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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 103125 May 17, 1993


PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by GOV. LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE and HON.
BENJAMIN V. PANGA as Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 33 at Pili, Camarines Sur, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION), ERNESTO SAN JOAQUIN and EFREN SAN
JOAQUIN,respondents.
The Provincial Attorney for petitioners.
Reynaldo L. Herrera for Ernesto San Joaquin.

QUIASON, J.:
In this appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. SP No. 20551 entitled
"Ernesto N. San Joaquin, et al., v. Hon. Benjamin V. Panga, et al.," this Court is asked to decide
whether the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units is subject, to the prior
approval of the Secretary of the Agrarian Reform, as the implementator of the agrarian reform
program.
On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed
Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate
property contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and
non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees.
The "WHEREAS" clause o:f the Resolution states:
WHEREAS, the province of Camarines Sur has adopted a five-year
Comprehensive Development plan, some of the vital components of which
includes the establishment of model and pilot farm for non-food and nontraditional agricultural crops, soil testing and tissue culture laboratory centers,
15 small scale technology soap making, small scale products of plaster of
paris, marine biological and sea farming research center,and other
progressive feasibility concepts objective of which is to provide the necessary
scientific and technology know-how to farmers and fishermen in Camarines
Sur and to establish a housing project for provincial government employees;
WHEREAS, the province would need additional land to be acquired either by
purchase or expropriation to implement the above program component;
WHEREAS, there are contiguous/adjacent properties to be (sic) present
Provincial Capitol Site ideally suitable to establish the same pilot
development center;
WHEREFORE . . . .

Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor, Hon. Luis
R.Villafuerte, filed two separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N.
San Joaquin, docketed as Special Civil Action Nos. P-17-89 and P-19-89 of the Regional Trial Court,
Pili, Camarines Sur, presided by the Hon. Benjamin V. Panga.
Forthwith, the Province of Camarines Sur filed a motion for the issuance of writ of possession. The
San Joaquins failed to appear at the hearing of the motion.
The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered
for their property. In an order dated December 6, 1989, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss
and authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property upon the deposit
with the Clerk of Court of the amount of P5,714.00, the amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to
answer for damages that private respondents may suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do
not prosper. The trial court issued a writ of possession in an order dated January18, 1990.
The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order, authorizing the Province of Camarines Sur
to take possession of their property and a motion to admit an amended motion to dismiss. Both
motions were denied in the order dated February 1990.
In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked: (a) that Resolution No. 129,
Series of 1988 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be declared null and void; (b) that the complaints for
expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the order dated December 6, 1989 (i) denying the motion to
dismiss and (ii) allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property subject of
the expropriation and the order dated February 26, 1990, denying the motion to admit the amended
motion to dismiss, be set aside. They also asked that an order be issued to restrain the trial court from
enforcing the writ of possession, and thereafter to issue a writ of injunction.
In its answer to the petition, the Province of Camarines Sur claimed that it has the authority to initiate
the expropriation proceedings under Sections 4 and 7 of Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and
that the expropriations are for a public purpose.
Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General stated that
under Section 9 of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), there was no need for the approval by
the Office of the President of the exercise by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent
domain. However, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must
first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of
petitioners for use as a housing project.
The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to
take possession of private respondents' lands and the order denying the admission of the amended
motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings until after
the Province of Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of
Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the property of the private respondents from
agricultural to non-agricultural land.
Hence this petition.
It must be noted that in the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked for: (i) the dismissal of the
complaints for expropriation on the ground of the inadequacy of the compensation offered for the
property and (ii) the nullification of Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988 of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur.
The Court of Appeals did not rule on the validity of the questioned resolution; neither did it dismiss the
complaints. However, when the Court of Appeals ordered the suspension of the proceedings until the
Province of Camarines Sur shall have obtained the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to
change the classification of the lands sought to be expropriated from agricultural to non-agricultural
use, it assumed that the resolution is valid and that the expropriation is for a public purpose or public
use.

Modernly, there has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of "public purpose" or
"public use" for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised. The old concept was that the
condemned property must actually be used by the general public (e.g. roads, bridges, public plazas,
etc.) before the taking thereof could satisfy the constitutional requirement of "public use". Under the
new concept, "public use" means public advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends to contribute
to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community, like a resort complex for tourists or
housing project (Heirs of Juancho Ardano v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 [1983]; Sumulong v. Guerrero,
154 SC.RA 461 [1987]).
The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolution is for a public purpose. The
establishment of a pilot development center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the
people of the Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational, the center would make available to the
community invaluable information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry.
Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing
project also satisfies the public purpose requirement of the Constitution. As held in Sumulong v.
Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461, "Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state
concern since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum the
general welfare."
It is the submission of the Province of Camarines Sur that its exercise of the power of eminent domain
cannot be restricted by the provisions of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657),
particularly Section 65 thereof, which requires the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform
before a parcel of land can be reclassified from an agricultural to a non-agricultural land.
The Court of Appeals, following the recommendation of the Solicitor General, held that the Province of
Camarines Sur must comply with the provision of Section 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law and must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to
expropriate the lands of the San Joaquins.
In Heirs of Juancho Ardana v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220, petitioners raised the issue of whether the
Philippine Tourism Authority can expropriate lands covered by the "Operation Land Transfer" for use
of a tourist resort complex. There was a finding that of the 282 hectares sought to be expropriated,
only an area of 8,970 square meters or less than one hectare was affected by the land reform
program and covered by emancipation patents issued by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. While the
Court said that there was "no need under the facts of this petition to rule on whether the public
purpose is superior or inferior to another purpose or engage in a balancing of competing public
interest," it upheld the expropriation after noting that petitioners had failed to overcome the showing
that the taking of 8,970 square meters formed part of the resort complex. A fair and reasonable
reading of the decision is that this Court viewed the power of expropriation as superior to the power to
distribute lands under the land reform program.
The Solicitor General denigrated the power to expropriate by the Province of Camarines Sur by
stressing the fact that local government units exercise such power only by delegation. (Comment, pp.
14-15; Rollo, pp. 128-129)
It is true that local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it
only when expressly authorized by the legislature (City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 28l US 439, 74 L.ed.
950, 50 SCt. 360). It is also true that in delegating the power to expropriate, the legislature may retain
certain control or impose certain restraints on the exercise thereof by the local governments (Joslin
Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 US 668 67 L. ed. 1167, 43 S Ct. 684). While such delegated power may
be a limited authority, it is complete within its limits. Moreover, the limitations on the exercise of the
delegated power must be clearly expressed, either in the law conferring the power or in other
legislations.
Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, was promulgated pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337, the
Local Government Code, which provides:

A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a
resolution of its sanggunian exercise the right of eminent domain and institute
condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local government, units must first secure
the approval of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to nonagricultural use, before they can institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is
no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the expropriation
of agricultural lands by local government units to the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform.
The closest provision of law that the Court of Appeals could cite to justify the intervention of the
Department of Agrarian Reform in expropriation matters is Section 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law, which reads:
Sec. 65. Conversion of Lands. After the lapse of five (5) years from its
award, when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for,
agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will
have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial
purposes, the DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the landowner, with
due notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize
the reclassification or conversion of the land and its disposition:Provided,
That the beneficiary shall have fully paid his obligation.
The opening, adverbial phrase of the provision sends signals that it applies to lands previously placed
under the agrarian reform program as it speaks of "the lapse of five (5) years from its award."
The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k) and 5 (1) of Executive Order No.
129-A, Series of 1987, cannot be the source of the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to
determine the suitability of a parcel of agricultural land for the purpose to which it would be devoted by
the expropriating authority. While those rules vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the
exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversions of agricultural lands for residential,
commercial or industrial uses, such authority is limited to the applications for reclassification
submitted by the land owners or tenant beneficiaries.
Statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to political subdivisions cannot be broadened or
constricted by implication (Schulman v. People, 10 N.Y. 2d. 249, 176 N.E. 2d. 817, 219 NYS 2d. 241).
To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no longer
expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc,
without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform,
because all of these projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then
be the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose
or public use.
Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall determine whether the use
of the property sought to be expropriated shall be public, the same being an expression of legislative
policy. The courts defer to such legislative determination and will intervene only when a particular
undertaking has no real or substantial relation to the public use (United States Ex Rel Tennessee
Valley Authority v. Welch, 327 US 546, 90 L. ed. 843, 66 S Ct 715; State ex rel Twin City Bldg. and
Invest. Co. v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 174 NW 885, 8 ALR 585).
There is also an ancient rule that restrictive statutes, no matter how broad their terms are, do not
embrace the sovereign unless the sovereign is specially mentioned as subject thereto (Alliance of
Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA 1 [1983]). The Republic of the
Philippines, as sovereign, or its political subdivisions, as holders of delegated sovereign powers,
cannot be bound by provisions of law couched in general term.
The fears of private respondents that they will be paid on the basis of the valuation declared in the tax
declarations of their property, are unfounded. This Court has declared as unconstitutional the

Presidential Decrees fixing the just compensation in expropriation cases to be the value given to the
condemned property either by the owners or the assessor, whichever was lower ([Export Processing
Zone Authority v. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 [1987]). As held inMunicipality of Talisay v. Ramirez, 183
SCRA 528 [1990], the rules for determining just compensation are those laid down in Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court, which allow private respondents to submit evidence on what they consider shall be
the just compensation for their property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is set
aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's order allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take
possession of private respondents' property; (b) orders the trial court to suspend the expropriation
proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the Department
of Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify private respondents' property from agricultural to nonagricultural use.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it sets aside the order of the trial court,
denying the amended motion to dismiss of the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

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Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 96298 May 14, 1991


RENATO M. LAPINID, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY and JUANITO
JUNSAY, respondents.
Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro & Arcilla Law Offices for petitioner.
Adolpho M. Guerzon for J. Junsay, Jr.
Evalyn L Fetalino, Rogelio C. Limare and Daisy B. Garcia-Tingzon for Civil Service Commission.

CRUZ, J.:p
The issue raised in this case has been categorically resolved in a long line of cases that should have
since guided the policies and actions of the respondent Civil Service Commission. Disregard of our
consistent ruling on this matter has needlessly imposed on the valuable time of the Court and indeed
borders on disrespect for the highest tribunal. We state at the outset that this conduct can no longer
be countenanced.

Petitioner Renato M. Lapinid was appointed by the Philippine Ports Authority to the position of
Terminal Supervisor at the Manila International Container Terminal on October 1, 1988. This
appointment was protested on December 15, 1988, by private respondent Juanito Junsay, who
reiterated his earlier representations with the Appeals Board of the PPA on May 9, 1988, for a review
of the decision of the Placement Committee dated May 3, 1988. He contended that he should be
designated terminal supervisor, or to any other comparable position, in view of his preferential right
thereto. On June 26, 1989, complaining that the PPA had not acted on his protest, Junsay went to the
Civil Service Commission and challenged Lapinid's appointment on the same grounds he had earlier
raised before the PPA. In a resolution dated February 14, 1990, the Commission disposed as follows:
After a careful review of the records of the case, the Commission finds the appeal
meritorious. In the comparative evaluation sheets, the parties were evaluated
according to the following criteria, namely: eligibility; education; work experience;
productivity/performance/ attendance; integrity; initiative/leadership; and physical
characteristics/personality traits. The results of the evaluation are as follows:
JUNSAY, Juanito 79.5
VILLEGAS, Benjamin 79
LAPINID, Renato 75
DULFO, Antonio 78
MARIANO, Eleuterio 79
FLORES, Nestor 80
DE GUZMAN, Alfonso 80
VER, Cesar 80
It is thus obvious that Protestants Junsay (79.5) and Villegas (79) have an edge over
that of protestees Lapinid (75) and Dulfo (78).
Foregoing premises considered, it is directed that Appellants Juanito Junsay and
Benjamin Villegas be appointed as Terminal Supervisor (SG 18) vice protestees
Renato Lapinid and Antonio Dulfo respectively who may be considered for
appointment to any position commensurate and suitable to their qualifications, and
that the Commission be notified within ten (10) days of the implementation hereof.
SO ORDERED.
Upon learning of the said resolution, Lapinid, 7who claimed he had not been informed of the appeal
and had not been heard thereon, filed a motion for reconsideration on March 19, 1990. This was
denied on May 25, 1990. The Philippine Ports Authority also filed its own motion for reconsideration
on June 19, 1990, which was denied on August 17, 1990. A second motion for reconsideration filed
on September 14, 1990, based on the re-appreciation of Lapinid's rating from 75% to 84%, was also
denied on October 19, 1990.
When the petitioner came to this Court on December 13, 1990, we resolved to require Comments
from the respondents and in the meantime issued a temporary restraining order. The Solicitor General
took a stand against the Civil Service Commission which, at his suggestion, was allowed to file its
own Comment. The petitioner filed a Reply. The private respondent's Comment was dispensed with
when it was not filed within the prescribed period.
We see no reason to deviate from our consistent ruling on the issue before us.

In Luego v. Civil Service Commission, this Court declared:


The issue is starkly simple: Is the Civil Service Commission authorized to disapprove
a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than
the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter?
xxx xxx xxx
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the
officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that
the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the
appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified
who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations
of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.
xxx xxx xxx
Significantly, the Commission on Civil Service acknowledged that both the petitioner
and the private respondent were qualified for the position in controversy. That
recognition alone rendered it functus officio in the case and prevented it from acting
further thereon except to affirm the validity of the petitioner's appointment. To be
sure, it had no authority to revoke the said appointment simply because it believed
that the private respondent was better qualified for that would have constituted an
encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor.
The same ruling has been affirmed, in practically the same language as Luego, in Central Bank
v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744; Santiago v. Civil Service Commission, 178 SCRA
733; Pintor v. Tan, G.R. No. 84022 and G.R. No. 85804, March 9, 1989, En Banc, Minute
Resolution; Galura v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 85812, June 1, 1989, En Banc, Minute
Resolution; Zulueta v. Mamangun, G.R. No. 85941, June 15, 1989, En Banc, Minute
Resolution; Remigio v. Chairman, Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 86324, July 6, 1989, En Banc,
Minute Resolution; Aurora Macacua v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 91520, July 31, 1990, En
Banc, Minute Resolution; Abdulwahab A. Bayao v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 92388,
September 11, 1990, En Banc, Minute Resolution; Orbos v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No.
92561, September 12, 1990; Alicia D. Tagaro v.The Hon. Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. No.
90477, September 13, 1990, En Banc, Minute Resolution;Elenito Lim v. Civil Service Commission, et
al., G.R. No. 87145, October 11, 1990, En Banc, Minute Resolution;Teologo v. Civil Service
Commission, G.R. No. 92103, November 8, 1990; Simpao v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No.
85976, November 15, 1990.
2

Only recently, in Gaspar v. Court of Appeals this Court said:


The only function of the Civil Service Commission in cases of this nature, according
to Luego, is to review the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil
Service Law, and when it finds the appointee to be qualified and all other legal
requirements have been otherwise satisfied, it has no choice but to attest to the
appointment. Luego finally points out that the recognition by the Commission that
both the appointee and the protestant are qualified for the position in controversy
renders it functus officio in the case and prevents it from acting further thereon except
to affirm the validity of the former's appointment; it has no authority to revoke the
appointment simply because it considers another employee to be better qualified for
that would constitute an encroachment on the discretion vested in the appointing
authority.
xxx xxx xxx
The determination of who among several candidates for a vacant position has the
best qualifications is vested in the sound discretion of the Department Head or

appointing authority and not in the Civil Service Commission. Every particular job in
an office calls for both formal and informal qualifications. Formal qualifications such
as age, number of academic units in a certain course, seminars attended, etc., may
be valuable but so are such intangibles as resourcefulness, team spirit, courtesy,
initiative, loyalty, ambition, prospects for the future, and best interests, of the service.
Given the demands of a certain job, who can do it best should be left to the Head of
the Office concerned provided the legal requirements for the office are satisfied. The
Civil Service Commission cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Head of Office
in this regard.
It is therefore incomprehensible to the Court why, despite these definitive pronouncements, the Civil
Service Commission has seen fit to ignore, if not defy, the clear mandate of the Court.
We declare once again, and let us hope for the last time, that the Civil Service Commission has no
power of appointment except over its own personnel. Neither does it have the authority to review the
appointments made by other offices except only to ascertain if the appointee possesses the required
qualifications. The determination of who among aspirants with the minimum statutory qualifications
should be preferred belongs to the appointing authority and not the Civil Service Commission. It
cannot disallow an appointment because it believes another person is better qualified and much less
can it direct the appointment of its own choice.
Appointment is a highly discretionary act that even this Court cannot compel. While the act of
appointment may in proper cases be the subject of mandamus, the selection itself of the appointee
taking into account the totality of his qualifications, including those abstract qualities that define his
personalityis the prerogative of the appointing authority. This is a matter addressed only to the
discretion of the appointing authority. It is a political question that the Civil Service Commission has
no power to review under the Constitution and the applicable laws.
Commenting on the limits of the powers of the public respondent, Luego declared:
It is understandable if one is likely to be misled by the language of Section 9(h) of
Article V of the Civil Service Decree because it says the Commission has the power
to "approve" and "disapprove" appointments. Thus, it is provided therein that the
Commission shall have inter alia the power to:
9(h) Approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to
positions in the civil service, except those presidential appointees,
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, police forces,
firemen, and jailguards, and disapprove those where the appointees
do not possess appropriate eligibility or required qualifications.
(Emphasis supplied)
However, a full reading of the provision, especially of the underscored parts, will
make it clear that all the Commission is actually allowed to do is check whether or not
the appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required
qualifications. If he does, his appointment is approved; if not, it is disapproved. No
other criterion is permitted by law to be employed by the Commission when it acts
onor as the Decree says, "approves" or "disapproves'an appointment made by
the proper authorities.
The Court believes it has stated the foregoing doctrine clearly enough, and often enough, for the Civil
Service Commission not to understand them. The bench does; the bar does; and we see no reason
why the Civil Service Commission does not. If it will not, then that is an entirely different matter and
shall be treated accordingly.
We note with stern disapproval that the Civil Service Commission has once again directed the
appointment of its own choice in the case at bar. We must therefore make the following injunctions
which the Commission must note well and follow strictly.

Whatever the reasons for its conduct, the Civil Service Commission is ORDERED to desist from
disregarding the doctrine announced in Luego v. Civil Service Commission and the subsequent
decisions reiterating such ruling. Up to this point, the Court has leniently regarded the attitude of the
public respondent on this matter as imputable to a lack of comprehension and not to intentional
intransigence. But we are no longer disposed to indulge that fiction. Henceforth, departure from the
mandate of Luego by the Civil Service Commission after the date of the promulgation of this decision
shall be considered contempt of this Court and shall be dealt with severely, in view especially of the
status of the contemner.
While we appreciate the fact that the Commission is a constitutional body, we must stress, as a
necessary reminder, that every department and office in the Republic must know its place in the
scheme of the Constitution. The Civil Service Commission should recognize that its acts are subject
to reversal by this Court, which expects full compliance with its decisions even if the Commission may
not agree with them.
The Commission on Civil Service has been duly warned. Henceforth, it disobeys at its peril.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the respondent Civil Service
Commission dated February 14, 1990, May 25, 1990, August 17, 1990, and October 19, 1990, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order dated December 13, 1990, is made
PERMANENT. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 143 SCRA 327.
2 G.R. No. 90799, October 18, 1990.

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