In Re: Argosino, 270 SCRA 26

18JUL
FACTS:
Al Caparros Argosino had passed the bar examinations but was denied of taking the
Lawyers Oath and to sign the Rolls of Attorneys due to his conviction of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide from a hazing incident. Later in his sentence, he
was granted probation by the court. He filed a petition to the Supreme Court praying
that he be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath and sign the Rolls of Attorneys. As a
proof of the required good moral character he now possess, he presented no less
than fifteen (15) certifications among others from: two (2) senators, five (5) trial court
judges, and six (6) members of religious order. In addition, he, together with the
others who were convicted, organized a scholarship foundation in honor of their
hazing victim.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mr. Argosino should be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath, sign the
Rolls of Attorneys, and practice law.
HELD:
YES. Petition granted.
RATIO:
Given the fact that Mr. Argosino had exhibited competent proof that he possessed the
required good moral character as required before taking the Lawyers Oath and to
sign the Rolls of Attorneys, the Supreme Court considered the premises that he is not
inherently in bad moral fiber. In giving the benefit of the doubt, Mr. Argosino was
finally reminded that the Lawyers Oath is not merely a ceremony or formality before
the practice of law, and that the community assistance he had started is expected to
continue in serving the more unfortunate members of the society
Spouses FRANKLIN and LOURDES OLBES, complainants, vs. Atty. VICTOR V.
DECIEMBRE,respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
Constituting a serious transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility was
the malevolent act of respondent, who filled up the blank checks entrusted to him as
security for a loan by writing on those checks amounts that had not been agreed upon
at all, despite his full knowledge that the loan they were meant to secure had already
been paid.
The Case
Before us is a verified Petition 1 for the disbarment of Atty. Victor V. Deciembre, filed
by Spouses Franklin and LourdesOlbes with the Office of the Bar Confidant of this
Court. Petitioners charged respondent with willful and deliberate acts of dishonesty,
falsification and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. After he had filed his
Comment 2 on the Petition, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Commissioner Caesar R.
Dulay, held several hearings. During those hearings, the last of which was held on
May 12, 2003, 3 the parties were able to present their respective witnesses and
documentary evidence. After the filing of the parties' respective formal offers of
evidence, as well as petitioners' Memorandum, 4 the case was considered submitted
for resolution. Subsequently, the commissioner rendered his Report and
Recommendation dated January 30, 2004, which was later adopted and approved by

the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XV-2003-177 dated July 30, 2004.
aCTHEA
The Facts
In their Petition, Spouses Olbes allege that they were government employees working
at the Central Post Office, Manila; and that Franklin was a letter carrier receiving a
monthly salary of P6,700, and Lourdes, a mail sorter, P6,000. 5
Through respondent, Lourdes renewed on July 1, 1999 her application for a loan from
Rodela Loans, Inc., in the amount of P10,000. As security for the loan, she issued
and delivered to respondent five Philippine National Bank (PNB) blank checks (Nos.
0046241-45), which served as collateral for the approved loan as well as any other
loans that might be obtained in the future. 6
On August 31, 1999, Lourdes paid respondent the amount of P14,874.37
corresponding to the loan plus surcharges, penalties and interests, for which the latter
issued a receipt, 7 herein quoted as follows:
"August 31, 1999
Received the amount of P14,874.37 as payment of the loan of P10,000.00 taken
earlier by Lourdes Olbes.
(Sgd.) Atty. Victor V. Deciembre
8-31-99
P10,000.00
PNB Check No. 46241-8/15/99" 8
Notwithstanding the full payment of the loan, respondent filled up four (of the five)
blank PNB Checks (Nos. 0046241, 0046242, 0046243 and 0046244) for the amount
of P50,000 each, with different dates of maturity August 15, 1999, August 20,
1999, October 15, 1999 and November 15, 1999, respectively. 9
On October 19, 1999, respondent filed before the Provincial Prosecution Office of
Rizal an Affidavit-Complaint against petitioners for estafa and violation of Batas
Pambansa (BP) 22. He alleged therein that on July 15, 1999, around one-thirty in the
afternoon at Cainta, Rizal, they personally approached him and requested that he
immediately exchange with cash their postdated PNB Check Nos. 0046241 and
0046242 totaling P100,000. 10
Several months after, or on January 20, 2000, respondent filed against petitioners
another Affidavit-Complaint for estafa and violation of BP 22. He stated, among
others, that on the same day, July 15, 1999, around two o'clock in the afternoon at
Quezon City, they again approached him and requested that he exchange with cash
PNB Check Nos. 0046243 and 0046244 totaling P100,000. 11
Petitioners insisted that on the afternoon of July 15, 1999, they never went either to
Cainta, Rizal, or to Quezon City to transact business with respondent. Allegedly, they
were in their office at the time, as shown by their Daily Time Records; so it would
have been physically impossible for them to transact business in Cainta, Rizal, and,
after an interval of only thirty minutes, in Quezon City, especially considering the
heavy traffic conditions in those places. 12
Petitioners averred that many of their office mates among them, Juanita Manaois,
Honorata Acosta and Eugenia Mendoza had suffered the same fate in their
dealings with respondent. 13
In his Comment, 14 respondent denied petitioners' claims, which he called baseless
and devoid of any truth and merit. Allegedly, petitioners were the ones who had
deceived him by not honoring their commitment regarding their July 15, 1999
transactions. Those transactions, totaling P200,000, had allegedly been covered by
their four PNB checks that were, however, subsequently dishonored due to
"ACCOUNT CLOSED." Thus, he filed criminal cases against them. He claimed that
the checks had already been fully filled up when petitioners signed them in his

presence. He further claimed that he had given them the amounts of money indicated
in the checks, because his previous satisfactory transactions with them convinced
him that they had the capacity to pay. SICDAa
Moreover, respondent said that the loans were his private and personal transactions,
which were not in any way connected with his profession as a lawyer. The criminal
cases against petitioners were allegedly private actions intended to vindicate his
rights against their deception and violation of their obligations. He maintained that his
right to litigate should not be curtailed by this administrative action.
Report of the Investigating Commissioner
In his Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Dulay recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years for violating Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The commissioner said that respondent's version of the facts was not credible.
Commissioner Dulay rendered the following analysis and evaluation of the evidence
presented:
"In his affidavit-complaint . . . executed to support his complaint filed before the
Provincial Prosecution Office of Rizal respondent stated that:
2.That last July 15, 1999, in the jurisdiction of Cainta, Rizal, both LOURDES E.
OLBES and FRANKLIN A. OLBES . . ., personally met and requested me to
immediately exchange with cash, right there and then, their postdated checks totaling
P100,000.00 then, to be immediately used by them in their business venture.
"Again in his affidavit-complaint executed to support his complaint filed with the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City respondent stated that:
2.That last July 15, 1999, at around 2PM, in the jurisdiction of Quezon City, M.M.,
both LOURDES E. OLBES and FRANKLIN A. OLBES . . ., personally met and
requested me to immediately exchange with cash, right there and then, their
postdated checks totaling P100,000.00 then, to be immediately used by them in their
business venture.
"The above statements executed by respondent under oath are in direct contrast to
his testimony before this Commission on cross-examination during the May 12, 2003
hearing, thus:
ATTY PUNZALAN: (continuing)
Q.Based on these four (4) checks which you claimed the complainant issued to you,
you filed two separate criminal cases against them, one, in Pasig City and the other in
Quezon City, is that correct?
A.Yes, Your Honor, because the checks were deposited at different banks.
Q.These four checks were accordingly issued to you by the complainants on July 15,
1999, is that correct?caCEDA
A.I will consult my records, You Honor, because it's quite a long time. Yes, Your
Honor, the first two checks is in the morning and the next two checks is in the
afternoon (sic).
COMM. DULAY:
Which are the first two checks?
ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
The first two checks covering check Nos. 46241 and 46242 in the morning. And
Check No. 46243 and 46244 in the afternoon, Your Honor.
ATTY. PUNZALAN:
Q.Could you recall what particular time in the morning that these two checks with
number 0046241 and 0046242 . . . have been issued to you?
A.I could not remember exactly but in the middle part of the morning around 9:30 to
10:00.
Q.This was issued to you in what particular place?

A.Here in my office at Garnet Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City.

Q.Is that your house?
A.No, it's not my house.
Q.What is that, is that your law office?
A.That is my retainer client.
Q.What is the name of that retainer client of yours?
ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
Your Honor, may I object because what is the materiality of the question?
ATTY. PUNZALAN:
That is very material. I am trying to test your credibility because according to you
these checks have been issued in Pasig in the place of your client on a retainer.
That's why I am asking your client. . .
COMM. DULAY:
The name of the client is not material I think. It is enough that he said it was issued
here in Pasig. What building?
ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
AIC Corporate Center, Your Honor.
COMM. DULAY:
What is the materiality of knowing the name of his client's office? aSIDCT
ATTY. PUNZALAN:
Because, Your Honor, the materiality is to find out whether he is telling the truth. The
place, Your Honor, according to the respondent is his client. Now I am asking who is
that client?
COMM. DULAY:
Your answer.
ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
A.It is AIC Realty Corporation at AIC Building.
Q.And the same date likewise, the complainants in the afternoon issued PNB Check
Nos. 0046243 and 0046244, is that correct?
A.Yes.
Q.So would you want to tell this Honorable office that there were four checks issued
in the place of your client in Pasig City, two in the morning and two in the afternoon?
A.That is correct, sir.
"Respondent was clearly not being truthful in his narration of the transaction with the
complainants. As between his version as to when the four checks were given, we find
the story of complainant[s] more credible. Respondent has blatantly distorted the
truth, insofar as the place where the transaction involving the four checks took place.
Such distortion on a very material fact would seriously cast doubt on his version of the
transaction with complainants.
"Furthermore respondent's statements as to the time when the transactions took
place are also obviously and glaringly inconsistent and contradicts the written
statements made before the public prosecutors. Thus further adding to the lack of
credibility of respondent's version of the transaction.
"Complainants' version that they issued blank checks to respondent as security for
the payment of a loan of P10,000.00 plus interest, and that respondent filled up the
checks in amounts not agreed upon appears to be more credible. Complainants
herein are mere employees of the Central Post Office in Manila who had a previous
loan of P10,000.00 from respondent and which has since been paid . . . Respondent
does not deny the said transaction. This appears to be the only previous transaction
between the parties. In fact, complainants were even late in paying the loan when it
fell due such that they had to pay interest. That respondent would trust them once

more by giving them another P200,000.00 allegedly to be used for a business and
immediately release the amounts under the circumstances described by respondent
does not appear credible given the background of the previous transaction and
personal circumstances of complainants. That respondent who is a lawyer would not
even bother to ask from complainants a receipt for the money he has given, nor
bother to verify and ask them what businesses they would use the money for
contributes further to the lack of credibility of respondent's version. These
circumstances really cast doubt as to the version of respondent with regard to the
transaction. The resolution of the public prosecutors notwithstanding we believe
respondent is clearly lacking in honesty in dealing with the complainants.
Complainant FranklinOlbes had to be jailed as a result of respondent's filing of the
criminal cases. Parenthetically, we note that respondent has also filed similar cases
against the co-employees of complainants in the Central Post Office and respondent
is facing similar complaints in the IBP for his actions." 15
The Court's Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of Commissioner Dulay, as approved and
adopted by the IBP Board of Governors. However, the penalty should be more severe
than what the IBP recommended. HEcSDa
Respondent's Administrative Liability
Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions. 16
It is bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law, but also known to
possess good moral character. 17 "A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society
whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and
whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which he
[or she] has sworn to be a fearless crusader." 18
By taking the lawyer's oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of
law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice.
19 Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a
manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the public's faith in the legal profession.
20
The Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates the following:
"Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes.
xxx xxx xxx
"Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
"Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession."
A high standard of excellence and ethics is expected and required of members of the
bar. 21 Such conduct of nobility and uprightness should remain with them, whether in
their public or in their private lives. As officers of the courts and keepers of the public's
faith, they are burdened with the highest degree of social responsibility and are thus
mandated to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and honor. 22
The oath that lawyers swear to likewise impresses upon them the duty of exhibiting
the highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor in their relationships with others.
The oath is a sacred trust that must be upheld and kept inviolable at all times. Thus,
lawyers may be disciplined for any conduct, whether in their professional or in their
private capacity, if such conduct renders them unfit to continue to be officers of the
court. 23

In the present case, the IBP commissioner gave credence to the story of petitioners,
who said that they had given five blank personal checks to respondent at the Central
Post Office in Manila as security for the P10,000 loan they had contracted. Found
untrue and unbelievable was respondent's assertion that they had filled up the checks
and exchanged these with his cash at Quezon City and Cainta, Rizal. After a careful
review of the records, we find no reason to deviate from these findings. DACTSH
Under the circumstances, there is no need to stretch one's imagination to arrive at an
inevitable conclusion. Respondent does not deny the P10,000 loan obtained from him
by petitioners. According to Franklin Olbes' testimony on cross-examination, they
asked respondent for the blank checks after the loan had been paid. On the pretext
that he was not able to bring the checks with him, 24 he was not able to return them.
He thus committed abominable dishonesty by abusing the confidence reposed in him
by petitioners. It was their high regard for him as a member of the bar that made them
trust him with their blank checks. 25
It is also glaringly clear that the Code of Professional Responsibility was seriously
transgressed by his malevolent act of filling up the blank checks by indicating
amounts that had not been agreed upon at all and despite respondent's full
knowledge that the loan supposed to be secured by the checks had already been
paid. His was a brazen act of falsification of a commercial document, resorted to for
his material gain.
And he did not stop there. Because the checks were dishonored upon presentment,
respondent had the temerity to initiate unfounded criminal suits against petitioners,
thereby exhibiting his vile intent to have them punished and deprived of liberty for
frustrating the criminal duplicity he had wanted to foist on them. As a matter of fact,
one of the petitioners (Franklin) was detained for three months 26 because of the
Complaints. Respondent is clearly guilty of serious dishonesty and professional
misconduct. He committed an act indicative of moral depravity not expected from, and
highly unbecoming, a member of the bar.
Good moral character is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the
practice of law. It is equally essential to observe this norm meticulously during the
continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. 27Good moral character
includes at least common honesty. 28 No moral qualification for bar membership is
more important than truthfulness and candor. 29 The rigorous ethics of the profession
places a premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior. 30 Lawyers must
be ministers of truth. Hence, they must not mislead the court or allow it to be misled
by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in good faith. 31
Deception and other fraudulent acts are not merely unacceptable practices that are
disgraceful and dishonorable; 32they reveal a basic moral flaw. The standards of the
legal profession are not satisfied by conduct that merely enables one to escape the
penalties of criminal laws. 33
Considering the depravity of the offense committed by respondent, we find the
penalty recommended by the IBP of suspension for two years from the practice of law
to be too mild. His propensity for employing deceit and misrepresentation is
reprehensible. His misuse of the filled-up checks that led to the detention of one
petitioner is loathsome.
In Eustaquio v. Rimorin, 34 the forging of a special power of attorney (SPA) by the
respondent to make it appear that he was authorized to sell another's property, as
well as his fraudulent and malicious inducement of Alicia Rubis to sign a
Memorandum of Agreement to give a semblance of legality to the SPA, were
sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law for five years. Here, the conduct
of herein respondent is even worse. He used falsified checks as bases for maliciously
indicting petitioners and thereby caused the detention of one of them. DHCcST

WHEREFORE, Atty. Victor V. Deciembre is found guilty of gross misconduct and

violation of Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
hereby indefinitely SUSPENDED from the practice of law effective immediately. Let
copies of this Decision be furnished all courts as well as the Office of the Bar
Confidant, which is directed to append a copy to respondent's personal record. Let
another copy be furnished the National Office of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED
DE GUZMAN VS. DE DIOS
350 SCRA 320 [2001]

Contrary to the misrepresentations of Alfonso, his sister Florencia was still alive at the
time he executed the affidavit of adjudication and the deed of sale, as were
descendants of the other children of the spouses Villanueva. Complainants claimed
that respondent was aware of this fact, as respondent had been their neighbor, from
the time of their birth, and respondent constantly mingled with their family.
Respondent said that the properties of the late spouses have been divided equally
among their compulsory heirs, but said old couple left for themselves one titled lot to
answer for their needs, which is subject now of the complaint. Alfonso and his wife
were tasked to take care of the old couple, as they were the ones living in the same
compound with their late parents. This fact was and is known by the other compulsory
heirs.

FACTS:
Diana De Guzman filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. De Dios for representing
conflicting interests. Complainant averred that she engaged the services of
respondent in 1995 as counsel in order to form a hotel and restaurant corporation.
With the assistance of respondent, said corporation was registered with the SEC.
Respondent also represented complainant in one case involving a property of the
corporation. Respondent however averred that since the action involved a property of
the corporation, she represented complainant to protect the interests of the
corporation, she being its legal counsel. Complainant also averred that while
respondent rose to become president of the corporation, she lost all her investments
when her delinquent shares were sold by the corporation in a public auction upon the
advise of respondent. The IBP dismissed the complaint on the ground that there was
no attorney client relationship.
ISSUE:
Whether there was attorney client relationship which may justify holding respondent
guilty of representing conflicting interests.
HELD:
Yes. It was complainant who retained respondent to form a corporation. She
appeared as counsel in behalf of the complainant. There was also evidence of
collusion between the board of directors and respondent. Indeed, the board of
directors now included respondent as the president. It was also upon her advice that
the delinquent shares of complainant were sold at public auction. The present
situation shows a clear case of conflict of interests of the respondent.
Heirs of the late Spouses Lucas vs. Beradio [A.C. No. 6270, January 22, 2007]
Post under case digests, Legal Ethics at Wednesday, February 22, 2012 Posted by
Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: On 22 May 1984, Alfonso executed an Affidavit of Adjudication stating that as
"the only surviving son and sole heir" of the spouses Villanueva, he was adjudicating
to himself the parcel of land under OCT No. 2522. Alfonso then executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale on 5 July 1984, conveying the property to Adriano Villanueva.
Respondent appeared as notary public on both the affidavit of adjudication and the
deed of sale.

He said that he notarized said documents in good faith, to help, assist and to guide
people who come to me for legal assistance.
Issue: Whether good faith on the part of the respondent justified her act
Held: No. Respondent herself admitted that she knew of the falsity of Alfonso's
statement that he was the "sole heir" of the spouses Villanueva. Respondent
therefore notarized a document while fully aware that it contained a material
falsehood,
Where admittedly the notary public has personal knowledge of a false statement or
information contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix his or
her notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public
accordingly as the circumstances of the case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity
and sanctity of the notarization process may be undermined and public confidence on
notarial documents diminished. In this case, respondent's conduct amounted to a
breach of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers
to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes.
Respondent also violated Rule 1.01 of the Code which proscribes lawyers from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.
Advincula vs. Atty. Macabata
AC No. 7204
March 07, 2007
Facts:
The complainant, Cynthia Advincula filed a disbarment case Atty. Ernesto Macabata
on the grounds of Gross Immorality.
The complainant sought for legal advice from the respondent regarding her
collectibles from Queensway Travel and Tours which later failed to settle its accounts
with the complainant. Thus, the possibility of filing a case against Queensway Travel
and Tours was discussed.
After the meeting on February 10, 2005, the respondent gave the complainant a ride
home. As the complainant gets off the car, the respondent allegedly held her arm,
kissed her cheek and embraced her tightly.
Again, after another meeting on March 06 2005, the respondent offered a ride. On
the road, the complainant felt sleepy for no obvious reason. The respondent
suddenly stopped the car in the vicinity of San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City.
This time, the respondent forcefully held her face, kissed her lips and held her breast.

The complainant managed to escape and decided to hire another lawyer for her
case. They had exchange of messages thru sms where the respondent apologized.
The respondent admitted kissing the complainant on the lips however countered that
there was no harassment, intimidation or lewdness instead everything was
spontaneous.
Issues:
Whether or not the respondent committed acts are grossly immoral, or which
constitute serious moral depravity that would warrant disbarment or suspension from
the practice of law
Decision:
The acts of kissing or beso-beso on the cheeks are mere gestures of friendship and
camaraderie, form of greetings, casual and customary. The acts of the respondent,
though, in turning the head of the complainant towards him and kissing her on the
lips are distasteful. However, such act, even if considered offensive and undesirable,
cannot be considered grossly immoral.
The complainant miserably failed to establish the burden of proof required of her.
However, her efforts are lauded to stand up for her honor.
The complaint for disbarment against the respondent, Atty. Ernesto Macabata, for
alleged immorality is dismissed. However, he is reprimanded to be more prudent and
cautious in dealing with his clients
ATTY. ORLANDO V. DIZON v. ATTY. MARICHU C. LAMBINO
ATTY. MARICHU C. LAMBINO v. ATTY. ORLANDO V. DIZON (Consolidated)
A.C. No. 6968, 9 August 2006

with the schools substitute parental authority and within the bounds of the law as
the NBI agents had no warrants of arrest.
With respect to the complaint against Atty. Dizon, the Commissioner recommended to
reprimand him for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility in recklessly
trying to arrest the suspects without warrant.
The IBP Board of Governors, by Resolution of October 22, 2005, adopted and
approved the Commissioners Report. The IBP thereupon transferred to this Court its
Notice of Resolution, together with the records of the cases which this Court noted by
Resolution of February 1, 2006.
When the complaint of Atty. Dizon before the Ombudsman against Chancellor
Posadas, Vice Chancellor Torres-Yu and Atty. Lambino was elevated on Certiorari
and Prohibition, this Court addressing in the negative the two issues raised therein, to
wit:
(1) Whether the attempted arrest of the student suspects by the NBI could be validly
made without a warrant; and (2) Whether there was probable cause for prosecuting
petitioner for violation of P.D. No. 1829. x x x,
held that the objection of the said UP officials to the arrest of the students cannot
be construed as a violation of P.D. No. 1829, Sec. 1 (c) without rendering
itunconstitutional, they having a right to prevent the arrest [of the students] at the
time because their attempted arrest was illegal.
By persisting in his attempt to arrest the suspected students without a warrant, Atty.
Dizon violated Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides, among others that a lawyer shall notcounsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system

A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.
Dennis Venturina (Venturina), Francis Carlo Taparan (Taparan) and Raymundo
Narag (Narag) were taken as suspects in the killing of a UP student. They were taken
into the custody of Col. Eduardo Bentain, head of the UP Security Force. Atty.
Orlando Dizon, then Chief of the Special Operations Group, requested that Taparan
and Narag be taken into his custody. Atty. Marichu Lambino (Lambino), Legal
Counsel of UP Diliman, opposed Atty. Dizons move, he not being armed with a
warrant for their arrest. After what appeared to be a heated discussion between Atty.
Dizon and the UP officials, the students were allowed to go back to their dormitories.
Atty. Villamor committed to accompany them to the NBI the following morning.
Atty. Dizon filed a complaint against Atty. Lambino before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for violation of Canon 1. Rules 1.1 to 1.3 of the Code of Professional
Responsibilty. He also earlier filed a criminal complaint against Atty. Lambino before
the Ombudsman for violation of P.D. 1829 which makes it unlawful for anyone to
obstruct the apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenses.
Atty Lambino in turn charged Atty. Dizon before the IBP with violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Upon Atty. Lambinos motion, the administrative cases
were consolidated.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Atty. Lambino or Atty. Dizon acted within their official duties
HELD:
By Report and Recommendation submitted to the Boardof Governors of the IBP on
June 20, 2005, CBD Investigating Commissioner Siegfrid B. Mison recommended the
dismissal of the complaint against Atty. Lambino in light of a finding that she acted
within her official duties as she safeguarded the rights of the students in accordance

Case: PAGCOR vs. Atty. Dante A.

Carandang
Facts:
-Atty. Carandang, respondent, is the president of Bingo Royale, Incorporated
(Bingo Royale), a private corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines.
-On February 2, 1999, PAGCOR and Bingo Royale executed a Grant of Authority to
Operate Bingo Games. Article V of this document mandates Bingo Royale to remit
20% of its gross sales to PAGCOR. This 20% is divided into 15% to PAGCOR and
5% franchise tax to the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
-In the course of its operations, Bingo Royale incurred arrears amounting to
P6,064,833.14 as of November 15, 2001.
Instead of demanding the
payment therefor, PAGCOR allowed Bingo Royale and respondent Atty.
Carandang to pay the said amount in monthly installment of P300,000.00 from
July 2001 to June 2003.
-Bingo Royale then issued to PAGCOR twenty four (24) Bank of Commerce checks in
the sum of P7,200,000.00 signed by respondent.
-However, when the checks were deposited after the end of each month at the Land
Bank, U.N. Avenue Branch, Manila, they were all dishonored by reason of
Bingo Royales Closed Account.
-Despite PAGCORs demand letters dated November 12 and December 12, 2001,
and February 12, 2002, respondent failed to pay the amounts of the checks. Thus,
PAGCOR filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila criminal complaints for
violations of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22 against respondent.
-PAGCOR contends that in issuing those bouncing checks, respondent is liable for
serious misconduct, violation of the Attorneys Oath and violation of the Code of

Professional
Responsibility;
and
prays
that
his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
-In his Opposition to the complaint, issuing bouncing checks because they were
drawn by Bingo Royale. His act of doing so is not related to the office of a lawyer.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Atty. Carandang is liable for serious misconduct and
violated the Attorneys oath and code of professional responsibility.
Held:
Whether to issue or not checks in favor of a payee is a voluntary act. It is clearly a
choice
for
an
individual
(especially
one
learned
in
the
law),
whether in a personal capacity or officer of a corporation, to do so after
assessing and weighing the consequences and risks for doing so.
As President of BRI, he cannot be said to be unaware of the probability that BRI, the
company he runs, could not raise funds, totally or partially, to cover the checks as
they
fell
due.
The
desire
to
continue
the
operations
of his company does not excuse respondents act of violating the law
by
issuing
worthless
checks. Moreover, inability to pay is not a
ground, under the Civil Code, to suspend nor extinguish an obligation. Specifically,
respondent contends that because of business reverses or inability to generate
funds, BRI should be excused from making good the payment of the checks. If this
theory is sustained, debtors will merely state that they no longer have the capacity to
pay and, consequently, not obliged to pay on time, nor fully or partially,
their debt to creditors. Surely, undersigned cannot agree with this contention.
As correctly pointed out by complainant, violation of B.P. Blg. 22
is an offense that involves public interest. Atty. Dante A. Carandang is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six
(6) months

Clarita J. Samala vs. Atty. Luciano D. Valencia

A.C. No. 5439; January 22, 2007
Austria-Martinez, J.
Facts:
Clarita J. Samala (complainant) filed a complaint against Atty. Luciano D. Valencia
(respondent) for Disbarment on the following grounds:
a.
(a)
serving on two separate occasions as counsel for contending
parties;
b.
(b)
knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary
evidence;
c.
(c)
initiating numerous cases in exchange for non-payment of rental
fees; and
d.
(d)
having a reputation of being immoral by siring illegitimate children.
After respondent filed his Comment, the Court referred the case to the IBP for
investigation, report, and recommendation.

After a series of hearings, the parties filed their respective memoranda and the case
was deemed submitted for resolution.
The Commissioner found respondent guilty of violating Canons 15 and 21 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended the penalty of suspension for
six months.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation
of Commissioner Reyes but increased the penalty of suspension from six months to
one year.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent violated Canons 15 and 21 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Held:
This Court adopts the report of the IBP Board of Governors except as to the issue on
immorality and as to the recommended penalty.
(a) On serving as counsel for contending parties.
Respondent, while being the counsel for defendant Valdez, also acted as counsel for
the tenants Lagmay, Valencia, Bustamante and Bayuga by filing an Explanation and
Compliance before the RTC.
The Presiding Judge warned respondent to refrain from repeating the act of being
counsel of record of both parties in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a
lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for
a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. He may not
also undertake to discharge conflicting duties any more than he may represent
antagonistic interests. This stern rule is founded on the principles of public policy and
good taste. It springs from the relation of attorney and client which is one of trust and
confidence. Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence,
but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice.
One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new
relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and
loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the
performance of that duty.
(b) On knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence.
Complainant alleges that in Civil Case No. 00-7137 filed before MTC, Branch 75 for
ejectment, respondent submitted TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's ownership
despite the fact that a new TCT No. 275500 was already issued in the name of Alba
on February 2, 1995.
During the hearing before Commissioner Raval, respondent avers that when the
Answer was filed in the said case, that was the time that he came to know that the
title was already in the name of Alba; so that when the court dismissed the complaint,
he did not do anything anymore. Respondent further avers that Valdez did not tell
him the truth and things were revealed to him only when the case for rescission was
filed in 2002.
Respondent failed to comply with Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be mislead by any
artifice. It matters not that the trial court was not misled by respondent's submission of
TCT No. 273020 in the name of Valdez, as shown by its decision dated January 8,

2002 dismissing the complaint for ejectment. What is decisive in this case is
respondent's intent in trying to mislead the court by presenting TCT No. 273020
despite the fact that said title was already cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 275500,
was already issued in the name of Alba.
(c) On initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees.
Complainant alleged that respondent filed the following cases: (a) Civil Case No.
2000-657-MK at the RTC, Branch 272; (b) Civil Case No. 00-7137 at the MTC,
Branch 75; and (c) I.S. Nos. 00-4439 and 01-036162 both entitled "Valencia v.
Samala" for estafa and grave coercion, respectively, before the Marikina City
Prosecutor. Complainant claims that the two criminal cases were filed in retaliation for
the cases she filed against Lagmay docketed as I.S. No. 00-4306 for estafa and I.S.
No. 00-4318 against Alvin Valencia (son of respondent) for trespass to dwelling.
As culled from the records, Valdez entered into a retainer agreement with respondent.
As payment for his services, he was allowed to occupy the property for free and
utilize the same as his office pursuant to their retainer agreement.
The Court finds the charge to be without sufficient basis. The act of respondent of
filing the aforecited cases to protect the interest of his client, on one hand, and his
own interest, on the other, cannot be made the basis of an administrative charge
unless it can be clearly shown that the same was being done to abuse judicial
processes to commit injustice.
The filing of an administrative case against respondent for protecting the interest of
his client and his own right would be putting a burden on a practicing lawyer who is
obligated to defend and prosecute the right of his client.
(d) On having a reputation for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.
The Court finds respondent liable for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.
During the hearing, respondent admitted that he sired three children by Teresita
Lagmay who are all over 20 years of age, while his first wife was still alive. He also
admitted that he has eight children by his first wife, the youngest of whom is over 20
years of age, and after his wife died in 1997, he married Lagmay in 1998.
Respondent further admitted that Lagmay was staying in one of the apartments being
claimed by complainant. However, he does not consider his affair with Lagmay as a
relationship and does not consider the latter as his second family. He reasoned that
he was not staying with Lagmay because he has two houses, one in Muntinlupa and
another in Marikina.
Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It may be difficult to
specify the degree of moral delinquency that may qualify an act as immoral, yet, for
purposes of disciplining a lawyer, immoral conduct has been defined as that "conduct
which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of respectable members of the community.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Atty. Luciano D. Valencia GUILTY of
misconduct and violation of Canons 21, 10 and 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years,
effective immediately upon receipt of herein Resolution.
FIRST DIVISION
RE: REPORT ON THE
A.M. No. P-06-2177
FINANCIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED (Formerly A.M. No. 06-4-268-RTC)
ON THE BOOKS OF ACCOUNTS
OF ATTY. RAQUEL G. KHO,

CLERK OF COURT IV,

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
ORAS, EASTERN SAMAR

Present:

RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
In our resolution dated June 27, 2006, we found Atty. Raquel G. Kho, former clerk of
court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Oras, Eastern Samar, guilty of gross
misconduct for his failure to make a timely remittance of judiciary funds in his custody
as required by OCA Circular No. 8A-93.[1] We ordered him to pay a fine of P10,000
for his transgression. The matter did not end there, however. Because his
malfeasance prima facie contravened Canon 1, Rule 1.01[2] of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, we ordered him to show cause why he should not be
disciplined as a lawyer and as an officer of the court. Atty. Kho submitted his
explanation in compliance with our directive. We shall now resolve this pending
matter and bring to a close this regrettable chapter in his career as a government
lawyer.
In his explanation, Atty. Kho admitted that his failure to make a timely remittance of
the cash deposited with him was inexcusable. He maintained, however, that he kept
the money in the courts safety vault and never once used it for his own benefit.
Atty. Khos apparent good faith and his ready admission of the infraction, although
certainly mitigating, cannot negate the fact that his failure to remit P65,000 in judiciary
funds for over a year was contrary to the mandatory provisions of OCA Circular 8A93. That omission was a breach of his oath to obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities[3] and of his duties under Canon 1, Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS
OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL
PROCESSES.
RULE 1.01.
conduct.

A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful

It is no accident that these are the first edicts laid down in the Code of Professional
Responsibility for these are a lawyers foremost duties. Lawyers should always keep
in mind that, although upholding the Constitution and obeying the law is an obligation
imposed on every citizen, a lawyers responsibilities under Canon 1 mean more than
just staying out of trouble with the law. As servants of the law and officers of the court,
lawyers are required to be at the forefront of observing and maintaining the rule of
law. They are expected to make themselves exemplars worthy of emulation.[4] This,
in fact, is what a lawyers obligation to promote respect for law and legal processes
entails.
The least a lawyer can do in compliance with Canon 1 is to refrain from engaging in
unlawful conduct.[5] By definition, any act or omission contrary to law is unlawful.[6] It

does not necessarily imply the element of criminality although it is broad enough to
include it.[7] Thus, the presence of evil intent on the part of the lawyer is not essential
in order to bring his act or omission within the terms of Rule 1.01 which specifically
prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful conduct.
Atty. Khos conduct was not only far from exemplary, it was unlawful as well. For this,
he must be called to account. However, his candid and repentant admission of his
error, his lack of intent to gain and the fact that this is his first offense should temper
his culpability considerably. Under the circumstances, a fine of P5,000 should suffice.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Raquel G. Kho is hereby found GUILTY of unlawful conduct in
violation of the Attorneys Oath, Section 20(a), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is ordered to pay
a FINE of P5,000 within ten days from receipt of this resolution.
The Financial Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator, is hereby
DIRECTED to deduct from Atty. Khos accrued leave credits as a former clerk of court
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Oras, Eastern Samar the fines imposed in this
resolution and in the resolution dated June 27, 2006.
SO ORDERED.

Joselano Guevarra vs. Atty. Jose Emmanuel Eala

A.C. No. 7136
August 1, 2007
Facts: On March 4, 2002 a complaint of disbarment was filed before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M.
Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala for grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the
lawyers oath. In the Complaint, Guevarra first met the respondent in January 2000
when his then fiance Irene Moje introduced respondent to him as her friend who was
married to Marianne Tantoco with whom he had three children.
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, Complainant noticed that from
January to March 2001, Irene had been receiving from respondent Cellphone calls,
as well as messages some which read I love you, I miss you, or Meet you at
Megamall. He also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early
in the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When
he asked her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parents house in
Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and Respondent together on two
occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene
abandoned the conjugal house. On April 22, 2001 complainant went uninvited to
Irenes birthday celebration at which he saw her and the respondent celebrating with
her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the
venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and
hauled off all her personal belongings. Complainant later found a handwritten letter
dated October 7, 2007, the day of his wedding to Irene, Complainant soon saw
respondents car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B11 Street, New

Manila where as he was later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already
residing. He also learned still later that when his friends saw Irene on about January
18, 2002 together with respondent during a concert, she was pregnant.
Issue: Whether Concubinage or Adulterous relationship, be the reason for the
disbarment of Atty. Jose Emmanuel Eala.
Held: Lawyers oath stated that a lawyer should support the Constitution and obey the
laws, Meaning he shall not make use of deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct, grossly immoral conduct, or be convicted in any crime involving moral
turpitude. In the case at bar Atty. Eala was accused of Concubinage, under ART. 334
of the Revised Penal Code, Any husband who shall keep a mistress in a conjugal
dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a
woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be
punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium period. Section 2 of
ART. XV states that Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of
the family and shall be protected by the state. Respondents grossly immoral conduct
runs afoul of the constitution and the laws, that he as a lawyer has sworn to uphold.
Hence the court declared Atty. Jose Emmanul M. Eala DISBARRED for grossly
immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of canon 1, Rule 1.01
and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
MAELOTISEA S. GARRIDO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTYS. ANGEL E. GARRIDO and ROMANA P. VALENCIA, Respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint-affidavit1 and a supplemental affidavit2 for
disbarment against the respondents Atty. Angel E. Garrido (Atty. Garrido) and Atty.
Romana P.Valencia (Atty. Valencia) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Committee on Discipline charging them with gross immorality. The complaint-affidavit
states:
1. That I am the legal wife of Atty. Angel E. Garrido by virtue of our marriage on June
23, 1962 at San Marcelino Church, Ermita, Manila which was solemnized by Msgr.
Daniel Cortes x x x
2. That our marriage blossomed into having us blessed with six (6) children, namely,
Mat Elizabeth, Arnel Angelito, Madeleine Eloiza, Arnel Angelo, Arnel Victorino and
Madonna Angeline, all surnamed Garrido;
3. x x x x
4. That on May, 1991, during my light moments with our children, one of my
daughters, Madeleine confided to me that sometime on the later part of 1987, an
unknown caller talked with her claiming that the former is a child of my husband. I
ignored it and dismissed it as a mere joke. But when May Elizabeth, also one of my
daughters told me that sometime on August 1990, she saw my husband strolling at
the Robinsons Department Store at Ermita, Manila together with a woman and a
child who was later identified as Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia and Angeli Ramona
Valencia Garrido, respectively x x x
5. x x x x
6. That I did not stop from unearthing the truth until I was able to secure the
Certificate of Live Birth of the child, stating among others that the said child is their

daughter and that Atty. Angel Escobar Garrido and Atty. Romana Paguida Valencia
were married at Hongkong sometime on 1978.
7. That on June 1993, my husband left our conjugal home and joined Atty. Ramona
Paguida Valencia at their residence x x x
8. That since he left our conjugal home he failed and still failing to give us our needed
financial support to the prejudice of our children who stopped schooling because of
financial constraints.
xxxx
That I am also filing a disbarment proceedings against his mistress as alleged in the
same affidavit, Atty. Romana P. Valencia considering that out of their immoral acts I
suffered not only mental anguish but also besmirch reputation, wounded feelings and
sleepless nights; x x x
In his Counter-Affidavit,3 Atty. Garrido denied Maelotiseas charges and imputations.
By way of defense, he alleged that Maelotisea was not his legal wife, as he was
already married to Constancia David (Constancia) when he married Maelotisea. He
claimed he married Maelotisea after he and Constancia parted ways. He further
alleged that Maelotisea knew all his escapades and understood his "bad boy" image
before she married him in 1962. As he and Maelotisea grew apart over the years due
to financial problems, Atty. Garrido met Atty. Valencia. He became close to Atty.
Valencia to whom he confided his difficulties. Together, they resolved his personal
problems and his financial difficulties with his second family. Atty. Garrido denied that
he failed to give financial support to his children with Maelotisea, emphasizing that all
his six (6) children were educated in private schools; all graduated from college
except for Arnel Victorino, who finished a special secondary course.4 Atty. Garrido
alleged that Maelotisea had not been employed and had not practiced her profession
for the past ten (10) years.
Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were contracted before he became a
member of the bar on May 11, 1979, with the third marriage contracted after the
death of Constancia on December 26, 1977. Likewise, his children with Maelotisea
were born before he became a lawyer.
In her Counter-Affidavit,5 Atty. Valencia denied that she was the mistress of Atty.
Garrido. She explained that Maelotisea was not the legal wife of Atty. Garrido since
the marriage between them was void from the beginning due to the then existing
marriage of Atty. Garrido with Constancia. Atty. Valencia claimed that Maelotisea
knew of the romantic relationship between her and Atty. Garrido, as they (Maelotisea
and Atty. Valencia) met in 1978. Maelotisea kept silent about her relationship with
Atty. Garrido and had maintained this silence when she (Atty. Valencia) financially
helped Atty. Garrido build a house for his second family. Atty. Valencia alleged that
Maelotisea was not a proper party to this suit because of her silence; she kept silent
when things were favorable and beneficial to her. Atty. Valencia also alleged that
Maelotisea had no cause of action against her.
In the course of the hearings, the parties filed the following motions before the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline:
First, the respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of Proceedings6 in view of the
criminal complaint for concubinage Maelotisea filed against them, and the Petition for
Declaration of Nullity7 (of marriage) Atty. Garrido filed to nullify his marriage to
Maelotisea. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline denied this motion for lack of
merit.
Second, the respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss8 the complaints after the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City declared the marriage between Atty. Garrido and
Maelotisea "an absolute nullity." Since Maelotisea was never the legal wife of Atty.
Garrido, the respondents argued that she had no personality to file her complaints

against them. The respondents also alleged that they had not committed any immoral
act since they married when Atty. Garrido was already a widower, and the acts
complained of were committed before his admission to the bar. The IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline also denied this motion.9
Third, Maelotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaints she filed against
the respondents, arguing that she wanted to maintain friendly relations with Atty.
Garrido, who is the father of her six (6) children.10 The IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline likewise denied this motion.11
On April 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan (Investigating
Commissioner San Juan) submitted her Report and Recommendation for the
respondents disbarment.12 The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP Board of
Governors (IBP Board of Governors) approved and adopted this recommendation
with modification under Resolution No. XVI-2004-375 dated July 30, 2004. This
resolution in part states:
x x x finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering that Atty. Garrido exhibited conduct which
lacks the degree of morality required as members of the bar, Atty. Angel E. Garrido is
hereby DISBARRED for gross immorality. However, the case against Atty. Romana
P. Valencia is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit of the complaint.
Atty. Garrido moved to reconsider this resolution, but the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline denied his motion under Resolution No. XVII-2007-038 dated January 18,
2007.
Atty. Garrido now seeks relief with this Court through the present petition for review.
He submits that under the circumstances, he did not commit any gross immorality that
would warrant his disbarment. He also argues that the offenses charged have
prescribed under the IBP rules.
Additionally, Atty. Garrido pleads that he be allowed on humanitarian considerations
to retain his profession; he is already in the twilight of his life, and has kept his
promise to lead an upright and irreproachable life notwithstanding his situation.
In compliance with our Resolution dated August 25, 2009, Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal
(Atty. Risos-Vidal), Director of the Commission on Bar Discipline, filed her Comment
on the petition. She recommends a modification of the penalty from disbarment to
reprimand, advancing the view that disbarment is very harsh considering that the 77year old Atty. Garrido took responsibility for his acts and tried to mend his ways by
filing a petition for declaration of nullity of his bigamous marriage. Atty. Risos-Vidal
also notes that no other administrative case has ever been filed against Atty. Garrido.
THE COURTS RULING
After due consideration, we resolve to adopt the findings of the IBP Board of
Governors against Atty. Garrido, and to reject its recommendation with respect to
Atty. Valencia.
General Considerations
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of
pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the
filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant do not apply in the determination
of a lawyers qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar.13 We have so ruled
in the past and we see no reason to depart from this ruling.14 First, admission to the
practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public
interest because it involves service to the public.15 The admission qualifications are
also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law.
Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law,
like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may inquire into
through this Court. In this sense, the complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct

party whose interest in the outcome of the charge is wholly his or her own;16
effectively, his or her participation is that of a witness who brought the matter to the
attention of the Court.
As applied to the present case, the time that elapsed between the immoral acts
charged and the filing of the complaint is not material in considering the qualification
of Atty. Garrido when he applied for admission to the practice of law, and his
continuing qualification to be a member of the legal profession. From this perspective,
it is not important that the acts complained of were committed before Atty. Garrido
was admitted to the practice of law. As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo,17 the
possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing
requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership in the legal
profession. Admission to the bar does not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry,
upon proper complaint, into any question concerning the mental or moral fitness of
the respondent before he became a lawyer.18 Admission to the practice only creates
the rebuttable presumption that the applicant has all the qualifications to become a
lawyer; this may be refuted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary even
after admission to the Bar.19
Parenthetically, Article VIII Section 5(5) of the Constitution recognizes the disciplinary
authority of the Court over the members of the Bar to be merely incidental to the
Court's exclusive power to admit applicants to the practice of law. Reinforcing the
implementation of this constitutional authority is Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court which expressly states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for, among others, any
deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the oath that he is required to take
before admission to the practice of law.
In light of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of
disbarment proceedings as a public interest concern, Maelotiseas affidavit of
desistance cannot have the effect of discontinuing or abating the disbarment
proceedings. As we have stated, Maelotisea is more of a witness than a complainant
in these proceedings. We note further that she filed her affidavits of withdrawal only
after she had presented her evidence; her evidence are now available for the Courts
examination and consideration, and their merits are not affected by her desistance.
We cannot fail to note, too, that Mealotisea filed her affidavit of desistance, not to
disown or refute the evidence she had submitted, but solely becuase of compassion
(and, impliedly, out of concern for her personal financial interest in continuing friendly
relations with Atty. Garrido).
Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a
moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the
community.20 Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
communitys sense of decency.21We make these distinctions as the supreme penalty
of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral,
conduct.22
In several cases, we applied the above standard in considering lawyers who
contracted an unlawful second marriage or multiple marriages.
In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,23 the respondent lawyer entered into multiple marriages
and subsequently used legal remedies to sever them. We ruled that the respondents
pattern of misconduct undermined the institutions of marriage and family institutions
that this society looks up to for the rearing of our children, for the development of
values essential to the survival and well-being of our communities, and for the

strengthening of our nation as a whole. In this light, no fate other than disbarment
awaited the wayward respondent.
In Villasanta v. Peralta,24 the respondent lawyer married the complainant while his
marriage with his first wife was subsisting. We held that the respondents act of
contracting the second marriage was contrary to honesty, justice, decency and
morality. The lack of good moral character required by the Rules of Court disqualified
the respondent from admission to the Bar.
Similar to Villasanta was the case of Conjuangco, Jr. v. Palma,25 where the
respondent secretly contracted a second marriage with the daughter of his client in
Hongkong. We found that the respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of
morality required of members of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of
marriage a sacred institution that demands respect and dignity. We also declared
his act of contracting a second marriage contrary to honesty, justice, decency and
morality.
In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of
Atty. Garrido established a pattern of gross immoral conduct that warrants his
disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to
the highest degree.
First, Atty. Garrido admitted that he left Constancia to pursue his law studies;
thereafter and during the marriage, he had romantic relationships with other women.
He had the gall to represent to this Court that the study of law was his reason for
leaving his wife; marriage and the study of law are not mutually exclusive.
Second, he misrepresented himself to Maelotisea as a bachelor, when in truth he was
already married to Constancia.26 This was a misrepresentation given as an excuse to
lure a woman into a prohibited relationship.
Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with Maelotisea notwithstanding
the subsistence of his first marriage. This was an open admission, not only of an
illegal liaison, but of the commission of a crime.
Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair with Atty. Valencia while his
two marriages were in place and without taking into consideration the moral and
emotional implications of his actions on the two women he took as wives and on his
six (6) children by his second marriage.
Fifth, instead of making legal amends to validate his marriage with Maelotisea upon
the death of Constancia, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia who bore him a
daughter.
Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal knowledge and convinced Atty. Valencia (who
was not then a lawyer) that he was free to marry, considering that his marriage with
Maelotisea was not "valid."
Seventh, as the evidence on record implies, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia in
Hongkong in an apparent attempt to accord legitimacy to a union entered into while
another marriage was in place.
Eighth, after admission to the practice of law, Atty. Garrido simultaneously cohabited
and had sexual relations with two (2) women who at one point were both his wedded
wives. He also led a double life with two (2) families for a period of more than ten (10)
years.
Lastly, Atty. Garrido petitioned for the nullity of his marriage to Maelotisea. Contrary to
the position advanced by Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, this was not an act of facing up to
his responsibility or an act of mending his ways. This was an attempt, using his legal
knowledge, to escape liability for his past actions by having his second marriage
declared void after the present complaint was filed against him.

By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the legal profession,
specifically, violations of the bar admission rules, of his lawyers oath, and of the
ethical rules of the profession.
He did not possess the good moral character required of a lawyer at the time of his
admission to the Bar.27 As a lawyer, he violated his lawyers oath,28 Section 20(a) of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,29 and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility,30 all of which commonly require him to obey the laws of the land. In
marrying Maelotisea, he committed the crime of bigamy, as he entered this second
marriage while his first marriage with Constancia was subsisting. He openly admitted
his bigamy when he filed his petition to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea.
He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which commands that he "shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct"; Canon 7 of the same Code, which demands
that "[a] lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession"; Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that,
"[a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession."
As a lawyer, his community looked up to Atty. Garrido with the expectation and that
he would set a good example in promoting obedience to the Constitution and the
laws. When he violated the law and distorted it to cater to his own personal needs
and selfish motives, he discredited the legal profession and created the public
impression that laws are mere tools of convenience that can be used, bended and
abused to satisfy personal whims and desires. In this case, he also used the law to
free him from unwanted relationships.
The Court has often reminded the members of the bar to live up to the standards and
norms expected of the legal profession by upholding the ideals and principles
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.31 Lawyers are bound to
maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, including
honesty, integrity and fair dealing.32 Lawyers are at all times subject to the watchful
public eye and community approbation.33 Needless to state, those whose conduct
both public and private fail this scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after appropriate
proceedings, accordingly penalized.34
Atty. Valencia
We agree with the findings of Investigating Commissioner San Juan that Atty.
Valencia should be administratively liable under the circumstances for gross
immorality:
x x x The contention of respondent that they were not yet lawyers in March 27, 1978
when they got married shall not afford them exemption from sanctions, for good moral
character is required as a condition precedent to admission to the Bar. Likewise there
is no distinction whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyers professional
capacity or in his private life. Again, the claim that his marriage to complainant was
void ab initio shall not relieve respondents from responsibility x x x Although the
second marriage of the respondent was subsequently declared null and void the fact
remains that respondents exhibited conduct which lacks that degree of morality
required of them as members of the Bar.35
Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective
reality.36 To have good moral character, a person must have the personal
characteristics of being good. It is not enough that he or she has a good reputation,
i.e., the opinion generally entertained about a person or the estimate in which he or
she is held by the public in the place where she is known.37 The requirement of good
moral character has four general purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to

protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to
protect errant lawyers from themselves.38 Each purpose is as important as the other.
Under the circumstances, we cannot overlook that prior to becoming a lawyer, Atty.
Valencia already knew that Atty. Garrido was a married man (either to Constancia or
to Maelotisea), and that he already had a family. As Atty. Garridos admitted
confidante, she was under the moral duty to give him proper advice; instead, she
entered into a romantic relationship with him for about six (6) years during the
subsistence of his two marriages. In 1978, she married Atty. Garrido with the
knowledge that he had an outstanding second marriage. These circumstances, to our
mind, support the conclusion that she lacked good moral character; even without
being a lawyer, a person possessed of high moral values, whose confidential advice
was sought by another with respect to the latters family problems, would not
aggravate the situation by entering into a romantic liaison with the person seeking
advice, thereby effectively alienating the other persons feelings and affection from his
wife and family.
While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty. Garridos marriage with Maelotisea was null
and void, the fact remains that he took a man away from a woman who bore him six
(6) children. Ordinary decency would have required her to ward off Atty. Garridos
advances, as he was a married man, in fact a twice-married man with both marriages
subsisting at that time; she should have said no to Atty. Garrido from the very start.
Instead, she continued her liaison with Atty. Garrido, driving him, upon the death of
Constancia, away from legitimizing his relationship with Maelotisea and their children.
Worse than this, because of Atty. Valencias presence and willingness, Atty. Garrido
even left his second family and six children for a third marriage with her. This scenario
smacks of immorality even if viewed outside of the prism of law.1avvphi1
We are not unmindful of Atty. Valencias expressed belief that Atty. Garridos second
marriage to Maelotisea was invalid; hence, she felt free to marry Atty. Garrido. While
this may be correct in the strict legal sense and was later on confirmed by the
declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garridos marriage to Maelotisea, we do not believe
at all in the honesty of this expressed belief.
The records show that Atty. Valencia consented to be married in Hongkong, not
within the country. Given that this marriage transpired before the declaration of the
nullity of Atty. Garridos second marriage, we can only call this Hongkong marriage a
clandestine marriage, contrary to the Filipino tradition of celebrating a marriage
together with family. Despite Atty. Valencias claim that she agreed to marry Atty.
Garrido only after he showed her proof of his capacity to enter into a subsequent valid
marriage, the celebration of their marriage in Hongkong39 leads us to the opposite
conclusion; they wanted to marry in Hongkong for the added security of avoiding any
charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage outside Philippine
jurisdiction. In this regard, we cannot help but note that Atty. Valencia afterwards
opted to retain and use her surname instead of using the surname of her "husband."
Atty. Valencia, too, did not appear to mind that her husband did not live and cohabit
with her under one roof, but with his second wife and the family of this marriage.
Apparently, Atty. Valencia did not mind at all "sharing" her husband with another
woman. This, to us, is a clear demonstration of Atty. Valencias perverse sense of
moral values.
Measured against the definition of gross immorality, we find Atty. Valencias actions
grossly immoral. Her actions were so corrupt as to approximate a criminal act, for she
married a man who, in all appearances, was married to another and with whom he
has a family. Her actions were also unprincipled and reprehensible to a high degree;
as the confidante of Atty. Garrido, she preyed on his vulnerability and engaged in a
romantic relationship with him during the subsistence of his two previous marriages.

As already mentioned, Atty. Valencias conduct could not but be scandalous and
revolting to the point of shocking the communitys sense of decency; while she
professed to be the lawfully wedded wife, she helped the second family build a house
prior to her marriage to Atty. Garrido, and did not object to sharing her husband with
the woman of his second marriage.
We find that Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, as her behavior demeaned the dignity of and discredited
the legal profession. She simply failed in her duty as a lawyer to adhere unwaveringly
to the highest standards of morality.40 In Barrientos v. Daarol,41 we held that
lawyers, as officers of the court, must not only be of good moral character but must
also be seen to be of good moral character and must lead lives in accordance with
the highest moral standards of the community. Atty. Valencia failed to live up to these
standards before she was admitted to the bar and after she became a member of the
legal profession.
Conclusion
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege
bestowed by law through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be
withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the lawyers lack of the essential
qualifications required of lawyers. We resolve to withdraw this privilege from Atty.
Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia for this reason.
In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon the respondents, we are aware that the
power to disbar is one to be exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of
misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as a legal
professional and as an officer of the Court.42
We are convinced from the totality of the evidence on hand that the present case is
one of them. The records show the parties pattern of grave and immoral misconduct
that demonstrates their lack of mental and emotional fitness and moral character to
qualify them for the responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as professionals
and as officers of the court.
While we are keenly aware of Atty. Garridos plea for compassion and his act of
supporting his children with Maelotisea after their separation, we cannot grant his
plea. The extent of his demonstrated violations of his oath, the Rules of Court and of
the Code of Professional Responsibility overrides what under other circumstances are
commendable traits of character.
In like manner, Atty. Valencias behavior over a long period of time unequivocally
demonstrates a basic and serious flaw in her character, which we cannot simply
brush aside without undermining the dignity of the legal profession and without
placing the integrity of the administration of justice into question. She was not an onlooker victimized by the circumstances, but a willing and knowing full participant in a
love triangle whose incidents crossed into the illicit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:
(1) DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of law for gross immorality,
violation of the Lawyers Oath; and violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility; and
(2) DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law for gross immorality,
violation of Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Angel E.
Garrido and Atty. Romana P. Valencia in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and another
copy furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the names of Angel E. Garrido and
Rowena P. Valencia from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED

ATTY.
FLORITA
S.
LINCO,Complainant
LACEBAL,Respondent.
A.C. No. 7241
[Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1506]

v.

ATTY.

JIMMY

D.

PERALTA, J.:
The instant case stemmed from an Administrative Complaint1 dated June 6, 2005
filed by Atty. Florita S. Linco (complainant) before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Jimmy D. Lacebal for disciplinary action for his failure
to perform his duty as a notary public, which resulted in the violation of their rights
over their property.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Complainant claimed that she is the widow of the late Atty. Alberto Linco (Atty. Linco),
the registered owner of a parcel of land with improvements, consisting of 126 square
meters, located at No. 8, Macopa St., Phase I-A, B, C & D, Valley View Executive
Village, Cainta, Rizal and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 259001.
Complainant alleged that Atty. Jimmy D. Lacebal (respondent), a notary public for
Mandaluyong City, notarized a deed of donation2 allegedly executed by her husband
in favor of Alexander David T. Linco, a minor. The notarial acknowledgment thereof
also stated that Atty. Linco and Lina P. Toledo (Toledo), mother of the donee,
allegedly personally appeared before respondent on July 30, 2003, despite the fact
that complainants husband died on July 29, 2003.3
Consequently, by virtue of the purported deed of donation, the Register of Deeds of
Antipolo City cancelled TCT No. 259001 on March 28, 20054 and issued a new TCT
No. 292515 in the name of Alexander David T. Linco.
Aggrieved, complainant filed the instant complaint. She claimed that respondent's
reprehensible act in connivance with Toledo was not only violative of her and her
children's rights but also in violation of the law. Respondent's lack of honesty and
candor is unbecoming of a member of the Philippine Bar.
In his Answer,6 respondent admitted having notarized and acknowledged a deed of
donation executed by the donor, Atty.Linco, in favor of his son, Alexander David T.
Linco, as represented by Lina P. Toledo.
Respondent narrated that on July 8, 2003, he was invited by Atty. Linco, through an
emissary in the person of Claire Juele-Algodon (Algodon), to see him at his residence
located at Guenventille II D-31-B, Libertad Street, Mandaluyong City. Respondent
was then informed that Atty. Linco was sick and wanted to discuss something with
him.
Respondent pointed out that Atty. Linco appeared to be physically weak and sickly,
but was articulate and in full control of his faculties. Atty. Linco showed him a deed of
donation and the TCT of the property subject of the donation. Respondent claimed
that Atty. Linco asked him a favor of notarizing the deed of donation in his presence
along with the witnesses.
However, respondent explained that since he had no idea that he would be notarizing
a document, he did not bring his notarialbook and seal with him. Thus, he instead told

Algodon and Toledo to bring to his office the signed deed of donation anytime at their
convenience so that he could formally notarize and acknowledge the same.
On July 30, 2003, respondent claimed that Toledo and Algodon went to his law office
and informed him that Atty. Linco had passed away on July 29, 2003. Respondent
was then asked to notarize the deed of donation. Respondent admitted to have
consented as he found it to be his commitment to a fellow lawyer. Thus, he notarized
the subject deed of donation, which was actually signed in his presence on July 8,
2003.
During the mandatory conference/hearing on September 7, 2005, it was established
that indeed the deed of donation was presented to respondent on July 8, 2003.7
Respondent, likewise, admitted that while he was not the one who prepared the deed
of donation, he, however, performed the notarization of the deed of donation only on
July 30, 2003, a day after Atty.Linco died.8
On November 23, 2005, in its Report and Recommendation,9 the IBP-Commission on
Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found respondent guilty of violating the Notarial Law and the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
The IBP-CBD observed that respondent wanted it to appear that because the donor
appeared before him and signed the deed of donation on July 8, 2003, it was just
ministerial duty on his part to notarize the deed of donation on July 30, 2003, a day
after Atty. Linco died. The IBP-CBD pointed out that respondent should know that the
parties who signed the deed of donation on July 8, 2003, binds only the signatories to
the deed and it was not yet a public instrument. Moreover, since the deed of donation
was notarized only on July 30, 2003, a day after Atty. Linco died, the
acknowledgement portion of the said deed of donation where respondent
acknowledged that Atty. Linco personally came and appeared before me is false.
This act of respondent is also violative of the Attorney's Oath to obey the laws and
do no falsehood.
The IBP-CBD, thus, recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice
of law for a period of one (1) year, and that his notarial commission be revoked and
he be disqualified from re-appointment as notary public for a period of two (2) years.
On April 27, 2006, in Resolution No. XVII-2006-215,10 the IBP-Board of Governors
resolved to adopt and approve the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
Respondent moved for reconsideration, but was denied.11
On July 29, 2009, considering respondent's petition for review dated May 19, 2009 of
IBP Resolution No. XVII-2006-215 dated April 27, 2006 and IBP Resolution No. XVIII2008-678 dated December 11, 2008, denying complainant's motion for
reconsideration and affirming the assailed resolution, the Court resolved to require
complainant to file her comment.12
In her Compliance,13 complainant maintained that respondent has not stated
anything new in his motion for reconsideration that would warrant the reversal of the
recommendation of the IBP. She maintained that respondent violated the Notarial
Law and is unfit to continue being commissioned as notary public; thus, should be
sanctioned for his infractions.

On August 16, 2011, in view of the denial of respondent's motion for reconsideration,
the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court, recommended that the instant
complaint is now ripe for judicial adjudication.
RULING
The findings and recommendations of the IBP are well taken.
There is no question as to respondent's guilt. The records sufficiently established that
Atty. Linco was already dead when respondent notarized the deed of donation on July
30, 2003. Respondent likewise admitted that he knew that Atty. Linco died a day
before he notarized the deed of donation. We take note that respondent notarized the
document after the lapse of more than 20 days from July 8, 2003, when he was
allegedly asked to notarize the deed of donation. The sufficient lapse of time from the
time he last saw Atty. Linco should have put him on guard and deterred him from
proceeding with the notarization of the deed of donation.
However, respondent chose to ignore the basics of notarial procedure in order to
accommodate the alleged need of a colleague. The fact that respondent previously
appeared before him in person does not justify his act of notarizing the deed of
donation, considering the affiant's absence on the very day the document was
notarized. In the notarial acknowledgment of the deed of donation, respondent
attested that Atty. Linco personally came and appeared before him on July 30, 2003.
Yet obviously, Atty. Linco could not have appeared before him on July 30, 2003,
because the latter died on July 29, 2003. Clearly, respondent made a false statement
and violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a
lawyer.
We will reiterate that faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of
the oath in an acknowledgment or juratis sacrosanct.14 Respondent should not
notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same
persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents
and truth of what are stated therein.15
Time and again, we have repeatedly reminded notaries public of the importance
attached to the act of notarization. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless,
routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who
are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private
document into a public document; thus, making that document admissible in evidence
without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full
faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large
must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and
appended to a private instrument.16
For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements
in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the
integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined.17 Hence, again, a notary
public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are
the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to
the contents and truth of what are stated therein.

This responsibility is more pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer. A graver
responsibility is placed upon him by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and
to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. He is mandated to the sacred
duties appertaining to his office, such duties, being dictated by public policy and
impressed with public interest.18Respondent's failure to perform his duty as a notary
public resulted not only in damaging complainant's rights over the property subject of
the donation but also in undermining the integrity of a notary public. He should,
therefore, be held liable for his acts, not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.

misconduct of officers of the court, and to remove from the profession of law persons
whose disregard for their oath of office have proved them unfit to continue
discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar.

In Lanuzo v. Atty. Bongon,19 respondent having failed to discharge his duties as a

notary public, the revocation of his notarialcommission, disqualification from being
commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years and suspension from the
practice of law for one year were imposed. We deem it proper to impose the same
penalty.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Zenaida P. Reyes is found guilty of gross

misconduct andDISBARRED from the practice of law. Let her name be stricken off
the Roll of Attorneys. This Decision is immediately executory.
Let all the courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, Integrated Bar of
thePhilippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant, be notified of this Decision and be
it duly recorded in the personal file of the respondent.
Respondent is ORDERED to turn over to complainant Marites E. Freeman the
proceeds of the insurance policies remitted to her by Lincoln Financial Group, in the
amount of 10,489.57, and Eagle Star Life Assurance Company Limited, 471.06, or
in the total amount of 10,960.63, which is approximately equivalent to P700,000.00,
pursuant to the prevailing exchange rate at the time of the subject transaction.
SO ORDERED.

WHEREFORE, for breach of the Notarial Law and Code of Professional

Responsibility, the notarial commission of respondent ATTY. JIMMY D. LACEBAL, is
REVOKED. He is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for a period of
two years. He is also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one year,
effective immediately. He is further WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
acts shall be dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date of receipt
of this Decision in order to determine when his suspension shall take effect.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision
likewise be attached to the personal records of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Freeman Vs. Reyes
Marites Freeman Vs. Atty. Zenaida P. Reyes AC No. 6246 , Nov. 15, 2011
Before this Court is an Administrative Complaint, filed by complainant Marites E.
Freeman, seeking the disbarment of Atty. Zenaida P. Reyes, for gross dishonesty in
obtaining money from her, without rendering proper legal services, and appropriating
the proceeds of the insurance policies of her deceased husband. Complainant also
seeks recovery of all the amounts she had given to respondent and the insurance
proceeds, which was remitted to the latter, with prayer for payment of moral and
exemplary damages.
In the report and recommendation dated August 28, 2003, Investigating
Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines found
respondent to have betrayed the trust of complainant as her client for being dishonest
in her dealings and appropriating herself the insurance proceeds intended for
complainant.
On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
recommendation. The Court agrees with the observation of the Investigating
Commissioner Atty. Zenaida P. Reyes should be disbarred. The object of the
disbarment proceeding is not so much to punish the individual attorney himself , as to
safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the court and the public from the

Be as it may, assuming that respondent acted within the scope of her authority to
represent the complainant in pursuing the insurance claims, she should never deviate
from the benchmarks set by Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In Re: Rodolfo Pactolin

on December 7, 2012
Problem Areas in Legal Ethics Moral Turpitude Disbarment
In May 2008, the Supreme Court, in G.R. No. 161455 (Pactolin vs Sandiganbayan),
affirmed the conviction of Atty. Rodolfo Pactolin for violation of Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code (Falsification by a Private Individual). It was duly proved that
Pactolin falsified a letter, and presented said letter as evidence in a court of law, in
order to make it appear that his fellow councilor acting as OIC-Mayor illegally caused
the disbursement of public funds. In said decisions, the Supreme Court referred the
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for appropriate administrative actions
against Pactolin.
ISSUE: What administrative sanctions can be imposed upon Atty. Pactolin
considering his conviction?
HELD: Rodolfo Pactolin should be, and is henceforth disbarred. The crime of
falsification of public document is contrary to justice, honesty, and good morals and,
therefore, involves moral turpitude. Moral turpitude includes everything which is done
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. It involves an act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to
society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals.
As a rule, the Supreme Court exercises the power to disbar with great caution. Being
the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, it is imposed only for the most
imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. But it has
always been held that it is appropriate to disbar a lawyer if he is convicted by final
judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. Further, Pactolins situation is
aggravated by the fact that although his conviction has been affirmed, he has not
served his sentence yet.

MANUEL C. YUHICO v. ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ

A.C. No. 8391, 23 November 2010,
EN BANC
(Per Curiam)
Atty. Fred Gutierrez asked for a cash loan of P30,000.00 from Manuel Yuhico.
Gutierrez then
claimed that he needed money to pay for the medical expenses of his mother who
was seriously ill. Yuhico
immediately handed the money. In turn, Gutierrez promised to pay the loan very
soon, since he was
expecting to collect his attorney's fees from a Japanese client.
Gutierrez again asked Yuhico for a loan, in the amount of P60,000.00, allegedly to
pay the medical
expenses of his wife who was also hospitalized. Again, Yuhico readily issued to
Gutierrez a check amounting
to P60,000.00. Again, Gutierrez promised to pay his two loans totalling to P90,000.00
"within a short
time."
Yuhico asked Gutierrez to pay his loans. Gutierrez failed to pay and in a text
message he asked for
an extension of time to pay. Later, thru a text message, Gutierrez attempted to borrow
money from Yuhico
again. Gutierrez claimed that his daughter needed P70,000.00 to pay the fees
required to take the licensure
examination in the U.S. Medical Board. Gutierrez assured him that he will pay all his
debts within a month.
However, this time, Yuhico refused to lend Gutierrez any amount of money. Instead,
he demanded from
Gutierrez the payment of his debts.
Gutierrez then sent another text message to Yuhico and requested him to give him
another week to
pay his debts. Gutierrez failed to make the payment. Yuhico's counsel sent a demand
letter to Gutierrez to
pay his debts, but to no avail. Thus, Yuhico filed the instant complaint against
Gutierrez before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).
On January 12, 2006, the IBP-CBD directed Gutierrez to submit his Answer on the
complaint
against him. In a Resolution, IBP-CBD found Gutierrez guilty of non-payment of just
debts and ordered him
to return the amount of P90,000.00 to Yuhico, with interest until full payment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gutierrez guilty of non-payment of just debts and likewise guilty of
gross
misconduct
HELD:Lawyers must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to the
bar, the courts and to their clients, which include prompt payment of financial
obligations
Deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross misconduct, for which a lawyer
may be
sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the
administration of

justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not only
legal proficiency, but also
a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the peoples
faith and confidence in
the judicial system is ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties to
society, to the bar,
the courts and to their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations.
They must conduct
themselves in a manner that reflects the values and norms of the legal profession as
embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
In the instant case, there is no question as to Gutierrez's guilt. His admission of the
loan he
contracted and his failure to pay the same leaves no room for interpretation. Neither
can he justify his act of
non-payment of debt by his dire financial condition. Gutierrez should not have
contracted loans which are
beyond his financial capacity to pay.
Likewise, it cannot be overlooked Gutierrez's propensity of employing deceit and
misrepresentations for the purpose of obtaining debts without the intention of paying
them. Records show
Gutierrez's pattern of habitually making promises of paying his debts, yet repeatedly
failing to deliver. The
series of text messages he sent to Yuhico promising to pay his loans, while
simultaneously giving excuses
without actually making good of his promises, is clearly reprehensible. Undoubtedly,
his acts demonstrate lack of moral character to satisfy the responsibilities and duties
imposed on lawyers as professionals and as
officers of the court.
Supreme Court also noted that in
Huyssen v. Atty. Gutierrez,
the Court had already disbarred
Gutierrez from the practice of law for gross misconduct due to non-payment of just
debts and issuance of
bouncing checks. In view of the foregoing, while the court agrees with the findings of
the IBP, it cannot,
however, adopt its recommendation to disbar Gutierrez for the second time,
considering that Gutierrez had
already been previously disbarred. Indeed, as the IBP pointed out, the court does not
have double or
multiple disbarments in its laws or jurisprudence. Neither do it have a law mandating
a minimum 5-year
requirement for readmission, as cited by the IBP. Thus, while Gutierrez's infraction
calls for the penalty of
disbarment, court cannot disbar him anew.
MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA, complainant, vs. ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON,
respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM p:
The Court has often reminded members of the bar to live up to the standards and
norms of the legal profession by upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the

Code of Professional Responsibility. Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high
standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
Lawyers are at all times subject to the watchful public eye and community
approbation. Needless to state, those whose conduct both public and private fail
this scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, accordingly
penalized. 1
Complainant Maria Victoria B. Ventura filed on July 29, 2004 a Complaint 2 for
Disbarment or Suspension before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Commission on Bar Discipline against respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson for "grossly
immoral conduct."
In her complaint, complainant alleged that
2.The herein Complainant MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA executed a Sworn
Statement dated 19 April 2002 and a Supplemental-Complaint dated 10 May 2002
stating therein that the crime of RAPE was committed against her person sometime in
December, 2001 and on 19 March 2002 when she was merelythirteen (13) years of
age by herein Respondent ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON, then thirty eight (38) years
old, married to Teresita B. Samson, Filipino and resident of Barangay 5, San
Francisco, Agusan Del Sur, Philippines. . . .
3.In his Counter-Affidavit, herein Respondent ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON admitted
that sexual intercourse indeed transpired between the herein Complainant MARIA
VICTORIA B. VENTURA and himself. . . . TDcCIS
4.After the conduct of preliminary investigation, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of Agusan Del Sur, Philippines issued a RESOLUTION dated 10 June 2002
dismissing the charge of RAPE and finding the existence of probable cause for the
crime of QUALIFIED SEDUCTION and issued the corresponding INFORMATION for
QUALIFIED SEDUCTION on 04 July 2002. . . .
5.Thereafter, the herein Complainant filed a MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
dated 26 August 2002 which was denied in the RESOLUTION dated 02 October 2002
of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan Del Sur. . . .
6.The aforesaid RESOLUTION dated 02 October 2002 was elevated to [the
Department of Justice], by way of a PETITION FOR REVIEW, and is pending
resolution by the Department of Justice.
xxx xxx xxx
8.The act/s committed by the herein Respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson against the
herein ComplainantMARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA as hereinbefore stated clearly
constitute . . . "grossly immoral conduct" under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court of the Philippines which provides for a penalty of "DISBARMENT or
SUSPENSION of an Attorney by the SUPREME COURT."
Complainant narrated in her Sworn Statement 3 that sometime in December 2001, at
around midnight, she was sleeping in the maid's room at respondent's house when
respondent entered and went on top of her. Respondent kissed her lips, sucked her
breast, and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. She felt pain and found
blood stain in her panty. She stated that another incident happened on March 19,
2002 at respondent's poultry farm in Alegria, San Francisco, Agusan del Sur.
Respondent asked her to go with him to the farm. He brought her to an old shanty
where he sexually abused her. Thereafter, respondent gave her five hundred pesos
and warned her not to tell anyone what had happened or he would kill her and her
mother. CAcEaS
In her Supplemental-Complaint, 4 complainant averred that respondent allowed her to
sleep in his house after her mother agreed to let her stay there while she studied at
the Agusan National High School. She further stated that on the night she was
sexually abused, she was awakened when respondent went on top of her. She

struggled to free herself and shouted, but respondent covered her mouth and nobody
could hear as nobody was in the house. Complainant also claimed that on March 19,
2002, between 5:00 p.m. to 6:00 pm, respondent forced her to ride a multi-cab. When
they arrived at his poultry farm in Alegria, respondent dragged her to a dilapidated
shack. She resisted his advances but her efforts proved futile.
Respondent alleged in his Answer 5 that
2.Respondent admits the allegations in paragraph 2 of the complaint to the effect that
Maria VictoriaVentura filed a complaint against him for Rape at the Provincial
Prosecutor's Office with qualification that the said complaint for Rape was dismissed.
Respondent, however, has no knowledge or information as to the truth of the
allegation that she was 13 years. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
5.Respondent vehemently denies the truth of the allegations in paragraph 8 of the
complaint to the effect that the acts of respondent in having sex with complainant
constitute . . . grossly immoral conduct. The truth is that [the] act of respondent in
having sex with complainant was done [with] mutual agreement after respondent
gave money to complainant. Respondent respectfully submit[s] that his act of having
sex with complainant once does not constitute . . . gross[ly] immoral conduct. There is
no human law that punishes a person who [has] sex with a woman with mutual
agreement and complainant [accepts] compensation therefore. Having sex with
complainant once with just compensation does not amount to immoral conduct. . . .
SEcAIC
xxx xxx xxx
6.The complaint is instigated by Corazon Ventura who was an employee at the Law
Office of respondent herein. The said Corazon Ventura entertained hatred and [had a
grudge] against the herein respondent who terminated her services due to
misunderstanding. . . .
7.The filing of the Criminal Case against respondent as well as this Administrative
Case is a well orchestrated and planned act of Corazon Ventura as vengeance
against respondent as a result of her separation from the employment in the Law
Office of the respondent. This claim is supported by the Affidavit of Natividad Ruluna,
the former Office Clerk at the Law Office of respondent. . . .
8.To show that Corazon Ventura desires to get back [at] respondent, she demanded
from respondent to settle with her and demanded the payment of the amount [of]
P2,000,000.00[;] otherwise she will file a case against him in Court for Rape and for
disbarment. Respondent did not come across with Corazon Ventura, the latter made
good her threats and filed the criminal case for Rape. [sic] When the case [for] rape
did not prosper because the Prosecutor dropped the Rape Case, Corazon Ventura
[sent word] to respondent that she is amenable for the amount of P400,000.00. In
effect, Corazon Ventura wanted to extort from respondent so that she [can] get even
with him and his wife for separating her from the employment;
9.Complainant is a woman of loose moral character. This is supported by the Affidavit
of Patronio Punayan, Jr. which is hereto attached as Annex "3". And Corazon Ventura
can afford to utilize Maria VictoriaVentura as her instrument in putting down the
respondent herein because Maria Victoria Ventura is not her biological daughter and
she knows before hand that her ward has a questionable reputation. The fact [that]
Corazon Ventura is not the biological mother of Maria Victoria Ventura is shown by
the pre-trial order in Criminal Case No. 5414. . . . SIcEHD
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent has not violated any grounds mentioned in this rule. Respondent
respectfully submits that his having sex with complainant with just compensation once

does not amount to immoral conduct. For who among men will not yield to temptation
when a woman shall invite him for sex?
Attached to respondent's Answer is his Counter-Affidavit 6 which he submitted to the
Provincial Prosecutor. He alleged therein that complainant usually stayed late at night
with her male friends when her mother was out of the house. He claimed that he
heard rumors that complainant had sexual affairs with different boys. Respondent
narrated that on March 19, 2002, he saw complainant with some of her classmates
near their rented house. Complainant told him that they wanted to go out to swim but
they did not have money. When she asked if he could spare some amount, he gave
her money. He told her in jest that he wanted to see her that afternoon and go to a
place where they could be alone, and he was surprised when she agreed. He just
thought that for complainant, sex is a common thing despite her age. At around 5:00
p.m., he fetched complainant at her house. She casually walked towards the car and
boarded it. He told her that they will not check in a lodging house because people
might recognize him. Upon reaching his poultry farm, respondent met his farm worker
and asked him if he could use the latter's hut. The farm worker agreed and they went
straight to the hut.
Inside the farm worker's hut, complainant did not hesitate in entering the room.
Respondent did not notice any involuntariness on her part as she undressed herself.
He asserted that they had sexual intercourse based on their mutual understanding.
Thereafter, the complainant dressed up and walked back to the multi-cab where she
waited for him. He told her not to tell anyone about what had happened, to which she
replied "natural buang kay motug-an"meaning, she's not crazy as to tell anyone. He
alleged that she accepted the money he gave because she needed to buy some
things but her mother did not give her any allowance. Respondent insisted that what
happened between them was the first and the last incident. He claimed that he was
able to confirm that complainant is no longer a virgin.
It likewise appears that the Investigating Prosecutors found that probable cause
exists for respondent to stand trial for qualified seduction. 7 The charge of rape,
however, was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. An Information was filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Agusan del Sur, Branch 6, but complainant who
was not satisfied with the dismissal of the rape charge, filed a motion for
reconsideration. When said motion was denied, complainant filed a petition for review
with the Department of Justice (DOJ). However, the DOJ sustained the findings of the
prosecutor.DcaECT
Then, on December 14, 2006, complainant and her mother appeared before the
public prosecutor and executed their respective Affidavits of Desistance. 8
Complainant stated that what happened between respondent and her in March 2002
was based on mutual understanding. Thus, she was withdrawing the complaint she
filed against respondent before the RTC as well as the one she filed before the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline. Accordingly, the criminal case against respondent was
dismissed. 9
In its Report and Recommendation 10 dated October 10, 2007, the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline recommended that respondent be suspended for a period of one
year from the practice of law for immorality with the warning that repetition of the
same or similar act will merit a more severe penalty.
On November 10, 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No.
XVIII-2007-237, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on

record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that respondent is found
guilty of immorality, the victim is a minor, respondent and his wife was victim's
guardians and for being a married man, Atty. Danilo S. Samson is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for five (5) years with Stern Warning that
repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely. 11
Complainant now moves to reconsider the IBP Resolution. She argues that the
penalty imposed by the IBP is not commensurate to the gravity and depravity of the
offense. She contends that respondent committed grossly immoral conduct by forcing
himself to have sexual intercourse with a young and innocent lass of 13 years of age.
He also took advantage of his moral ascendancy over complainant considering that
she was then staying at respondent's residence. Moreover, there was a betrayal of
the marital vow of fidelity considering that respondent was a married man. She insists
that this detestable behavior renders respondent unfit and undeserving of the honor
and privilege which his license confers upon him. Thus, complainant prays that the
penalty of disbarment be imposed. 12
Meanwhile, respondent also filed a Motion for Reconsideration 13 of the IBP
Resolution. He asserts that complainant has not presented any proof of her minority.
Likewise, during the sexual encounter, complainant was not under their custody. He
contends that complainant's mother even testified that her daughter stayed at
respondent's house only until February 2002. He further stresses that because of his
admission and remorse, and since this is the first time he has been found
administratively liable, he is entitled to a reduction of the penalty to one year
suspension from the practice of law. IScaAE
The pertinent provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS
OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 7 A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. aHIDAE
As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo, 14 the possession of good moral character is
both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the
bar and to retain membership in the legal profession. It is the bounden duty of
members of the bar to observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard
the integrity of the Bar. 15 Consequently, any errant behavior on the part of a lawyer,
be it in the lawyer's public or private activities, which tends to show said lawyer
deficient in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to
warrant suspension or disbarment. IATHaS
Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a
moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the
community. 16 Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
community's sense of decency. 17
From the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of
respondent himself, we find that respondent's act of engaging in sex with a young

lass, the daughter of his former employee, constitutes gross immoral conduct that
warrants sanction. Respondent not only admitted he had sexual intercourse with
complainant but also showed no remorse whatsoever when he asserted that he did
nothing wrong because she allegedly agreed and he even gave her money. Indeed,
his act of having carnal knowledge of a woman other than his wife manifests his
disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity.
Moreover, the fact that he procured the act by enticing a very young woman with
money showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard for the dignity of the human
person and the ethics of his profession.
In Cordova v. Cordova,18 we held that the moral delinquency that affects the fitness
of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the
generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which
makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage.
Respondent has violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by complainant,
then a 13-year-old minor, 19 who for a time was under respondent's care. Whether
the sexual encounter between the respondent and complainant was or was not with
the latter's consent is of no moment. Respondent clearly committed a disgraceful,
grossly immoral and highly reprehensible act. Such conduct is a transgression of the
standards of morality required of the legal profession and should be disciplined
accordingly.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly states that a member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for,
among others, any deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the oath that he is
required to take before admission to the practice of law. It bears to stress that
membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege
bestowed by law through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be
withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the lawyer's lack of the essential
qualifications required of lawyers. 20
Likewise, it was held in Maligsa v. Cabanting 21 that a lawyer may be disbarred for
any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to
be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court. Similarly, in Dumadag v. Lumaya, 22 the Court
pronounced:
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid
standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful
compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the conditions required for
remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to
practice law. CcEHaI
The fact that complainant filed an Affidavit of Desistance during the pendency of this
case is of no moment. Complainant's Affidavit of Desistance cannot have the effect of
abating the instant proceedings in view of the public service character of the practice
of law and the nature of disbarment proceedings as a public interest concern. A case
of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief to a
complainant as in a civil case, but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal
profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the public and the courts. A
disbarment case is not an investigation into the acts of respondent but on his conduct
as an officer of the court and his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar. 23
Illicit sexual relations have been previously punished with disbarment, indefinite or
definite suspension, depending on the circumstances. 24 In this case, respondent's
gross misbehavior and unrepentant demeanor clearly shows a serious flaw in his
character, his moral indifference to sexual exploitation of a minor, and his outright
defiance of established norms. All these could not but put the legal profession in

disrepute and place the integrity of the administration of justice in peril, hence the
need for strict but appropriate disciplinary action. 25
The Court is mindful of the dictum that the power to disbar must be exercised with
great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of
the bar. Thus, where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could
accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be decreed. 26 However, in the
present case, the seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its power to
disbar as it appears to be the most appropriate penalty. 27
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson is hereby DISBARRED for Gross
Immoral Conduct, Violation of his oath of office, and Violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01
and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the
records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the
Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and circulated to all courts.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED