administrator could amply protect
the estate.
MR denied. In the CA, del Carmen and Serafin Medina, her brother,
instituted an action for certiorari with PI citing Gonzales' conflicting
interests as special administrator and as interested buyer of the Bitukang
Manok property.
The CA found the petition insufficient.
The SC issued a TRO restraining the lower court and Gonzales from
implementing the orders and from otherwise interfering in the possession
by the petitioner Rosalia M. del Carmen of a property known as "Bitukang
Manok" of the intestate estate of the deceased Agustin Medina. A writ of PI
to the same effect was also issued upon the posting of a bond.
A person with an adverse conflicting interest is unsuitable for the

trust reposed in an administrator of an estate.
The sale to Rosalia of the Bitukang Manok property having been approved
and confirmed by the lower court over the personal opposition of Gonzales
which approval he appealed to the CA, his subsequent appointment as
special administrator of the estate a year later created a clear conflict of
interest that could cause grave damage and prejudice to the estate and
subject it to unnecessary suits.
With specific reference to the Bitukang Manok property as sold by the
estate through Gonzales' predecessor as special administrator and
confirmed by the lower court, the same has passed to del Carmens
ownership and possession since the court's confirmation of the sale. Yet
now, Gonzales by virtue of his appointment, as special administrator a year
later seeks in such other capacity to interfere with del Carmen in the
harvests of the property purportedly on behalf of the estate when in fact
he is going against the official stand of the estate which upholds the sale.
Grave prejudice may thus be inflicted by Gonzales on del Carmen as an
heir as well as the other heirs such as Serafin Medina because of the
further delay in their receiving their distributive shares of their father's
estate as well as to del Carmen as buyer because of Gonzales' interference
with her enjoyment of the property paid for in full by her since 1970.
An administrator is deemed unsuitable and should be removed

where his personal interests conflict with his official duties, by
virtue of the equally established principle that an administrator is a
quasi trustee, disqualified from acquiring properties of the estate,
and who should be indifferent between the estate and claimants of
the property except to preserve it for due administration, and who
should be removed when his interest conflicts with such right and
duly.
The Court does not look with favor on such practice of clerks of court or
other court employees being appointed as administrators of estates of
decedents pending settlement before the probate court. The objectivity and
impartiality of such clerks of court or other employees so appointed as
administrators in discharging their regular functions may be easily
compromised by extraneous considerations. Probate courts are
therefore enjoined to desist from such practice of appointing their
clerks of court or other court employees as administrators or
receivers of estates or the like.
The lower court is directed to name a suitable person or entity, who is
competent and qualified and does not suffer from any proscribed conflict of
interest, (and preferably upon the common agreement of the heirs, to
avoid any further bickerings) as regular administrator charged with the
task of accomplishing and terminating the administration of the estate with
the utmost reasonable dispatch, with a view to an early distribution of the
net estate among the heirs and persons entitled thereto.
ISSUE: (Rule 78)

Whether or not the appointment of Edgardo as Administrator is proper.
HELD:
YES.
RATIO:
The order of preference in the appointment of an administrator depends

on the attendant facts and circumstances.
Although in the case of Inestate Estate of the deceased Geronima Uy

Coque. Juan Navas L. Sioca vs. Jose Garcia, the Court held that:
A probate court cannot arbitrarily disregard the preferential
rights of the surviving spouse to the administration of the
estate of a deceased person; but if the person enjoying
such preferential rights is unsuitable the court may
appoint another person.
Aleli U. Concepcion
SILVERO v. COURT OF APPEALS
Rule 78Letters Testatmentary and of Administration, When and To Whom
IssuedOrder of Preference
Rule 80Special AdministratorPowers and Duties of Special Administrator
FACTS:
On 7 October 1987, Beatriz Silverio died without leaving any will.

She was survived by her husband Ricardo, Sr. and her children:
Edmundo, Edgardo, Ricardo, Jr., Nelia and Ligaya.
More than 3 years after Beatrizs death, Edgardo filed a Petition for Letters
of Administration.
Subsequently, he filed an Urgent Petition for
Appointment as Special Administrator, alleging that during Beatrizs
lifetime, she acquired real and personal properties in the Philippines and
abroad; that Ricardo, Sr. has not made any settlement, judicial or
extrajudicial, of the estate of his deceased wife; and that Ricardo, Jr., has
been managing the estate for his won benefit and advantage.
After publication, notice and hearing, Edgardo was appointed as Special

Administrator pending resolution of the Petition for Appointment of Regular
Administrator.
Ricardo, Sr. interposed his Opposition to the Petition for Letters of

Administration. However, since he was in the United States attending to
other matters, the Court ruled that his not showing up amounted to waiver
to present evidence (he moved to transfer the date of the hearing several
times but each time, he failed to show up).
Edgardo was thereafter appointed as Special Administrator.

Ricardo, Sr.s MR was likewise denied.
Ricardo, Sr. filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals imputing
GADALEJ on the part of the RTC Judge. The CA ruled that there was no
GADALEJ and said that the Rules do not provide that the surviving spouse
takes precedence exclusive of and over all the other heirs of the deceased.
Ricardo, Sr. filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme
Court.
The determination of a persons suitability for the office of

administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the
court exercising the power of appointment and such judgment will
not be interfered with on appeal unless it appears affirmatively
that the court below was an error.
ISSUE: (Rule 80)

Whether or not the RTC judge erred in granting Edgardos Petition to Allow Claim
against the Estate and for the Annotation of Attorneys Lien filed by counsel for
private respondent.
HELD:
Yes.
RATIO:
The respondent court is not vested with the power to order the special
administrator to sell real properties of the estate pending determination of
the validity of the regular administrators appointment pursuant to Section
2, Rule 80 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
Powers and duties of special administrator.-Such special
administrator shall take possession and charge of the goods,
chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased and preserve the
same for the executor or administrator afterwards appointed, and
for that purpose may commence and maintains suits as
administrator. He may sell only such perishable and other property
as the court orders sold. A special administrator shall not be liable
to pay any debt of the deceased unless so ordered by the court.

GASPAY, JR. v. CA and ALFARO, 238 SCRA 163 (1994)
RULE 78 ORDER OF PREFERENCE
FACTS
Flaviano Gaspay, Sr. died intestate on October 1983 in Tacloban City. He

was then married to Agueda Dionisio. They were childless.
In 1988, private respondent Guadalupe Gaspay Alfaro filed a petition with

the RTC-Naval, Biliran32 alleging among others that she is the
acknowledged illegitimate daughter of the decedent. Guadalupe prayed
for the issuance of letters of administration of the decedents
estate.
Petitioners Flaviano, Jr. and Eriberta opposed the petition. Flaviano is the
adopted son of the decedent while Eriberta is a next of kin. Both alleged
that Guadalupe is a stranger, and even assuming her illegitimate
status, there is no proof of her recognition or acknowledgment.
The trial court dismissed Guadalupes petition on December 1989.
The CA, on appeal by Guadalupe, reversed the trial court. It found

the evidence ample and sufficient to prove Guadalupes filiation and
recognition, and her consent to the recognition. The CA also held that
actions based on voluntary recognition can be instituted after the death of
the putative father.
ISSUE(S) / RATIO
Did the CA err in finding that Guadalupe is entitled to letters of
administration? NO
Guadalupe has, in sum, proved her entitlement to be administrator of the

estate of her father Flaviano, Sr., being an acknowledged and recognized
illegitimate child of the decedent.
6, Rule 78 is in Guadalupes favor. It provides, under subsection (b) in

conjunction with subsection (c) thereof, that:
If the husband or widow, or next kin, neglects for 30 days
after the death of a person to apply for administration or to
request that administration be granted to some other
person, x x x it may be granted to such other person as the
court may select.
For a fact, petitioners neglected to apply for letters of

administration 30 days after the death of Flaviano, Sr. Not even
Agueda Dionisio, widow of Flaviano, Sr., filed a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration.
On Guadalupes consent to her recognition as required under Art. 281 of

the Civil Code
The trial court held that the evidence was insufficient to show Guadalupes consent
to her recognition under Art. 281 of the Civil Code. 33
The SC affirmed the CA in holding that the evidence profusely proved that
Guadalupe consented to her voluntary recognition as an illegitimate child.
Both courts took notice of the fact that Guadalupe has been using the
surname Gaspay since childhood up to the time she got married, and that
when she filed the petition she used the same surname Gaspay.
In Apacible v. Castillo, the SC ruled that the approval may be supplied by

the childs consent given even after reaching majority.
UY v. CA
Rule 78: C. Order of Preference
FACTS:
K.C. Uy died intestate leaving his spouse and his 5 children, one of whom was
Wilson, the petitioner.
A special proceedings was instituted where Hofilena was appointed the as

special administrator of the estate. Petitioner sought reconsideration of the
order.
The Judge revoked the Hofilenas appointment and letters of administration

were issued to Wilson.
Johnny Uy filed a Motion to Intervene, praying that he be appointed the

administrator alleging he was the brother of the deceased, a creditor and he
has knowledge of the properties that should be included in the estate.
At first the court denied his motion, but upon reconsideration he was appointed
as co-administrator.
Wilson moved to have Johnny bring into the estate properties of the deceased
which Johnny did but Wilson was unsatisfied with his compliance.
PETITION DISMISSED.
OTHER ISSUES
On Guadalupes claim as illegitimate daughter of Flaviano, Sr.
The trial court held that the evidence presented failed to prove her purported
status, and that even if the petition were to be treated as an action to compel
recognition, it would not prosper because it should have been filed during the
lifetime of Flaviano, Sr.
The SC held that the death of Flaviano, Sr. does not constitute a time bar
to Guadalupes claim as his acknowledged illegitimate daughter. Settled is
the rule that actions based on voluntary acknowledgment may be brought
even after the fathers death.
It affirmed the consideration made by the CA of the testimony of Martin
Garin, even if it was not assigned as an error by Guadalupe on appeal,
since it is a key factor in deciding the issue authoritatively. Garin testified
that the two letters presented by Guadalupe was written in the Waray
dialect by the decedent. The letters show clearly that Flaviano, Sr.
acknowledged Guadalupe as his daughter.
33
Art. 281, par. 1 A child who is of age cannot be recognized without his consent. The
Note that Biliran was formerly part of Leyte. It became an independent province in 1992
provision is under Section 1, Recognition of Natural Children, which is under Chapter 4,
under RA No. 7160.
Illegitimate Children, of Book 1 of the Civil Code.
32
The court that Johnny had substantially complied with the order and there was
no cogent reason to remove him as co-administrator.
CA ruled that the courts refusal to remove him as co-administrator was neither
an error of judgment nor a grave abuse of discretion.
A co- administrator performs all the functions and duties and

exercises all the powers of a regular administrator , only that he is
not laone as an administrator.
The practice of appointing co-administrators is not prohibited. Both

Phil. And American jurisprudence provide various reasons:
1. To have the benefit of their judgment and to have at all times the
different interests to be represented;
2. Where justice and equity demands that different and opposing
interest be represented in the management of the estate;
3. Where the estate is large or for any cause, an intricate and
perplexing one to settle;
4. To have all interested persons satisfied and their representatives
work in harmony to the best interests of the estate; and
5. When the person entitled to administration of an estate desire to
have a competent person associated with him in the office
WILSONS CONTENTIONS:
His appointment as administrator was already final or res judicata so the

inferior court had no authority to re-open the issue of the appointment of
an administrator
That Johnny was alien to the estate and he had a conflict of interest.
ISSUE:
1.)W/N the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion in appointing
a co-administrator to the estate of the deceased? NO
RATIO:
The main function of the probate court is to settle and liquidate the estates
of the deceased person either summarily or through the process of
administration. And the court must follow the order of preference in Sec. 6.
Here, the court appointed an administrator and later appointed a coadministrator.
The court cannot arbitrarily and without sufficient reason disregard the
preferential rights of the surviving spouse to administer the estate of the
deceased spouse. But if the person enjoying such preference is unsuitable,
the court may appoint another.
In probate proceedings, probate courts are allowed to modify or revoke

their orders as long as the proceedings are pending in the same court and
timely applications or motions for such revocation or modification has been
made by the interested parties. Such as in this case.
RULE 79
The determination of a person as suitable for the office of an

administrator rests in the sound judgment of the court exercising
the power of appointment and such judgment shall not be
interfered with on appeal unless it appears affirmatively that the
court was in error.
Unsuitableness may consist in adverse interest of some kind of hostility to

those immediately interested in the estate.
Here, the preference was NOT

Wilson, it appointed Johnny, a
the estate was sizeable and
attending to it (in fact, he did
estate under administration.)
disregarded. Instead of removing

creditor, as o-administrator since
Wilson was having a hard time
not submit reports regarding the
This might be due to his inexperience but that is not sufficient reason to
remove him. And intervenor Johnny was claiming to be the patriarch of the
Uy family and knowledge of the businesses and properties of the deceased.
Appointing him as co-administrator might be proper to shed light on the
enormous properties and businesses of the deceased.
CHUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS (1998)

Rule 79: Contents of Petition
FACTS
Roberto Lim Chua lived out of wedlock with private respondent Florita A.
Vallejo. Out of this union, the couple begot two illegitimate children, namely,
Roberto Rafson Alonzo and Rudyard Pride Alonzo.
Roberto Chua died intestate.
Florita filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City IN RE: PETITION
FOR DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIP, GUARDIANSHIP OVER THE PERSONS AND
PROPERTIES OF MINORS ROBERT RAFSON ALONZO and RUDYARD PRIDE
ALONZO, all surnamed CHUA and ISSUANCE OF LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION.
Antonietta Garcia Vda. de Chua, representing to be the surviving spouse of

Roberto Chua, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue.
She alleged that at the time of the decedent's death Davao City was his
residence, hence, the RTC of Davao City is the proper forum.
Florita filed an opposition to the Motion to Dismiss stating that Antonietta is

not the surviving spouse of Roberto and she is a stranger to the children and
that the children were residents of Cotabato City.
Florita filed a Motion for Admission of an Amended Petition "in order that the
designation of the case title can properly and appropriately capture or
capsulize in clear terms the material averments in the body of the pleadings;
thus avoiding any confusion or misconception of the nature and real intent
and purpose of this petition." The amended petition contained identical
material allegations but differed in its title, thus: IN RE: PETITION FOR THE
SETTLEMENT OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF ROBERTO L. CHUA,
DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIP, GUARDIANSHIP OVER THE PERSONS AND

PROPERTIES OF MINORS ROBERT AND RUDYARD, all surnamed CHUA and
ISSUANCE OF LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.
The petition contained exactly the same prayers as the original petition.
Antonietta opposed the motion to amend petition alleging that at the hearing
of said motion, private respondent's counsel allegedly admitted that the sole
intention of the original petition was to secure guardianship over the persons
and property of the minors.
Motion to dismiss was denied. TC held that Antonietta had no personality to

file the motion.
TC: appointed Florita as guardian over the person and properties of the two
minor children.
On appeal Antonietta argued that Florita admitted in her opposition to

petitioner's motion to dismiss and in open court that the original petition she
filed is one for guardianship; hence, the trial court acted beyond its
jurisdiction when it issued letters of administration over the estate of Roberto
L. Chua, thereby converting the petition into an intestate proceeding, without
the amended petition being published in a newspaper of general circulation
as required by Section 3, Rule 79.
CA: While private respondent may have alleged in her opposition to the
motion to dismiss that petition was for guardianship, the fact remains that
the very allegations of the original petition unmistakably showed a twin
purpose: (1) guardianship; and (2) issuance of letters of administration. As
such, it was unnecessary for her to republish the notice of hearing through a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.
Whether the original petition filed by Florita was only for guardianship? NO.
It was for guardianship and issuance of letters of administration.
The jurisdictional facts required in a petition for issuance of letters of

administration are: (1) the death of the testator; (2) residence at the time
of death in the province where the probate court is located; and (3) if the
decedent was a non-resident, the fact of being a resident of a foreign
country and that the decedent has left an estate in the province where the
court is sitting.
While paragraph 4 of the original petition failed to indicate the residence of

the deceased at the time of his death, the omission was cured by the
amended petitions.
All told the original petition alleged substantially all the facts required to be
stated in the petition for letters of administration. Consequently, there was
no need to publish the amended petition as petitioner would insist in her
second assignment of errors.
Be that as it may, petitioner has no legal standing to file the motion to

dismiss as she is not related to the deceased, nor does she have any interest
in his estate as creditor or otherwise.
Duran vs. Duran

Special Proceeding: RULE 79
Facts:
Likewise, the prayer of the petition states:

2. That Letters of Administration be issued to herein petition for the
administration of the estate of the deceased ROBERTO LIM CHUA.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of
administration.
The title alone of the original petition clearly shows that the petition is one
which includes the issuance of letters of administration. The title of said
petition reads:
IN RE: PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIPS, GUARDIANSHIP
OVER THE PERSON AND PROPERTIES OF MINORS ROBERTO ALONZO
AND RUDYARD ALONZO, all surnamed CHUA and ISSUANCE OF
LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are
prayed;
The original petition also contains the jurisdictional facts required in a

petition for the issuance of letters of administration. Section 2, Rule 79 of
the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration ? A petition for
letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and
must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs and the names
and residences of the creditors, of the decedent'
Pio Duran died without testament.

Cipriano Duran, one of the decedents brother executed a public instrument
assigning and renouncing his hereditary rights to the decedents estate in
favour of Josefina Duran(the decedents spouse) for the amount of Php
2,500.
A year later, Cipriano filed a petition for intestate proceedings to settle
Pios estate and asked that he be made the administrator.
Josefina Duran opposed on the ground that Cipriano is not an interested
person due to the deed of transfer and renunciation signed by Cipriano
mentioned above.
She asked that she be appointed administrator instead.
Cipriano argued that the document was procured through fraud and the
consideration was grossly inadequate.
Another brother, Miguel Duran filed a petition to be joined as co-petitioner
of Cipriano.
Josefina opposed and argued that such is an improper attempt to intervene
in the case.
ISSUE: W/N CIPRIANO WAS AN INTERESTED PERSON?

Cipriano argues that the document he signed did not render him a person
without interest in the estate.
(c) The probative value and character of the property of the

estate;.
He argues ( bases on the Santos case) that as assignment by one heir of

his share in the estate to a co-heir amounts to a partition needing court
approval to be effective.
And that the assigning heir does not lose his status as a person interested
in the estate, even after such assignment is approved by the Court.
HELD: NO.
The Rules of Court provides that a petition for administration and

settlement of an estate must be filed by an "interested person" (See. 2,
Rule 79).
The situation in the Santos case involves an assignment between co-heirs

pendente lite, during the course of settlement proceedings, properly and
validly commenced. At the time of said assignment, therefore, the
settlement court had already acquired jurisdiction over the properties of
estate. As a result, any assignment regarding the same had to be approved
by said court. And since the approval the court is not deemed final until the
estate is closed the assigning heir remains an interested person in
proceedings even after said approval, which can be vacated is given.
In the present case, however, the assignment took place when no

settlement proceedings was pending.
The properties subject matter of the assignment were not under the
jurisdiction of a settlement court. Allowing that the assignment must be
deemed a partition as between the assignor and assignee, the same does
not need court approval to be effective as between the parties.
An extrajudicial partition is valid as between the participants even if the

requisites of Sec. 1, Rule 74 for extrajudicial partition are not followed,
since said requisites are for purposes of binding creditors and nonparticipating heirs only (Hernandez v. Andal, 78 Phil. 196).
Should it be contended that said partition was attended with fraud, lesion
or inadequacy of price, the remedy is to rescind or to annul the same in an
action for that purpose. And in the meanwhile, assigning heir cannot
initiate a settlement proceedings, for until the deed of assignment is
annulled or rescinded, it is deemed valid and effective against him, so that
he is left without that "interest" in the estate required to petite for
settlement proceedings.
Anent appellant Miguel Duran, he sought in his petition below to "join

petitioner Cipriano Duran as co-petitioner in the latter's
As aptly ruled by the court a quo, since there was really no settlement
proceedings in the first place, the petition to intervene must be denied.
Gutierrez v. Villegas
May 31, 1962
Rule 79-Interested Party
Facts:
basically stated that Adela assigned all her rights, interests and
participation in the estate to her sister Rizalina and that she will no longer
take part in the proceedings and that she is no longer entitled to the
service of any pleadings, motion, order or decision filed or promulgated
therein.)
About two weeks after, Adela presented a verified manifestation in the
probate court wherein she averred that the deed of assignment and the
first manifestation were obtained through fraud practiced by the
administrator upon her and were vitiated by mistake or undue influence.
Adela was previously in need of money and was misled by Rizalina and
Jose into believing that the estate was of little value and had plenty of
debts.
Adela, in the manifestation, stated that she was then in the process of
preparing a complaint for annulment, that she was tendering the full
amount of what Jose paid to her.
Adela, through a motion, asked that she be furnished with all the copies of
all pleadings filed or to be filed in the intestate proceedings.
Jose, as an administrator, opposed the motion. He alleged that Adela,
although originally a party to the probate proceedings, has voluntarily and
expressly desisted from being so, and that having assigned by sale all her
rights, interests and participation in the estate, she has no longer any legal
standing in the case.
ISSUE: Whether Adela is still entitled to be furnished with pleadings filed

by the administrator in the probate proceedings and orders issued by the
lower court. YES.
Ratio:
Adela is an indispensable party to the proceedings.
While it is true that she executed a deed of assignment, it is also a fact that she
asked the same to be annulled, which action is now pending. Although she had filed
a manifestation dropping herself from the proceedings and presenting the supposed
Deed of Assignment, the record shows that the court failed to take an action
thereon.
According to the Civil Code, every act intended to put an end to indivision among
co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition. The transaction or
deed of assignment is in the nature of an extrajudicial partition, court approval is
necessary, and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over the
estate and over their persons, by the mere act of assignment.
Even if the partition had been judicially approved on the basis of the
alleged deed of assignment, an aggrieved her does not lose her standing in
the probate court.
Irene Santos died intestate leaving as her only heirs Jose (SURVIVING
SPOUSE) and Rizalina and Adela (NIECES).
Jose filed a petition for letters of administration and was appointed as such.
During the pendency of the case, an unverified manifestation signed by
Adela Gutierrez accompanied by a public instrument entitled Kasulatan ng
Bilihan at Salinan was presented to the probate court. (The document
IMPORTANT: In this case the deed of assignment was executed during the
pendency of the proceedings and no before as in the subsequent case.
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Dumlao

Rule 79 Contents of Petition
FACTS:
Ricardo Gonzalez, District Manager of Shell Philippines, Inc. for Mindanao filed a
Petition for Letters of Administration with the CFI of Agusan del Norte and Butuan
City, praying that he be appointed judicial administrator of the estate of deceased
Regino Canonoy.
Judge Echavez, Jr. issued an Order setting the hearing on the petition, directing that
the order be published in a newspaper, and that copies of the order be sent to each
of all the known heirs of the deceased Regino Canonoy.
Private respondents, heirs of deceased, opposed to the issuance of letters of
administration to Gonzalez, alleging that: Gonzalez is a complete stranger to the
intestate estate of Regino Canonoy; he is not a creditor of the estate; and he is an
employee of Shell Philippines, Inc., an alleged creditor of the estate, and so he
would not be able to properly and effectively protect the interest of the estate in
case of conflicts.
After hearing, TC appointed Bonifacio Canonoy as administrator of the intestate
estate of Regino Canonoy. Subsequently, petitioner Shell filed its claim against the
estate of the deceased Regino Canonoy.
Bonifacio Canonoy filed a MTD the claim of Shell. Shell filed an amended claim
against the estate. The administrator filed his Reply to the Opposition to MTD. He
filed an Answer to the amended claim filed by Shell, interposing compulsory
counterclaims for the estate. Petitioner filed an answer to the Counterclaim.
Upon joinder of the issues on Shell's claim, the TC, this time presided over by
respondent Judge Dumlao set the pre-trial. Counsel for the administrator filed a
MTD the case, alleging that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
subject matter because petitioner Gonzalez is not the "interested person"
contemplated by Section 2, Rule 79 of the ROC.
Shell filed its Opposition to the Motion on the ground that the TC had acquired
jurisdiction over the case to issue letters of administration as the interest of
Gonzalez in the estate is not a jurisdictional fact that needs to be alleged in the
petition. Respondent Judge dismissed the case. MR denied, so Shell filed a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the ROC.
ISSUES:
(1) W/N the jurisdictional facts that need to be stated in a petition for letters of
administration under Section 2(a), Rule 79 of the ROC include the specific assertion
that the petitioner therein is an "interested person." NO
(2) W/N the administration court may properly and validly dismiss a petition for
letters of administration filed by one who is not an "interested person" after having
appointed an heir of the decedent as administrator of the latter's intestate estate
and set for pre-trial a claim against the said estate. NO
HELD:
1. TC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the case after having
set for pre-trial petitioner's amended claim against the estate. Sec. 2, Rule 79 of the
ROC provides for the contents of petition of letter of administration:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and
residences of the creditors, of the decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of
administration.
The jurisdictional facts alluded to are: the death of the testator, his
residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court
is sitting or, if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left his
estate in such province. These facts were enumerated in the petition filed by
Gonzalez.
The allegation that a petitioner seeking letters of administration is an
interested person does not fall within the enumeration of jurisdictional
facts.
Since the opening sentence of the section requires that the petition must be filed by
an interested person, a MTD may lie not on the basis of lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the court, but rather on the ground of lack of legal capacity to institute the
proceedings.
Private respondents did not file a MTD, but instead they filed an Opposition which
did not ask for the dismissal of the petition but merely opposed the issuance of
letters of administration in favor of Gonzalez. The failure to move for a dismissal
amounted to a waiver.
2. TC had acquired jurisdiction over the case. Immediately after the filing of
the case, the TC complied with Sec. 3, Rule 79 of the ROC by issuing an
Order. At the initial hearing, petitioner Gonzalez established the jurisdictional
requirements by submitting in evidence proof of publication and service of notices of
the petition. It heard the evidence on the qualifications and competence of Bonifacio
Canonoy, then appointed him as the administrator and finally directed that letters of
administration be issued to him.
Not only had the administrator and the rest of the private respondents
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the TC, they even expressly
affirmed and invoked such jurisdiction in praying for reliefs and remedies
in their favor.
Hence, they cannot now be heard to question the jurisdiction of the TC. While it
may be true that jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, a
party who has affirmed and invoked it in a particular matter to secure an
affirmative relief cannot be allowed to afterwards deny that same
jurisdiction to escape penalty.
TRILLANA vs. CRISOSTOMO (1951)

Rule 79 A. Interested Party
FACTS
SUPREME COURT EN BANC
[This is an appeal from an order of the CFI denying Consorcia Crisostomos petition
for relief from the judgment of the said court allowing the will of October 19, 1948,
executed by the deceased Damasa Crisostomo; Nazario Trillana is the
administrator-appellee]
The appellants, Consorcia Crisostomo et al, submit to SC three propositions:
(a) Judgment of January 5 (probate of will) obtained through fraud (as the
proponents of the will didnt cause personal notice of hearing to legal heirs of
decedent);
(b) Lower court failed to perform its legal duty to set date for proving the will of
August 16, 1948;
(c) Failure to set aside a date for proving the will of August 16 with the will of
October 19 was entirely due to the lower court's fault or negligence.
Consorcia Crisostomo et al also argue that they are interested parties and
therefore may appeal in the present case.
ISSUES / HELD
W/n Consorcia Crisostomo et al are interested parties? No.
RATIO
On Interested Parties:
Appellants, Consorcia Crisostomo et al, merely allege that they are
"nephews and nieceslegal heirs of the deceased Damasa Crisostomo,"
without specifying the degree of relationship they had to Damasa. They
contend that October 19 will should be probated jointly or together with
the will of August 16, and the latter be allowed instead of the former. In
the October 19 will and August 16, the testatrix is leaving all her properties
as legacies to other persons, the appellants have no interest in the probate
of said wills, and they cant appeal from the judgment that allowed one of
them instead of the other.
Appellants argue that they are interested parties and may appeal in the present
case, because in the event the will of October 19 is disallowed and that of August 16
is allowed, the legacies in the latter are declared invalid or the legatees incapable to
inherit, the legacies will go to appellants. This argument has no merit.
In civil actions and special proceedings, unless otherwise provided by law,
the interest in order that a person may be a party on appeal must be
material and direct (materially and directly benefited or injured by the
court's order or judgment) and not indirect or contingent. Here, the
interest claimed by the appellants is purely contingent or dependent upon
several uncertain and future events to (1) disallowance of Oct will; (2)
allowance of Aug will, and (3) invalidation of certain legacies left in Aug
will.
Minor Issues:
The Court held that they cannot consider the question whether the lower court
complied with the requirement of personal notice of hearing because that question
has not been raised in the court below (either in their original petition for relief or in
their motion for reconsideration of the order denying their petition for relief). With
no evidence to the contrary, presumption stays that the court w/c probate the Oct
will, complied with its duty.
Also, in the statement of facts in to the appellants' petition for relief, stated that
copy of this order was published in "The Star Reporter", newspaper of general
circulation in Bulacan on November 5, 12 and 19 respectively, and the
corresponding notices served by the office of the Clerk of Court, in accordance with
law.
Because there was a failure to show that the judgment of the lower court of January
5 (probating the will of testatrix of October 19), was obtained through fraud, there
was no error in denying the appellant's petition for relief.
Where a will is duly probated after publication, the order admitting the will is, in the
absence of fraud, effective against persons. The fact that an heir or other interested
party lives so far away as to make it impossible for such party to be present at the
date appointed for the probate of the will doesnt render the order of probate void
for lack of due process (In re Estate of Johnson).
The Court also held that the lower court was right in not setting a date for proving
the will of August 16, 1948, because this will was expressly and absolutely revoked
by the will of October 19, 1948, executed by the same executrix or deceased, filed
for allowance on November 1, 1948, with the same CFI of Bulacan.
If two wills are presented for allowance but one of them revoked, such will cannot
be included in the probate of the latter subsequent will, because it would be a waste
of time to allow the revoked will if the subsequent revoking will is allowed. The
revoked will may be probated and allowed only if the subsequent revoking will is
disallowed.
RULE 80
ANDERSON VS. PERKINS
Rule 80: Powers and Duties of Special Administrator
FACTS
Special proceedings were commenced by Dora Perkins Anderson seeking the
probate of the late Eugene Arthur Perkins will. Dora also filed an urgent
petition for the appointment of Alfonso Ponce Enrile as special administrator of
the estate. On the same day, Alfonso was appointed upon his posting of a
P50,000 bond.
Idonah Slade Perkins, surviving spouse of Eugene entered an opposition to the
probate of the will.
Later, the special administrator Alfonso submitted an inventory of all the assets
which have come to his knowledge as belonging to Eugene at the time of his
death.
About two years later, special administrator Alfonso submitted a petition

seeking authority to sell, or give away to some charitable or educational
institution/s, some personal effects (clothes, books, gadgets, electrical
appliances, etc.) which were allegedly deteriorating both physically and in
value. The court required a specification of the properties sought to be sold.
Instead, the special administrator submitted a copy of the inventory of the
personal properties belonging to the estate with the items sought to be sold
marked with a check in red pencil.
would not mind being sold to preserve their value, the proposed sale is
premature.
Also, there are no reasons of extreme urgency to justify the proposed sale over
the strong opposition and objection of Idonah who may later be adjudged
owner of a substantial portion of the personalities in question. After all, most of
the items sought to be sold can easily be preserved in either or both of two
residential houses (Manila and Baguio City).
Re: special administrator Alfonsos claim that Idonah should have indicated the
alleged "fine furniture" which she did not want sold and that her refusal to do
so is an indication of her unmeritorious claim Idonah was not given a
reasonable opportunity to point out which items she did not want sold. Her
opposition and motion for reconsideration were overruled by the lower court
without reasons. The records do not even show that an inquiry was made as to
the validity of the grounds of her opposition.
Idonah also filed an opposition to the proposed sale. But, the lower court
approved the proposed sale. Idonah moved to reconsider on the following
grounds:
1. The order in effect authorized the special administrator to sell the entire
personal estate of the deceased;
2. There was no showing that the goods sought to be sold were perishable;
3. The goods sought to be sold represented her lifetime savings and collections;
4. There were unauthorized withdrawals from the properties of the estate, and
the sale of the inventoried lot would prevent identification and recovery of
the articles removed; and
5. There is evidence showing Idonahs separate rights to a substantial part of
the personal estate.
DE GUZMAN VS. GUADIZ (1980)

Rule 80 Special Administrator
FACTS:
ISSUES / HELD
Is the special administrators power to sell limited to perishable property - NO
RATIO
Section 2, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court, provides that the special administrator
"may sell such perishable and other property as the court orders sold", which
shows that the special administrator's power to sell is not limited to
"perishable" property only.
The function of a special administrator is only to collect and preserve the
property of the deceased until a regular administrator is appointed. But it is not
alone the specific property of the estate which is to be preserved, but its value
as well, as shown by the legal provision for the sale by a special administrator
of perishable property. It is in line with this general power to preserve not only
the property of the estate but also its value, that Section 2, Rule 81 also
empowers such administrator to sell "other property as the court ordered sold".
ISSUE/ HELD
De Guzman filed a petition for the probate of Catalina Bajacans will before
the Nueva Ecija CFI. The will institutes De Guzman as sole and universal heir
and as executor.
Villegas filed a motion to dismiss/opposition claiming ownership over the real
properties disposed by the will by virtue of a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos
executed by the testatrix in their favor.
Judge Guadiz resolved to defer resolution of the opposition until presentation
of evidence by the parties.
De Guzman filed a motion for the appointment of a special administrator
alleging that the unresolved opposition would necessarily delay the probate
of the will and the appointment of an executor and so somebody
representing the estate should collect and receive the palay harvests
pending the wills probate.
Judge Guadiz denied De Guzmans motion ruling that there is no need for a
special administrator because the properties covered by the will are in the
possession of the oppositors who claim to be their owners.
De Guzman filed a MR which was also denied.
ISSUE / HELD:
W/N the lower court erred in authorizing the special administrator to sell certain
personal properties of the estate YES. It was premature.
Should a special administrator be appointed? YES.
RATIO
RATIO:
The records show that up to the time the proposed sale was asked for and
judicially approved, no proceeding had been taken to segregate the alleged
exclusive property of Idonah from the mass of the estate supposedly left by
Eugene or to liquidate the conjugal partnership property of the spouses.
Until the issue of the ownership of the properties sought to be sold is heard and
decided, and the conjugal partnership liquidated or at least an agreement be
reached with Idonah as to which properties of the conjugal partnership she
Sec. 1, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court provides:

Appointment of Special Administrator - When there is delay in granting letters
testamentary or of administration by any cause including an appeal from the
allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special administrator to
take possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing
the delay are decided and executors or administrators appointed.
A special administrator may be appointed when there is a delay in the probate of the
will and the issuance of letters of administration due to any cause. Such appointment
is discretionary for the court but subject to the mentioned qualification. It should
however not be whimsical, or contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal principle.
In the instant case, the fact that there is a delay in the probate of the will and that the
granting of letters testamentary will be prolonged necessitate the appointment of a
special administrator. These circumstances fall under the phrase by any cause.
The facts that justify the appointment of a special administrator are:
1.) Delay in the hearing of the petition for the probate of the will.
2.) The basis of Villegas claim to the estate of Bajacan and opposition to the
probate is a deed of donation allegedly executed by Bajacan and her late
sister in their favor.
There is an immediate need to file an action for the annulment of such deed of
donation in behalf of the estate and De Guzman indeed filed one. The case was
dismissed on the ground that De Guzman has no personality to file the action because
although he is named heir in the will which has not been probated. In the meantime
there is nobody to sue in order to protect the interest of the estate considering that
the probate of the will and the appointment of an executor will take time.
The reason for the appointment of a special administrator is the fact that estates of
decedents frequently become involved in protracted litigation, thereby being exposed
to great waste and losses if there is no authorized agent to collect the debts and
preserve the assets in the interim. The need to appoint usually arises when there is a
need to protect the estate during the pendency of the wills probate/ delay in the
appointment of an executor.
In this case, there is a need to protect the interests of the estate as regards to the
produce of the land covered.
As to the fact that the oppositors already possess the property, the court ruled that
Judge Guadiz failed to distinguish between the partisan possession of litigants from
that of the neutral possession of the special administrator. When appointed, a special
administrator is regarded, not as a representative or the agent of the parties
suggesting the appointment, but as the administrator in charge of the estate, and in
fact, as an officer of the court. The accountability which the court attaches to a special
administrator is different from the personal possession of private respondents.
The only way to test the validity of the alleged donation in favor of the private
respondents is to appoint a special administrator who will have the personality to
file the corresponding action.
HEIRS OF CASTILLO V. LACUATA-GABRIEL (2005)
Rule 80
FACTS
On January 1989, Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel (Crisanta), wife of Lorenzo B. Almoradie,
died in Malabon City, Metro Manila, leaving behind P1.5M as her estate.
After Crisantas death, her mother, Crisanta Santiago Vda. de Yanga (de Yanga),
commenced an intestate proceeding (Case A) before the RTC of Malabon City. She
alleged that her daughter died intestate leaving an estate which was being managed
by her wastrel and incompetent son-in-law, Lorenzo, and by two other equally
incompetent persons. She prayed that letters of administration be issued to her son
Mariano, also the brother of the deceased, and that she be awarded her share of the
estate of her daughter after due hearing. However, the RTC appointed Lorenzo as
administrator.
Meantime, the marriage between Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel and Lorenzo Almoradie
was declared void for being bigamous. The RTC then removed Lorenzo as
administrator and appointed Mariano in his stead.
On October 1989, Belinda Dahlia Y. Almoradie Castillo (Belinda), claiming to be the
only legitimate child of Lorenzo and Crisanta, filed a motion for intervention in Case
A. Resolution on this motion was held in abeyance pending some incidents in the
CA.
On November 1989, Roberto Y. Gabriel (Roberto), the legally adopted son of
Crisanta, filed before the RTC of Malabon City a petition for probate of an alleged
will and for the issuance of letters testamentary in his favor (Case B). He alleged
that he was instituted as the sole heir in his mothers will, and was designated as
alternate executor for the named executor therein, Francisco S. Yanga, a brother of
Crisanta, who had predeceased the latter.
On June 1990, Belinda died.
Case A and B were consolidated. The RTC dismissed the intestate proceedings, and
the probate court appointed Roberto as special administrator of his mothers estate.
On May 2001, the heirs of Belinda filed a Motion praying that they be substituted as
party-litigants in lieu of their late mother.
On April 2001, Roberto died. His widow, Dolores L. Gabriel (respondent herein),
filed a Manifestation and Motion where she prayed that she be admitted as
substitute in place of her late husband, and be appointed as administratrix of the
estate of Crisanta.
The heirs of Belinda opposed this. They averred that Dolores was not Crisantas next
of kin, let alone the lawful wife of the late Roberto. In addition, Bena Jean (an heir
of Belinda) filed a Motion praying that she be appointed administratrix of the estate
of her grandmother Crisanta.
Dolores opposed the motion of Bena Jean, claiming that the latter has neither
proven her kinship with Crisanta nor shown any particular qualification to act as
administratrix of the estate.
The lower court appointed Dolores as special administratrix. The court noted the
motion for substitution filed by the heirs of Belinda, stating that they were mere
strangers to the case and that their cause could better be ventilated in a separate
proceeding.
The heirs of Belinda filed an MR. This was denied. Consequently, they filed a petition
for certiorari with the CA. This was also denied by the CA. Thus, the heirs filed the
instant petition for review.
Petitioners allegations: They allege that Dolores cannot be appointed as special
administratrix because she does not have the right to inherit from Crisanta. They
also say that Roberto was not really Crisantas adopted son but just a nephew,
leaving them as the only compulsory heirs. Thus, since the principal consideration
for the appointment of administrator is the applicants interest in the estate, it
would be unfair if Dolores was named special administratrix.
ISSUES / HELD
Was Dolores properly appointed as the special administratrix of Crisantas
estate? YES.
The appointment of a special administrator lies in the sound discretion of
the probate court. The discretion, however, must be sound, and not
whimsical, or contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal principle.
pending probate of the will, Roberto died, leaving his widow Dolores as his sole
heir. Thus, Dolores has much stake in Crisantas estate in case the latters will is
allowed probate. The court then appointed Dolores as special administratrix in the
exercised of their sound discretion.
The court here added that the distribution of shares is not an issue in a suit
involving the appointment of special administrators. The issue of heirship is one that
will be determined in the decree if distribution. All that the court determines in the
appointment of a special administrator is who is entitled to administer the estate
until the appointment of a regular administrator.
Section 6, Rule 78 refers to the appointment of a regular administrator. Section 1,
Rule 80, refers to the appointment of a special administrator. The heirs cannot rely
on Rule 78 to uphold their claim against Dolores.
Further, the prayer of the heirs for Bena Jean to be the regular administratrix of
Crisantas estate should be addressed to the probate court.
MATIAS vs. GONZALES (1957)
RULE 80: NECESSITY FOR, AND QUALIFICATIONS OF, A SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR
RATIO
A special administrator is a representative of a decedent appointed by the
probate court to care for and preserve his estate until an executor or general
administrator is appointed. When appointed, a special administrator is regarded not
as a representative of the agent of the parties suggesting the appointment, but as
the administrator in charge of the estate, and, in fact, as an officer of the court. As
such officer, he is subject to the supervision and control of the probate court and is
expected to work for the best interests of the entire estate, especially its smooth
administration and earliest settlement.
FACTS
PROBATE PROCEEDING:
Aurea Matias initiated a special proceeding for the probate of a document
purporting to be the will of her aunt, Gabina Raquel.
(in other words, special administrator = temporary administrator. He acts as such

only until a regular or general administrator is appointed.)
Feb 8, 1956: The CFI of Cavite, presided over by respondent Judge Gonzales,
sustained the opposition & denied the petition for probate. So Aurea appealed.
The principal object of appointment of temporary administrator is to preserve the

estate until it can pass into the hands of person fully authorized to administer it for
the benefit of creditors and heirs. The reasons for appointment of temporary
administrator are:
1.
2.
3.
Protacted litigations which expose the estate to waste and losses unless an
authorized agent can manage the same.
Other causes which delay regular administration of the estate, such as the
proving of the will.
(The new rules have added this third reason in Section 1, Rule 80). When
there is delay in granting letters testamentary or administration by any
cause, i.e. when the parties cannot agree among themselves. The basis for
appointing a special administrator under the Rules is broad enough to
include any cause or reason for the delay in granting letters testamentary
or of administration.
In the instant case, Crisanta left a document purporting to be her will where her
adopted son Roberto, was named as the sole heir of all her properties. However,
According to the said will, the heir to the entire estate of Gabina, except the
properties bequeathed to her other nieces and nephews, is Aurea. Aurea was
also appointed in the will as executrix.
Basilia Salud, a first cousin of Gabina, opposed the probate of the alleged will.
ISSUE WITH REGARD TO SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR:

Soon after the institution of the probate proceeding filed by Aurea, an issue
arose between Aurea and Basilia regarding the person to be appointed
special administrator of the estate of the deceased:
- AUREA: proposed Horacio Rodriguez to be the special administrator
- BASILIA: urged the appointment of Victorina Salud
Aug 11, 1952: The court, presided over by Judge Bernabe, appointed Horacio
Rodriguez as special administrator of the estate of Gabina Raquel.
Feb 17, 1956 (after Judge Gonzales denied the petition for probate): Basilia Salud
filed a motion with the court presided over by Judge Gonzales. She moved for the
dismissal of Horacio Rodriguez as special administrator, and the appointment, in
his stead of Ramon Plata.
Feb 27, 1956: Respondent Judge Gonzales granted said motion. He found Horacio
guilty gross negligence, so he relieved him as special administrator of the estate
of Gabina. He appointed Basilia as special administratrix of the estate of Gabina,
to be assisted by her niece Victorina Salud, who shall always aid,
interpret, and advise Basilia. Judge Gonzales also ordered that Basilia shall
be helped by Ramon Plata as co-administrator.
MAIN ISSUE / HELD: W/N the order of Judge Gonzales removing Horacio
Rodriguez as special administrator of the estate of Gabina should be set
aside YES
Horacio Rodrigiez was appointed special administrator of the estate of Gabina by
order of Judge Bernabe on Aug. 11, 1952.
Judge Bernabe made that decision on the ground that while Victorina Salud
resides in Manila as a pharmacist in the Santa Isabel Hospital, Horacio Rodriguez,
a practicing lawyer and a former public prosecutor, and later, mayor of Cavite, is
a resident of Cavite.
The order of Judge Gonzales on Feb 27, 1956, removing Horacio and
appointing Basilia, Victorina, and Ramon to the management of the
estate, amounted to a reversal of the aforementioned order of Judge
Bernabe on Aug 11, 1952.
Although the probate of the alleged will of Gabina was denied by Judge Gonzales,
the order to this effect is not yet final and executory. It is still pending review on
appeal taken by Aurea.
The probate of said will being still within realm of legal possibility, Aurea
has, as the universal heir and executrix designated in said instrument, a
special interest to protect during the pendency of said appeal.
Basilia and her principal witness, Victorina, would be considered for the
management of the estate. As a consequence, Aurea had no opportunity to
object to the appointment of Basilia as special administratrix, and of
Victorina, as her assistant and adviser. So the order of Judge Gonzales
removing Horacio denied Aurea of due process.
The order was also issued by Judge Gonzales with evident knowledge of the
physical disability of Basilia (Basilia was over 80 years old and totally blind).
Otherwise, Judge Gonzales would not have directed that Basilia shall be assisted
by her niece Victorina, who shall always aid, interpret, and advise Basilia.
VALARAO V. PASCUAL and DIAZ (26 November 2002)

Powers and Duties of Special Administrator Rule 80
FACTS:
Felicidad Pascual died leaving a substantial inheritance for her collateral

relatives. Gloriosa Valarao (niece) initiated special proceedings for the
issuance of letters of administration in her favor. Conrado Pascual (brother)
and Manuel Diaz (nephew) filed with the same probate court a petition for
probate of an alleged holographic will.
By agreement, Valarao and Diaz were appointed joint administrators. The

probate court denied probate of the alleged holographic will and gave due
course to the intestate settlement of the estate.
Valarao moved for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate. Diaz
also asked to be special co-administrator. Valarao opposed it because Diaz
allegedly neglected his previous assignment as co-administrator.
The probate court appointed Valarao as special administratrix for the following
reasons: (1) Unanimity of choice by the heirs; (2) Vigorous objection to Diaz as
co-administrator and (3) Valaraos side represent a numerical majority. It also
ordered Diazs group of heirs to respect Valaraos authority as special
administratrix and to furnish her copies of documents pertinent to the
properties comprising the estate.
Diaz contested the allegation that he had been remiss in his duties as coadministrator and alleged that justice and equity demanded that his group of
heirs be also represented in the management of the estate. The probate court
denied Diazs MR.
Pascual and Diaz filed another MR for another order on the ground that (1)
Valarao was not authorized to dispossess them of their rightful custody of
properties in the absence of proof that they were being dissipated and (2)
Valaraos possessory right had already been constructively exercised when
the heirs on her side took possession of the estate.
While the MR was pending resolution, Pascual and Diaz filed a petition for
certiorari to reverse and set aside the orders that appointed only Valarao as
special administratrix and to order Diaz as special co-administrator.
The probate court cited Pascual and Diaz for indirect contempt of court for
refusing to turn over to Valarao documents and ordered them arrested until
In this case, there are at least 2 factions among the heirs of the deceased: one,
represented by Aurea, and another, to which Basilia and Victorina belong.
Since the lower court deemed it best to appoint more than one special
administrator, justice and equity demands that both factions be
represented in the management of the estate of the deceased. So
appointing Basilia, Victorina, and Ramon as 3 special administrators is not proper
since all belong to the same faction. The faction of Aurea is not represented.
Roxas vs. Pecson: Laid down the rule that only one special administrator may be
appointed to administrate temporarily the estate of the deceased.
- But such must be considered in the light of the facts obtaining in that case.
- The lower court appointed therein a special administrator for some properties
forming part of said estate, and a special administratrix for other properties
thereof -- Thus, there were 2 separate and independent special administrators.
But
that
case
is
not
identical
to
this
case.
Here,
there
is
only one special administration, the powers of which shall be exercised jointly
by two special co-administrators.
There are also authorities in support of the power of courts to appoint several
special co-administrators.34
OTHER REASONS WHY JUDGE GONZALES ORDER SHOULD BE SET ASIDE:
While Horacio had notice of the hearing of the motion for his removal as special
administrator, the record shows that Aurea did not receive such notice.
The motion filed by Basilia was for the dismissal of Horacio and the appointment
of Ramon as special administrator of the estate. So Aurea had no notice that
34
US cases: Lewis vs. Logdan; Harrison vs. Clark; In re Wilson's Estate; Davenport vs. Davenport
compliance. The arrest warrant was lifted when they promised to deliver the
documents.
The CA set aside the order appointing Valarao as sole special administratrix and
explained that since the heirs were divided into 2 factions, justice and equity
demanded that both factions be represented.
The special administrator enjoys not merely subsidiary possession to be carried

out when the heirs dissipate the properties but primary and independent
discretion of keeping them so they may be preserved for regular
administration.
Pascual and Diaz cannot deprive Valarao of access to and custody of essential
documents by arguing that their possession in behalf of Valarao is already
constructive possession which constitutes full compliance with the possessory
powers under Sec. 2.
The right of possession whether characterized as actual or constructive

empowers the special administrator with the discretion at any time to exercise
dominion or control over the properties and documents comprising the estate.
The partisan possession exercised by litigants over properties of the estate

differs greatly from the neutral possession of a special administrator. Thus, the
possession of portions of the estate by Pascual and Diaz excludes the
possessory right over the same properties inherent in the mandate of a special
administrator.
The appreciation of the powers of a special administrator is evident in the

words possession and charge. Even if we have to concede that possession
means only the fictitious custody of a thing, the word charge the commitment
of a thing to the care and custody of another would emphasize the actual
possession of the properties of the estate whenever vital.
When taken together, the words possession and charge highlight the fact that a
special administrator must be able to subject the properties of the estate to his
control and management when in his good judgment such action is needed.
The special administratrix appointed by the probate court must be constantly

aware that she is not a representative nor the agent of the parties but the
administrator in charge of the estate and in fact an officer of the court. As an
officer of the court, she is subject to the supervision and control of the probate
court and is expected to work for the best interests of the entire estate,
especially its smooth administration and earliest settlement. She ought to be
sensitive to her position as special administratrix and neutral possessor which is
both fiduciary and temporary in character.
ISSUES & HELD:

1.
W/N the probate court can appoint Valarao as sole special administratrix Yes.
2.
W/N the probate court erred in commanding Pascual and Diaz to turn over all
documents pertinent to the estate under pain of contempt. Yes.
RATIO:
1.
The probate court

administrator.
There is nothing whimsical or capricious in the probate courts action not to

appoint Diaz as special co-administrator since the orders clearly stipulate the
grounds. The probate court also weighed the evidence before concluding not to
designate Diaz as he was found to be remiss in his previous duty as coadministrator.
Pascual and Diaz rely in the cases of Matias v. Gonzales35, Corona v. CA36 and
Vda. De Dayrit v. Ramolete37 but these cases do not establish an absolute right
demandable from the probate court to appoint special co-administrators who
would represent the respective interests of squabbling heirs.
Rather, the cases constitute precedents for the authority of the probate court to
designate not just one but two or more special co-administrators for a single
estate. Whether the probate court exercises such prerogative is left entirely to
its sound discretion. The cited cases also have different factual and moral
circumstances and independent proprietary interests that are not necessarily
related to the demand for representation repeatedly demanded.
2.
Pascual and Diaz have to turn over the documents.
The powers of a special administrator are delineated in Sec. 2, Rule 80 of the

Rules of Court, vesting upon him the authority to take possession and charge
of the goods, chattels, rights, credits and estate of the deceased and preserve
the same for the executor or administrator afterwards appointed.
There is nothing in Sec. 2 requiring a special administrator to take possession

of the estate only upon a prior finding that the heirs have been wasting
properties of the estate which are in their possession.
35
had
discretion
to
appoint
only
one
special
The applicant was the universal heir and executrix designated in the will that has special
interest deserving of protection pending appeal.
36
The SC gave consideration to the executrixs choice of Special Administrator considering her
own inability to serve and wide latitude of discretion given her by the testatrix. The presence of
conflicting interests among heirs was not per se the key factor in the designation of a second
special administrator.
37
As the wife owns of the conjugal properties, she too is the compulsory heir of her husband.
To deprive her of any hand in the administration of the estate prior to the probate of the will
would be unfair to her proprietary interests.

Rules 74-80

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RULE 74

CIPRIANO Abut had married twice.

The children of the first marriage opposed the probate.

Jurisdiction, once acquired by the court, continues until the case

Land with improvements was formerly conjugal property of spouses Gregorio

Rosario obtained loans from Bank of Calape, secured by a mortgage on the

Rosario accepted the suggestion and Atty. de la Serna prepared the

Rosario exercised rights of ownership over the land.

TC: dismissed action for partition. Petitioners failed to overcome the

CA: upheld validity of the extrajudicial partition and sustained dismissal of

Whether the extrajudicial settlement is valid. YES

There was no evidence to show that extrajudicial settlement was required to

Ma. Socorro contends:

Partition of the estate is not possible as there has been no determination of

Section 1, Rule 74 allows heirs to divide the estate among themselves

AVELINO vs. COURT OF APPEALS (2000)

DOMINGO vs. ROCES

Proper annotation of lis pendens can protect the claimant.

A few months later, respondents Rodriguez Siblings, siblings of Miguel, filed an

The deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition (ESP) covered 14 parcels of

The applicable prescriptive period in this case is 4 years, and as stated in

Jorgea Igot-Soroo, Frisca Booc and Felix Cuizon executed an

or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful

Issue/Held: W/n the complaint filed by the private respondents has

The pertinent provisions of Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, are

considering that title thereto was obtained through a Compromise

Issue/Held: W/n reconveyance still lies against expropriated property-NO

Title: Rebong vs. Ibanez

The annotation was pursuant to Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 74 of the

Whether the petition to cancel annotation should be allowed. NO

The annotation could NOT be cancelled because the registered interests

This is a case for ejectment filed by PADERES against PADA-KILARIO.

Said law provides that a petition to cancel any annotation on a

Petitioner Rebong applied for a petition to cancel the annotation on the

The property was donated to her by the HEIRS OF ANANIAS AND

MTC- ruled in favor of PADA-KILARIO; RTC and CA- PADERES

THIRD, PADA-KILARIO is estopped from impugning the extrajudicial

He prayed in his petition that letters of administration be issued to him in

Conchita opposed this on the ground that the appointment of an administrator

The extrajudicial settlement states that due to the difficulty of making a

Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, provides that:

parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the

Utolo insists that he has a right to be administrator. He lost to his mother-in-law. He

If there is an actual necessity for court intervention, due to the heirs'

The allegation that the estate has an outstanding obligation of

Utulo vs. vda. De Garcia (1938)

Alaban then filed an APPLICATION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION with the

Alaban learnt of the probate proceedings only on July 2001.

It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a

Also, an action for annulment of judgment is resorted to in cases where the

CA dismissed the petition. MR was also denied.

Rule 37 provides that motion for new trial OR MR on ground of excessive

AVERA VS. GARCIA (1921)

BALANAY Jr. vs. MARTINEZ (1975)

Felix Jrs counsel of record was Atty. Cabreros

Art. 143 of the Civil Code

Nowhere was it alleged nor shown that Leonida Coronado is entitled to

ISSUE/HELD: W/N Juana is in estoppel from questioning the ownership of

CUENCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS (1973)

Respondent Lourdes filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the

Case: Fernandez v. Dimagiba (Full title of the cases: Fernandez, Eusebio

Benedicta delos Reyes is the decedent in this case.

Grounds advanced for the opposition were forgery, vices of