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ISSUE: whether or not the respondent Judge has

committed a grave abuse of discretion in allowing


the defendant Francisco E. Fernandez to file a thirdparty complaint against the third-party defendants.
Rule: YES. Section 12 of Rule 6 of the Revised
Rules of Court 1 authorizes a defendant to bring into
a lawsuit any person "not a party to the action ... for
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other
relief in respect of his opponent's claim." From its
explicit language it does not compel the defendant
to bring the third-parties into the litigation, rather it
simply permits the inclusion of anyone who meets
the standard set forth in the rule. The secondary or
derivative liability of the third-party is central
whether the basis is indemnity, subrogation,
contribution, express or implied warranty or some
other theory. The impleader of new parties under
this rule is proper only when a right to relief exists
under the applicable substantive law. 2This rule is
merely a procedural mechanism, and cannot be
utilized unless there is some substantive basis under
applicable law.
The requirement that for a third-party complaint to
be available the third-party defendant must be liable
secondarily to the original defendant in the event
that the latter is held liable to the plaintiff Absent
therefore in the case at bar the nexus between
petitioners as third-party defendants and Francisco
E. Fernandez, the third-party plaintiff, showing the
existence of a secondary or derivative liability of
the former in favor of the latter "in respect of his
opponent's claim" the third-party action would not
be proper.
Banco Filipino savings and mortgage bank vs
CA
Facts: On
Dec.
20,
1993,
Santiago
(Isabela) Memorial Park (SANTIAGO) filed
a complaint for redemption and
specific
performance against Banco Filipino (BANK).
SANTIAGO alleged that the BANK foreclosed the
mortgage and became the highest bidder in the sale.
The Certicate of Sale was inscribed at the back of
the TCT on Jan. 21, 1991. On Aug. 6, 1991,
SANTIAGO offered to repurchase the property at
P700k which was the start of negotiation between

the 2. SANTIAGO was given up to the end of


March 1992 to negotiate and make special
arrangement for any satisfactory plan of payment
for the redemption. On Jan. 23, 1992, the Deputy
Liquidator directed SANTIAGO to remit at least
P50k to the BANK to manifest its willingness
to redeem. On Jan. 20, 1993, SANTIAGO increased
its offer to P1M. But the BANK demanded P5.8M.
Issue: Whether or not SANTIAGO can redeem the
property.
Held: NO. SANTIAGO has no cause of action
for redemption against petitioner. The right
of redemption should be exercised within the
specified time limit, which is one year from the date
of registration of the certificate of sale. The
redemptioner should make an actual tender in good
faith of the full amount of the purchase price. In
case of disagreement over the redemption price, the
redemptioner
may
preserve
his
right
of redemption through judicial action which in
every case must be filed within the one-year period
of redemption. The filing of the court action to
enforce redemption, being equivalent to a formal
offer to redeem, would have the effect of preserving
his redemptive rights and freezing the expiration
of the one-year period. In this case, the period
of redemption expired
on
Jan.
21,
1992.
The complaint was filed on Dec. 20, 1992.
SANTIAGO should have filed the complaint before
Jan.
21,
1992.
Moreover,
while
the complaint alleges
that
SANTIAGO made an offer to redeem the subject
property within the period of redemption, it is not
alleged in the complaint that there was an actual
tender of payment of the redemption price as
required by the rules. It was alleged that
SANTIAGO merely made an offer of P700k as
redemption price, which however, as stated
in complaint, the redemption money was the total
bank claim of P925,448.17 plus lawful interest and
other allowable expenses incident to the foreclosure
proceedings. Thus, the offer was even very much

lower than the price paid by petitioner as the highest


bidder
in
the
auction
sale.
Also, there was no categorical allegation in
the complaint that
the
original
period
of redemption had been extended. Assuming
arguendo that the period for redemption had been
extended, i.e., up to end of March 1992, still private
respondent failed to exercise its right within said
period.
Gochan vs. Gochan G.R. No. 146089, December
13, 2001, 372 SCRA 256 (GATCHALIAN)
FACTS:
Respondents were stockholders of the Felix
Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation and the
Mactan Realty Development Corporation.
Respondents offered to sell their shares in the
two corporations to the individual petitioners in
consideration of the sum of P200,000,000:00.
Petitioners accepted and paid the said amount to
respondents. (Receipts were issued and given to
the petitioners as proof)
Respondents, through Crispo Gochan, Jr.,
required individual petitioners to execute a
"promissory note. The former drafted the
promissory note in his own handwriting and had
the same signed by the petitioners. Unbeknown
to petitioners, Crispo Gochan, Jr. inserted in the
"promissory note" a phrase that says, "Said
amount is in partial consideration of the sale."
Respondents filed a complaint against
petitioners for specific performance and
damages alleging that the petitioners that
offered to buy their shares of stock,in
consideration of P200M and multiple properties.
Accordingly, respondents claimed that they are
entitled to the conveyance of the properties, in
addition to the amount of P200,000,000.00,
which they acknowledge to have received from
petitioners plus damages.
Petitioners filed their answer, raising the
following affirmative defenses one of which is
the lack of jurisdiction by the trial court for nonpayment of the correct docket fees;
Trial court ruled in favor of the defendants. It
cited that respondents paid the necessary filing
and docket fees of at least P165K.

MR denied. Petition for certiorari with CA


dismissed. MR denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
1. Did the respondent file and pay the
necessary docket fees to warrant courts
jurisdiction?
1. What is the real nature of the case?
2. What should be the basis for the assessment
of the correct docket fees?
HELD:
1. NO
1. Real action not specific performance
2. Assessed value of the property, or the
estimated value
The rule is well-settled that the court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of
the prescribed docket fees. In the case of Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion,12 this
Court held that it is not simply the filing of the
complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a
trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter
or nature of the action.
Petitioners, that the complaint is in the nature of a
real action which affects title to real properties;
hence, respondents should have alleged therein the
value of the real properties which shall be the basis
for the assessment of the correct docket fees.
It is necessary to determine the true nature of the
complaint in order to resolve the issue of whether or
not respondents paid the correct amount of docket
fees therefor. In this jurisdiction, the dictum adhered
to is that the nature of an action is determined by
the allegations in the body of the pleading or
complaint itself, rather than by its title or heading.
The caption of the complaint below was
denominated as one for "specific performance and
damages." The relief sought, however, is the
conveyance or transfer of real property, or
ultimately, the execution of deeds of conveyance in
their favor of the real properties enumerated in the
provisional memorandum of agreement. Under
these circumstances, the case below was actually a
real action, affecting as it does title to or possession
of real property.

Real action is one where the plaintiff seeks the


recovery of real property or, as indicated in section
2(a) of Rule 4 (now Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure), a real action is an action
affecting title to or recovery of possession of real
property.

CANCELLATION OF CERTIFICATES OF TITLE


in behalf of RP vs. Kenrick and Alfonso
Concepcion

In the case at bar, therefore, the complaint filed with


the trial court was in the nature of a real action,
although ostensibly denominated as one for specific
performance. Consequently, the basis for
determining the correct docket fees shall be the
assessed value of the property, or the estimated
value thereof as alleged by the claimant

-Kenrick allegedly filed an answer signed by Atty.


Onofre Garlitos, Jr as their counsel (but later on,
during a Senate hearing, it was found that
somebody else signed for Atty. Garlitos but he did
not authorize such signing)

We are not unmindful of our pronouncement in the


case of Sun Insurance, to the effect that in case the
filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied
by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow
payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in
no case beyond the applicable prescriptive period.
However, the liberal interpretation of the rules
relating to the payment of docket fees as applied in
the case of Sun Insurance cannot apply to the
instant case as respondents have never demonstrated
any willingness to abide by the rules and to pay the
correct docket fees. Instead, respondents have
stubbornly insisted that the case they filed was one
for specific performance and damages and that they
actually paid the correct docket fees therefor at the
time of the filing of the complaint.
NOTE: The parties in the Sun Insurance case
expressed willingness to pay the correct docket fees
Republic vs Kenrick Development corp
Facts: Kenrick Development Corp built a perimeter
wall which encroached upon some parcels of land
occupied by Air transportation office (ATO) based
on TCTs derived from TCT No. 17508 registered in
the name of one Alfonso Concepcion. When ATO
verified the TCTs with the Land Registration
Authority (LRA), it was found that there were no
record of TCT no. 17508 and its ascendant title.
Land was also covered by Villamor Air Base.
-so OSG, on behalf of LRA, filed a COMPLAINT
FOR REVOCATION, ANNULMENT AND

-Alfonso Concepcion cannot be found so alias


summon by publication done

-case punctuated by various incidents relative to


modes of discovery, pre-trial, postponements or
continuances, MTDs, Motion to declare defendant
in default, et al.
-Pending hearing, Senate conducted hearing in aid
of legislation on the issuances of fake titles and
focused on how Kenrick was able to obtain title to
lands wherein it built perimeter fence. Here is
where atty. Garlitos denied that he signed the
answer before the RTC
-with that admission before the senate, OSG filed
Urgent motion to declare Kenrick in default. answer no signature of counsel so mere scrap of
paper
-RTC: granted, declared defendant in default,
allowed RP to present evidence ex parte
-MR: Denied, so petition for certiorari
-CA: reversed RTC
Statements of Atty. Garlitos in the Senate hearing
unreliable, not subject to cross examination
Acts of Atty Garlitos after the filing of the answer:
although he did not sign it, he prepared the draft of
the answer and even if it was signed by another
person, he did not contest it and even represented
Kenrick in another case - these acts supposedly
cured whatever defect the answer had
ISSUE: WON CA erred ? YES. Kenrick is really in
default, for their answer was not signed therefore

the said pleading is deemed as a mere scrap of paper


and thus they are not considered to have submitted
any answer at all.
On the alleged blanket authority given by Atty.
Garlitos for anyone to sign the draft answer he
prepared
-acts of Kenrick was deemed to have adopted the
statements of Atty. Garlitos (that the answer
submitted was not signed by him therefore, they
have submitted a defective answer) - adoptive
admission
-SIGNED PLEADING: signed by the counsel or the
party himself; counsel's signature cannot be
delegated and means that he certifies that he has
read the pleading; that, to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief, there is a good ground to
support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.
Under the Rules of Court, it is counsel alone, by
affixing his signature, who can certify to these
matters.
On liberal interpretation of rules (rules are mere
technicalities.)
Procedural requirements which have often been
disparagingly labeled as mere technicalities have
their own valid raison d etre in the orderly
administration of justice. To summarily brush them
aside may result in arbitrariness and injustice. 19
The Courts pronouncement in Garbo v. Court of
Appeals 20 is relevant:
Procedural rules are [tools] designed to facilitate the
adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are
thus [enjoined] to abide strictly by the rules. And
while the Court, in some instances, allows a
relaxation in the application of the rules, this, we
stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for
erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity.
The liberality in the interpretation and application
of the rules applies only in proper cases and under
justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true
that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is
equally true that every case must be prosecuted in

accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure


an orderly and speedy administration of justice.
Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed
except only when, for the most persuasive of
reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of
an injustice not commensurate with the degree of
his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
prescribed procedure. 21 In this case, respondent
failed to show any persuasive reason why it should
be exempted from strictly abiding by the rules.
As a final note, the Court cannot close its eyes to
the acts committed by Atty. Garlitos in violation of
the ethics of the legal profession. Thus, he should
be made to account for his possible misconduct.
Argallon vs CA
FACTS: Petitioner, Jocson filed a complaint for
Reconveyance and Damages against Private
respondents, Marcelo Steel Corp (MSC) and Maria
Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC) represented
by their president, Jose Marcelo. The trial court
ruled in favor of petitioner. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC. Since no
appeal from the decision of the CA was made by the
defendants, said decision became final and
executory. Jocson thus filed a Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Execution, which was granted
by the court. A Writ of Execution was issued,
and the properties of MSC were levied in full
satisfaction of the judgment. Execution sale was
scheduled; meanwhile Midas Corporation filed a
third-party claim alleging that some of the levied
properties were previously mortgaged to it. Thus
the execution sale was postponed, and Jocson
posted a P36M indemnity bond so the levied
properties will not be released to Midas Corp.
The execution sale proceeded in full satisfaction of
judgment, and a certificate of sale was issued to
petitioner Rodolfo Tuising, who was the highest
bidder. MSC filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion to
annul the execution sale and to issue an order
directing the Sheriffs not to deliver the properties
sold at the auction to Tiusing alleged that its
obligation was merely joint with MCFC and that the

total price of the properties sold on execution was


unconscionably inadequate. The Trial Court
granted MSCs motion and annulled the execution
sale and cancelled the Certificate of Sale. Jocson
moved for reconsideration arguing that the
obligation was solidary and therefore may be
enforced in full against either of the defendants.
MSC filed a Manifestation and Motion on
Satisfaction of Judgment, depositing P4,260,198.11
in Managers Check with the TC. TC denied
Jocsons Motion and granted MSCs Manifestation
and Motion. Jocson filed a Notice of Appeal but
later withdrew it and instead filed a Petition for
Certiorari with the CA, which however denied the
petition, ruling that since the TCs decision was
silent as to the nature of the obligation, the same is
therefore joint; the MR was also denied, hence this
petition. The petition filed before the SC
however was not signed by Jocsons counsel but
only by Tuisings counsel. Also, only Tuising
signed the Verification and Certification for nonforum shopping (CNFS). Four months from
filing the petition, Tuising filed a Special Power of
Attorney allegedly signed by Jocson authorizing
him (Tuising) to file the petition and to verify and
certify the same. Meanwhile Jocson filed with
the TC a Motion for Issuance of Alias Writ of
Execution to implement the decision against
MCFC.
ISSUE: WON the petition is defective.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO:
1. Under Sec 3 of Rule 7, every pleading must be
signed by the party or counsel representing him;
otherwise it produces no legal effect.
a. There is nothing in the record of the case that
shows Tusings counsel was authorized by Jocons
counsel to sign on his behalf.
b. Tusings counsel had no authority to sign for
Jocson or his counsel.

2. A pleading which lacks proper verification shall


be treated as an unsigned pleading, and therefore
without effect.
a. A petition for review on certiorari requires
verification (Section 1 Rule 45).
b. Tuising did not explain why the SPA was
belatedly filed.
3. Lack of or a defective CNFS is generally not
curable by its subsequent correction or submission,
unless there is a need to relax the rule under special
circumstances.
a. Here there is no compelling reason to relax the
rules.
b. The CNFS is based on the rule that in the interest
of orderly judicial procedure, litigants should not
pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora.
c. The CNFS requires personal knowledge, and the
lone signing petitioner cannot be presumed to have
personal knowledge of the filing by his copetitioners of any action similar to the current
petition.
d. The flaw is fatal because it was Jocson, the
principal party in the original case, who did not
sign.
e. Further, Jocson filed a Motion for Issuance of
Alias Writ, signifying that he did not anymore
intend to appeal the decision of the CA.
Vicar vs FEB leasing
FACTS: Petitioner obtained loans from herein
respondent for the purchase of construction
equipment. The same was sold to the respondent
with lease-back agreement. However, due its
course, petitioner defaulted in payment. Hence,
respondent filed an action for sum of money,
damages and replevin for the leased equipment
against herein respondent. Petitioner filed for
motion to dismiss but was denied by the RTC which
was ground on forum-shopping. Thus, petitioner
filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of

Appeals, to stop the implementation of the Writ of


Replevin issued against the subject equipment. ,
however, instantly dismissed by the CA in its herein
assailed Resolution dated October 23, 2002,
because the Verification and the Certification
against forum shopping had been executed by
Petitioner Carmelita V. Lim without any showing
that she had the authority to sign for and on behalf
of petitioner-corporation.
On November 23, 2003, the day after receiving its
copy of the Resolution, Vicar filed an "Omnibus
Motion for Reconsideration and for Admission of
the Attached Secretarys Certificate, denied on the
ground of the same was belatedly filed and did not
cure the defect of said petition. Hence the appeal.
ISSUE: WON CA erred in dismissing the petition.
RULE: YES. , the Court deems it proper and
justifiable to grant the present Petition. Clearly,
petitioners did not deliberately ignore SC Circular
28-9191 to prohibit and penalize the evils of forum
shopping. In fact, a "Verification/Certification,"
stating the information required under the Circular,
was attached to the Petition for Certiorari filed
before the CA. Petitioners merely missed attaching
to their Petition a concrete proof of Lims authority
from
Vicar
to
execute
the
said
Verification/Certification on its behalf. The latter,
however, lost no time in submitting its corporate
secretarys Certificate attesting to the fact that,
indeed, Petitioner Vicars board of directors had
unanimously approved a Resolution on October 2,
2002, authorizing its president and general manager,
Carmelita V. Lim, to file the Petition and "to
execute and sign x x x the verification and
certification against forum shopping."
The Certificate was submitted to the CA on the day
right after it had denied the Petition. Such swiftness
of action indicates that the Resolution -- authorizing
Petitioner Lim to file the Petition and execute the
Verification and the Certification against forum
shopping on behalf of Petitioner Vicar -- did exist at
the time the Petition was filed. Such fact also lends
credence to the assertion of petitioners that it was

only due to inadvertence and oversight that they


failed to attach the Secretarys Certificate to their
Petition for Certiorari.
In closing, the Court stresses once more that
technical rules of procedure should be used to
promote, not frustrate, justice. While the swift
unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective,
the granting of substantial justice is an even more
urgent ideal.23 Rules of procedure are but tools
designed to facilitate, not obstruct, the attainment of
justice.

Maranaw Hotels v CA
Facts: Private respondent filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal against herein petitioner before the
labor arbiter. The Labor arbiter dismissed the
complaint went to NLRC, the latter reversed the
formers decision. Hence, petitioner appealed before
the CA but was dismissed on account of the failure
of the petitioner to append the board resolution
authorizing the counsel for petitioner to file the
petition before the Court of Appeals. on the ground
of non-compliance with the rule on certification
against forum shopping taking into account that the
aforesaid certification was subscribed and verified
by the Personnel Director of petitioner corporation
without attaching thereto his authority to do so for
and in behalf of petitioner corporation per board
resolution or special power of attorney executed by
the latter. petitioner invokes substantial justice as
justification for a reversal of the resolution of the
Court of Appeals.13 Petitioner likewise contends that
the filing of a motion for reconsideration with the
certificate of non-forum shopping attached
constitutes substantial compliance with the
requirement. Hence the appeal.
Issue: WON CA erred in dismissing the petition.
Rule: NO. Well-settled is the rule that the certificate
of non-forum shopping is a mandatory requirement.
Substantial compliance applies only with respect to

the contents of the certificate but not as to its


presence in the pleading wherein it is required.
Petitioners contention that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration with an appended certificate of non
forum-shopping suffices to cure the defect in the
pleading is absolutely specious. It negates the very
purpose for which the certification against forum
shopping is required: to inform the Court of the
pendency of any other case which may present
similar issues and involve similar parties as the one
before it. The requirement applies to both natural
and juridical persons.

HUIBONHOA V CONCEPCION
Facts: