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G.R. No.

135962 Case Digest


G.R. No. 135962, March 27, 2000
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, petitioner
vs Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., respondent
POnente: Puno
Facts:
MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro
Manila. Bel-Air is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members are
homeowners of Bel-Air Villagee in Makati City. Bel-Air is the registered owner of the
Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.
December 30, 1995 Bel-Air received a notice from MMDA requesting Bel-Air to open
Neptune St. to public vehicular traffic. On the same day, MMDA apprised that the
perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would
be demolished.
January 2, 1996, MMDA instituted a case for injunction against Bel-Air; and prayed
for a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining Neptune St. and prohibiting the
demolition of the perimeter wall. Court issued a TRO the next day.
After due hearing, RTC denied the issuance of a preliminary injunction. MMDA
question the denial and appealed to the CA. CA conducted an ocular inspection of
Neptune St. then issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the MMDA
proposed action.
On January 27, 1997, appellate court rendered a decision finding MMDA no authority
to order the opening of Neptune St. It held that the authority is in the City Council of
Makati by ordinance.
The motion for reconsideration is denied hence this recourse.
Issues: (1) MMDA has the authority to mandate the opening of Neptune St. to public
traffic pursuant to its regulatory and police powers? (2) Is passage of an ordinance a
condition precedent before the MMDA may order the opening of subdividion roads
to public traffic? (3) Is Bel-Air estopped from denying the authority of MMDA? (4)Was
Bel-Air denied of due process despite the several meetings held between MMDA and
Bel-Air? (5) Has Bel-Air come to court with unclean hands?
MMDA: it has the authority to open Neptune St. because it is an agent of the
Government endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro
Manila. From the premise of police powers, it follow then that it need not for an
ordinance to be enacted first.
**Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. Police power is lodged
primarily in the National Legislature, which the latter can delegate to the President
and administrative boards, LGU or other lawmaking bodies.
**LGU is a political subdivision for local affairs. Which has a legislative body
empowered to enact ordinances, approved resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the province/city/municipality.
**Metro Manila is declared as a special development and administrative region in
1995. And the administration of metro-wide basic services is under the MMDA.Which
includes, transport and traffice management. It should be noted that MMDA are
limited to the acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation,
preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies and installation of a
system and administration. MMDA was not granted with legislative power.
Ruling:
1 | E d w i n V. d e N i c o l a s , L O 1

(1) The basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street is contained in the notice
of December 22, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent BAVA, through its president.
The notice does not cite any ordinance or law, either by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Makati City or by the MMDA, as the legal basis for the proposed
opening of Neptune St.
(2) The MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. Although the MMC is
the forerunner of the present MMDA, an examination of Presidential Decree (P. D.)
No. 824, the charter of the MMC, shows that the latter possessed greater powers
which were not bestowed on the present MMDA.
(3) Under the 1987 Constitution, the local government units became primarily
responsible for the governance of their respective political subdivisions. The MMA's
jurisdiction was limited to addressing common problems involving basic services
that transcended local boundaries. It did not have legislative power.
Petition Denied.

2 | E d w i n V. d e N i c o l a s , L O 1

Duncan Association Of Detailman-PTGWO and Pedro A. Tecson, petitioner


vs. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc., respondent
September 19, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioner Pedro Tecson was hired on Oct. 25, 1995 by respondent Glaxo
Wellcome Philippines, Inc. as a medical representative. He was assigned to market
Glaxo's products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area. Upon his
employment, Tecson signed an employment contract, wherein he agreed, among
others, to study and abide by existing company rules; to disclose to management
any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or
employees of competing drug companies; and if management found that such
relationship posed a possible conflict of interest, to resign from the company.
On September, 1998 Tecson married Bettsy, an employee of a rival
pharmaceutical firm Astra Pharmaceuticals as the branch coordinator. The
relationship, including the subsequent marriage, dismayed Glaxo. On January 1999,
Tecson's superiors informed him that his marriage to Bettsy had given rise to a
conflict of interest. Negotiations ensued, with Tecson adverting to his wife's possible
resignation from Astra, and Glaxo making it known that they preferred to retain his
services owing to his good performance. Yet no resolution came to pass. In
September 1999, Tecson applied for a transfer to Glaxo's milk division, but his
application was denied in view of Glaxo's "least-movement-possible" policy. Then in
November 1999, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan
del Sur sales area. Tecson asked Glaxo to reconsider its decision, but his request
was denied. Tecson sought Glaxos reconsideration regarding his transfer and
brought the matter to Glaxos Grievance Committee. Glaxo, however, remained firm
in its decision and gave Tescon until February 7, 2000 to comply with the transfer
order. Tecson defied the transfer order and continued acting as medical
representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area.
On Nov. 15, 2000, the Natl. Conciliation and Mediation Board ruled that
Glaxos policy was valid. Glaxo's policy on relationships between its employees and
persons employed with competitor companies, and affirming Glaxo's right to
transfer Tecson to another sales territory. This decision was assailed by petitioners
before the Court of Appeals and the Court, but for nothing.
ISSUE:
1)Whether or Not Glaxos policy against its employees marrying employees
from competitor companies is valid, and in not holding that said policy violates the
equal protection clause of the Constitution;
(2) Whether Tecson was constructively dismissed.
RULING:
The record shows that Tecson was cognizant about the policy imposed by Glaxo
company, upon signing the contract, he voluntarily set his hands to follow the said policies.
Albeit employees are free to cultivate relationships w/ and marry persons of their own choosing.
What the company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest between the employee and the
company that may arise out of such relationships. After Tecson married Bettsy, Glaxo
gave him time to resolve the conflict . Glaxo even expressed its desire to retain
Tecson in its employ because of his satisfactory performance and suggested that his
wife would be the one to resign instead. Glaxo likewise acceded to his repeated
requests for more time to resolve the conflict of interest. When the problem could
3 | E d w i n V. d e N i c o l a s , L O 1

not be resolved after several years of waiting, Glaxo was constrained to reassign
Tecson to a sales area different from that handled by his wife for Astra. Notably, the
Court did not terminate Tecson from employment but only reassigned him to
another area where his home province, Agusan del Sur, was included. In effecting
Tecsons transfer, Glaxo even considered the welfare of Tecsons family. Clearly, the
foregoing dispels any suspicion of unfairness and bad faith on the part of Glaxo.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against
petitioners.

Duncan Assoc. of Detailman-PTGWO vs. Glaxo Wellcome Phils., Inc.


438 SCRA 343
FACTS:
Tecson was hired by Glaxo as a medical representative on Oct. 24, 1995. Contract of
employment signed by Tecson stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study
and abide by the existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing
future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees with
competing drug companies and should management find that such relationship
poses a prossible conflict of interest, to resign from the company. Company's Code
of Employee Conduct provides the same with stipulation that management may
transfer the employee to another department in a non-counterchecking position or
preparation for employment outside of the company after 6 months.
Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo's products in the Camarines SurCamarines Norte area and entered into a romantic relationship with Betsy, an
employee of Astra, Glaxo's competition. Before getting married, Tecson's District
Manager reminded him several times of the conflict of interest but marriage took
place in Sept. 1998. In Jan. 1999, Tecson's superiors informed him of conflict of
intrest. Tecson asked for time to comply with the condition (that either he or Betsy
resign from their respective positions). Unable to comply with condition, Glaxo
transferred Tecson to the Butuan-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. After his
request against transfer was denied, Tecson brought the matter to Glaxo's
Grievance Committee and while pending, he continued to act as medical
representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area. On Nov. 15, 2000,
the National Conciliation and Mediation Board ruled that Glaxo's policy was valid...
ISSUE:
Whether or not the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees
from marrying employees of any competitor company is valid
RULING:
On Equal Protection
Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing
strategies, and other confidential programs and information from competitors. The
prohibition against pesonal or marital relationships with employees of competitor
companies upon Glaxo's employees is reasonable under the circumstances because
relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the company. That
Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interest cannot be denied.

4 | E d w i n V. d e N i c o l a s , L O 1

It is the settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are
addressed only to the state or those acting under color of its authority. Corollarily, it
has been held in a long array of US Supreme Court decisions that the equal
protection clause erects to shield against merely privately conduct, however,
discriminatory or wrongful.
The company actually enforced the policy after repeated requests to the employee
to comply with the policy. Indeed the application of the policy was made in an
impartial and even-handed manner, with due regard for the lot of the employee.
On Constructive Dismissal
Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting, an involuntary resignation resorted
to when continued employment becomes impossible, unreasonable or unlikely;
when there is demotion in rank, or diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination,
insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee. None
of these conditions are present in the instant case.
HELD
The challenged policy has been implemented by Glaxo impartially and
disinterestedly for a long period of time. In the case at bar, the record shows that
Glaxo gave Tecson several chances to eliminate the conflict of interest brought
about by his relationship with Betsy, but he never availed of any of them
DISPOSITIVE
"WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

5 | E d w i n V. d e N i c o l a s , L O 1

NON VS. DAMES [185 SCRA 523; G.R. NO. 89317; 20 MAY 1990]
Sunday, February 08, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet,
Camarines Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic year
1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions against the school in
the preceding semester. The subject of theprotests is not, however, made clear in
the pleadings.
Petitioners filed a petition in the court seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to
the school, but the trial court dismissed the petition. They now petition the court to
reverse its ruling in Alcuaz vs. PSBA1, which was also applied in the case. The court
said that petitioners waived their privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment with
respondent college when they adopted, signed, and used its enrollment form for the
first semester of school year 1988-89, which states that: The Mabini College
reserves the right to deny admission of students whose scholarship and attendance
are unsatisfactory and to require withdrawal of students whose conduct discredits
the institution and/or whose activities unduly disrupts or interfere with the efficient
operation of the college. Students, therefore, are required to behave in accord with
the

Mabini

College code

of

conduct and

discipline.

Issue: Whether or Not the students right to freedom of speech and assembly
infringed.
Held: Yes. The protection to the cognate rights of speech and assembly guaranteed
by the Constitution is similarly available to students is well-settled in our
jurisdiction. However there are limitations. The permissiblelimitation on Student
Exercise of Constitutional Rights within the school presupposes that conduct by the
6 | E d w i n V. d e N i c o l a s , L O 1

student, in class or out of it, which for any reason whether it stems from time, place,
or type of behavior should not materially disrupt classwork or must not involve
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.

ROBERTO GONZALES, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS


COMMISSION, PEPSI COLA PRODUCTS, PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents,
G.R. No. 131653, March 26, 2001. Second Division. De Leon, Jr., J.
Nature of the Case:
This case is a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of the Decision and
Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), dated June 26, 1997
and August 12, 1997, respectively, reversing the Decision dated October 15, 1996
of the Labor Arbiter who found and declared that petitioner Roberto Gonzales was
illegally dismissed by private respondent Pepsi Cola Products, Philippines, Inc.
(PCCPI) and ordered his reinstatement with payment of full backwages.
Facts:
Petitioner Roberto Gonzales was an employee of private respondent Pepsi
Cola Products, Philippines, Inc. (PCPPI) since July 25, 1989. In 1990 he was promoted
to the position of Route Manager and tasked with the supervision and coordination
of the activities of salesmen servicing the area under his jurisdiction. His service
with the respondent company was abruptly interrupted on October 6, 1993 when
the private respondent terminated his services after he was implicated in an
irregularity when he instigated the issuance by his subordinate salesman of an
official receipt for his post-dated check whereby he could have evaded payment to
private respondent of his debt as a concurrent dealer of Pepsi Cola products.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that Gonzales was dismissed illegally. He found and
declared that the petitioner was denied due process when no written notice of the
charges was received by petitioner prior to notice of termination. The Labor Arbiter
opined that the imputation against the petitioner was committed by the latter not
as an employee but as a concessionaire, and that PCPPI has suffered no damage as
a consequence of the acts of petitioner, thus, concluding that there was no
justifiable reason for the termination of the employment of the petitioner.

7 | E d w i n V. d e N i c o l a s , L O 1

The NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter finding that the
separation or termination from employment of the petitioner by the private
respondent due to loss of trust and confidence is a just and valid cause for dismissal
under Article 282(c) of the Labor Code.
Issue:
Whether the NLRC erred in reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter and in
dismissing the complaint for illegal dismissal.
Arguments:
For the Petitioner:
Petitioner contends that public respondent NLRC gravely abused its discretion
in reversing the factual findings and conclusions of the Labor Arbiter.
On October 15, 1996, the Labor Arbiter found and declared that petitioner
was denied due process when no written notice of the charges against him was
received by petitioner prior to his receipt of the notice of termination. There was no
justifiable reason for the termination of the employment of petitioner, the Labor
Arbiter concluding that the imputation against petitioner was committed by the
latter not as an employee but as a concessionaire of private respondent PCPPI, and
that there is no showing that private respondent PCPPI suffered damage as a
consequence thereof.

For the Respondent:


The evidence on record shows that contrary to the finding of the Labor
Arbiter, petitioner was given ample opportunity to present his side and to defend
himself against the charges. In a letter dated April 14, 1993, petitioner was directed
by private respondent PCPPI to report to the Security Office on April 16, 1993 for
administrative investigation.
While the letter does not show on its face that the petitioner acknowledged
receipt thereof, it is undisputed that petitioner freely, voluntarily and actively
participated in the administrative investigation on the charges filed against him, as
evidenced by his signature affixed on each page of the minutes of the hearings
conducted on April 16, 1993 and June 25, 1993.
In a letter dated September 30, 1993, petitioner was notified of his
termination from employment on the ground of loss of confidence and having
violated the company rules and regulations, to wit:
Group III Frauds and Acts of Dishonesty
4. Engaging in fictitious transactions, fake invoicing, deals
padding and other sale malpractices
8. Breach of trust and confidence.
Ruling:

8 | E d w i n V. d e N i c o l a s , L O 1

The dismissal of the petitioner is valid and that public respondent NLRC
committed no grave abuse of discretion in reversing the decision of the Labor
Arbiter and in dismissing the complaint for illegal dismissal.
Under Article 282(c) of the Labor Code, an employer can terminate the
employment of the employee concerned for fraud or willful breach by an employee
of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative. Loss
of confidence, as a just cause for termination of employment, is premised on the
fact that the employee concerned holds a position of responsibility, trust and
confidence.
In the present case, petitioner is not an ordinary rank-and-file
employee. He is a Route Manager, a managerial level position as settled in the case
of United PepsiCola Supervising Union (UPSU) v. Laguesma. The test of managerial
status has been defined as an authority to act in the interest of the employer, which
authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires independent
judgment. As managerial employee, petitioner is tasked to perform key and
sensitive functions, and thus he is bound by more exacting work ethics.
Private respondent PCPPI has sufficiently shown that petitioner has become
unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded of his position. Petitioner betrayed
his employers trust and confidence when he instigated the issuance by his
subordinate salesman of an official receipt for his post-dated check on December
22, 1992 whereby he (petitioner) could have evaded payment to private respondent
PCPPI of his debt amounting to P116,182.00. These acts committed by petitioner
adversely reflected on his integrity. As Route Manager he disregarded the private
respondent companys rules and regulation prohibiting the issuance of official
receipt for post-dated check payment unless the same is done by the Sales Office
Manager.
The fact the private respondent PCPPI ultimately suffered no monetary
damage as petitioner subsequently settled his account is of no moment. This was
not the reason for the termination of his employment in the respondent company
but the anomalous scheme he engineered to cover up his past due account, which
constitutes a clear betrayal of trust and confidence.
The Court has ruled that the petitioner is indeed unfit to continue working for
private respondent PCPPI, and that public respondent NLRC committed no grave
abuse of discretion in reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter and in dismissing
the complaint for illegal dismissal.
The petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, and the assailed Decision
and Resolution of public respondent National Labor Relation Commission dated June
26, 1997 and August 12, 1997, respectively, are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as
to costs.

9 | E d w i n V. d e N i c o l a s , L O 1

ROBERTO GONZALES, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS


COMMISSION, PEPSI COLA PRODUCTS, PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents,
G.R. No. 131653, March 26, 2001. Second Division. De Leon, Jr., J.
Nature of the Case:
This case is a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of the Decision and
Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), dated June 26, 1997
and August 12, 1997, respectively, reversing the Decision dated October 15, 1996
of the Labor Arbiter who found and declared that petitioner Roberto Gonzales was
illegally dismissed by private respondent Pepsi Cola Products, Philippines, Inc.
(PCCPI) and ordered his reinstatement with payment of full backwages.
Facts:
Petitioner Roberto Gonzales was an employee of private respondent Pepsi
Cola Products, Philippines, Inc. (PCPPI) since July 25, 1989. In 1990 he was promoted
to the position of Route Manager and tasked with the supervision and coordination
of the activities of salesmen servicing the area under his jurisdiction. His service
with the respondent company was abruptly interrupted on October 6, 1993 when
the private respondent terminated his services after he was implicated in an
irregularity when he instigated the issuance by his subordinate salesman of an

10 | E d w i n V . d e N i c o l a s , L O 1

official receipt for his post-dated check whereby he could have evaded payment to
private respondent of his debt as a concurrent dealer of Pepsi Cola products.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that Gonzales was dismissed illegally. He found and
declared that the petitioner was denied due process when no written notice of the
charges was received by petitioner prior to notice of termination. The Labor Arbiter
opined that the imputation against the petitioner was committed by the latter not
as an employee but as a concessionaire, and that PCPPI has suffered no damage as
a consequence of the acts of petitioner, thus, concluding that there was no
justifiable reason for the termination of the employment of the petitioner.
The NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter finding that the
separation or termination from employment of the petitioner by the private
respondent due to loss of trust and confidence is a just and valid cause for dismissal
under Article 282(c) of the Labor Code.
Issue:
Whether the NLRC erred in reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter and in
dismissing the complaint for illegal dismissal.

Arguments:
For the Petitioner:
Petitioner contends that public respondent NLRC gravely abused its discretion
in reversing the factual findings and conclusions of the Labor Arbiter.
On October 15, 1996, the Labor Arbiter found and declared that petitioner
was denied due process when no written notice of the charges against him was
received by petitioner prior to his receipt of the notice of termination. There was no
justifiable reason for the termination of the employment of petitioner, the Labor
Arbiter concluding that the imputation against petitioner was committed by the
latter not as an employee but as a concessionaire of private respondent PCPPI, and
that there is no showing that private respondent PCPPI suffered damage as a
consequence thereof.
For the Respondent:
The evidence on record shows that contrary to the finding of the Labor
Arbiter, petitioner was given ample opportunity to present his side and to defend
himself against the charges. In a letter dated April 14, 1993, petitioner was directed
by private respondent PCPPI to report to the Security Office on April 16, 1993 for
administrative investigation.
While the letter does not show on its face that the petitioner acknowledged
receipt thereof, it is undisputed that petitioner freely, voluntarily and actively
participated in the administrative investigation on the charges filed against him, as
evidenced by his signature affixed on each page of the minutes of the hearings
conducted on April 16, 1993 and June 25, 1993.
In a letter dated September 30, 1993, petitioner was notified of his
termination from employment on the ground of loss of confidence and having
violated the company rules and regulations, to wit:

11 | E d w i n V . d e N i c o l a s , L O 1

Group III Frauds and Acts of Dishonesty


4. Engaging in fictitious transactions, fake invoicing, deals
padding and other sale malpractices
8. Breach of trust and confidence.
Ruling:
The dismissal of the petitioner is valid and that public respondent NLRC
committed no grave abuse of discretion in reversing the decision of the Labor
Arbiter and in dismissing the complaint for illegal dismissal.
Under Article 282(c) of the Labor Code, an employer can terminate the
employment of the employee concerned for fraud or willful breach by an employee
of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative. Loss
of confidence, as a just cause for termination of employment, is premised on the
fact that the employee concerned holds a position of responsibility, trust and
confidence.
In the present case, petitioner is not an ordinary rank-and-file
employee. He is a Route Manager, a managerial level position as settled in the case
of United PepsiCola Supervising Union (UPSU) v. Laguesma. The test of managerial
status has been defined as an authority to act in the interest of the employer, which
authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires independent
judgment. As managerial employee, petitioner is tasked to perform key and
sensitive functions, and thus he is bound by more exacting work ethics.
Private respondent PCPPI has sufficiently shown that petitioner has become
unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded of his position. Petitioner betrayed
his employers trust and confidence when he instigated the issuance by his
subordinate salesman of an official receipt for his post-dated check on December
22, 1992 whereby he (petitioner) could have evaded payment to private respondent
PCPPI of his debt amounting to P116,182.00. These acts committed by petitioner
adversely reflected on his integrity. As Route Manager he disregarded the private
respondent companys rules and regulation prohibiting the issuance of official
receipt for post-dated check payment unless the same is done by the Sales Office
Manager.
The fact the private respondent PCPPI ultimately suffered no monetary
damage as petitioner subsequently settled his account is of no moment. This was
not the reason for the termination of his employment in the respondent company
but the anomalous scheme he engineered to cover up his past due account, which
constitutes a clear betrayal of trust and confidence.
The Court has ruled that the petitioner is indeed unfit to continue working for
private respondent PCPPI, and that public respondent NLRC committed no grave
abuse of discretion in reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter and in dismissing
the complaint for illegal dismissal.
The petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, and the assailed Decision
and Resolution of public respondent National Labor Relation Commission dated June
26, 1997 and August 12, 1997, respectively, are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as
to costs.

12 | E d w i n V . d e N i c o l a s , L O 1

Restituto Ynot Vs IAC GR NO 74457 March 20 1987 CASE DIGEST


Facts
On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat
from Masbate to Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police station
commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed
by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive order and the
recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of the case, the confiscation
was sustained and the court declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The
petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also
upheld the ruling of RTC.
Issue: Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?
Ruling:
The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify
EO 626-A amending EO 626 in asic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except
under certain conditions. The supreme court said that The reasonable connection
between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the
questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of
the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter,
considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province
than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent
their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it
easier to kill them there
The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act
defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed
punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due process was not properly
observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the
police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a
complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The measure
struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be
heard, thus denying due process.
City of Manila vs Judge Perfecto Laguio GR NO 118127 April 12 2005 CASE
DIGEST
On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN ORDINANCE
PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING
CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN
THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It basically prohibited establishments such as bars, karaoke
bars, motels and hotels from operating in the Malate District which was notoriously
viewed as a red light district harboring thrill seekers. Malate Tourist Development
Corporation avers that the ordinance is invalid as it includes hotels and motels in
the enumeration of places offering amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates
that they do not market such nor do they use women as tools for entertainment.
MTDC also avers that under the LGC, LGUs can only regulate motels but cannot
prohibit their operation. The City reiterates that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of
Police Power as provided as well in the LGC. The City likewise emphasized that the
purpose of the law is to promote morality in the City.

13 | E d w i n V . d e N i c o l a s , L O 1

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid.


HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted
that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of
the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure
prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the
enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional
infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private
rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals
The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is
subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation
that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. In the case at bar, the
enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is
unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
The Classification of Hotels, motels, Hostel, and lodging house are different
from sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, night clubs, day clubs, super
clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls. The Supreme Court Said that it is
baseless and insupportable.
In addition, the Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially
divests the respondent of the beneficial use of its property. Ordinances placing
restrictions upon the lawful use of property must, in order to be valid and
constitutional, specify the rules and conditions to be observed and conduct to avoid.
The Ordinance however is not a regulatory measure but is an exercise of an
assumed power to prohibit The foregoing premises show that the Ordinance is an
unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of property and personal rights of citizens.
For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, even under the
guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid

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People vs. Cayat


Equal Protection Requisites of a Valid Classification Bar from Drinking Gin
In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-Christians
from drinking gin or any other liquor outside of their customary alcoholic drinks.
Cayat, a native of the Cordillera, was caught with an A-1-1 gin in violation of this
Act. He was then charged and sentenced to pay P5.00 and to be imprisoned in case
of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt but he challenged the constitutionality of the
said Act. He averred, among others, that it violated his right to equal protection
afforded by the constitution. He said this an attempt to treat them with
discrimination or mark them as inferior or less capable race and less entitled will
meet with their instant challenge. The law sought to distinguish and classify native
non-Christians from Christians.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equal protection clause.
HELD: The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites of a reasonable
classification. The SC emphasized that it is not enough that the members of a group
have the characteristics that distinguish them from others. The classification must,
as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. The requisites to be complied with
are;
(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or
substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon
accident of birth or parentage. The law, then, does not seek to mark the nonChristian tribes as an inferior or less capable race. On the contrary, all measures
thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a
recognition of their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment of those privileges
now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before
the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has
endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and
secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of
placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality.

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Ormoc Sugar Central vs Ormoc City


Equal Protection
In 1964, Ormoc City passed a bill which read: There shall be paid to the City
Treasurer on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar
Company Incorporated, in Ormoc City a municipaltax equivalent to one per centum
(1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreigncountries.
Though referred to as a production tax, the imposition actually amounts to a tax
on the export of centrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. For
production of sugar alone is not taxable; the only time the tax applies is when the
sugar produced is exported. Ormoc Sugar paid the tax (P7,087.50) in protest
averring that the same is violative of Sec 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code
which provides: It shall not be in the power of the municipal council to impose a
tax in any form whatever, upon goods and merchandise carried into the
municipality, or out of the same, and any attempt to impose an import or export tax
upon such goods in the guise of an unreasonable charge for wharfage, use of
bridges or otherwise, shall be void. And that the ordinance is violative to equal
protection as it singled out Ormoc Sugar As being liable for such tax impost for no
other sugar mill is found in the city.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection.
HELD: The SC held in favor of Ormoc Sugar. The SC noted that even if Sec 2287 of
the RAC had already been repealed by a latter statute (Sec 2 RA 2264) which
effectively authorized LGUs to tax goods and merchandise carried in and out of their
turf, the act of Ormoc City is still violative of equal protection. The ordinance is
discriminatory for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinances
enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the
city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms
applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular
and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the
same class as plaintiff, from the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a
similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance
expressly points only to Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.
Facts: The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4 imposing on any
and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in
Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to
USA and other foreign countries. Payments for said tax were made, under protest,
by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of
First Instance of Leyte a complaint against the City of Ormoc as well as its
Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor alleging that the ordinance is unconstitutional
for being violative of the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of
taxation. The court rendered a decision that upheld the constitutionality of
theordinance. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the
equal protection clause and rule of uniformity of taxation, were infringed?
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Held: Yes. Equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically
situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation,
and a classification is reasonable where 1) it is based upon substantial distinctions;
2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; 3) the classification applies not only
to present conditions, but also to future conditions substantially identical to those
present; and 4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same
class. A perusal of the requisites shows that the questioned ordinance does not
meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc
Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. The taxing ordinance should not be singular
and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central for the
coverage of the tax.

Tiu v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 278 (1999)


The constitutionality and validity of EO 97-A, that provides that the grant and
enjoyment of the tax and duty incentives authorized under RA 7227 were limited to
the business enterprises and residents within the fenced-in area of the Subic
Special Economic Zone (SSEZ), was questioned.
Nature of the case: A petition for review to reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals which upheld the constitutionality and validity of the E.O. 97-A.
Facts of the case: The petitioners assail the constitutionality of the said Order
claiming that they are excluded from the benefits provided by RA 7227 without any
reasonable standards and thus violated the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. The Court of Appeals upheld the validity and constitutionality and
denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition was filed.
Issue: WON E.O. 97-A violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution
Arguments: Petitioners contend that the SSEZ encompasses (1) the City of
Olongapo, (2) the Municipality of Subic in Zambales, and (3) the area formerly
occupied by the Subic Naval Base. However, EO 97-A, according to them, narrowed
down the area within which the special privileges granted to the entire zone would
apply to the present fenced-in former Subic Naval Base only. It has thereby
excluded the residents of the first two components of the zone from enjoying the
benefits granted by the law. It has effectively discriminated against them, without
reasonable or valid standards, in contravention of the equal protection guarantee.
The solicitor general defends the validity of EO 97-A, arguing that Section 12 of RA
7227 clearly vests in the President the authority to delineate the metes and bounds
of the SSEZ. He adds that the issuance fully complies with the requirements of a
valid classification.
Decision: Panganiban J., The Court held that the classification was based on valid
and reasonable standards and does not violate the equal protection clause.
The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject
to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial
distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated
differently from another. The classification must also be germane to the purpose of
the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class.
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Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be germane


to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4)
apply equally to all members of the same class.
Ruling: Petition denied. The challenge decision and resolution were affirmed.

Tiu v Ca G.R. No. 127410. January 20, 1999


J. Panganiban
Facts:
On March 13, 1992, Congress, with the approval of the President, passed into
law RA 7227. This was for the conversion of former military bases into industrial and
commercial uses. Subic was one of these areas. It was made into a special
economic zone.
In the zone, there were no exchange controls. Such were liberalized. There was also
tax incentives and duty free importation policies under this law.

On June 10, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 97 (EO
97), clarifying the application of the tax and duty incentives. It said that
On Import Taxes and Duties. Tax and duty-free importations shall apply only
to raw materials, capital goods and equipment brought in by business enterprises
into the SSEZ
On All Other Taxes. In lieu of all local and national taxes (except import taxes and
duties), all business enterprises in the SSEZ shall be required to pay the tax
specified in Section 12(c) of R.A. No. 7227.
Nine days after, on June 19, 1993, the President issued Executive Order No. 97-A
(EO 97-A), specifying the area within which the tax-and-duty-free privilege was
operative.
Section 1.1.
The Secured Area consisting of the presently fenced-in former Subic
Naval Base shall be the only completely tax and duty-free area in the SSEFPZ.
Business enterprises and individuals (Filipinos and foreigners) residing within the
Secured Area are free to import raw materials, capital goods, equipment,
and consumer items tax and duty-free.
Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of EO 97-A for allegedly being violative
of their right to equal protection of the laws. This was due to the limitation of tax
incentives to Subic and not to the entire area of Olongapo. The case was referred to
the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court concluded that such being the case, petitioners could not claim
that EO 97-A is unconstitutional, while at the same time maintaining the validity
of RA 7227.
The court a quo also explained that the intention of Congress was to confine the
coverage of the SSEZ to the "secured area" and not to include the "entire Olongapo
City and other areas mentioned in Section 12 of the law.
Hence, this was a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
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Issue:
Whether the provisions of Executive Order No. 97-A confining the application of R.A.
7227 within the secured area and excluding the residents of the zone outside of the
secured area is discriminatory or not owing to a violation of the equal protection
clause.
Held. No. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
Citing Section 12 of RA 7227, petitioners contend that the SSEZ encompasses (1)
the City of Olongapo, (2) the Municipality of Subic in Zambales, and (3) the area
formerly occupied by the Subic Naval Base. However, they claimed that the E.O.
narrowed the application to the naval base only.
OSG- The E.O. Was a valid classification.
Court- The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is
subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by
substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and
regulated differently from another. Theclassification must also be germane to the
purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class.
Inchong v Hernandez- Equal protection does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced.
Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be germane
to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4)
apply equally to all members of the same class.

RA 7227 aims primarily to accelerate the conversion of military reservations into


productive uses. This was really limited to the military bases as the law's intent
provides. Moreover, the law tasked the BCDA to specifically develop the areas the
bases occupied.
Among such enticements are: (1) a separate customs territory within the zone, (2)
tax-and-duty-free importations, (3) restructured income tax rates on business
enterprises within the zone, (4) no foreign exchange control, (5) liberalized
regulations on banking and finance, and (6) the grantof resident status to certain
investors and of working visas to certain foreign executives and workers. The target
of the law was the big investor who can pour in capital.
Even more important, at this time the business activities outside the "secured area"
are not likely to have any impact in achieving the purpose of the law, which is to
turn the former military base to productive use for the benefit of the Philippine
economy. Hence, there was no reasonable basis to extend the tax incentives
in RA 7227.
It is well-settled that the equal-protection guarantee does not require
territorial uniformity of laws. As long as there are actual and material
differences between territories, there is no violation of the constitutional
clause.
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Besides, the businessmen outside the zone can always channel their capital into it.
RA 7227, the objective is to establish a "self-sustaining, industrial, commercial,
financial and investment center. There will really be differences between it and the
outside zone of Olongapo.
The classification of the law also applies equally to the residents and businesses in
the zone. They are similarly treated to contribute to the end gaol of the law.

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