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G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977

PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as
Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased,plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and
Natural Guardian of said minor, defendants-appellees.
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffsappellants, defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted
criminally. After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground that
his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to kill,
coupled with mistake." As We view the foregoing background
of this case, the two decisive issues presented for Our
resolution are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the
acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for
civil liability, was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code
he applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed
fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald,
though a minor, living with and getting subsistence from his
father, was already legally married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a
reiteration and further clarification of the dual character,
criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of
obligation which was firmly established in this jurisdiction
in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court
postulated, on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice
Bocobo on the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa
criminal or delito and mere culpa or fault, with pertinent
citation of decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, the works
of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our own,
that the same given act can result in civil liability not only
under the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code.
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should
ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as
we are announcing doctrines that have been little understood,
in the past, it might not he inappropriate to indicate their
foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only
reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to hold that
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or
negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal
import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution
of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application
in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to
property- through any degree of negligence - even the slightest
- would have to be indemnified only through the principle of
civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what
sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We
are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring
about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the
interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that
killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the
literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless

a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown

development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is
conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Spanish Civil Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil
case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the
defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of
criminal negligence which cannot be shown beyond reasonable
doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In
such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible
in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code.
Otherwise. there would be many instances of unvindicated civil
wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both
the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has
given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already
discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and
efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a
common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil
responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is
another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the
Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by, our
laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and
nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based
on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present
case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we
believe it is high time we pointed out to the harms done by
such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for
fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code
to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasidelict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so
that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime
under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the
better safeguarding or private rights because it realtor, an
ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that
an independent civil action, not depending on the issues,
limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely
directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to
secure adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73 Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a
reading of the foregoing excerpts from the opinion in Garcia
that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code
therein referred to contemplate only acts of negligence and
not intentional voluntary acts - deeper reflection would reveal
that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so
limited, but that in fact it actually extends to fault or culpa. This
can be seen in the reference made therein to the Sentence of
the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which
involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed,
Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here at the time
of Garcia, provided textually that obligations "which are
derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not
punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II,

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Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is
precisely the underline qualification, "not punishable by law",
that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an ultimo
construction or interpretation of the letter of the law that
"killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling
that "(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law to
smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient
origin and such full-grown development as culpa
aquiliana orquasi-delito, which is conserved and made
enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code."
And so, because Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code
Commission that drafted the original text of the new Civil Code,
it is to be noted that the said Code, which was enacted after
the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11 not punishable
by law," thereby making it clear that the concept of culpa
aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in
violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or matter. Thus,
the corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the new
code, which is Article 1162, simply says, "Obligations derived
from quasi-delicto shall be governed by the provisions of
Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by
special laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of
the new code provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision
(Article 2177) through at first sight startling, is not so novel or
extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal
and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal
law, while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of
ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and
individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such
distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa
extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by
decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as
clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding
Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177,
acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether
on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent
civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal
negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa
aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.",
(Report of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to
only acts of negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo
about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth liftrather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the
lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And
considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of
the new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and
independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in

character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility

arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and
3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, it is
"more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and
more in harmony with modern progress"- to borrow the
felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and
Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article
2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only
acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character,
whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently,
a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if
he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on
both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to
the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the
two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability
referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively
to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as
a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even
by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not been committed by the
accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia,
that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts
which may be punishable by law.4
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the
criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict,
hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against
him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's
emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty.
Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the
conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from
responsibility cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon
emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under
Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the
minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article
399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or
absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary
concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's
person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as
though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or
alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his
father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court
only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article
2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity,
the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the

3
minor children who live in their company." In the instant case,
it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was
living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the
time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore,
Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a
situation which is not unusual.
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to
Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of
Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is
now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has
become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial
court is ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing
opinion. Costs against appellees.
G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984
ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and
JOSE FARLEY BEDENIA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS
This is a petition for review on certiorari of a Court of Appeals'
decision which reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction
and acquitted the petitioners of the crime of grave coercion on
the ground of reasonable doubt but inspite of the acquittal
ordered them to pay jointly and severally the amount of
P9,000.00 to the complainants as actual damages.
The petitioners were charged under the following information:
The undersigned Fiscal accused ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO
GALDONES, PEPITO BEDENIA, YOLLY RICO, DAVID BERMUNDO,
VILLANOAC, ROBERTO ROSALES, VILLANIA, ROMEO GARRIDO,
JOSE ORTEGA, JR., RICARDO CELESTINO, REALINGO alias
"KAMLON", JOHN DOE alias TATO, and FOURTEEN (14)
RICARDO DOES of the crime of GRAVE COERCION, committed
as follows:
That on or about February 8, 1964 at around 9:00 o'clock in the
morning, in the municipality of Jose Panganiban, province of
Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above- named accused, Roy Padilla,
Filomeno Galdones, Pepito Bedenia, Yolly Rico, David
Bermundo, Villanoac, Roberto Rosales, Villania, Romeo
Garrido, Jose Ortega, Jr., Ricardo Celestino, Realingo alias
Kamlon, John Doe alias Tato, and Fourteen Richard Does, by
confederating and mutually helping one another, and acting
without any authority of law, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously, by means of threats, force and
violence prevent Antonio Vergara and his family to close their
stall located at the Public Market, Building No. 3, Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and by subsequently forcibly
opening the door of said stall and thereafter brutally
demolishing and destroying said stall and the furnitures therein
by axes and other massive instruments, and carrying away the
goods, wares and merchandise, to the damage and prejudice of
the said Antonio Vergara and his family in the amount of
P30,000.00 in concept of actual or compensatory and moral

damages, and further the sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary

damages.
That in committing the offense, the accused took advantage of
their public positions: Roy Padilla, being the incumbent
municipal mayor, and the rest of the accused being policemen,
except Ricardo Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and that it was committed with
evident premeditation.
The Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Tenth Judicial
District rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
states that:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Roy
Padilla, Filomeno Galdonez, Ismael Gonzalgo and Jose Parley
Bedenia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave
coercion, and hereby imposes upon them to suffer an
imprisonment of FIVE (5) months and One (1) day; to pay a fine
of P500.00 each; to pay actual and compensatory damages in
the amount of P10,000.00; moral damages in the amount of
P30,000.00; and another P10,000.00 for exemplary damages,
jointly and severally, and all the accessory penalties provided
for by law; and to pay the proportionate costs of this
proceedings.
The accused Federico Realingo alias 'Kamlon', David Bermundo,
Christopher Villanoac, Godofredo Villania, Romeo Garrido,
Roberto Rosales, Ricardo Celestino and Jose Ortega, are hereby
ordered acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt for their
criminal participation in the crime charged.
The petitioners appealed the judgment of conviction to the
Court of Appeals. They contended that the trial court's finding
of grave coercion was not supported by the evidence.
According to the petitioners, the town mayor had the power to
order the clearance of market premises and the removal of the
complainants' stall because the municipality had enacted
municipal ordinances pursuant to which the market stall was a
nuisance per se. The petitioners stated that the lower court
erred in finding that the demolition of the complainants' stall
was a violation of the very directive of the petitioner Mayor
which gave the stall owners seventy two (72) hours to vacate
the market premises. The petitioners questioned the
imposition of prison terms of five months and one day and of
accessory penalties provided by law. They also challenged the
order to pay fines of P500.00 each, P10,000.00 actual and
compensatory damages, P30,000.00 moral damages,
P10,000.00 exemplary damages, and the costs of the suit.
The dispositive portion of the decision of the respondent Court
of Appeals states:
WHEREFORE, we hereby modify the judgment appealed from
in the sense that the appellants are acquitted on ground of
reasonable doubt. but they are ordered to pay jointly and
severally to complainants the amount of P9,600.00, as actual
damages.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending
that the acquittal of the defendants-appellants as to criminal

4
liability results in the extinction of their civil liability. The Court
of Appeals denied the motion holding that:
xxx xxx xxx
... appellants' acquittal was based on reasonable doubt
whether the crime of coercion was committed, not on facts
that no unlawful act was committed; as their taking the law
into their hands, destructing (sic) complainants' properties is
unlawful, and, as evidence on record established that
complainants suffered actual damages, the imposition of actual
damages is correct.
Consequently, the petitioners filed this special civil action,
contending that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW
OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING UPON
PETITIONERS PAYMENT OF DAMAGES TO COMPLAINANTS
AFTER ACQUITTING PETITIONERS OF THE CRIME CHARGED
FROM WHICH SAID LIABILITY AROSE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING IN ITS
RESOLUTION DATED DECEMBER 26, 1974 THAT SINCE
APPELLANTS' ACQUITTAL WAS BASED ON REASONABLE
DOUBT, NOT ON FACTS THAT NO UNLAWFUL ACT WAS
COMMITTED, THE IMPOSITION OF ACTUAL DAMAGES IS
CORRECT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A LEGAL
INCONSISTENCY, IF NOT PLAIN JUDICIAL ERROR, IN HOLDING IN
ITS APPEALED RESOLUTION THAT PETITIONERS COMMITTED
AN UNLAWFUL ACT, THAT IS TAKING THE LAW INTO THEIR
HANDS, DESTRUCTING (sic) 'COMPLAINANTS' PROPERTIES',
AFTER HOLDING IN ITS MAIN DECISION OF NOVEMBER 6,1974
THAT THE ACTS FOR WHICH THEY WERE CHARGED DID NOT
CONSTITUTE GRAVE COERCION AND THEY WERE NOT
CHARGED OF ANY OTHER CRIME.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE PETITIONERS
HEREIN, APPELLANTS IN CA-G.R. NO. 13456CR, JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY, TO PAY COMPLAINANTS P9,600.00 IN SUPPOSED
ACTUAL DAMAGES.
The issue posed in the instant proceeding is whether or not the
respondent court committed a reversible error in requiring the
petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after
acquitting them from the criminal charge.
Petitioners maintain the view that where the civil liability
which is included in the criminal action is that arising from and
as a consequence of the criminal act, and the defendant was
acquitted in the criminal case, (no civil liability arising from the
criminal case), no civil liability arising from the criminal charge
could be imposed upon him. They cite precedents to the effect
that the liability of the defendant for the return of the amount
received by him may not be enforced in the criminal case but
must be raised in a separate civil action for the recovery of the
said amount (People v. Pantig, 97 Phil. 748; following the

doctrine laid down in Manila Railroad Co. v. Honorable Rodolfo

Baltazar, 49 O.G. 3874; Pueblo contra Abellera, 69 Phil. 623;
People v. Maniago 69 Phil. 496; People v. Miranda, 5 SCRA
1067; Aldaba v. Elepafio 116 Phil. 457). In the case before us,
the petitioners were acquitted not because they did not
commit the acts stated in the charge against them. There is no
dispute over the forcible opening of the market stall, its
demolition with axes and other instruments, and the carting
away of the merchandize. The petitioners were acquitted
because these acts were denominated coercion when they
properly constituted some other offense such as threat or
malicious mischief.
The respondent Court of Appeals stated in its decision:
For a complaint to prosper under the foregoing provision, the
violence must be employed against the person, not against
property as what happened in the case at bar. ...
xxx xxx xxx
The next problem is: May the accused be convicted of an
offense other than coercion?
From all appearances, they should have been prosecuted
either for threats or malicious mischief. But the law does not
allow us to render judgment of conviction for either of these
offenses for the reason that they were not indicted for, these
offenses. The information under which they were prosecuted
does not allege the elements of either threats or malicious
mischief. Although the information mentions that the act was
by means of threats', it does not allege the particular threat
made. An accused person is entitled to be informed of the
nature of the acts imputed to him before he can be made to
enter into trial upon a valid information.
We rule that the crime of grave coercion has not been proved
in accordance with law.
While appellants are entitled to acquittal they nevertheless are
liable for the actual damages suffered by the complainants by
reason of the demolition of the stall and loss of some of their
properties. The extinction of the penal action does not carry
with it that of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the
civil might arise did not exist. (Rule 111, Sec. 3 (c), Rev. Rules of
Court; Laperal v. Aliza, 51 OG.R. 1311, People v. Velez, 44 OG.
1811). In the instant case, the fact from which the civil might
arise, namely, the demolition of the stall and loss of the
properties contained therein; exists, and this is not denied by
the accused. And since there is no showing that the
complainants have reserved or waived their right to institute a
separate civil action, the civil aspect therein is deemed
instituted with the criminal action. (Rule 111, Sec. 1, Rev. Rules
of Court).
xxx xxx xxx
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the
fundamental proposition that when a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with it. There is
no implied institution when the offended party expressly

5
waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it
separately. (Morte Sr. v. Alvizo, Jr., 101 SCRA 221).
The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the
criminal case refers exclusively to civil liability ex delicto
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. (Elcano v.
Hill, 77 SCRA 98; Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472). In other words,
the civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the
accused is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime.
As easily as 1942, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice
Jorge Bocobo in Barredo v. Garcia, et at. 73 Phil. 607 laid down
the rule that the same punishable act or omission can create
two kinds of civil liabilities against the accused and, where
provided by law, his employer. 'There is the civil liability arising
from the act as a crime and the liability arising from the same
act as a quasi-delict. Either one of these two types of civil
liability may be enforced against the accused, However, the
offended party cannot recover damages under both types of
liability. For instance, in cases of criminal negligence or crimes
due to reckless imprudence, Article 2177 of the Civil Code
provides:
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding
article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability
arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of
the defendant.
Section 3 (c) of Rule 111 specifically provides that:
Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. In all cases
not included in the preceding section the following rules shall
be observed:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the
civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person
entitled to the civil action may institute it in the Jurisdiction
and in the manner provided by law against the person who
may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or
indemnity for the damage suffered.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the
accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that
the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus,
the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil.
286) as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil
cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability of
the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature (De Guzman
v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558; People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in
the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed
by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability (See
Art. 332, Revised Penal Code); and, where the civil liability does
not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which
the accused was acquitted (Castro v. Collector of Internal
Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See Regalado, Remedial Law

Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623). Article 29 of the Civil Code

also provides that:
When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the
ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission
may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance
of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may
require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in
case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon
reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of
any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text
of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that
ground.
More recently, we held that the acquittal of the defendant in
the criminal case would not constitute an obstacle to the filing
of a civil case based on the same acts which led to the criminal
prosecution:
... The finding by the respondent court that he spent said sum
for and in the interest of the Capiz Agricultural and Fishery
School and for his personal benefit is not a declaration that the
fact upon which Civil Case No. V-3339 is based does not exist.
The civil action barred by such a declaration is the civil liability
arising from the offense charged, which is the one impliedly
instituted with the criminal action. (Section 1, Rule III, Rules of
Court.) Such a declaration would not bar a civil action filed
against an accused who had been acquitted in the criminal case
if the criminal action is predicated on factual or legal
considerations other than the commission of the offense
charged. A person may be acquitted of malversation where, as
in the case at bar, he could show that he did not
misappropriate the public funds in his possession, but he could
be rendered liable to restore said funds or at least to make a
proper accounting thereof if he shall spend the same for
purposes which are not authorized nor intended, and in a
manner not permitted by applicable rules and regulations.
(Republic v. Bello, 120 SCRA 203)
There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil
action to still be filed considering that the facts to be proved in
the civil case have already been established in the criminal
proceedings where the accused was acquitted. Due process has
been accorded the accused. He was, in fact, exonerated of the
criminal charged. The constitutional presumption of innocence
called for more vigilant efforts on the part of prosecuting
attorneys and defense counsel, a keener awareness by all
witnesses of the serious implications of perjury, and a more
studied consideration by the judge of the entire records and of
applicable statutes and precedents. To require a separate civil
action simply because the accused was acquitted would mean
needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication
of litigation with all its attendant loss of time, effort, and
money on the part of all concerned.

6
The trial court found the following facts clearly established by
the evidence adduced by both the prosecution and the
defense:
xxx xxx xxx
(9) In the morning of February 8, 1964, then Chief Galdones,
complying with the instructions contained in said
Memorandum No. 32 of the Mayor, and upon seeing that
Antonio Vergara had not vacated the premises in question,
with the aid of his policemen, forced upon the store or stall and
ordered the removal of the goods inside the store of Vergara,
at the same time taking inventory of the goods taken out, piled
them outside in front of the store and had it cordoned with a
rope, and after all the goods were taken out from the store,
ordered the demolition of said stall of Antonio Vergara. Since
then up to the trial of this case, the whereabouts of the goods
taken out from the store nor the materials of the demolished
stall have not been made known.
The respondent Court of Appeals made a similar finding that:
On the morning of February 8th, because the said Vergaras had
not up to that time complied with the order to vacate, the coaccused Chief of Police Galdones and some members of his
police force, went to the market and, using ax, crowbars and
hammers, demolished the stall of the Vergaras who were not
present or around, and after having first inventoried the goods
and merchandise found therein, they had them brought to the
municipal building for safekeeping. Inspite of notice served
upon the Vergaras to take possession of the goods and
merchandise thus taken away, the latter refused to do so.
The loss and damage to the Vergaras as they evaluated them
were:
Cost of stall construction P1,300.00
Value of furniture and equipment
judgment destroyed 300.00
Value of goods and equipment taken 8,000.00
P9,600.00
It is not disputed that the accused demolished the grocery stall
of the complainants Vergaras and carted away its contents. The
defense that they did so in order to abate what they
considered a nuisance per se is untenable, This finds no
support in law and in fact. The couple has been paying rentals
for the premises to the government which allowed them to
lease the stall. It is, therefore, farfetched to say that the stall
was a nuisance per se which could be summarily abated.
The petitioners, themselves, do not deny the fact that they
caused the destruction of the complainant's market stall and
had its contents carted away. They state:
On February 8, 1964, despite personal pleas on Vergaras by the
Mayor to vacate the passageways of Market Building No. 3, the
Vergaras were still in the premises, so the petitioners Chief of
Police and members of the Police Force of Jose Panganiban,
pursuant to the Mayor' 6 directives, demolished the store of
the Vergaras, made an inventory of the goods found in said
store, and brought these goods to the municipal building under
the custody of the Municipal Treasurer, ...

The only supposed obstacle is the provision of Article 29 of the

Civil Code, earlier cited, that "when the accused in a criminal
prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for
damages for the same act or omission may be instituted."
According to some scholars, this provision of substantive law
calls for a separate civil action and cannot be modified by a rule
of remedial law even in the interests of economy and simplicity
and following the dictates of logic and common sense.
As stated by retired Judge J. Cezar Sangco:
... if the Court finds the evidence sufficient to sustain the civil
action but inadequate to justify a conviction in the criminal
action, may it render judgment acquitting the accused on
reasonable doubt, but hold him civilly liable nonetheless? An
affirmative answer to this question would be consistent with
the doctrine that the two are distinct and separate actions, and
win (a) dispense with the reinstituting of the same civil action,
or one based on quasi-delict or other independent civil action,
and of presenting the same evidence: (b) save the injured party
unnecessary expenses in the prosecution of the civil action or
enable him to take advantage of the free services of the fiscal;
and (c) otherwise resolve the unsettling implications of
permitting the reinstitution of a separate civil action whether
based on delict, or quasi-delict, or other independent civil
actions.
... But for the court to be able to adjudicate in the manner here
suggested, Art. 29 of the Civil Code should be amended
because it clearly and expressly provides that the civil action
based on the same act or omission may only be instituted in a
separate action, and therefore, may not inferentially be
resolved in the same criminal action. To dismiss the civil action
upon acquittal of the accused and disallow the reinstitution of
any other civil action, would likewise render, unjustifiably, the
acquittal on reasonable doubt without any significance, and
would violate the doctrine that the two actions are distinct and
separate.
In the light of the foregoing exposition, it seems evident that
there is much sophistry and no pragmatism in the doctrine that
it is inconsistent to award in the same proceedings damages
against the accused after acquitting him on reasonable doubt.
Such doctrine must recognize the distinct and separate
character of the two actions, the nature of an acquittal on
reasonable doubt, the vexatious and oppressive effects of a
reservation or institution of a separate civil action, and that the
injured party is entitled to damages not because the act or
omission is punishable but because he was damaged or injured
thereby (Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, pp.
288-289).
We see no need to amend Article 29 of the Civil Code in order
to allow a court to grant damages despite a judgment of
acquittal based on reasonable doubt. What Article 29 clearly
and expressly provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in case the
defendant has been acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the
ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable

7
doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is
not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or
omission. The Civil Code provision does not state that the
remedy can be availed of only in a separate civil action. A
separate civil case may be filed but there is no statement that
such separate filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode
of recovering damages.
There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the
rendition of a judgment of acquittal and a judgment awarding
damages in the same criminal action. The two can stand side by
side. A judgment of acquittal operates to extinguish the
criminal liability. It does not, however, extinguish the civil
liability unless there is clear showing that the act from which
civil liability might arise did not exist.
A different conclusion would be attributing to the Civil Code a
trivial requirement, a provision which imposes an uncalled for
burden before one who has already been the victim of a
condemnable, yet non-criminal, act may be accorded the
justice which he seeks.
We further note the rationale behind Art. 29 of the Civil Code
in arriving at the intent of the legislator that they could not
possibly have intended to make it more difficult for the
aggrieved party to recover just compensation by making a
separate civil action mandatory and exclusive:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case
also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious
flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to
numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the
acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the
court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is
that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the the
criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability
cannot be demanded.
This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to
unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails
to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability
and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of
the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct
from each other. One affects the social order and the other,
private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the
offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered
by the aggrieved party... it is just and proper that, for the
purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the
offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for
the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why should
the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not
the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved
only by preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the
aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is
also punishable by the criminal law? (Code Commission, pp. 4546).
A separate civil action may be warranted where additional
facts have to be established or more evidence must be
adduced or where the criminal case has been fully terminated

and a separate complaint would be just as efficacious or even

more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where
the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil
aspects of the case. The offended party may, of course, choose
to file a separate action. These do not exist in this case.
Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in the
trial, appellate, and review stages, it would be unjust to the
complainants in this case to require at this time a separate civil
action to be filed.
With this in mind, we therefore hold that the respondent Court
of Appeals did not err in awarding damages despite a judgment
of acquittal.
WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals and dismiss the petition for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 122039. May 31, 2000]
VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA
JUJEURCHE SUNGA and FRANCISCO SALVA, respondents.
D E C I S I ON
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
At 10 oclock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private
respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a college freshman
majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman University, took a
passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente
Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24
passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an "extension
seat," a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of
the vehicle.
On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the
jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she was seated at
the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing
passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by
Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left
rear portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. She
sustained a fracture of the "distal third of the left tibia-fibula
with severe necrosis of the underlying skin." Closed reduction
of the fracture, long leg circular casting, and case wedging were
done under sedation. Her confinement in the hospital lasted
from August 23 to September 7, 1989. Her attending physician,
Dr. Danilo V. Oligario, an orthopedic surgeon, certified she
would remain on a cast for a period of three months and would
have to ambulate in crutches during said period.
Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging
violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to
exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier.
Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against
Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck.
The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party
defendant and absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it was
the driver of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the
accident. It took cognizance of another case (Civil Case No.
3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasidelict, in which Branch 37 of the same court held Salva and his

8
driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his
jeepney.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower court
was reversed on the ground that Sungas cause of action was
based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the
common carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under
the Civil Code. The appellate court dismissed the third-party
complaint against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for
damages to Sunga. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and another one is entered ordering defendantappellee Vicente Calalas to pay plaintiff-appellant:
(1) P50,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages;
(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) P10,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
(4) P1,000.00 as expenses of litigation; and
(5) to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the ruling in Civil
Case No. 3490 that the negligence of Verena was the
proximate cause of the accident negates his liability and that to
rule otherwise would be to make the common carrier an
insurer of the safety of its passengers. He contends that the
bumping of the jeepney by the truck owned by Salva was
a caso fortuito. Petitioner further assails the award of moral
damages to Sunga on the ground that it is not supported by
evidence. Sdaadsc
The petition has no merit.
The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case
No. 3490 finding the driver and the owner of the truck liable
for quasi-delict ignores the fact that she was never a party to
that case and, therefore, the principle of res judicata does not
apply. Missdaa
Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present
case the same. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether
Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the
damage caused to petitioners jeepney. On the other hand, the
issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract
of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa
aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the
negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract
or culpa contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the
performance of a contractual obligation.
Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be
clearly established because it is the basis of the action,
whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted
merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact
that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to
transport his passenger safely to his destination.[2] In case of
death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code
provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at
fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and

1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the

common carrier the burden of proof. Slxmis
There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil
Case No. 3490, finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the
damage to petitioners jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. It
is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between
the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck
driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in
actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of
contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a
person where there is no relation between him and another
party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But,
where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation,
and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation
thus created. Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned,
some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting
the diligence required of common carriers with regard to the
safety of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence
in cases of death or injury to passengers. It provides: Slxsc
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business
and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for
the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to
all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is
further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1746, Nos. 5,6,
and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the
passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for
all the circumstances.
Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers,
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed by articles 1733 and
1755.
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the
presumption of negligence at once arose, and it became the
duty of petitioner to prove that he had to observe
extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers. Scslx
Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga "safely as far as
human care and foresight could provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances" as required by Art. 1755? We do not think so.
Several factors militate against petitioners contention. Slx
First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not
properly parked, its rear portion being exposed about two
meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing
the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. This is a
violation of the R.A. No. 4136, as amended, or the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code, which provides:

9
Sec. 54. Obstruction of Traffic. - No person shall drive his motor
vehicle in such a manner as to obstruct or impede the passage
of any vehicle, nor, while discharging or taking on passengers
or loading or unloading freight, obstruct the free passage of
other vehicles on the highway.
Second, it is undisputed that petitioners driver took in more
passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney, a
violation of 32(a) of the same law. It provides: Mesm
Exceeding registered capacity. - No person operating any
motor vehicle shall allow more passengers or more freight or
cargo in his vehicle than its registered capacity.
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed
her in a peril greater than that to which the other passengers
were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to
overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him for
the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he
was actually negligent in transporting passengers. Calrky
We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioners
contention that Sungas taking an "extension seat" amounted
to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the
injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas should
not be compensated merely because those passengers
assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded
ferry. This is also true of petitioners contention that the
jeepney being bumped while it was improperly parked
constitutes caso fortuito. A caso fortuito is an event which
could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was
inevitable.[3] This requires that the following requirements be
present: (a) the cause of the breach is independent of the
debtors will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c)
the event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to
fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the debtor did
not take part in causing the injury to the creditor.[4] Petitioner
should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its
body protruding two meters into the highway. Kycalr
Finally, petitioner challenges the award of moral damages
alleging that it is excessive and without basis in law. We find
this contention well taken.
In awarding moral damages, the Court of Appeals stated: Kyle
Plaintiff-appellant at the time of the accident was a first-year
college student in that school year 1989-1990 at the Silliman
University, majoring in Physical Education. Because of the
injury, she was not able to enroll in the second semester of
that school year. She testified that she had no more intention
of continuing with her schooling, because she could not walk
and decided not to pursue her degree, major in Physical
Education "because of my leg which has a defect already."
Plaintiff-appellant likewise testified that even while she was
under confinement, she cried in pain because of her injured
left foot. As a result of her injury, the Orthopedic Surgeon also
certified that she has "residual bowing of the fracture side."
She likewise decided not to further pursue Physical Education
as her major subject, because "my left leg x x x has a defect
already."

Those are her physical pains and moral sufferings, the

inevitable bedfellows of the injuries that she suffered. Under
Article 2219 of the Civil Code, she is entitled to recover moral
damages in the sum of P50,000.00, which is fair, just and
reasonable.
As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions
for damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one
of the items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil
Code.[5] As an exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in
cases in which the mishap results in the death of a passenger,
as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil
Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud
or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220.[6]
In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages
since there was no factual finding by the appellate court that
petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract
of carriage. Sungas contention that petitioners admission in
open court that the driver of the jeepney failed to assist her in
going to a nearby hospital cannot be construed as an admission
of bad faith. The fact that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck
who took her to the hospital does not imply that petitioner was
utterly indifferent to the plight of his injured passenger. If at
all, it is merely implied recognition by Verena that he was the
one at fault for the accident. Exsm
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
March 31, 1995, and its resolution, dated September 11, 1995,
are AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the award of
moral damages is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.