II. F.

Legislative Journal and Other Congressional Records

Subtopic: Enrolled Bill Theory
The enrolled bill rule, is a principle of judicial interpretation of rules of procedure in legislative
bodies. Under the doctrine, once a bill passes a legislative body and is signed into law, the courts
assume that all rules of procedure in the enactment process were properly followed. That is, "[i]f a
legislative document is authenticated in regular form by the appropriate officials, the court treats
that document as properly adopted." (Wikipedia)
Enrolled bill rule provides that if a legislative document is authenticated in regular form by the
appropriate officials, the courts treat that document as properly adopted. (USlegal.com)
CASE DIGESTS
TITLE: Casco Philippine Chemical Co. vs. Gimenez
FACTS: Casco Philippine Chemical Co., a company engaged in the production of synthetic resin
glues used in bonding lumber and veneer by plywood and hardwood producers, purchased foreign
exchange for the importation of urea and formaldehyde which are key ingredients in the production
of synthetic resin. For their transactions in November and December in 1959, Casco Philippine
Chemical Co., paid a margin fee totaling P33,765.42, in accordance to provisions of Republic Act
No. 2609, otherwise known as the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law. In May, 1960, the said
company made another purchase of foreign exchange and paid P6,345.72 as margin fee.
However, Casco Philippine Chemical Co. Had sought a refund of margin fee for their transactions in
November and December before they made the May purchase. The refund was requested based on
Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank of the Philippines, dated November
3, 1959, declaring that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from margin
fees. Consequently, Casco also filed a refund for their transactions for the month of May.
The Central Bank issued margin fee vouchers for the amounts requested by Casco, however, the
Auditor of Central bank refused to approve said vouchers. The auditor said that the separate
purchases of urea and formaldehyde were not covered by the provisions of Section 2, Paragraph
XVIII of RA 2609 which read:

XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when
imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users.
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. insisted that the term urea formaldehyde seen on the
abovementioned provision should be interpreted as urea and formaldehyde.
ISSUE: Whether or not "urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempt by law from the payment of the
aforesaid margin fee.
RULING:
Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a condensation
product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to
temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. This produce when applied in water solution and
extended with inexpensive fillers constitutes a fairly low cost adhesive for use in the manufacture
of plywood.
...it is well settled that the enrolled bill which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of
"urea and formaldehyde" is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure
passed by Congress and approved by the President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120;
Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-18684, September 14, 1961).
If there has been any mistake in the printing ofthe bill before it was certified by the officers of
Congress and approved by the Executive on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the
principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic
system the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

The Supreme Court AFFIRMED the earlier decision [the separate purchase of urea and
formaldehyde was not covered by the exemption provisions of RA 2609], with cost against the
petitioner.
TITLE: Astorga vs. Villegas
FACTS: The contention on this case arose from the passage of House Bill 9266 which became
Republic Act 4065 known as An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice Mayor of the
City of Manila, Further Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of Republic Act
Numbered Four Hundred Nine, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised Charter of the City of
Manila.
House Bill 9266 was filed at the House of Representatives and it passed on third hearing without
amendments. It was then sent to the Senate Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments
and Cities and was then favorably recommended with minor amendments made by the
committees chair, Senator Gerardo Roxas, who suggested that instead of the City Engineer, the
President Pro tempore of the Municipal Board should succeed in the event the Vice-Mayor is
incapacitated to act as Mayor.
When the bill was discussed for second reading on the Senate Floor, Senator Arturo Tolentino made
substantial amendments which were approved by the Senate in toto. Senator Roxas amendments
does not appear in the Senates journals. HB 9266 went through the regular process for its passing
and in June 18, 1964, the President signed it and it became RA 4065.
The following month, Respondent Mayor Antonio Villegas denounced RA 4065 saying that the
wrong version of House Bill 9266 was signed by the President. The Senate President then wrote a
letter to the President of the Philippine explaining that the enrolled copy of HB 9266 signed by the
secretaries of both Houses and the presiding officers thereof was not the bill duly approved by
Congress. The Senate President added that, hence, his signature was invalid or of no effect.
Consequentially, the President of the Philippines wrote to presiding officers of both Houses
informing them that given the circumstances, he was withdrawing his signature on HB 9266.
Following these events, Villegas issued circulars to the citys government offices and owners of
business within Manila to disregard RA 4065. He also recalled five policemen who were assigned to
Vice Mayor Herminio Astorga. Reacting to the actions of Villegas, Astorga filed a petition for
Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction to
the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court must look into the Legislative Journals to determine if
the RA 4065 was validly enacted.
RULING:
It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and
independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to accept, as having passed
Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in other cases
that if the attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts
may resort to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was
the logical conclusion reached in a number of decisions, 10although they are silent as to whether
the journals may still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding officers is present.
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution
requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of
misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to
inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text
passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this
Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that
substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but

were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is not
asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky
undertaking, 13 but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law.
This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they
withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error committed and subsequently
rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that
error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would
be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the lawmaking body.
The Supreme Court DISMISSED the petition and declared that RA 4065 was duly enacted and
therefore did not become law.