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Franco vs.

IAC |
G.R. No. 71137 October 5, 1989 |
FACTS
Yulo was driving a Franco Bus when he swerved to the opposite lane to avoid colliding with a parked truck. The Franco
Bus took the lane of an incoming Isuzu Mini Bus driven by Lugue. The two vehicles collided, resulting in the deaths of
both drivers and two passengers of the Mini Bus. The owner of the Isuzu Mini Bus, the wife of one of the passengers
who died, and the wife of the driver of the Mini Bus filed an action for damages against Mr. and Mrs. Franco, owners of
the Franco Transportation Company.
The spouses set up the defense that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting and
supervising their employees, including the deceased driver. The RTC held that this defense of due diligence could not be
invoked by the spouses since the case was one for criminal negligence punishable under Article 102 and 103 of the
Revised Penal Code and not from Article 2180 of the Civil Code. It held the spouses liable for damages to the family of
the deceased. The CA agreed with the lower court.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N spouses Franco, as employer, may invoke the defense of diligence of a
good father of a family in denying their liabilities against the victims.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
YES. The action is predicated upon quasi delict, not upon crime. Hence, the defense of due diligence can be invoked by
the defendants. However, in this case, the spouses were not able to prove such due diligence. Therefore, they are liable
for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Distinction should be made between the subsidiary liability of the employer under the RPC and the employers primary
liability under the Civil Code, which is quasi- delictual or tortious in character. The first type of liability is governed by
Articles 102 and 103 of the RPC, which provide that employers have subsidiary civil liability in default of their employees
who commit felonies in the discharge of their duties.
The second kind is governed by Articles 2176, 2177, and 2180 of the Civil Code on the vicarious liability of employers
for those damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. In this second kind, the
employers liability ceases upon proof that he observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Under Article 103 of the RPC, the liability of the employer is subsidiary to the liability of the employee. Before the
employers subsidiary liability may be proceeded against, it is imperative that there should be a criminal action where
the employees criminal negligence are proved. Without such criminal action being instituted, the employers liability
cannot be predicated under Article 103. In this case, there was no criminal action instituted because the driver who
should stand as accused died in the accident. Therefore, there is no basis for the employers subsidiary liability, without
the employees primary liability. It follows that the liability being sued upon is based not on crime, but on culpa
aquiliana, where the defense of the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family may be raised by the employer.
The employers are liable since they failed to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
selecting and/or supervising the driver. They admitted that the only kind of supervision given to the drivers referred to
the running time between the terminal points of the line. They only had two inspectors whose duties were only ticket
inspections. There is no evidence that they were really safety inspectors.
School of Holy Spirit Quezon City vs. Taguiam
[G.R. No. 165565. July 14, 2008]
FACTS:
Respondent Taguiam was the class adviser of a Grade 5 class of petitioner school. After obtaining permission from the
principal, they were allowed to use the school swimming pool for their year-end activity. With this, respondent Taguiam
distributed the parents/guardians permit forms to the students.
The permit form of student Chiara Mae was unsigned. But because the mother personally brought her to the school
with her packed lunch and swimsuit, Taguiam concluded that the mother allowed her to join. Before the activity started,
respondent warned the pupils who did not know how to swim to avoid the deeper area. However, while the pupils were
swimming, two of them sneaked out. Respondent went after them to verify where they were going. Unfortunately,
while respondent was away, Chiara Mae drowned. When respondent returned, the maintenance man was already
administering cardiopulmonary resuscitation on Chiara Mae. She was still alive when respondent rushed her to the
General Malvar Hospital where she was pronounced dead on arrival.

The petitioner school conducted a clarificatory hearing to which respondent attended and submitted her Affidavit of
Explanation. A month later, petitioner school dismissed respondent on the ground of gross negligence resulting to loss
of trust and confidence.
Issue: Whether or not respondents dismissal on the ground of gross negligence resulting to loss of trust and confidence
was valid
HELD: Yes. Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, gross and habitual neglect of duties is a valid ground for an employer to
terminate an employee. Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or a failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or
the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them.
Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform ones duties for a period of time, depending upon the
circumstances.
The SC concluded that respondent had been grossly negligent. First, it is undisputed that Chiara Maes permit form was
unsigned. Yet, respondent allowed her to join the activity because she assumed that Chiara Maes mother has allowed
her to join it by personally bringing her to the school with her packed lunch and swimsuit. Second, it was respondents
responsibility as Class Adviser to supervise her class in all activities sanctioned by the school. Thus, she should have
coordinated with the school to ensure that proper safeguards, such as adequate first aid and sufficient adult personnel,
were present during their activity. She should have been mindful of the fact that with the number of pupils involved, it
would be impossible for her by herself alone to keep an eye on each one of them.

Notably,respondents negligence, although gross, was not habitual. In view of the considerable resultant damage,
however, the SC agreed that the cause is sufficient to dismiss respondent. Indeed, the sufficiency of the evidence as well
as the resultant damage to the employer should be considered In the dismissal of the employee. In this case, the
damage went as far as claiming the life of a child.
St. Marys Academy vs. Carpetanos
GR No. 143363, February 6, 2002
FACTS:
Herein petitioner, conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996 They visited schools from where
prospective enrollees were studying. Sherwin Carpitanos joined the campaign. Along with the other high school
students, they rode a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School. Such
jeep was driven by James Daniel II, a 15 year old student of the same school. It was alleged that he drove the jeep in a
reckless manner which resulted for it to turned turtle. Sherwin died due to this accident.
ISSUE: WON petitioner should be held liable for the damages.
HELD:
CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under Article 218 and 219 of the Family Code where it was pointed
that they were negligent in allowing a minor to drive and not having a teacher accompany the minor students in the
jeep. However, for them to be held liable, the act or omission to be considered negligent must be the proximate cause
of the injury caused thus, negligence needs to have a causal connection to the accident. It must be direct and natural
sequence of events, unbroken by any efficient intervening causes. The parents of the victim failed to show such
negligence on the part of the petitioner. The spouses Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was
not the reckless driving of James but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Futhermore, there was no
evidence that petitioner allowed the minor to drive the jeep of Villanueva. The mechanical defect was an event over
which the school has no control hence they may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident.
The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or
to 3rd persons for injuries caused while it is being driven on the road. It is not the school, but the registered owner of
the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin. Case was remanded to the trial court
for determination of the liability of the defendants excluding herein petitioner.

Palisoc vs. Brillantes| Teehankee


G.R. No. L-29025, October 4, 1971| 41 SCRA 557

FACTS
Deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon were classmates at the Manila Technical Institute,
and on the afternoon of March 10, 1966, between two and three o'clock, they, together with another classmate
Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory room located on the ground floor. Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio L. Daffon were
working on a machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on at them. Daffon made a remark to the effect that
Palisoc was acting like a foreman. Because of this remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face. Daffon, in
retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face, which was followed by other fist blows on the stomach.
Palisoc retreated apparently to avoid the fist blows, but Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows until Palisoc
stumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall face downward. Palisoc became pale and fainted. First aid was
administered to him but he was not revived, so he was immediately taken to a hospital. He never regained
consciousness; finally he died.
Plaintiffs-appellants as parents of the deceased had filed on May 19, 1966, the action below for damages. Defendants,
per the trial court's decision, are: "Defendant Antonio C. Brillantes, at the time when the incident which gave rise to his
action occurred was a member of the Board of Directors of the institute; the defendant Teodosio Valenton, the
president thereof; the defendant Santiago M. Quibulue, instructor of the class to which the deceased belonged; and the
defendant Virgilio L. Daffon, a fellow student of the deceased. At the beginning the Manila Technical Institute was a
single proprietorship, but lately on August 2, 1962, it was duly incorporated."
The trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code however absolved
from liability the three other defendants- officials of the Manila Technical Institute citing that Article 2180 is not
applicable in the case at hand.
ISSUES
W/N the trial court erred in absolving the defendant-school officials.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
YES, DEFENDANTS-SCHOOL OFFICIALS ARE LIABLE UNDER ART. 2180
The lower erred in law in absolving defendants-school officials on the ground that
they could be held liable under Article 2180, Civil Code, only if the student who inflicted the fatal fistblows on his
classmate and victim "lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendants officials of the school." As stated
above, the phrase used in the cited article "so long as (the students) remain in their custody" means the protective
and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as
they are at attendance in the school, including recess time.
There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the tortious
act must live and board in the school, as erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in
Exconde) on which it relied, must now be deemed to have been set aside by the present decision.
Defendants Valenton and Quibulue as president and teacher-in-charge of the school must therefore be held jointly and
severally liable for the quasi-delict of their co- defendant Daffon in the latter having caused the death of his classmate,
the deceased Dominador Palisoc. The unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the protagonists-students
could have been avoided, had said defendants but complied with their duty of providing adequate supervision over the
activities of the students in the school premises to protect their students from harm, whether at the hands of fellow
students or other parties.
At any rate, the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability, in compliance with the last
paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by "(proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage." In the light of the factual findings of the lower court's decision, said defendants failed to prove such
exemption from liability. .

G.R. No. L-54357


April 25, 1988
REYNALDO PASCO, assisted by his father PEDRO PASCO, petitioner,
vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN, BRANCH V, STA. MARIA and ARANETA UNIVERSITY, respondents.
Ponciano G. Hernandez for petitioner. Marcelo C. Aniana for respondents.
PARAS, J.:
The sole question of law raised by petitioner in this case is whether the provision of the penultimate paragraph of Article
2180 of the Civil Code which states: Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
is equally applicable to academic institutions.
The facts of this case are as follows: On August 24, 1979 at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, petitioner, together with
two companions, while walking inside the campus of the private respondent Araneta University, after attending classes
in said university, was accosted and mauled by a group of Muslim students led by Abdul Karim Madidis alias "Teng." Said
Muslim group were also students of the Araneta University. Petitioner was subsequently stabbed by Abdul and as a
consequence he was hospitalized at the Manila Central University (MCU) Hospital where he underwent surgery to save
his life. On October 5, 1979, petitioner, assisted by his father Pedro Pasco, filed a complaint for damages against Abdul
Karim Madidis and herein private respondent Gregorio Araneta University which was docketed as Civil Case No. SM1027. Said school was impleaded as a party defendant based on the aforementioned provision of the Civil Code.
On October 26, 1979, respondent school filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds:
a.
The penultimate paragraph of Article 2180 of the New Civil Code under which it was sued applies only to
vocational schools and not to academic institutions;
b.
That every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code.
Hence, the civil liability in this case arises from a criminal action which the defendant university has not committed;
c.
Since this is a civil case, a demand should have been made by the plaintiff, hence, it would be premature to bring
an action for damages against defendant University. (Rollo, p. 96)
On May 12, 1980, respondent court issued an Order * granting said Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner moved to reconsider
the Order of Dismissal but the motion was likewise denied on the ground that there is no sufficient justification to
disturb its ruling. Hence, this instant Petition for certiorari under Republic Act No. 5440, praying that judgment be
rendered setting aside the questioned order of May 12, 1980 dismissing the complaint as against respondent school and
the order of July 17, 1980 denying the reconsideration of the questioned order of dismissal, with costs against
respondent school.
We find no necessity of discussing the applicability of the Article to educational institutions (which are not schools of
arts and trades) for the issue in this petition is actually whether or not, under the article, the school or the university
itself (as distinguished from the teachers or heads) is liable. We find the answer in the negative, for surely the provision
concerned speaks only of "teachers or heads."
WHEREFORE, this Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
Yap, C.J. and Padilla, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:
I dissent. Paragraph 5 of Art. 2180 may be construed as the basis for the liability of the school as the employer for the
failure of its teachers or school heads to perform their mandatory legal duties as substitute parents. Herrera, J.
concurring (Amadora et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-47745, citing Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts &
Damages, 1978 ed., p. 201).

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:


I join Justice Sarmiento in his dissent.
As stated by him, my view is that while the educational institution is not directly liable, yet the school, as the employer,
may be held liable for the failure of its teachers or school heads to perform their mandatory legal duties as substitute
parents (Article 2180, Civil Code). The school, however, may exculpate itself from liability by proving that it had
exercised the diligence of a good father of the family.
Melencio-Herrera, J., dissent.
Amadoras vs. CA |
FACTS
Alfredo Amadora is a student of Colegio de San Jose Recoletos. While he was in the schools auditorium he was shot to
death by a classmate in the name of Pablito Daffon. The latter was then convicted of homicide through reckless
imprudence.
The victims parents sued for damages under Art. 2180 against the school, the principal, dean for boys, the Physics
teacher, the accused, his parents and some other students along with their parents.
Later, the complaint against the other students and their parents were dropped. The Amadoras contend that the
presence of Alfredo was by reason of a Physics experiment, hence the student is still under custody of the school at the
time of the incident.
The school, however, denies liability since his presence was merely to submit the Physics project and that the
semester had already ended.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N private respondents are liable
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
No.
Article 2180 applies to schools whether academic or non-academic. The student is deemed in the custody of the
school as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and is within its premises, whether the school
semester has just begun or has ended.
The liability of the article is by the head superior in-charge to the student and not by the school who could be liable
under respondeat superior. Both have the defense of bonus pater familias. In this case the evidence did not support who
the in-charge teacher was other than the fact he submitted his Physics report.
And even if the Physics teacher was in fact in charge there is no showing that he was negligent in the supervision and
discipline of the accused. The private respondents properly adduced evidence to prove they exercised bonus pater
familias.
Salvosa vs. IAC| Padilla
G.R. No. 70458 October 5, 1988 |SCRA
FACTS
o Petitioner Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) is an academic institution and an
institution of arts and trade.
o PetitionerBenjaminSalvosaisthePresidentandChairmanoftheBoardofBCF. o The Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit
had Jimmy B. Abon as its duly
appointed armorer. As armorer of the ROTC Unit, Abon received his appointment from the AFP. Not being an employee
of the BCF, he also received his salary and orders from the AFP. Abon was also a commerce student of the BCF.
o On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF, Abon shot Napoleon Castro a student of the
University of Baguio with an unlicensed firearm which the former took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. As
a result, Castro died and Abon was prosecuted for, and convicted of the crime of Homicide by Military Court.
o Theheirs of Castro sued for damages.
o TC sentenced Abon, Salvosa and BCF, jointly and severally liable to pay the heirs
of Castro.
o CA affirmed with modification in the amount of damages.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N Salvosa and BCF can be held solidarity liable with Abon for damages
under Article 218012 of the Civil Code, as a consequence of the tortious act of Abon.
o TC and CA: Yes. Abon was in the protective and supervisory custody of the BCF when he shot Castro as he must have
been attending night classes and therefore that hour in the evening was just about dismissal time for him or soon
thereafter. The time interval is safely within "recess time".
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
No. Abon cannot be considered to have been "at attendance in the school," or in the custody of BCF, when he shot
Castro. Logically, therefore, Salvosa and BCF cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Abon
for damages resulting from his acts.
Rationale behind Art. 2180: So long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a certain
extent, in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of
the [student].
12 Teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are liable for "damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody."
Art. 2180 'so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the
school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the
school, including recess time.
A "recess...at attendance in the school," contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where
the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises, or the area within
which the school activity is conducted.
A student not "at attendance in the school" cannot be in "recess" thereat.
The mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not constitute "attending
school" or being in the "protective and
supervisory custody' of the school, as contemplated in the law.
Moreover, Abon was supposed to be working in the armory with definite
instructions from his superior, the ROTC Commandant, when he shot Castro.
Salvosa vs. IAC| Padilla
G.R. No. 70458 October 5, 1988 |SCRA
FACTS
o Petitioner Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) is an academic institution and an
institution of arts and trade.
o PetitionerBenjaminSalvosaisthePresidentandChairmanoftheBoardofBCF. o The Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit
had Jimmy B. Abon as its duly
appointed armorer. As armorer of the ROTC Unit, Abon received his appointment from the AFP. Not being an employee
of the BCF, he also received his salary and orders from the AFP. Abon was also a commerce student of the BCF.
o On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF, Abon shot Napoleon Castro a student of the
University of Baguio with an unlicensed firearm which the former took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. As
a result, Castro died and Abon was prosecuted for, and convicted of the crime of Homicide by Military Court.
o TheheirsofCastrosuedfordamages.
o TC sentenced Abon, Salvosa and BCF, jointly and severally liable to pay the heirs
of Castro.
o CA affirmed with modification in the amount of damages.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N Salvosa and BCF can be held solidarity liable with Abon for damages under Article 218012
of the Civil Code, as a consequence of the tortious act of Abon?
o TC and CA: Yes. Abon was in the protective and supervisory custody of the BCF when he shot Castro as he must have
been attending night classes and therefore that hour in the evening was just about dismissal time for him or soon
thereafter. The time interval is safely within "recess time".
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
No. Abon cannot be considered to have been "at attendance in the school," or in the custody of BCF, when he shot
Castro. Logically, therefore, Salvosa and BCF cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Abon
for damages resulting from his acts.

Rationale behind Art. 2180: So long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a certain
extent, in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of
the [student].
12 Teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are liable for "damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody."
Art. 2180 'so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the
school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the
school, including recess time.
A "recess...at attendance in the school," contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where
the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises, or the area within
which the school activity is conducted.
A student not "at attendance in the school" cannot be in "recess" thereat.
The mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not constitute "attending
school" or being in the "protective and
supervisory custody' of the school, as contemplated in the law.
Moreover, Abon was supposed to be working in the armory with definite
instructions from his superior, the ROTC Commandant, when he shot Castro.
Ylarde v Aquino | GANCAYCO, J
G.R. No. L-33722, July 29, 1988 | 163 SCRA 697
FACTS
June 11 1951: Juanito Chan, son of Chan Lin Po and Remedios Diala, drove and operated a motor vehicle (a truck)
along Rizal Ave Ext, Manila in a reckless and imprudent manner thereby causing to hit Nicolas Paras, 65 yo, and ran over
his head, crushing it, resulting to his instantaneous death; facs revealed that the truck was registered in the name of Lim
Koo.
At the initial stage of the criminal trial, Petitioner, Estanislawa Canlas (widow of Nicolas, representing also 5 minor
children), made a reservation to file a separate civil action.
TC: Juanito is guilty, serve sentence of 1yr-8mos, plus 5K indeminity.
CA: modified, 1yr not less than 4 yrs of imprisonment, indemnity also affirmed.
In the civil action, same facts were alleged. Defendants disclaimed liability by
establishing that Juanito is married and is no longer a minor living in the company of his parents, and that he is also not
an employee of Lim Koo. Thus, Neither Juanitos parents can be made liable under vicarious liability (2180 of the NCC)
nor the owner of vehicle be the subsidiary liable under 103 of the RPC.
Civil action: dismissed, since petitioner already tried to execute the indemnity adjudged in the crim action and Juanito
already served subsidiary imprisonment by virtue of his inability to pay indemnity. Petitioner insists on the liability of
parents and truck owner. MR denied, hence this petition.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N Respondents can be made liable over the civil liability of Juanito?
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
NO.
2180 par 5 of the NCC (primary liab-vicarious liab) only applies if the offender is a MINOR LIVING in the COMPANY of
his PARENTS. In this case, Juanito was already married and lives independently from his parents
103 of the RPC (subsidiary liab) only attaches if EER between the owner and offender is established and that the act
happened while he was discharging his duties (as employee). In this case, no evidence was presented to establish such
relationship.
NB: The civil complaint was confused with the nature of liability to charge (103 or 2180). Court however clarified that
the lower court erred when they adjudged that the civil action is barred by res judicata. The civil action from crim act
and indep civil action are of different nature and purpose. The 2 cases affect different parties. In the indep civil action,
subsidiary and vicarious liab were being established. Nevertheless, since 2180 of NCC and 103 of RPC was inapplicable,
the action was still dismissed.
G.R. No. 182353
June 29, 2010
ST. JOSEPH'S COLLEGE, SR. JOSEPHINI AMBATALI, SFIC, and ROSALINDA TABUGO, Petitioners,
vs. JAYSON MIRANDA, represented by his father, RODOLFO S. MIRANDA, Respondent.

Facts:
On November 17, 1994, at around 1:30 in the afternoon inside St. Joseph Colleges premises, the class to which Jayson
Val Miranda belonged was conducting a science experiment about fusion of sulphur powder and iron fillings under the
tutelage of Rosalinda Tabugo, she being the subject teacher and employee of SJC. The adviser of *Jaysons+ class is
Estefania Abdan.
Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experiment without having adequately secured it from any untoward
incident or occurrence. In the middle of the experiment, [Jayson], who was the assistant leader of one of the class
groups, checked the result of the experiment by looking into the test tube with magnifying glass. The test tube was
being held by one of his group mates who moved it close and towards the eye of [Jayson]. At that instance, the
compound in the test tube spurted out and several particles of which hit *Jaysons+ eye and the different parts of the
bodies of some of his group mates. As a result thereof, *Jaysons+ eyes were chemically burned, particularly his left eye,
for which he had to undergo surgery and had to spend for his medication. Upon filing of this case [in] the lower court,
*Jaysons+ wound had not completely healed and still had to undergo another surgery.
Upon learning of the incident and because of the need for finances, *Jaysons+ mother, who was working abroad, had to
rush back home for which she spent P36,070 for her fares and had to forego her salary from November 23, 1994 to
December 26, 1994, in the amount of at least P40,000.
On the other hand, [petitioners SJC, Sr. Josephini Ambatali, SFIC, and Tabugo] alleged that [Jayson] was a grade six pupil
of SJC. On November 17, 1994, before the science experiment was conducted, [Jayson] and his classmates were given
strict instructions to follow the written procedure for the experiment and not to look into the test tube until the heated
compound had cooled off. [Jayson], however, a person of sufficient age and discretion and completely capable of
understanding the English language and the instructions of his teacher, without waiting for the heated compound to
cool off, as required in the written procedure for the experiment and as repeatedly explained by the teacher, violated
such instructions and took a magnifying glass and looked at the compound, which at that moment spurted out of the
test tube, a small particle hitting one of [Jaysons+ eyes.
Jayson was rushed by the school employees to the school clinic and thereafter transferred to St. Lukes Medical Center
for treatment. At the hospital, when Tabago visited [Jayson], the latter cried and apologized to his teacher for violating
her instructions not to look into the test tube until the compound had cooled off.
After the treatment, [Jayson] was pronounced ready for discharge and an eye test showed that his vision had not been
impaired or affected. In order to avoid additional hospital charges due to the delay in *Jaysons+ discharge, Rodolfo S.
Miranda, *Jaysons+ father, requested SJC to advance the amount of P26,176.35 representing *Jaysons+ hospital bill until
his wife could arrive from abroad and pay back the money. SJC acceded to the request.
On December 6, 1994, however, the parents of [Jayson], through counsel, wrote SJC a letter demanding that it should
shoulder all the medical expenses of [Jayson] that had been incurred and will be incurred further arising from the
accident caused by the science experiment.
RTC in favor of Jayson. CA affirmed.
Issue: W/N petitioners are liable. YES
Ratio: Both courts correctly concluded that the immediate and proximate cause of the accident which caused injury to
Jayson was the sudden and unexpected explosion of the chemicals, independent of any intervening cause. The assailed
Decision of the CA quotes with favor the RTC decision, thus:
In this case, [petitioners] failed to show that the negligence of [Jayson] was the proximate cause of the latters injury.
We find that the immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of [Jayson] when he curiously looked into the
test tube when the chemicals suddenly exploded which caused his injury, but the sudden and unexpected explosion of
the chemicals independent of any intervening cause. [Petitioners] could have prevented the mishap if they exercised a
higher degree of care, caution and foresight.
The court a quo correctly ruled that: "All of the [petitioners] are equally at fault and are liable for negligence because all
of them are responsible for exercising the required reasonable care, prudence, caution and foresight to prevent or avoid
injuries to the students. The individual [petitioners] are persons charged with the teaching and vigilance over their
students as well as the supervision and ensuring of their well-being. Based on the facts presented before this Court,
these [petitioners] were remiss in their responsibilities and lacking in the degree of vigilance expected of them.
[Petitioner] subject teacher Rosalinda Tabugo was inside the classroom when the class undertook the science
experiment although [Jayson] insisted that said [petitioner] left the classroom.

No evidence, however, was presented to establish that [petitioner] Tabugo was inside the classroom for the whole
duration of the experiment. It was unnatural in the ordinary course of events that [Jayson] was brought to the school
clinic for immediate treatment not by [petitioner] subject teacher Rosalinda Tabugo but by somebody else. The Court is
inclined to believe that [petitioner] subject teacher Tabugo was not inside the classroom at the time the accident
happened. The Court is also perplexed why none of the other students (who were eyewitnesses to the incident) testified
in Court to corroborate the story of the [petitioners]. The Court, however, understands that these other students cannot
testify for [Jayson] because [Jayson] is no longer enrolled in said school and testifying for [Jayson] would incur the ire of
school authorities.
Estefania Abdan is equally at fault as the subject adviser or teacher in charge because she exercised control and
supervision over [petitioner] Tabugo and the students themselves. It was her obligation to insure that nothing would go
wrong and that the science experiment would be conducted safely and without any harm or injury to the students.
[Petitioner] Sr. Josephini Ambatali is likewise culpable under the doctrine of command responsibility because the other
individual [petitioners] were under her direct control and supervision. The negligent acts of the other individual
[petitioners] were done within the scope of their assigned tasks.
"The defense of due diligence of a good father of a family raised by [petitioner] St. Joseph College will not exculpate it
from liability because it has been shown that it was guilty of inexcusable laxity in the supervision of its teachers (despite
an apparent rigid screening process for hiring) and in the maintenance of what should have been a safe and secured
environment for conducting dangerous experiments. [Petitioner] school is still liable for the wrongful acts of the
teachers and employees because it had full information on the nature of dangerous science experiments but did not
take affirmative steps to avert damage and injury to students. The fact that there has never been any accident in the
past during the conduct of science experiments is not a justification to be complacent in just preserving the status quo
and do away with creative foresight to install safety measures to protect the students. Schools should not simply install
safety reminders and distribute safety instructional manuals. More importantly, schools should provide protective gears
and devices to shield students from expected risks and anticipated dangers.
"Ordinarily, the liability of teachers does not extend to the school or university itself, although an educational institution
may be held liable under the principle of RESPONDENT SUPERIOR. It has also been held that the liability of the employer
for the [tortuous] acts or negligence of its employees is primary and solidary, direct and immediate and not conditioned
upon the insolvency of or prior recourse against the negligent employee."
As found by both lower courts, the proximate cause of Jaysons injury was the concurrent failure of petitioners to
prevent the foreseeable mishap that occurred during the conduct of the science experiment. Petitioners were negligent
by failing to exercise the higher degree of care, caution and foresight incumbent upon the school, its administrators and
teachers.
Article 218 of the Family Code, in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, bestows special parental authority on the
following persons with the corresponding obligation, thus:
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care shall
have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or
custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school,
entity or institution.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
Moreover, petitioners cannot simply deflect their negligence and liability by insisting that petitioner Tabugo gave
specific instructions to her science class not to look directly into the heated compound.
In marked contrast, both the lower courts similarly concluded that the mishap which happened during the science
experiment was foreseeable by the school, its officials and teachers. This neglect in preventing a foreseeable injury and
damage equates to neglect in exercising the utmost degree of diligence required of schools, its administrators and
teachers, and, ultimately, was the proximate cause of the damage and injury to Jayson. As we have held in St. Marys,

"for petitioner *St. Marys Academy+ to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as
negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the
accident."12
St. Francis High School vs. CA| Paras G.R. No. 82465 February 25, 1991 |SCRA
FACTS
Ferdinand Castillo, then a freshman student of Section 1-C at the St. Francis High
School, wanted to join a school picnic undertaken by Class I-B and Class I-C at Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon.
Ferdinand's parents, respondents spouses Dr. Romulo Castillo and Lilia Cadiz Castillo, because of short notice, did not
allow their son to join but merely allowed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic, with the directive that he
should go back home after doing so. However, because of persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand went on with them to
the beach.
During the picnic and while the students, including Ferdinand, were in the water, one of the female teachers was
apparently drowning. Some of the students, including Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process, it was
Ferdinand himself who drowned. His body was recovered but efforts to resuscitate him ashore failed.
Thereupon, the Castillo spouses filed a complaint against the St. Francis High School, represented by the spouses
Fernando Nantes and Rosario Lacandula, Benjamin Illumin (its principal), and the teachers: Tirso de Chaves, Luisito
Vinas, Connie Arquio, Nida Aragones, Yoly Jaro, and Patria Cadiz, for Damages which respondents allegedly incurred
from the death of their 13-year old son, Ferdinand Castillo.
The TC found in favor of the Castillo spouses and against petitioners-teachers Arquio, de Chaves, Vinas, Aragones, Jaro
and Cadiz. On the other hand, the TC dismissed. the case against the St. Francis High School, Benjamin Illumin and
Aurora Cadorna.
o While it is alleged that when defendants Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones arrived at the picnic site, the drowning incident
had already occurred, such fact does not and cannot excuse them from their liability. In fact, it could be said that by
coming late, they were remiss in their duty to safeguard the students.
o Benjamin Illumin had himself not consented to the picnic and in fact he did not join it. Defendant Aurora Cadorna had
then her own class to supervise and in fact she was not amongst those allegedly invited by defendant Connie Arquio to
supervise class I-C to which Ferdinand Castillo belongs.
CA
o St. Francis High School and the school principal, Benjamin Illumin, are
liable under Article 2176 taken together with the 1st, 4th and 5th
paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code
o Under Article 2180, supra, the defendant school and defendant school
principal must be found jointly and severally liable with the defendants- teachers for the damages incurred by the
plaintiffs as a result of the death of Ferdinand. It is the rule that the negligence of the employees in causing the injury or
damage gives rise to a presumption of negligence on the part
of the owner and/or manager of the establishment (in the present case, St. Francis High School and its principal); and
while this presumption is not conclusive, it may be overthrown only by clear and convincing proof that the owner and/or
manager exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and/or supervision of the
employee or employees causing the injury or damage (in this case, the defendants- teachers). The record does not
disclose such evidence as would serve to overcome the aforesaid presumption and absolve the St. Francis High School
and its principal from liability.
o Whether or not the victim's parents had given such permission to their son was immaterial to the determination of the
existence of liability on the part of the school and school officials for the damage incurred by the Castillo spouses as a
result of the death of their son. What is material to such a determination is whether or not there was negligence on the
part of school officials vis-a-vis the supervision of the victim's group during the picnic; and, as correctly found by the trial
court, an affirmative reply to this question has been satisfactorily established by the evidence, as already pointed out.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N there was negligence attributable to the school officials which will
warrant the award of damages to the Castillo spouses;
W/N Art. 2180, in relation to Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code is applicable to
the case at bar;
W/N the award of exemplary and moral damages is proper under the

circumstances surrounding the case at bar.


Castillos:
The death of their son was due to the failure of the petitioners to exercise the proper diligence of a good father of the
family in preventing their son's drowning
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
No. There was no negligence attributable to the school officials which will warrant the award of damages to the Castillo
spouses.
The school officials are neither guilty of their own negligence or guilty of the
negligence of those under them. Consequently, they are not liable for damages.
No. Art. 2180, in relation to Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code is not applicable to the case at bar.
Before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or
omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee
was in the performance of his assigned tasks.
In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of their assigned tasks. The incident
happened not within the school premises, not on a school day and most importantly while the teachers and students
were holding a purely private affair, a picnic. It is clear from the beginning that the incident happened while some
members of the I-C class of St. Francis High School were having a picnic at Talaan Beach. This picnic had no permit from
the school head or its principal, Benjamin Illumin because this picnic is not a school sanctioned activity neither is it
considered as an extra-curricular activity.
Mere knowledge by petitioner/principal Illumin of the planning of the picnic by the students and their teachers does
not in any way or in any manner show acquiescence or consent to the holding of the same.
No. The award of exemplary and moral damages is improper under the circumstances surrounding the case at bar.
No negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers to warrant the award
of damages to the respondents-spouses.
Petitioners Connie Arquio the class adviser of I-C, the section where Ferdinand belonged, did her best and exercised
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any untoward incident or damages to all the students who joined the
picnic.
With these facts in mind, no moral nor exemplary damages may be awarded in favor of respondents-spouses. The case
at bar does not fall under any of the grounds to grant moral damages.9
Separate Opinion:
Padilla, dissenting:
Although the excursion may not have been attended by the appropriate school authorities, the presence or stamp of
authority of the school nevertheless pervaded by reason of the participation not of one but of several teachers, the
petitioners. As found by the court a quo, the excursion was an activity "organized by the teachers themselves, for the
students and to which the student, NATURALLY, acceded."
Having known of the forthcoming activity, petitioner Illumin, as school principal, should have taken appropriate
measures to ensure the safety of his students. His silence and negligence in performing his role as principal head of the
school that must be construed as an implied consent to such activity.
As administrative head (principal) of St. Francis High School, petitioner Illumin acted as the agent of his principal (the
school) or its representatives, the petitioners-spouses Nantes and Lacandula. Consequently, and as found by the
respondent court. Article 2176 in conjunction with Article 2180,
9 Art. 2217. Moral Damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission.
paragraphs (1) and (5) are applicable to the situation. In the application of these provisions, the negligence of the
employee in causing injury or damage gives rise to a presumption of negligence on the part of the owner and/or
manager of the establishment. While this presumption is not conclusive, it may be overcome only by clear and
convincing evidence that the owner and/or manager exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and/or supervision of the employees causing the injury or damage. I agree with the respondent court that no
proof was presented to absolve the owner and/or manager, herein petitioners-spouses Nantes and Lacandula, and
Illumin. Thus, as correctly held by the respondent court, they too must be accountable for the death of Ferdinand
Castillo.

PSBA v. Court of Appeals | Padilla


G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992| 205 SCRA 729
FACTS
Carlitos Bautista was a third year commerce student in PSBA. In Aug 30, 1985, he was stabbed while on the 2nd floor
of the school, causing his death. It was established that the assailants were not students of PSBA.
The parents of Carlitos filed a damage suit against PSBA and its school authorities for the death of their child.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that since they are presumably sued under Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
the complaint states no cause of action against them, as jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that academic
institutions, such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit of the rule in the afore-stated article.
RTC dismissed the MTD. CA affirmed. The CA ratiocinated as follows: Article 2180 (formerly Article 1903) of the Civil
Code is an adoption from the old Spanish Civil Code. The comments of Manresa and learned authorities on its meaning
should give way to present day changes. The law is not fixed and flexible (sic); it must be dynamic. In fact, the greatest
value and significance of law as a rule of conduct in (sic) its flexibility to adopt to changing social conditions and its
capacity to meet the new challenges of progress.Construed in the light of modern day educational system, Article 2180
cannot be construed in its narrow concept as held in the old case of Exconde vs. Capuno and Mercado vs. Court of
Appeals; hence, the ruling in the Palisoc case that it should apply to all kinds of educational institutions, academic or
vocational.At any rate, the law holds the teachers and heads of the school staff liable unless they relieve themselves of
such liability pursuant to the last paragraph of Article 2180 by "proving that they observed all the diligence to prevent
damage." This can only be done at a trial on the merits of the case.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N PSBA and its school authorities are vicariously liable for the death of
Carlitos Bautista inside its premises.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
NO, THEY ARE NOT LIABLE.
Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco parentis. This Court
discussed this doctrine in the afore-cited cases of Exconde, Mendoza, Palisoc and, more recently, in Amadora vs. Court
of Appeals. 6 In all such cases, it had been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage should
have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of he educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of
its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this material situation does not exist in the present case for, as
earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made
liable.
Soliman vs. Tuazon | Feliciano
G.R. No. 66207, May 18, 1992 | 209 SCRA 47
FACTS
Petitioner Soliman Jr. filed a civil complaint for damages against respondents Republic Central Colleges, R.L. Security
Agency, and Solomon, a security guard at Republic.
The complaint alleges that one morning, while Soliman was in the premises of Republic, as he was still a regular
enrolled student, Solomon with intent to kill attacked and shot him in the abdomen. It is further alleged that such
wound would have caused his death, were it not for timely medical assistance, and because of this he may not be able
to attend his regular classes and perform his usual work from three to four months.
Republic Colleges filed a motion to dismiss, contending that Soliman had no action against it. It averred that it should
be free from liability because it was not the employer of the security guard. Moreover, Article 2180 (7th paragraph) did
not apply, since such holds teachers and heads responsible only for damages caused by their pupils and
students/apprentices.
The MTD was granted by the judge. Hence this instant petition. ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N Republic Central Colleges may be held liable for damages.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
REPUBLIC CENTRAL COLLEGES MAY NOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR DAMAGES UNDER ARTICLE 2180 (AS AN EMPLOYER).
HOWEVER, IT MAY BE LIABLE ON THE BASIS OF AN IMPLIED CONTRACT.
Under Article 2180 of the NCC, employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or

industry. Also, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils,
their students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
There is no basis to hold Republic liable under Article 2180. The employer of security guard Solomon was R.L. Security
Agency Inc. Where the security agency, as here, recruits, hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or security guards,
the agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen. Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security
guards attaches to the employer agency, and not to the clients or customers of such agency.
The fact that a client company may give instructions or directions to the security guards assigned to it, does not, by
itself, render the client responsible as an employer.
Solomon was neither a pupil nor a student of Republic. Hence, the provision with
regard to the liability of teachers and heads is also not available to make Republic
liable for damages.
Nevertheless, Republic may be held liable on the basis of an implied contract
between it and Soliman, because of its obligation to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to
prevent the breakdown thereof. Should this be the case, the school may still avoid liability by proving that the breach of
its contractual obligation to the students was not due to its negligence, here statutorily defined to be the omission of
that degree of diligence which is required by the nature of obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of person,
time and place.
Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he supposed that petitioner could have no cause of action other than
one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Respondent trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but
rather should have, in the interest of justice, allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex
contractu or ex lege on the part of respondent Colleges.
Petition GRANTED. Order REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Case REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings.