Running head: BEYOND THE PHYSICAL

Beyond the Physical:

Playing in the Field of Consciousness
Diana Ciuca

Consciousness & Cognition Final Paper

December 13, 2015

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Abstract

The problem of defining consciousness presents itself as a conundrum in conducting research in the field of
the neuroscience of consciousness. A non-physical definition has often been avoided, but this paper intends to
show why it is favorable through Benjamin Libets Conscious Mental Field Theory. Not only does his theory
align with our intuitions about free will, it can also explain the discrepancy between reality and awareness that
occurs in neurological disorders. In these situations, the CMF would be reduced in its ability to mediate neural
information, yet it retains the ability to influence neural information through its existence.

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Beyond the Physical:

Consciousness as a Field
Leibniz proposes an image of a mill to represent the brain as a machine, the structure of which produces thinking, feeling
and perceiving. Inside, there are nothing but parts which push and move each other, akin to the mechanic underpinnings of the
brain. Yet, looking in the brain, or the mill, one would never find anything that could explain perception. Leibniz poses a skeptic
response to the question of finding a physical property of consciousness. In the modern debate over consciousness, finding neural
correlates, or a certain way that consciousness can be physically mapped onto the brain, is of main importance, shoving nonmaterialist theories to the side.
In fact, the vast majority current scientific research focuses on the quantitatively measurable aspects of consciousness.
There are gaps that science seems to omit, leaving room for free interpretation. The room tends to be filled with more research
favoring physicalist descriptions. However, it is necessary for a philosophical foundation of the purpose of consciousness to
describe its emergence because all that mechanistic explanations do is describe the functions of existing systems. To declare the
emergence of a system known as consciousness, one would have to propose a deeper understanding of what processes occur to give
rise to consciousness. The majority of this work has already been done by providing physical data on brain structures and functions,
yet to describe consciousness in purely physical terms would serve to corrupt the nature of it by reducing it without providing a
solid explanation for why certain parts should map out to create consciousness.
The issue at hand is not as scientific as it is epistemological. We are searching for a theoretical framework which fits the
evidence. One of the most promising theories, Global Workspace Theory takes attention as a modulator of conscious perception,
failing to account for how actions could occur unconsciously. Integrated Information Theory proposes consciousness can be
witnessed in widespread neural connections, but restrains consciousness to the physical realm. In contrast, the theory which best
answers the problem Leibniz presents while acknowledging the limits of physical explanations is Dr. Benjamin Libet's Conscious
Mental Field (CMF) Theory. First, the philosophical and scientific reasoning behind his theory will be provided, along with how it
can be applied for interpretations of existing neuroscience research.

Conscious Mental Field Theory Explained and Defended

"There is an unexplained gap between the category of physical phenomena, and the category of subjective phenomena,"
asserts Dr. Libet. Philosopher David Chalmers (1995) characterized this void as the "explanatory gap" between the 'easy' question of
"What are the functions of consciousness?" and "How does experience arise from the functions of consciousness?" The former
question allows itself to be answered through current scientific research into neural mechanisms, while the latter question remains

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ambiguously discussed. Rene Descartes, known for his substance dualism, proposed that the substance of the physical world (the
body and its neurons) is independent and not reducible to the mind (mental and conscious properties) (Libet, 2004, p. 181). Libets
model of consciousness follows a similar path. Whereas Chalmers uses experience and the notion of qualia to refer to the subjective
interpretations of physical phenomena, the idea of the mind, or the subjective cognitive interpretation of experience will be referred
to as consciousness for the sake of clarity and unity in this paper. Everything else, as in the bodily functions that correlate or
correspond to the mind, is the physical. This distinction that Libet emphasizes assumes a separation of the two, thus falling victim to
Leibniz's skepticism about a purely materialist approach to identifying consciousness.

Non-Physical Consciousness
Our psychological background tends to separate "externally observable brain processes and relatable reportable subjective
experience" (Libet, 2004, p. 153). The two work concomitantly, as research interprets internal mental activities from neuroimaging
data and other methods that map the physical reality occurring in the brain. Libet's CMF Theory attempts to explain experience
through a third modality, a structure superimposed on the body but which cannot exist independently of it. Instead, the physical
body and immaterial conscious work together harmoniously with the body causally acting on the brain. Libet suggests that "local
[neuronal] alterations in the CMF would be reflected in a changed overall field, but there would not be a separately required
mechanism for transmission and integration of such local contributions" (2004, p. 169). This vague explanation may fall under
Chalmers's scrutiny as Libet obscures how CMF gives rise to experience or even why. Yet, Libet seemingly sidesteps that question
by describing CMF as an emergent property of consciousness, or a unique fundamental property in nature (p. 163). Consciousness,
in the definition of CMF, is therefore a phenomenon "displayed by the system but not evident in the properties that make up [the]
system" (p. 162). Not only is it not evident in the system, the way it works surpasses our understanding of physics.
Nevertheless, the meaning of "physical limitations" is up for debate. Either the argument can be made that quantum
mechanics paints the universe as uncertain, and therefore unmeasurable. In this case, consciousness could work through quantum
mechanics without a perceptible violation of physical laws as it operates on a level that is undetectable (Libet, 2004, p. 154). On
the other hand, consciousness may be physically detectable through measuring the shifting of neuronal patterns. Libet claims that if
consciousness exerts its influence by minimal actions, it would be impossible in practice to measure the small changes that occur
due to consciousness and not play them off as merely unconscious fluctuations (p. 154). Regardless, Libet remains steadfast in his
claim that the CMF is in a phenomenological category not reducible to (although intimately related with) neuronal processes (p.
170). The question remains, how do we know this is the case? Libet looks to free will.

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Free Will and the Awareness Gap

Dr. Libets studies on readiness potential and free will led to much skepticism regarding how much will we actually exert. Libet
found that the minor rise in membrane potential, termed the readiness potential, that predated a conscious intention to act now
results from unconscious modulation that leads to making a decision to act (Libet, 2004, p. 155). This finding led to some people to
claim that free will is illusory along the lines of determinism. Others, such as Libet, felt the need to hold onto their intuitions about
free will and find an explanation that fit our own feelings of conscious control (p. 167).
Unsatisfied with Libets findings that the neural decision to move happens well before we are aware of the urge to move,
by 1/2s or more, Schurger, Sitt and Dehaene devised a Libetus Interruptus task that prompts the subject to move immediately,
thereby eliminating independently forming an intention to act (2012, p. E2910). Their results suggest that our neural decision to
move (act now) may be determined stochastically by ongoing spontaneous fluctuations in neural activity (E2909). In contrast to
Libet who assumes that the motor decision coincides with the onset of the readiness potential, Schurger et al. suggest that the
neural decision to move coincides in time with average subjective estates of the time of awareness of intention to move (E2910).
Their interpretation would not allow Libet to introduce the CMF as a modulating mechanism between the time of unconscious
decision and act now intention. The discrepancy in definition over the start of a neural decision aligns Schruger et al.s study with
a deterministic view, which Libet opposes on philosophical grounds. Therefore, Libet is more willing to base his theories on the
existence of a gap between a readiness potential and the intention to move. In this gap, he is able to insert the CMF as the cause of
the will.
Libet looks towards Robert Sperrys work to assign the role of the CMF as supervening over the decision to act now
(Libet, 2004, p. 169). The CMFs supervening action fills the space caused gap between awareness of intention to move and the
readiness potentials unconscious rise in preparation to move. In Libets model, removing the CMF would remove the cause of the
will. Whereas Shruger et al.s work strives to eliminate this gap, Libets studies defends its existence through experiments on
sensory stimulation and awareness in which the skin and cerebral cortex were simulated at different times. He defends his claim for
a requirement of about 0.5 sec [for] cerebral activities to produce awareness of the skin stimulus by showing that an initial weak
skin stimulation could be retroactively modified by a second input in the somatosensory cortex that was initiated between 200 and
500 msec after (p. 50). Both the single pulse to the skin and later cerebral response are necessary for awareness and both require
around 500 msec activities in the brain (p. 50). This leads Libet to conclude that the content of an event can be detected by the
brain unconsciously, without awareness of it (p. 56). Thus, other processes, such as a conscious mental field, may modulate the
content of an experience before it consciously appears (p. 71). Memory integration could be one of the other processes, but Libet
denies this claim.

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If there is a 500 msec gap between stimulation and perception (or awareness) of that stimulus, why do we not perceive the
gap? Libet stimulated the cortex of subjects after a skin response and paradoxically found that subjects reported feeling the
sensation at the time of cortical stimulation rather than skin simulation, even if the two were separated by some hundreds of
milliseconds (p. 74). Along with his initial findings, Libet saw that only after a 500 msec delay would the subject report feeling the
two sensations simultaneously. While we feel like skin simulation happens instantaneously, cortical sensation elicits the delay in
awareness Libet predicted. Libet hints that the difference results from a primary evoked potential which comes about with skin
stimulation but not with cortical stimulation. He excitedly suggests that there is a subjective referral of the timing for that
experience back to the time of the primary EP response! (p. 75). These results further support the gap of awareness that underlies
Libets CMF theory. These findings also support Libets use of pinpointing the unconscious, yet voluntary neural decision to act
now as earlier in the rise of the readiness potential rather than later. Moreover, a time-dependent gap in awareness allows for
plausible interpretations of blindsight and subliminal processing, discussed further on.

Conscious Mental Field Theory Applied

The reasoning behind Conscious Mental Field Theory has been illustrated as well as its philosophical underpinnings. Thus,
the final move is to concisely summarize how it works and use this definition to explain other observable mental phenomena.
Essentially, the Conscious Mental Field simply is a third ingredient inserting itself between the mind and body. In a way, Libet
avoids the mind-body problem of localizing the consciousness in either substance by introducing a new substance. Libet does not
give a location for it, but explains that the CMF is in influenced but not reliably predicted by neural patterns.
In Libets words, we may view conscious subjective experience as if it were a field, produced by appropriate though
multifarious neuronal activities of the brain (p. 168). Libet identifies several aspects of it and in order for CMF Theory to be
applied, these parts must be upheld by interpretations the data. The CMF:

is not physically observable or reducible

is only accessible to the individual subject

provides the entity in which unified subjective experience is present (p. 168)

causally alters neuronal functions

The first point have been already made, with the second as an acknowledged fact (that only you can access your full experience) but
what makes the last two characterizations valid? Arguments in defense of CMF illustrate its applicability in explaining disparate
phenomena such as subliminal processing, blindsight, vegetative states, dissociative identity disorder, hypnosis, hemiparesis,
unilateral neglect and alien hand syndrome. Where it suffers is in split brain patients, which Libet acknowledges yet steadfastly
defends his position.

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Subliminal Processing
Subliminal processing experiments show a stimulus to a patient at a threshold below conscious awareness by limiting the
time the stimulus is shown followed by backwards masking. In one study, during conditions of subliminal processing, isolated
neuronal activity was elicited but not widespread (Dehaene, et al., 2001). Thus, there is neural evidence for unconscious detection
of a signal which is distinct from conscious awareness of a signal on an observable neuronal level (Libet, 106). Another study by
Pohl, Berner and Hoffmann illustrates that these unconscious stimuli do not need to be aware for them to affect a behavioral
response. The demonstrated this effect in advanced chess players, who were primed with a checking image that led to a faster
response when another checking image came up. Similar results were seen with nonchecking images such that congruent
situations correlate. In non-advanced chess players, no subliminal priming response was seen. These results indicate the readiness
potential were unconsciously raised by the first prime that led to an easier, and thereby faster, decision. With regard to subliminal
processing, CMF Theory allows for the unconscious mind to retain a powerful role which influences the subjective experience
without the necessary awareness. Since the stimuli is below a detectable threshold, it would be limited to physical brain regions and
not enter the CMF. If it had, it would be at the level of awareness and not subliminal.

Blindsight
In blindsight, patients with damaged regions of the occipital lobe report a loss of sight in their visual field. Yet, when
presented with stimuli in their blind field, patients, when forced to guess, report the presence of a stimuli with an accuracy that is
significantly above the level of chance. The patients are adamant about not seeing in their blind area and, in studies, report
frustration with having to force a guess. Yet, the findings show otherwise. It seems that patients do not want to believe in their own
abilities. A rearranging of neuronal pathways of the damaged occipital lobe to redirect stimuli to the undamaged side could explain
the high level of accuracy by way of neuroplasticity.
The physical limitations of the brain damage result in a loss of sight, yet integration of other areas can explain blindsight.
For instance, the amygdala was activated as a response to emotional faces in a patient with cortical blindness (Pegna et al. 2005).
The patient guessed the valence of the emotion with accuracy above chance, possibly indicating that other processes besides the
primary visual cortices may be at play in giving rise to a subjective feeling that led to a decision. These subjective feelings probably
affect the CMF at a level that is unconscious. Or, alternatively, Libet proposes that conscious and unconscious visual functions
may reside in some structure outside the primary visual cortex, such as the amygdala (119). This structure would amplify the
stimuli in the primary visual cortex and trigger awareness. A similar study by Marshall & Halligan illustrates the case of a patient
with left homonyous hemianopia who displays relatively accurate perception of a house on fire as opposed to a normal house

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(1988). They suggest that their results showed tacit awareness of left space (as indexed here by rational non-random preferences)
despite explicit denial of any basis upon which to make the requisite choice (the stimuli are judged as identical) (1988). Thus, the
physical blindness the person experiences may be psychologically ingrained into their beliefs, in spite of some preference indicating
mild perception.
These findings fit into CMF Theory because the existence of a CMF predicts that there is a split between the physical and
mental. Even if the patients can accurately guess above chance, they refuse to believe any ability to see. Monkeys, on the other
hand, hold no such beliefs about being blind, and therefore do not doubt themselves before responding correctly to the location of
stimuli shown in a blind field (Cowey and Stoerig, 1995). More importantly, blindsight demonstrates Libets idea of subjective
referral as the way in which consciousness bridges the gap between the onset of a stimulus (EP) and the conscious perception of it.
Libet believes that, at least in blindsight, localization of a target occurs unconsciously. Along the idea that specific sensory
projection to the primary visual area is required only for subjective localization, not for unconscious localization, the CMF is
useful for subjective interpretation of the input (81). Moreover, Libet speculates that these subjective interpretations, or
corrections, of sensations are constructed, or learned. It is more likely that there is a combination of both explanations provided
working to justify blindsight: neuroplasticity and subjective referral. It is possible that other structures may be contributing to sight,
while awareness (the CMF) still believes in the blindness.

Vegetative States
One of the distinguishing traits of emergence from the vegetative state into the minimally conscious state is the
coordination of mental processes to produce a willed response. Without specifying a mechanism for how emergence into a more
conscious state could occur, it would be assumed that this transition would be marked by a CMF that switched from non-functioning
to functioning. The switch is can be defined when the patient, previously determined to be unconscious, exemplifies a consciouslike response. For instance, Owen et al. (2006) correlated the fMRI data of patients with damaged brains to healthy brains and found
striking similarities between both when asked to think about playing tennis and walking through their house. The vegetative patients
who were capable of responding in a manner like healthy patients led the researchers to label them as consciously aware (p 1402).
Monti et al. took the data one step further and asked patients questions, using motor imagery responses to correspond to yes/no
questions. Although the definition of consciousness remains a hazy one, consciousness in vegetative patients is partly characterized
by an ability to demonstrate free will. In disruptions of consciousness on a global scale, the question remains how does one get out
of a vegetative state? It is likely that a third, non-physical structure could have contributed to it - a structure that willed itself into a
conscious state as opposed to out of it.

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Hemiparesis, Unilateral Neglect and Alien Hand Syndrome

When there is damage to the brain in an observable area, loss of awareness of damage usually accompanies that disorder.
For instance, patients with right cerebral lesions often encounter asomatognosia, or an inability to recognize the affected limb as
ones own, along with anosognosia, denial of their condition (Meador, Loring, Feinberg, Lee & Nichols, 2000). They lose motor
control of that body part, but more importantly, they often lose awareness that their limb is a part of them. If there is a CMF, then it
would seem to have disappeared from the region that is damaged, so that awareness of the limb fades from the patients remaining
CMF. The patient remains fixated in the idea that their limb is functional, confabulating about reality (Meador et al., p. 819).
Meador et al. views this condition results from a lack of awareness (p. 819). Moreover, they speculate that self-awareness in
normal conditions would rely on several parallel processes (819). The CMF could be one of these parallel processes, or it could be
the entity running these processes to result in awareness of the limb. Unlike in visual perception, in which there could be a third
area modulating sensory input from the primary visual cortex, there isnt as widespread activation of the cortex in asomatognosia, so
there is a wider disruption of cognitive functions that may be not easily replaced. So, an extra structure modulating representation of
space is not a likely answer to how hemiparesis works with the CMF.
In unilateral neglect, the patient tends to omit an area of visual space from mental representation. For example, in objectcentered neglect, a patient told to draw a flower will only draw the left side of the flower if they have damage to their right
hemisphere. With regard to spatial representation of words, Caramazza and Hillis (1990) suggest the function that is lacking in these
patients would normally occur at a level of representation that has abstracted away from the specifics of the two sets of tasks, like
a higher order function (p. 268).. In a study of representational space, Bisiach and Luzzati (1978) interpret their findings to indicate
that an image is most likely split between the two hemispheres, so that it is abstracted and split in half. This split represents a
functional disunity that is normally integrated by a working, unified conscious like a Conscious Mental Field. The patient Bisiach
and Luzzati studied, N.V., could address the left-side of an extremely familiar room but with an absent-minded, almost annoyed
tone (p. 103). Patients with neglect often lack awareness of their absence of processing, anosognosia, because they can easily turn
their heads and use their dominant hemisphere to recognize previously unaddressed objects in normal situations. Yet, a lack in metacognition of their symptoms produces the same question of how awareness is affected by loss of cognitive functions. It is speculated
that the CMF cannot access damaged parts of the cortex, so it is reasonable that a loss of function would result in a loss of
awareness of the function. The lost part can no longer contribute to the awareness produced in the CMF that leads to a subjective
experience of the function. Some of the awareness is preserved is in cases of mild, localized brain damage, such as alien hand
syndrome.
In alien hand syndrome, either the patient is aware that the hand is theirs, but they have no control over it; or, in extreme
cases, the patient renounces the hand is theirs (Parkin 1996, 173). The case of MP, who showed damage to the Supplementary

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Motor Area and corpus callosum, indicated a disruption of planning of movement and some lack of inter-hemispheric connection
in her struggle to fight her disruptive hand (180). Unlike hemiparesis, awareness of damage for alien hand patients such as M.P.
tends to be preserved probably as a result of focal rather than global damage. Either way, Libet characterizes this problem as a loss
of will, probably as a result of lesions in the fronto-medial portion of premotor area which are often attributed the roles of
executive decision making (Libet, 129).

Dissociative Identity Disorder and Hypnosis

In contrast with neurological disorders, Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) appears to be psychological in nature, not
exhibiting any aspects of observable neurologic damage. If we take the dissociative model of explaining this phenomenon seriously,
then we are left with two independently-operating functional Conscious Mental Fields in one person. If we believe in the sociocognitive model, such that the patient falls under the influence of suggestions and believes them, then the Conscious Mental Field
remains intact and unified. In the latter case, it is likely that repair of the disorder can occur, whereas in a split of two (or likely more
conscious fields), unification would be unlikely, if not impossible. This problem is further explained through the conundrum of split
brain patients.

Split Brain
Conscious Mental Field Theory demands a unity of consciousness. However, when it comes to split brain patients, a
disunity of consciousness occurs. Regardless, split brain patients exhibit normal behavior marked by a unified self of self (Libet,
2004, p. 211). Their feelings of unity leads Libet to claim that the the conscious self in split brain patients is largely unified (211).
He maintains this stance in spite of evidence that each hemisphere has exhibited its own sense of conscious abilities that is
functionally separate from the other hemisphere. For instance, R. W. Sperry (1968) tested patients to show that cross-modal transfer
of information in split brain patients fails when the patient is forced to use the hand that is contralateral to the stimulus to find the
object represented by the stimulus. Cross-performance in touching spots on opposite hands is also weak. Similar results occur when
a patient is showed a question mark in the left field and a dollar sign in the right field. When asked to draw what they saw with the
left hand, they reliably drew the dollar sign. When asked to verbalize what he saw, the answer is a question mark. These finding
show that each hemisphere may have specialization that is unique to them, such as language in the left. Moreover, Sperry (1968)
makes the bold claim that one hemisphere does not know what the other hemisphere has been doing (p. 726). In spite of that, both
hemispheres exemplify a well-developed sense of self and social awareness, even if the right hemisphere often lags behind the left
(Sperry, 1979, p. 165). Sperry claims that one hemisphere, the right one, may be the minor hemisphere and only exert a small

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amount of influence over the overall actions. He further speculates that in split-brain patients, subcortical processes may have some
role in the functional transfer of information from one hemisphere to the other.
Libet acknowledges and applies Sperrys results by referring primarily to the subjective experience of split brain patients as
a single-minded, unified individuals as defense for CMF Theory (Libet, 2004, p. 210). Sperry (1968) finds that a unifying body
schema and a unity of optic image can lead to a unity of self. In normal patients, our bilateral redundancy as a result of
evolutionary design works to integrate both hemispheres while in split brain patients, they choose to operate in only one. Thus, for
Libet, the CMF resides in the major hemisphere, or as he writes, unity of the CMF would, in [split brain] circumstances be
restricted to a given hemifield (171). Furthermore, Libet proposes that the Conscious Mental Field does not have the ability to
jump across substantial gaps of space or of tissue barriers (170). If anything, it would be useful for him to drop this limitation to
better incorporate the unity of mind in split brain patients exhibited under normal, not clinical, conditions.
When the minor hemisphere is addressed, is the information available to the same person? It is likely that personal
information could be stored in the CMF, on other central brain structures, or separately in each hemisphere. Could the CMF shift to
the other hemisphere to produce awareness of self? Libet suggests not. Sperrys results of self-identification in both hemispheres
indicate that each hemisphere processes the same personal information. He stipulates that an emotional and mental aura generated
by some items are more likely to spread readily to the opposite hemisphere presumably through brain stem systems (p. 165).
Therefore, it seems that a unity of self is the least amount of unity needed for Libet to claim that a Conscious Mental Field is
subjectively processing information - and it could be influenced by fundamentally regulating systems such as the amygdala or brain
stem. Interestingly enough, it may be the CMF is still unified over the entire skull which leads to some aura and transfer of
information from one hemisphere to the other through the CMF. So, if this transfer occurs in their normal life when the two
hemispheres seemingly operate in unity, each hemisphere would have access to the same information. Why this split surfaces when
tested and disrupts the unity of the CMF could be that both hemispheres contribute to the CMF. The CMF then reflexively operates
on each hemisphere either in separately in each part (for split brain patients) or as a whole; but it can only operate based on the
information it can receive. Thus, it is possible that the CMF splits only when it is forced to do so under testing conditions.
Conversely, if we take attention to be a regulator of perception, then two separate foci of attention could lead to two
different modalities of perception, and thus, two distinct consciousnesses. In a study by Luck, Hillyard, Mangun and Gazzaniga
(1989), split brain patients appeared to display two distinct foci of attention indicated by a lower search slope when scanning
bilateral displays rather than unilateral displays. In this case, the Conscious Mental Field is either unified as stated previously and
working in both hemispheres simultaneously but through different functional pathways, or it is disunified and working
independently in each hemisphere. The latter option not only prompts the question of how many splits of consciousness could result,
but it denies Libets claim that the CMF is unified. The overarching question remains - if information cannot cross the corpus

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callosum, how is it supposed to enter the Conscious Mental Field? Since awareness of information primarily requires functional
integration of it, cross-hemisphere transfer should result in a unified sense of awareness. The opposite, that a lack of crosshemisphere transfer results in a disunified sense of awareness (the problem with Libets model) is not supported by Sperrys work.
What Libet aims to prove is that, in spite of a disintegrated system, a unity of self still occurs because of the presence of the CMF.
Overall, disorders of consciousness exemplify what occurs when there is a conscious mental field that is disrupted. Either
the argument can be made along the lines of dissociative network theory that in these situations, the Conscious Mental Field is not
unified, which would, in turn, negate the definition of a CMF. Or, it could be suggested that the CMF is fully functional but the
interpretations of the subjective experience are altered with or without noticeable changes to the physical. It follows logically that in
order for a Conscious Mental Field to work properly, the brain needs to work properly. Any failures of integration of information
caused by damage can only lead to correlating what structures have which functions. If we look beyond the physical and towards the
causal properties of the CMF, these correlations would prove to be more meaningful.

The Future of Conscious Mental Field Theory

The experimental design for testing the CMF Theory is touted as one of the facets of Libets theory that other theories lack.
A slab of cortex would be isolated neuronally, only connected by blood vessel to maintain that it is still alive. When it is stimulated,
then the isolated area could still affect the CMF even though it does not project its nerve signals along a pathway as Integrated
Information Theory would presume. The most reliable site for this testing would be at the sensory cortex, as stimulating it should
reliably produce an experience. The process of finding a neurosurgeon and patient to comply with the requisite study has not proved
promising for Libet.
The beauty of CMF Theory is that Libet assigns a significant amount of power and influence to unconscious processes in
his work. It is likely that a Conscious Mental Field could become more aware of the unconscious processes and then change them.
For instance, in patients with Schizophrenia, having them address their voices as embodied avatars enabled them to reduce the
malevolence of these voices (Leff, Williams, Huckvale, Arbuthnot & Leff, 2013). Just as blindsight monkeys did not have any
problem believing they could see, maybe blindsight patients could use their CMF to regain some more confident consciousness in
that visual field. The discrepancy between the thoughts of patients with neurological or psychological damage and the reality they
can experience may be modulated by awareness. In fact, one of Libets most surprising claims is that subjectively, we do live in the
antedated present, although in fact we are not aware of the present for up to 0.5 sec after the sensory signal arrives at the cerebral
cortex (p. 88). This gap in awareness, in which CMF exists, provides for a hopeful role of the will. Maybe it is the will that raises
people out of a vegetative state. Perhaps, that same will can repair psychological disorders of consciousness and also work on
repairing neurological disorders to the extent that neuroplasticity may allow. Ultimately, the choice for Libets Conscious Mental

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Field Theory not only relies on the ease at which it fits into existing data, but at the optimistic prospects it could give us,
individually, in determining our own futures in accord to the modulation of our perceptions through free will and the Conscious
Mental Field.

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BEYOND THE PHYSICAL

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Appendix:
If my corpus callosum were split, as it sometimes feels like, and I would produce information visually
that I am incapable of transferring verbally, heres what my essay would probably look like.

Thank you so much for an enlightening semester!