Beyond System: The Rhetoric of Paralogy

Author(s): Thomas Kent

Source: College English, Vol. 51, No. 5 (Sep., 1989), pp. 492-507
Published by: National Council of Teachers of English
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Thomas Kent

Beyond
Paralogy

System:

The

Rhetoric

of

Systemic rhetoric is the conception of rhetoric that treats discourse production

and discourse analysis as codifiable processes, processes derived from the idea
that language possesses a foundational or conventional center of some sort. This
formulation of rhetoric as system traces its genealogy to Plato's and Aristotle's
responses to the pragmatic rhetorics of the Sophists. As we now know, the
Sophists fulfilled a very valuable social function in Greek society by providing
the practical training required of young men in order for them to succeed in the
democratic city-state. Best represented by Protagoras and Gorgias, the Sophists
travelled from city to city instructing citizens, primarily patrician young men, in
the important art or techne of rhetoric, and this instruction typically included
practical training in the routine but important day-to-day activities required in
Greek political, legal, and economic social life. Steeped in Gorgiasian agnosticism and Protagorean materialism, the Sophistic conception of rhetoric
treated discourse as a social instrument, and as the practical treatment of
language-in-use, the Sophistic rhetorics were thoroughly pragmatic, decentered,
and anti-metaphysical.
For Plato, this kind of pragmatic approach to discourse obviously posed a direct threat to his entire metaphysics, and for Aristotle, Sophistic materialism led
directly to an untenable relativism that threatened the foundation of his categories. Although I cannot pursue here all the reasons that Plato and Aristotle so violently condemned the Sophists, reasons that clearly included the problem of
economic competition for students, one important reason no doubt concerned
the Sophistic rejection of foundational epistemology based on the Protagorean
contention that man and not eternal forms or categories is the center of all things
(see Rankin; Coby; esp. Kerford). For epistemological foundationalism and a
metaphysics of presence to endure, Sophistic philosophy, which consisted primarily of rhetoric in its practical uses, had to be eradicated, and for the most
part it was. The Sophistic conception of rhetoric as a social art grounded in the
everyday uses of language has been lost to us; in our contemporary genealogy of
rhetoric, no continuous Sophistic rhetorical tradition exists. For 2500 years,
Thomas Kent is associate professor of English at Iowa State University. He is the author of Interpretation and Genre: The Role of Generic Perception in the Study of Narrative Texts (Bucknell University
Press).

College English, Volume 51, Number 5, September 1989

492

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Beyond System: The Rhetoric of Paralogy

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rhetoric has been dominated not by social pragmatic conceptions of language-inuse, but rather by epistemologically-centered conceptions of language as system.
Aristotle established the boundaries of rhetoric as we know it that from antiquity to our time have remained remarkably stable, especially in the areas of discourse production and analysis. In the Rhetoric, Aristotle argues that discourse
production may be described according to a kind of organic structuralism where
a text-usually an oral address-transcends the sum of its parts. For Aristotle, a
text-whatever its kind-cannot be reduced to discrete parts that, in turn, may
be abstracted from the process of discourse production and then talked about
without concern for each part's structural interaction with all the other parts. In
the Aristotelian formulation, discourse production always constitutes a systemic
process characterized by what he calls the "enthymeme." According to Aristotle, rhetoric stands in an antistrophic relation to dialectic in that dialectic aims
for scientific reduction characterized by the syllogism while rhetoric aims for
rhetorical reconstruction characterized by the enthymeme (see Raymond). Both
rhetoric and dialectic, however, resemble one another-they are not oppositions-in that both are based on logical constructs (the syllogism and the enthymeme) and both may be reduced to a process or system. Employing the epistemological foundation provided by the systemic enthymeme, Aristotle
generates the primary function of rhetoric-"the
faculty of observing in any
given case the available means of persuasion" (11:1355b)-and proceeds to characterize the process of persuasion according to certain proofs, logical categories,
and topoi (see Ryan). Beginning with the presupposition of the enthymeme-a
presupposition derived from his initial separation of rhetoric from dialectic-Aristotle generates a logico-systemic superstructure for rhetoric that stands outside
both history and social interaction, and it represents a clear reaction to the
Sophistic notion of rhetoric as a pragmatic social activity.
Ironically, the most enduring legacy of the Aristotelian systemic rhetoric has
been the non-Aristotelian classical reduction of rhetoric into discrete categories
of inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, and pronuntiatio. In the Rhetoric, Aristotle emphasizes the organic and interactive character of discourse production
within his logical system, but within the classical Greco-Roman paradigm, Aristotle's organicism-his search for a systemic rhetorical method-was dropped in
favor of a formulaic linear system that described the stages in the process of discourse production. For example, the primary Aristotelian thrust in Cicero's De
oratore, Tacitus' Dialogus, and Quintilian's Institutio oratoria concerns the
proper parts that come together to form the oratorial text, especially the role
played by invention in composing these parts. The founding fathers of the
classical rhetorical tradition studied the categories themselves, and they paid little attention to organicism and practically no attention to the possibility of reconstituting Aristotle's formal categories. Certainly lively debate ensued about
the function of these five parts of discourse production from Boethius' reformulation of the enthymeme-his epicheireme-forward to Ramus' further elaboration of rhetoric as primarily style and delivery (omitting invention and the
topics) through the Port-Royal Logic to Richard Whately who considered rhetoric "(in conformity with the very just and philosophic view of Aristotle) as an

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offshoot from Logic" (8). These debates, however, never questionedthe logical
and formalistfoundationof the classical paradigm,nor did they question the Aristotelian conception of system.
In our time, this classical paradigmstill controls our conception of discourse
production, and it appears regularlyas the constitutive schema from which the
entire field of rhetoric takes its shape. For the most part, our contemporary
metadiscourseof rhetoric-the languagewe employ to talk about rhetoric-has
remainedthe same for 2000 years. We continue to employ the classical paradigmatic categories of discourse production, although nowadays we generally
reduce the five categories to three: invention, arrangement,and style. Of course,
it is important to emphasize that current notions about discourse production
reinvent Aristotle in the sense that they attemptto revive the idea of organicinteraction among these three paradigmaticelements within something that has
come to be called the writing "process." Althoughthese contemporaryprocess
approachesto writing-approaches usually derived from theories of inventionattempta returnto Aristotle by addingan interactiveand recursivedimensionto
the act of discourse production, they do not attempt to go beyond Aristotle's
categories nor do they attemptto conceptualize a rhetoricaltraditionoutside the
classical paradigm.For example, current process theories of discourse production generally follow three epistemological approaches:the Kantian approach,
the neo-positivist approach, and the social-semiotic approach.The Kantianapproach understands discourse production to be generated from innate mental
categories that constitute human consciousness; modal theories of discourse,
tagmemic theory, the PrewritingSchool, and expressive theories represent examples of this approach.The neo-positivistapproachunderstandsdiscourse production to be an empiricalphenomenonthat can be tested and measured;work
by schema theorists, cyberneticistsand informationtheorists, protocol theorists,
and brain hemisphere researchers represent this approach. The social-semiotic
approachunderstandsdiscourse productionto be a communalactivity that is socially and historicallydetermined;ethnography,collaborativewritingtheory, social constructionist theory, and the conventionalist semiotics of the Halliday
school are examples of this approach.These three divisions obviously do constitute the only way to characterize current approaches to discourse production
(for other possible divisions see, e.g., Faigley; Berlin); nor do these categories
possess firm boundaries in that some rhetoricians see themselves working in
more than one category. For example, many neo-positivistempiricists,especially protocol theorists like Linda Flower and Kantians like Peter Elbow, claim
that their work possesses a strong social dimension. Althoughstrict boundaries
are impossible to establish precisely, most of our approachesto currentresearch
in discourse productionconformin generalto the outline sketched out here.
Although seemingly different, these approachesactually share a set of common assumptions, especially the Kantian and the neo-positivist approaches,
which are philosophically akin anyway. First, each approach defines itself and
finds its identity within the classical paradigm; all Kantians, neo-positivists, or
social constructionists see themselves working within invention theory, stylistics, or some other subcategory of the classical paradigm. Few rhetoricians

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Beyond System: The Rhetoric of Paralogy

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question the legitimacy of the paradigm or seek alternative ways of characterizing rhetoric. Second, and perhaps more important, none of these three approaches sees itself reacting against the Aristotelian formulation of rhetoric as a
system. Each approach may describe the system differently-as mental constructs, phenomenalistic data, or social conventions-but all these approaches
assume nonetheless that discourse production may be codified in a logico/systemic manner. In fact, most contemporary rhetoricians perceive their work to be
part of one long and continuous Aristotelian tradition, and, today, no influential
theory of rhetoric-except perhaps Kenneth Burke's acknowledgement of the
unconscious (e.g., Burke 167-69)-suggests that discourse production might be
paralogic and unsystemic in nature.
Much like theories of discourse production, contemporary theories of discourse analysis also conform both to the classical paradigm that defines the
boundaries of rhetoric and to the Aristotelian conception of discourse as system.
Broadly speaking, the dominant approach to discourse analysis in this century
corresponds to the rhetorical category of elocutio or style, which constitutes an
extraordinarily wide range of endeavors (see Bennett). Contemporary rhetorical
analysis, which includes much contemporary literary analysis as well, has been
dominated by one aspect of style, the study of tropological language--especially
metaphor and metonomy-and this preoccupation is the thread that connects
rhetoric with contemporary poetics, linguistics, and philosophy (see Rice; Genette; Todorov). In one sense, the histories of twentieth-century poetics, linguistics, and analytic philosophy share a common horizon, the study of figuration. In contemporary poetics, for example, we may trace a genealogy that
stretches from Russian Formalist preoccupations with poetic language, structuralist descriptions of metaphor and metonomy, New Critical conceptions of
irony and metaphoric complexity to current communitarian, phenomenological,
and deconstructive conceptions of literary language. In linguistics, we may trace
out a similar heritage from the Prague School's structuralist analyses of metaphoric and metonymic axes, anthropological linguistic concerns with figuration
and myth, to current discussions of metaphoric language in speech act theory
and pragmatics. Twentieth-century analytic philosophy also has been centrally
concerned with figuration from Gotlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and the early
Wittgenstein, through the Vienna Circle and Anglo-American positivism, to the
later Wittgenstein, Gilbert Ryle, J. L. Austin, and Donald Davidson (to cite just
a few of the major figures within this one branch of philosophy).
Although contemporary poetics, linguistics, and analytic philosophy pursue
very different ends, each endeavor, in its own way, undertakes a brand of rhetorical analysis that takes shape only against the backdrop of the classical paradigm. Consider, for example, Roman Jakobson's famous distinction between
metaphoric-paradigmatic constructions and metonymic-syntagmatic constructions. To comprehend Jakobson's distinction, we obviously must first understand the paradigm in which he is working. That is, we must understand that
Jakobson employs the traditional conceptions of metaphor and metonomy in
radically new ways; we must understand, in other words, that Jakobson himself
accepts the boundaries of the classical paradigm while he simultaneously sets

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out to widen them. We must also understand that Jakobson makes no attempt to
destroy the paradigm, for he seeks only to employ traditional rhetorical concepts
in new ways. Even a radically subversive analytical strategy like American deconstruction theory, or at least the deconstruction theory practiced by Paul de
Man, finds its field of reference only in relation to its reaction against the metaphysically centered conceptions of tropes-primarily metaphor-represented
within the classical paradigm. Certainly, de Manian deconstruction seeks to undermine these conceptions, but in order to do so, it must accept the classical
paradigm as the representation for rhetoric. Unlike Derrida, de Man does not
seek to challenge the paradigm itself, and, in fact, he seems to view his work as
an extension of the classical paradigm (see de Man 6).
In addition to accepting the representation of rhetoric established by the
classical paradigm, most contemporary theories of discourse analysis also correspond to contemporary theories of discourse production in another important
way. Like theories of discourse production, most contemporary theories of discourse analysis-I would say all except Jacques Derrida's deconstruction theory
and some versions of American pragmatic theory-follow the Aristotelian example by proposing a logico-systemic foundation for the analysis of figuration. In
this century literary theorists, linguistic theorists, and language philosophers
have quested for the holy grail of a totalizing system, for a definitive and final
explanation of language's figurative power. In fact, the history of discourse analysis in this century may be described as the usurpation of one totalizing system
by another totalizing system. In poetics, for example, the analysis of literary discourse has been dominated by the preoccupation with formal systems-the formalisms of Russian Formalism, New Criticism, Structuralism, and American
versions of Phenomenology. For linguistics, a similar story may be told: structuralist and anthropological theories, generative theories, and pragmatic/speech
act theories all attempt to describe how discourse operates by employing the
foundational notion of system. Analytic philosophy also has been dominated by
the quest for a logical system that might explain the operation of discourse, and,
as Richard Rorty points out, only recently have some philosophers relinquished
this task. Existing within the classical paradigm that establishes the boundaries
of rhetoric, the dominant contemporary theories of both discourse production
and discourse analysis rely on the notion of system, and little attention has been
given to the possibility that discourse production and analysis may be nonsystemic and paralogical in nature.
Within the classical paradigm, the foundational element that gives both discourse production and analysis their systemic identities has changed over time.
For Aristotle, the foundational element that identified his rhetorical system was
the enthymeme; for Ramus, it was dialectic; for Jakobson, it was metaphoric
and metonymic displacement, and so forth. In contemporary rhetorical study,
the most powerful foundational element, the element that cuts across all the
many different kinds of rhetorical systems, is the notion of convention. In contemporary theories of discourse production, for example, some conception of
convention provides the foundational element that supports every rhetorical system. Kantians argue that the logico-mental categories shared by language users

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possess a conventional dimension. According to the Kantians, these schematic

categories do not constitute things-in-themselves; rather, they represent the contingent and conventional mental processes that we employ to structure reality,
and these processes may even change over time. Similar to the Kantian conventionalists, the neo-positivists argue that the things that they analyze-protocols,
recall, syntactic maturity, given-new constructs, and so forth-do not constitute
things-in-themselves; rather, they represent shared conventional processes that
remain static long enough to reveal themselves to us so that we may measure
and codify them. Unlike the Kantians and neo-positivists,
the socialsemioticians argue that socially constructed conventions constitute all that we
can know about reality; for these materialists, conventions become the things-inthemselves, and our ability to produce discourse becomes contingent on our
more fundamental ability to understand our social and historical situation.
Similar to these theories of discourse production, most contemporary theories
of discourse analysis also include a conception of convention as a foundational
element in their analytical systems. In structuralist and formalist poetics, for example, genres like poems and novels often are distinguished according to their
uses of something we call "literary conventions," and, in turn, stylistic analysis
becomes the description of these conventions. Contemporary linguistics-especially in the area of speech act theory-and
analytic philosophy also are
grounded in the idea that language is conventional; in fact, the one assumption
shared by most language philosophers in this century is the foundational assumption that language is conventional in nature. For example, David Lewis
claims that "It is a platitude-something
only a philosopher would dream of
denying-that there are conventions of language" (160).
Language philosophers, linguistic theorists, and literary critics only recently
have begun to question the idea that conventionalism forms the foundation for
all of language study, and the two contemporary philosophers who have contributed most to this critique are Donald Davidson and Jacques Derrida. At first
glance, Davidson and Derrida would seem to share little philosophical common
ground; Davidson represents the culmination of analytic philosophy in this century, and Derrida has devoted his career to deconstructing the tradition that
Davidson represents. On closer inspection, however, Davidson's and Derrida's
treatments of convention share many important similarities, and although they
approach the subject from very different angles, they end up in much the same
place (for a further discussion of these similarities, see Wheeler; Pradhan). Both
Davidson and Derrida argue that language is not convention-bound and, consequently, they suggest that theories of discourse production and analysis that
ground themselves in this assumption require reformulation. By calling into
question the very foundation of contemporary rhetoric-and of all language
study for that matter-Davidson and Derrida also question the possibility of a
totalizing Aristotelian systemic analysis of discourse as well as the existence of
the classical paradigm that forces us to define rhetoric according to categories
established in antiquity and legitimated by habit and tradition. In their critiques
of conventionalism, Davidson and Derrida require us to reinvent rhetoric according to a different paradigm, a paradigm defined not by systemic logic but,

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rather, by nonsystemic paralogy. Such a reformulation of rhetoric offers new

possibilities for the study of both discourse production and discourse analysis
while it simultaneously requires us to rethink some of our foundational assumptions about language itself.
Donald Davidson formulates his critique of conventionalism in the essay
"Communication and Convention," which he concludes by inverting the conventionalist argument that language is convention-bound. Davidson tells us:
if I am right in what I have said in this paper, convention is not a conditionof language. I suggest, then, that philosopherswho make conventiona necessary element
in languagehave the matterbackwards.The truthis ratherthat languageis a condition for havingconventions. (280)
In traditional language philosophy, it is "convention" that links the sign we produce to the act the sign produces in the world, and Davidson denies that any
such link exists that connects "what our words mean . . . and our purposes in
using them" (271). By denying traditional assumptions about the nature of language conventions, Davidson does not explain meaning by reverting to a simplistic correspondence theory between signifier and signified. He does not suggest, for example, that a non-arbitrary, one-to-one correspondence exists
between signifier and signified. He admits the arbitrariness of signs, but insists
that arbitrary should not be confused with convention, for clearly, "what is arbitrary is not necessarily conventional" (265). To say that a particular sound or a
particular mark arbitrarily signifies something does not mean that the sound or
the mark is conventional. Thus he departs from the tradition marked off by J. L.
Austin, H. P. Grice, John Searle, and Michael Dummett, and many other language philosophers, rhetoricians, and literary theorists who hold that we employ
language in order to bring about certain changes in the world, and that because
language possesses illocutionary force, some non-arbitrary conventional connection must exist between the sign and its effect in the world. If such a conventional connection were non-arbitrary, it would possess regularity or what Derrida calls "iterability" across language (179). That is, a non-arbitrary convention
of language that signifies the illocutionary force of a sound or a mark would operate independently of any particular language or language act. Both Davidson
and Derrida argue that no such feature of language exists.
In his analysis, Davidson isolates three categories of theories that attempt to
describe the link between a sign's meaning and its social effect:
first, there are theories that claim there is a conventionconnectingsentences in one
or anothergrammaticalmood (or containingan explicit performativephrase) with
illocutionaryintentions, or some broaderpurpose; second, there are theories that
look to a conventionaluse for each sentence; and third, there are theories to the effect that there is a convention that ties individualwords to an extension or intension. These are not competingtheories. Dependingon details, all combinationsof
these theories are possible. (266)
The first kind of theory pertains to theorists like Dummett who suggest that sentences assert something and that assertions are convention-bound. Davidson
identifies three problems with such a formulation. First, Davidson points out the
commonsense notion that the same sentence may be employed for uses other

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Beyond System: The Rhetoric of Paralogy

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than assertion; it may be employed for telling a joke or asking a question and so
forth. Therefore, if there is a convention that makes an assertion an assertion, it
must reside outside the sentence itself in the context where the sentence is uttered. No conventional element connected with the isolated sentence-like
mood, for example-can mark the sentence as an assertion or any other kind of
performative, and when we move our search from the isolated sentence to the
context in which it is uttered, we still cannot discover a codifiable conventional
element that gives an assertion its identity. According to Davidson, we can only
establish some very vague criteria to explain why a sentence may be read as an
assertion in one context and a joke in another, and even if we could establish
firm criteria to explain why we agree to call an assertion an assertion in every
context, this agreement would not necessarily establish a convention. As Davidson reminds us, "We all agree that a horse must have four legs, but it is not a
convention that horses have four legs" (269).
Davidson's second refutation of the idea that modalities are conventionbound treats the claim that a conventional element exists that marks an asserter's intention to assert something. Since an assertion must be recognized as
an assertion by an audience and is, therefore, a public act, it would be nice to
think that some sort of conventional element exists that announces to the world
our intention to assert something. Since no such convention can be isolated in
ordinary language use, Gottlob Frege tried, unsuccessfully, to invent a symbol
that would mark an assertion as an assertion. But such a symbol, as Davidson
indicates, cannot work. Clearly, if such a convention existed in ordinary language, every liar or actor would employ it to convince us of her or his sincerity.
No such public, identifiable, consensual convention exists nor could exist that
marks a sentence as an assertion or as any other kind of performative.
Davidson's third refutation denies the claim that convention marks the speaker's intention to utter a true sentence. Davidson shows that this claim forms part
of an analysis of what "assertion" means: in order to assert something, we must
by definition believe what we assert or we would not be asserting. No conventional sign could exist that announces that we are sincere about our assertions,
for, as we noted, such a sign would be available to the liar as well as to the
sincere. With these three arguments, Davidson demonstrates, I believe, that
whatever it is that links a sentence with a performative act in the world (e.g.,
whatever it is that enables us to order a hot dog and get one), it is not a convention of language.
The second class of theories addressed by Davidson concerns attempts to find
the meaning of a sentence in its uses and not in some attribute (like mood) of the
sentence itself. Addressing the first class of theories, Davidson demonstrated
that no convention can be isolated that marks a particular sentence for a particular use. He now addresses the related claim that a sentence is linked to its meaning by a conventional element residing outside the sentence in something frequently called its conventional use. Davidson explains that "Stated crudely,
such theories maintain that there is a single use (or some finite number of uses)
to which a given sentence is tied, and this use gives the meaning of the sentence" (271). The argument employed in this kind of theory goes something like

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this: Because any sentence may be put to myriaduses, any one use (or any finite
number of uses) of a particularsentence is conventional. Therefore, when we
produce discourse, we always seek, according to this argument, the conventional element that will enable us to make our intentionsclear or, in Davidson's
terminology, we always seek to express an "ulterior purpose," an effect that
exists outside the sentence itself. Clearly, in speakingor writing,an intendedeffect always exists, but this intended effect cannot be realized only throughthe
writer's or speaker's intention. As Davidson says, "if I intend to get my audience to do or believe something, it must be throughtheir correct interpretation
of the literal meaning of my words" (273). (By "literal meaning," Davidson
means something along the lines of a Tarski-styletheory of truth as well as the
semantic propertiesof words [271].)
In this line of thinking, a convention would be requiredto link up the literal
meaning of a sentence with its ulteriorpurpose, and, Davidson argues, no such
convention exists nor could there be one. Davidson cites the example of the sentence "Eat your eggplant," where a conventional connection supposedly exists
between the ulteriorpurpose of the sentence-getting someone to eat her or his
eggplant-and the literal meaningof the sentence. Davidson arguesthat if such a
convention did exist, it would require a markerthat indicates the speaker's or
writer's sincerity, that "what he representshimself as wantingor tryingto do he
in fact wants or is trying to do" (274). In this example, for instance, a conventional markerwould be requiredto tell the listener that the speaker was sincere
about her desire to get someone to eat eggplant. However, as we have seen, no
such markercan exist. According to Davidson, an unbridgeablesplit exists between the sign and its effect in the world, a split that he views as the very essence of language:
I conclude that it is not an accidentalfeature of languagethat the ulteriorpurpose
of an utteranceand its literal meaningare independent,in the sense that the latter
cannot be derived from the former:it is of the essence of language.I call this feature of language the principle of the autonomy of meaning. (274)

Meaning is "autonomous" because any sentence-no matter what its intended

literal meaning-may be employed for any numberof ulteriorpurposes or performative acts. Therefore, no convention exists that (1) marks a sentence for a
particularuse or (2) marksa particularuse (or a finite numberof uses) for a particular sentence.
The third class of theories claims that meaningis conventional, or, more precisely, that "it is a convention that we assign the meaning we do to individual
words and sentences when they are uttered or written" (276). Davidson begins
his analysis of this claim by employingDavid Lewis' descriptionof convention
as a regularity(R):
(1) Everyone involved conformsto R and (2) believes that others also conform. (3)
The belief that others conformto R gives all involved a good reason to conformto
R. (4) All concerned prefer that there should be conformityto R. (5) R is not the
only possible regularitymeeting the last two conditions. (6) Finally, everyone involved knows (1)-(5) and knows that everyone else knows (1)-(5), etc. (Lewis
164-65)

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At the center of Lewis' analysis resides the idea that the conventional element in
communication consists of a systemic hermeneutic method or a shared interpretive technique. According to Lewis, speaker and hearer (or reader and writer) must assign the same meaning to the speaker's words in order for successful
communication to occur-although clearly the speaker and hearer (or writer and
reader) are not required to employ the same language. In our ordinary day-today communication, most of the conditions set out by Lewis indeed are met:
communication requires that speakers intend their listeners to interpret their
words in a certain way; speakers must know that hearers have the ability to interpret what they intend; speakers and hearers must share the understanding
that speakers intend their words to be interpreted, and so forth. As Davidson insists, however, the most important element of Lewis' analysis-the condition of
regularity-cannot be met.
When we communicate, we certainly share some conditions of a common interpretive method or at least those minimal conditions set out above, but regularity can only mean recurrence over time (what Derrida calls iteration), not
simply agreement at a specific moment. According to Davidson, the only candidate for this kind of recurrence is sound pattern: "speaker and hearer must repeatedly . . . interpret relevantly similar sound patterns of the speaker in the
same way" (277). (As we will see, Derrida expands the idea of recurrence in language to include the mark as well as sound pattern.) The important word here is
"interpret," and although certain sound patterns may recur, it is difficult, if not
impossible, "to say exactly how speaker's and hearer's theories for interpreting
the speaker's words must coincide" (278). These hermeneutic strategies must
coincide after we utter a word, or communication cannot occur; but in order for
a convention to be established that represents the coincidence of hermeneutic
theories, regularity dictates that these theories coincide before an utterance.
However, as Davidson indicates, communication can occur even if speaker and
hearer possess different advance hermeneutic strategies because a speaker obviously can provide enough clues to enable a hearer to interpret what the speaker intends to communicate. Of course, a speaker must also possess some notion
about how these clues coincide with the hearer's ability to interpret them, but,
again, this coincidence cannot be predicted or conventionalized; it can only be
guessed at. Davidson's point (and Derrida's, too) is that we cannot describe this
coincidence in any formal manner. That is, we cannot conventionalize the process by which we make our theory of interpretation coincide with other theories.
In his analysis of convention, Davidson seeks to displace the idea that language is convention-bound and foundational. In place of a hermeneutics founded
on the idea of conventionality, Davidson suggests something that he calls "radical interpretation" that is similar in some ways to Derridean deconstruction.
Davidson argues that
It is easy to misconceive the role of society in language.Languageis, to be sure, a
social art. But it is an error to suppose we have seen deeply into the heart of linguistic communicationwhen we have noticed how society bends linguistichabitsto
a public norm. What is conventionalabout language,if anythingis, is that people
tend to speak much as their neighborsdo. (278)

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This convergence of linguistic practice, the fact that we tend to speak much as
our neighbors do, tells us nothing, however, about the interpretive skills required to bring about the convergence. According to Davidson, our social conditioning does not provide us with a store of language conventions from which we
draw when we wish to communicate something; social conditioning simply ensures us "that we may, up to a point, assume that the same method of interpretation that we use for others, or that we assume others use for us, will work
for a new speaker" (278). In a Gadamerian sense, social conditioning provides
us with a horizon within which we test out interpretive possibilities when we encounter a speaker or a text, and the fit of one hermeneutic strategy with another
can never be prescribed in advance. At best, then, social conventions represent
only one kind of hermeneutic element that helps us communicate. Davidson explains that
Knowledge of the conventions of languageis thus a practicalcrutch to interpretation, a crutch we cannot in practice afford to do without-but a crutch which,
under optimumconditionsfor communication,we can in the end throw away, and
could in theory have done withoutfrom the start. (279)
Radical interpretation means that we employ our knowledge of a language to
make guesses about what speakers and writers desire to communicate, and no
formal method may be established to ensure that our guesses will be correct. A
knowledge of conventions-linguistic or otherwise-only helps make us better
guessers. To return to the beginning of this discussion, then, convention does
not provide a necessary foundation for language; rather, language provides a
home for convention.
In "Signature Event Context," a critique of convention that echoes many of
Davidson's concerns, Derrida traces out some of the implications of a deconventionalized language theory, and by arguing that no conventional link
exists between the sign and the sign's effect in the world, he, in a sense, corroborates Davidson's critique while simultaneously going beyond it. Although
Derrida concentrates on the written sign where Davidson treats the spoken
word, Derrida, like Davidson, argues that no identifiable conventional element
exists linking a written sign to its context because a context can never be absolutely determinable. (Derrida also makes the same claim for the spoken word although here I will concentrate only on his analysis of the written sign.) According to Derrida, the written sign derives its authority from absence, for "One
writes in order to communicate something to those who are absent" (177). Written discourse must, then, "remain readable despite the absolute disappearance
of any receiver, determined in general" (179). In other words, any written sign
must be repeatable or "iterable," and this iterability gives writing its identity bethe death of
cause "A writing that is not structurally readable-iterable-beyond
the addressee would not be writing" (180). Derrida's conception of "iterability"
and Davidson's and Lewis' analysis of convention as a "regularity" share an
important common feature: both suggest that the sign must be repeatable in
order to communicate anything at all. However, where Davidson looks for (and
fails to find) repeatability in convention, Derrida looks for it in language itself.

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By claiming that no convention may be isolated that links a sign with an effect in
the world, Davidson hints at the possibility that language possesses no center,
no anchor, no foundation that attaches a sign to a determinate meaning. Derrida,
however, does not hint at this possibility; he insists on it.
Going beyond Davidson, Derrida argues that iterability "implies that there is
no such thing as a code-organon of iterability-which could be structurally secret" (180), for the very feature of iterability gives every language code its identity. Because every "organon of iterability," by definition, must be iterable, no
code is context specific. Derrida explains that
The possibility of repeating and thus of identifying the marks is implicit in every
code, makingit into a network that is communicable,transmittable,decipherable,
iterablefor a third, and hence for every possible user in general. To be what it is,
all writingmust, therefore,be capableof functioningin the radicalabsence of every
empiricallydeterminedreceiver in general.(180)
Rephrased, Derrida's formulation argues that a split exists between the written
sign and its effect in the world, a formulation that supports, it seems to me,
Davidson's claim for the autonomy of meaning. If meaning cannot be isolated in
the sentence itself or in its context, as Davidson argues, and if the meaning of a
word-either spoken or written-is not conventionally or contextually bound, as
both Davidson and Derrida claim, then language loses its anchor and resists systemic formulation altogether. Although Davidson hesitates to make this conclusion, Derrida does not, and he sees clearly the ramifications of such a deconventionalized language theory:
Every sign, linguistic or non-linguistic, spoken or written . . . in a small or large
unit, can be cited, put between quotationmarks;in so doingit can breakwith every
given context, engenderingan infinity of new contexts in a mannerwhich is absolutely illimitable. This does not imply that the markis valid outside of a context,
but on the contrarythat there are only contexts without any center or absolute anchoring. This citationality,this duplicationor duplicity,this iterabilityof the mark
is neitheran accident nor an anomaly, it is that (normal/abnormal)
withoutwhich a
markcould not even have a functioncalled "normal."(185-86)
Derrida argues and Davidson suggests that language possesses a paralogical dimension, a dimension that, in any conventional sense, refutes formalization,
codification, and systemization.
Earlier in this discussion, I indicated my belief that Davidson and Derrida
started from different philosophical directions but ended in the same place.
Working within the analytic tradition, Davidson desires to refute the specific
claim that language is convention-bound, and unlike Derrida, he does not view
his project as the decentering of the entire philosophical tradition. Derrida, on
the other hand, understands his analysis of both convention and context to be
only one part, although certainly an extremely important part, of his larger project: the critique of a metaphysics of presence. Although both Davidson and Derrida approach the problem of convention from very different points of view and
with very different aims and intentions, both agree that language seems to possess no conventional anchor or at least no anchor that we can identify, codify,
and then talk about. The ramifications of such a conclusion for the discipline of

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rhetoric are profound, and here I would like to mention what I perceive to be
three of these ramificationsfor rhetoric in general and for studies in discourse
productionand discourse analysis in particular.
(1) If no codifiable conventional link exists between a sign (or a sentence) and
its effect in the world, then no systemic rhetoric in the Aristotelian tradition can
account for the effects produced by language. This assertion calls into question

the foundationalpresuppositionthat supportswhat I have called previously the

"classical paradigm." From Aristotle forward, rhetoricianshave presupposed
that (a) something links discourse to the world and (b) this somethingcould be
classified in a logico-systemic way. The classical paradigmrests on the foundational assumptionthat the correspondencebetween the sign and its effect in the
world can be representedby a metalanguagegroundedin a conception of system, process, and logic. If such a correspondencebetween the sign and its effect
in the world cannot be representedby such a metalanguageor, even more to the
point, if it cannot be representedat all in any sort of logical (enthymemic)way,
we are forced, then, to reinvent rhetoric; we are forced to move away from a
conception of rhetoric groundedin ideas of system, process, and formal logic,
and move toward a conception of rhetoricgroundedin paralogy,difference, and
indeterminancy.
(2) If no codifiable link exists that connects the sign to its effect in the world,
then no logico-systemic account of discourse production is possible. I have ar-

gued here that, in general, three broad theoreticalapproachesnow dominatethe

study of discourse production: the Kantian, the neo-positivist, and the social
semiotic. The Kantian approachassumes that discourse productionmay be described as a formal system of logically coherent categories or modes-classification, description, narration, and so forth-that, in some sort of conventional
way, link the sign (or the sentence) with its effect in the world. The neopositivist approachassumes that an empiricalsystem-a system built on a scientific model that measures recall, tests short- and long-termmemory, investigates
brain hemisphere function, analyzes protocols, describes writers at work, and
kindred activities-may be employed to discover the link between the sign (or
the sentence) and its effect in the world. The social semiotic approachassumes
that a conventional link exists among the members of differentdiscourse communities, and meaning as well as knowledge are grounded in socially constructed conventions; therefore, the sign (or the sentence) may be interpreted
only throughthe sign's conventional effect in these differentdiscourse communities. If no convention can be found to link the sign (or the sentence) to its effect in the world, then the presuppositionalfoundationthat supportsall three of
these theoretical approachesto discourse productionis seriously underminedif
not destroyed entirely.
(3) If no codifiable link exists that connects the sign to its effect in the world,
then no formal system of rhetorical analysis-no metalanguage-can be formulated that will account for the tropological use of language. Any rhetorical theory, linguistic theory, or literary theory that attempts to explain the relation between metaphor and metonomy or attempts to describe the uses of language (for
example the uses of literary/non-literary language) must posit or, at least, must

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presuppose a conventionallink between the sign (or the sentence) and its effect
in the world. This connection may reside either (a) in the sign (or the sentence)
itself represented by systemic (usually synchronic) formulations like paradigmatic/syntagmaticlinks, generativegrammars,markedbinaryoppositions, mood
indicators, and so forth-or (b) in the context representedby systemic (usually
dialectical)formulationslike performatives,discourse communities,horizons of
expectation, base/superstructurerelations, and other diachronicrepresentations.
All of these formulationsshare the presuppositionthat meaningis conventional.
Clearly, if no conventionallink between the sign and its effect can be detected in
either the sign itself or in its context, many of our most influentialtheories of
discourse analysis can explain satisfactorilyneither the nature of language nor
how the effects of languageare produced.
I do not mean to suggest, however, that languageconventions are nonexistent, nor do I mean to suggest that they are unimportantfor communicationor
that they are not useful crutches in everyday social discourse. Along the lines of
Davidson's and Derrida'scritiques, I mean to suggest only that languagemakes
convention possible, and not the other way around. No one questions the claim
that convention aids communication,but as Davidson points out, after we make
this claim and after we demonstratethat the claim possesses validity, we have
said nothing about the natureof language. We have commentedonly about one
feature of language:its sufficientability to generatesocial conventions. As Marx
righted Hegelian theory and set it on its feet, Davidson and Derrida, I believe,
right contemporary language theory by reversing its base/superstructurerelation. Language does not represent a superstructurebuilt on convention; language provides the base on which a superstructureof conventionsresides. When
we analyze or describe this conventionalsuperstructure,we say very little about
the natureof the languagebase that makes the superstructurepossible, and within the boundariesof the discussion here, we, in addition,say very little about the
connection between rhetoricand language, especially the two endeavors of discourse productionand analysis.
By rethinkingour most fundamentalassumptions about the productionand
the analysis of discourse-assumptions about the convention-boundnature of
discourse and assumptions about the systemic nature of discourse production
and discourse analysis-we may begin to move beyond a rhetoricaltraditionthat
has reached, I believe, a dead end. Our current conceptions of rhetoric,
drenched as they are in the Platonic/Aristotelianformulationsof logic, process,
and system, cannot account for the hermeneuticdimensionintrinsicto both discourse productionand discourse analysis. I believe that we can begin to account
for these living social acts only by reinventingrhetoricand thereby accounting
for the paralogicnatureof language.
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