Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 3019
February 9, 1907
Atty. Orendain: .
PAREDES, J.:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the appealed decision is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and another one is rendered
ordering defendant-appellee to pay
plaintiff-appellant:
1. P20,000.00 as moral damages;
2. P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages;
3. P5,000.00 as attorney's fees;
4. Cost of suit.
SO ORDERED. 12
It did not, however, allow the grant of damages for
the delay in the performance of the petitioner's
obligation as the requirement of demand set forth in
Article 1169 of the Civil Code had not been met by
the private respondent. Besides, it found that the
private respondent offered no evidence to prove
that his contract of carriage with the petitioner
provided for liability in case of delay in departure,
nor that a designation of the time of departure was
the controlling motive for the establishment of the
contract. On the latter, the court a quo observed
that the private respondent even admitted he was
unaware of the vessel's departure time, and it was
only when he boarded the vessel that he became
aware of such. Finally, the respondent Court found
no reasonable basis for the private respondent's
belief that demand was useless because the
petitioner had rendered it beyond its power to
perform its obligation; on the contrary, he even
admitted that the petitioner had been assuring the
passengers that the vessel would leave on time,
and that it could still perform its obligation to
transport them as scheduled.
To justify its award of damages, the Court of
Appeals ratiocinated as follows:
It is an established and admitted fact
that the vessel before the voyage
had undergone some repair work on
the cylinder head of the engine. It is
likewise admitted by defendantappellee that it left the port of Cebu
City with only one engine running.
Defendant-appellee averred:
. . . The dropping of
the vessel's
anchor after running
slowly on only one
engine when it
departed earlier must
have alarmed some
nervous passengers .
..
The entries in the logbook which
defendant-appellee itself offered as
evidence categorically stated therein
that the vessel stopped at Kawit
Island because of engine trouble. It
reads:
2330 HRS STBD ENGINE'
EMERGENCY STOP
2350 HRS DROP ANCHOR DUE
TO ENGINE TROUBLE, 2 ENGINE
STOP.
The stoppage was not to start and
synchronized [sic] the engines of the
vessel as claimed by defendantappellee. It was because one of the
engines of the vessel broke down; it
was because of the disability of the
vessel which from the very
beginning of the voyage was known
to defendant-appellee.
Defendant-appellee from the very
start of the voyage knew for a fact
that the vessel was not yet in its
sailing condition because the second
engine was still being repaired.
Inspite of this knowledge, defendantappellee still proceeded to sail with
only one engine running.
Defendant-appellee at that instant
failed to exercise the diligence which
all common carriers should exercise
in transporting or carrying
passengers. The law does not
merely require extraordinary
diligence in the performance of the
obligation. The law mandates that
common carrier[s] should
exercise utmost diligence the
transport of passengers.
Art. 2201.
xxx xxx xxx
In case of fraud, bad
faith, malice or
wanton attitude, the
obligor shall be
responsible for all
damages which may
be reasonably
attributed to the nonperformance of the
obligation.
Plaintiff-appellant is entitled to moral
damages for the mental anguish,
fright and serious anxiety he
suffered during the voyage when the
vessel's engine broke down and
when he disembarked from the
vessel during the wee hours of the
morning at Cebu City when it
returned. 14
2. When the
defendant's act or
omission has
compelled the plaintiff
to litigate with third
persons or to incur
expenses to protect
his interest.
This Court holds that the above does not
satisfy the benchmark of "factual, legal and
equitable justification" needed as basis for
an award of attorney's fees. 37 In sum, for
lack of factual and legal basis, the award of
attorney's fees must be deleted.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and
the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 39901 is AFFIRMED subject to
the modification as to the award for attorney's fees
which is hereby SET ASIDE.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-46558 : July 31, 1981.]
PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC., Petitioner, vs. THE COURT
OF APPEALS and JESUS V. SAMSON, Respondents.
DECISION
GUERRERO, J.:
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of said
decision, but the same was denied per Resolution
dated October 25, 2000.
Hence, herein petition for review
on certiorari alleging that:
1. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED AN
ERROR IN DECLARING THAT THE TRUE
NATURE OF THE CONTRACT ENTERED
INTO BY THE PARTIES AS ONE
EQUITABLE MORTGAGE AND NOT A
PACTO DE RETRO SALE;
2. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED AN
ERROR IN ORDERING THE
RESPONDENT TO PAY PETITIONER
LEGAL INTEREST DESPITE THE
CONFLICTING ADMISSIONS OF THE
PARTIES THAT THE AGREED
INTERESTS WAS EITHER 9% OR 10%;
3. THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE
LOWER COURT ARE CONTRARY TO
EVIDENCE AND THE ADMISSIONS OF
THE PARTIES;
4. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED AN
ERROR IN GOING BEYOND THE ISSUES
OF THE CASE BY DELETING THE
AWARD FOR DAMAGES DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THE SAME WAS NOT
RAISED AS AN ISSUE IN THE APPEAL; 5
The petition lacks merit.
The Court finds the allegations of petitioner that the
findings of fact of the CA are contrary to evidence
and admissions of the parties and that it erred in
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 153004
November 5, 2004
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Subject of the present petition for review on
certiorari is the Decision,1 dated January 30, 2002,
as well as the April 12, 2002, Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55122. The
appellate court reversed the Decision,3 dated
October 4, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 148, in Civil Case No. 95-811,
and likewise denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.
The facts of this case are undisputed.
Ernesto V. Santos and Santos Ventura Hocorma
Foundation, Inc. (SVHFI) were the plaintiff and
defendant, respectively, in several civil cases filed
in different courts in the Philippines. On October 26,
1990, the parties executed a Compromise
Agreement4 which amicably ended all their pending
litigations. The pertinent portions of the Agreement
read as follows:
II
WHETHER OF NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING LEGAL
IN[T]EREST IN FAVOR OF THE
RESPONDENTS, MR. SANTOS AND
RIVERLAND, INC., NOTWITHSTANDING
THE FACT THAT THE OBLIGATION OF
THE PETITIONER TO RESPONDENT
SANTOS TO PAY A SUM OF MONEY HAD
BEEN CONVERTED TO AN OBLIGATION
TO PAY IN KIND DELIVERY OF REAL
PROPERTIES OWNED BY THE
PETITIONER WHICH HAD BEEN FULLY
PERFORMED
III
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS ARE
BARRED FROM DEMANDING PAYMENT
OF INTEREST BY REASON OF THE
WAIVER PROVISION IN THE
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, WHICH
BECAME THE LAW AMONG THE
PARTIES10
The only issue to be resolved is whether the
respondents are entitled to legal interest.
Petitioner SVHFI alleges that where a compromise
agreement or compromise judgment does not
provide for the payment of interest, the legal
interest by way of penalty on account of fault or
delay shall not be due and payable, considering
that the obligation or loan, on which the payment of
legal interest could be based, has been superseded
by the compromise agreement.11 Furthermore, the
petitioner argues that the respondents are barred
by res judicata from seeking legal interest on
account of the waiver clause in the duly approved
compromise agreement.12 Article 4 of the
compromise agreement provides:
Plaintiff Santos waives and renounces any
and all other claims that he and his family
may have on the defendant Foundation
arising from and in connection with the
aforesaid civil cases, and defendant
Foundation, on the other hand, also waives
and renounces any and all claims that it
may have against plaintiff Santos in
connection with such cases.13 [Emphasis
supplied.]
Lastly, petitioner alleges that since the compromise
agreement did not provide for a period within which
...
The two-year period must be counted from October
26, 1990, the date of execution of the compromise
agreement, and not on the judicial approval of the
compromise agreement on September 30, 1991.
When respondents wrote a demand letter to
petitioner on October 28, 1992, the obligation was
already due and demandable. When the petitioner
failed to pay its due obligation after the demand
was made, it incurred delay.
Article 1169 of the New Civil Code provides:
Those obliged to deliver or to do something
incur in delay from the time the obligee
judicially or extrajudicially demands from
them the fulfillment of their obligation.
[Emphasis supplied]
Delay as used in this article is synonymous to
default or mora which means delay in the fulfillment
of obligations. It is the non-fulfillment of the
obligation with respect to time.23
In order for the debtor to be in default, it is
necessary that the following requisites be present:
(1) that the obligation be demandable and already
liquidated; (2) that the debtor delays performance;
and (3) that the creditor requires the performance
judicially or extrajudicially.24
In the case at bar, the obligation was already due
and demandable after the lapse of the two-year
period from the execution of the contract. The twoyear period ended on October 26, 1992. When the
respondents gave a demand letter on October 28,
1992, to the petitioner, the obligation was already
due and demandable. Furthermore, the obligation
is liquidated because the debtor knows precisely
how much he is to pay and when he is to pay it.
FIRST DIVISION
[9]
1.
When the obligation is breached, and it consists
in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or
forbearance of money, the interest due should be that
which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore,
the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the
time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of
stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum
to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or
extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions
of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2.
When an obligation, not constituting a loan or
forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the
amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the
discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No
interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated
claims or damages except when or until the demand can
be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly,
where the demand is established with reasonable
certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the
claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169,
Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be so
reasonably established at the time the demand is made,
the interest shall begin to run only from the date the
judgment of the court is made (at which time the
quantification of damages may be deemed to have been
reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the
computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the
amount finally adjudged.
3.
When the judgment of the court awarding a
sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of
legal interest whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or
paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such
finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being
deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of
credit.[20]
It is undisputed that the amount of
US$2,531,632.58 remitted by the Singaporeans
represented the 154,462 PaBC common shares
previously issued to, and owned by, Mandarin
Development
Corporation
bought
by
the
Singaporeans at the price of US$16.39 per share.
The investment was approved by the Central Bank
under Monetary Board Resolution No. 323 dated 19
February 1982 and constituted about 11% of the
total subscribed capital stock of PaBC. Clearly, the
amount remitted to PaBC by the Singaporeans was
an investment.
An investment is an expenditure to acquire
property or other assets in order to produce
revenue. It is the placing of capital or laying out of
money in a way intended to secure income or profit
from its employment. To invest is to purchase
securities of a more or less permanent nature, or to
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The rise in value of four lots in one of the country's
prime residential developments, Ayala Alabang
Village in Muntinlupa City, over a period of six (6)
years only, represents big money. The huge price
difference lies at the heart of the present
controversy. Petitioners insist that the lots should
be sold to them at 1984 prices while respondent
maintains that the prevailing market price in 1990
should be the selling price.
Dr. Daniel Vazquez and Ma. Luisa Vazquez1 filed
this Petition for Review on Certiorari2 dated
October 11, 2001 assailing the Decision3 of the
Court of Appeals dated September 6, 2001 which
reversed the Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) and dismissed their complaint for specific
performance and damages against Ayala
Corporation.
Despite their disparate rulings, the RTC and the
appellate court agree on the following
antecedents:5
xxx
3.1.2. The true and complete list, certified
by the Secretary and Treasurer of the
Company showing:
xxx
D. A list of all persons and/or entities with
whom the Company has pending contracts,
if any.
xxx
3.1.5. Audited financial statements of the
Company as at Closing date.
4. Conditions Precedent
All obligations of the BUYER under this
Agreement are subject to fulfillment prior to
or at the Closing, of the following conditions:
4.1. The representations and warranties by
the SELLERS contained in this Agreement
shall be true and correct at the time of
Closing as though such representations and
warranties were made at such time; and
xxx
6. Representation and Warranties by the
SELLERS
The SELLERS jointly and severally
represent and warrant to the BUYER that at
the time of the execution of this Agreement
and at the Closing:
xxx
6.2.3. There are no actions, suits or
proceedings pending, or to the knowledge
of the SELLERS, threatened against or
ATTY. BLANCO
Don't talk about standard.
WITNESS
A: No, it is not.