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Message Guidance: Executive Action Will Not Be a Magnet for Future Unauthorized
Immigration
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President Obama is taking action within his legal authority to address our broken immigration
system, just as a bipartisan group of 11 presidents have done 39 times in the last 60 years.
This executive action is focusing enforcement resources on felons not families, making our
community safer and keep families together.
Bringing nearly five million people out of the shadows is a win for American workers and
taxpayers, with increased tax revenue, and an upward push on wages.
Executive action is not a substitute for legislation, and Congress still must act to pass a
permanent solution to our broken immigration system.
Key Points
President Obama is taking action within his legal authority to address our broken immigration system
President Obama is taking action within his legal authority to address our broken immigration
system. This is about good policy that keeps families together, grows our economy and makes
our country safer.
Eleven presidentsincluding Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and George W. Bushhave
acted 39 times to address immigration over the last 60 years.
In 1991, President George H.W. Bush took action that shielded 1.5 million people from
deportation, about 40 percent of the undocumented immigrants in the country at that time.
President Obamas action impacts a similar number of undocumented immigrants.
President Obamas executive action focuses our enforcement actions on felons not families,
enhancing public safety and taking steps to avoid ripping families apart.
Focusing on serious criminals and felons will make our communities safer.
Our enforcement agencies will now have information on more than four million undocumented
immigrants who will come out of the shadows. They will register with the government and both
they and their employers will pay taxes.
Bringing nearly five million people out of the shadows is a win for American workers and taxpayers
Bringing five million people onto the books means that they and their employers have to pay
taxes, which benefits all Americans. CAP has estimated that in the first year of the program
alone, these five million immigrants will contribute $3 billion in payroll tax revenue alone, and
$22.6 billion over five years.
The costs of this action will be paid for by administrative fees paid by the immigrants
themselves.
Executive action is not a substitute for legislation, and Congress still must act
Speaker Boehner has had a bipartisan passed Senate bill sitting on his desk for more than a year.
The bipartisan Senate bill passed 68-32 in 2013, with support from 14 Republicans, one of the
few things this Congress has been able to do in a bipartisan way in years. That bill had the
strongest border security provisions in American history, but Boehner refused to bring it to a
vote.
Only Congress can solve our broken immigration system, but the President is taking actions
within his authority while Congress delays.
Congress of course makes the laws. But the president has wide latitude in determining how to
go about enforcing those laws. From a legal perspective, there is no question that the president
has the power to broadly expand deferred action. The legal underpinning of deferred action is
prosecutorial discretion which is the decision to enforce, or not enforce, a particular law against
an individual. Every law enforcement agency in the world engages makes these determinations:
They are the inevitable by-product of enforcement in a universe of limited resources. And in the
immigration context, a decision to focus on violent offenders, for example, is a completely
unexceptional use of this executive authority.
Law scholars agree that the president has the legal authority. In September, 136 immigration
law professors penned a letter arguing that President Obama has broad legal authority on
immigration, and that his prosecutorial discretion power is backed by the Constitution.
Executive Action that provides discretionary relief from deportation has been used by every single
president since Eisenhower.
Eleven U.S. presidents from both parties have taken executive actions on immigration 39 times
over the past 60 years.
Many of these executive policies have been sweeping in scope. George H.W. Bush, for example,
in accordance with his Family Fairness policy, deferred the deportation of up to 1.5 million
undocumented spouses and children of individuals who were legalized under the Immigration
and Reform Act of 1986.
Executive Action will improve public safety and national security because it requires undocumented
immigrants to register with the government and undergo background checks.
Currently more than 11 million undocumented immigrants are living in the United States and
their identities, addresses, and backgrounds are unknown to the government. Although the vast
majority of these individuals are hard-working, law-abiding and are deeply rooted in the U.S.,
their anonymity makes it harder for law enforcement to identify those individuals who
represent a threat to our communities. A policy that enables low-priority immigrants to come
forward, register with the government, and request a reprieve from removal, will help us focus
on high priorities.
Providing temporary legal status improves public safety as individuals no longer fear being
deported, and are more willing to communicate with the authorities and report crimes. It also
decreases their chances of being victimized because of their immigration status, when criminals
know that they will not go to the police because of they lack status. Our communities are safest
when everyone feels comfortable and safe to come forward to the legal authorities.
a. Deferred action also opens opportunities for individuals to secure drivers licenses and auto
insurance. These policies help increase road safety by ensuring that undocumented immigrants
are driving with the appropriate training and financial safeguards. For example, a study showed
that around 57% of individuals, who received a temporary relief from deportation under
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, were able to receive their drivers
licenses. DACA, a 2012 executive action, provided relief to 553,197 eligible undocumented
individuals who came to the U.S. as children.
Providing deferred action to low-priority undocumented immigrants will produce large economic
benefits to the nation.
Undocumented immigrants who receive deferred action and temporary work permits will see
their wages rise by 8.5 percent as they can work legally, and find jobs that match their skills.
If 5 million undocumented immigrants are eligible to apply for work permits, these workers will
add $3 billion more in payroll taxes in the first year of the program. Over five years, these
workers will contribute $22.6 billion in payroll taxes to the U.S. economy.
Providing temporary legalization to undocumented workers will not undermine the job
opportunities or wages of American workers. Immigrants and native-born workers typically do
not compete for the same jobs, but instead complement one another.
A 2014 Gallup poll shows that 94 percent of Americans believed it is important for the
administration to take steps to deal with undocumented immigrants already living in the U.S.
this year.
A 2014 Pew survey shows there is bipartisan support for providing legal status to undocumented
immigrants 81 percent of Democrats and 64 percent of Republicans favor such policies.
Overall, 73 percent of all Americans sampled in the 2014 Pew surveyand 89 percent of
Latinossay that undocumented individuals who meet certain criteria should be allowed to stay
legally in the U.S.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the Obama administration did not ramp up enforcement or
deportations after he took office. Nor did he scale back enforcement. Instead, he attempted to
direct resources in a more targeted fashion by eliminating large work place raids, emphasizing
border enforcement over interior removals, and resetting the agencys priorities.
The Obama Administration inherited an immigration enforcement regime that had doubled in size
since 2002. In President Bushs last year in office, the budget for immigration and border
enforcement reached more than $17 billion and those resources were leveraged to deport 360,000
people. So the immigration enforcement apparatus was already built and in overdrive when
President Obama took office.
Over the course of the last 6 years, the annual budget for immigration and border enforcement has
hovered between $17 and $18 billion with an average of roughly 400,000 removals each year.
It is true that there has been a slight uptick in the amount of funding Congress has appropriated
each year for enforcement purposes and in the number of removals that have been effected. But it
is also true that removals have comported more closely with articulated agency priorities people
with criminal convictions, recent illegal entrants, and repeat immigration violators.
It is also true that attempted unlawful entriesa proxy for the number of people attempting to
enter the countryare at their lowest point in the last 40 years; concurrently, the likelihood of
apprehension at the border are at historic highs.
The best characterization of immigration and border enforcement under this administration is not a
ramping up and then a scaling back. It is more a matter of maintaining the inherited scale of
operations while charting a more targeted course by defining and implementing priorities.
Message Guidance: Executive action will not be a magnet for future unauthorized immigration:
Strict eligibility requirements: As with the Deferred Action program for DREAMers (aka DACA), the
new grant of deferred action for parents, the DAPA program, has strict eligibility requirements.
Applicants: Must have a citizen or permanent resident child, have been in the country for at least 5
years, and must have entered the country prior to January 1, 2010. No one who came more recently
than 2010, or enters in the future, will be eligible.
Executive action will not be a magnet: There is also no evidence that the last legalization program
signed by President Reagan in 1986 (the Immigration Reform and Control Act) incentivized the flow
of unauthorized immigrants. In fact, in the early 1990smore than five years after IRCAthe flow
of unauthorized immigrants actually dropped.
DACA was not a magnet: There is no evidence that the DACA program in 2012 caused a surge of
unauthorized migration:
o The uptick in child refugees at the southern border began well before the DACA
program was announced in FY 2012.
o Even taking into account these children, unauthorized migration is still at its lowest
point in the last 40 years.
o Pew estimates that the overall number of unauthorized migrants has stayed steady, not
rising.
New resources for border security: As part of the executive actions, DHS is putting in place new
enforcement priorities which will put an even stronger emphasis at identifying, catching, and
removing immigrants caught trying to enter the country without status. These investmentsalong
with a newly announced strategy to coordinate efforts across federal agencies at the borderadd
to the unprecedented resources the administration has already put on the border, doubling the
border patrol, and adding a litany of technology to ensure 100 percent eyes on the border to see
anyone attempting to cross in real time, 24/7.
A deferred action program will not increase the number of people looking for jobs in the U.S.,
thereby competing with American workers. There are already 8 million undocumented immigrants
working in the US. According to the Social Security Administration, only 38% of these workers and
their employers are paying payroll taxes. This means we are missing out on billions of dollars in tax
revenues each year.
Allowing 5 million low-priority undocumented immigrants to apply for work permits under deferred
action would create an avenue for these workers and their employers to get on the books and start
paying taxes, leading to a $22.6 billion increase in revenues, over five years.
Getting a work permit allows undocumented immigrants to move freely across the labor market and
find jobs that best match their skill. It is better for everyone and our economy when people are
working in jobs where they can utilize all of their skills. For example, everyone benefits when a
trained nurse is able to apply and get a job in a hospital instead of working as a nanny in someones
home.
Allowing undocumented immigrant to acquire a work permit will increase their earnings by 8.5%.
Immigrants will spend this extra earnings on things like cars, phones, and clothing. All of this extra
spending adds up, ultimately creating jobs and boosting wages for all workers.
Labor economist have consistently found that immigrants, including those who might receive
deferred action, and the native-born do not compete against each other because they have
different skill sets, and ultimately hold different jobs. In fact, as immigrants enter the labor
market, native-born workers move up the occupational ladder, with women and African
American workers being the most likely to do so.
Deferred action includes a rigorous application process that will eliminate any national security
threats. Applicants will have to register with the government and pass background checks before
they can receive the status, so no violent criminals, gang members, or terrorists will be able to take
advantage of the program.
Immigrants are already less likely to commit crimes than the native born: They are far less likely to
be in prison than the native born, and crime rates are lowest in states with the greatest growth in
immigrant populations.
There is no correlation between unauthorized immigration and crime. In fact, even as the
unauthorized immigrant population has risen over the past two decades, the violent crime rate in
the U.S. has dropped significantly.
Allowing low-priority immigrants to come forward and request deferred action means that there will
be fewer people living in the shadows, beyond the reach of law enforcement. Instead, the
government will know who is here to contribute and who is here to do us harm.
There is no question that the president has the legal authority to broadly expand deferred action.
The legal underpinning of deferred action is prosecutorial discretion and federal courts have
recognized the exercise of such discretion in the immigration context for decades.
There are clear and obvious limits to what the president can do: for example, he cannot provide
permanent status or citizenship to undocumented immigrants. Anything he does can be undone by
the next president. Executive action is therefore neither a complete nor a permanent solution to the
problems plaguing the immigration system but rather an interim step to make it more effective and
functional until Congress acts.
All 11 presidents from both parties have taken executive actions on immigration 39 times over
the past 60 years.
George H.W. Bush, for example, in accordance with his Family Fairness policy, deferred the
deportation of up to 1.5 million undocumented spouses and children of individuals who were
legalized under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. That was approximately 40%
of the estimated undocumented population at the time.
As with the Deferred Action program for DREAMers (aka DACA), any expansion of deferred action
will have strict eligibility requirements and only apply to individuals who have been in the country
for a significant period of time (e.g. 5 or 10 years). Anyone who came more recently or after the
announcement will be ineligible.
There is also no evidence that the last legalization program signed by President Reagan in 1986 (the
Immigration Reform and Control Act) incentivized the flow of unauthorized immigrants. In fact, in
the early 1990smore than five years after IRCAthe flow of unauthorized immigrants actually
dropped.
In any case, the massive buildup at the border since 1993 and especially over the last 10 years has
created a more secure border than ever before. Congress holds the key to providing lasting control
over the border by modernizing our legal immigration system and created legal channels that
effectively regulate our integrated labor market.
A 2014 Gallup poll shows that 94 percent of Americans believed it is important for the
administration to take steps to deal with undocumented immigrants already living in the U.S. this
year.
By a 57 to 39 percent margin, voters in Election Day exit polls preferred offering legal status to
unauthorized immigrants working in the U.S., rather than deporting them.
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Even as the president is protecting low-priority immigrants from removal, enforcement and removal
will continue unchanged. The administration will continue to deport people who enter without legal
status, and will continue to secure the border to keep them from entering in the first place.
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Interested Parties
Overview
A wide body of unambiguous federal case law makes clear that the Executive Branch has broad
prosecutorial discretion over the enforcement of federal law. Prosecutorial discretion, of course, is the
decision by a prosecutor to enforce, or not enforce, the law against an individual in a specific instance.
That exercise of discretion is rooted in the Presidents constitutional authority to take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed,1 and is the inevitable by-product of enforcement in a universe of limited
resources.
The courts have repeatedly affirmed that this broad discretionary authority extends to the
agency context, when a federal agency like the Department of Homeland Security is the decision-maker,
rather than a criminal prosecutor.2 And more specifically, federal courts have explicitly concluded that it
extends to immigration matters.3 In the immigration context today, where there is a profound mismatch
between enforcement resources and enforcement targets, Executive Branch discretion in deciding how
to allocate those resources is unavoidable.
Judicial review of enforcement decisions based on prosecutorial discretion is disfavored
because, among other things, the Government's enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship to
the Government's overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts
are competent to undertake.4 And in the agency context, because the decision to initiate
U.S. Const. Art. II, 3; United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 447 (1996); Heckler v. Chaney,
470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
2
See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832.
3
See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012) (A principal feature of the removal
system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials. . . Federal officials, as an initial matter,
must decide whether it makes sense to pursue removal at all . . .).
4
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985).
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administrative actions shares to some extent the characteristics of the decision of a prosecutor in the
executive branch [,+ courts are similarly hesitant to review agency decisions not to enforce.5
Over the years there have been numerous written agency policies guiding the exercise of
discretion in immigration enforcement, the most recent of which was the June 2011 memo from John
Morton, the former Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).6 These memos identify
what types of individuals and what types of conduct should be prioritized for enforcement and
conversely who and what should be low priorities. The current articulated prosecutorial discretion
standard for ICE and for Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) is principally one of pursuing
those cases that meet the agencys priorities for federal immigration enforcement generally.7
Although prosecutorial discretion often occurs in the normal course of enforcement, the
government can also establish policies that allow individuals to come forward and request an exercise of
discretion in their case. And in the immigration arena, the government has exercised its discretion
through a variety of administrative mechanisms, including deferred action.
Deferred action is a discretionary determination, recognized in statute and regulation, to defer
removal of an individual as an act of prosecutorial discretion.8 Decisions are made on a case-by-case
basis following an individualized review of the applicants request. For decades, federal officials in both
Republican and Democratic administrations have utilized deferred action in individual cases and
implemented policies that made it available to particular classes of people.
In short, prosecutorial discretion is so deeply ingrained in our constitutional architecture that it
amounts to an unexceptional exercise of executive power. Yet despite the wide latitude afforded the
executive branch, it is also true that the discretion is not unbounded and can be reinforced or
constrained (to some degree) by Congress.9 Several constitutional and statutory constraints establish
outer limits on the administrations authority to expand deferred action.
This brief provides additional background on deferred action and analyzes the constitutional and
statutory constraints on an expansion of deferred action. It concludes that, as long as the Administration
operates within those constraints, there are no legal obstacles to an expansion of deferred action.
5
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Background
Immigration officers are entrusted with the power to make individualized enforcement
decisions based on the availability of resources, agency enforcement priorities, and humanitarian
concerns. A wide variety of individualized enforcement decisions are subject to prosecutorial discretion,
including initiating removal cases, granting deferred action, granting parole, staying a final order of
removal, executing a removal order, and deciding to issue or cancel a notice of detainer.10
The Executive Branch has long used prosecutorial discretion in enforcing immigration law. As a
1959 textbook on immigration reform explained, Congress traditionally has entrusted the enforcement
of its deportation policies to executive officers and this arrangement has been approved by the
courts.11 This practice has been constant through both Republican and Democratic administrations.
During the George W. Bush Administration, for example, the Principal Legal Advisor for ICE explained the
Administration policy that some cases cry for an exercise of prosecutorial discretion.12
Deferred action is also a long-standing practice. The Executive Branch has used it for decades to
ensure the efficient and effective administration of the Immigration and Nationality Acts (INA)
detention and deportation provisions. In fact, every President since Eisenhower has utilized deferred
action or similar administrative mechanisms to exercise discretion in removal decisions.13
For example, in 1977, the Attorney General temporarily suspended the deportation of the Silva
letterholders, who were foreign nationals from the Western Hemisphere living in the United States
without legal authorization. Their deportation was suspended during the pendency of a class action
filed on their behalf, which sought to reclaim 145,000 visa slots that were incorrectly counted against
the quota for their countries.14
Another example of the large scale use of deferred action came in 1990, when President George
H.W. Bushs Immigration Commissioner expanded a blanket deferral of removal for all spouses and
10
11
12
2005).
13
15
children of the individuals legalized under the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act.15 That program
protected some 1.5 million individuals from removal, an estimated 40% of the undocumented
population at the time.
Moreover, federal regulations and policies have long authorized deferred action. Following the
actions taken on behalf of Silva letter holders, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in 1978
promulgated a broad statement regarding the availability of deferred action, which it revised in 1981.
That policy allowed INS district directors to recommend consideration of deferred action in appropriate
cases.16 The 1981 Instruction explained that: The deferred action category recognizes that the
Service has limited enforcement resources and that every attempt should be made administratively to
utilize these resources in a manner which will achieve the greatest impact under the immigration laws.
The executive branch has also issued a number of regulations providing for deferred action.17
In September 2012, USCIS implemented the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)
program. DACA does not confer substantive rights, immigration status, or pathways to citizenship on
those that meet the programs eligibility criteria.18 Instead, eligible individuals are granted the
opportunity to request a determination of whether they should be granted deferred action consistent
with DHSs existing prosecutorial discretion policy.
For successful applicants, USCIS defers removal proceedings for two years, subject to renewal.
Under existing regulations, such individuals may apply for employment authorization. As of June 2014,
USCIS had accepted 685,544 requests for deferred action under the program. It had approved 580,946
requests and rejected 23,883 requests, with the rest pending action.19
15
Id.
See MadaLuna v. Fitzpatrick, 813 F.2d 1006, 1008 n.1 (9th Cir. 1987).
17
See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. 214.14(d) (allowing for deferred action in the U-visa context); 8 C.F.R.
214.11 (allowing deferred action to T visa applicants); 70 Fed. Reg. 70992-70996 (Nov. 25, 2005)
(providing deferred action to foreign students impacted by Hurricane Katrina).
18
Childhood arrivals must make a request to USCIS for deferred action. In order to make a request
an applicant must have: (1) been younger than age 31 as of June 15, 2012; (2) come to the United States
before age 16; (3) continuously resided in the United State for five consecutive years; (4) entered the
United States without inspection before June 15, 2012 (or have had lawful immigration status expire as
of that date); (5) graduated from high school, currently be in school, or be an honorably discharged
veteran of the Coast Guard or Armed Forces of the United States ; (6) not been convicted of a felony or
serious misdemeanor; and (7) been physically present in the United States on June 15, 2012.
19
USCIS, Number of I-821D, Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals by Fiscal
Year, Quarter, Intake, Biometrics and Case Status: 2012-2014,available at
16
16
Constitutional Constraints
Notwithstanding the executive branchs broad discretionary authority to expand deferred
action, the Constitution does impose constraints on the Executive Branchs decision not to enforce the
removal provisions of the immigration laws in certain circumstances. First, the Constitution imposes a
duty on the President to take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and thus prevents the
Executive Branch from refusing to enforce a law simply because the President disagrees with the law.
Second, the president may not selectively enforce the immigration laws based on constitutionally
suspect criteriasuch as race, gender, or religion. Third, the president may not usurp Congresss role in
legislating. As discussed below, however, none of these limitations presents an obstacle to a deferred
action program modeled on the DACA program instituted in June 2012.
Take Care Clause
The first constitutional constraint on the Executive Branchs authority to expand the use of
deferred action is the Take Care Clause of the Constitution, which provides that the President shall take
care that the Laws be faithfully executed.20 While one could conceive of an Executive Branch
enforcement policy that might violate the Take Care Clauseif, for example, the President simply
refused to enforce an immigration law at all because he substantively disagreed with itno such
objection can be raised against either DACA or any similarly constructed future deferred action program,
for at least three reasons.
First, the Obama Administration is actively enforcing and implementing U.S. immigration laws,
including the provisions for removal of persons present without authorization and (especially) criminal
aliens. Just last year, ICE removed more than 400,000 individuals, 99% of which met one or more of the
agencys civil immigration enforcement priorities.21 ICEs choice to develop intelligent priorities for the
use of its enforcement resourcesto weigh national security, public safety, border security, and
humanitarian concernsdoes not violate the Take Care Clause. To the contrary, with limited budgetary
resources, ICE is compelled to prioritize cases to administer the immigration laws effectively and
efficiently.
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/Immigration%20
Forms%20Data/All%20Form%20Types/DACA/DACA_fy2014_qtr3.pdf
20
U.S. Const. Art. II, 3.
21
Marc R. Rosenblum & Kristen McCabe, Deportation and Discretion: Reviewing the Record and
the Option to Change (Migration Policy Institute, October 2014), available at
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/deportation-and-discretion-reviewing-record-and-optionschange
17
See supra at 2-3 (describing the constancy of prosecutorial discretion over several decades and
through administrations of either political party). Just last year ICE issued a prosecutorial discretionbased enforcement directive urging restraint in enforcement actions against alien parents, legal
guardians, and primary caretakers of minors who are U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents.
U.S.C.I.S. Directive No. 11064.1, Facilitating Parental Interests in the Course of Civil Immigration
Enforcement Activities (August 23, 2013). The Parental Interests Directive does not yet apply to the
parents of children present in the United States with no permanent legal status (e.g., DACA-eligible
minors).
23
See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 488 (1999) (As a general
matter . . . an alien unlawfully in this country has no constitutional right to assert selective enforcement
as a defense against his deportation.).
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without an adequate delegation of authority by Congress. Neither argument is persuasive in the context
of DACA or with respect to a broader deferred action program modeled on DACA.
First, critics have charged that DACA is unlawful because it represents an attempt to afford an
immigration benefit to the same population of aliens to whom Congress has failed to extend relief. That
unenacted legislation, the DREAM Act, would confer conditional permanent resident status for certain
immigrant students and would also allow them to apply for permanent legal status as long as they
attend college or serve in the U.S. Armed Forces. This critique is not persuasive for at least two reasons.
First, although a substantially similar group of people would benefit under both programs, DACAunlike
the DREAM Actconfers no substantive rights, immigration status, or pathway to citizenship. Because
the DREAM Act would modify immigrants substantive rights under federal immigration law, legislation
would be required. DACA (and a broader form of deferred action) does not have that effect, but rather
constitutes a channeling of Executive Branch discretion within the constraints of existing law. The mere
fact that the Executive Branch might take a step that is within its broad enforcement authority but
which Congress has not specifically authorized, does not render that action contrary to congressional
intent.
Second, critics also charge that Congress did not provide the Executive Branch with intelligible
principles to establish and implement the DACA program. This argument under the non-delegation
doctrine claims that 103(a)(3) of the INA is far too broad a grant of statutory authority to meet the
intelligible principles standard required for the Executive Branch to execute its lawmaking authority.24
But the non-delegation doctrine has never been used to invalidate an exercise of executive enforcement
discretion. That is because the doctrine acts as a limit on Congresss power to vest authority in the
Executive Branch, not on the Executive Branchs authority itself. Congress always legislates against a
background that includes the fundamental principle that the Executive Branch has enforcement
discretion.
Moreover, since the mid-1930s, virtually every delegation of lawmaking authority by Congress
to the Executive has been upheld*,+ and it is highly unlikely that a court would apply this moribund
doctrine to an immigration program when Congress has repeatedly delegated power to the Executive
Branch in this arena.25 This issue poses no meaningful challenge to the expanded use of deferred action.
Statutory Constraints
Federal statutes also impose some specific constraints on the manner in which deferred action
may be expanded, who may benefit from the expansion, and the overall scale of the expansion. First,
24
25
See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assn., Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
Id. at 282.
19
the Impoundment Control Act prohibits the taking of any . . . executive action or inaction which
effectively precludes the obligation or expenditure of budget authority, except in specific
circumstances that may not apply in this context. Second, appropriations riders require DHS to conduct
a background check before granting an immigration benefit, including deferred action, to any individual.
Third, the Immigration and Nationality Act also contains language explicitly regulating the granting of
immigration benefits, such as adjustment of status, so a deferred action program could not grant such
benefits. And fourth, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) generally prohibits the creation of a new
substantive rule without engaging in notice-and-comment rulemaking. As with the constitutional
constraints described above, none of these limitations will prevent the expansion of a deferred action
program modeled on DACA.26
Impoundment Control Act
The Impoundment Control Act regulates the Presidents authority to impound, i.e. not spend,
funds that Congress has appropriated. There are two categories of impoundment that the President
26
Other objections that have been raised to DACA and the expansion of any such programs are
clearly meritless and warrant only brief discussion. For example, DACA has been challenged as in
conflict with 1225(b)(1)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which states: If an immigration
officer determines that an alien . . . who is arriving in the United States or . . . is inadmissible . . . the
officer shall order the alien removed from the United States without further hearing or review . . . . 8
U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). In Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-cv-03247, 2013 WL 1744422
(N.D. Tex. 2013), the court held that this provision prohibited immigration officials from granting
deferred action to arriving and inadmissible aliens, due to the mandatory shall in the statute. The case
was subsequently dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and has not been addressed by other courts. Indeed,
commentators have roundly criticized the Crane holding and its interpretation of shall in the INA
context. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Love & Arpit K. Garg, Presidential Inaction and the Separation of Powers,
112 Mich. L. Rev. 1195, 1200 (2014) (arguing that critics of DACA have not presented a cogent legal
argument and citing the Crane decision as representing a minority view); Lauren Gilbert, Obama's Ruby
Slippers: Enforcement Discretion in the Absence of Immigration Reform, 116 W. Va. L. Rev. 255, 256
(2013) (discussing the Crane decision but concluding that DACA falls squarely within the Presidents
powers); see also David A. Martin, A Defense of Immigration-Enforcement Discretion: The Legal and
Policy Flaws in Kris Kobach's Latest Crusade, 122 Yale L.J. Online 167 (2012) (concluding the use of
shall in the INS affords the Executive Branch broad discretion over immigration enforcement
decisions). Further, Cranes treatment of the word shall is inconsistent with many other federal
decisions. See, e.g., Delgado v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (holding that the
Attorney General has discretion to hold that a non-aggravated felony constitutes a particularly serious
crime for purposes of withholding of removal despite the statutes use of shall); Matter of E-R-M &LR-M, 25 I. & N. Dec. 520 (2011) (holding that the shall in 1225(b)(2)(B) is permissive rather than
mandatory).
20
may not undertake without Congressional approval: deferral and rescission.27 The Act defines deferral
to include any . . . executive action or inaction which effectively precludes the obligation or expenditure
of budget authority. 28 This provision prevents the President from refusing to expend resources
appropriated by Congress on the grounds that he disagrees with the policy choice underlying the
appropriation.29
A decision by the Executive Branch to refuse to enforce provisions of the immigration laws could
violate the Impoundment Control Act if it had the effect of precluding the expenditure of funds that
Congress had appropriated for immigration enforcement. For example, for fiscal year 2014, Congress
appropriated $5,229,461,000 for salaries and expenses for ICE, not less than $2,785,096,000 [of which]
is for detention and removal operations and not less than $1,600,000,000 [of which] shall be available
to identify aliens convicted of a crime who may be deportable, and to remove them from the United
States once they are judged deportable.30 If an expanded deferred action policy prevented ICE from
expending those resources, it could constitute an unlawful deferral.
Nonetheless, the Impoundment Control Act presents no obstacle to the expanded use of
deferred action, for several reasons:
First, and most significantly, even with a broadened deferred-action program in place, it is
virtually certain that the Executive will expend all of the funds that Congress appropriates for any
particular fiscal year for detention and removal. The number of persons who can be removed in any
particular year, given resource constraints, is but a fraction of the number of removable persons present
within the United States. Moreover, a deferred-action program would allow the Executive to focus its
detention and removal priorities on those persons presenting particularly significant threats to national
security.
Second, the appropriations at issue are lump-sum appropriations, which agencies have
discretion to allocate among specific programs, projects, or items within the scope of the
27
See 2 U.S.C. 683 (setting forth procedure for rescission of budget authority); id. 684 (setting
forth procedure for deferral of budget authority).
28
Id. 682.
29
See City of New Haven, Conn. v. United States, 809 F.2d 900, 909 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that
Section 1013 of the Impoundment Control Act, 2 U.S.C. 684, remov [ed] any colorable statutory basis
for unchecked policy deferrals by the President of appropriations (emphasis in original)).
30
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2014, P.L. 113-76, 128 Stat. 247, 251
(2014).
21
appropriation.31 Consequently, DHS has substantial discretion over how it spends the appropriated
funds, so long as it stays within the very broad parameters of the statutory language. (Of course,
Congress could include more specific language in future appropriations bills.)
Third, an expanded deferred action policy would have at most a contingent, uncertain impact on
future enforcement spending. As an initial matter, the issuance of an expanded policy might, due to
implementation delays, have little to no impact on DHSs ability to spend presently-appropriated funds.
Any impact on future expenditures would (A) only affect funds not yet appropriated; (B) result from
case-by-case decisionmaking, with each individual case having no material effect; and (C) be highly
contingent on funding and enforcement decisions made by future Congresses and agency officials. In
these circumstances, it is unclear whether a deferred-action policy would constitute an executive
action which effectively precludes the obligation or expenditure of budget authority governed by the
Impoundment Control Act.
Fourth, as discussed above, the use of prosecutorial discretion is grounded in the Presidents
constitutional authority and well-established in the immigration context.32 Courts will hesitate to read
the Impoundment Control Act, in conjunction with appropriations legislation, to effectively override that
discretion by requiring the Executive Branch to spend fixed sums carrying out enforcement actions that
it would have otherwise declined to pursue.
Appropriations Restrictions
A rider on the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2014 imposes a concrete
procedural limitation on any expanded deferred action policy. That provision requires that a
background check be performed on an alien before any immigration benefit is granted.33 Because
31
See Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 192 (1993) (*T+he very point of a lump sum appropriation is to
give an agency the capacity to adapt to changing circumstances and meet its statutory responsibilities in
what it sees as the most effective or desirable way. . . . [A] fundamental principle of appropriations law
is that where Congress merely appropriates lump-sum amounts without statutorily restricting what can
be done with those funds, a clear inference arises that it does not intend to impose legally binding
restrictions . . . .); UAW v. Donovan, 746 F.2d 855, 860-861 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J.) (A lump-sum
appropriation leaves it to the recipient agency (as a matter of law, at least) to distribute the funds
among some or all of the permissible objects as it sees fit.)
32
See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012) (A principal feature of the
removal system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials.)
33
See 113 HR 3457, at 269 (SEC. 524. None of the funds made available in this Act may be used
by United States Citizenship and Immigration Services to grant an immigration benefit unless the results
of background checks required by law to be completed prior to the granting of the benefit have been
22
deferred action qualifies as an immigration benefit, any expanded deferred action policy must
incorporate background checks in the same manner that DACA already does.
An appropriations rider also provides that DHS shall maintain a level of not less than 34,000
detention beds.34 At present, DHS correctly interprets this language as a detention capacity
requirement rather than a detention utilization requirement. See [Testimony of Secretary Johnson
before House Appropriations Committee in March 2014]. As a result, this mandate would not conflict
with any expanded use of deferred action.
Immigration and Nationality Act
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) does not contain any express limits on deferred
action relief. Nevertheless, the INA does contain detailed rules for granting benefits that are more
permanent and substantial than deferred action. For example, the INAs adjustment of status provision
sets forth specific categories of persons who may apply for adjustment of status.35 The comprehensive
nature of that list implies that Congress did not authorize the Executive Branch to create new categories
of people who may receive a status adjustment. Consequently, any expanded deferred action program
should not attempt to authorize recipients to adjust their status directly or obtain other benefits in a
manner that contravenes existing law.
Administrative Procedure Act
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) places procedural requirements on federal agencies.
Section 553 of the Act requires agencies to afford notice of a proposed rulemaking and an opportunity
for public comment prior to a rules promulgation, amendment, modification, or repeal. This process,
including the litigation that often follows, is frequently used by opponents of a policy to challenge or
delay a rule. However, interpretative rules, general statements of policy, [and] rules of agency
organization, practice or procedure are exempted from the notice and comment requirement.36 The
received by United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, and the results do not preclude the
granting of the benefit.).
34
Department of Homeland Security, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, P. L. 113-76, P. 128 Stat. 251.
35
23
Manual defines general statements of policy as statements issued by an agency to advise the public
prospectively of the manner in which the agency proposes to exercise a discretionary power.37
In the most directly pertinent case on point, a federal court of appeals held that the 1978 and
1981 Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Operating Instructions relating to deferred action
were general statements of INS policy, not subject to the requirements of notice-and-comment
rulemaking.38 In reaching its decision, the court addressed when an agency directive is considered a
substantive rule, for which notice and comment procedures are required, or a general statement of
policy, for which they are not.39
Under the APA, a general statement of policy preserves [the officials+ flexibility and their
opportunity to make individualized determination*s+.40 To be such a general statement of policy, the
directive (1) must operate only prospectively, (2) must not establish a binding norm, and (3) must
leave INS officials free to consider the individual facts in the various cases that arise.41
A key factor considered by most courts is whether the policy provides sufficient discretion to the
agency. For example, the Eleventh Circuit held that a new policy requiring detention for Haitian
immigrants without any discernible guidelines for discretionary parolea departure from prior policy
did not qualify as a general statement of policy because such a broad rule of detention with undefined
37
MadaLuna v. Fitzpatrick, 813 F.2d 1006, 101213 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing the Manual, at 30. n. 3
(1947) (emphasis removed)).
38
See 813 F.2d at 1012.
39
40
41
Id. at 1013.
Id. (quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1014 (quotation marks omitted). Other circuits use similar analyses. See S.E.C. v. Markowski,
277 F. Appx 903, 905 (11th Cir. 2008) (This court generally differentiates on the basis that general policy
statements leave agencies free to exercise discretion whereas rules establish binding norms.); Ctr. for Auto
Safety v. Natl Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 452 F.3d 798, 807 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting the difficulty in
distinguishing between general statements of policy and agency rules, and looking to whether the statement
reflect*s+ final agency action or constitute*s+ binding rules.); Am. Hosp. Assn v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (Agency actions or statements falling within the three exemptions are not determinative of issues
or rights addressed. They express the agencys intended course of action, its tentative view of the meaning of a
particular statutory term, or internal house-keeping measures organizing agency activities. They do not, however,
foreclose alternate courses of action or conclusively affect rights of private parties. (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Schweiker, 649 F.2d 221, 224 (4th Cir. 1981) (stating that the policy at issue
was a general statement of policy because it operated only prospectively and did not establish a binding norm,
but rather *t+he agency retain[ed] discretion to require clinical investigations in appropriate cases and to approve
or disapprove individual NDAs on a case-by-case basis.).
24
exceptions is susceptible to rigid enforcement with no opportunity to avoid the rule's harsh results. 42
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit allowed the revocation of an interim rule without notice and comment
where the rule was in fact a general statement of policy because authorities retained the discretion to
deny relief to aliens who established eligibility under the interim rule.43
DACAand any broadening of deferred action modeled on DACAplainly qualifies as a general
statement of policy under the APA. The directive is intended to apply only prospectively to those who
seek relief and it does not create a hard and fast rule that amounts to a binding normnot everyone
who meets the criteria to request deferred action under DACA will receive it. Rather, those who meet
certain criteria are invited to request relief and then USCIS is free to consider the individual facts in the
various cases that arise in determining whether or not to grant deferred action. The DACA policy does
not alter the agencys discretion to give or decline such relief. Instead, it merely articulates the fact that
such discretionary relief is potentially available to those with certain characteristics that suggest they
are a low enforcement priority, and then invites that specific class of individuals to request deferred
action.
Any expansion of deferred action to other low priority individuals that shares these
characteristics with DACA will be exempt from notice and comment rulemaking.
42
43
Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll, 48 F.3d. 1331 (4th Cir. 1995). Note that courts have not required that every
aspect of a policy incorporate discretion. In Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary, a memorandum
instructing INS officers to conduct a second round of interviews of certain asylum applicants that were
identical in form and substance to the first round was deemed to be a general statement of policy
becauseeven though the requirement to conduct the second set of interviews was mandatorythe
policy itself did not change the criteria [asylum seekers] must meet in order to receive asylum. Id., 807
F. Supp. 928 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
25
26
Kansas: 26,000 undocumented immigrants are eligible for deferred action under the presidents
November 20th executive actions on immigration. If these immigrants are able to receive a temporary
work permit, it would lead to a $22 million increase in tax revenues, over five years. [link]
Kentucky: 15,000 undocumented immigrants are eligible for deferred action under the presidents
November 20th executive actions on immigration. If these immigrants are able to receive a temporary
work permit, it would lead to a $31 million increase in tax revenues, over five years. [link]
Maryland: 60,000 undocumented immigrants are eligible for deferred action under the presidents
November 20th executive actions on immigration. If these immigrants are able to receive a temporary
work permit, it would lead to a $114 million increase in tax revenues, over five years. [link]
Michigan: 35,000 undocumented immigrants are eligible for deferred action under the presidents
November 20th executive actions on immigration. If these immigrants are able to receive a temporary
work permit, it would lead to a $49.3 million increase in tax revenues, over five years. [link]
Minnesota: 31,000 undocumented immigrants are eligible for deferred action under the presidents
November 20th executive actions on immigration. If these immigrants are able to receive a temporary
work permit, it would lead to a $42 million increase in tax revenues, over five years. [link]
Missouri: 21,000 undocumented immigrants are eligible for deferred action under the presidents
November 20th executive actions on immigration. If these immigrants are able to receive a temporary
work permit, it would lead to a $27 million increase in tax revenues, over five years. [link]
Nebraska: 15,000 undocumented immigrants are eligible for deferred action under the presidents
November 20th executive actions on immigration. If these immigrants are able to receive a temporary
work permit, it would lead to a $16 million increase in tax revenues, over five years. [link]
Nevada: 53,000 undocumented immigrants are eligible for deferred action under the presidents
November 20th executive actions on immigration. If these immigrants are able to receive a temporary
work permit, it would lead to a $21 million increase in tax revenues, over five years. [link]
New Jersey: 150,000 undocumented immigrants are eligible for deferred action under the presidents
November 20th executive actions on immigration. If these immigrants are able to receive a temporary
work permit, it would lead to a $136 million increase in tax revenues, over five years. [link]
New York: 258,000 undocumented immigrants are eligible for deferred action under the presidents
November 20th executive actions on immigration. If these immigrants are able to receive a temporary
work permit, it would lead to a $184 million increase in tax revenues, over five years. [link]
North Carolina: 122,000 undocumented immigrants are eligible for deferred action under the
presidents November 20th executive actions on immigration. If these immigrants are able to receive a
temporary work permit, it would lead to a $197 million increase in tax revenues, over five years. [link]
27
Ohio: 25,000 undocumented immigrants are eligible for deferred action under the presidents
November 20th executive actions on immigration. If these immigrants are able to receive a temporary
work permit, it would lead to a $41 million increase in tax revenues, over five years. [link]
Oklahoma: 29,000 undocumented immigrants are eligible for deferred action under the presidents
November 20th executive actions on immigration. If these immigrants are able to receive a temporary
work permit, it would lead to a $26 million increase in tax revenues, over five years. [link]
Pennsylvania: 38,000 undocumented immigrants are eligible for deferred action under the presidents
November 20th executive actions on immigration. If these immigrants are able to receive a temporary
work permit, it would lead to a $75 million increase in tax revenues, over five years. [link]
Texas: 594,000 undocumented immigrants are eligible for deferred action under the presidents
November 20th executive actions on immigration. If these immigrants are able to receive a temporary
work permit, it would lead to a $338 million increase in tax revenues, over five years. [link]
Virginia: 66,000 undocumented immigrants are eligible for deferred action under the presidents
November 20th executive actions on immigration. If these immigrants are able to receive a temporary
work permit, it would lead to a $106 million increase in tax revenues, over five years. [link]
Washington: 82,000 undocumented immigrants are eligible for deferred action under the presidents
November 20th executive actions on immigration. If these immigrants are able to receive a temporary
work permit, it would lead to a $57 million increase in tax revenues, over five years. [link]
Wisconsin: 25,000 undocumented immigrants are eligible for deferred action under the presidents
November 20th executive actions on immigration. If these immigrants are able to receive a temporary
work permit, it would lead to a $19 million increase in tax revenues, over five years. [link]
28
29
Everyone agrees that our immigration system is broken and needs reform. While only Congress has the
power to fix the immigration system once and for all, until it acts, there are important steps the president
can take that will start fixing our system while also increasing tax revenues, and strengthening our
economy. Today, there are 274,000 undocumented immigrants living in Arizona. Enabling even a
portion of these immigrants to register with the government, request a reprieve from removal, and apply
for a temporary work permit would increase Arizonas tax revenues by $100 million, over five years, and
lead to a cascade of economic benefits.
Expanding deferred action will permit undocumented immigrants to work legally. Temporary work
permits will provide these workers with the ability to secure jobs that match their skill set and enhance
their productivity. As immigrants get on the books and work legally, their earnings will rise, and so too
will their tax contributions. Executive action on immigration is a step toward fixing our broken system,
and for Arizona, it is a step toward a stronger fiscal and economic future.
Fiscal Benefits of Executive Action in Arizona:
- There are 104,000 undocumented immigrants in Arizona who are potentially eligible for deferred
action under President Obamas recent executive actions on immigration. If these immigrants are able
to receive a temporary work permit, it would lead to a $100 million increase in tax revenues for
Arizona, over five years.
Economic Benefits of Executive Action:
- Expanding deferred action will significantly strengthen Arizonas economy. When undocumented
immigrants can work legally, they are able to shield themselves against workplace exploitation and
move freely across the labor market to find jobs just like anyone else. Combined, this leads to an
8.5% increase in their earnings. For the average undocumented immigrant that means they are
taking home an additional $1,872 each year. As these extra earnings are spent throughout the
economy, demand for goods and services rises, spurring job creation and raising the wages of all
American workers.
About the Analysis:
Tax benefits were calculated using the average annual income of undocumented immigrants, as estimated
by CAP; effective tax rates for Arizona, as calculated by the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy; and
estimated wage increases due to receiving a temporary work permit. The calculated tax benefits reflect the extra
revenue that results from some undocumented immigrants filing taxes for the first time, in addition to the taxes paid
by all undocumented immigrants on their increased earnings. The analysis applied state-specific labor force and
employment participation rates for undocumented immigrants as reported by the Migration Policy Institute. The
analysis also accounts for the fact that an estimated 38% of undocumented immigrants are already paying income
taxes, nationally. In 2010, 3.02 million undocumented immigrants filed income taxes using an Individual Tax
Identification Number, nearly 38% of the 8.0 million undocumented workers. It is assumed that the same share of
immigrants at the state level are currently filing taxes. The estimated number of undocumented immigrants includes
parents of children (who are US citizen or have Legal Permanent Resident status), and those individuals covered
under DACA expansion. The estimate isnt confined to those parents who have been in the US for longer than 5
years.
30
31
32
33
34
Everyone agrees that our immigration system is broken and needs reform. While only Congress has the
power to fix the immigration system once and for all, until it acts, there are important steps the president
can take that will start fixing our system while also increasing tax revenues, and strengthening our
economy. Today, there are 398,000 undocumented immigrants living in Georgia. Enabling even a
portion of these immigrants to register with the government, request a reprieve from removal, and apply
for a temporary work permit would increase Georgias tax revenues by $190 million, over five years, and
lead to a cascade of economic benefits.
Expanding deferred action will permit undocumented immigrants to work legally. Temporary work
permits will provide these workers with the ability to secure jobs that match their skill set and enhance
their productivity. As immigrants get on the books and work legally, their earnings will rise, and so too
will their tax contributions. Executive action on immigration is a step toward fixing our broken system,
and for Georgia, it is a step toward a stronger fiscal and economic future.
Fiscal Benefits of Executive Action in Georgia:
- There are 130,000 undocumented immigrants in Georgia who are potentially eligible for deferred
action under President Obamas recent executive actions on immigration. If these immigrants are able
to receive a temporary work permit, it would lead to a $190 million increase in tax revenues for
Georgia, over five years.
Economic Benefits of Executive Action:
- Expanding deferred action will significantly strengthen Georgias economy. When undocumented
immigrants can work legally, they are able to shield themselves against workplace exploitation and
move freely across the labor market to find jobs just like anyone else. Combined, this leads to an
8.5% increase in their earnings. For the average undocumented immigrant that means they are
taking home an additional $1,872 each year. As these extra earnings are spent throughout the
economy, demand for goods and services rises, spurring job creation and raising the wages of all
American workers.
About the Analysis:
Tax benefits were calculated using the average annual income of undocumented immigrants, as estimated
by CAP; effective tax rates for Georgia, as calculated by the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy; and
estimated wage increases due to receiving a temporary work permit. The calculated tax benefits reflect the extra
revenue that results from some undocumented immigrants filing taxes for the first time, in addition to the taxes paid
by all undocumented immigrants on their increased earnings. The analysis applied state-specific labor force and
employment participation rates for undocumented immigrants as reported by the Migration Policy Institute. The
analysis also accounts for the fact that an estimated 38% of undocumented immigrants are already paying income
taxes, nationally. In 2010, 3.02 million undocumented immigrants filed income taxes using an Individual Tax
Identification Number, nearly 38% of the 8.0 million undocumented workers. It is assumed that the same share of
immigrants at the state level are currently filing taxes. The estimated number of undocumented immigrants includes
parents of children (who are US citizen or have Legal Permanent Resident status), and those individuals covered
under DACA expansion. The estimate isnt confined to those parents who have been in the US for longer than 5
years.
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
Everyone agrees that our immigration system is broken and needs reform. While only Congress has the
power to fix the immigration system once and for all, until it acts, there are important steps the president
can take that will start fixing our system while also increasing tax revenues, and strengthening our
economy. Today, there are 91,000 undocumented immigrants living in Minnesota. Enabling even a
portion of these immigrants to register with the government, request a reprieve from removal, and apply
for a temporary work permit would increase Minnesotas tax revenues by $42 million, over five years,
and lead to a cascade of economic benefits.
Expanding deferred action will permit undocumented immigrants to work legally. Temporary work
permits will provide these workers with the ability to secure jobs that match their skill set and enhance
their productivity. As immigrants get on the books and work legally, their earnings will rise, and so too
will their tax contributions. Executive action on immigration is a step toward fixing our broken system,
and for Minnesota, it is a step toward a stronger fiscal and economic future.
Fiscal Benefits of Executive Action in Minnesota:
- There are 31,000 undocumented immigrants in Minnesota are potentially eligible for deferred
action under President Obamas recent executive actions on immigration. If these immigrants are able
to receive a temporary work permit, it would lead to a $42 million increase in tax revenues for
Minnesota, over five years.
Economic Benefits of Executive Action:
- Expanding deferred action will significantly strengthen Minnesotas economy. When undocumented
immigrants can work legally, they are able to shield themselves against workplace exploitation and
move freely across the labor market to find jobs just like anyone else. Combined, this leads to an
8.5% increase in their earnings. For the average undocumented immigrant that means they are
taking home an additional $1,872 each year. As these extra earnings are spent throughout the
economy, demand for goods and services rises, spurring job creation and raising the wages of all
American workers.
About the Analysis:
Tax benefits were calculated using the average annual income of undocumented immigrants, as estimated
by CAP; effective tax rates for Minnesota, as calculated by the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy; and
estimated wage increases due to receiving a temporary work permit. The calculated tax benefits reflect the extra
revenue that results from some undocumented immigrants filing taxes for the first time, in addition to the taxes paid
by all undocumented immigrants on their increased earnings. The analysis applied state-specific labor force and
employment participation rates for undocumented immigrants as reported by the Migration Policy Institute. The
analysis also accounts for the fact that an estimated 38% of undocumented immigrants are already paying income
taxes, nationally. In 2010 3.02 million undocumented immigrants filed income taxes using an Individual Tax
Identification Number, nearly 38% of the 8.0 million undocumented workers. It is assumed that the same share of
immigrants at the state level are currently filing taxes. The estimated number of undocumented immigrants includes
parents of children (who are US citizen or have Legal Permanent Resident status), and those individuals covered
under DACA expansion. The estimate isnt confined to those parents who have been in the US for longer than 5
years.
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55