GUMARU v QUIRINO STATE COLLEGE

Assailed in this petition for review is the Decision[1] dated November 25, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 72603, which reversed and set aside the Order dated June 26, 2002 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 88, denying the motion to quash the writ of execution issued in Civil
Case No. Q-97-32470, as well as its Resolution dated June 17, 2004, which denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:

On June 25, 1985, C.T. Gumaru Construction and Quirino State College, an educational institution
organized and existing under Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 440,[2] through its president, Julian A. Alvarez,
entered into an Agreement[3] for the construction of the state colleges building
in Diffun, QuirinoProvince. Construction was done in stages and was covered by supplemental
agreements, because funding depended on the state colleges annual budget allocation and fund
releases from the government.
On October 17, 1997, Constantino T. Gumaru, owner and proprietor of C.T. Gumaru Construction,
filed a complaint for damages[4] before the RTC of Quezon City against the state college and Julian A.
Alvarez, asking for (1) P368,493.35, the expected profits which he would have realized from the
construction of an unfinished portion of the project which was allegedly awarded by the defendants to
another contractor in violation of his preferential right to finish the project; (2) P592,136.51, the
escalation costs of construction materials and supplies; (3) P50,000.00, the value of plaintiffs bodega
allegedly demolished by the defendants; and (4), P200,000.00 for moral and exemplary damages,
attorneys fees and costs of litigation.[5]
On May 8, 1998, Atty. Carlos T. Aggabao, purportedly acting as counsel for the defendants, moved to
dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue. The motion was denied. Defendants were
directed to file an answer. When they failed to answer within the prescribed period, they were declared
in default and plaintiff was allowed to present evidence ex parte.
On February 22, 2001, the trial court decided the case in favor of the plaintiff, viz:
WHEREFORE, x x x judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff Gumaru and against the
defendants College and Alvarez directing the latter to JOINTLY and SEVERALLY pay the former as follows:
1.

The sum P368,493.35 for the First Cause of action;

2.

The amount of P592,136.51 for the Second Cause of action;

3.

The amount of P50,000.00 for the Third Cause of action;

4.

P100,000.00 for moral damages and P100,000 for attorneys fees, plus costs.

5.

The first three awards are with legal interests reckoned

from the filing of this case until the amounts are paid in
full.[6]

Defendants failed to appeal from the decision, a copy of which was duly served on
Atty. Aggabao on March 6, 2001.[7] The decision became final and executory, and plaintiff moved for the
issuance of a writ of execution. On December 5, 2001, a Writ of Execution[8] was issued, directing the ExOfficio Provincial Sheriff of Quirino Provinceto seize the personal properties or, if insufficient, the real
properties of the defendants to satisfy the judgment awards. The awards amounted to P1,739,725.30,
inclusive of interests and sheriffs fees.
On January 11, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for the first time
as counsel for the defendants. At the same time, it filed a Motion to Quash Writ of Execution on the
following grounds: (a) defendants were not duly represented in court, since the OSG was not notified of
the proceedings; and (b) writs of execution may not be issued against government funds and properties
to satisfy court judgments.
Meanwhile, a Sheriffs Notice of Levy and Auction Sale[9] was issued against two (2) parcels of land in the
name of Quirino State College,[10] viz:
WHEREAS, by virtue of a Writ of Execution issued by the Hon. Abednego O. Adre, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, x x x Branch 38, Quezon City x x x the undersigned provincial Sheriff of Quirino in
order to satisfy the amount of ONE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THIRTY NINE THOUSAND SEVEN
HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE AND 30/100 PESOS (P1,739,725.30) with interest thereon from the date of
execution until fully paid aside from other incidental expenses incurred in connection with enforcement
of this Writ of Execution is HEREBY LEVIED upon all rights, interest and participation of the defendant
over the property described below, to wit:
LAND
A parcel of land under ARP. No. 00411-15003 in the name of Quirino State College, Diffun, Quirino of
which land is situated at Bonifacio, Diffun, Quirino, Philippines, containing an area of THIRTY THOUSAND
(30,000) SQM. more or less.
LAND
A portion of land under ARP. No. 00415-16002 in the name of Quirino State College, Diffun, Quirino of
which land situated at Bonifacio, Diffun, Quirino, Philippines, containing an area of 11.13110161
HA. more or less.
In an Urgent Motion dated March 13, 2002,[11] the OSG reiterated its
plea for the quashal of the writ of execution and asked the court to take judicial notice of Supreme
Court Administrative Circular No. 10-2000,[12] as well as Commission on Audit (COA) Resolution No.
2000-366[13] dated December 19, 2000, which finally adjudged plaintiff liable to the state college
for P4,681,670.00 in overpayments, and liquidated damages for delay in the construction of the college
building.
The trial court denied the motion to quash the writ of execution.[14] Without ruling on the issue of the
defendants alleged lack of legal representation, the court ruled that the properties of the state college
may be seized under the writ of execution, since it is an incorporated agency of the government given
specific powers to sue and be sued. A separate appropriation to satisfy the judgment awards was not

considered necessary, because the state colleges charter provides that funds for the construction and
repair of its buildings, machinery, equipment, and facilities shall be taken from its annual appropriation.
The OSG filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. On November 25, 2003, the Court of
Appeals granted the petition.[15] In quashing the writ of execution, the Court of Appeals ruled that
although the funds and properties of government agencies with personalities separate and distinct from
the government are not exempt from execution or garnishment, the rule does not apply where the
incorporated government agency concerned is performing a vital governmental function, like herein
state college. In such cases, the money claim should be filed first with the COA as provided in
Presidential Decree No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines.
Gumarus motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
I. Whether or not, upon the facts and circumstances obtaining herein, the consent given by the State to
respondent to sue and be sued is plenary and not limited only to proceedings anterior to the stage of
execution;
II. Whether or not the money claim subject of the case below is required to be filed first with the
Commission on Audit (COA);
III. Whether or not the enforcement of the money judgment here involved is subject to rules and
procedures under Sections 49-50 of Presidential Decree No. 1445;
IV. Whether or not, being an incorporated agency of the Government, respondents liability is
controlled by the rulings on incorporated or chartered government agencies;
V. Whether or not further appropriation is required for the enforcement of the money judgment against
respondent herein; and
VI. Whether or not respondents representation below by counsel of its own choice instead of by the
OSG was proper.
Stated differently, the proper issues to be resolved are: (a) whether respondent state college was
properly represented before the trial court; (b) if in the negative, whether the lack of proper legal
representation was enough to nullify the proceedings; and (c) whether the properties of respondent
state college may be seized under the writ of execution issued by the trial court.
On the issue of legal representation, Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, provides:

The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
requiring the services of lawyers. When authorized by the President or head of the office concerned, it
shall also represent government owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor General
shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the
services of lawyers. x x x x

Under the foregoing, the OSG is mandated to act as the law office of the government, its agencies,
instrumentalities, officials and agents in any litigation or proceeding requiring the services of a
lawyer.[16] With respect to government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs), the OSG shall act as
counsel only when authorized by the President or by the head of the office concerned. The principal law
office of GOCCs, as provided in Section 10, Chapter 3, Title III, Book IV, of the Administrative Code of
1987,[17] is the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC).
In the case at bar, respondent state college is classified under the Code as a chartered institution,[18] viz:
(12) Chartered institution refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and
vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives.This term includes
the state universities and colleges and the monetary authority of the State. (emphasis ours)
as opposed to a GOCC defined in the following segment,[19] viz:
(13) A government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized as a stock
or non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or
proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either
wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51)
percent of its capital stock: Provided, That government-owned or controlled corporations may be
further categorized by the Department of the Budget, the Civil Service Commission, and the Commission
on Audit for purposes of the exercise and discharge of their respective powers, functions and
responsibilities with respect to such corporations.
Therefore, the proper statutory counsel of respondent state college is the OSG. Legal representation by
Atty. Carlos T. Aggabao, a private lawyer, was clearly improper. InGonzales v. Chavez,[20] we traced the
statutory origins of the OSG and ruled that its mandate to act as the principal law office of the
government is compulsory, viz:
In x x x tracing the origins of the Office of the Solicitor General to gain a clear understanding of the
nature of the functions and extent of [its] powers x x x, it is evident that a policy decision was made in
the early beginnings to consolidate in one official the discharge of legal functions and services of the
government. x x x
x x x

x x x

x x x

x x x [T]he intent of the lawmaker was to give the designated official, the Solicitor General, x x x the
unequivocal mandate to appear for the government in legal proceedings. Spread out in the laws
creating the office is the discernible intent which may be gathered from the term shall, which is
invariably employed, from Act No. 136 (1901) to the more recent Executive Order No. 292 (1987).
Under the principles of statutory construction, so familiar even to law students, the term shall is
nothing if not mandatory.[21] (emphases ours)
Thus, the Solicitor General cannot refuse to represent the government, its agencies, instrumentalities,
officials and agents without a just and valid reason. He should not desist from appearing before the
Court even in those cases where his opinions may be inconsistent with the government or any of its
agents he is expected to represent.[22] As in the case of fiscals or prosecutors, bias or prejudice and
animosity or hostility do not constitute legal and valid excuses for inhibition.[23] Unlike a practicing
lawyer who has the right to decline employment, a fiscal or prosecutor, or the Solicitor General in the

case at bar, cannot refuse to perform his functions without violating his oath of office.[24]Refusal to
perform the duty is compellable by a writ of mandamus.[25] On the other hand, government agencies
were admonished not to reject the services of the Solicitor General, or otherwise fail or refuse to
forward the papers of a case to the OSG for appropriate action.[26] Actions filed in the name of the
Republic that are not initiated by the OSG will be summarily dismissed.[27] Moreover, the fee of the
lawyer who rendered legal service to the government in lieu of the OSG or the OGCC is the personal
liability of the government official who hired his services without the prior written conformity of the
OSG or the OGCC, as the case may be.[28] We explained the rationale for the compulsory nature of the
OSGs mandate, in this wise:
The rationale x x x is not difficult to comprehend. Sound government operations require consistency in
legal policies and practices among the instrumentalities of the State. x x x [A]n official learned in the law
and skilled in advocacy could best plan and coordinate the strategies and moves of the legal battles of
the different arms of the government. Surely, the economy factor, too, must have weighed heavily in
arriving at such a decision.
x x x

x x x

x x x

Sound management policies require that the governments approach to legal problems and policies
formulated on legal issues be harmonized and coordinated by a specific agency. The government owes it
to its officials and their respective offices, the political units at different levels, the public and the various
sectors, local and international, that have dealings with it, to assure them of a degree of certitude and
predictability in matters of legal import.
From the historical and statutory perspectives x x x it is beyond cavil that it is the Solicitor General who
has been conferred the singular honor and privilege of being the principal law officer and legal
defender of the Government. One would be hard put to name a single legal group or law firm that can
match the expertise, experience, resources, staff and prestige of the OSG which were painstakingly built
up for almost a century.
x x x [E]ndowed with a broad perspective that spans the legal interests of virtually the entire
government officialdom, the OSG may be expected to transcend the parochial concerns of a particular
client agency and instead, promote and protect the public weal. Given such objectivity, it can discern,
metaphorically speaking, the panoply that is the forest and not just the individual trees. Not merely will
it strive for a legal victory circumscribed by the narrow interests of the client office or official, but as
well, the vast concerns of the sovereign which it is committed to serve.[29]
The Solicitor General is thus expected to be the official who would best uphold and protect the legal
interests of the government.[30] His non-representation of the government is dangerous and should not
be allowed.
The magnitude of the non-representation by the OSG is nowhere more apparent than in the case at bar.
Instead of having been represented by an official learned in the law who will promote and protect
the public weal taking into consideration the vast concerns of the sovereign which it is committed to
serve, respondent state college was instead represented by a private lawyer who made no move to
protect its interests except to file a motion to dismiss the complaint filed against the state college, which
was eventually denied by the trial court. No answer to the complaint was filed notwithstanding due
receipt of the order directing its filing, as a consequence of which the state college was declared in
default. The order of default itself was not reconsidered, no move whatsoever having been made in that
direction. The plaintiff was allowed to present its evidence ex-parte. When the decision was rendered

adjudging the state college and its co-defendant, Julian A. Alvarez, liable to the plaintiff, no effort was
made to appeal the decision notwithstanding due receipt of a copy thereof by Atty. Aggabao on March
6, 2001. Thus, a writ of execution was issued against the properties of the state college, which by this
time remained as the sole defendant, Julian A. Alvarez having died during the pendency of the case and
no proper substitution of parties having been made at the instance of Atty. Aggabao. Clear, therefore,
was the utter failure of justice insofar as respondent state college is concerned. It was as if it was not
represented by counsel at all. While it may be argued that the officials of respondent state college
should have informed the OSG of the suit filed against the state college, and that it was their fault or
negligence that the OSG was not informed in the first place, it is settled, however, that the principle
of estoppel does not operate against the government for the act of its agents or their inaction.[31] The
State has to protect its interests and cannot be bound by, or estopped by the mistakes or negligent acts
of its officials or agents, much more, non-suited as a result thereof.[32] The legality of legal
representation can be raised and questioned at any stage of the proceedings.[33]
The circumstances of this case, therefore, justify the nullification of the proceedings before the trial
court, and the writ of execution issued as a consequence thereof. The state college should be given the
opportunity to present its defenses with the benefit of its statutory counsel, the OSG. A new trial would
best serve the interests of justice. With this disquisition, discussion of the other issues is not necessary.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. This case is REMANDED to the trial court for trial anew, with
the Office of the Solicitor General appearing as counsel for respondent Quirino State College. The
Decision dated February 22, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 88, in Civil Case No.
Q-97-32470, and the assailed Decision dated November 25, 2003 and Resolution dated June 17, 2004 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72603 are, for this reason, VACATED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
REY C. SARMIENTO, ANGELITO C. SARMIENTO, WILLY C. SARMIENTO and RAQUEL C. SARMIENTOCO,Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. EDELSON G. OLIVA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment1 filed by complainants
Rey, Angelito, Willy and Raquel2 Sarmiento against respondent Atty. Edelson G. Oliva.
Complainants alleged that they received, as payment for the purchase3 of a P13 million Makati City
property,4 five postdated checks from respondent.5 When presented to the drawee bank, two checks
were dishonored due to "closed account."6 Consequently, complainants sent demand letters to
respondent on June 21, 2003 and October 7, 2003.
On May 20, 2004, respondent requested complainants to reduce his obligation to P11 million.
Complainants agreed. He gave a partial down payment of P200,0007 and issued four postdated Premier
Bank checks.8 Upon presentment, the first check was dishonored again due to "closed account."9 On
October 7, 2004, complainants again demanded payment from respondent but the demand was

ignored.10 Hence, this complaint, which was originally filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP).
Respondent, in his answer, claimed that this complaint was instituted to harass him inasmuch as he had
no outstanding financial obligation to the complainants. He maintained that complainants had a buyer
for the property on installment. He issued the checks on the condition that these would only be
presented on approval and release of proceeds of the loan as the buyer would issue his own checks to
cover payment in respondents name. Because the complainants deposited the checks for clearing
without informing him, they actually violated their agreement.11
The complaint was set for mandatory conference/hearing12 but respondent repeatedly failed to appear
at the scheduled hearings despite due notice.13 He was thus deemed to have waived his right to
participate in further proceedings.14
In its January 23, 2006 report and recommendation,15 the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP
found that respondent transferred the property to his name despite giving complainants only P200,000.
He took advantage of complainants who trusted him and relied on his good faith. Furthermore, he never
appeared in any of the scheduled hearings. The CBD thus recommended that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for two years.1awphi1
The IBP Board of Governors approved and adopted the report and recommendation of the CBD in
toto and ordered respondent to restitute the amount of P11 million to complainants.16
We modify the recommendation of the IBP.
In a resolution dated October 7, 1994, respondent was disbarred in Libit v. Attys. Edelson G. Oliva and
Umali17for grave misconduct.18 Hence, not being a member of the bar, he cannot be suspended from the
practice of law.
Libit was never mentioned in the records of this case. Complainants obviously had no knowledge of
respondents disbarment in 1994. Respondent must have represented himself to complainants as
a bona fide member of the bar. Furthermore, he never informed the IBP of his prior disbarment. As a
former lawyer, he knew that the jurisdiction of the IBP is limited to members of the bar.
Since respondent himself made a positive misrepresentation to complainants that he was still a lawyer
and even submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the IBP, he is estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the IBP over him. For this reason we find as proper the recommendation of the IBP that
respondent be required to indemnify the complainants the amount of P11 million.19 Respondent does
not dispute that complainants were the owners of the property before he had the title to the said
property transferred in his name. He cannot unduly enrich himself and enjoy ownership of the property
without compensating complainants.
Moreover, the Court has held that a disbarred lawyer, who continues to represent himself as a lawyer
with the authority to practice law commits a contumacious act20 and is liable for indirect contempt.21
WHEREFORE, respondent Edelson G. Oliva is hereby ORDERED to show cause within ten days from
receipt of this resolution why he should not be cited for indirect contempt for misrepresenting himself
to be an attorney, without prejudice to complainants right to seek other legal remedies.
SO ORDERED.

PACANA v ATTY. PASCUAL LOPEZ

PER CURIAM:
This case stems from an administrative complaint[1] filed by Rolando Pacana, Jr. against Atty. Maricel
Pascual-Lopez charging the latter with flagrant violation of the provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[2] Complainant alleges that respondent committed acts constituting conflict of interest,
dishonesty, influence peddling, and failure to render an accounting of all the money and properties
received by her from complainant.

On January 2, 2002, complainant was the Operations Director for Multitel Communications Corporation
(MCC). MCC is an affiliate company of Multitel International Holdings Corporation (Multitel). Sometime
in July 2002, MCC changed its name to Precedent Communications Corporation (Precedent).[3]

According to complainant, in mid-2002, Multitel was besieged by demand letters from its members and
investors because of the failure of its investment schemes. He alleges that he earned the ire of Multitel
investors after becoming the assignee of majority of the shares of stock of Precedent and after being
appointed as trustee of a fund amounting to Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) deposited at Real
Bank.

Distraught, complainant sought the advice of respondent who also happened to be a member of the
Couples for Christ, a religious organization where complainant and his wife were also active members.
From then on, complainant and respondent constantly communicated, with the former disclosing all his
involvement and interests in Precedent and Precedents relation with Multitel. Respondent gave legal
advice to complainant and even helped him prepare standard quitclaims for creditors. In sum,
complainant avers that a lawyer-client relationship was established between him and respondent
although no formal document was executed by them at that time. A Retainer Agreement[4] dated
January 15, 2003 was proposed by respondent. Complainant, however, did not sign the said agreement
because respondent verbally asked for One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as acceptance fee
and a 15% contingency fee upon collection of the overpayment made by Multitel to Benefon,[5] a
telecommunications company based inFinland. Complainant found the proposed fees to be prohibitive
and not within his means.[6] Hence, the retainer agreement remained unsigned.[7]

After a few weeks, complainant was surprised to receive a demand letter from respondent[8] asking for
the return and immediate settlement of the funds invested by respondents clients in Multitel. When
complainant confronted respondent about the demand letter, the latter explained that she had to send
it so that her clients defrauded investors of Multitel would know that she was doing something for
them and assured complainant that there was nothing to worry about.[9]

Both parties continued to communicate and exchange information regarding the persistent demands
made by Multitel investors against complainant. On these occasions, respondent impressed upon

complainant that she can closely work with officials of the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), the
Department of Justice (DOJ), the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportations (BID),[10] and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)[11] to resolve complainants
problems. Respondent also convinced complainant that in order to be absolved from any liability with
respect to the investment scam, he must be able to show to the DOJ that he was willing to divest any
and all of his interests in Precedent including the funds assigned to him by Multitel.[12]
Respondent also asked money from complainant allegedly for safekeeping to be used only for his case
whenever necessary. Complainant agreed and gave her an initial amount of P900,000.00 which was
received by respondent herself.[13] Sometime thereafter, complainant again gave
respondent P1,000,000.00.[14] Said amounts were all part of Precedents collections and sales proceeds
which complainant held as assignee of the companys properties.[15]

When complainant went to the United States (US), he received several messages from respondent sent
through electronic mail (e-mail) and short messaging system (SMS, or text messages) warning him not to
return to the Philippines because Rosario Baladjay, president of Multitel, was arrested and that
complainant may later on be implicated in Multitels failed investment system. Respondent even said
that ten (10) arrest warrants and a hold departure order had been issued against him. Complainant,
thereafter, received several e-mail messages from respondent updating him of the status of the case
against Multitel and promised that she will settle the matter discreetly with government officials she can
closely work with in order to clear complainants name.[16] In two separate e-mail
messages,[17] respondent again asked money from complainant, P200,000 of which was handed by
complainants wife while respondent was confined in Saint Lukes Hospital after giving birth,[18] and
another P700,000 allegedly to be given to the NBI.[19]

Through respondents persistent promises to settle all complainants legal problems, respondent was
able to convince complainant who was still in the US to execute a deed of assignment in favor of
respondent allowing the latter to retrieve 178 boxes containing cellular phones and accessories stored
in complainants house and inside a warehouse.[20] He also signed a blank deed of sale authorizing
respondent to sell his 2002 Isuzu Trooper.[21]

Sometime in April 2003, wary that respondent may not be able to handle his legal problems,
complainant was advised by his family to hire another lawyer. When respondent knew about this, she
wrote to complainant via e-mail, as follows:

Dear Butchie,

Hi! Ok ka lang? Hope you are fine. Sorry if I shocked you but I had to do it as your friend and lawyer.
The charges are all non-bailable but all the same as the SEC report I told you before. The findings are the
same, i.e. your company was the front for the fraud of Multitel and that funds were provided you.

I anticipated this, that is why I really pushed for a quitclaim. Rolly is willing to return the Crosswind,
laptap (sic) and [P]alm [P]ilot. Manny Cancio really helped. Anthony na lang. Then, I will need the
accounting of all the funds you received from the sale of the phones, every employees and directors[]
quitclaim (including yours), the funds transmitted to the clients through me, the funds you utilized, and
whatelse (sic) is still unremitted, every centavo must be accounted for as DOJ and NBI can have the
account opened.

I will also need the P30 M proof of deposit with Real [B]ank and the trust given [to] you. So we can
inform them [that] it was not touched by you.

I have been informed by Efie that your family is looking at hiring Coco Pimentel. I know him very well as
his sister Gwen is my best friend. I have no problem if you hire him but I will be hands off. I work
differently kasi. In this cases (sic), you cannot be highprofile (sic) because it is the clients who will be
sacrificed at the expense of the fame of the lawyer. I have to work quietly and discreetly. No funfare.
Just like what I did for your guys in the SEC. I have to work with people I am comfortable with. Efren
Santos will sign as your lawyer although I will do all the work. He can help with all his connections.
Vals friend in the NBI is the one is (sic) charge of organized crime who is the entity (sic) who has your
warrant. My law partner was the state prosecutor for financial fraud. Basically we have it covered in all
aspects and all departments. I am just trying to liquidate the phones I have allotted for you s ana (sic) for
your trooper kasiwhether we like it or not, we have to give this agencies (sic) to make our work easier
according to Val. The funds with Mickey are already accounted in the quit claims (sic) as
attorneys (sic)fees. I hope he will be able to send it so we have funds to work with.
As for your kids, legally they can stay here but recently, it is the children who (sic) the irate clients and
government officials harass and kidnap to make the individuals they want to come out from hiding (sic).
I do not want that to happen. Things will be really easier on my side.

Please do not worry. Give me 3 months to make it all disappear. But if you hire Coco, I will give him
the free hand to work with your case. Please trust me. I have never let you down, have I? I told you this
will happen but we are ready and prepared. The clients who received the phones will stand by you and
make you the hero in this scandal. I will stand by you always. This is my expertise. TRUST me! That is
all. You have an angel on your side. Always pray though to the best legal mind up there. You will be ok!

Candy[22]

On July 4, 2003, contrary to respondents advice, complainant returned to the country. On the eve of his
departure from the United States, respondent called up complainant and conveniently informed him
that he has been cleared by the NBI and the BID.[23]

About a month thereafter, respondent personally met with complainant and his wife and told them that
she has already accumulated P12,500,000.00 as attorneys fees and was willing to give P2,000,000.00 to
complainant in appreciation for his help. Respondent allegedly told complainant that without his help,
she would not have earned such amount. Overwhelmed and relieved, complainant accepted
respondents offer but respondent, later on, changed her mind and told complainant that she would
instead invest theP2,000,000.00 on his behalf in a business venture. Complainant declined and
explained to respondent that he and his family needed the money instead to cover their daily expenses
as he was no longer employed. Respondent allegedly agreed, but she failed to fulfill her
promise.[24]Respondent even publicly announced in their religious organization that she was able to help
settle the ten (10) warrants of arrest and hold departure order issued against complainant and narrated
how she was able to defend complainant in the said cases.[25]

By April 2004, however, complainant noticed that respondent was evading him. Respondent would
either refuse to return complainants call or would abruptly terminate their telephone conversation,
citing several reasons. This went on for several months.[26] In one instance, when complainant asked
respondent for an update on the collection of Benefons obligation to Precedent which respondent had
previously taken charge of, respondent arrogantly answered that she was very busy and that she would
read Benefons letter only when she found time to do so.

On November 9, 2004, fed up and dismayed with respondents arrogance and evasiveness, complainant
wrote respondent a letter formally asking for a full accounting of all the money, documents and
properties given to the latter.[27] Respondent rendered an accounting through a letter dated December
20, 2004.[28] When complainant found respondents explanation to be inadequate, he wrote a latter
expressing his confusion about the accounting.[29] Complainant repeated his request for an audited
financial report of all the properties turned over to her; otherwise, he will be constrained to file the
appropriate case against respondent.[30] Respondent replied,[31] explaining that all the properties and
cash turned over to her by complainant had been returned to her clients who had money claims against
Multitel. In exchange for this, she said that she was able to secure quitclaim documents clearing
complainant from any liability.[32] Still unsatisfied, complainant decided to file an affidavitcomplaint[33] against respondent before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) seeking the disbarment of respondent.

In her Answer-Affidavit,[34] respondent vehemently denied being the lawyer for Precedent. She
maintained that no formal engagement was executed between her and complainant. She claimed that
she merely helped complainant by providing him with legal advice and assistance because she
personally knew him, since they both belonged to the same religious organization.[35]

Respondent insisted that she represented the group of investors of Multitel and that she merely
mediated in the settlement of the claims her clients had against the complainant. She also averred that
the results of the settlement between both parties were fully documented and accounted

for.[36] Respondent believes that her act in helping complainant resolve his legal problem did not violate
any ethical standard and was, in fact, in accord with Rule 2.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[37]

To bolster her claim that the complaint was without basis, respondent noted that a complaint for estafa
was also filed against her by complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor in Quezon City citing
the same grounds. The complaint was, however, dismissed by Assistant City Prosecutor Josephus
Joannes H. Asis for insufficiency of evidence.[38] Respondent argued that on this basis alone, the
administrative case must also be dismissed.

In her Position Paper,[39] respondent also questioned the admissibility of the electronic evidence
submitted by complainant to the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline. Respondent maintained that the email and the text messages allegedly sent by respondent to complainant were of doubtful authenticity
and should be excluded as evidence for failure to conform to the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. No.
01-7-01-SC).

After due hearing, IBP Investigating Commissioner Patrick M. Velez issued a Report and
Recommendation[40] finding that a lawyer-client relationship was established between respondent and
complainant despite the absence of a written contract. The Investigating Commissioner also declared
that respondent violated her duty to be candid, fair and loyal to her client when she allowed herself to
represent conflicting interests and failed to render a full accounting of all the cash and properties
entrusted to her. Based on these grounds, the Investigating Commissioner recommended her
disbarment.

Respondent moved for reconsideration,[41] but the IBP Board of Governors issued a
Recommendation[42] denying the motion and adopting the findings of the Investigating Commissioner.

The case now comes before this Court for final action.

We affirm the findings of the IBP.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional responsibility provides:

Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after full disclosure of the facts.

This prohibition is founded on principles of public policy, good taste[43] and, more importantly, upon
necessity. In the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the
clients case, including its weak and strong points. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and
guarded with care. No opportunity must be given to him to take advantage of his client; for if the
confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by the loss thereof.[44] It behooves lawyers not only to
keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double
dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is
paramount in the administration of justice.[45] It is for these reasons that we have described the
attorney-client relationship as one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.[46]

Respondent must have known that her act of constantly and actively communicating with complainant,
who, at that time, was beleaguered with demands from investors of Multitel, eventually led to the
establishment of a lawyer-client relationship. Respondent cannot shield herself from the inevitable
consequences of her actions by simply saying that the assistance she rendered to complainant was only
in the form of friendly accommodations,[47] precisely because at the time she was giving assistance to
complainant, she was already privy to the cause of the opposing parties who had been referred to her
by the SEC.[48]

Respondent also tries to disprove the existence of such relationship by arguing that no written contract
for the engagement of her services was ever forged between her and complainant.[49] This argument all
the more reveals respondents patent ignorance of fundamental laws on contracts and of basic ethical
standards expected from an advocate of justice. The IBP was correct when it said:

The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that there was a professional relationship
between the parties. Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the employment of an
attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the
advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his
profession.[50] (Emphasis supplied.)

Given the situation, the most decent and ethical thing which respondent should have done was either to
advise complainant to engage the services of another lawyer since she was already representing the
opposing parties, or to desist from acting as representative of Multitel investors and stand as counsel for
complainant. She cannot be permitted to do both because that would amount to double-dealing and
violate our ethical rules on conflict of interest.

In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,[51] we explained the concept of conflict of interest, thus:

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to fight for an
issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client. This rule covers not only cases in
which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been
bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will
require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which
he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first
client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is
whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance thereof.[52]

Indubitably, respondent took advantage of complainants hapless situation, initially, by giving him legal
advice and, later on, by soliciting money and properties from him. Thereafter, respondent impressed
upon complainant that she had acted with utmost sincerity in helping him divest all the properties
entrusted to him in order to absolve him from any liability. But simultaneously, she was also doing the
same thing to impress upon her clients, the party claimants against Multitel, that she was doing
everything to reclaim the money they invested with Multitel. Respondent herself admitted to
complainant that without the latters help, she would not have been able to earn as much and that, as a
token of her appreciation, she was willing to share some of her earnings with complainant.[53] Clearly,
respondents act is shocking, as it not only violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility,[54] but also toyed with decency and good taste.
Respondent even had the temerity to boast that no Multitel client had ever complained of respondents
unethical behavior.[55] This remark indubitably displays respondents gross ignorance of disciplinary
procedure in the Bar. As a member of the Bar, she is expected to know that proceedings for disciplinary
actions against any lawyer may be initiated and prosecuted by the IBP Board of Governors, motu
proprio or upon referral by this Court or by the Board of Officers of an IBP Chapter[56] even if no private
individual files any administrative complaint.

Upon review, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and recommendations of the IBP
Investigating Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP Board of Governors, on the admissibility of the
electronic evidence submitted by complainant. We, accordingly, adopt the same in toto.

Finally, respondent argues that the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to disbar her on the
grounds of deceit, malpractice and other gross misconduct, aside from violation of the Lawyers Oath,
has been rendered moot and academic by voluntary termination of her IBP membership, allegedly after
she had been placed under the Department of Justices Witness Protection Program.[57] Convenient as it

may be for respondent to sever her membership in the integrated bar, this Court cannot allow her to do
so without resolving first this administrative case against her.

The resolution of the administrative case filed against respondent is necessary in order to determine the
degree of her culpability and liability to complainant. The case may not be dismissed or rendered moot
and academic by respondents act of voluntarily terminating her membership in the Bar regardless of
the reason for doing so. This is because membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions.[58] The conduct of a lawyer may make him or her civilly, if not criminally, liable to his client or
to third parties, and such liability may be conveniently avoided if this Court were to allow voluntary
termination of membership. Hence, to terminate ones membership in the Bar voluntarily, it is
imperative that the lawyer first prove that the voluntary withdrawal of membership is not a ploy to
further prejudice the public or to evade liability. No such proof exists in the present case.

WHEREFORE, respondent Attorney Maricel Pascual-Lopez is hereby DISBARRED for representing

conflicting interests and for engaging in unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct in violation of her
Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondents record as a member of the Bar, and notice of
the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

CAMARA v ATTY. REYES

Before us is a Letter-Complaint[1] filed by complainant Trinidad H. Camara against respondent Atty.
Oscar Amandy Reyes.

Sometime in 2003, complainant hired the services of respondent to handle her case. As partial
acceptance fee, respondent received from complainant P50,000.00 evidenced by a receipt[2] placed on
his calling card. Respondent, however, took no steps to protect complainants interest. As no service
was rendered by respondent, complainant asked that he return the amount given him so that she could
use it in repairing her house. Respondent offered that he would take charge of repairing the house. Yet,
he again failed to fulfill his promise, which prompted the complainant to reiterate her demand for the
return of the money.[3] As respondent failed to give back the amount demanded, complainant initiated
the instant case.

In his Answer, respondent prayed that the case be closed and terminated, simply because the
matter has already been resolved by all the parties concerned. He added that complainant went to his

office and explained that she signed the letter-complaint not knowing that it was against respondent, as
she was made to believe that it was a complaint against her neighbor.[4]

Complainant and respondent failed to attend the mandatory conference; and to submit their
respective position papers.

On February 19, 2007, we referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.[5]

In his Report and Recommendation, IBP Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag made the following
findings:

There is proof that respondent receipted the amount of Php50,000.00 in his own
handwriting. Even his calling card was given to the complainants.

Canon 16, Rule 16.01 provides that a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.

Canon 18, Rule 18.03 provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Canon 18, Rule 18.04 provides that a lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his
case and shall respond within a reasonable time to clients request for information.

Using the above yardsticks, clearly the respondent is liable and failed to live [up] to [the] above
mentioned standards.

While it is true that complainant Trinidad Camara allegedly executed an affidavit, the same will
not save the respondent.

As a general rule, disbarment proceeding shall not be interrupted or terminated by reason of the
desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges or failure of the complainant

to prosecute unless the Court motu proprio determines that there is no compelling reason to continue
with the disbarment or suspension proceedings against the respondent.

We reiterate that the respondent did not traverse the charges against him. He simply wanted
this case to be closed and terminated allegedly because he and Mrs. Camara had already resolved their
problem and the latters son, who also signed the letter-complaint as attorney-in-fact has no authority
to do so.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it [is] most respectfully recommended that the respondent be
suspended for six (6) months from the active practice of law.[6]

In its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-522, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report
and recommendation of the investigating Commissioner, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution a[s] Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, and for respondents violation of Canon 16, Rule 16.01, Canon 18,
Rule 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Oscar Amandy Reyes is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.

We agree with the foregoing recommendation.

The Court notes that despite the opportunity accorded to respondent to refute the charges against him,
he failed to do so or even offer a valid explanation.[7] It is incumbent upon respondent to meet the issue
and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of
morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him. These, respondent miserably failed to do.[8]

The record is bereft of any evidence to show that respondent has presented any countervailing evidence
to dispute the charges against him. In his answer, he did not even deny complainants allegations. He
only prayed that the case be closed and terminated, simply because the problem with complainant had
already been resolved.

The alleged compromise between complainant and respondent is not enough to exonerate the latter
from the present disciplinary case. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of the
interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne
out by the record, the charge of negligence has been duly proved.[9]

Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They
are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare, and for the purpose of preserving courts of
justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to
answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant is in no sense a party,
and has generally no interest in the outcome of the case.[10] This is also the reason why this Court may
investigate charges against lawyers regardless of complainants standing.[11]

When respondent accepted the amount of P50,000.00 from complainant, it was understood that he
agreed to take up the latters case, and that an attorney-client relationship between them was
established. From then on, it was expected that he would serve his client, herein complainant, with
competence, and attend to her cause with fidelity, care and devotion.[12]

The act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in handling complainants case and
subsequently failing to render such services is a clear violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence.[13] Specifically, Rule 18.03 states:

A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.

A member of the legal profession owes his client entire devotion to the latters genuine interest, and
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights. An attorney is expected to exert his best efforts
and ability to preserve his clients cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his client, likewise,
serves the ends of justice. Verily, the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the
corresponding duties, not only to the client, but also to the court, to the bar and to the public.[14]

The fiduciary duty of a lawyer and advocate is what places the law profession in a unique position of
trust and confidence, and distinguishes it from any other calling. Once this trust and confidence is
betrayed, the faith of the people, not only in the individual lawyer but also in the legal profession as a
whole, is eroded. To this end, all members of the bar are strictly required at all times to maintain the
highest degree of public confidence in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of their profession.[15]

The factual antecedents in Reyes v. Vitan[16] and Sencio v. Atty. Calvadores[17] bear a striking similarity to
the present case. In Reyes, complainant engaged the services of respondent lawyer for the purpose of
filing the appropriate complaint or charges against the formers sister-in-law and the latters
niece. After receiving the amount ofP17,000.00, respondent did not take any action on complainants
case. In Sencio, complainant therein, likewise, engaged the services of Atty. Calvadores to prosecute the
civil aspect of the case in relation to the death of her son in a vehicular accident. The total amount
of P12,000.00 was duly acknowledged and received by respondent as attorneys fees. Despite repeated
assurances by respondent, complainant discovered that the former had not filed any case on her behalf.

In both cases, we suspended the respondent lawyers for a period of six (6) months. Thus, we impose
the same penalty on respondent herein, as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors.

WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-522 of the IBP Board of Governors is AFFIRMED. Accordingly,
Atty. Oscar Amandy Reyes is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS from the practice of
law.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents
personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines, and all courts in the country for
their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.