(1) PUBLIC STATEMENT BY CIA DIRECTOR JOHN BRENNAN

ON THE SSCI REPORT ON THE FORMER DETENTION AND

INTERROGATION PROGRAM

Over the past several decades, and especially since the terrible
tragedy of 9/11, the CIA has been at the forefront of our Nations
campaign against al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations
worldwide. The women and men of the CIA have operated
around the globe, 24-hours-a-day, working with their U.S.
colleagues as well as with foreign partners to prevent terrorist
attacks. As a result of these efforts, including the many sacrifices
made by CIA officers and their families, countless lives have been
saved and our Homeland is more secure.

As part of the CIAs global effort to dismantle al-Qaida and to

prevent future terrorist attacks, the Agency was directed by
President Bush six days after 9/11 to carry out a program to
detain terrorist suspects around the world. Certain detainees
were subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs),
which the Department of Justice determined at the time to be
lawful and which were duly authorized by the Bush Administration.
These techniques, which were last used by the CIA in December
2007, subsequently were prohibited by an Executive Order issued
by President Obama when he took office in January 2009.

Today, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI)

released a redacted version of the Executive Summary, Findings,
and Conclusions of its Study on CIAs former detention and
interrogation program, along with Minority Views and the

Additional Views of a number of Committee members on the

same subject. The CIA has also released its redacted June 2013
response to the Study, which is being posted on our website,
www.cia.gov.

As noted in CIAs response to the study, we acknowledge that the

detention and interrogation program had shortcomings and that
the Agency made mistakes. The most serious problems occurred
early on and stemmed from the fact that the Agency was
unprepared and lacked the core competencies required to carry
out an unprecedented, worldwide program of detaining and
interrogating suspected al-Qaida and affiliated terrorists. In
carrying out that program, we did not always live up to the high
standards that we set for ourselves and that the American people
expect of us. As an Agency, we have learned from these
mistakes, which is why my predecessors and I have implemented
various remedial measures over the years to address institutional
deficiencies.

Yet, despite common ground with some of the findings of the

Committees Study, we part ways with the Committee on some
key points. Our review indicates that interrogations of detainees
on whom EITs were used did produce intelligence that helped
thwart attack plans, capture terrorists, and save lives. The
intelligence gained from the program was critical to our
understanding of al-Qaida and continues to inform our
counterterrorism efforts to this day.

We also disagree with the Studys characterization of how CIA

briefed the program to the Congress, various entities within the

Executive Branch, and the public. While we made mistakes, the
record does not support the Studys inference that the Agency
systematically and intentionally misled each of these audiences
on the effectiveness of the program. Moreover, the process
undertaken by the Committee when investigating the program
provided an incomplete and selective picture of what occurred.
As noted in the Minority views and in a number of additional views
of Members, no interviews were conducted of any CIA officers
involved in the program, which would have provided Members
with valuable context and perspective surrounding these events.

Throughout its 67-year history, CIA has played a critical role

keeping our Nation secure, and CIA officers are rightly proud and
honored to be part of an organization that is indispensable to our
national security. The numerous challenges on the world stage
demand the full attention, focus, and capabilities of the women
and men of the CIA so that our country can stay strong and our
fellow Americans remain safe. To be successful, the CIA needs to
work closely with its Congressional oversight committees as we
confront these challenges. With todays release of Committee
documents and the CIA response, we look forward to the way
ahead.

(2) CIA FACT SHEET REGARDING THE SSCI STUDY ON THE

FORMER DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM

The Detention and Interrogation Program Ended in

2009 and Will Not Be Renewed at CIA:

President Obama ended the detention and
interrogation program nearly six years ago in 2009.
The use of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques
(EITs) by CIA ended in December 2007, and was
subsequently prohibited by an Executive Order
issued by President Obama when he took office in
January 2009.
The President also directed that CIA no longer
operate detention facilities and banned the use of all
interrogation techniques that are not in the Army
Field Manual for those held in U.S. custody or under
the effective control of the United States in any
armed conflict.
It is Director Brennans resolute intention to
ensure that Agency officers scrupulously adhere to
these directives, which the Director fully supports.

History:
The detention and interrogation program was
authorized by President George W. Bush six days
after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, reviewed and
determined to be lawful by the Justice Department,

and implemented by the CIA.

The program was one part of a global counterterrorism effort undertaken by CIA to dismantle alQaida and prevent another mass-casualty strike on
American soil.

CIAs Response Acknowledges Serious Mistakes:

CIAs 2013 response (found at www.cia.gov) to
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI)
Study acknowledges that the program had
shortcomings and the Agency made mistakes. The
most serious problems occurred early on and
stemmed from the fact that the Agency was
unprepared and lacked the core competencies
required to undertake an unprecedented program of
detaining and interrogating suspected terrorists
around the world.
In carrying out that program, CIA did not always
live up to the high standards that we set for
ourselves and that the American people expect of
us.
CIA has owned up to these mistakes, learned
from them, and taken numerous corrective actions
over the years. Further improvements to CIA
practices continue to be made today as a result of

our review of the SSCI Study.

The Program Produced Valuable and Unique

Intelligence:
The Agency takes no position on whether
intelligence obtained from detainees who were
subjected to EITs could have been obtained through
other means or from other individuals. The answer
to this question is, and will remain, unknowable.
However, CIA reviews indicate that the program,
including interrogations of detainees on whom EITs
were used, did produce valuable and unique
intelligence that helped thwart attack plans, capture
terrorists and save lives. Tab C of the Agencys
response addresses this issue in detail.
CIAs position on the value of information derived
from detainees is not an endorsement of the policy
decision to use EITs or an ends-justify-the-means
case for them, but merely a reflection of the
historical record.
CIA assesses that most of the 20 case studies
cited in the SSCI Study and the Agencys
representations about them remain valid examples
of the programs effectiveness, although CIA has
acknowledged some flaws in its past

representations.

Bin Ladin Example:

For instance, information that CIA obtained from
detainees played a role, in combination with other streams
of intelligence, in finding Usama Bin Ladin.
Information from detainees in CIA custody relating to
the involvement of courier Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in
delivering messages to and from Bin Ladin fundamentally
changed our assessment of his potential importance to our
hunt for Bin Ladin.
As an example, Ammar al-Baluchi, after undergoing
EITs, was the first detainee to reveal that Abu Ahmad alKuwaiti served as a courier for messages from Bin Ladin
after Bin Laden had departed Afghanistan. Before that,
CIA had only general information that Abu Ahmad had
interacted with Bin Ladin before the groups retreat from
Tora Bora in late 2001, when Bin Ladin was relatively
accessible to a number of al-Qaida figures.
This information prompted CIA to re-question other
detainees on Abu Ahmads role, to review previous
reporting in light of this information, and to increase the
focus of Abu Ahmads role in our questioning. CIA then
combined this information with reporting from other
streams to build a profile of Abu Ahmads experiences,

family, and characteristics that allowed us to eventually

determine his true name and location.

CIA Representations to Congress, the Executive

Branch, and the Public Regarding the Program:
CIA disagrees with the Studys inference that the
CIA systematically and intentionally misrepresented
the program to Congress, others in the Executive
Branch, and the media.
The Agencys record is not perfect there were
instances where representations about the program
that were used or approved by Agency officers were
inaccurate, imprecise, or fell short of Agency
tradecraft standards -- but the factual record does
not support the inference in the Study that the
Agency conspired to intentionally mislead the
Congress or others regarding the effectiveness of
the program.
Within the limits on access established by the
White House, CIA made a good faith effort to keep
Congressional oversight committee leaders fully
briefed on the program.
CIA also facilitated multiple reviews by its own
Inspector General (IG), whose reports allowed
Agency leaders to address a number of the same

shortcomings noted in the SSCI report.

Despite some flaws in CIAs representations of
effectiveness, the overall nature and value of the
program, including the manner in which
interrogations were carried out and the IGs findings
about the programs shortcomings, were accurately
portrayed to CIAs Executive and Legislative Branch
overseers, as well as the Justice Department.

CIAs Response Included Recommendations Based on

a Review of the Study:
While there are no specific recommendations for
CIA improvement in the SSCI Study, CIA developed
its own recommendations based a review of the
concerns raised in the Study. CIA has made
substantial progress implementing these
recommendations, including:
o To better plan and manage sensitive
programs, CIA has codified a requirement to
explicitly address at the outset lines of
authority, resources, the implications of public
disclosure, and an exit strategy.
o CIA is improving how it assesses the
effectiveness of its sensitive programs and
has instituted a process for determining which

assignments entail particularly sensitive

responsibilities requiring enhanced vetting of
CIA officers being considered for those
assignments.
o CIA has created a mechanism to ensure it
regularly revalidates and, as necessary,
updates the factual basis for the legal
guidance on which it relies from the Justice
Departments Office of Legal Counsel.
o CIA has established a requirement that
internal accountability boards do not focus
exclusively on individual misconduct, but look
more broadly at any systemic problems.

CIAs Response Takes an Introspective Look at the

Past with an Eye towards the Future:
CIA has learned many lessons over the years
from this chapter in its history, and the Agency is
stronger as a result. The SSCI Study is no
exception.
Nevertheless, CIA must ensure the SSCI Study
doesnt undermine the confidence of officers
charged with executing current or future Presidential
directives and hopes that, in the future, such reports
can be the result of collaborative, bi-partisan

investigations.
CIA sincerely hopes that, as a result of the
Committees work and our subsequent review and
response, we can move forward in our efforts to
address successfully the many national security
challenges facing our nation. By learning from the
past while focusing on the future, we will be best
able to meet our responsibility to protect the
American people.