G.R. No.

L-44060 July 20, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BIENVENIDO PARAGSA, alias "BENBEN", defendant-appellant.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Bienvenido Paragsa, alias "Benben", appealed to the Court of Appeals the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Cebu (Judge Agapito Hontanosas, presiding), the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered convicting the accused Bienvenido
Paragsa of the crime of Rape as charged in the Information beyond reasonable
doubt and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as
minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as the maximum and to indemnify the complaining witness in the
amount of P8,000.00 (People vs. Rogato Rivera, 58, O.G. and People vs. Chan et
al., CA No. 03545-GR, August 11, 1967) with all legal accessories and to pay the
costs. Being a detention prisoner, he is entitled to the full credit of his preventive
imprisonment from the time of his confinement up to the date of the promulgation
of this judgment.
xxx xxx xxx
(pp. 10-19, rollo).
Because the penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed by the Court of Appeals on the accused,
this case is now before US for review pursuant to Section 34, Republic Act No. 296, as amended,
otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The evidence for the prosecution consists of the testimony of Mirasol Magallanes, the alleged
rape victim, her aunt-in-law, Mrs. Lita Parochel, and Dr. Luis L. Gandiongco of the Bantayan
Emergency Hospital, Bantayan, Cebu, who examined the offended party and submitted Exhibit
A embodying his findings thereon,
Substantially, the records show that in the afternoon of July 13, 1971, Mirasol, who was then a
little over twelve and a half (12) years old (Exhibit B, p. 7, rec.), was alone in her parents'
house in Sitio Tabagac of Barrio Bunacan, Municipality of Madridejos, Cebu, cooking hog feed.
Her parents were away at the time her father was in Cadiz, while her mother was in Sagay,
both in Negros Occidental (p. 16, t.s.n., Jan. 5, 1972) while the rest of the family were with
Mirasol's grandmother in Barrio Codia; also in Madridejos, Cebu. Mirasol was a 6th grade
student of the Bunacan Elementary School (p. 6, t.s.n., Dec. 3, 1971). Upon instruction of her
mother, she did not go to school that afternoon so that she could look after the pigs and cook
their feed. Thus, she was alone in the ground floor of their house cooking hog feed when the

accused, Bienvenido Paragsa, armed with a hunting knife, entered the house and closed the door
after him. Approaching from behind, he placed his left arm around Mirasol's neck, encircled her
abdomen with his right arm, at the same time pointing the hunting knife with s right hand at her
breast, and threatened her not to shout otherwise she would be killed. Thereafter, the accused
pushed her to a bamboo bed nearby, rolled up her dress and, with his two hands, removed her
panties. The accused then placed his hunting knife on the bed by Mirasol's side, opened the
zipper of his pants while kneeling on the bed, opened Mirasol's thighs, picked up the hunting
knife again, placed himself on top of Mirasol, inserted his erect penis into her sexual organ and
then made four push and pull movement until he ejaculated (pp. 7, 10-11, 12, 13, 14, t.s.n., Ibid).
In the process, Mirasol's dress and panties were not torn, since, because of fear, she allowed the
accused to roll up her dress and pull her panties without any resistance whatsoever. During the
intercourse, the accused was not holding the hunting knife. After the accused had discharged, he
ran to the storeroom of the house upstairs because he heard Mrs. Lita Parochel, wife of the
younger brother of Mirasol's father, calling from outside the gate of the house, asking Mirasol to
open the gate. Mirasol did not answer because she was then in the act of putting on her panties
(p. 14, t.s.n., Ibid; p. 10, t.s.n., Jan. 5, 1972). After she had put on her panties, she opened the
gate and saw her aunt Lita, who asked her what the accused did to her, but she did not answer
because she was afraid as the accused was still inside the house. She also did not tell her aunt
Lita that the accused had sexual intercourse with her under threats and against her will. Her aunt
Lita then walked away.
Thereafter, the accused reappeared in the room and told Mirasol that if she would tell her aunt
Lita what he did, he would kill her (pp. 13-14, t.s.n., Dec. 3, 1971). After the incident, Mirasol
went to Barrio Codia later in the afternoon of the same day and joined her brother and sister and
grandmother. She did not reveal to any of them what transpired between her and the accused in
Tabagac.
Mirasol's father returned from Cadiz, Negros Occidental that same day; but Mirasol did not also
reveal the incident to him because she was afraid her father might punish her. Her mother
returned home on July 16, 1971 from Sagay, Negros Occidental; but Mirasol did not also tell her
mother about what happened to her on July 13 in Tabagac It was her aunt Lita who revealed the
matter to Mirasol's mother, who thereupon confronted her daughter. Mirasol had to reveal the
incident of July 13 to her mother only when her mother asked her about it; because, according to
her, she wanted to take revenge on the accused (p. 15, Dec. 3, 1971). Three days after her return
from Sagay, Negros Occidental on July 19, 1971 Mirasol's mother brought her to the
Bantayan Emergency Hospital in Bantayan, Cebu, where she was examined by Dr. Luis L.
Gandiongco, who submitted his findings as follows:
Abrasion of inguinal region
Abrasion, left thigh, medial side
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Discharges sticky, milky in color, found at the anterior fornix but negative for
spermatozoa (Exh. A, p. 8, rec.; p. 2, t.s.n., Nov. 16, 1971).

Mrs. Lita Parochel, the aunt-in-law of Mirasol, testified that she is the wife of the younger
brother of Mirasol's father. Her house is fifty (50) meters away from the house of her brother-inlaw, Ruperto Magallanes. In the afternoon of July 13, 1971, she went to the house of her brotherin-law in Tabagac Arriving there, she saw, through the gate which was made of split bamboos,
the accused running away when she shouted to Mirasol, who was then in the act of putting on her
panties, to open the gate (p. 10, t.s.n., Jan. 15, 1972). Mirasol opened the gate after she had put
on her panties. Entering the house, Mrs. Parochel asked Mirasol what the accused did to her, but
Mirasol did not answer. So, she hid and from her hiding place she saw the accused emerge from
his hiding place and run away, passing through the gate of the fence. Thereupon, she told
Mirasol to go home to barrio Codia because she was also going there (p. 15, t.s.n., Ibid).
Mrs. Parochel met Mirasol's father at about 4:00 o'clock the same afternoon but she did not talk
to him about what she saw earlier in Tabagak However, she revealed the incident to her husband
(p. 17, t.s.n., Ibid).
When Mirasol's mother returned from Sagay, Negros Occidental, Mrs. Parochel had a
conversation with her regarding the person of the accused and thereafter Mirasol's mother filed
the corresponding complaint against the accused (p. 18, t.s.n., Ibid).
Incidentally, in support of the complaint of Bernandina Magallanes, mother of Mirasol, Mrs.
Parochel executed an affidavit which she subscribed and swore to before the municipal judge of
Madridejos, Cebu, on July 30, 1971, wherein she stated, among other things:
1. That at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 13, 1971, I went to the house
of Ruperto Magallanes, my neighbor;
2. That when I entered their fence, I found out that one Benben Paragsa ran from
the bed where Mirasol Magallanes was sitting on while putting on her panties;
3. That she, Mirasol Magallanes, upon my arrival, did not say anything to me
about the happening; and that I was only thinking that something had happened
(Exh. 1, p. 5, rec.).
In his typewritten brief, the appellant enumerated and discussed five errors as having been
committed by the trial court. These errors may, however, be boiled down to the issue of
credibility.
Appellant admits having sexual intercourse with Mirasol, the complaining witness, but he stoutly
denied that he did so by employing force or intimidation against Mirasol. He claims he and
Mirasol were sweethearts; that on the day of the incident, it was Mirasol who invited him to the
latter's house where they had sexual intercourse after kissing each other; and that the intercourse
they had that afternoon was, as a matter of fact, their third sexual intercourse (pp. 2, 3, 5, 6, 8-9,
t.s.n., March 21, 1972).

The foregoing testimony of the accused was substantially corroborated by two witnesses for the
defense, Mercado Batosbatosan and Eduardo Ducay (pp. 5, 6-7, 12, 15-16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 25,
t.s.n., Feb. 1, 1972).
A careful scrutiny of the record reveals that the prosecution's evidence is weak, unsatisfactory
and inconclusive to justify a conviction.
Certain circumstances negate the commission by the appellant of the crime charged and point to
the conclusion that the sexual intercourse between the appellant and the complaining witness was
voluntary. Force and intimidation were not proven. Mirasol did not offer any resistance or vocal
protestation against the alleged sexual assault. She could have easily made an outcry or resisted
the appellant's advances without endangering her life. But she did not. She was allegedly raped
in her own home, not far from her neighbors and during the daytime. If, indeed, she was raped
under the circumstances narrated by her, she could have revealed the same the very moment she
was confronted by her aunt Lita who asked her what the accused did to her upon entering the
house immediately after the intercourse took place and when the accused ran from the bed to a
storeroom of the house to hide upon seeing and/or hearing the voice of her aunt Lita. or, she
could have grabbed the hunting knife by her side when the copulation was going on, and with it
she could have possibly prevented the accused from consummating the sexual act. But she did
not.
Another circumstance is that Mirasol did not reveal immediately to her parents that she was
raped. It was only after her mother arrived from Sagay, Negros Occidental, three (3) days after
the incident, and confronted her about the rape incident that her mother learned through her aunt
Lita that she eventually revealed to her mother what the accused did to her in the afternoon of
July 13, 1971.
Still another circumstance is the fact that Mirasol did not bother at all to rebut the testimony of
the appellant and his witnesses to the effect that the accused and Mirasol were actually
sweethearts; and that they had had two previous sexual communications before July 13, 1971,
one of which happened on June 29, 1971 in the house of the accused, where Mirasol and the
accused slept together in the evening of the same day after the mother of the accused and Mirasol
had returned from the town fiesta of Bantayan, Cebu (p. 10, t.s.n., March 21, 1972).
The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied admission of the truth of the
statements uttered in his presence is applicable in criminal cases. But before the silence of a
party can be taken as an admission of what is said, it must appear: (1) that he heard and
understood the statement; (2) that he was at liberty to interpose a denial; (3) that the statement
was in respect to some matter affecting his rights or in which he was then interested, and calling,
naturally, for an answer; (4) that the facts were within his knowledge; and (5) that the fact
admitted or the inference to be drawn from his silence would be material to the issue (IV
Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, 1973 ed., p. 316). These requisites of
admission by silence all obtain in the present case. Hence, the silence of Mirasol on the facts
asserted by the accused and his witnesses may be safely construed as an admission of the truth of
such assertion.

One more circumstance which engenders serious doubt on the truthfulness of Mirasol is the
testimony of Dr. Gandiongco that he did not notice any laceration in the walls of Mirasol's
vagina, thus
Q Doctor, you testified that according to your findings a foreign
body might have inserted the internal organ of the offended party?
A Yes, sir.
Q And as a matter of fact, in your examination there was no
laceration?
A There was no laceration (p 5, t.s.n., November 16, 1971;
Emphasis supplied).
Considering Mirasol's tender age, if she had no previous sexual experience, she must have been a
virgin when she was allegedly raped by the accused. Yet she did not state that she felt some pain
as the accused tried to insert his organ into her private part. Neither did she state that she was
bleeding during and after the alleged forced coition. Instead, she matter-of-factly narrated that
the accused made four push and pull movements after which the latter ejaculated indicating
that he had an easy time doing it.
If WE are to believe her story, certainly the doctor who examined her could have noticed the
lacerations even after the lapse of three (3) days from the coition, if the intercourse on July 13,
1971 was in fact her first experience. WE believe the absence of lacerations in the walls of
Mirasol's vagina, as testified to by Dr. Gandiongco, supra, eloquently confirms the truth of the
accused's assertion that before the incident in question, he and Mirasol had two prior copulations.
And still another circumstance which casts serious doubt on the credibility of the complaining
witness and her aunt Lita is the matter of the hunting knife. While it is true that on the witness
stand these two witnesses practically corroborated each other on this particular point, the matter
of the accused having a hunting knife with him on the day of the incident was not, however,
mentioned by Mrs. Parochel in her affidavit, Exhibit 1, which she executed on July 30, 1971
five months before she testified in court. Besides, at the trial, the prosecution did not bother to
present such "hunting knife".
A last circumstance which also engenders serious doubt on the veracity of Mrs. Parochel, whose
testimony the trial court summarized, runs thus:
... The victim did not answer the call of her aunt nor did she open the barred door.
... She returned to the opened door and asked Mirasol what had happened. Mirasol
was very pale, trembling and in a state of shock, did not answer her inquiries ...(p.
3, Decision; p. 64, rec.; emphasis added).

The Solicitor General adopted the above factual summary made by the trial court by stating that

Mirasol's aunt, Lita Parochel ... found her niece in a state of shock (p. 4, Brief for
the Plaintiff-Appellee; p. 49, rec.; Emphasis supplied).
A painstaking scrutiny of the record, particularly the transcript of stenographic notes, shows that
contrary to the finding of the trial court, Mirasol answered the call of her aunt and opened the
gate of the house after she had put on her panties (p. 14, t.s.n., Dec. 3, 1971); and that Mirasol
only seemed to be afraid, besides trembling (p. 23, t.s.n., 1972); nowhere in the record is any
evidence of Mirasol having been in a state of shock.
If Mirasol was in fact in a state of shock
1. How come she was able to put on her panties and thereafter open the gate of the house when
she heard her aunt Lita calling from the outside?
2. Her aunt Lita would feel so alarmed and so concerned that she would not lose any time to
bring her to a doctor or to a hospital for medical treatment or assistance;
3. Her aunt Lita would have confronted the accused who was still hiding in the closet in a corner
of the ground floor, or she would have gone to the nearest police authority or barrio captain, who
could have easily apprehended the accused:
4. Her aunt could have sought the assistance of their barriomates or neighbors; or
5. She could have brought Mirasol to her own house which was on about 50 meters away (pp. 7,
20, t.s.n., Jan. 5, 1972). But what did she do? She abandoned Mirasol "because" she Mirasol had
to feed her hogs (p. 24,Idem).
That Mirasol was pale, afraid and trembling can only be attributed to the fact that her aunt
discovered her having sexual intercourse at so young an age and that she feared that her aunt
would report the same to her parents.
And if Mrs. Parochel really believed that her niece Mirasol was raped by appellant about 3
o'clock that afternoon of July 13, 1971, why did she not report the outrage to Mirasol's father
her husband's brother whom she met about 4 o'clock that same afternoon, just one hour after
the alleged rape?
Mrs. Parochel's close relationship to her niece-daughter of her brother-in-law vitiates her
credibility.
Appellant cannot be legally convicted of simple seduction under Article 338 of the Revised
Penal Code, for the same is not warranted by the wording of the information, which does not
alleged deceit, although appellant testified that he promised to marry Mirasol if "something
happens to her body." Much less can simple seduction include rape.

WHEREFORE, APPELLANT BIENVENIDO PARAGSA, ALIAS "BENBEN", IS HEREBY

ACQUITTED, WITH COSTS de oficio AND HIS IMMEDIATE RELEASE IS HEREBY
ORDERED UNLESS HE IS BEING DETAINED ON OTHER CHARGES.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Muoz-Palma, J., vote for the affirmance of the judgment.

G.R. No. L-61016 April 26, 1983

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF HORACIO R.
MORALES, JR., petitioner,
vs.
MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GEN. FABIAN C. VER and COL. GALILEO
KINTANAR, respondents.
G.R. No. L-61107 April 26, 1983
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ANTONIO C.
MONCUPA, JR. ANTONIO C. MONCUPA, JR., petitioner,
vs.
MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GEN. FABIAN C. VER and COL. GALILEO
KINTANAR, respondents.
Lorenzo M. Taada, Augusto Sanchez, Jejomar Binay and Antonio Quintos for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

CONCEPCION, JR., J.:

1. The petitions are without merit and are hereby DISMISSED.
2. Petitioners were arrested on April 21, 1982 at about 9:45 a.m. while they were riding
together in a motor vehicle on Laong-Laan Street, Quezon City, by elements of Task Force
Makabansa of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Since their arrest, they have been
under detention. Petitioner Morales filed his petition forhabeas corpus with this Court on
July 9, 1982, while petitioner Moncupa filed his on July 19, 1982. On July 20, 1982
petitioners, together with several others, were charged with rebellion (Art. 134, Revised
Penal Code) before the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Criminal Case No. Q-21091 filed
by the City Fiscal of Quezon City. The trial of the case has yet to be terminated. The
continued detention of petitioners to answer for the offense charged is therefore legal.
3. Petitioners alleged that they were arrested without any warrant of arrest; that their
constitutional rights were violated, among them the right to counsel, the right to remain
silent, the right to a speedy and public trial, and the right to bail. They also air the charge
that they were subjected to maltreatment and torture; that they did not have the
opportunity to present their defense before the inquest fiscal and therefore asked this
Court to order the reinvestigation of the charges against them. Acting on such plea, this
Court in a resolution en banc dated July 22, 1982 ordered the City Fiscal of Quezon City to
conduct such reinvestigation and at the same time appointed him "to act as commissioner
of this Court and receive evidence of the charges made by petitioners before this Court of
alleged torture and violation of their constitutional rights, particularly the right to

counsel." On September 28, 1982, the City Fiscal submitted his report on the
reinvestigation affirming the existence of a prima facie case for rebellion against petitioners
and several others. And on February 8, 1983 he submitted to this Court the transcript of
the notes taken at the reception of the evidence on the charges of petitioners.
4. If petitioners had been arrested in a communist country, they would have no rights to
speak of. However, the Philippines is a republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people
and all government authority emanates from them. 1 We have a Constitution framed by a
constitutional convention and duly ratified by the people. We subscribe to the rule of law.
We believe in human rights and we protect and defend them. Petitioners are entitled to the
full enjoyment of all the rights granted to them by law. And this Court stands as the
guarantor of those rights.
5. Our Constitution provides:
SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No
force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the
free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of
this section shall be inadmissible in evidence. 2
6. After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a confrontation arises
which at best may be termed unequal. The detainee is brought to an army camp or police
headquarters and there questioned and cross-examined not only by one but as many
investigators as may be necessary to break down his morale. He finds himself in a strange
and unfamiliar surroundings, and every person he meets he considers hostile to him. The
investigators are well-trained and seasoned in their work. They employ all the methods and
means that experience and study has taught them to extract the truth, or what may pass for
it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are unlettered and are not aware of their
constitutional rights. And even if they were, the intimidating and coercive presence of the
officers of the law in such an atmosphere overwhelms them into silence. Section 20 of the
Bill of Rights seeks to remedy this imbalance.
7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him
of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be
informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement
he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient
means-by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the
arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be
conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any
person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself
or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be
valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the

procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall
be inadmissible in evidence.
8. During the period of his detention, he shall have the right to confer with his counsel at
any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night, alone and privately, in the jail or any
other place of custody. 3
Arrest.
9. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be forthcoming to
answer for the commission of an offense. 4
10. An arrest may be made with or without a warrant.
SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized. 5
11. Our Constitution clearly defines the persons who may issue a warrant of arrest and
limits them to a "judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law." It
also lays down in unmistakable terms the procedure required before a search warrant or
warrant of arrest may issue.
12. A Presidential Arrest and Commitment Order is a warrant of arrest issued by the
President of the Philippines. 6 Its issuance must therefore comply with the requirements of
the Constitution, in the same manner and to the same extent, as a warrant of arrest issued
by a judge issuance must therefore comply with the requirements of the Constitution, in
the same manner and to the same extent, as a warrant of arrest by a judge.
13. An arrest may also be made without a warrant.
SEC. 6. Arrest without warrant When lawful. A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is about to commit an offense in his presence;
(b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it;

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another. 7
14. Care should be exercised in making an arrest without a warrant. Where there is no
justification for the arrest, the public officer could be criminally liable for arbitrary
detention 8 or unlawful arrest 9 or for some other offense.
15. The petitioners claim they were arrested without a warrant. The Memorandum to the
President dated April 21, 1982 from Gen. Fabian C. Ver, Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, wherein he reported the arrest of petitioners, the subversive
documents seized from them and the results of the ensuing tactical interrogation, with a
recommendation for the issuance of a Presidential Arrest and Commitment Order, was
approved by the President only on April 23, 1982. Indeed, therefore, petitioners were
arrested without a warrant. However, months before their arrest, petitioners were already
under surveillance on suspicion of committing rebellion. From the results of the said
surveillance, the evidence then at hand, and the documents seized from them at the time of
their arrest, it would appear that they had committed or were actually committing the
offense of rebellion. Their arrest without a warrant for the said offense is therefore clearly
justified.
Procedure after Arrest.
16. After a person is arrested either without a warrant or by virtue of a warrant of arrest
issued by a judge or by virtue of a Presidential Arrest and Commitment Order, the proper
complaint or information against him must be filed with the courts of justice within the
time prescribed by law, to wit:
FURTHER AMENDING ARTICLE 125 OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE, AS AMENDED (PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1404)
WHEREAS, the periods within which arrested persons shall be delivered to
the judicial authorities as provided in Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, are on occasions inadequate to enable the government to file
within the said periods the criminal information against persons arrested for
certain crimes against national security and public order.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution, and in the interest of national security as well as public safety
and order, do hereby decree and order as part of the law of the land the
following amendment to Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended:
SECTION 1. Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is hereby
further amended to read as follows:

ART. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons. -The

penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be
imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain
any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such
person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of:
six hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties,
or their equivalent; nine hours, for crimes or offenses
punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent; and
eighteen hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive
or capital penalties, or their equivalent; Provided, however,
That the President may, in the interest of national security and
public order, authorize by Executive Order longer periods,
which in no case shall exceed 30 days, or for as long as the
conspiracy to commit the crime against national security and
public order continues or is being implemented, for the
delivery of persons arrested for crimes or offenses against
public order as defined in Title III, Book 11 of this Code,
namely: Articles 134, 136, 138, 139, 141, 142, 143, 144, 146 and
147, and for acts in violation of Republic Act No. 1700 as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 885, taking into
consideration the gravity of the offense or offenses, the number
of persons arrested, the threat to national security or to public
safety and order, and/or the occurrence of a public calamity or
other emergency situation preventing the early investigation of
the cases and the filing of the corresponding information
before the civil courts.
In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the
cause of his detention and shall be allowed, upon his request, to
communicate and confer at any time with his attorney or
counsel, and to be visited by his immediate relatives.
SEC. 2. All acts, executive order, proclamations, Presidential Decrees,
General Orders, Letters of Instruction, rules and regulations, or parts
thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this decree are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.
SEC. 3. Transitory provision.-Pending the preparation and promulgation by
the President of the Executive Order referred to in Section 1 hereof, the
detention of persons arrested for any of the abovementioned offenses against
public order shall continue to be governed by the provisions of General
Orders No. 2, dated September 22, 1972 as amended by General Order Nos.
60 and 62, dated September 24, 1977 and October 22, 1977, respectively.
SEC 4. This decree shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila this 9th day of June, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and seventy-eight."
17. Failure of the public officer to do so without any valid reason would constitute a
violation of Art. 125, Revised Penal Code, as amended. And the person detained would be
entitled to be released on a writ of habeas corpus, unless he is detained under subsisting
process issued by a competent court. 10
Power of the Courts.
18. The writ of habeas corpus has often been referred to as the great writ of liberty. It is the
most expeditious way of securing the release of one who has been illegally detained. The
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended, but not the writ itself.
19. The Bill of Rights provides:
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws.
20. In Lansang vs.Garcia, 42 SCRA 448,473,We said:
In our resolution of October 5, 1972, We stated that 'a majority of the court
'had 'tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy
itself of the existence of the factual bases for the issuance of Presidential
Proclamations Nos. 889 and 889A ... and thus determine the constitutional
sufficiency of such bases in the light of the requirements of Article III, sec. 1,
par. 14, and Article VII, sec. 10, par. 2, of the Philippine Constitution ...'
Upon further deliberation, the members of the Court are now unanimous in
the conviction that it has the authority to inquire into the existence of said
factual bases in order to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof.
21. We reiterate this doctrine.
22. Furthermore, We hold that under the judicial power of review and by constitutional
mandate, in all petitions for habeas corpus the court must inquire into every phase and
aspect of petitioner's detention from the moment petitioner was taken into custody up to
the moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition. Only after such a scrutiny can
the court satisfy itself that the due process clause of our Constitution has in fact been
satisfied.
23. The submission that a person may be detained indefinitely without any charges and the
courts cannot inquire into the legality of the restraint goes against the spirit and letter of
the Constitution and does violence to the basic precepts of human rights and a democratic
society.

The Right to Bail.

24. Next to life a man loves his freedom. Some men love their freedom even more than their
life.
25. In all criminal prosecutions the accused is presumed innocent. Because of this
presumption and inasmuch as every man has a natural desire to be free, our Constitution
laid down the right to bail in these words:
SEC. 18. All persons, except those charged with capital offenses when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties. Excessive bail shall not be required. 11
26. Although martial law was terminated on January 17, 1981, by virtue of Proclamation
No. 2045 of the President of the Philippines, the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus continues to be suspended in the two autonomous regions in Mindanao and in all
other places with respect to certain offenses, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President/Prime
Minister of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution, do hereby revoke Proclamation No. 1081 (Proclaiming a State
of Martial Law in the Philippines) and Proclamation No. 1104 (Declaring the
Continuation of Martial Law) and proclaim the termination of the state of
martial law throughout the Philippines; Provided, that the call to the Armed
Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
insurrection, rebellion and subversion shall continue to be in force and effect;
and Provided that in the two autonomous regions in Mindanao, upon the
request of the residents therein, the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus shall continue; and in all other places the suspension of the
privilege of the writ shall also continue with respect to persons at present
detained as well as others who may hereafter be similarly detained for the
crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to
commit such crimes, and for all other crimes and offenses committed by
them in furtherance of or on the occasion therefore, or incident thereto, or in
connection therewith. ... (Presidential Proclamation No. 2045).
27. Normally, rebellion being a non-capital offense is bailable. But because the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus remains suspended "with respect to persons at present detained
as well as other who may hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or
rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and for all other
crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance of or on the occasion thereof, or
incident thereto, or in connection therewith," the natural consequence is that the right to
bail for the commission of anyone of the said offenses is also suspended. To hold otherwise
would defeat the very purpose of the suspension. Therefore, where the offense for which
the detainee was arrested is anyone of the said offenses he has no right to bail even after the
charges are filed in court.

28. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and
crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute
direct attacks on the life of the State.
29. Just as an individual has right to self-defense when his life is endangered, so does the
State. The suspension of the privilege of the writ is to enable the State to hold in preventive
imprisonment pending investigation and trial those persons who plot against it and commit
acts that endanger the State's very existence. For this measure of self-defense to be
effective, the right to bail must also be deemed suspended with respect to these offenses.
30. However, there is a difference between preventive and punitive imprisonment. Where
the filing of charges in court or the trial of such charges already filed becomes protracted
without any justifiable reason, the detention becomes punitive in character and the
detainee regains his right to freedom.
The Charges of Torture.
31. When petitioners charged in their petitions that they had been tortured and maltreated,
the Court decided to appoint the City Fiscal of Quezon City to hear the charges and to
receive the evidence. Not because We are an investigating body. Nor are We a trier of facts.
But because petitioners' charges are material and relevant to the petitions before Us.
32. As mentioned earlier, the Court Commissioner submitted the transcript of the
proceedings held before him. We will not pass upon the merits of the torture charges.
However, they should be filed before the body which has jurisdiction over them as
provided for in Presidential Decrees Nos. 1822, 1822-A and 1850.
33. The present form of our government, to all intents and purposes, merged the executive
and legislative branches into one. Members of parliament are at the same time cabinet
ministers. Under the system of checks and balances ordained by the Constitution, the
judiciary serves as the check and balance to the merged executive and legislative branches.
The judiciary is therefore called upon to express its thoughts on areas outside the
traditional and narrow confines of decision making, with the end in view that together we
may explore the free market of Ideas and arrive at what is best for our country and our
people.
34. Our people cry out for a better life. They want more food in their stomachs, roofs over
their heads, health services for themselves and their families, education for their children,
and other necessities that make life worth living. They cannot be denied. They want it and
they want it now. Timely indeed are the thrusts of the KKK and the BLISS programs.
35. However, we cannot lead them to a truly better life, unless we achieve complete peace in
our land; and we cannot have complete peace unless we improve the administration of
justice.

36. It was a wise man who once said: "Tell me how a country's poor receive their justice
and I will tell you how stable its government is." 12
37. Whenever we speak of the administration of justice we refer to four principal areas: the
preservation of peace and order which is the primary task of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the National Integrated Police, both under the Ministry of Defense; the
investigation and prosecution of offenses and the administration of our penal system which
are under the Ministry of Justice; the application and interpretation of laws and the trial
and adjudication of cases which fall under the jurisdiction of the courts; and appearance as
counsel for the government particularly in appealed criminal cases and as counsel for the
Commission on Elections, Securities and Exchange Commission, and others, which is the
responsibility of the Office of the Solicitor General. In everyone of these areas much can be
done to achieve our ultimate goal-that in this fair land of ours, no man, no matter how
humble, no matter how poor shall thirst for justice.
38. Our machinery of justice should be geared towards helping and protecting the poor
among us. Not knowing their rights, not having the means to pay for the services of a
lawyer, possessing no influence whatsoever, they are invariably the victims of injustice. The
affluent can take care of themselves. They are better aware of their rights, they have
influence, and they can engage the services of the best counsel. But the poor can only pray
to God and hope to find relief in the system of justice established by their government.
39. We must open all avenues for complaints and keep them open so that the grievance
procedure may be made more readily available to the masses of our people. Only by
knowing their needs can we give them what they rightfully deserve.
40. It is undeniable that throughout the length and breadth of our land, lawlessness and
disorder have increased and continue to increase to undesirable proportions. It is wishful
thinking to believe otherwise. An efforts must be exerted now to reverse the trend. We
cannot afford any delay. And we should begin by bringing to the bar of justice the culprits
in particular who burned and destroyed public property, and attacked, kidnapped and
killed public functionaries. For the questions may validly be asked: If the government
cannot protect public property, how can it protect private property? If the government
cannot guarantee the safety and lives of its officials, how can it guarantee the safety and
lives of private individuals?
41. The investigation and prosecution of cases should be further improved so that only
meritorious cases shall reach the courts, thus contributing to the unclogging of court
dockets. Many criminal cases initiated by complainants are just harassment suits and
should never have been filed in court. In the process, it is required that all fiscals be
appointed in a permanent capacity. Their security of tenure is the foundation stone of their
independence. Our penal system should be further updated to make more effective the
rehabilitation of criminals. Let us do away with instances of first offenders who serve
sentence in order to be reformed but who come out instead as hardened criminals.

42. And with the judicial revamp just effected under B.P. 129, the trial and decision
making process has been modified and vastly improved to achieve better results. But it
must be remembered that courts which are not filled are as good as no courts at all.
Therefore, more appointments to the existing vacancies should be made.
43. One lesson our people have learned-painfully but well-is that politics and a good
administration of justice-like oil and water-do not mix; that when politics infiltrates the
administration of justice, injustice is often the outcome. In some jurisdictions of the United
States, there are sheriffs (peace officers) and district attorneys (prosecutors) who are
elected by the voters and who run for office as the candidates of a political party. In the
Philippines such a system would never work because in our culture we have values
peculiarly our own-value like "utang na loob", "compadre", "pakikisama", "tayu-tayo",
"bigayan", "bata ko", "amo ko", and the "god- father mentality". Values like these have
derailed and may derail the administration of justice. Political followers commit abuses in
the belief that come what may their political bosses would shield them from punishment.
Can you imagine how criminal cases would be investigated and prosecuted if fiscals
(prosecutors) were chosen by election? How would our laws be enforced if policemen and
members of the Armed Forces were elected by the people? And yet the heads of the
Ministries of Justice and Defense and the Office of the Solicitor General are all active
politicians.
44. The burdens of office fall heavily on their shoulders. Perhaps it is time we relieve them
of the additional burdens that being politicians entail. Our Constitution foresaw the need
for heads of ministries who are not active politicians in providing that ". . . . At least a
majority of the Members of the Cabinet who are heads of ministries shall come from the
Regional Representations of the Batasang Pambansa. . . ." 13
45. The campaign against venality in office-malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfesance
should be pursued with renewed vigor. For graft and corruption are like termites gnawing
away the foundation of government. The harm done is sometimes not realized; or even if
realized, under- estimated. In the process let us remember to stress preventive measures to
save public property from loss.
46. The communist threat remains a nagging problem of government. Whether Marxist,
Maoist, Leninist, aided by the New People's Army, rebels, radicals, and lawless elements,
they all have but one aim-one single purpose-one defined objective: to bring down by
violence the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and to forcibly seize political
power in order that they may replace our existing political, social, economic, and legal
order with an entirely new one based on communism.
47. Once before, in the early fifties, communists threatened the established order. They
were driven back by the Armed Forces, mainly because of the support of our people. We
must keep, strengthen and solidify the sympathy, faith, loyalty, and trust in the government
of our brothers in the rural areas. Guns and bullets alone will not do it. We can accomplish
this only by giving them better government. It is a condition sine qua non to achieve success
in the fight against subversion.

48. By and large, the Armed Forces are composed of good and disciplined men. However,
there are those who are not worthy of the uniforms they wear. Not a few have enriched
themselves by abusing the powers of their position. Some are involved in extortion,
smuggling, and kidnapping for ransom. There are others who maintain gambling, drug
rings, and prostitution dens. And still others have committed robbery, rape, murder, and
other offenses. The campaign to rid the organization of such misfits should be carried out
with missionary zeal. For indeed victims of abuse are often alienated from the government.
49. The Filipinos are a God-loving and a God-fearing people. We believe in peace and
freedom. We believe in the family and its strong ties. We can never willingly accept
communism and what it stands for.
50. While the government should continue to repel the communists, the subversives, the
rebels, and the lawless with all the means at its command, it should always be remembered
that whatever action is taken must always be within the framework of our Constitution and
our laws.
51. When the judgment of history is written, as leaders of our people, we shall be asked to
account not only for what we did, not only for what we did not do, but also for what visions
we have today of our tomorrow.
52. What will be our answer?
53. WHEREFORE, as aforestated, the petitions should be, as they are hereby,
DISMISSED. With costs against the petitioners.
54. SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 98321-24 June 30, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RICARDO DE GUZMAN y SAN PEDRO, VICENTE JIMENEZ y BUSTAMANTE,
JOSEPH CAILANG y SUAN, RUEL BACLAYON y GELLEMER, LEOPOLDO
CAILANG y SUAN, ALEX BARRETO, CONSTANTINO VILLANUEVA, VICTOR
NUEZ, JR. and CELSO BUSTAMANTE, accused. VICTOR NUEZ, JR., appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Efren V. Ramirez for accused-appellant.

MELO, J.:

Ricardo de Guzman y San Pedro, Vicente Jimenez y Bustamante, Joseph Cailang y Suan, Ruel
Baclayon y Gellemer, Leopoldo Cailang y Suan, Alex Barreto, Constantino Villanueva y
Hermogenes, Victor Nuez, Jr. and Celso Bustamante were charged before the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu with three counts of murder and one count of frustrated murder in four
Informations, the first of which reads as follows:
That on or about the 4th day of April, 1989, at about 7:45 o'clock A.M., in the
City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, who were then 9 in number, armed with an unlicensed firearm
thereby constituting themselves as a band, conniving and confederating together
with several others who are still at large and whose case will be separately
considered as soon as procedural requirements are complied with, and mutually
helping one another, with treachery and evident premeditation, with deliberate
intent, with intent to kill, did then and there attack, assault and shoot one Jose
Bantug, hitting him on the different parts of his body thereby inflicting upon said
Jose Bantug the following physical injuries, to wit:
GUNSHOT WOUNDS OF THE HEAD,
BODY AND (R) SKULL
as a consequence of which the said Jose Bantug died later. (pp. 20-21, Rollo.)
Three other Informations identically worded as the one aforequoted, charged the accused with
the murder of Francisco Carteciano y Sorilla and Antonio S. Carteciano, and the frustrated
murder of Lorna V. Carteciano (pp. 22-29, Rollo).
Following joint trial, the court a quo rendered a decision on July 31, 1990, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, promises considered, the Court finds the accused Victor Nuez,
Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of murder
(3 counts) and frustrated murder, for which he is hereby sentenced as follows:
In Criminal Case No. CBU-15224 reclusion perpetua and to
further indemnify the Heirs of Engr. Jose Bantug, Jr. in the sum of
P30,000;
In Criminal Case No. CBU-15228 reclusion perpetua and to
further indemnify the Heirs of Francisco Carteciano, Jr. in the sum
of P30,000;
In Criminal Case No. CBU-15229 reclusion perpetua and to
further indemnify the Heirs of Major Antonio Carteciano in the
tune of P30,000 and the further sum of P31,000 representing
funeral/burial expenses; and

In Criminal Case No. CBU-15230 six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to further indemnify the
offended party Lorna Carteciano in the sum of P12,665.25
representing hospitalization/medical expenses.
On the sole ground of reasonable doubt, a verdict of acquittal is hereby entered in
all the above-entitled cases for the accused Ricardo De Guzman, Vicente Jimenez,
Joseph Cailang, Ruel Baclayon, Leopoldo Cailang, Alex Barreto, Constantino
Villanueva and Celso Bustamante, and their immediate release from custody is
ordered unless they are facing some other charge. The bailbonds posted by
Vicente Jimenez, Ricardo De Guzman and Celso Bustamante are hereby
cancelled. (pp. 73-74, Rollo)
Victor Nuez, Jr., the only accused found guilty, is now before us, assigning the following
alleged errors:
I
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT HAS
FAILED TO TAKE IN TO CONSIDERATION THE VARIOUS HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS PERPETRATED UPON THE PERSON OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT DURING HIS ARREST AND CUSTODY.
II
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT'S
FINDINGS OF FACTS ARE VIOLATIVE OF TESTIMONIAL AND
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND HAD THEY BEEN
PROPERLY APPRECIATED AND CONSIDERED IT WOULD RESULT IN
ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S ACQUITTAL, RATHER THAN HIS SOLE
CONVICTION.
III
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED
WHEN IT HAS FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE VITAL INCONSISTENCIES,
SUBSTANTIAL CONTRADICTIONS OF THE WITNESSES FOR THE
PROSECUTION, AS WELL AS, INCORRECT APPRECIATION OF THE
TWO CONFIRMED "CONTRADICTORY ROLE" (HITMAN/BACK-UP
MAN) OF VICTOR NUEZ, JR. (DECISION, p. 4; DECISION, pp. 8-9, IN
RELATION TO TSN-DUMDUM, JULY 10, 1989 pp. 39-42), WHICH WHEN
CORRECTLY APPRECIATED WOULD RESULT IN ACQUITTAL FOR
HAVING DEBUNKED MORAL CERTAINTY/PROOF BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT ON THE "POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF THE
ACCUSED BY THE WITNESSES OF THE PROSECUTION WHOSE

CREDIBILITY [HAS] BEEN ASSAILED (PEOPLE VS. ATENECIO, 128

SCRA 22; PEOPLE VS. RECIMIENTO, JR., 128 SCRA 95; PEOPLE VS.
CASTELO, 133 SCRA 667) BY THIS HONORABLE COURT/APPELLANT.
IV
FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE
DECISION (DECISION, p. 13) OF THE, TRIAL COURT WITH
ASSUMED/INFERRED "EXISTENCE OF CONSPIRACY" INSPITE OF NO
PROOF TO THAT EFFECT AS REFLECTED IN THE PROCEEDING (12
PAGES OF THE DECISION NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION GLARINGLY
VIOLATES CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS (SEC. 1; SEC. 14 (1); ART.
III, 1987 CONSTITUTION) AND THE RULING OF PEOPLE VS.
BENAVIDEZ, 127 SCRA 188; PEOPLE VS. ZOSA, 130 SCRA 77).
V
FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: INASMUCH AS THE TRIAL COURT
ACQUITTED THE SEVEN ACCUSED, LEAVING ONLY HEREIN
ACCUSED-APPELLANT, SO CONSPIRACY HAS NOT BEEN
SUFFICIENTLY PROVEN; AND CONSEQUENTLY, IT IS LEGALLY
ERRONEOUS FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO LET THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT SUFFER FOR NON-EXISTING CONSPIRACY AND
PENALIZING HIM FOR CONSPIRING HIMSELF. (pp. 1-2, Appellant's Brief
Following p. 149, Rollo.)
The facts of the case, as established by the evidence, are as follows:
At around 7:45 A.M. of April 4, 1989, Major Antonio Carteciano was driving his private jeep
toward Camp General Arcadio Maxilom in Lahug, Cebu City where he was stationed as medical
officer of the PC/INP Provincial Command. With him in the jeep were his wife, Lorna
Carteciano, who was seated beside him, his mother-in-law, Juanita Ricaplaza, his 13-year old
son Reiser, his brother, Francisco Carteciano, Jr., a neighbor, Engr. Jose Bantug, Jr., and
Bantug's daughter, Jennifer. Except for Major Carteciano and his wife, the rest were seated at the
back of the jeep.
Near the intersection of M. Velez and V. Rama streets, the sound of gunfire was heard coming
from the left side of the street. Major Carteciano drew his .45 caliber pistol and fired toward his
left. Immediately thereafter, gunshots were fired in succession, hitting Major Carteciano,
Francisco Carteciano, Jose Bantug, and Lorna Carteciano.
When the jeep came to a full stop, several gunmen emerged from their hiding places and
approached the jeep. Accused-appellant Victor Nuez, Jr., demanded from Lorna Carteciano her
husband's firearm. Lorna pleaded that there was nothing to give, offering instead her valuables.
Thereupon, accused-appellant Nuez fired at Major Carteciano point-blank, hitting his head
which was resting on Lorna's lap. Then the gunmen withdrew toward a jeepney. Nuez aimed a

gun at the driver of the jeepney, Rosalito Tibio, and ordered him to drive toward V. Rodriguez
Street. The passengers of the jeepney were ordered by Nuez to disembark. All the gunmen then
boarded the jeepney and when they reached the cemetery at Barangay Calamba they alighted.
As a result of the, shooting, Major Antonio Carteciano, Francisco Carteciano, and Engineer Jose
Bantug died. Lorna Carteciano was seriously wounded, and would have died were it not for the
timely medical assistance rendered to her.
On April 7, 1989, 15 persons were presented to Juanita Ricaplaza at the VISCOM Hospital and
she identified 7 of them as the perpetrators of the crimes, namely:
1. Victor Nuez
2. Constantino Villanueva
3. Ruel Baclayon
4. Leopoldo Cailang
5. Joseph Cailang
6. Ricardo de Guzman and
7. Vicente Jimenez
On the same day, 15 persons were likewise presented to Lorna Carteciano at the VISCOM
Hospital where she was undergoing treatment for the wounds she sustained during the shooting
and she identified the following as participants in the shooting:
1. Victor Nuez
2. Ruel Baclayon
3. Leopoldo Cailang
4. Constantino Villanueva and
5. Alex Barreto
On April 8, 1989, Reiser Carteciano identified Celso Bustamante as another participant in the
shooting.
During the joint trial of the cases, Juanita Ricaplaza, Lorna Carteciano, and Reiser Carteciano
positively identified the afore-mentioned persons as the perpetrators of the crimes. Lorna
Carteciano further testified that Victor Nuez was the gunman who shot her husband, Major
Carteciano, in the head.
Accused-appellant contends that no warrant of arrest was issued against him and his co-accused,
and that, therefore, their arrest was unlawful. It appears according to the findings of the trial
court that
In the early dawn of 6 April 1989 combined PC/INP elements who were equipped
with search warrants (Exhs. X, X-I, X-2; Y, Y-1, Y-2; Z, Z-1, Z-2; AA, AA-1,
AA-2; BB, BB-1, BB-2; CC, CC-1, CC-2; DD, DD-1, DD-2; & EE, EE-1, EE-2)
went to Sambag II and searched several houses thereat. The operation was
launched on the basis of intelligence reports about the presence of armed men in

that area who were suspected to have pulled the Carteciano ambush. They did not
find any firearm but they were able to pick up 10 suspects who were later turned
over to the Cebu METRODISCOM. The next day the suspects were taken to
Camp Lapu Lapu Station Hospital where Lorna Carteciano was confined. They
were made to join a police lineup and from a distance of 5 meters Juanita
Ricaplaza pointed to 7 persons as among those who staged the ambush. They gave
their names as Victor Nuez, Jr., Constantino Villanueva, Ruel Baclayon,
Leopoldo Cailang, Joseph Cailang, Ricardo de Guzman and Vicente Jimenez. For
her part, Lorna Carteciano identified 5 of them, namely, Victor Nuez, Jr., Ruel
Baclayon, Leopoldo Cailang, Constantino Villanueva and Alex, Barreto. (p.
62, Rollo)
It is much too late for accused-appellant to raise the question of his arrest without a warrant of
arrest. It bears emphasis that accused-appellant, together with his co-accused, pleaded not guilty
upon arraignment. Appellant is, thus, estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest. Any
irregularity attendant to his arrest was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and by participating in the trial
(People vs. Rabang, 187 SCRA 682 [1990]). Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is not
sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial
free from error (U.S. vs. Grant and Kennedy, 18 Phil. 122 [1910]; People vs. Briones, 202 SCRA
708 [1991).
Next, accused-appellant assails the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. The arguments
advanced on this point are far from persuading. The inconsistencies pointed out by accusedappellant in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses are so minor and trivial that they cannot
impair the main thrust of their testimony that they saw accused-appellant at the scene of the
shooting, describing with clarity his active participation in the commission of the crimes. At any
rate, the trial judge's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses' testimony is to be accorded
great respect on appeal (People vs. Gerones, 193 SCRA 263 [1991]; People vs. Natan, 193
SCRA 355 [1991]), and in the absence of any showing that the trial court had over-looked
certain substantial facts, said factual findings are entitled to great weight and indeed are binding
even on the Supreme Court (People vs. Umali, 193 SCRA 493 [1991]). An assiduous
examination of the evidence fails to unearth any fact of substantial weight to negate the
correctness of the findings of fact of the trial. Lorna Carteciano, the wife of victim, Major
Carteciano, who was herself wounded in the shooting, positively identified accused-appellant as
the gunman who shot Major Carteciano point-blank in the head. Accused-appellant was only 2
feet away from Lorna Carteciano, who was cradling the head of Major Carteciano, when he shot
Major Carteciano in the head. At that distance the possibility of Lorna Carteciano making a
mistaken identification is remote. She could not have been impelled by any evil motive in
identifying accused-appellant as the killer of her husband. Her motive, laudable at that, is to
obtain justice for the murder of her husband.
The testimony of Lorna Carteciano finds ample corroboration in the testimony of Juanita
Ricaplaza that accused-appellant was pointing his gun at Lorna Carteciano, and by the testimony
of Rosalito Tibio who testified that accused-appellant commandeered his jeepney at gunpoint.

It is further contended that accused-appellant was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel
when he was subjected to a paraffin test without the assistance of counsel. Accused-appellant's
reliance on his constitutional right to counsel at the time he was given a paraffin test is misplaced
for he was not then under custodial investigation. The right to counsel attaches only upon the
start of an investigation, that is, when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit
information and/or confessions or admissions from the accused. At such point or stage, the
person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of
extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing
interrogation (Gamboa vs. Cruz, 162 SCRA 642 [1988]). In People vs. Loveria (187 SCRA 47
[1990]), this Court held that during a police line-up where the accused was identified by the
victim, the accused's right to counsel was not violated because he was not, at that moment, under
custodial investigation.
Accused-appellant also protests that there was no proof of conspiracy. Although the same degree
of proof required for establishing the crime is required to support a finding of the presence of
conspiracy, meaning that conspiracy must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the
commission of the offense itself (People vs. Custodio, 47 SCRA 289 [1972]; People vs. Llamera,
51 SCRA 48 [1973]; People vs. Geronimo, 53 SCRA 246 [1973]; People vs. Tumalip, 60 SCRA
303 [1974]), conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence; it may be deduced from the
mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated (People vs. Ogapay, 66 SCRA 210
[1975]; People vs. Alonzo, 73 SCRA 484 [1976]), and spontaneous coordination of the attack by
the accused establishes the existence of conspiracy (People vs. Aleta, 72 SCRA 542 [1976]).
There is ample evidence to establish conspiracy among accused-appellant and the other
perpetrators of the crimes charged. In this connection we quote with approval the following
observations of the Solicitor General:
As correctly found by the trial court, the assailants "were waiting in ambush", at
the intersection of M. Velez and V. Rama Streets in the morning of April 4, 1988.
When the jeep being then driven by Major Carteciano came into view, a single
gunshot was fired as an apparent signal that the target of the ambush had arrived
at the appointed place. Thereupon, shots were fired in quick succession hitting
Major Carteciano, his brother Francisco and Engineer Jose Bantug the only
occupants of the jeep who could have offered resistance to the attack. Thereafter,
the assailants surrounded the jeep to ascertain whether their criminal objective
had been accomplished and thereupon demanded the firearm of Major Carteciano
from his wife (who offered, instead, her valuables) evidently to eliminate all
means of defense or retaliation from the victims.
Having failed to obtain the firearm, the assailants, particularly appellant Victor
Nuez, ensured the accomplishment of their purpose by shooting Major
Carteciano in the head.
Immediately thereafter, appellant made a sign to his companions that their
objective had been accomplished (Vide, tsn, 6/22/89, pp. 4-45).

Thereupon, appellant led his companions in their escape by commandeering a

passenger jeepney and instructing the driver thereof to take them away from the
scene of the crimes.
The foregoing circumstances, no doubt, show that appellant and his group indeed,
conspired in the execution of the offenses charged. The acts performed by them
relative to the commission of the crimes were so concerted indicating unity of
purpose and unity in the execution of their unlawful objective. (pp. 23-24,
Appellee's Brief, following p. 156, Rollo)
It is, however, argued that. The acquittal of the other accused persons negates conspiracy; hence
accused-appellant's conviction as principal in all the offenses charged is improper. The argument
is fallacious. The trial court's judgment of acquittal of the co-accused of accused-appellant is
anchored on its findings that the identities of the others were not duly established by the
prosecution witnesses. Their acquittal is not based on any findings that it was accused-appellant
alone who was the perpetrator of all the crimes. On the contrary, the evidence on record clearly
establishes the fact that accused-appellant and several persons committed the crime in a planned,
synchronized, and concerted action.
We, therefore, find that the conviction of accused-appellant for the crimes charged has been
established beyond reasonable doubt and the penalty imposed is in accordance with law.
However, the civil indemnity imposed by the trial court should be increased to P50,000 in
conformity with our recent rulings on the matter.
WHEREFORE, except for the modification that the civil indemnity to be paid by accusedappellant Victor Nuez, Jr. to the heirs of each victim who died is hereby increased to P50,000,
the appealed decision is hereby affirmed in all other respects, with costs against accusedappellant.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-24484

May 28, 1968

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RAMON NARCISO Y CONTRERAS, ET AL., defendants,
RUFINO PEA Y GUEVARRA, defendant on review.
Enrique P. Syquia for defendant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
ANGELES, J.:
This is an automatic review of Criminal Case No. 5871 of the Court of First Instance of Manila
entitled "People of the Philippines versus Ramon Narciso y Contreras, Elias Gloria y Bernardino,
Francisco Celso y Garcia and Rufino Pea y Guevarra", pursuant to section 9, Rule 122 of the
Rules of Court (sec. 9, Rule 118 of the old Rules), one of the accused therein, Rufino Pea y
Guevarra, having been sentenced by the trial court to the supreme Penalty of
"Death".1vvphi1.nt
The above-named accused were prosecuted in the court a quo for the crime of murder, the
pertinent information for which, filed on July 12, 1961, alleged as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of July, 1961, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, being all detained prisoners, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery, and with the use
of superior strength, attack, assault and hit with pieces of wood Roberto Monreal y
Calbario, another detained prisoner, several times on different parts of his body, thereby
inflicting upon said Roberto Monreal y Calbario mortal physical injuries which were the
direct and immediate cause of his death.
Contrary to law.
All the said accused pleaded "not guilty" to the charge when they were arraigned on July 17,
1961. Thereafter, the prosecution presented its evidence consisting of the testimonies of: (a) Dr.
Mariano B. Lara, Chief of the Medico-Legal Section, MPD; (b) Bernardo Villalon, a prisoner
serving sentence for robbery in the City Jail of Manila; (c) Pat. Crispin Umaging, MPD; (d)
Servillano N. David, Chemical Analyst, MPD; (e) Det. Cpl. Carlos Martin, Jr., MPD; (f) Det.
Sgt. Herminio Clemente, MPD; and (g) Pat. Avelino Leano, MPD. Various exhibits, identified
and marked during the trial, were also offered in evidence, among them: Exh. B, the necropsy
report; Exh. H-1, a piece of wood stained with blood; Exh. I, a blanket with human blood stains;
Exh. J, the extrajudicial statement of accused Elias Gloria; Exh. K, the extrajudicial statement of
accused Rufino Pea; Exh. L, the extrajudicial statement of accused Ramon Narciso; Exh. M, the
extrajudicial statement of accused Francisco Celso; and Exh. N, the extra-judicial statement of
prisoner Bernardo Villalon, the eyewitness to the killing of the victim inside Cell 2-A of the city
jail who testified for the People. All the aforesaid extra-judicial statements were objected to by
the defense as "hearsay evidence", but were, nevertheless, admitted by the trial court.

Soon after the prosecution rested its case, accused Ramon Narciso filed a Motion to Dismiss
dated June 1, 1964, followed by accused Francisco Celso who also submitted his own Motion to
Dismiss dated June 4, 1964. In an order dated August 7, 1964, the trial court granted the motion
of Francisco Celso as against whom the case was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence, but the
motion to dismiss filed by Ramon Narciso was denied in the same order. The accused Elias
Gloria subsequently escaped from the New Bilibid Prisons in Muntinlupa and has since then
remained at large; so, the case as against him had to be suspended. Trial continued and evidence
was presented for the defense of Rufino Pea and Ramon Narciso; but the latter, on February 10,
1965, died of "asphyxial cardio-respiratory failure" (bangungot), and the case was likewise
dismissed as against him. The case was, therefore, submitted for decision on February 16, 1965,
as against the only remaining accused, Rufino Pea, who, as earlier stated, now stands convicted
of the crime of murder.
Our own examination of the record of the case revealed the circumstances surrounding the
killing of Roberto Monreal inside Cell 2-A, City Jail of Manila on July 10, 1961, as testified to
by the lone eyewitness, Bernardo Villalon, who was serving sentence in the same cell of the said
jail at the time. The gist of his testimony follows, to wit:
About an hour or so before midnight in the evening of July 10, 1961, Roberto Monreal was lying
on his belly on a mat on the cement floor of Cell 2-A, City Jail of Manila. The count of prisoners
inside had just been taken. In that cell, measuring about 7 by 15 meters, were some 80 inmates.
The cots were not enough for them and some had to sleep on mats on the floor. The place was
illuminated, for the big bulbs were on. Some six (6) meters from the place where Monreal was a
bed on the cement floor and about five (5) meters from Bernardo Villalon (the witness) who was
seated on top of a double-deck bed were the accused Elias Gloria and Rufino Pea; they (Gloria
and Pea) talked in whispers for about two (2) minutes and Rufino Pea pointed to Monreal with
his left thumb. Monreal who was lying on the floor (nakadapa) was awake, but he did not see
Elias Gloria and Rufino Pea as they talked because there were beds between them, although the
latter could see Monreal. Thereafter, Gloria and Pea left walking towards the end of the cell.
Soon, there was a relief of guards. Bernardo Villalon left the double-deck bed where he was after
about five minutes and laid himself on the cement floor beside Roberto Monreal. He slept, about
one (1) meter distant from the latter.
At about 11:15, shortly after he fell asleep, Bernardo Villalon was awakened by some noise. He
got up in a sitting position and saw that Roberto Monreal who was beside him, was being beaten
with a piece of wood by Elias Gloria who was standing near. Villalon moved aside, still in his
sitting position, farther away from Monreal. Elias Gloria hit Monreal with the piece of wood a
number of times, about three (3) times; and each time he delivered a blow, Elias Gloria cursed at
the victim: "Ikaw, Bahala Ka". Blood was seen as Roberto Monreal lay prostrate on the cement
floor, motionless, his body half-covered with a blanket with the head and right arm exposed.
Elias Gloria had companions with him at the time he was beating Monreal but Villalon who was
near failed to recognize them nor was he able to ascertain their number for there was already a
commotion inside. However, nobody was near the place where Elias Gloria was beating Roberto
Monreal; the other inmates were all far. After the beating, Elias Gloria dropped the piece of
wood and left the place. Bernardo Villalon then stood and ran away.

Bernardo Villalon testified further that he was confined in the city jail only on May 16, 1961, but
he has come to know of the existence of gangs or organizations of inmates there the "OXO",
the "Sigue-Sigue" and the "Bahala Na". He knows the victim, Roberto Monreal, who was with
him for three (3) days inside Cell 2. They were later transferred together to Cell 2-A. They have
stayed together since then, during the three days that they were confined in Cell 2-A immediately
preceding the night of the incident. The accused are also known to Bernardo Villalon because
they use to eat together. He knows them to be members of the Sigue-Sigue Gang, while the
victim was affiliated with the Bahala Na Gang during his lifetime. Bernardo Villalon was not
aware of the existing feud between these organizations or "gangs", but he learned about it on that
very night of the incident because at about 8:00 or 9:00 o'clock that very same evening there was
trouble inside Cell 2, just beside Cell 2-A, where Arturo Forcuna @ Boy Golden (a "Bahala Na"
gang member) and some of his companions in Cell 2, were beaten by members of the SigueSigue Gang. Boy Golden was transferred to the cell bodega after the incident. He admitted
though that he does not know the cause of the gang rivalry. He also confessed that he has tattoo
marks on the parts of his body symbolizing membership in the Bahala Na Gang, but he explained
that he was forced to join the organization after the killing of Roberto Monreal because
subsequent thereto "there was no place where I could be put in the City Jail."
Other witnesses for the prosecution testified to the following effect: Soon after the beating, the
prison guards came. Four detained prisoners were ordered to carry the victim to a jeep which
took Roberto Monreal to the North General Hospital where he was pronounced "dead on arrival".
The policemen searched the cell for the objects used in the killing while the desk sergeant
notified the Homicide Section of the MPD. Detectives from the Homicide Section arrived later;
they conducted an ocular inspection of the scene of the crime, and then took custody of the seven
suspects delivered to them by Capt. Natividad along with several pieces of wood found inside the
cell and a bloodstained blanket. From the City Jail, the seven detention prisoners picked were
taken to the Headquarters of the MPD. A verbal investigation ensued wherein inmates Bernardo
Villalon and Alfredo de la Rosa pointed to their co-prisoners Elias Gloria, Ramon Narciso,
Francisco Celso and Rufino Pea as the persons responsible for the killing of Roberto Monreal,
and these persons, when questioned about the incident, admitted their participation in the killing.
Thereupon, their individual statements were reduced to writing. Det. Cpl. Carlos Martin, Jr. took
the statements of accused Elias Gloria and Rufino Pea (Exhs. J & K); Det. Sgt. Herminio
Clemente reduced to writing the statements of accused Ramon Narciso and witness Bernardo
Villalon (Exhs. L & N); while the statement of accused Francisco Celso (Exh. M) was taken by
Pat. Avelino Leano. The investigations were taken simultaneously, although separately and
independently. They were conducted in one room at the headquarters of the Manila Police
Department in the presence of all the investigators and the answers given to them could be heard
by the others. Except the accused Francisco Celso who does not know how to read, and whose
statement was first read to him by Det. Cpl. Martin, Jr., all the rest personally read their
respective statements after the investigation. The statements were all signed before office hours
started the day following the night of the incident. After evaluating the statements, they were
forwarded to the Fiscal's Office by the Homicide Section of the MPD.
The medico-legal officer who conducted the autopsy on the body of the victim found two (2)
lacerated wounds at the back of the head, any of which could have caused the death of Roberto
Monreal. They were fatal because of the fracture of the cranium which caused hemorrhage all

over the brain. Other superficial skin lacerations were found above the left eye. He was of the
opinion that the wounds could have been caused by a blunt instrument, like a piece of wood. He
also ventured to say that the victim could be in a lying position when he was hit by the blunt
instrument. The chemist who examined the pieces of wood and the blanket recovered by the
police from the scene of the crime testified, on the other hand, that the piece of wood measuring
1-" 1-" x 23" (Exh. H-1) and the colored blanket (Exh. I) contained human blood, although
he was not able to ascertain whether the blood found in said exhibits were those of the victim.
Accused Rufino Pea testified in his own defense. He denied whatever participation in the
incident. He repudiated his confession and claimed that he signed his confession after he had
been maltreated by the policemen inside the jail. He declared that as soon as he, Elias Gloria,
Ramon Narciso and Francisco Celso reached the Homicide Section at the MPD Headquarters,
Det. Clemente and his companions repeatedly asked him if he had anything to do with the killing
of Roberto Monreal inside Cell 2-A, to which he consistently answered "that he had nothing to
do with it". Dissatisfied with his answer, Det. Clemente and his companions brought him inside
the toilet, and once there, Det. Clemente and his companions started giving him blows on
different parts of his body his face, belly, neck and stomach. He remembered that Det.
Clemente repeatedly boxed him; one of his companions gave him three (3) blows, while another
boxed him four (4) times. They continued boxing him inside the toilet for about ten minutes,
during which time he lost consciousness for about three (3) times, and for which reason he could
not exactly remember how many blows they gave him at different parts of his body. But even
with such punishment, he told them that he had nothing to do with the clubbing of Monreal.
They made him lie down on a long bench inside the toilet after that. One of the companions of
Det. Clemente sat on his stomach. They held his hands. A towel was placed over his mouth and
nose and then they started pouring 7-Up. The treatment lasted for about five (5) minutes, after
which he lost consciousness. He regained his senses after that, but because he could no longer
bear the punishment, he asked him to prepare a statement which he could sign. He was given
several sheets of paper after that which he signed without knowing their contents. It was about
early the next morning following the incident in Cell 2-A when they asked him to sign the
statement. He owned the signature appearing on the statement he signed (Exh. K, p. 185,
Record), but maintained that the answers to the questions appearing thereon were not his. The
only questions they repeatedly asked him was "if I know anything about the clubbing of
Monreal", and to which question he answered "that I did not have anything to do with it". He
could not remember if he was ever asked if he had been maltreated; he could not remember
anything because he lost consciousness several times. He did not remember also whether they
asked him where he lived at the time, but admitted that the residence, civil status and age
appearing in Exh. K were correct. His co-accused and he were neighbors outside jail, and they all
belonged to the "Sigue-Sigue Gang" inside the jail.
After the maltreatment in the hands of the police officers at the headquarters of the MPD, he had
a hearing in Branch 16 of the Court of First Instance of Manila in connection with another case.
He could not remember whether it was on July 11, 1961, or not, but during that hearing, he told
his parents about the maltreatment they have given him. His parents informed an attorney about
it and the latter had him examined in the Medico-Legal Section of the Manila Police Department.
He could not remember, however, the name of the doctor who examined him. At that time, his
face and body were swollen.

Like his co-accused Ramon Narciso, Rufino Pea also signed his name on a blank sheet of paper
in open court which was marked as Exh. 1-Pea (p. 270, Record) in his attempt to show that the
signature on Exh. K was made by him under duress.
From the foregoing evidence, the lower court found Rufino Pea guilty of murder for the killing
of Roberto Monreal in the night of July 10, 1961, holding that the proof of corpus delicti plus the
testimony of the lone eyewitness and the confession of the accused afford more than sufficient
bases of conviction. Thus, in its decision dated March 25, 1965, said accused was sentenced to
death; to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P6,000.00; and to pay one-fourth () of
the costs.
The judgment of conviction is here assailed by counsel de oficio appointed to represent the
accused Rufino Pea in this review. Said counsel submitted an enlightening brief espousing the
cause of the convicted man. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, failed to submit any brief
notwithstanding seventeen (17) extensions of time within which to submit one that were
requested by him and granted by this Court. Hence, the case of the People was deemed submitted
for decision without any brief.
The first important question posed in this review is procedural: whether or not the trial court was
right in admitting in evidence against Rufino Pea his own extrajudicial confession (Exh. K), and
the respective extrajudicial confessions (Exhs. J, L and M) of his co-accused Elias Gloria,
Francisco Celso and Ramon Narciso. It appears that accused Elias Gloria never testified in court
in this case because he escaped from confinement in Muntinlupa during the trial and was never
re-arrested thereafter; so with accused Francisco Celso as against whom the case was dismissed
by order of the court on August 7, 1964. He neither testified for the prosecution nor for the
defense of any of the other accused. It was shown by the prosecution that all the accused were
investigated in the same room at the headquarters of the MPD, but there is no showing, since
they were investigated simultaneously and separately by different investigators, that Rufino Pea
knew that Elias Gloria and Francisco Celso had implicated him in the killing of Roberto Monreal
in their statements, or that Rufino Pea was thereafter informed about the contents of their
statements. We have no doubt, therefore, that the extrajudicial statements of Elias Gloria (Exh. J)
and Francisco Celso (Exh. M) may not be directly introduced in evidence as proof of specific
facts against accused Rufino Pea, in accordance with the well-settled rule that extrajudicial
statements of an accused implicating his co-accused may not be utilized against the latter unless
repeated in open court.1 The said extrajudicial confessions of Elias Gloria and Francisco Celso
are admissible only against them but not against Rufino Pea as to whom they are hearsay
evidence, for the latter never had any opportunity to cross-examine them.2 Of course, these rules
admit of exceptions. Thus, it has been held that where confessions had been made by several
accused and there could have been no collusion with reference to them, the fact, that the
statements are in all material respects identical, is confirmatory of the testimony of an
accomplice.3 It will be noted, however, that there is a marked difference between the case
of People vs. Badilla and the one at bar. In the Badilla case, several accused were charged under
an information alleging conspiracy, unlike in this case where there was no such allegation in the
information and the defense had seasonably objected to the admission of any evidence, including
Exhibits J and M, tending to prove conspiracy. But even if conspiracy were properly alleged and

proven in this case, the admissibility of Exhibits J and M as against accused Rufino Pea should
be qualified. So explained this Court in that case of People vs. Badilla:
In other words, while an extrajudicial declaration of a co-conspirator may not be directly
introduced in evidence against another co-conspirator as proof of specific facts, it may
nevertheless under certain conditions be taken into consideration as a circumstance in the
credibility of the testimony of an accomplice. [Emphasis supplied.]
We find no plausible reason why the principle should not be made to apply to this case where
several accused had been charged together of a crime without any allegation of conspiracy; but
with the above-quoted authority, there could be no doubt that for purposes of proving the fact
that Rufino Pea participated in the killing of Roberto Monreal as declared by his co-accused
Elias Gloria and Francisco Celso in their extrajudicial confessions Exhibits J and M, the said
statements are objectionable, although the court may consider the fact that the confessions of
Rufino Pea and those of his co-accused Elias Gloria and Francisco Celso are, in all material
respects, identical as a circumstance in judging the credibility of Rufino Pea's testimony in
court for which purpose Exhibits J and M are admissible against the latter. The same rule of
qualified admissibility is applicable to the extrajudicial confession of accused Ramon Narciso as
against Rufino Pea. Accused Ramon Narciso testified in court for his own defense and was
questioned at length about his extrajudicial confession (Exh. L) which he repudiated. He died
sometime thereafter; that is why the case as against him had been dismissed, but his said
confession was legally before the court with the extra-judicial confessions of all the other
accused and We do not think that the trial court erred in taking cognizance of the fact that they
were substantially in accord for purposes of passing upon Rufino Pea's credibility. Rufino
Pea's own statement (Exh. K), on the other hand, is competent evidence as against him for all
purposes under the Rules,4provided that its authenticity and voluntariness are beyond question.
This brings Us to the defense of Rufino Pea that his statement Exh. K is involuntary. But first,
let us examine the contents of that extrajudicial confession.
It appears that the confession was taken by Det. Cpl. Carlos Martin, Jr. in the presence of Det.
Sgt. Herminio Clemente at the headquarters of the MPD in the early morning of July 11, 1961,
about seven (7) hours after the commission of the crime or at about 6:20 a.m., to be precise. In
that statement, Rufino Pea appears to have declared in Tagalog dialect, substantially as follows:
that he was 21 years of age, single, a boy at Cine Esa at Herbosa, Tondo, Manila, and was
presently residing in the same place at 440 Herbosa; that he knew why he was at the
headquarters of the MPD at the time, i.e., there was a man they killed the night before inside Cell
2-A; that he knew the person they killed only by face; that they agreed to attack (tirahin) that
person because he was a member of the "Bahala Na Gang"; that there was nothing wrong at all
being a member of that gang, only there was already feud between the two gangs; that those who
agreed to kill the man were Boy AA, Ely, Celso and he (Rufino Pea appears to have been asked
to point to the persons he mentioned and pointed to Ramon Narciso as Boy AA, to Elias Gloria
as Ely, and to Francisco Celso as Celso, who were then all present in the same room where the
investigation was conducted); that they agreed to kill the man at about 9:00 that evening (to a
similar question that followed, the answer given was: that they agreed to kill the man that same
evening after the roll call at about 11:00 o'clock) ; that when they first came near the man to

strike him, the man was lying on the cement floor on his back (tihaya), one of his arms raised
near his head; that the first to come near the man was Boy AA who immediately covered the face
of the man with a blanket; that the blanket shown to him (he appears to have been shown the
bloodstained blanket recovered by the police at the scene of the crime) was the one used by Boy
AA in covering the face of the man they hit; that the piece of wood (measuring 1-" x 1-" x
23") shown to him was the one used by them in hitting the man; that they alternately used (aming
pinagpasahan) that piece of wood, until all of them were able to hit the man; that he was the first
to strike, followed by Celso; the next was Ely, and the last one was Boy AA; that the place where
they killed the man was the cement floor where he was lying inside Cell 2-A; that they made the
killing at about 11:00 o'clock after the roll call; that they decided to kill the man because the
"Bahala Na Gang" were all enemies; that he studied in school and finished Grade III; that he
knew how to read and understood Tagalog; and that having read and understood the contents of
the statement, he is willing to sign the same to attest to the truth of what he had therein stated.
Accused Rufino Pea claimed during the trial of the case that his confession (Exh. K) was signed
by him only after the members of the MPD had given him a countless number of blows all over
his body, and after they mercilessly gave him repeated doses of 7-Up treatment into his nose. He
testified that as a result of the torture he received in the hands of policemen who investigated
him, his body and face were swollen, and when sometime thereafter, he appeared before a branch
of the Court of First Instance of Manila in connection with another case, he then informed his
parents about the maltreatment; that his parents contacted a certain attorney who had him
examined in the Medico-Legal Section of the Police Department of Manila by one of the doctors
there. And yet, no medical certificate of the doctor who examined him then was ever presented in
the court below; nor was the alleged medico-legal officer who conducted the examination, asked
to testify in the said proceeding even as the prosecution had reminded the defense counsel that he
had not presented the doctor who allegedly conducted the examination, to testify. The record
shows that the said counsel asked permission from the court to confer with accused Rufino Pea,
after which conference, he announced that he was not calling the doctor who conducted the
alleged examination anymore. That circumstance, to our mind, is the best evidence refuting his
statement in court that he had been subject of barbaric practices by the police. We really see no
reason why such evidence had been suppressed, if the accused was sincere in his allegations. We
are inclined, therefore, to discard the torture theory of the defense. Upon the face of the
confession, We see no sign of suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity;
the answers given to the questions were responsive and informative, and we are satisfied that the
said confession was voluntary.
But counsel for herein reviewed argues that the extrajudicial confession (Exh. K) of Rufino Pea
does not show "suspicious circumstances", is "replete with details", "reflects spontaneity and
coherence", and the "response therein to every interrogatory is fully informative", because the
said statement was prepared by the police investigator who propounded the questions and
answered them himself; and that the accused had nothing to do whatever with said statement
except to sign it, after the use of force and violence against him. Counsel draws this conclusion
from the explanation given by the police investigator who conducted the investigation of the
accused in this case that they first conducted a verbal examination of all the suspects of the
inquiry and only after they were sure that the persons investigated had something to do with the

crime, were their statements reduced to written form. The pertinent portions of the testimony of
Det. Cpl. Carlos Martin, Jr. of the MPD on this point, follows:
CROSS EXAMINATION BY ATTY. MAGNO:
Q. You were the officer who took the statements of the accused and Pea in this case?
A. Yes, I was.
Q. Before you took down the statements of accused Gloria and Pea, did you already
know that they were going to admit the offense?
xxx

xxx

xxx

A. We asked them if they were going to tell the truth. They said "Yes"; then we asked
them to relate the incident.
Q. Do you mean to say that before you asked the specific questions now appearing in
the statements of the accused, you did not know the answers they would give to those
questions?
A. Naturally.
Q. You can qualify your answer by saying that you know some of the answers that
they would give?
A. Some of the answers, yes.
Q. To what effect were those answers which you knew they were going to give?
A. Their participation in the crime. We asked them if they participated, they said yes.
Q. In other words, before taking the statements of the accused, you already knew that
they were going to admit the offense, is that correct? A.-We investigated them first, and
after that we reduced into writing their statements. Q.-Just answer the question?
A. Yes.
Q. And that is because you conducted a verbal investigation on these accused before
you took their written statements, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. I am now showing you Exhibits "J" and "K", which are the statements,
respectively, of Gloria and Pea. When you asked the questions now appearing on
Exhibit "J", particularly the questions now appearing or referring to the alleged

participation, for instance, the question in Exhibit "J" which has been marked Exhibit "J1", (Counsel reading Exhibit "J-1"), you already knew the answer to this question, is that
not right?
A. Yes.
Q. So that actually, it was but mere formality on your part to ask that question and to
have that answer recorded, is that not also correct?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. As a matter of fact, if we go over all the questions in Exhibits "J" and "K", there
was none of these answers, whatsoever, that you did not already know before you asked
the questions, is that not correct? .
A. No. You mean to say the answers were these ...
COURT:
Q. No, you knew the answers already, you anticipated the answers. Did you know the
answers to the respective questions in Exhibits "J" and "K" before the answers were
given?
A. No, your Honor.
COURT:
No. Naturally, how can he know. They admitted generally that they were the ones, but
the way, the manner ...
ATTY. MAGNO:
Q. Do you want us and the Honorable Court to understand that even the manner the
offense was committed was not known to you before the answers to the questions in
Exhibits "J" and "K" were given to you?
A. In the verbal investigation we asked them how they did it, and they showed us how
they did it. They described it to us.
Q. So that actually, you already knew the manner the offense was committed before
you asked the questions? .
A. Yes. (Tsn, July 25, 1963, pp. 13-15.)
We have studied carefully the import of the foregoing testimony and searched the record with
painstaking solicitude, but we failed to find anything that would sustain the charge of herein

counsel for Rufino Pea that it was the investigator himself who propounded the questions and at
the same time gave the answers appearing in Exh. K, much less, the claim that said accused had
no part in the preparation of the confession except to sign it. Our own examination of the
extrajudicial statements shows that all the accused in this case had revealed therein their
individual participations in the killing of the victim and the participation of the others. Accused
Elias Gloria states in his confession Exhibit J, that Ramon Narciso, Alfredo de la Rosa, Rufino
Pea and Francisco Celso were his companions in killing Roberto Monreal. Accused Ramon
Narciso points in his confession Exh. L, to Elias Gloria and Rufino Pea as his companions.
Accused Francisco Celso, on the other hand, points to Elias Gloria, Rufino Pea and Ramon
Narciso as the persons he saw who struck at the victim, with himself taking no part therein; while
the accused Rufino Pea in his confession points to Ramon Narciso, Elias Gloria, Francisco
Celso and himself as the ones who killed the victim. Other inconsistencies in the manner these
accused took turn in hitting the victim are significant: Thus, Elias Gloria declared that Ramon
Narciso was the first to hit with the piece of wood, followed by Alfredo de la Rosa; then by
Rufino Pea; Celso was next, with himself delivering the last blow. Rufino Pea's declaration
was to the effect that he was the first to hit the victim with the piece of wood, followed by Celso,
then Gloria and finally Narciso. Ramon Narciso, on the other hand, declared in his statement that
it was Rufino Pea who first delivered the blow with the piece of wood, followed by Elias
Gloria; while Francisco Celso stated that it was Elias Gloria, Rufino Pea and Ramon Narciso
who struck at the victim with the piece of wood in that order. These circumstances may be
considered in support of the claim of the police officers who conducted the investigations of the
accused that they conducted the examinations separately and simultaneously without collusion
either on the part of the investigators or on the part of the accused. The same circumstances may
be considered in disputing the veracity of Rufino Pea's claim that he did not give any of the
answers appearing in his confession. To this effect was the holding of this Court in a similar
case:5
... This inconsistency, the way we look at it, is additional proof that the confession was
indeed voluntary. Ordinarily, if the confession was prepared by the Constabulary agents
themselves and imposed upon the appellants, it would be as perfectly tight as the agents
could have done it leaving the appellants no possibility of escape from his guilt....
Of course, We are not unaware that some officers of the law resort to the illegal and
reprehensible tactics of extorting confessions through violence and intimidation.6 But the trial
court did not give credence to the claim of the accused that he had no part in the preparation of
his confession and that he signed it only after he was tortured. Having seen the manner and
demeanor of the witnesses during the trial, the matter of assigning values to their statements in
court is within the better competence of trial courts,7 and We find no compelling reason to
disturb the findings of the lower court on this point in this case. Moreover, We find the
testimonies of the police officers who testified in this case to be credible, and We cannot but be
slow to believe that these officers would be so totally devoid of conscience and so recreant to
official duty as to confabulate together in pinning a capital offense on an innocent man without
apparently any reason therefor; and no such reason has here been shown.8Suffice it to say that
the crime committed in this case took place inside the city jail; the police had conducted an
investigation of the inmates there immediately after the incident and We believe the possibility
of error in picking the persons really responsible was quite remote.

It is also argued that the trial court erred in finding Rufino Pea guilty of the crime charged.
Reliance is placed on the fact that the lone witness for the prosecution who saw the killing of
Roberto Monreal categorically declared that he saw only Elias Gloria hit the victim with a piece
of wood. It is, therefore, contended that the testimony of said witness tends to exculpate accused
Rufino Pea rather than incriminate him in the killing and could not be the basis of conviction.
The conclusion is not entirely correct. It is true that the lone Government witness to the killing
had stated that he did not actually see the other accuse hit Roberto Monreal with the piece of
wood. But that alone does not conclusively show that Rufino Pea did not hit the victim. The
pertinent portions of the testimony of that witness follows:
Q. Do you know why said Monreal died in that commotion?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where were you at that time?
A. I was beside the victim.
Q. What did you see?
A. The deceased was being beaten.
Q. Who was beating the deceased?
A. Elias Gloria.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q. What was the position of Monreal at the time he was beaten by Gloria?
A. He was lying down, face downwards on the floor.
Q. COURT:
Q. What was the position of Gloria when he was beating him?
A. He was in a standing position.
Q. What was holding Monreal in that position?
A. He was already wounded when I saw him being beaten by Gloria.
Q. How many times did you see Gloria beat the victim?
A. About three (3) times.

Q. In what part of his body did you see Gloria beat the victim?
A. On the head.
Q. Aside from Gloria, were there other persons around or near the victim?
A. Yes, but I did not recognize them.
Q. More or less, how many?
A. I did not count, and I do not remember, but there were some.
Q. What were those others, whom you said you cannot remember, doing at the time
Gloria was hitting the victim?
A. They were just standing.
Q. You said that Monreal was already wounded in that prostrate position at the time
he was beaten by Gloria. Where were you previous to that?
A. I was lying beside Roberto Monreal. I was sleeping.
Q. Will you tell the court how you were awakened when you said you were sleeping at
that time?
A. Because of the noise of the beating.
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that witness Bernardo Villalon was awakened by the noise
of the beating. When he woke up, the victim was already wounded. He saw only Gloria beating
the victim with a piece of wood at the time. He had companions then who were near or around
the victim, although he did not recognize them. In his extra-judicial confession, on the other
hand, accused Rufino Pea narrated that the first to approach the victim who was lying on the
cement floor was Ramon Narciso (Boy AA) who immediately covered the face of the victim
with a blanket; that he (Rufino Pea) was the first one to strike at the victim; he was followed by
Francisco Celso, then by Elias Gloria, and lastly by Ramon Narciso; and that they killed the
victim hitting him with the same piece of wood alternately in that order. We do not find the
testimony of the eyewitness and the confession of Rufino Pea utterly irreconcilable. The
testimony of the eyewitness simply means he did not see Rufino Pea beat the victim because
when he woke up, the said accused and Francisco Celso were already through with their beating
of the accused. This is deducible from the confession of Rufino Pea that he and Francisco Celso
struck at the victim with the same piece of wood before Elias Gloria had his turn to strike with
that single piece of wood used by all of them. This is also a logical conclusion from the
statement of the eyewitness that he was awakened by the beating and that when he first awoke,
the victim was already wounded and prostrate on the floor. At any rate, even if the testimony of
the eyewitness on this point is left wholly out of consideration, still there is sufficient basis of
conviction, for a confession corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti will suffice.9 It is really

not indispensable that an eyewitness should have seen the commission of the crime before an
accused may be held liable under his own confession. The usefulness of the confession as a
species of proof, would vanish if it were necessary, in addition to the confession, to adduce other
evidence sufficient to justify conviction independently of such confession.10
Finally, the alleged denial of due process cannot be favorably considered. The record shows that
the case suffered protracted delays due to repeated postponement of the hearings, but said
postponements were either caused by the prosecution or the defense. To be sure, the prosecution
appears to have requested a number of postponements caused by absence of witnesses but We
presume that said witnesses were thereafter able to satisfactorily explain to the trial court their
absences, otherwise, they should have been cited for contempt by the trial court. The witnesses
referred to are members of the Manila Police Department, of the Homicide Section thereof. The
crime wave that has besieged the city these years is only too well known, and their official duties
must have contributed to their repeated inability to appear during the trial. Likewise, the
circumstance that there were eight different counsels de oficio who took turns in handling the
defense of accused Rufino Pea in this case, does not appear to have materially prejudiced his
cause. It appears that there were repeated changes of counsel during the trial, whenever
appointed counsel de oficio for herein accused was absent, one of the other counsels de oficio for
the other accused was designated or substituted in his place. This should not be cause for lament;
for on the contrary, it speaks well of the desire of the court to allow accused Rufino Pea to avail
himself of counsel all throughout the course of the protracted proceeding.
All the foregoing considered, there is no room for doubt that accused Rufino Pea participated in
the clubbing of Roberto Monreal inside Cell 2-A of the City Jail of Manila on the night of July
10, 1961. The writer is of the opinion, however, that said accused should not be convicted of
consummated murder, as charged in the information. Except for Rufino Pea's own confession,
the evidence for the prosecution, so far as admissible against the said accused, consists of proof
of corpus delicti. The only evidence of his direct participation in the commission of the crime
was his own extra-judicial confession, a scrutiny of which, on the other hand, would readily cast
doubt as to whether the blow with the piece of wood he delivered upon the victim as revealed in
the said confession could have been fatal. The said confession, Exh. K, narrates that when they
came near the victim, the latter was lying on his back (tihaya) on the cement floor. First to
approach the victim was accused Ramon Narciso (Boy AA) who immediately covered the face
of the victim with a blanket; and thereupon, Rufino Pea struck at him with the piece of wood.
There is no suggestion that Rufino Pea hit the victim more than once; he merely confessed that
after striking at the victim, he passed on the piece of wood to Francisco Celso. The eyewitness,
on the other hand, testified that when he woke up, he saw the victim beside him already
wounded, lying prostrate on the cement floor on his belly (nakadapa), upon whom Elias Gloria
delivered three successive blows with the same piece of wood used by Rufino Pea. At that
precise time, according to him, the body of the victim then was still covered with the blanket
although the head was already exposed. The medico-legal officer who conducted the autopsy on
the body of the victim found three (3) wounds which he described in his necropsy report (Exh.
B) and in his testimony before the court. Two big lacerated wounds at the back of the head were
described as fatal. The doctor was of the opinion that any one of them could have caused the
death of the victim for both wounds caused fractures in the cranium and hemorrhage all over the
brain. The third wound (on the face) was described as follows:

Contusion and superficial skin laceration with swollen tissue hematoma of soft tissues
around left eye.
This last wound was never describe as fatal by the medico-legal officer, both in his necropsy
report and in his testimony during the trial. And this wound, the way We look at it, could have
been the one cause by accused Rufino Pea when he delivered the first blow upon the victim,
considering the evidence that at the time the victim was lying on his back (tihaya) and the face
was then covered with the blanket. The fatal wounds at the back of the head may reasonably be
attributed to the succeeding blows delivered by any of the other accuse who, as seen by the
eyewitness, struck at the victim while the man was lying on his belly (nakadapa) with the head
already exposed. It would not be farfetched to surmise that after the first blow, the victim made
an attempt to rise, causing the blanket to slip down the head thus exposing it, at which precise
time, the succeeding blows were delivered, causing the fall of the victim back on the cement
floor on his belly. If this were so, then it would be safe to conclude that the superficial wound
was the one that may alone be attributed to accused Rufino Pea, considering the circumstances
that there was no allegation of conspiracy in the information, and the defense had seasonably
made objections to the introduction of evidence tending to prove conspiracy, and which
objections were all sustained by the trial court. Neither did the court below make any finding of
conspiracy in the decision under review; for on the contrary it declared:
... It should be noted that in default of an allegation of conspiracy, the herein accused is
not found responsible for the acts of his co-accused as his conspirators, but for his
individual participation for the death of the victim.
Rufino Pea should, therefore, be held liable only for the consequences of his own act that of
inflicting upon the person of the victim the superficial wound above-mentioned.
Intent to kill is apparent on the face of Rufino Pea's own confession, but he failed to hit the
victim mortally, either because of his poor aim or because he failed to apply the degree of force
necessary. Whatever the real cause is, there is no doubt that the injury he inflicted upon the
victim could not have produced the intended killing as a consequence; hence, the stage of
execution insofar as accused Pea is concerned, was merely attempted.
The qualifying circumstance of treachery was properly considered by the court, but evident
premeditation may not be appreciated as the evidence tends to show that the attack upon the
victim was thought of only some fifteen (15) minutes before the incident. Use of superior
strength also should not be considered against the accused, for even if We were to believe the
claim of Rufino Pea in his confession that all the accuse in this case, each delivered blows upon
the victim, he declared in the same confession that they attacked the deceased Roberto Monreal
alternately, one after the other. So with the aggravating circumstance of nighttime, which does
not appear to have been especially sought since the notion to commit the crime was thought of
only shortly before its commission.11 In the absence of any aggravating circumstance other than
treachery which had been considered as a qualifying circumstance, and in the absence of any
mitigating circumstance, either which attended the commission of the crime, the Penalty
imposable under the law,12 should be applied in its medium period. The Penalty for attempted
murder is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period.

Applying the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused Rufino Pea should be
sentenced to a Penalty the minimum of which should be within the range of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period, with a maximum within the range
of prision mayor in its minimum period.
WHEREFORE, the decision under review is modified accordingly, and the accused Rufino Pea
is hereby sentenced to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional to
eight (8) years of prision mayor, and to pay the heirs of the offended party in the sum of FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00). The judgment of the lower court is affirmed in all other respects.
Counsel de oficio in this proceeding is ordered compensated by the Government in the amount of
TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P200.00) in accordance with section 32, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court.
G.R. No. 185008

September 22, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
MAXIMO OLIMBA alias "JONNY," Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Widower Maximo Olimba alias "Jonny," herein appellant, was accused of several counts of rape
by two (2) of his three (3) minor daughters aged thirteen1 and twelve.2 He seeks before this Court
the reversal of his conviction by the trial court and the appellate court.
Consistent with the ruling of this Court in People v. Cabalquinto,3 we shall withhold the real
names of victims AAA and BBB, as well as those of their family members, and any other
relevant information that would tend to establish or compromise their identities.
On 11 June 2003, the prosecution filed before the regional trial court twelve (12) separate
Informations for rape against appellant. Ten (10) charges, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. N2234 and N-2237 to N-2245,4 were allegedly committed against his daughter AAA. The
remaining two (2), docketed as Criminal Case Nos. N-2235 and N-2236, were allegedly
committed against his daughter BBB.5
On 17 July 2003, appellant entered pleas of not guilty to all the charges. On 9 September 2003,
pre-trial was terminated without any stipulation of facts. Thereafter, trial ensued with the
prosecution presenting the testimonies of: (1) AAA;6 (2) BBB;7 and (3) Dr. Fernando B.
Montejo,8 Municipal Health Officer, Municipality of xxx, Province of xxx, who identified the
Medical Certificate issued to BBB. On the other hand, only appellant9testified for the defense.
Criminal Case Nos. N-2234 and N-2237 to N-2245
The evidence for the prosecution may be summarized in the following manner:

AAA was born on 18 November 1989.10 She was first raped by appellant at the early age of eight
(8) years old.11 She never told the incident to her grandmother, who was then staying with them,
because the appellant threatened to kill her siblings.12 Besides, her grandmother was sick at the
time of the incident.13 Since then, AAA has been repeatedly raped.
AAA testified that sometime during the first week of January 2003, she, herein appellant, and the
rest of the children took their supper and retired for the night.14 AAA, however, could not sleep
as she was apprehensive that appellant would rape her again.15 True enough, around midnight,
appellant took off AAAs shorts and underwear, and inserted his male organ into her
vagina.16 She pleaded and begged for pity but to no avail.17She could not shout because he
threatened to harm her.18 She pinched her sister BBB lying next to her but the latter did
nothing.19 Helpless and without recourse, she just kept on crying.20
Appellant also raped AAA on or about the second week of January 2003.21 At around midnight,
when the rest of the children were already fast asleep, appellant removed her shorts and
underwear and inserted his male organ into her vagina.22 She asked him to stop and reminded
him that she is his daughter. As before, she did not shout because she was afraid he would hurt
her.23
The rape was repeated on or about the third week of January 2003. Appellant took AAAs shorts
and underwear and inserted his male organ into her vagina.24 She asked for mercy but to no
avail.25 She did not attempt to shout or thereafter report the incident because she was afraid that
appellant would kill her siblings.26
Despite the sexual abuses, AAA could not leave the house for good because of the repeated
threats to the lives of her siblings.27 Appellant also maltreated her whenever she refused to
submit to his lustful desires.28 On an unspecified date, he kicked her stomach and she collapsed
on the floor.29
Appellant continued to rape AAA on or about the 30th and 31st of January 2003; the first,
second, third, and fourth week of March 2003; and the 19th of April 2003.30
Thereafter, AAA agreed to be the housemaid of CCC. She went with CCC to Manila.31 While in
Manila, she told CCC of the sexual abuses she suffered from his father.32 CCC sent her back to
file charges against the appellant.33 She, accompanied by CCCs daughter DDD, returned and
proceeded to the police station to report the incidents.34 AAA also submitted herself to physical
examination,35 which revealed the following findings:
Genitalia: no gross deformities
: non-hyperemia
: (+) old hymenal scar 9 oclock position36
In refuting the allegations,37 appellant claimed AAA was not in their hometown in January
200338 on the alleged rape incidents subject of Criminal Case Nos. 2234, 2237, 2239, 2240, and

2241. She was in Manila from April 2002 to January 2003.39 He learned from his cousin EEE
that AAA returned only on 1 February 2003. She stayed with EEE because she did not send the
money she earned from working in Manila to appellant.40
On 14 April 2003, AAA finally went back to appellants house.41 He hit her with a bamboo stick
because she refused to go home with him when he tried to fetch her on an unspecified
date.42 Afterwards, he learned from a certain FFF that AAA went back to Manila.43 Appellant
thereafter saw her at the police station on 26 May 2003.44
Criminal Case Nos. N-2235 and N-2236
BBB, who was born on 6 January 1991,45 could not remember the date when she was first raped
by appellant.46 She was subsequently defiled on two (2) more occasions.47
Thus, sometime during the last week of April 2003, appellant, BBB, and her two (2) brothers
retired for the night48 in their living room.49 Two (2) of her siblings were not around. One of
them was AAA. She was already in Manila.50
Later that evening, BBB felt appellant undress her.51 Appellant took off her underwear and
inserted his male organ into her vagina.52 She did not exert any effort to resist him because she
was afraid of the six-inch long knife he held.53 Her attempt to wake a brother up, who lay next to
her, proved to be futile.54
This was repeated in the evening of 24 May 2003 while BBBs siblings were fast asleep.55 He
kissed BBB on her lips and inserted his male organ into her vagina.56
During trial, Dr. Fernando B. Montejo, MD, MPH, Municipal Health Officer, Municipality of
xxx, Province of xxx, identified the Medical Certificate submitted to the court to be the same he
issued when he examined BBB. The Certificate indicated the following: (1) "abrasion with
mucosal swelling (R) vaginal vault;"57 and (2) "semen-like substance seen and felt at cervical
os."58
On examination, the doctor testified that the abrasion and swelling in the right side of BBBs
vagina could have been caused by a male organ. Further, the semen-like substance at the cervical
canal could have come from a male organ. However, he clarified that the substance was not
conclusively identified as semen allegedly because the medical technologist was not "competent"
to further examine it in the microscope.59
Appellant solely testified for the defense and denied the allegations of rape.60 He countered that
BBB left his house on 14 April 2003, the very day that he maltreated AAA.61 He looked for and
found BBB only on 25 May 2003.62 Hence, she was not staying in his house during the last week
of April 2003 and on 24 May 2003 when the rapes were allegedly committed.63 He added that
BBB started leaving his house without permission in 2002 and has been given scoldings.64 He
also claimed that he was in his house working and could not recall any unusual incident on 24
May 2003 when BBB was allegedly raped for the third time.651avvphi1

When asked what could be the possible motive for the filing of the case against appellant, he
answered that AAA and BBB did not want anybody to look after them.66 He also believed that
AAA filed a complaint against him because "she made mistake (sic) since she did not give [him]
money xxx."67 On the other hand, BBB filed the complaints because he scolded her.68
On 5 July 2004, the regional trial court found appellant guilty of twelve (12) counts of rape69 in
Criminal Case Nos. N-2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244 and
2245. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused Maximo Olimba Y
Montero GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape in two (2) counts for Crim.
Case No. 2235 and Crim. Case No. 2236. He is meted the penalty of two (2) Death
penalties by lethal injections.
The victim (BBB) is awarded P150,000.00 in civil indemnity and P175,000.00 in moral
damages, for each count.
In Criminal Cases Nos. 2234, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244 and 2245, where
the victim is (AAA), the accused Maximo Olimba Y Montero is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape on Ten (10) Counts. He is meted the penalty of Death for
each count, through lethal injection.
The accused Maximo Olimba Y Montero shall pay the victim (AAA) the amount
of P75,000.00 in civil indemnity for each rape committed. The accused shall further
pay P100,000.00 to (AAA) in moral damages for each Rape.
Appealed to this Court, the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals for its disposition70 in
accordance with the ruling in People v. Mateo71 allowing an intermediate review by the Court of
Appeals of cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death.
On 30 August 2007, the decision72 of the trial court was AFFIRMED by the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No. 00530 with the MODIFICATION that the penalty of death in each
of the cases should be reduced to reclusion perpetua in accordance with the law prohibiting the
imposition of death penalty.73
On 14 July 2008, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the appellants notice of appeal.74 This
Court required the parties to simultaneously file their respective supplemental briefs.75 Only the
appellant opted to submit his supplemental brief.76
Our Ruling
We uphold the conviction of the appellant.
The well-entrenched principles in the determination of the innocence or guilt of the accused in
rape cases are, once again, seriously considered in the evaluation of this case. The three
principles are:

(1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for
the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape
in which only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on
its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense.77
Due to the nature of the commission of the crime of rape, the testimony of the victim may be
sufficient to convict the accused, provided that such testimony is "credible, natural, convincing
and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things."78 Thus, in People v.
Leonardo,79 we stated the evidentiary value of the testimony of the rape victim:
Credible witness and credible testimony are the two essential elements for the determination of
the weight of a particular testimony. This principle could not ring any truer where the
prosecution relies mainly on the testimony of the complainant, corroborated by the medico-legal
findings of a physician. Be that as it may, the accused may be convicted on the basis of the lone,
uncorroborated testimony of the rape victim, provided that her testimony is clear, convincing and
otherwise consistent with human nature.80
Upon these considerations, we have ascertained that the prosecution has sufficiently established
the appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Credibility of the Witnesses for the Prosecution
The trial court categorically stated that AAA and BBB "were straightforward and coherent,
further made believable by their display of candor and naivete."81 The appellate court, in turn,
applied the settled policy that "the finding of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses
deserve[s] a high degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal."82
Before us, appellant now posits that the instant case falls within the established
exceptions83 finding refuge in our ruling in People v. Guittap.84 Thus:
While it is our policy to accord proper deference to the factual findings of the trial court, owing
to their unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct,
and attitude under grueling examination, where there exist facts or circumstances of weight and
influence which have been ignored or misconstrued, or where the trial court acted arbitrarily in
its appreciation of facts, we may disregard its findings.85
We find the exception to the rule inapplicable in this case.
No material inconsistencies in the testimony of AAA
In his Supplemental Brief dated 5 March 2009, appellant points out that there were material
inconsistencies in the testimony of AAA that cannot be considered insignificant.86 Specifically, it
was revealed on cross examination that her grandmother was also staying in the house and
sleeping thereat at the time of the rape incident. This, he argues, affects the likelihood of the

consummation of rape because AAAs grandmother would definitely have noticed the untoward
incident.87
We are not convinced. Time and again, we reiterate that lust is no respecter of time and place.
Thus, in People v. Anguac,88 we rejected appellants claim that it is impossible for the victims
siblings, who were sleeping with her, not to be awakened during the rape incident because, in
numerous cases, this Court has found that rape could indeed be committed in the same room
where other family members are sleeping.89
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the prosecution failed to reconcile AAAs
statements as to the dates when her grandmother lived with them, we consider such to be trivial a
matter to impair AAAs credibility. Such would not diminish the value of the testimony.90 On the
contrary, it would strengthen the credibility of the testimony because it erases any suspicion of a
coached or rehearsed witness.91
Appellant further contends that the inconsistent testimony on AAAs attempt to wake BBB up is
likewise material because the act could not have been consummated if, indeed, BBB was roused
from her sleep.92
This is likewise unmeritorious. It should be noted that BBB, the supposed witness to the incident,
is a mere child, who could be cowed into silence by a person exercising moral ascendancy and
influence over her. Granting that appellant could have discontinued his bestial act, if and when
there was a witness to the commission of the crime, it was clear in the testimony of AAA that
appellant was not aware that BBB was then already awake.
Q And [BBB] was awaken[ed] while your father was doing this thing to you?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did [BBB] do?
A She did not do anything.
Neither can we sustain the appellants contention that AAA was in Manila when some of the
rape incidents were allegedly committed. The source of the information is a third person93 who
was not presented in court. Sans any validation, the allegation remains to be hearsay. Further, a
thorough examination of the testimony of AAA would show that she left for Manila only
once94 sometime after 19 April 2003 after the last rape incident.95 We confirm the observation of
the trial court that her entire testimony was clear, consistent, and convincing.
Failure to immediately report the rape incidents was reasonable
Applying People v. Romero, Jr.,96 where this Court doubted the credibility of the seventeenyear-old complainant because she failed to "come out in the open and bring her abuser[compadre of her aunt] to justice" in a span of eight months,97 appellant argues that the failure of
AAA and BBB to immediately report the rape incidents significantly affects their

credibility.98 Romero, however, is not on all fours with the prevailing circumstances of this case.
The flaws and inconsistencies in the testimony of the complaining witness in that case were so
material that it seriously impaired the witnesscredibility.99
In the recent case of People v. Alarcon,100 this Court well explained the reason why the failure of
a victim to immediately report the rape does not essentially weaken the case against an
accused.101
The charge of rape is rendered doubtful only if the delay was unreasonable and unexplained. In
this case, AAA did not report what her father did to her because she was terribly afraid that he
would harm her. This is a normal reaction by minors to hide the truth because they are easily
intimidated by threats on their person and other members of the family. xxx The only time she
felt safe was after they had moved out of their fathers house.102As written in People vs.
Macapanas,
x x x. How the victim comforted herself after the incident was not significant as it had nothing to
do with the elements of the crime of rape. Not all rape victims can be expected to act
conformably to the usual expectations of everyone. Different and varying degrees of behavioral
responses are expected in the proximity of, or in confronting, an aberrant episode. It is settled
that different people react differently to a given situation or type of situation and there is no
standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or
frightful experience. 103
The reliance of appellant on the acquittal of the accused in People v. Ladrillo104 is likewise
misplaced. In that case, it was alleged that the crime was committed "on or about the year 1992,"
in appellants residence in Abanico, Puerto Princesa City, when the defense was able to prove
that appellant had never been there nor was he familiar with the complainant and her family until
he resided thereat in 1993.105 With this piece of information, together with other material
inconsistencies in the testimony of the complainant, we ruled:
xxx. But the mind cannot rest easy if this case is resolved against accused-appellant on the basis
of the evidence for the prosecution which, xxx, is characterized by glaring inconsistencies,
missing links and loose ends that refuse to tie up.106
In the case at bar, we found no inconsistent statement so material that it would seriously affect
the credibility of the witnesses.
Moral character of the victim is immaterial
Neither can we sustain appellants argument that the credibility of BBBs testimony is
compromised by her "apparent exposure xxx to the ways of the world at an early age of seven
(7)"107 because she and her friends frequent the poblacion.108 BBB has satisfactorily explained
the reason why she sometimes passed the night in the poblacion with her friends. She was afraid
that her father would rape her again.109 Assuming for the sake of argument that BBB is a woman
of loose morals, she is not precluded from being a victim of rape.110 Even prostitutes can be
victims of rape.111

It bears stressing that in rape, the moral character of the victim is immaterial, the essence of rape
being the act of having carnal knowledge of a woman without her consent. 112
Motive vis-a-vis credible testimony
Appellants contention that AAA and BBB charged him of rape only because they wanted to be
emancipated from parental guidance and discipline is likewise without merit. Time-honored is
the doctrine that motives, such as those attributable to revenge, family feuds, or resentment,
cannot destroy the credibility of minor complainants who gave unwavering testimonies during
their direct and cross-examinations.113 The testimonies of AAA and BBB were solid throughout
the direct and cross-examination. In fact, the cross-examination even strengthened the cases
against the appellant as most of the material questions necessary to prove the elements of rape
were established when the witnesses answered the questions of the defense counsel.114
Bare Denial of the Appellant
We cannot give weight to the self-serving alibi and denial of the appellant over the positive and
straight forward testimony of AAA and BBB. Once more, we apply the settled rule that "alibi is
an inherently weak defense that is viewed with suspicion because it is easy to fabricate."115 Alibi
and denial must be strongly supported by corroborative evidence in order to merit
credibility.116 Appellants alibi is, simply, uncorroborated.
Elements of Rape
Under Sec. 2 of the Anti-Rape Law of 1997,117 rape is committed, among others, "[b]y a man
who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman" by means of force, threat or intimidation.118
On the bases of the consistent and forthright testimonies of 13-year-old victim AAA and 12year-old victim BBB detailing their harrowing experiences that concluded with positive
statements that appellant inserted his organ into their private parts,119 the prosecution has
sufficiently established that appellant had carnal knowledge of (1) AAA on or about the 1st, 2nd
and 3rd week of January, 2003 [Criminal Case Nos. 2234, 2237, and 2239] and (2) BBB on or
about the last week of April, 2003 and 24 May 2003 [Criminal Case Nos. 2235 and 2236].
The presence of threat and intimidation was likewise established. After every rape, appellant
threatened AAA that he would kill her siblings should she report the incidents. Also, in view of
their father-daughter relationship, the moral ascendancy of appellant over AAA and BBB can
substitute for violence and intimidation.120 For this reason, appellants use of a six-inch long
knife121 to cower BBB in fear and yield her into submission can be considered already a
surplusage for the purpose of proving the element of threat or intimidation.
With the testimonies of AAA and BBB, and even assuming for the sake of argument that the
defense was able to diminish the probative value of the medical findings presented to corroborate
the testimony of the victims, we are convinced that the prosecution has established the guilt of
the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. It bears stressing that the lone and uncorroborated

testimony of a rape victim, as long as it is clear, convincing and otherwise consistent with human
nature, may suffice to convict the accused.122
Presence of Special Qualifying Circumstances
The twin qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship that were specifically alleged in
the Informations were likewise adequately established by the prosecution. The machine copies of
the certificates of live birth of AAA and BBB, which the defense voluntarily admitted to be
faithful reproductions of the original copies,123 the testimonies of AAA and BBB stating that the
appellant is their father,124 and the testimony of appellant himself admitting that AAA and BBB
are his daughters,125 sufficiently proved the following: (1) that AAA and BBB were born on 18
November 1989 and 6 January 1991, respectively; (2) that they were minors, being 13 and 12
years old, respectively, at the time they were repeatedly defiled during the early months of 2003;
and (3) that appellant is their father.
These are judicial admissions within the contemplation of Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which provides that "[a]n admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the
course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof."126
Modifications in the Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Quantum of evidence in each and every charge of rape
Settled is the rule that each and every charge of rape is a distinct and separate crime;127 each
must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.128 It is, therefore, necessary that the victim of rape
provide further details on how each of the act was committed, otherwise, the bare allegation
would be inadequate to establish the guilt of the accused.129
Applying this principle, the conviction of the appellant in Criminal Case Nos. 2238, 2240, 2241,
2242, 2243, 2244 and 2245 (referring to the rape incidents on or about the 30th and 31st of
January 2003, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th weeks of March 2003, and on or about 19 April 2003)
should be reversed.
In these cases, the prosecution merely had AAA testify that she was repeatedly raped on different
dates130 but failed to touch on how each of the acts was committed. Thus:
[Criminal Case No. 2240]
Q On January 30, 2003 what happened?
A He again raped me.
Q Where?
A In our house.

Q What time was it?

A Midnight.
Q Where were your siblings then?
A They [were] all asleep.
[Criminal Case No. 2241]
Q How about on the following day that is January 31, 2003 what happened?
A He again raped me.
Q Where?
A In our house.
Q What time was it?
A Also midnight.
Q What were your siblings do[ing] then?
A They [were] sleeping.
[Criminal Case No. 2242]
Q In the first week of March year 2003 what happened?
A I was again raped by my father.
Q What time was it?
A Midnight.
Q And your siblings[,] what were they doing?
A Sleeping.
[Criminal Case No. 2243]
Q On the second week of March, 2003 what happened?
A He again raped me.

Q What time was it?

A Midnight.
Q How about your siblings where were they?
A Sleeping.
[Criminal Case No. 2244]
Q In the third week of March what happened?
A He again raped me.
Q Where?
A In our house.
Q What time was it?
A Midnight.
Q How about your siblings where were they?
A In our house sleeping.
[Criminal Case No. 2245]
Q On the fourth week of March 2003 what happened?
A He again raped me.
Q What time was it?
A Midnight.
Q How about your siblings where were they?
A Sleeping.
[Criminal Case No. 2238]
Q Now, [AAA] on April 19, 2003, what happened?
A He again raped me.

Q Where?
A In our house.
Q What time was it?
A Midnight.
Q How about your siblings?
A In our house sleeping.
On cross examination,131 AAA testified:
xxxx
Q The same thing happened subsequent weeks particularly on January 30 and weeks of March
2003?
A Yes, Sir.
ATTY. ALBAO:
Q And in these particular incidents you were likewise wearing shorts?
A Sometimes I am wearing pants.
Q But when this rape incidents happened you are already wearing shorts?
A Sometimes I was wearing long pants.
Clearly, these are too general, inadequate and insufficient to establish the appellants guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.132
Basic is the rule that where the prosecution fails to meet the quantum of evidence required for
the conviction of an accused, that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt, this Court shall consider in
the latters favor his constitutional right to be presumed innocent.133 Necessarily, appellant
should be acquitted in these cases.
In light of this result, we see a need to remind the prosecution to ensure that the quantum of
evidence required for the conviction of an accused charged of multiple counts of rape or any
crime for that matter is met in accordance with the ruling in this case.
Penalty of reclusion perpetua in lieu of death penalty; non-eligibility for parole

Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty of death shall be imposed
when rape is committed with the twin qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship.134 However, with the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 (An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines) on 24 June 2006, the Court of Appeals correctly
reduced the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua135 in Criminal Case Nos. 2234 to 2237 and
2239.
This, notwithstanding, appellant should not be eligible for parole as the law136 specifically
provides:
Sec. 3. Person convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will
be reduced toreclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act
No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
Monetary liability
Finding appellant guilty of only three (3) counts of rape committed against AAA in Criminal
Case Nos. 2234, 2237, and 2239 and two (2) counts of rape committed against BBB in Criminal
Case Nos. 2235 and 2236, all qualified by the twin special aggravating circumstances of minority
and relationship, and applying current jurisprudence,137 each victim shall be entitled to the
following for each count of rape: civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00; and moral
damages in the amount of P75,000.00. Also for each count of rape, the award of exemplary
damages in the amount of P30,000.00 "to set a public example and serve as deterrent against
elders who abuse and corrupt the youth"138 is likewise in order.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 30 August 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEBCR-H.C. No. 00530, finding appellant Maximo Olimba guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
twelve (12) counts of rape is hereby MODIFIED in the following manner:
1. Appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of qualified
rape committed against AAA in Criminal Case Nos. 2234, 2237, and 2239. For each
count of rape, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole and to pay AAA the amount ofP75,000.00 (or a total
of P225,000.00) as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 (or a total of P225,000.00) as moral
damages, and P30,000.00 (or a total of P90,000.00) as exemplary damages;
2. Appellant is also found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of
qualified rape committed against BBB in Criminal Case Nos. 2235 and 2236. For each
count of rape, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole and to pay BBB the amount ofP75,000.00 (or a total of P150,000.00)
as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 (or a total of P150,000.00) as moral damages,
and P30,000.00 (or a total of P60,000.00) as exemplary damages; and
3. With respect to Criminal Case Nos. 2238, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244 and 2245, the
appellant is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. SO ORDERED.