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UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS
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SCHOOL OF LAW
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GROUP 1
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TOPIC: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
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27 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW
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Tuesday (8:00- 9:00pm); Friday (7:00- 9:00pm)
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Submitted to:
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(Atty. Bacatan)
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Submitted by:
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Group 1
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January 30, 2014
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GROUP 1 (Administrative Law)
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Yray, Rhea C.

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Garces, Yohanna

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Ocat, Mylene

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Amistoso, Shella

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Jordan, Rebecca

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Aquino, Liz Arden

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Enricoso, Gilbee Pearl

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Gacang, Jeah Jean

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Bautista, Mel-Lisanina

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Daligdig, Rufaida

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Pajo, Julie Ann Mae

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Penalosa, Jun

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Esparagoza, Stephen Jorge


Manuales, Eisone Brix

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OUTLINE
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CHAPTER I (INTRODUCTION)
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- Scope
96- Kinds of Administrative Law
97- Background and Framework
98- Creation of Administrative Agencies
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100
CHAPTER II (POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES)
101A. Powers in General
102
B. Express and Implied Powers
103
C. Ministerial and Discretionary Powers
104
D. Mandatory and Permissive
105E. Errors in the Exercise of Powers
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CHAPTER III (POWER OF CONTROL, SUPERVISION and
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INVESTIGATION)
110A. President
111
B. Investigative Power (President)
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CHAPTER IV (QUASI LEGISLATIVE POWER)
114
A. Legislative Power as General
115B. Delegation of Legislative Power
116C. Contemporary Construction of Quasi- Legislative Power
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118
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CHAPTER V (QUASI- JUDICIAL POWER)
120A. Quasi- Judicial Power in General
121B. Jurisdiction
122C. Administrative Procedure
123D. Due Process in Quasi Judicial Proceedings
124E. Decision, Appeal and Judicial Review
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126
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CHAPTER VI (DOCTRINES OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION AND
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EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES)
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A. Primary Jurisdiction
130B. Doctrines of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
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CHAPTER VII (JUDICIAL REVIEW)
134
A. Judicial Review in general
135B. Limitations
136C. Petition for Review (RULE 43 RULES OF COURT)
137D. Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus

138E. Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

139
140
141

CHAPTER I

142

INTRODUCTION

143
144Administrative Law
145

The branch of public law that fixes the organization of the government and

146determines competence of authorities who execute the law and indicates to individual
147remedies for the violations of his rights.
148
149Scope of Administrative Law
150

Administrative law embraces all the law that controls, or is intended to control, the

151administrative operations of the government.


152
153Kinds of Administrative Law
154A.

That body of statutes setting up or creating administrative agencies and

155endowing them with power and duties;


156B.

That body of agency-made law, i.e., rules, regulations and orders promulgated in

157the exercise of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions;


158C.

That body of legal principles governing the acts of public agents which conflict

159with private rights;


160D.

That body of determinations, decisions and orders of administrative bodies made

161in the settlement of controversies arising in their particular fields.


162
163
164

165NATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES


166Concept
167
168Definition of administrative agency
169

- An administrative agency is defined as "[a] government body charged with

170administering and implementing particular legislation. Examples are workers' compensation


171commissions, x x x and the like. x x x The term 'agency' includes any department,
172independent establishment, commission, administration, authority, board or bureau x x x ."
173
174Republic v. Court of Appeals 200 SCRA 226
175Facts:
176

Sugar Regulatory Administration and Republic Planters Bank questioned the decision

177of the CA which dismissed the petition of the former on the ground of lack of capacity to sue.
178Issue:
179

WON administrative agency has only such powers as expressly granted to it by law

180and those that are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof?


181RULING:
182

The SC ruled in the negative. Administrative agency has only such powers as are

183expressly granted to it by law and those that are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof?
184In this case, administrative agency is judicially defined as government body charged with
185the administering and implementing particular legislation examples are workers
186compensation commissions and the like. The term agency includes any department,
187independent establishment, commission, administration, authority or bureau.
188
189
190
191
192Test for determining administrative nature

1931. Mandatory statutory requirement intended for the protection of the citizens and by a
194disregard of which their rights are injuriously affected;
195
1962. Directory if no substantial right depends on it and no injury can result from ignoring it
197and purpose of legislature can be accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed and
198substantially, the same results attained.
199
200
201Administrative function, defined - Administrative functions are those which involve the
202regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and
203the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the Policy of the legislature or
204such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence
205
206In Re: Rodolfo Manzano 166 SCRA 246
207Facts:
208

Its a petition file by judge Manzano allowing him to accept the appointment by

209executive order by the governor of locos Sur Rodolfo farinas as the member of locos Norte
210provincial committee on justice created pursuant to presidential order. That his membership
211in committee will not in any way amount to an abandonment to his present position as
212executive judge of branch xix, RTC, first judicial region and as a member of judiciary.
213Issue: What is an administrative agency?
214Ruling:
215

Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the

216conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and
217regulations to better carry out the Policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the
218administrative agency by the organic law of its existence
219

220

The petition is denied. The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the

221judiciary to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. (Section 12,


222Article VIII, Constitution.)
223

Insofar as the term "quasi-judicial" is concerned, it has a fairly clear meaning and

224Judges can confidently refrain from participating in the work of any administrative agency
225which adjudicates disputes and controversies involving the rights of parties within its
226jurisdiction. The issue involved in this case is where to draw the line insofar as administrative
227functions are concerned.
228

"Administrative functions" as used in Section 12 refers to the executive machinery of

229government and the performance by that machinery of governmental acts. It refers to the
230management actions, determinations, and orders of executive officials as they administer the
231laws and try to make government effective. There is an element of positive action, of
232supervision or control.
233

In the dissenting opinion of Justice Gutierrez:

234

Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the

235conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and
236regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the
237administrative agency by the organic law of its existence "we can readily see that
238membership in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice would not involve any regulation
239or control over the conduct and affairs of individuals. Neither will the Committee on Justice
240promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative functions. Its work is
241purely advisory. A member of the judiciary joining any study group which concentrates on the
242administration of justice as long as the group merely deliberates on problems involving the
243speedy disposition of cases particularly those involving the poor and needy litigants-or
244detainees, pools the expertise and experiences of the members, and limits itself to
245recommendations which may be adopted or rejected by those who have the power to
246legislate or administer the particular function involved in their implementation.
247

248Public office, defined in relation to administrative law


249
250Fernandez vs. Sto. Tomas 248 SCRA 194
251Facts:
252

In this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for a Temporary

253Restraining Order, petitioners Salvador C. Fernandez and Anicia M. de Lima assail the
254validity of Resolution No. 94-3710 of the Civil Service Commission and the authority of the
255Commission to issue the same.
256Petitioner Fernandez was serving as Director of the Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit
257while petitioner de Lima was serving as Director of the Office of the Personnel Relations,
258both at the Central Office of the Civil Service Commission in Quezon City, Metropolitan
259Manila. While petitioners were so serving, Resolution No. 94-3710 signed by public
260respondents Patricia A. Sto. Tomas and Ramon Ereneta, Jr., Chairman and Commissioner,
261respectively, of the Commission, was issued.
262
263Issues:
264(1)Whether or not the Civil Service Commission had legal authority to issue Resolution No.
26594-3710 to the extent it merged the OCSS [Office of Career Systems and Standards], the
266OPIA [Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit] and the OPR [Office of Personnel
267Relations], to form the RDO [Research and Development Office]; and
268
269(2)Whether or not Resolution No. 94-37 10 violated petitioners' constitutional right to security
270of tenure.
271Ruling:
272

Public office is frequently used to refer to the right, authority and duty, created and

273conferred by law, by which, for a given period either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure
274of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions
275of government, to be exercised by that individual for the benefit of the public.

276

Examination of the foregoing statutory provisions reveals that the OCSS, OPERA

277and ORR, and as well each of the other Offices, consist of aggregations of Divisions, each of
278which Divisions is in turn a grouping of Sections. Each Section, Division and Office
279comprises groups of positions within the agency called the Civil Service Commission, each
280group being entrusted with a more or less definable function or functions these functions are
281related to one another, each of them being embraced by a common or general subject
282matter. These offices relate to the internal structure of the Commission.
283
284

The objectives sought by the Commission in enacting Resolution No. 94-3710 were

285described in that Resolution in broad terms as "effect[ing] changes in the organization to


286streamline [the Commission's] operations and improve delivery of service." These changes
287in internal organization were rendered necessary by, on the one hand, the decentralization
288and devolution of the Commission's functions effected by the creation of fourteen (14)
289Regional Offices and ninety-five (95) Field Offices of the Commission throughout the country,
290to the end that the Commission and its staff may be brought closer physically to the
291government employees that they are mandated to serve.
292

N.B. We (SC) note, firstly, that appointments to the staff of the Commission are not

293appointments to a specified public office but rather appointments to particular positions or


294ranks. Thus a person may be appointed to the position of Director III or Director IV; or to the
295position of Attorney IV or Attorney V; or to the position of Records Officer I or Records Officer
296II; and so forth. In the instant case, petitioners were each appointed to the position of
297Director IV, without specification of any particular office or station. The same is true with
298respect to the other persons holding the same position or rank of Director IV of the
299Commission.
300
301

302Administrative framework of the Philippines (Executive Order No. 292)


303Iron and Steel Authority vs. CA 249 SCRA 538
3041.

Definition of Government of the Republic of the Phils. -

305refers to the corporate governmental entity through which the functions of government are
306exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears from the
307context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the
308Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal or
309barangay subdivisions or other forms of local government.
310
3112.

Definition of Agency of the government - refers to any of

312the various units of the Government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality,
313or government-owned or controlled corporations, or a local government or a distinct unit
314therein.
315
3163.

Definition of Instrumentality - refers to any agency of the

317National Government, not integrated within the department framework vested within special
318functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering
319special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term
320includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned or controlled
321corporations.
322
323Definition of Administration 324US vs. Dorr 2 Phil 332
325Facts:
326

Dorr is the owner of newspaper manila freedom charge with the crime of libel

327together with Eduard OBrian.

328

The defendants were tried and found guilty of the offense charged in the complaint,

329and each was sentenced to six months imprisonment at hard labor and a fine of $1,000,
330United States currency. From this judgment the defendants have appealed to this court.
331

During the course of the proceedings a motion was made by the defendants asking

332that they be granted a trial by jury, as provided for in Article 111, section 2, of the Constitution
333of the United States, and under the sixth amendment to the Constitution, which motion was
334denied by the court, and an exception was also taken to this ruling.
335Issue:
336

The issue is to determine whether these provisions of the Constitution of the United

337States relating to trials by jury are in force in the Philippine Islands.


338Ruling:
339

Administration is the aggregate of those persons in whose hands the reins of

340government are for the time being.


341
3421. That while the Philippine Islands constitute territory which has been acquired by and
343belongs to the United States, there is a difference between such territory and the territories
344which are a part-of the United States with reference to the Constitution of the United States.
3452. That the Constitution was not extended here by the terms of the treaty of Paris, under
346which the Philippine Islands were acquired from Spain. By the treaty the status of the ceded
347territory was to be determined by Congress.
3483. That the mere act of cession of the Philippines to the United States did not extend the
349Constitution here, except such parts as fall within the general principles of fundamental
350limitations in favor of personal rights formulated in the Constitution and its amendments, and
351which exist rather by inference and the general spirit of the Constitution, and except those
352express provisions of the Constitution which prohibit Congress from passing laws in their

353contravention under any circumstances; that the provisions contained in the Constitution
354relating to jury trials do not fall within either of these exceptions, and, consequently, the right
355to trial by jury has not been extended here by the mere act of the cession of the territory.
3564. That Congress has passed no law extending here the provision of the Constitution relating
357to jury trials, nor were any laws in existence in the Philippine Islands, at the date of their
358cession, for trials by jury, and consequently there is no law in the Philippine Islands entitling
359the defendants in this case to such trial; that the Court of First Instance committed no error in
360overruling their application for a trial by jury
361

The act of Congress of July 1, 1902, entitled An Act temporarily to provide for the

362administration of the affairs of civil government in the Philippine Islands, and for other
363purposes, in section 5 extends to the Philippine Islands nearly all of the provisions of the
364Constitution known as the Bill of Rights. But there was exempted from it the provisions of the
365Constitution relating to jury trials contained in section 2, Article 111, and in the sixth
366amendment.
367

The court reach the conclusion that the Philippine Commission is a body expressly

368recognized and sanctioned by act of Congress, having the power to pass laws, and has the
369power to pass the libel law under which the defendants were convicted.
370
371Creation, reorganization, and abolition of administrative agencies
372

The administrative body may be created by the Constitution, or by a Statute,

373or by authority by Law. If created by the Constitution itself, the administrative body can be
374altered or abolished only by Constitution. But where the body was created only by statute,
375the legislature that breathed life into it can amend or even repeal its charter, thereby
376resulting in its abolition which is justified if made in good faith.
377
378A.

Creation of administrative agencies

379
380Eugenio vs. CSC 243 SCRA 196
381Facts:
382

Petitioner is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She

383applied for Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank, On August 2, 1993;
384she was given a CES eligibility. On September 15, 1993, she was recommended to the
385President for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service Board. All was not to turn well
386for petitioner. On October 1, 1993, respondent Civil Service Commission2 passed Resolution
387No. 934359. The resolution became an impediment to the appointment of petitioner as Civil
388Service Officer, Rank IV.
389
390Issue: WON the CSC had the power to abolish the career executive service board.
391
392Ruling:
393

No. "Except for such offices as are created by the Constitution, the creation of public

394offices is primarily a legislative function, In so far as the legislative power in this respect is
395not restricted by constitutional provisions, it is supreme, and the legislature may decide for
396itself what offices are suitable, necessary, or convenient. When in the exigencies of
397government it is necessary to create and define duties, the legislative department has the
398discretion to determine whether additional offices shall be created, or whether these duties
399shall be attached to and become ex-officio duties of existing offices. An office created by the
400legislature is wholly within the power of that body, and it may prescribe the mode of filling the
401office and the powers and duties of the incumbent, and, if it sees fit, abolish the office."
402
403
404B.

Abolition of administrative agencies

405Busacay v. Buenaventura 93 Phil 787

406
407Facts:
408

Plaintiff Marcelino A. Busacay was a duly-appointed and qualified pre-war toll

409collector, classified as permanent by the Civil Service Commission, but was laid off due to
410the destruction of the bridge caused by flood. When the bridge was reconstructed and
411reopened to traffic, Busacay notified the respondent Provincial Treasurer of his intention and
412readiness to resume his duties, but he was refused reinstatement.
413
414Issue: Whether or not the total destruction of the bridge abolished the position of toll
415collector.
416
417Held:
418

The SC ruled in the negative. All offices created by statute are more or less

419temporary, transitory or precarious in that they are subject to the power of the legislature to
420abolish them. But this is not saying that the rights of the incumbents of such positions may
421be impaired while the offices exist, except for cause.
422
423
424De la Llana v. Alba 112 SCRA 294
425Facts:
426

The petitioners questioned the constitutionality of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of

4271980 by imputing the lack of good faith in its enactment and characterizing as an undue
428delegation of legislative power to the president his authority to fix compensation and
429allowance of the justices and judges thereafter appointed and the determination of the date
430when the reorganization shall be deemed completed. On the other hand, the solicitor
431general interposed a defense of legitimate exercise of the power vested in the Batasang
432Pambansa.

433
434Issue: WON the enactment into law of BP 129 was done in good faith.
435
436Ruling:
437

Yes, it was done in good faith and is valid. This conclusion flows from the

438fundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court
439and therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new
440appointments and commissions. Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution vests in the
441National Assembly the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various
442courts, subject to certain limitations in the cage of the Supreme Court.
443
444
445Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals 258 SCRA 134
446Facts:
447

President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No. 1341 converting the Phil College of

448Commerce into a Polytechnic University, defining its objectives, organizational structure and
449functions, and expanding its curricular offerings.
450Issue: Whether or not P.D. 1341 did not abolish but only changed, the former PCC into what
451is now the PUP.
452Held:
453

No, what took place was a change in academic status of the educational institution

454not in its corporate life.


455

When the purpose is to abolish a department or an office or an organization and to

456replace it with another one, the lawmaking authority says so.

457

Neither the addition of a new course offerings nor changes in its existing structure

458and organization bring about the abolition of an educational institution and the creation of a
459new one only an express declaration to that effect by the lawmaking authority will.
460

Stand transferred simply means that lands transferred to the PCC were to be

461understood as transferred to the PCC were to be understood as transferred to the PUP as


462the new name of the institution.
463

But these are hardly indicia of an intent to abolish an existing institution and to

464create a new one. New course offerings can be added to the curriculum of a school without
465affecting its legal existence. Nor will changes in its existing structure and organization bring
466about its abolition and the creation of a new one. Only an express declaration to that effect
467by the lawmaking authority will.
468
469C.
4701.

Reorganization of administrative agencies


Reorganization, defined

471National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration vs. CSC 221 SCRA 145
472Facts:
473

The records show that in 1977, petitioner Garcia, a Bachelor of Laws

474graduate and a First grade civil service eligible was appointed Deputy Register of Deeds VII
475under permanent status. Said position was later reclassified to Deputy Register of Deeds III
476pursuant to PD 1529, to which position, petitioner was also appointed under permanent
477status up to September 1984. She was for two years, more or less, designated as Acting
478Branch Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan. By virtue of Executive Order No. 649
479(which took effect on February 9, 1981) which authorized the restructuring of the Land
480Registration Commission to National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration and
481regionalizing the Offices of the Registers therein, petitioner Garcia was issued an
482appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II on October 1, 1984, under temporary status, for
483not being a member of the Philippine Bar. She appealed to the Secretary of Justice but her

484request was denied. Petitioner Garcia moved for reconsideration but her motion remained
485inacted. On October 23, 1984, petitioner Garcia was administratively charged with Conduct
486Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. While said case was pending decision, her
487temporary appointment as such was renewed in 1985. In a Memorandum dated October 30,
4881986, the then Minister, now Secretary, of Justice notified petitioner Garcia of the termination
489of her services as Deputy Register of Deeds II on the ground that she was "receiving bribe
490money". Said Memorandum of Termination which took effect on February 9, 1987, was the
491subject of an appeal to the Inter-Agency Review Committee which in turn referred the appeal
492to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB).
493
494Issue:
495

Whether or not membership in the Bar, which is the qualification requirement

496prescribed for appointment to the position of Deputy Register of Deeds under Section 4 of
497Executive Order No. 649 (Reorganizing the Land Registration Commission (LRC) into the
498National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration or NALTDRA) should be required
499of and/or applied only to new applicants and not to those who were already in the service of
500the LRC as deputy register of deeds at the time of the issuance and implementation of the
501abovesaid Executive Order.
502
503Ruling:
504

If the newly created office has substantially new, different or additional functions,

505duties or powers, so that it may be said in fact to create an office different from the one
506abolished, even though it embraces all or some of the duties of the old office it will be
507considered as an abolition of one office and the creation of a new or different one. The same
508is true if one office is abolished and its duties, for reasons of economy are given to an
509existing officer or office.
510

511

Executive Order No. 649 was enacted to improve the services and better

512systematize the operation of the Land Registration Commission. A reorganization is carried


513out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient.
514To this end, the requirement of Bar membership to qualify for key positions in the NALTDRA
515was imposed to meet the changing circumstances and new development of the times.
516Private respondent Garcia who formerly held the position of Deputy Register of Deeds II did
517not have such qualification. It is thus clear that she cannot hold any key position in the
518NILTDRA. The additional qualification was not intended to remove her from office. Rather, it
519was a criterion imposed concomitant with a valid reorganization measure.
520
521
522Reasons for creation of administrative agencies
523
524Lianga Bay Logging, Inc. vs. Judge Enage 16 July 1987
525Ruling:
526

As recently stressed by the Court, "in this era of clogged court dockets, the

527need for specialized administrative boards or commissions with the special knowledge,
528experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or
529essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has
530become well nigh indispensable.
531
532
533Solid Homes vs. Payawal 29 August 1989
534Ruling:
535

As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary

536to create more and more administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified
537activities. Specialized in the particular fields assigned to them, they can deal with the

538problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature
539or the courts of justice.
540
541Reyes vs. Caneba
542Ruling:
543

"(T)he thrust of the related doctrines of primary administrative jurisdiction and

544exhaustion of administrative remedies is that courts must allow administrative agencies to


545carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of
546their respective competence. Acts of an administrative agency must not casually be
547overturned by a court, and a court should as a rule not substitute its judgment for that of the
548administrative agency acting within the perimeters of its own competence."
549
550Blue Bar Coconut Phil. Vs Tantuico 29 July 1988
551Ruling:
552

The petitioners also question the respondents' authority to audit them. They contend

553that they are outside the ambit of respondents' "audit" power which is confined to
554government-owned or controlled corporations. This argument has no merit. Section 2 (1) of
555Article IX-D of the Constitution provides that "The Commission on Audit shall have the
556power, authority and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the
557revenues and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in
558trust by or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
559instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporation with original
560charters, and on a post-audit basis.
561x x x
562(d) Such nongovernmental entities receiving subsidy or equity directly or indirectly from or
563through the Government which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to

564such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity." (Italics supplied) The Constitution formally
565embodies the long established rule that private entities who handle government funds or
566subsidies in trust may be examined or audited in their handling of said funds by government
567auditors.
568
569
570
571

CHAPTER II

572

POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

573
574
575A. Powers IN GENERAL
576B. EXPRESS AND IMPIED
577
578
579C. MINISTERIAL AND DISCRETIONARY POWERS
580
581Ministerial Power
582
583Definitions:
584Ministerial Power: It is a power exercised in response to a duty as imposed by law and its
585performance does not depend upon the discretion if the administrative agency involved or of
586the administrative officers performing said powers. (Suarez, 2001)
587
588Some jurisprudential definitions of ministerial power are as follows:
589Symaco vs. Aquino,

590A purely ministerial act or duty to a discretional act, is one which an officer or tribunal
591performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the
592mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment,
593upon the propriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer,
594and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty
595is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of
596official discretion nor judgment.
597Cario vs. Capulong,
598A ministerial duty is one which is so clear and specific as to leave no room for the
599exercise of discretion in its performance. On the other hand, a discretionary duty is
600that which by nature requires the exercise of judgment.
601Asuncion vs. De Yriarte,
602Simply because the duties of an official happen to be ministerial, it does not
603necessarily follow that he may not, in the administration of his office, determine
604questions of law.
605
606Ministerial duty distinguished from discretionary power
607
Ministerial Duty
Discretionary Power
Purely ministerial act/duty
Clear and specific as to Requires the exercise of An officer or tribunal performs in
leave

no

room

for

the judgment.

a given state of facts, in a

exercise of discretion in its

prescribed

manner,

in

performance.

obedience to the mandate of


legal authority, without regard to
or the exercise of his own

judgment, upon the propriety of


the act done.
Requires

neither

the Law imposes a duty upon

exercise of official discretion a public officer and gives


nor judgment.

him the right to decide how


or when the duty shall be

Remedy : Mandamus

performed.
Petition for certiorari

608
609IMPORTANCE: To determine what remedy may be availed of by an aggrieved party against
610the non-performance of duty by the officer.
611
612Carino vs. Capulong 222 SCRA 593
613Facts:
614

The petitioner filed the present case to annul the order issued by the

615respondent Judge and prevent the same in conducting further hearing thereof. AMA
616Computer College situated in Davao city operated as an Educational Institution
617without the required authorization that must be secured first before the DECS. As a
618consequence thereof, the DECS issued an order for the closure of the said school
619with the aid of the military as per agreement of the two governmental agencies. The
620private respondent filed a case before the RTC Davao to enjoin DECS from
621implementing the said closure pending the approval of the request to operate of the
622said school. The said request was denied by the DECS for not complying the
623requirements prescribed by the Department. The said case was dismissed,
624undaunted the private respondent appeal before the CA which later affirmed the
625decision of the lower court. The private respondent then filed a petition before the
626RTC of Makati with the same cause of action now using the organization of the
627parents of their students. The said court presided by the respondent Judge issued
628the preliminary injunction sought by the private respondent. Hence, this petition. The

629private respondent contended that the same should be permitted to operate because
630DECS is only performing a ministerial power over the circumstance. The DECS on
631the other hand contended that it exercises a discretionary power in pursuant to the
632provisions of law with respect to educational institutions.
633
634Issue: Whether or not the public petitioner exercised ministerial or discretionary
635function.
636Ruling:
637

The SC ruled that the public petitioner exercised discretionary power with

638respect to the issuance of permit to operate as an educational institution. The Court


639further distinguished ministerial and discretionary powers. A purely ministerial act or
640duty to a discretional act, is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state
641of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority,
642without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment, upon the propriety of the act
643done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to
644decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is ministerial only when
645the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor
646judgment.
647
648Accordingly, the granting of license to operate is vested upon the judgment of the
649DECS in securing the quality education that an educational institution should provide
650pursuant to the constitutional provision on education and the organic law authorizing
651said department to issue rules and regulations pertinent thereto.
652
653
654Mateo vs. CA 196 SCRA 280
655Facts:

656

Petitioners filed an action for the recovery of a parcel of land. RTC ruled in

657favor the petitioner. Issued execution of judgment for private respondent. Petitioner
658filed relief from judgment. Judge denied petition for relief from judgment. Petitioner
659filed mandamus.
660
661Issue: Whether or not granting of the petition for relief from judgment is ministerial?
662Ruling:
663

Ministerial duty in granting appeal. But deciding on judging on the appeal is

664discretionary.
6651.

Ministerial duty, defined - is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a

666given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal


667authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment (remedy mandamus)
6682.

Discretionary power, defined - If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer,

669and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed (remedy
670certiorari)
6713.

Importance of knowing distinction to determine the remedies available

6724.

Delegation of ministerial and discretionary power

673
674
675Discretionary power
676
677Definitions:
678Discretionary Power: This is the power of administrative agencies to act officially on certain
679cases referred to them according to the dictates of their own judgment and conscience and
680not controlled by the judgment or conscience of others. (Suarez, 2001)
681
682Some jurisprudential definitions of ministerial power are as follows:

683Asuncion vs. De Yriarte,


684Discretion, it may be said generally, is a faculty conferred upon a court or other
685official by which he may decide a question either way and still be right. The power
686conferred upon the division of archives with respect to the registration of articles of
687incorporation is not of that character. It is of the same character as the determination
688of a lawsuit by a court upon the merits. It can be decided only one way correctly.
689Meralco Securities Corp vs. Savellano,
690"Discretion," when applied to public functionaries, means a power or right conferred
691upon them by law of acting officially, under certain circumstances, uncontrolled by the
692judgment or consciences of others. A purely ministerial act or duty in contradiction to
693a discretional act is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts,
694in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without
695regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the
696act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to
697decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not
698ministerial.
699
700Binamira vs. Ramos,
701An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to another, the
702presumption being that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to
703exercise that judgment and discretion, and unless the power to substitute another in
704his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another.
705Republic vs. Capulong,

706(d)iscretion when applied to public functionaries, means a power or right conferred


707upon them by law of acting officially, under certain circumstances, uncontrolled by the
708judgment or conscience of others. A purely ministerial act or duty in contradiction to a
709discretional act is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in
710a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard
711to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act
712done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide
713how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not
714ministerial.
715People vs. Quibate,
716But such "discretion" afforded a judge means sound discretion exercised, not
717arbitrarily or willfully, but with regard to what is right and equitable under
718the circumstances and the law, and directed by the judge's reason and conscience to
719just result
720
721D. MANDATORY AND PERMISSIVE DUTIES AND POWERS
722Generally
723
724The question as to whether a duty or power vested in an official or administrative agency is
725mandatory or permissive depends upon the kind of the statute which granted such power.
726
727Statutes may be classified either mandatory or directory. The classification is important in
728resolving the question of what effect should be given to the mandate of a statute.
729
7302.16 Mandatory and directory power or duties, generally.
731

7321.

Mandatory/prohibitory statute, defined and effect

733Sarina vs. CFI of Bukidnon 24 SCRA 715


734Ruling: A mandatory statute is a statute which commands either positively that
735something be done, or performed in a particular way, or negatively that something be
736not done, leaving the person concerned no choice on the matter except to obey.
737
7382.

Permissive/directory statute, defined and effect

739
740Meralco Securities Corp. vs. Savellano 117 SCRA 804
741Facts: This case sought to set aside and annul the writ of mandamus issued by
742Judge Savellano, ordering petitioner Meralco Securities Corporation to pay and
743petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue to collect from the former the amount of
74451M by way of alleged deficiency corporate income tax, plus interests and
745surcharges due thereon and to pay private respondents 25% of the total amount
746collectible as informers reward.
747Issue: Whether or not the writ of mandamus is correct.
748Ruling: Thus, after the Commissioner who is specifically charged by law with the
749task of enforcing and implementing the tax laws and the collection of taxes has after
750a mature and thorough study rendered his decision or ruling that no tax is due or
751collectible, and his decision is sustained by the Secretary, now Minister of Finance
752(whose act is that of the President unless reprobated), such decision or ruling is a
753valid exercise of discretion in the performance of official duty and cannot be
754controlled much less reversed by mandamus. A contrary view, whereby any stranger
755or informer would be allowed to usurp and control the official functions of the
756Commissioner of Internal Revenue would create disorder and confusion, if not chaos
757and total disruption of the operations of the government.
758

759Agpalo: A directory statute is a statue which is permissive or discretionary in nature and


760merely outlines the act to be done in such a way that no injury can result from ignoring it or
761that its purpose can be accomplished in a manner other that prescribed and substantially the
762same result obtained.
763
764
7652.17 When mandatory or discretionary
766
767

There is no universal rule by which directory provisions in a statute may in all

768circumstances be distinguished from those which are mandatory. In the determination of this
769question, the primary object is to ascertain legislative intent.
770
771

In Taada vs. Vuenco, Words of permissive character may be given a mandatory

772significance in order to effect the legislative intent, and, when the terms of a statute are such
773that they cannot be made effective to the extent of giving each and all of them some
774reasonable operation, without construing the statute as mandatory, such construction should
775be given;
776
777Test to determine nature of statute and that of power.
778
779

The test generally employed to determine whether a statute is mandatory or directory

780or that of the power vested by it is to ascertain the consequences that will follow in case
781what the statute requires is not done or what it forbids is performed.
782
783
784E. ERRORS IN EXERCISE OF POWERS

785
786

Government not bound by errors of public officers.

787The government can do no wrong. It authorizes only legal acts by its officers. Its officers and
788agents do wrong or commit unauthorized acts. And when they do, they are not errors or acts
789of the government.
790
791

Doctrine of non-suability of the state inapplicable the state cannot be sued

792without its consent.


793
794Shauf vs. CA, 191 SCRA 713
795Facts: Petitioner was applying for a position for guidance counselor in a school (navy
796based) which was denied even though she was qualified. Filed a case against the
797military officials concerned because of discrimination. The military invoked the non798suability of the state.
799Issue: Whether or not the non-suability clause applies.
800Ruling: The principle of non-suability does not apply because the petitioner is
801questioning the personal judgment or discretion of the officials not their office by
802virtue of their official capacity.
803
804
805
806Government is not stopped by mistakes of officers.
807

Government can subsequently correct the mistake or the erroneous application of the

808law.
809
810Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. CTA 234 SCRA 348
811Ruling : Illegal or invalid acts which are in excess of the jurisdiction of administrative
812agency cannot bind the government, therefore estoppels does not apply.

813
814Presumption of regularity.
815

Government officials are presumed to perform their functions with regularity and

816strong evidence is necessary to rebut this presumption.


817
818
819Blue Bar Coconut vs. Tantuico 163 SCRA 716
820Facts:
821

The President issued PD 232 creating the Philippine Coconut Authority and

822established a coconut stabilization fund. The members were originally 11 but reduced
823to 7. Thereafter, respondent chairman of the coconut authority initiated a special
824coconut end-user companies which included the petitioner. The chairman directed to
825collect short levies and overpriced subsidies to apply the same to settlement of short
826levies should they fail to pay. COA agreed to release the subsidy provided they post
827a bond equal to the amount of the disputed claim. Petitioner contended that it is
828unacceptable that the COA Chairman and Auditor had no jurisdiction. They caused
829the withholding of the subsidy case endorsed to the court.
830
831Issue: Whether or not respondent COA chairman may disregard the PCA rules and
832decision had became moot.
833
834Ruling:
835

The legal presumption is that official duty has been duly performed; and it is

836'particularly strong as regards administrative agencies x x vested with powers said to


837be quasi-judicial in nature, in connection with the enforcement of laws affecting
838particular fields of activity, the proper regulation and/or promotion of which requires a
839technical or special training, 'aside from a good knowledge and grasp of the overall
840conditions, relevant to said fields, containing in the nation. The consequent policy

841and practice underlying our Administrative Law is that courts of justice should respect
842the findings of fact of said administrative agencies, unless there is absolutely no
843evidence in support thereof or such evidence is clearly, manifestly and patently
844insubstantial.
845
846Acts done by an official are presumed to be valid.
847

CHAPTER III

848

POWER OF CONTROL, SUPERVISION AND INVESTIGATION

849
850
851A. PRESIDENT AS CHIEF EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER
852
853EXECUTIVE POWER OF THE PRESIDENT
854The President is the Chief Administrative Officer of the Government. While the Constitution
855does not expressly say so, he has that position by reason of his being Chief Executive and
856head of the government. He welds all administrative powers that inhere in such position.
857Administrative power is an adjunct and is designed to complement the effective exercise of
858executive power, vested in the President.
859
860
861Article VII Section I
862The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.
863
864Marcos v. Manglapus
865The inevitable question arises by enumerating certain powers of the President. Did
866the framers of the Constitution intend that the President shall exercise those specific
867powers and no other? Are these enumerated powers the breadth and scope of
868executive power?

869It would not be accurate, however, to state that executive power is the power to enforce
870laws, for the President is the head if state as well as head of the government and whatever
871powers herein in such position pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it.
872Furthermore the Constitution itself provides that the execution of laws is only one of the
873powers of the President.
874Corollary, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to specific powers
875enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of
876specific powers enumerated.
877
878 PRESIDENT'S POWER OF CONTROL
879Section 17, Article VII The President shall have control of all executive departments,
880bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
881
882 the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in
883the performance of his duties and to substitute his judgment with that of the latter.
884
885 the presidents power of control over the executive branch extends to all executive officers
886from cabinet to secretary to the lowliest clerk in the executive department.
887 the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by
888law in the officers of executive departments, bureaus or offices of the national government,
889as well as to the act in lieu of such officers.
890
891
892Araneta v. Gatmaitan
893

The legality of the President's issuance of an executive order banning fishing by trawl

894was questioned because the Secretary of Agriculture, and not the President, was the official
895authorized by Congress to issue rules and regulations to implement the ban on trawl fishing.
896In sustaining the legality of the executive order, the Supreme Court ruled that since the

897Secretary of Agriculture was empowered to regulate or ban fishing by trawl, the President in
898the exercise of power of control can take over from him such authority and issue the
899executive order to exercise it. The President's power of control means that if a cabinet
900secretary or a head of a bureau or agency can issue rules and regulations, as authorized by
901law, the President has the power not only to modify or amend the same but can also
902supplant the rules by another set entirely different from those issued by his subordinate.
903The President exercises the power of control through executive departments and executive
904officials. Under the Constitution, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts
905of the executive department, the heads of various executive departments are assistants and
906agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive 'is required
907by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that
908he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief
909Executive are performed by and through the executive department secretaries as his alter
910egos, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in
911the regular course of business, are unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive
912, preemptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
913
914 the President's power of control includes the power to detail an executive officer in the
915office, without any prior approval from any executive officer, as long as there is no reduction
916of rank or salary and is not considered as disciplinary action.
917
918Tecson v. Salas
919

Hence, the act of the President cannot be countermanded by a secretary who is a

920mere subordinate of the President nor can a subordinate of the department of secretary
921disregard his superior's altering his action in the performance of his function as the
922department secretary, who has power of control over him, act as the President's alter-ego
923and his action is presumed to be that of the President.
924

925 DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED POLITICAL AGENCY


926 the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and
927in person, and there is need for him to delegate some of them to his cabinet members.
928 under this doctrine, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
929Executive Department, the heads of various executive department assistants and agents of
930Chief Executive.
931 the Presidents power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the
932Cabinet who, in turn and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their
933respective jurisdiction in the executive departments. The acts of the department Secretary
934are presumed to be the acts of the President.
935
936

Limitations on the President's control power

937 the abolition or creation of an executive office


938 the suspension or removal of career executive officials or employees without due process
939of law
940 the setting aside, modification, or supplanting of decisions of quasi-judicial agencies
941including that of the Office of the President on contested cases that have become final
942pursuant to law or to rules and regulations promulgated to implement the law
943
944

Presidents power of supervision

945 Supervision is a lesser power than control. The power of supervision does not allow the
946superior to annul the acts of the subordinate.
947 the power to see that the officials concerned perform their duties and if they later fail or
948neglect to fulfill them, take such action or steps as prescribed by law to make them perform
949their duties.
950
951 Ordinance Power

952 the President's ordinance power is the Executive's rule-making authority in implementing
953or executing constitutional or statutory power.
954
955 Executive Orders- acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent
956character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be
957promulgated in executive orders.
958 Administrative Orders- acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of the
959governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be
960promulgated in administrative orders.
961 Proclamations- acts of the President fixing a date of declaring a status or condition of
962public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation or a specific law or
963regulation is made to depend, shall have the force of an executive order.
964 Memorandum orders- acts of the President on matters of administrative detail or of
965subordinate or temporary interest which only concern a particular officer or office of the
966government shall be embodied in memorandum orders.
967 Memorandum circulars- acts of the President on matters relating to internal administration
968which the President desires to bring the attention of all or some departments, agencies,
969bureau or offices of the government, for information or for compliance.
970 General or special orders- acts and commands of the President in his capacity as
971Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be issued as general or
972special orders.
973
974 Power over aliens
975
976 Section 8. Power to Deport. The President shall have the power to deport aliens subject to
977the requirements of due process.

978 Section 9. Power to Change Non-Immigrant Status of Aliens. The President subject to the
979provisions of the law, shall have the power to change the status of non-immigrants by
980allowing them to acquire permanent residence status without necessity of visa.
981
982 Section 10. Power to Countermand Decisions of the Board of Commissioners of the
983Bureau of Immigration. The decision of the board of Commissioners which has jurisdiction
984over all deportation cases shall become final and executor after 30 days from promulgation,
985unless within such period the President shall order the contrary.
986 Section 11. Power Over Aliens under the General Principles of International Law. The
987President shall exercise the respect to aliens in the Philippines such powers are recognized
988by the generally accepted principles of international law.
989
990
991 Powers of Eminent Domain, Escheat, Land Reservation and Recovery of Ill- gotten
992Wealth
993 Section 12. Power of Eminent Domain. The President shall determine when it is
994necessary or advantageous to exercise the power of eminent domain in behalf of the
995National Government and direct the Solicitor General, whenever he deems the action
996advisable , to institute expropriation proceedings as the proper court.
997 Section 13. Power to Direct Escheat or Reversion Proceedings. The President shall direct
998the Solicitor General to institute escheat or reversion proceedings over all lands transferred
999or assigned to persons disqualified under the Constitution to acquire land.
1000 Section 14. Power to reserve lands of the public and private domain of the government.
1001(1.) The President shall have the power to reserve for settlement or public use, and for
1002specific public purposes, any of the lands of the public domain, the use of which is not
1003otherwise directed by law. The reserve land shall thereafter remain subject to the specific
1004public purpose indicated until otherwise provided by law or proclamation.

1005(2.) He shall also have the power reserve from sale or other disposition and for specific
1006public uses or purposes, any land belonging to the private domain of the Government, or
1007any of the friar lands, the use of which is not otherwise directed by law and thereafter such
1008land shall be used for the purposes specified by such proclamation until otherwise provided
1009by law.
1010 Section 15. Power over Ill-gotten Wealth. The President shall direct the Solicitor General
1011to institute proceedings to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or
1012employees from their nominees or transferees.
1013Within the period fixed in or any extension thereof authorized by the Constitution, the
1014President shall have the authority to recover all ill-gotten properties.
1015
1016
1017 Power of Appointment
1018 Nature
1019

Basically executive

1020

Prerogative of the appointing power

1021 Kinds of Appointments


1022

Regular- requires the confirmation of CA

1023

Ad interim- appointment takes effect immediately

1024

Recess- needs no confirmation by the CA

1025
1026 Section 16. Power of Appointment. The President shall exercise the power to appoint such
1027officials as provided for in the Constitution and laws.
1028 Section 17. Power to Issue Temporary Designation.
1029

(1.)The President may temporarily designate an officer already on the government

1030service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive
1031branch, appointment to which is vested in him by law, when (a.) The officer regularly

1032appointed to the office is unable to perform his duties by reason of illness, absence or any
1033other cause or (b.) There exists a vacancy.
1034

(2.) The person designated shall receive the compensation attached to the position,

1035unless he is already in the government service in which case he shall receive only such
1036additional compensation as, with his existing salary, shall not exceed the salary authorized
1037by law for the position filled. The compensation hereby authorized shall be paid out of the
1038funds appropriated for the office or agency concerned.
1039

(3.) In no case shall a temporary designation exceed 1 year.

1040
1041
1042 Other Powers
1043

B. POWER OF INVESTIGATION

1044 Notice and hearing in investigation


1045

If the law, upon which the investigation is authorized, provides that the person

1046investigated be given notice or accorded the opportunity to be heard, then such right cannot
1047be ignored nor he be denied notice and hearing without violating his right to due process.
1048

If the law is silent on the matter, notice and hearing depends upon the stage during

1049which investigation is conducted and the possible consequences to him of the outcome of
1050such investigation.
1051 Executive power of investigation
1052
1053

Evangelista v. Jarencio

1054

It has been essayed that the life blood of the administrative process is the flow fact,

1055the gathering, the organization and the analysis of evidence. Investigations are useful for all
1056administrative functions, not only for rule making, adjudication, and licensing but also for
1057prosecuting, for supervising and directing, and for purposes no more specific than
1058illuminating obscure areas to find out what if anything should be done. An administrative
1059agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only in proceedings of legislative or

1060judicial nature, but also in proceeding whose sole purpose is to obtain information upon
1061which future action of a legislative or judicial nature may be taken and may require the
1062attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct
1063general inquiries into evils calling for correction, and to report findings to appropriate bodies
1064and make recommendations for action.
1065

The Presidents investigatory power emanates from his power of supervision and

1066control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices; his power of supervision over
1067local government units; and his power of appointment of presidential appointees, which are
1068conferred upon him by the Constitution.
1069
1070 Inquisitive Power, which is known as examining or investigatory power, is one of the
1071determinative powers of an administrative body which better enables it to exercise quasi1072judicial authority. This power allows the administrative body to inspect the records and
1073premises and investigate the activities, of persons or entities coming under its jurisdiction, or
1074require disclosure of information by means of accounts, records, reports, testimony of
1075witnesses, production of documents or otherwise.
1076
1077 Investigatory power as main function
1078

An investigatory body with the sole power of investigation does not exercise judicial

1079functions and its power is limited to investigating the facts and making findings in respect
1080thereto. The test whether an administrative body is exercising judicial functions or merely
1081investigatory functions is;
1082adjudication signifies the exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and
1083obligations of the parties before it.
1084 if the only purpose of investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted before it based on
1085facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final
1086pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is absence of judicial discretion and
1087judgment.

1088
1089
1090
1091
1092
1093

CHAPTER IV

1094

QUASI - LEGISLATIVE POWER

1095
1096
1097A. Legislative Power as General
1098
1099Legislative power is the power to make, alter and repeal laws.
1100

- is vested in the Congress

1101
1102Separation of Powers prohibits the delegation of purely and inherently legislative power.
1103Such power consists generally of what the law shall be, to whom it may be applied, or what
1104acts are necessary to effectuate the law.
1105
1106EXCEPTION: may delegate as to how the law shall be enforced, to issue rules to fill in
1107details, to ascertain facts on which the law will operate to exercise police power and to fix
1108rates.
1109
1110Administrative Rule-Making is the power to promulgate rules and regulations or general
1111orders which are legally binding and receive statutory force upon going into effect.
1112
1113Distinctions between Quasi-legislative power or rule making and quasi-judicial or
1114adjudication

11151.) The rules and regulations issued in the exercise of RULE-MAKING POWER are of
1116general applicability issued by the administrative agency to implement its purely
1117administrative policies and functions. ADJUDICATION means a determination of rights and
1118privileges and duties by an administrative agency resulting in a decision or order which
1119applies to specific situations or to specific persons or entities and is premised on a finding of
1120facts or on a report of it
11212.) The issuance of rules and regulations in the exercise by an administrative agency of its
1122QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWER does not require notice and hearing. While ADJUDICATION
1123requires notice and hearing or at least the opportunity to be heard on the port of the affected
1124person as a prerequisite for the validity of its decision.
1125
11263 Types of rule-making power
11271.) Rule-making by reason of particular delegation of authority
11282.) Rule-making by the construction and interpretation of a statute being administered
11293.) Determination of facts under a delegated power as to which a statute shall go into effect.
1130
1131B. Delegation of Legislative Power
1132
1133Delegation of legislative power refers to the grant of authority by the legislature to
1134administrative agencies to issue rules and regulations concerning how the law entrusted to
1135them for implementations may be enforced.
1136Power of subordinate legislation is the delegated authority to issue rules and regulations
1137to carry out the provisions of the statute which have the force and effect of law.
1138Reason: The increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing inability
1139of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attentions.
1140
1141
1142Test to determine validity of delegation

11431.) Completeness Test the law must be complete in all its items and conditions when it
1144leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do
1145is enforce it.
1146
11472.) Sufficient Standard Test there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
1148map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running
1149riot. Standard may be express or implied.
1150
1151Regulations cannot restrict nor enlarge the law
1152 > Pelaez v. Auditor General
1153The authority to create municipal corporations is essentially and eminently legislative in
1154nature since they are purely creatures of the statute.
1155
1156> People vs. Maceren (79 SCRA 450)
1157The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what
1158acts should constitute an offense. The Court ruled that the Secretary of Agriculture exceeded
1159his authority and the administrative order was devoid of legal basis because the Fisheries
1160Law did not expressly prohibit electro fishing.
1161
1162> Toledo v. Civil Service Commission
1163The CSC issued a regulation prohibiting the employment in the Civil Service a person who is
1164already 57 or more years of age, except with the prior consent of the Commission and the
1165appointee possesses special qualification and the vacancy cannot be filled by promotion of
1166qualified officers. As the civil service law which the Commission is tasked to implement does
1167not contain any such prohibition or qualification, the Supreme Court, in Toledo v. Civil
1168Service Commission, nullified said regulation.
1169
1170Rule must be reasonable

1171>Lupangco v. Court of Appeals


1172
1173PRC issued a resolution, which provides that no examinee (in licensure examinations in
1174accountancy) shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conduct by or
1175shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university,
1176or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of
1177any if the aforementioned or similar institutions during the three days immediately preceding
1178every examination day including the examination day. The Court declared such resolution
1179unconstitutional for being unreasonable and violative of academic freedom.
1180
1181
1182Prohibition against re-delegation; Exceptions
1183- Doctrine of potestas delegata non delegari protest what has been delegated cannot be
1184delegated.
1185- The delegation of this legislative power may be sustained only upon the ground that some
1186standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the delegation has
1187prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated power.
1188
1189Rate Fixing; When hearing is required
1190The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a legislative or
1191an adjudicative function (quasi-judicial).
1192
1193Legislative function the grant of a prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a
1194requirement of due process.
1195

- when the rules or the rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a

1196given kind throughout the Philippines,


1197
1198Adjudicative function prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates.

1199

- when the rules or the rates apply exclusively to a named person or

1200entity and are predicated upon a finding of facts, on the basis of which the rules or rates are
1201based
1202
1203C. Contemporary Construction
1204
1205Distinction between Administrative Rule and Interpretation.
1206Administrative rule when an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, in
1207the exercise of its rule-making power delegated to it by the legislature, makes a new law
1208with the force and effect of a valid law.
1209
1210Administrative interpretation When it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it
1211merely interprets a pre-existing law.
1212
1213Executive Construction, generally ; kinds of.
1214- is the construction placed upon the statute by an executive or administrative officer called
1215upon to execute or administer such statute.
1216
12173 Types of Executive interpretation of the law.
12181.) To implement the law. Either express or implied.
12192.) By the Secretary of Justice in his capacity as the chief legal advisor of the government. it
1220is in the form of opinions issued upon request of administrative or executive officials who
1221enforce the law.
12223.) is the interpretation handed down in an adversary proceeding in the form of a ruling by an
1223executive officer exercising quasi-judicial power.
1224
1225Forms of Interpretation
1226- Rules, circulars, opinions, and directives.

1227
1228Publication is not required.
1229- Rules which are merely interpretations of the law or of the regulations issued to implement
1230the law need not be published to be effective, the said interpretation not being considered as
1231law.
1232
1233Construction of rules and regulations
1234- Rules and regulations issued by executive or administrative officers pursuant to, and as
1235authorized by, law have the force and effects of laws.
1236
1237- An administrative body has the power to interpret its own rule and such interpretation
1238becomes part of the rule itself.
1239
1240
1241
1242B. Delegation of Legislative Power
1243
1244

The delegation of legislative power refers to the grant of authority by the legislature to

1245administrative agencies to issue rules and regulations concerning how the law entrusted to
1246them for implementation may be enforced.1 The reasons for the delegation of this power are:
1247the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing inability of the
1248legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention or in other
1249words, the three factors namely: the growing complexities of modern life, multiplication of
1250number of subjects leading government regulation, increase difficulties in administering laws.
1251The growth of the society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated
1252problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization
1253even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present11Agpalo, Administrative Law, Law on Public Officers and Election Law, 2005 Ed. P.62

1254day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide the direct and
1255efficacious or specific solution.
1256
1257

In the case of Solid Homes, Inc. vs.Payawal2, it held As a result of the growing

1258complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary to create more and more
1259administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the particular fields
1260assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be
1261expected from the legislature or the courts of justice. This is the reason for the increasing vesture of quasi1262legislative and quasi-judicial powers in what is now not unreasonably called the fourth department of the
1263government. Statues conferring powers on their administrative agencies must be liberally construed to
1264enable them to discharge their assigned duties in accordance with the legislative purpose.
1265
1266

However, In view of the doctrine of separation of powers, administrative agencies do

1267not possess legislative or judicial power in the strict sense, and such power may not be
1268delegated to them, except where otherwise provided by the Constitution. However, limited
1269power may be conferred to carry out the legislative purpose. 3 Further, it is said that the
1270essentials of legislative functions, namely, the determination of legislative policy and its
1271formulation and promulgation as a defined and binding rule of conduct, cannot be delegated
1272by the legislature.
1273
1274

In Eastern Shipping Lines VS. POEA4, whether the issuance of Memorandum

1275Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation of power. Supreme Court held that there was
1276valid delegation of powers. In questioning the validity of the memorandum circular, Eastern
1277Shipping Lines contended that POEA was given no authority to promulgate the regulation,
1278and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative
1279discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation. GENERAL RULE: Non22177 SCRA 72, 79 (1989)
33 De Leon, De Leon Jr , Administrative Law: Text and Cases, 2010 ed pp. 176-177
44166 SCRA 533

1280delegation of powers; exception. It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive


1281contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to
1282determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of
1283the latter subject tis a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or
1284surrendered by the legislature to the delegate. Two Tests of Valid Delegation of Legislative
1285Power There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of
1286legislative power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first
1287test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature
1288such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it.
1289Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map
1290out the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
1291Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate,
1292who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power
1293essentially legislative. Xxx The delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non1294delegation the exception.
1295
1296

The case of Tatad vs. Secretary of the Dept. of Energy5, the petitions challenge

1297the constitutionality of RA No. 8180 entitled An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil
1298Industry and For Other Purposes. The deregulation process has two phases: (a) the
1299transition phase (Aug. 12, 1996) and the (b) full deregulation phase (Feb. 8, 1997 through
1300EO No. 372).Sec. 15 of RA No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to
1301the President and the Sec. of Energy because it does not provide a determinate or
1302determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining when to implement the
1303full deregulation of the downstream oil industry, and the law does not provide any specific
1304standard to determine when the prices of crude oil in the world market are considered to be
1305declining nor when the exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered stable.
1306Whether or not sec. 15 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power.
55 81 SCRA 330,350-352 (1997)

1307The court ruled that Sec. 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient
1308standard test. RA No. 8180 provided that the full deregulation will start at the end of March
13091997 regardless of the occurrence of any event. Thus, the law is complete on the question of
1310the final date of full deregulation.Sec. 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of
1311the Presidenthe is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and
1312petroleum in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso to the
1313US dollar is considered stable.
1314
1315Test to determine validity of delegation
13161. The completeness of the statute making the delegation
1317

Completeness test to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of

1318legislative power states that the law must be complete in all its items and conditions when it
1319lives the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do
1320is to enforce it. Under this test, its completeness is necessary so that by appropriate judicial
1321review and control, any action taken pursuant to delegated authority may be kept within the
1322defined limits of the authority conferred.
1323

In the case of Pelaez vs. Auditor General6, this is where President (Marcos)

1324

issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities this is purportedly in pursuant to

1325

Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides that the President of the

1326

Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any

1327

province, sub-province, municipality, [township] municipal district or other political

1328

subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any

1329

province into one or more sub provincesThe VP Emmanuel Pelaez and a taxpayer

1330

filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be

1331

appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs are

1332

unconstitutional. He said that Sec 68 of the RAC has been impliedly repealed by Sec

1333

3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may not be created or their boundaries

66 15 SCRA 569 (1965)

1334

altered nor their names changed except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding

1335

provincial board upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected and

1336

the recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the

1337

proposed barrio is situated. Pelaez argues, accordingly: If the President, under this

1338

new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is

1339

composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities? The Auditor

1340

General countered that only barrios are barred from being created by the President.

1341

Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that t a municipality can be created

1342

without creating barrios. Existing barrios can just be placed into the new municipality.

1343

This theory overlooks, however, the main import of Pelaez argument, which is that

1344

the statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a

1345

negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists of

1346

several barrios. The question in this case is that whether Congress has delegated the

1347

power to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec 68 of the RAC. The court

1348

said that although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the

1349

power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is

1350

essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law:

1351

(a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed,

1352

carried out or implemented by the delegate

1353

limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the

1354

delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a

1355

statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such

1356

policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard,

1357

there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the

1358

delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.

1359
1360
1361

and (b) fix a standard the

In the case at bar, the power to create municipalities is eminently legislative in


character not administrative.

1362
1363
13642. The presence of a sufficient standard
1365

Under this test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the

1366boundaries of the delegate authority and prevent the delegation from running riot7.Sufficient
1367standard prescribed in EO. 797 Memorandum Circular no. 2 is one such administrative
1368regulation. The model contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number
1369of the cases without challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA in requiring the
1370model contract is not limited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the
1371exercise of the said authority. The standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which
1372in creating the POEA, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to fair
1373and equitable employment practices. 8
1374Sufficiency of Standards
1375

The sufficiency of a particular standard or limit governing the authority and discretion

1376of the administrative agency in effecting the policy of the legislature greatly depends upon
1377the nature of the power exercised and the nature of the right restricted by such power or
1378upon whether or not proper regulation or control requires the vesting of such discretion.
1379Further, Detailed standards are not required, especially in regulatory enactments under
1380police power. However, it must be noted that the personal judgment of the agency, where
1381unrestrained, is not standard or sufficient standard. Even when there had been laid down
1382broad standards, such are not sufficient if the statute expressly adds in the opinion of the
1383agency, or expressly confers policy-making power upon the agency.
1384
1385

As far as our court is concerned, they have laid down sufficient standards fair and

1386equitable employment practices as ruled in the case of Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs.
1387POEA; public interest stated in the case People vs. Rosenthal, as well as Justice and
77De Leon, De Leon Jr , Administrative Law: Text and Cases, 2010 ed p. 178 par.(5)
88166 SCRA 533

1388equity held in Antamok Gold Fields vs. CIR, also in the case of Calalang vs. Williams,
1389public convenience and welfare, simplicity economy and efficiency in Cervantes vs.
1390Auditor General.9
1391
1392

There has been that question whether the President, who under this new law cannot

1393even create a barrio, can create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since
1394barrios are units of municipalities. The court held in the case Cardona vs. Municipality of
1395Binangonan, such claim is untenable, for said case involved, not the creation of a new
1396municipality, but a mere transfer of territory from an already existing municipality
1397(Cardona) to another municipality (Binagonan), likewise, existing at the time of and prior to
1398said transfer. It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common boundary,
1399in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may
1400partake of an administrative nature involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways
1401to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities the authority to create municipal
1402corporations is essentially legislative in nature. In the language of other courts, it is strictly a
1403legislative function or solely and exclusively the exercise of legislative power
1404

Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to

1405fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to


1406forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in
1407itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented
1408by the delegate2 and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently
1409determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the
1410performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the
1411delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law;
1412and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with
1413reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his
99Agpalo, Administrative Law, Law on Public Officers and Election Law, 2005 Ed.p.68

1414authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the
1415law, but, also and this is worse to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with
1416the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of
1417separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently,
1418undermining the very foundation of our Republican system. Section 68 of the Revised
1419Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of
1420the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be
1421carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently
1422precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to.
1423
1424

The power of control under the provision Section 10 (1) of Article VII of the

1425Constitution implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as
1426may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the
1427national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the
1428Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to
1429the latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking
1430whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by
1431statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments, so long
1432as the same or its officers act Within the scope of their authority. He may not enact an
1433ordinance which the municipal council has failed or refused to pass, even if it had thereby
1434violated a duty imposed thereto by law, although he may see to it that the corresponding
1435provincial officials take appropriate disciplinary action therefor. Neither may he vote, set
1436aside or annul an ordinance passed by said council within the scope of its jurisdiction, no
1437matter how patently unwise it may be. He may not even suspend an elective official of a
1438regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a
1439decision

of

the

corresponding

provincial

board.

1440Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect,
1441remove any of its officials, by creating a new municipality and including therein the

1442barrio in which the official concerned resides, for his office would thereby become
1443vacant. Thus, by merely brandishing the power to create a new municipality (if he had
1444it), without actually creating it, he could compel local officials to submit to his
1445dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising over them the power of control denied to him
1446by the Constitution.
1447
1448

But it must be remembered that the standard fixed cannot be enlarged nor restricted.

1449In the case of Tatad vs. Secretary of Energy, Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional. The
1450SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180 because it violated Sec 19 of Art 12 of the
1451Constitution. It violated that provision because it only strengthens oligopoly which is contrary
1452to free competition. It cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and
1453controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the
1454only major league players in the oil market. All other players belong to the Lilliputian league.
1455As the dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various
1456capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their immense benefit. Yet, this is
1457only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in the heart of their
1458competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New players that intend to
1459equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own will
1460have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them
1461will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be
1462competing on an uneven field. The argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable
1463because it will induce prospective players to invest in refineries puts the cart before the
1464horse. The first need is to attract new players and they cannot be attracted by burdening
1465them with heavy disincentives. Without new players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell
1466and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry is an idle dream.
1467

RA 8180 is unconstitutional on the ground inter alia that it discriminated against the

1468new players insofar as it placed them at a competitive disadvantage vis--vis the

1469established oil companies by requiring them to meet certain conditions already being
1470observed by the latter.
1471

An example where standard is insufficient is the case,Ynot vs. IAC10 where There

1472had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To
1473strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of
1474carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. So, the law was
1475contested whether it is valid or not. According to the Supreme Court, the EO is not valid as it
1476indeed violates due process. EO 626-A treated a presumption based on the judgment of the
1477executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a
1478subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and
1479explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC
1480 found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the
1481method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of
1482the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the
1483property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately
1484condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to
1485adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and
1486militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid
1487delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited
1488discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
1489
1490Issues on validity of delegation
1491

Solicitor General vs. MMA11, The Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance

1492No. 11, authorizing itself "to detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/
1493abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila."
1494The Court issued a resolution requiring the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the SolGen to
1010 GR No. 74457, March 20, 1987
1111 204 SCRA 837 (1991)

1495submit separate comments in light of the contradiction between the Ordinance and the SC
1496ruling. The MMA defended the ordinance on the ground that it was adopted pursuant to the
1497power conferred upon it by EO 32 (formulation of policies, promulgation of resolutions). The
1498Sol Gen expressed the view that the ordinance was null and void because it represented an
1499invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power. The flaw in the measure was that it violated
1500existing law, specifically PD 1605, which does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the
1501removal of license plates and the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations in
1502Metropolitan Manila. He made no mention, however, of the alleged impropriety of examining
1503the said ordinance in the absence of a formal challenge to its validity. The question is on the
1504ordinance whether Ordinance 11 is justified on the basis of the General Welfare Clause
1505embodied in the LGC. The court decided that is unjustifiable under the General Welfare
1506Clause.
1507 The Court holds in this case that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to
1508promulgate such measures, it appearing that the requisites of such delegation are present.
1509These requisites are. 1) the completeness of the statute making the delegation; and 2) the
1510presence of a sufficient standard.---1511

The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as

1512agents of the national legislature. Necessarily, the acts of these agents must reflect and
1513conform to the will of their principal. To test the validity of such acts in the specific case now
1514before us, we apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the
1515accepted principles governing municipal corporations. According to Elliot, a municipal
1516ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be
1517unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may
1518regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with
1519public policy.
1520

A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under

1521consideration do not pass the first criterion because they do not conform to existing law. The
1522pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the

1523confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There
1524is nothing in the following provisions of the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila
1525Commission to impose such sanctions. In fact, the provisions prohibit the imposition of such
1526sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The Commission was allowed to "impose fines and
1527otherwise discipline" traffic violators only "in such amounts and under such penalties as are
1528herein prescribed," that is, by the decree itself. Nowhere is the removal of license plates
1529directly imposed by the decree or at least allowed by it to be imposed by the Commission.
1530Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides that "in case of traffic violations, the driver's
1531license shall not be confiscated." These restrictions are applicable to the Metropolitan Manila
1532Authority and all other local political subdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila, including
1533the Municipality of Mandaluyong. `The requirement that the municipal enactment must
1534not violate existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by
1535virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature. They are mere
1536agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the
1537Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of
1538their principal. In the case before us, the enactments in question, which are merely local in
1539origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute. To
1540sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other ordinances amending and so
1541violating national laws in the guise of implementing them. Thus, ordinances could be passed
1542imposing additional requirements for the issuance of marriage licenses, to prevent bigamy;
1543the registration of vehicles, to minimize carnapping; the execution of contracts, to forestall
1544fraud; the validation of parts, to deter imposture; the exercise of freedom of speech, to
1545reduce disorder; and so on. The list is endless, but the means, even if the end be valid,
1546would be ultra vires. The measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of PD
15471605 but, worse, impose sanctions the decree does not allow and in fact actually prohibits.
1548In so doing, the ordinances disregard and violate and in effect partially repeal the law. We
1549here emphasize the ruling in the Gonong case that PD 1605 applies only to the Metropolitan
1550Manila area. It is an exception to the general authority conferred by R.A. No. 413 on the

1551Commissioner of Land Transportation to punish violations of traffic rules elsewhere in the


1552country with the sanction therein prescribed, including those here questioned. The Court
1553agrees that the challenged ordinances were enacted with the best of motives and shares the
1554concern of the rest of the public for the effective reduction of traffic problems in Metropolitan
1555Manila through the imposition and enforcement of more deterrent penalties upon
1556traffic violators. At the same time, it must also reiterate the public misgivings over the abuses
1557that may attend the enforcement of such sanction in eluding the illicit practices described
1558in detail in the Gonong decision. At any rate, the fact is that there is no statutory authority
1559for and indeed there is a statutory prohibition against the imposition of such penalties in the
1560Metropolitan Manila area. Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be impose by the
1561challenged enactments by virtue only of the delegated legislative powers. It is for Congress
1562to determine, in the exercise of its own discretion, whether or not to impose such sanctions,
1563either directly through a statute or by simply delegating authority to this effect to the local
1564governments in Metropolitan Manila. Without such action, PD 1605 remains effective
1565and continues prohibit the confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles (except under the
1566conditions prescribed in LOI 43) and of driver licenses as well for traffic violations
1567in Metropolitan Manila.
1568
1569Rules or Regulations Generally
1570
1571

Rules and regulation are the product of subordinate legislation. If valid, the rules and

1572regulations issued by the administrative agencies to implement the law have the force and
1573effect of a law. Until set aside, the rules are binding upon the executive and administrative
1574agency.
1575

In order to be valid, the administrative rules and regulations must be germane to the

1576objects and purpose of the law, conform to the standards that the law prescribes, must be
1577reasonable and must be related solely to carrying into effect the general provisions of the

1578law.12 A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is
1579followed and its scope is within the statute granted by the legislature, even if the courts do
1580not agree with the policy stated therein.13
1582Regulations cannot Restrict nor Enlarge the Law
1583
1584

The rule is that an Administrative agency cannot add to or detract from the provisions

1585of the law it is designed to implement. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative
1586authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law they
1587are intended to carry into effect. They cannot widen its scope. These agencies cannot
1588amend an act of Congress.
1589
1590Rules must be reasonable
1591
1592

In the case of Lupangco vs. CA14, it is ruled by the court that the resolution of the

1593PRC providing examinees of the CPA board examination shall not attend any review class,
1594briefing, conference or the like conduct by, or shall receive any handout, review material, or
1595any tip from any school, college or university or any review center or the like during the
1596three day immediate preceding every examination day including examination day, was
1597unconstitutional for being unreasonable and violative of academic freedom.
1598

As explained in this case, it is an axiom in administrative law that administrative

1599authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations.
1600To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adopted to secure the
1601end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are
1602authorized to be issued then they must be held invalid.

1212Vda. De Penida vs. Pena, 187 SCRA 161 (1994)


1313Tayug Rural Bank vs. Central Bank 146 SCRA 120 (1986)
1414 GR no. 77372, April 29, 1988

1603

On the other hand, the rules issued by the administrative agency to carry out the law

1604must be germane to its proper object. The general rule is that the power to reorganize
1605executive offices granted by the law to reorganization commission does not include vesting
1606an administrative body the quasi-judicial authority to adjudicate certain claims which
1607ordinarily come within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
1608

However, there is the so called restriction on grant of judicial power. The doctrine of

1609separation of powers of government also operates to restrict the exercise of judicial functions
1610to administrative agencies. Since the legislature cannot exercise judicial functions, it
1611certainly is precluded from delegating the exercise of judicial functions to administrative
1612agencies or officers. However, it is recognized that some judicial powers may be conferred
1613and exercise by an administrative agency without violating any provisions of the law. Such
1614that this judicial power is a restricted one, limited only to what is incidental and reasonably
1615necessary to the proper and efficient administration of the statutes that are committed to
1616them for administration.
1617
1618Rules constituting an offense
1619
1620The administrative tasked to execute the law has no power to penalize violation of its rules
1621and regulation where the law does not provide the violation of such rules and even it does
1622not prescribe the penalty for such violation. The case of People vs. Maceren, the court ruled
1623that the Secretary of Agriculture exceeded his authority and the administrative order was
1624devoid of legal basis because the fisheries law did not expressly prohibit electro fishing.
1625When Rules take effect? Take note on the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera15, where the Court
1626ruled that Section 2 of the Civil Code provides that Laws shall take effect after fifteen days
1627following their completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless otherwise it is
1628provided. Covered by This rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated
1629by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly
1515 146 SCRA 446 (1986)

1630delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution.


1631Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to
1632enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
1633
1634

Exception on the Prohibition against re-delegation is the doctrine of protestas

1635delegata non delegari protest or what has been delegated cannot be delegated. The doctrine
1636rests on the principle that a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty in
1637violation of the trust reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge it directly.
1638In case of delegation of a rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is
1639required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be
1640reasonable and just. However, even in the absence of an express requirement as to
1641reasonableness, this standard may be implied.16
1642Likewise, it has been held that the authority given by the LTFRB, the regulatory body with
1643delegated power to fix rates of public utilities, to provincial bus operators to set a fare range
1644over and above the authorized existing fare and illegal and invalid, as it is tantamount to an
1645undue delegation of legislative authority- protestas delegata non delegari protest.17
1646
1647
1648
1649C. Contemporary Construction
1650Administrative rule and interpretation distinguished
1651

When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulation, it makes a new law with

1652the force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of
1653policy; it merely interprets a pre-existing law. The rules promulgated pursuant to law are
1654binding on the courts, even if innate wisdom. On the other hand, administrative interpretation
1655of the law is best merely advisory, for it is the courts that determines what the law means.
1616De Leon, De Leon Jr , Administrative Law: Text and Cases, 2010 ed. p.179 par (8)
1717De Leon, De Leon Jr , Administrative Law: Text and Cases, 2010 ed. p.179/ Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center
18vs. Garcia Jr. 239 SCRA 386 (1994)

1656

A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is

1657followed its scope is within the statutory authority granted by legislature even not the
1658agreement with the policy stated therein or in its innate wisdom.(Davis, op. cit., 195-197)
1659
1660Executive Construction; its kind
1661

The duty of enforcing the law necessarily calls for the interpretation of its ambiguous

1662provision. The executive and the administrative officer generally the very first interpret the
1663law, preparatory to its enforcements.
1664

1665 The three types of Executive Interpretation:


1666The construction by an executive or administrative officer directly called implementation.
1667

-A practice or a mode of enforcement of not applying the statute to certain situation or of

1668applying it in a particular manner is an implied interpretation.


1669
1670The construction by the Secretary of Justice in his capacity as the chief legal adviser of
1671the government.
1672

-In the form of opinions issued upon request of administrative or executive officials who

1673enforce the law.


1674

1675The interpretation handed down in an adversary proceeding in the form of a ruling by the
1676executive officer exercising quasi-judicial power.
1677

-The court in a case pointed out the distinction between an interpretation by the executive

1678officer charged with the enforcement of a law and by handed down by an executive or
1679administrative official in an adversary proceeding: There is a basis for making such a
1680distinction because the position of a public officer, charged with the enforcement of a law, is
1681different from the one who must decide a dispute.
1682
1683Forms of interpretation

1684

The construction or interpretation by administrative or administrative agencies may take

1685many form, commonly comprehend with the term "administrative practice". The
1686administrative practice includes any formal or informal act of the administrative agency of a
1687previous judicial interpretation of a statute by the SC; the court will accord weight to
1688construction by administrative or executive departments of the government.
1689
1690Publication is not required.
1691

Rules which are merely interpretation of the law or of the regulations issued to implement

1692the law need not be published to be effective.


1693
1694Weight accorded to contemporaneous construction.
1695

GR, where there is doubt to the proper interpretation of a statute, the uniform construction

1696placed by the executive officer charged with bits enforcement will be adopted, if necessary to
1697resolve the doubt. Unless, it is shown to be clearly erroneous, contemporaneous
1698construction will control the interpretation of the statute by the court.
1699Construction of the rules and regulations.
1700

An administrative body has the power to interpret its own rule and such interpretation

1701becomes part of the rule itself. Unless shown to be erroneous, unreasonable or arbitrary
1702such interpretation is entitled to recognition and respect from the court. Moreover, the
1703dismissal of court suit of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies does not preclude the
1704aggrieved party from appealing the decision to the office of the secretary.
1705
1706Reason why contemporaneous construction is gives much weight.
1707

The contemporaneous construction is entitled to great weight because it comes from the

1708particular branch of government called upon to implement the law thus construed. In other
1709words, the factor leading the court to give the principle of contemporaneous construction
1710much weight are the respect due the governmental agency or official charged with the
1711implementation of the law, their competence expertness, experience, and informed

1712judgement, and the fact that they frequently are drafters of the law they interpret.
1713
1714Legislative approval of administrative construction.
1715

The legislative is presumed to have full knowledge of a contemporaneous or practical

1716construction of a statute by an administrative or executive officer charged with its


1717enforcement. The legislature may, by action or inaction, approve or ratify such
1718contemporaneous construction. It is an axiom of law that legislative ratification construction
1719is equivalent to mandate, in the Latin maxim, ratihabito acquiparatur mandate.
1720
1721Re-enactment by legislature.
1722

The principle of legislative approval by re-enactment stats that the re-enactment of the

1723statute, previously given a contemporaneous construction, is a persuasive indication of the


1724adoption by the legislature of the prior construction.
1725

The reason why such contemporaneous construction given much weight due to the fact

1726that there is an agreement between two department to the meaning of the law, and it
1727devolves upon the judiciary to give it a deferential treatment.
1728
1729When contemporaneous construction disregarded.
1730

The contemporaneous construction of a statute vis neither controlling nor binding upon

1731the court. The duty and power to interpret the law is vested upon the judicial branch. The
1732court may disregard the contemporaneous construction, when there is no ambiguity, clear
1733erroneous, where strong reason to the contrary exists and where the court gives previously
1734different interpretation. It is the role of the judiciary to refine and when necessary, to correct
1735the constitutional or statutory interpretation.
1736
1737Erroneous construction creates no rights; exception.
1738

An erroneous contemporaneous construction creates no vested right on the part of those

1739who relied upon, and followed such construction. A vested right may not arise from wrong

1740interpretation of a law by administrative officer whose primary duty is to enforce and not to
1741construe, the law. Consequently, those who benefited from the erroneous contemporaneous
1742construction may not prevent correction of such or excuse themselves from complying with
1743the construction as corrected; nor can they set up such error as legal obstacle against
1744recovery from them of what they have received pursuant to and on the basis of, the
1745erroneous application of law.
1746
1747
1748
1749
1750
1751
1752
1753
1754
1755
1756
1757
1758
1759
1760
1761
1762
1763
1764
1765
1766
1767

1768

CHAPTER V

1769

QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER

1770
1771
1772

A. IN GENERAL

1773
1774WHAT IS QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER?
1775

Quasi-judicial is defined as a term applied to the actions or discretions of public

1776administrative officers or bodies required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of


1777facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action, and
1778to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.18.
1779

This broad definition includes an official exercising quasi-judicial function short of that of

1780a judge, such as a public prosecutor.19 The quasi-judicial function becomes similar to that of
1781a judge when it goes further into adjudication or the determination of rights, privileges and
1782duties resulting in a decision or order which applies to a specific situation and becomes final
1783and executor after a certain period of time has expired.20
1784

Quasi-judicial function may refer to that of a public prosecutor who is said to be a quasi-

1785judicial officer because of the nature of his function, but his duty of conducting
1786preliminary investigation to determine the existence of probable cause, to file an
1787information in court and to prosecute the accused has been described as a principally
1788executive in nature and not quasi-judicial.
1789
1790WHAT IS QUASI-JUDICIAL BODY?

1918 1 Lupango v. CA, 160 SCRA 848 [1988]


2019 2. Cojuanco, Jr. v. PCGG, 190 SCRA 226 [1997]
2120 3. Carino v. Commission on Human Rights, 204 SCRA 483 [1991]

1791

Quasi-judicial body has been defined as an organ of government other than a

1792court and, other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either
1793adjudication or rule making.21
1794
1795THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-DOLLAR SALTING TASK FORCE vs. Honorable Court of
1796Appeals, Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc., et.al.
1797
1798GR. No. 83578, March 16, 1989, en banc (Sarmiento, J.)
1799
1800
1801FACTS:
1802

Presidential Anti-dollar Salting Task Force (PADS Task Force), headed by State

1803Prosecutor Jose Rosales issued 6 search warrants against Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc.
1804et al (Karamfil). Karamfil filed a petition before the RTC to enjoin the implementation of the
1805search warrants. The RTC issued a TRO and then set the case for a hearing. Subsequently,
1806the RTC favored Karamfil. The Court of Appeals (CS), at first, favored PADS. However, upon
1807motion by Karamfil, the decision was reversed.
1808ISSUE:
1809

Whether or not PAD is a quasi-judicial body (co-equal with the rank and standing of

1810the RTC)
1811HELD:
1812

Petition DENIED. In submitting that it is a quasi-judicial entity, the petitioner states

1813that it is endowed with express powers and functions under PD No.1936, to prosecute
1814foreign exchange violations as defined and punished under PD No. 1883.
1815

A quasi-judicial body has been defined as an organ of government other than a

1816court and, other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either

2221 4. Presidential Anti-dollar Salting task Force v. CA [March 16,1989]

1817an adjudication or rule making. The most common types of such bodies have been listed as
1818follows:
1819

1. Agencies created to function in situations wherein the government is offering some

1820

gratuity, grant, or special privilege, like the defunct Philippine Veterans Board,

1821

Board

on

Pensions

for

Veterans,

and

NARRA,

and

Philippine

Veterans

1822
1823

Administration.
2. Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeding to carry

1824

on certain government functions, like the Bureau of Immigration, the Bureau of

1825

Internal Revenue, the Board of Special Inquiry and Board of Commissioners, the Civil

1826
1827

Service Commission, the Central Bank of the Philippines.


3. Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is performing some

1828

business service for the public, like the Bureau of Posts, the Postal Savings Bank,

1829

Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Authority, Philippine National Railways, the

1830
1831

Civil Aeronautics Administration.


4. Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to

1832

regulate business affected with public interest, like the Fiber Inspections Board,

1833
1834

the Philippine Patent Office, Office of the Insurance Commissioner.


5. Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking under

1835

the police power to regulate private business and individuals, like the Securities &

1836

Exchange Commission, Board of Food Inspectors, the Board of Review for Moving

1837
1838

Pictures, and the Professional Regulation Commission.


6. Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to adjust

1839

individual controversies because of some strong social policy involved, such as the

1840

National Labor Relations Commission, the Court of Agrarian Relations, the Regional

1841

Offices of the Ministry of Labor, the Social Security Commission, Bureau of Labor

1842

Standards, Women and Minors Bureau.

1843

As may be seen, it is the basic function of these bodies to adjudicate claims and/or to

1844

determine rights, and unless its decisions are reasonably appealed to the proper

1845

reviewing authorities, the same attain finality and become executor. A perusal of the

1846

PADs organic act, PD. No. 1936, as amended by PD. No. 2002, convinces the Court that

1847

the Task Force was not meant to exercise quasi-judicial functions, that is, to try

1848

and decide claims and execute its judgments. As the Presidents arm called upon to

1849

combat the vice of dollar salting or the blackmarketing and salting of foreign exchange,

1850

it is tasked alone by the decree to handle the prosecution of such activities, but nothing

1851

more.

1852

The undertaking of PAD is to determine whether or not probable cause exists to

1853

warrant the filing of charges with the proper court, meaning to say, to conduct an inquiry

1854

preliminary to a judicial recourse, and to recommend action of appropriate authorities. It

1855

is not unlike a fiscals office that conducts a preliminary investigation to determine

1856

whether or not prima facie evidence exists to justify hauling the respondent to court, and

1857

yet, while it makes that determination, it cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court. For

1858

it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.

1859

If the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is not a quasi-judicial body, it cannot

1860

be said to be co-equal or coordinate with the Regional Trial Court. There is nothing in its

1861

enabling statures that would demonstrate its standing at par with the said court.

1862
1863
1864

SANTIAGO, JR vs. BAUTISTA

1865

32 SCRA 188, March 30, 1970

1866

_____________________________ _______

1867

Determination by a committee as who should be ranked first, second and third honors

1868

among graduating pupils does not require quasi-judicial adjudication.

1869

_________________ _________________

1870FACTS:
1871

The appellant was a grade 6 pupil in a certain public elementary school. As the

1872school year was then about to end, the Committee on the Rating of Students for Honor was
1873constituted by the teachers concerned at said school for the purpose of selecting the honor
1874students of its graduating class. With the school Principal, as chairman, and the members of

1875the committee deliberated and finally adjudged Socorro Medina, Patricia Lingat and Teodoro
1876C. Santiago, Jr. as first, second and third honors, respectively. The schools graduation
1877exercises were thereafter set for May 21, 1965; but three days before that date, the third
1878placer Teodoro Santiago, Jr., represented by his mother, and with his father as counsel,
1879sought the invalidation of the ranking of honor students thus made, by instituting the above1880mentioned civil case in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, committee members along
1881with the District Supervisor and the Academic Supervisor of the place.
1882ISSUE:
1883

Whether or not the determination by a committee of honor students is a quasi-judicial

1884power as to be subject to judicial review by petition for certiorari under Rule 65 or Rules of
1885Court.
1886HELD:
1887

No. Supreme Court ruled that its function does not require quasi-judicial

1888adjudication. Judicial action is an adjudication upon the rights of parties who in general
1889appear or are brought before the tribunal by notice or process, and upon whose claims some
1890decision or judgment is rendered. It implies impartiality, disinterestedness, a weighing of
1891adverse claims, and is inconsistent with discretion on the one hand- for the tribunal must
1892decide according to law and the rights of the parties- or with dictation on the other; for in the
1893first instance it must exercise its own judgment under the law, and not act under a mandate
1894from another power.
1895

It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial function is to determine what the

1896law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and
1897whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine whose
1898questions, he acts judicially.
1899What are JUDICIAL OR QUASI-JUDICIAL ACTS?
1900

It is difficult, if not impossible, precisely to define what are judicial or quasi judicial acts,

1901and there is considerable conflict in the decisions in regard thereto, in connection with the
1902law as to the right to a writ of certiorari. It is clear, however, that it is the nature of the act to

1903be performed, rather than the office, board, or body which performs it, that determines
1904whether or not it is the discharge of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. It is not essential that
1905the proceedings should be strictly and technically judicial, in the sense in which that word is
1906used when applied to courts of justice, but it is sufficient if they are quasi judicial. It is
1907enough if the officers act judicially in making their decision, whatever may be their public
1908character. 22
1909
1910QUASI-JUDICIAL ADJUDICATION
1911

The resolution of controversies is the raison detre of courts.

1912How this essential function accomplished?


1913

1. The ascertainment of all the material and relevant facts from the pleadings and

1914
1915

from the evidence adduced by the parties.


2. After that determination of the facts has been completed, by the application of the

1916

law thereto to the end that the controversy may be settled authoritatively, definitely

1917

and finally.

1918What are its requirements?


1919
1920
1921

1. Previously established rules and principles


2. Concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals
3. Decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles.

1922
1923
1924HON. ISIDRO CARINO (Secretary of DECS), et.al. vs. THE COMMISSION ON HUMAR
1925RIGHTS, et.al; GR. No. 96681, December 2, 1991, En banc (Narvasa, J.)
1926_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
1927The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that
1928it may investigate, receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human
1929rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and
1930cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency
2322 Santiago, Jr. vs. Bautista, 32 SCRA 188

1931or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
1932controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking.
1933A grant of investigatory power does not include a grant of quasi-judicial or quasi legislative.
1934_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
1935
1936FACTS:
1937

Some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the Manila Public School

1938Teachers Association (MPSTA) and the Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook
1939what they described as mass concerted actions to dramatize and highlight their plight
1940resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had
1941time and again been brought to the latters attention. This mass concerted actions happened
1942during ordinary class days.
1943

For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private

1944respondents) were administratively charged. They were also preventively suspended for
1945ninety (90) days. In the administrative case the respondents later filed separate answers,
1946opted for a formal investigation, and also moved for suspension of the administrative
1947proceedings pending resolution by the Supreme Court of their application for issuance of an
1948injunctive writ/temporary restraining order. The motion for suspension was denied.
1949
1950ISSUE:
1951

Whether or not the Commission on Human Rights is a quasi-judicial body which has

1952adjudicatory power.
1953HELD:
1954

Petition DENIED. The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to

1955say, determine with the character of finality and definiteness, the same issues which have
1956been passed upon and decided by the Secretary of Education, Culture & Sports, subject to
1957the Civil Service Commission.

1958

The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power;

1959and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial
1960agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
1961

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power

1962is that it may investigate, receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed
1963human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication,
1964and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial
1965agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the
1966facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered
1967such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must
1968be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end
1969that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively,
1970subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.
1971
1972

The proposition is made clear by the constitutional provisions specifying the powers

1973of the CHR:


1974

1. Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights

1975
1976

violations involving civil and political rights;


2. Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for

1977
1978

violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;


3. Provide appropriate legal of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos

1979

residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the

1980

measures for the protection of human rights underprivileged whose human rights

1981
1982
1983

have been violated or need protection;


4. Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
5. Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to

1984
1985

enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;


6. Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to

1986
1987

provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;


7. Monitor the Philippine Governments compliance with international treaty obligations

1988

on human rights;

1989

8. Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose

1990

possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine

1991
1992

the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;


9. Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the

1993
1994
1995

performance of its functions;


10. Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
11. Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.

1996
1997

As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and functions

1998bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. However, it cannot try and decide
1999cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do.
2000To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge.
2001
2002

Investigate, commonly understood means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or

2003probe into, research on, study. The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find
2004out, to learn, obtain information.
2005

Adjudicate, commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge,

2006decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle.


2007

Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power to

2008investigate, cannot and should not try and resolve on the merits (adjudicate) the matters
2009involved in Striking Teachers case. These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the
2010original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary
2011powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction
2012of the Civil Service Commission.
2013
2014
2015WHAT ARE THE DETERMINATIVE POWERS OR THE CLASSIFICATION OF
2016ADJUDICATORY POWERS?
2017

2018

1. ENABLING Powers Those that permit the doing of an act which the law undertakes

2019

to regulate and would be unlawful without government approval. Usually

2020

characterized by the grant or denial of permit or authorization.

2021

Example: Issuance of licenses to engage in a particular business.

2022

2. DIRECTING Powers Those that involve the corrective powers of public utility

2023

commissions, powers of assessment under the revenue laws, reparations under

2024

public utility laws, and awards under workmens compensation laws, and powers of

2025
2026

abstract determination such as definition valuation, classification and fact finding.


3. DISPENSING Powers Exemplified by the authority to exempt from our relax a

2027

general prohibition, or authority to relieve from an affirmative duty. Its difference from

2028
2029

4. SUMMARY Powers Those that apply compulsion or force against person or

2030

property to effectuate a legal purpose without a judicial warrant to authorize such

2031

action. Usually without notice and hearing.

2032

Example: Abatement of nuisance, summary restraint, levy of property of delinquent

2033

tax payers

licensing power is that dispensing power sanctions a deviation from a standard.

2034

5. EQUITABLE Powers Those that pertain to the power to determine the law upon a

2035

particular state of facts. It refers to the right to and must, consider and make proper

2036

application of the rules of equity.

2037

Example: Power to appoint a receiver, power to issue injunctions.

2038
2039
2040QUASI-JUDICIAL DISTINGUISHED FROM QUASI-LEGISLATIVE
2041
2042GENERAL RULE:

2043

Quasi-judicial adjudication refers to a determination of rights, privileges and duties

2044by an administrative agency resulting in a decision or order affecting a named person and
2045becoming final and executor after the lapse of a certain period.
2046

EXCLUSION: Does not cover rules and regulation of general applicability issued by

2047the administrative body to implement its purely administrative policies and functions, in the
2048exercise of its quasi-legislative power. 23
2049
2050

Distinction as to RULE OR REGULATION issued by an Administrative Agency in

2051

the exercise of:

QUASI-JUDICIAL
Notice and hearing is required

QUASI-LEGISLATIVE
Notice and hearing is not necessary, in an
administrative agency actions

2052
2053

Distinction as to the JUDICIAL ACTION TO QUESTION A DECISION of a quasi-

2054

judicial agency in the exercise of:

QUASI-JUDICIAL
Filed with the Court of Appeals

QUASI-LEGISLATIVE
Filed with the Regional Trial Court

2055
2056
2057WHAT ARE THE REASONS FOR CREATION OF QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCIES?
2058
2059
2060
2061

1.
2.
3.
4.

To unclog court dockets.


To meet the growing complexities of modern society.
To help in the regulation of ramified activities of a developing country.
To entrust to specialized agencies in specified fields with their special

2062

knowledge, experience, and capability the task of dealing with problems thereof as

2063

they have the experience, expertise and power of dispatch to provide solutions

2064
2065

thereto.

2066VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR A QUASI-JUDICIAL OFFICER


2423 Lupangco v. CA, 160 SCRA 848 [1988]

2067
2068

Arbitration

2069 is the reference of a dispute to an impartial third person for determination on the basis of
2070evidence and arguments presented by the parties who have bound themselves to accept the
2071decision? It may be voluntary or compulsory.
2072

Voluntary Arbitration is the referral of a dispute by the parties pursuant to a

2073voluntary arbitration clause or agreement to an impartial third person or panel for a final
2074resolution.
2075

Involuntary Arbitration is one compelled by the government to accept the resolution

2076of the dispute through the arbitration of a third party.


2077

The nature of the work of voluntary arbitrator, whether acting alone or in a

2078panel makes him acquire the status of a quasi-judicial agency, as he acts as a quasi-judicial
2079officer who determines the rights of the parties and renders decision, which is appealable
2080by petition for review to the Court of Appeals within 15 days from receipt thereof. 24
2081
2082
2083

B. JURISDICTION

2084
2085WHAT IS JURISDICTION?
2086

Jurisdiction is derived from the Latin words, juries and deco, which mean I

2087speak by the law. Jurisdiction means the power or capacity conferred by the Constitution
2088or by law to a court or tribunal to entertain, hear and determine certain controversies, and
2089render judgment thereon.25
2090
2091
2092HOW JURISDICTION IS DETERMINED?
2524 Luzon Dev. Bank v. Assn of Luzon Dev. Bank Employees, 249 SCRA 162 [1995]; Oceanic Bic Division(FFW) v. Romero, 130
26SCRA 392 [1984]; Continental Marble Corp. v. NLRC, 161 SCRA 151 [1088]

2725 People v. Mariano, 71 SCRA 600 [1976]

2093

Jurisdiction is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of

2094the action.26
2095
2096WHAT ARE THE CLASSIFICATIONS OF JURISDICTION?
2097
2098
2099

1. Jurisdiction over the nature of the action


2. Jurisdiction over the subject matter
a. Refers to the nature of the cause of action and of the relief sought which is

2100

vested by law and which is not acquired by consent or acquiescence of the

2101

parties, nor by the unilateral assumptions thereof by a tribunal, neither can it

2102

be fixed by the will of the parties, nor can it be acquired through, or waived,

2103

enlarged or diminished by, any act or omission of the parties, nor can it be

2104
2105
2106
2107

conferred by acquiescence of the court or tribunal.


2. Jurisdiction over the issues framed in the pleadings
3. Jurisdiction over person of the parties
a. Jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner or plaintiff is acquired by the

2108

latters filing the initiatory pleading and paying the required docket or filing

2109
2110

fees.
b. Jurisdiction over the person of the respondent or defendant is acquired by

2111

the service of summons or by his voluntary submission to the authority of the

2112
2113

court or tribunal.
c.

2114
2115EXTENT OF JURISDICTION
2116
2117

Judicial power, which is the power to hear and decide cases between parties who

2118have the right to sue in courts of law and equity, belongs to the judiciary or the courts.
2119Jurisdiction to hear and decide such causes is granted by the Constitution or by the statutes,
2120and unless a jurisdiction on a specific matter has been clearly conferred by Congress upon a
2121quasi-judicial agency, the latter cannot exercise it and the same remains with the courts
2122under their constitutionally conferred judicial power.
2826 Municipality of Sogod v. Rosal, 201 SCRA 683 [1991]

2123
2124

RULE: An administrative body to which quasi-judicial power has been delegated is a

2125tribunal of limited jurisdiction and as such it could wield only such powers as are specifically
2126granted to it by its enabling stature. The extent to which an administrative agency may
2127exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute
2128creating or empowering such agency.27
2129
2130

The power granted by law to an administrative agency to issue rules and regulations,

2131and procedures in the execution and implementation of its assigned task includes the
2132issuance of a rule governing appeals to the Office of the President, even if the enabling law
2133does not provide for the remedy of appeal, and failure to appeal from a decision of the
2134administrative agency precludes the aggrieved party from seeking judicial recourse.28
2135
2136HOW IS THE JURISDICTION OF A QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCY CONSTRUED?
2137
2138

An administrative body to which quasi-judicial power has been delegated is a tribunal

2139of limited jurisdiction and as such it could wield only such powers as are specifically granted
2140to it by it enabling statute. Its jurisdiction is interpreted strictissimi juris.29
2141
2142RE-STATEMENT OF THE RULE
2143

The extent of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may

2144exercise is defined by law.


2145

An administrative agency may exercise only such powers as have been expressly

2146or impliedly granted by the statute creating such agency.


2147
2148TEJADA vs. HOMESTEAD PROPERTY CORPORATION
2927 Antipolo Realty Corp. v. NHA, 153 SCRA 399 [1987]
3028 Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Office of the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs, 153 SCRA 317 [1987]
3129 Chin V. Land Bank of the Philippines, 201 SCRA 190 [1991]

2149178 SCRA 164 [1989]


2150FACTS:
2151

Private respondent Taclin V. Banez offered to sell to petitioner Enriqueto F. Tejada a

2152200 square meter lot owned by respondent corporation. Private respondent suggested that
2153petitioner pay a reservation fee of P20,000.00, which would form part of the consideration in
2154case they reach a final agreement of sale and which amount was to be returned to the
2155petitioner should the parties fail to reach an agreement. After paying the reservation fee, the
2156respondent corporation changed the terms of monthly amortization which resulted in the
2157demand of the petitioner for the return of his reservation fee. Respondent refused to return
2158the same and petitioner brought suit with the RTC for a collection of sum of money.
2159Respondents herein filed a motion to dismiss contesting the jurisdiction of the RTC to hear
2160the case. The same was denied and respondents appealed to the CA who decided in their
2161favor. Petitioner argues that inasmuch as there is no perfected contract of sale between the
2162parties, the claim for recovery of the reservation fee properly falls within the jurisdiction of the
2163regular courts and not that of the HSRC.
2164ISSUE:
2165

Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the recovery of reservation fee.

2166HELD:
2167

Under Presidential Decree No. 1344, the NHA has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and

2168decide claims involving refund and other claims filed by a subdivision lot or condominium
2169unit buyer against the project owner, etc. There is no such qualification in said provision of
2170law that makes a distinction between a perfected sale and one that has yet to be perfected.
2171The word buyer in the law should be understood to be anyone who purchases anything for
2172money. Under the circumstances of this case, one who offers to buy is as much a buyer as
2173one who buys by virtue of a perfected contract of sale. Said powers have since been
2174transferred to the HLRB.
2175

When an administrative agency or body is conferred quasi-judicial functions, all

2176controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining to its specialization are deemed to be

2177included within the jurisdiction of said administrative agency or body. Split jurisdiction is not
2178favored. Since in this case the action for refund or reservation fee arose from a proposed
2179purchase of a subdivision lot obviously the HLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
2180
2181ESTOPPEL TO DENY JURISDICTION
2182GENERAL RULE:
2183

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or by law, and

2184may not be conferred by agreement of the parties, nor can it be waive. It may be raised
2185at any stage of the proceeding as a defense.
2186

Exception:

2187

Where an aggrieved party appealed an adverse decision to a higher administrative

2188

body, such as the Office of the President, he cannot thereafter challenged the

2189

jurisdiction of the appellate body to decide the appealed case.

2190In GARMENTS AND TEXTILE EXPORT BOARD vs. CA, 30the Supreme Court ruled,
2191

Having already invoked the jurisdiction of the GTEB in the earlier actions

2192

involving the same controversy as that before us, AIFC cannot now be heard to

2193

question that same jurisdiction simply because it was unable to obtain the reliefs

2194

prayed for by it from the GTEB. We have warned against such practice on more than

2195

one occasion in the past.

2196

It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to

2197

secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief,

2198

repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. The Court frowns upon and does not

2199

tolerate the undesirable practice of some litigants who submit voluntarily a cause and

2200

then accepting the judgment when favorable to them and attacking it for lack of

2201

jurisdiction when adverse.

2202
2203PARTY CANNOT TAKE INCONSISTENT POSITIONS
3230 Garments and Textile Export Board vs. CA, 79 SCAD 515, 268 SCRA 258 [1997]

2204

A party or litigant cannot take a position in court different from that which he took

2205before an administrative body. This may not be permitted for the reason that underlies the
2206requirement of prior exhausting of administrative remedies to give administrative authorities
2207the prior opportunity to decide controversies within its competence, and in much the same
2208way that, on the judicial level, issues not raised in the lower court cannot be raise for the first
2209time on appeal.31
2210
2211
2212C. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
2213
2214Rules of Procedure, Generally
2215-

The Constitution empowers quasi-judicial agencies to issue their own rules of

2216procedure. It provides that rules of procedure of quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
2217unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. This is an implied grant of power to issue
2218procedural rules.
2219The grant if quasi-judicial power to an administrative agency carries with it the power
2220to promulgate its rules of procedure for the proper exercise of its adjudicative power and for
2221the guidance of interested parties or party litigants.
2222Rules of procedure issued by quasi-judicial bodies must not diminish, increase, or
2223modify substantive rights.
2224The Rules of Court are suppletory to rules of procedure of quasi-administrative
2225agencies. This means that any deficiency or absence of applicable provision Rules of Court
2226would be applied.
2227
2228Rules Subject to Supreme Court Modification
2229-

All procedural rules, whether issued by quasi-judicial agencies or embodied in

2230statutes enacted by Congress, are subject to alteration or modification by the Supreme Court
2231in the exercise of its constitutional rule-making power,
3331 Cuerdo v. COA, 166 SCRA 657 [1988]

2232-

In First Lepanto Ceramics Inc. vs. CA, the provision of Sec. 79 of RA 7942, which

2233states that the decision of the Mines Adjudication Board may be appealed by a petition for
2234review by certiorari and question of law may be filed by the aggrieved party with the SC
2235within 30 days from the receipt of the order or decision of the Board is not effective, as there
2236is no showing from the face thereof that it was enacted with the advice and concurrence of
2237the SC. Hence such order or decision may only be appealed to the CA pursuant to Rule 43
2238of the Revised Rules of Court.
22392240Technical Rules Not Applicable
2241-

The technical rules of procedure and of evidence prevailing in courts of law and

2242equity are not controlling in administrative proceedings.


2243Purpose: to free administrative boards or agencies from the compulsion of technical
2244rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial
2245proceedings would not invalidate an administrative order.
2246The rule that an administrative agency exercising quasi-judicial power is not bound
2247by technical rules of procedure and evidence should not be so interpreted as to dispense
2248with the fundamental and essential right of due process, such as the opportunity to be heard
2249and the existence of substantial evidence to support its decision.
2250It is a settled principle that administrative rules of procedure should be construed
2251liberally in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy
2252and inexpensive determination of their respect claims and defenses.
2253
2254
2255Procedure Prescribed by Book VII of 1987 Administrative Code
2256-

Sec 1 provides that the rules of procedure therein prescribed shall be applicable to

2257all agencies defined in the next succeeding section, except the Congress, the Judiciary, the
2258Constitutional Commission, military establishments in all matters relating exclusively to
2259Armed Forces personnel, the Board of Pardons and Parole, and state universities.
2260Agency -> includes any department, bureau, office, commission, authority or officer
2261of the National Government authorized by law or executive order to make rules, issue

2262licenses, grant rights or privileges, and adjudicate cases; research institutions with respect to
2263licensing functions; government corporation with respect to functions regulating private
2264rights, privilege, occupation or business; and officials in the exercise of disciplinary power as
2265provided by law.
2266
2267
2268Justiciable Controversy; Contested Case
2269-

The assumption of jurisdiction of an administrative agency to adjudicate a

2270controversy requires that there must be an appropriate case which involves a justiciable
2271controversy.
2272It is one instituted by and against parties having interest in the subject matter
2273appropriate for judicial determination predicated on a given state of facts.
2274Party-in-interest -> is the person to whom the right to seek judicial redress or relief
2275belongs which can be enforced against the party correspondingly charged with having been
2276responsible for, or to have given rise to, the cause of action.
2277Contested Case -> any proceeding, including licensing, in which the legal rights,
2278duties or privileges asserted by specific parties as required by the Constitution or by law are
2279to be determined after hearing.
2280

> When the grant, renewal, denial or cancellation of a license is required

2281

to be preceded by notice and hearing, it becomes a contested case, in

2282

which event the procedure applicable for contested cases applies.

2283-

License ->includes the whole or any part of any agency permit, certificate, passport,

2284clearance, approval, registration, charter, membership, statutory exemption or other form of


2285permission, or regulation of the exercise of a right or privilege.
2286Licensing ->includes agency process involving the grant, renewal, denial, revocation,
2287suspension, annulment, withdrawal, limitation, amendment, modification or conditioning of
2288license
2289

> Except in cases of willful violation of pertinent laws, rules and

2290

regulations or when public safety requires otherwise, no license may be

2291

withdrawn, suspended or annulled without notice and hearing.

2292-

Before a tribunal, board or office may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is

2293necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property
2294under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom
2295is brought, in turn, before the tribunal, board or officer clothed with power and authority to
2296determine what that law is and thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of the contending
2297parties.
2298
2299Institution of Proceedings
23002301-

The proceedings are instituted by the filing of a complaint or petition.


Formal Application

2302

> Alleges the ultimate facts and prays for specific reliefs.

2303

> Rules against forum shopping applies to quasi-judicial proceedings

2304

> Complaint should contain a certification under oath that complainant:

2305

1. Has not therefore commenced any action or filed any claim

2306involving the same issues in any court, tribunal, or quasi-judicial agency and to the best of
2307his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein.
2308

2. If there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement

2309of the present status thereof;


2310

3. If he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim

2311has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within 5 days therefrom to the court
2312wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading had been filed.
2313
2314-

Ex Parte or Informal Proceedings

2315

> Application for permits or licenses or renewal thereof

2316

>May be initiated by a mere letter sent by a complainant.

2317

> These proceedings become contested when the application is opposed or

2318denied, or such letter, after ex parte investigation, show the need for the person complained
2319of to be given opportunity to be heard on the matter.

2320
2321
2322
2323
2324Forum Shopping
2325

-> The improper practice of going from one court to another in the hope of securing a

2326favorable relief in one court which another court has denied or the filing or repetitious suits or
2327proceedings in different courts concerning substantially the same subject matter.
2328

-> A party seeks a favorable opinion in another forum, other than appeal or certiorari

2329
2330Test to Determine Forum Shopping
2331-

Whether the elements of litis pendentia are present or whether a final judgment in

2332one case will amount to res judicator in the other.


2333Where there are identity of parties or interests represented, rights asserted and relief
2334sought in different tribunals.
2335
2336Acquisition of Jurisdiction
2337-

By acquiring jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner

2338

>by voluntary appearance through filing a complaint, petition or an initiatory or

2339appropriate pleading and paying fees, if required by the agencys rules


2340-

By acquiring jurisdiction over the person of the respondent

2341

>by voluntary appearance or submitting to the body or by service of summons

2342upon him
2343-

Summons -> a writ by which a respondent is notified pf the action against him and is

2344asked to file his answer thereto.


2345
2346Pre-Trial Conference
2347-

Before a contested case is scheduled for hearing, a pre-trial conference is held

2348among the parties to the case

2349-

Sec. 10 of Book 7 of the 1987 Administrative Code requires that To expedite

2350demonstrative proceedings involving conflicting rights or claims and obviate expensive


2351litigations, every agency shall in the public interest, encourage amicable settlement,
2352compromise, and arbitration.
2353
2354Default in Administrative Case
2355

Default -> used in its broad meaning, to include failure to file a responsive pleading,

2356failure to appear in any hearing or failure to present evidence, in any of which instances the
2357hearing may proceed in his absence without violating the partys right to due process.
2358
2359Administrative Proceeding; Hearing
236023611.
23622.
23633.
2364-

Involves:
taking and evaluation of evidence
determining facts based upon the evidence presented
rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved
The parties shall be given opportunity to present evidence and argument on all

2365issues. The notice and hearing are procedural requirements of due process, the absence
2366of which will render the decision in a contested case null and void. The essence of
2367procedural due process in admin proceedings is the opportunity to be heard.
2368The motion for reconsideration constitutes a sufficient opportunity to be heard just as
2369an appeal be taken from the decision accords the losing party the opportunity to present his
2370side. Any such procedural step cures the defect of lack of previous notice, except when the
2371other due process requirement i.e. presence of substantial evidence as basis of the
2372decision , cold neutrality of an impartial judge on the part of the quasi-judicial officer,
2373competent and impartial tribunal, have not been complied with.
2374Hearing does not necessarily require a trial type presentation of evidence. To be
2375heard does not mean verbal arguments before tribunal; it can be through written pleading.
2376However where it appears that there are issues of fact which cannot be decided without
2377trials of the case on the merits, one must be held.
23782379Subpoena and Contempt of Court

2380-

Subpoena -> is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and testify at

2381the hearing or trial of the action or at any investigation conducted under the laws of the
2382country
2383Subpoena DucesTecum -> an order to produce specified documents, and the same
2384is issued upon application of a party by showing clear and unequivocal proof that the
2385documents sought to be produced contain evidence relevant and material to the issue
2386before the agency.
2387The authority to issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum and to punish for
2388contempt any disobedience thereof by itself, if so authorized, or through the courts, applies
2389only in the exercise by the administrative agency of its quasi-judicial power and not its
2390administrative or ministerial functions.
2391Evidence
2392-

The right to cross-examine witnesses, which Sec. 12(3) Book 7 of the 1987

2393Administrative Code gives every party, implies that no hearsay evidence be admitted, as the
2394right of cross-examine is the safeguard against its admission.
2395Admitting of Evidence > the agency may admit and give probative value to evidence
2396commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in conduct of their affairs.
2397Affidavits of Witnesses may not be considered unless the affiants are put in the
2398witness stand for cross-examination on their affidavits, except when the parties waive the
2399same expressly or impliedly
2400Matters of judicial notice have 3 material requisites
24011.
it must be one of common and general knowledge
24022.
it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain
24033.
it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the tribunal
2404To assure compliance with the requisites of judicial notice, the rules require that the
2405quasi-judicial tribunal or agency shall notify the parties of the facts take judicial notice, and
2406shall afford them the opportunity to contest the facts so noticed.
2407Hierarchy of Evidence Values
24081.

Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt -> required for conviction of an accused in a

2409criminal case means that which is logical and inevitable result of the evidence on record,
2410exclusively of any other consideration, or moral certainty or that degree of proof which
2411produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind

24122.

Clear and Convincing-> that measure or degree of proof which will produce in mind

2413of trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be established
24143.
Preponderance of Evidence -> the degree of evidence required in civil cases, means
2415that evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing that that which is offered in
2416opposition to
24174.
Substantial Evidence -> the required to reach a conclusion in administrative
2418proceedings or to establish a fact before administrative and quasi-judicial bodies means
2419such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
2420conclusion; more than a scintilla but may be somewhat less than preponderance
2421
2422Delegation of Quasi-Judicial Power
2423

The power conferred upon an administrative agency to issue rules and regulations

2424necessary to carry out its functions has been held to be an adequate source of authority to
2425delegate a particular function, unless by express provision of the law or by implication it has
2426been withheld.
2427
2428Delegation to Receive Evidence
2429-

Sec. 24(1) Every Agency shall have such number of qualified and competent

2430members of the bar as hearing officers as may be necessary for the hearing and
2431adjudication of contested cases.The provision is an implied grant of power to quasi-judicial
2432agencies to delegate to hearing officers the reception of evidence.
2433A quasi-judicial body may delegate the function to receive evidence and perform any
2434and all acts necessary for the resolution of factual issues falling within its jurisdiction.
2435The delegate merely reports the facts found and the quasi-judicial body retain the
2436power to approve or reject the report and to decide the case.
2437The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and
2438discretion does not preclude him from utilizing; as a matter of practical administrative
2439procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to him the facts, on the basis of
2440which the officer makes his decision.
2441

2442D. DUE PROCESS IN QUASI-JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS


2443Generally
2444

- Two concepts:

2445

1. Substantive Due Process responsiveness to the supremacy of reason,

2446obedience to the dictates of justice; requires that the law itself, not merely the procedures by
2447which the law would be enforced is fair, reasonable and just.
2448

2. Procedural Due Process consists of the 2 basic rights of notice and

2449hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal;
2450refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced
2451
2452Cardinal Primary Requirements of Due Process, Generally
2453

1. the right to a hearing which includes the right to present ones case and submit

2454evidence in support thereof


2455

2. the tribunal must consider the evidence presented

2456

3. the decision must have something to support itself

2457

4. the evidence must be substantial, and substantial evidence means such evidence

2458as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion


2459

5. the decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least

2460contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected


2461

6. the tribunal or body of any of its judges must act on its own independent

2462consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of
2463subordinate
2464

7. the board or body should in all controversial questions, render its decision in such

2465manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the
2466reason for the decision rendered
2467

8. the officer or tribunal conducting the investigation must be vested with competent

2468jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable


2469guarantee of honesty and impartiality

2470
2471

- What due process abhors is not lack of previous notice but the absolute lack of

2472opportunity to be heard. The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard.


2473
2474Requisites of Due Process, Generally
2475-

The principle of due process furnishes a standard to which governmental action

2476should conform in order to impress it with the strand of validity. Fidelity to such standard
2477must of necessity be the overriding concern of the government agencies exercising quasi2478judicial functions.
2479In quasi-judicial proceedings, where it appears that there are issues of fact which
2480cannot be decided without a trial of the case on the merits, one must be held. The rule is
2481where and adjudicative fact is at issue, a trial-type hearing ought to be held.
2482Administrative due process include:
2483

1. the right to notice, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of the

2484proceeding that may affect a persons legal rights


2485

2. reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights, introduce

2486witnesses and relevant evidence in his favor


2487

3. a tribunal so constituted as to give him reasonable assurance of honesty

2488and impartiality, and one of competent jurisdiction


2489

4. a finding or decision by that tribunal supported by substantial evidence

2490presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the records or disclosed to the parties
2491affected.
2492
2493Cold-Neutrality of Impartial Judge
2494-

A critical component of due process is a hearing before and impartial and

2495disinterested tribunal. Ingrained is the rule that every litigant is entitled to nothing less that
2496the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
2497-

Instances:

2498a.

a hearing officer in a contested case cannot act as prosecutor in the same case.

2499b.

an admin officer who has rendered a decision in a contested case cannot review,

2500after he has been promoted to a higher position with review functions, the decision in the
2501said case.
2502-

In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to

2503be a farce, the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is
2504under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real review of
2505the case.
2506
2507Impartial and Competent Tribunal
2508-

One of the indispensable requirements of due process in administrative proceeding is

2509that the tribunal conducting the investigation:


2510

1. must be vested with competent jurisdiction

2511

2. constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable

2512guarantee of honesty and impartiality.


2513
2514Notice and Hearing
2515-

Due process as guaranteed by the constitution extends to admin proceedings, the

2516foremost requirement of which is the right to a hearing, which include the right to present
2517ones case and to submit evidence in support thereof. The need for notice and opportunity to
2518be heard is the heart of procedural due process.
2519-

A violation of any of the cardinal requirements of due proceedings renders any

2520judgment or order issued therein null and void and can be attacked in any appropriate
2521proceeding.
2522-

If there is an alleged violation of the rules, then the party affected should be given the

2523chance to show otherwise and not in a motion for reconsideration thereafter filed, as the
2524issue of violation raises factual issues which require trial-type hearing to ascertain its truth.
2525
2526

a. Prior Notice and Hearing Required

2527

- In administrative case, the general rule is that prior notice and hearing are

2528necessary only where the law so requires.


2529

- The inquiry should therefore be into the enabling statute which clothes an

2530administrative agency or officer with certain duties and responsibilities in the discharge of
2531which some person may be adversely affected.
2532

- In any contested case all parties shall be entitled to notice and hearing. The

2533notice shall be served at least five days before the date of the hearing and shall state the
2534same, time and place of hearing.
2535

- In a case decided by the Supreme Court, it was held that: The

2536Sandiganbayan can preventively suspend a public official charged with a crime before it,
2537there must first be a hearing to determine the validity of the information, and a finding that
2538the information is valid makes it mandatory for the court to preventively suspend the accused
2539for a period not exceeding ninety days.
2540
2541

b. When Prior Notice Not Required

2542

- As a general rule, where what is exercised is police power duly delegated to

2543an administrative officer, or where what is sought to be prevented or achieved requires


2544immediate action for the public good or interest, prior notice or hearing is not necessary for
2545the validity of the action taken, so long as the aggrieved party is subsequently accorded
2546hearing on the action taken, by the administrative agency setting the case for hearing or
2547upon motion or petition by the aggrieved party.
2548

- The withdrawal, suspension or annulment of a license in cases of willful

2549violation of pertinent laws, rules and regulations or when public security, health or safety so
2550require.
2551
2552Prior Notice Not Required in the Exercise of Police Power
2553-

Where the act questioned results from the exercise of police power of the state, prior

2554notice and hearing are not required, unless the applicable law so expressly provides.

2555Considerations of procedural due process cannot outweigh the evil sought to be prevented
2556by the exercise of police power.
25572 Kinds of Nuisances:
25581.
Nuisance per se constitutes a direct menace to public health or safety, and so may
2559be abated summarily, without legal proceedings and without hearing
25602.
Nuisance per accidens which depends upon certain conditions or circumstances
2561and which is a question of fact, cannot be abated without due hearing in a tribunal
2562authorized to decide whether such thing does in law constitute a nuisance
2563Twin rights of notice and hearing may be considered dispensable in certain
2564instances:
25651.
In proceedings where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like the summary
2566abatement of a nuisance per se.
25672.

Where there is a tentativeness of administrative action, that is , where the respondent

2568is not precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice
2569to the person affected, such as the summary distraint and levy of the property of a
2570delinquent taxpayer, and the replacement of a temporary appointee
25713.

Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to exercise them had

2572not been claimed.


2573Notice Minimum Requirement in Summary Dismissal
2574-

In summary proceedings, which are authorized by law to be instituted against erring

2575police officers, the filing of charges which must be made known to the respondent and the
2576allowance of reasonable opportunity to respondent to answer the charges constitute the
2577minimum requirements of due process.
2578It is mandatory that charges be specified in writing and that the affidavits in support
2579thereof be attached to the complaint because these are the only ways by which evidence
2580against the respondent can be brought to his knowledge.
2581The rule that the requirements of due process are satisfied if a party initially denied a
2582hearing is subsequently granted one by means of motion of reconsideration applies only if
2583the charges and the evidence against him are set forth in the record.
2584
2585Notice and Hearing in Rate-Fixing

2586-

The issuance of a fixing rate order, which is issued by and administrative agency in

2587the exercise of its quasi-judicial power requires notice and hearing.


2588As a general rule, a public utility must be afforded some opportunity to be heard as to
2589the propriety and reasonableness of rate fixed for its services by a public service
2590commission.
2591
2592Prior Notice in Issuance of Ex Parte or Preliminary Order
2593-

As a general rule, provisional reliefs, such as temporary restraining orders, cease or

2594desist orders, may be granted by quasi-judicial agencies without prior notice and hearing.
2595-

Similarly, in disciplinary proceedings, the disciplining authority may preventively

2596suspend the officer or employee charges with a grave offense without prior notice or hearing,
2597the preventive suspension not being a penalty.
2598-

Needs the establishment of prima facie evidence

2599
2600Opportunity to be Heard
2601-

Essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain

2602ones side or a chance to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
2603-

As long as the parties were given the opportunity to be heard before the judgment

2604was rendered, the demands of due process were sufficiently met.


2605-

Even if there is notice or opportunity to be heard, which is said to be the essence of

2606due process, there is still violation of due process which renders the decision or ruling of the
2607administrative agency invalid, where:
26081.

there is no evidence to support the decision

26092.

where evidence other than that presented during the proceedings or disclosed in the

2610records was taken into account in rendering the ruling


26113.

where the quasi-judicial body or officer did not possess the cold neutrality of an

2612impartial judge, as when he acted as investigator

26134.

where the administrative officer or body acted with grave abuse of discretion

2614amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction


2615
2616Where there is no Denial of Due Process
2617

- A party who has been notified of the hearing but failed to attend the same or

2618refrained from participating in the agency proceedings cannot complain that he has been
2619denied due process.
2620
2621Motion for Reconsideration Cures Procedural Due Process Defects; Exceptions
2622

General Rule: The rule that the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the decision or

2623ruling against a party cured the defect in the lack of prior notice and hearing as to preclude
2624the party from claiming denial of due process assumes that the other requirements of due
2625process have been complied with.
2626
2627

Exceptions:
1. If any of the other requirements has not been observed, the rule does not

2628apply, as when the evidence against the party is not set forth in the record of the case, one
2629of the indispensable requirements of due process being that the decision of an
2630administrative agency must be rendered on the evidence contained in the record and
2631disclosed to the party affected and the motion for reconsideration not being sufficient to cure
2632the fatal defect.
2633

2. The fact that the affected party had been heard before an investigating

2634body, whose findings were the basis of the disciplinary action against him, does not preclude
2635a finding that he has been denied due process, rendering the penalty imposed as invalid,
2636where the investigating body did not include as member a representative from an
2637organization specifically required by law to be so represented therein because one of the
2638indispensable requirements of due process that the officer or tribunal conducting the
2639investigation must be vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a

2640person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty and impartiality, was not
2641followed.
2642

3. Where the decision against him has nothing to support itself, one of the

2643cardinal requirements of due process being that the decision or ruling of an administrative
2644body must be supported by substantial evidence.
2645
2646Substantial Evidence as Basis of Decision
2647

- Another cardinal requirement of due process in administrative adjudication is that

2648the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing or at least
2649contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
2650

- The decision must be supported by substantial evidence and absent such would

2651render the decision void.


2652
2653Right to Counsel, Not a Due Process Requirement
2654-

In the case of Lumiqued vs. Exevea the issue raised was: Does the due process

2655clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an administrative inquiry? The
2656Supreme Court ruled that petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceeding to
2657have competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued was not accused of
2658any crime in the proceedings below. The investigation conducted by the committee created
2659by Dept. Order 145 was for the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively
2660liable under the law for the complaints filed against him. While investigations conducted by
2661an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that
2662under the existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by
2663counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondents capacity to
2664represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated
2665with counsel.

2666-

The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the

2667Constitution or the law. In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply
2668the opportunity to explain ones side.
2669
2670
2671E. DECISION, APPEAL AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
2672Decision Defined
2673

(In administrative law) means the whole or any part of the final disposition, not of an

2674interlocutory character, whether affirmative, negative, or injunctive in form, of a quasi-judicial


2675agency in any matter, including licensing, rate fixing and granting of rights and privileges.
2676
2677Period to Render Decision
2678-

Section 14 of Book VII of the 1987 Administrative code provides that the agency

2679shall decide each case within thirty days following its submission.
2680-

A case is deemed submitted for decision after both parties shall have concluded

2681presentation of their evidence or upon the filing of their respective memoranda, if required or
2682if they so ask and the same be granted.
2683-

A statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed

2684to be merely directly, so that non-compliance with it does not invalidate the judgment on the
2685theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated, but the
2686failure of the administrative or quasi-judicial officer to decide the case within the prescribed
2687period may render him administratively liable therefore, as he is enjoined by the code of
2688conduct for public officers to promptly act on all matters before him.
2689
2690Form of Decision
2691-

The fact that quasi-judicial agencies are not courts of justice does not excuse them

2692from the requirement that their decisions should clearly and distinctly express the facts and
2693the law on which they are based.

2694-

Sec. 14, Book VII of the 1987 Administrative Code requires that Every decisions

2695rendered by the agency in a contested case shall be in writing and shall state clearly and
2696distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
2697-

Compliance by quasi-judicial tribunals or agencies with the requirements of decision-

2698writing becomes especially important in appealable decisions because decisions of quasi2699judicial bodies are appealable to the Court of Appeals by means of a petition for review, in
2700which the appellant is entitled to raise questions of fact, or of law, or both.
2701
2702Publication of Decisions
2703

- The law requires that every agency shall publish and make available for public

2704inspection all decisions or final orders in the adjudication of contested cases.


2705
2706Relief and Sanction
2707

Relief -> includes the whole or part of any grant of money, assistance, license,

2708authority, privilege, exemptions, exception, or remedy; recognition of any claim, right,


2709immunity, privilege, exemption or exception; or taking of any action upon the application or
2710petition of any person.
2711

Sanction-> includes the whole or part of a prohibition, limitation or other condition

2712affecting the liberty of any person; the withholding of relief; the imposition of penalty or fine;
2713the destruction, taking, seizure or withholding of property; the assessment of damages,
2714reimbursement, restitution, compensation, cost, charges or fees; the revocation or
2715suspension of license; or the taking of other compulsory or restrictive action.
2716
2717Finality of Decision
2718-

The decision of the agency shall become final and executor 15 days after the receipt

2719of a copy thereof by the party adversely affected unless within that period an administrative
2720appeal or judicial review, if proper, has been perfected. One motion for reconsideration may
2721be filed, which shall suspend the running of the said period.

2722-

An administrative agency may alter, modify or reverse its decision with or without a

2723motion for reconsideration, only before the decision becomes final and executor. The
2724established principle is that once a decision becomes final and executor, it is removed from
2725the power or jurisdiction of the quasi-judicial body which rendered it to further alter or amend,
2726much less revoke it.
2727
2728Promulgation of Decision
2729-

A decision of an administrative officer or agency, in the exercise of quasi-judicial

2730power, becomes binding only after it is validly promulgated.


2731Promulgation -> the delivery of the decision to the clerk of court for filing and
2732publication
2733

->the process by which a decision is published, officially announced,

2734

made known to the public or delivered to the clerk of court form filing,

2735

coupled with notice to the parties or their counsel.

2736-

If at the time of the promulgation of a decision or resolution, a judge or a member of a

2737collegiate court or quasi-judicial agency had earlier signed or registered his vote for the
2738decision, has vacated his office, his vote is automatically withdrawn or cancelled.
2739
2740Notice of Decision
2741-

The parties are entitled to be informed of the decision rendered by the quasi-

2742administrative agency.
2743-

If a party is represented by counsel, the notice of the decision must be made upon

2744counsel. It is well settled that notice to counsel is notice to client. On the other hand, notice
2745to client does not mean notice to counsel.
2746
2747Decision by Collegiate Body; Vote Required

2748-

A collegiate body can validly decide only when it formally acts as such. A decision by

2749a director for the collegiate body is void. Just as the decision of only one member thereof is
2750void where a quorum of two is required
2751-

Commission -> a body composed of several persons acting under lawful authority to

2752perform some public service. It is also defined as a board or committee of officials appointed
2753and empowered to perform certain acts or exercise certain jurisdiction of a public nature or
2754service.
2755-

Where the law creating a collegiate body provides that its decision be arrived by

2756majority vote, such majority can validly render a decision. For all practical purposes, the
2757majority becomes the full board. For all practical purposes, the majority becomes the full
2758board.
2759-

The powers and duties of boards and other collegiate bodies may not be exercised

2760by individual members separately. Their acts are official only when done by the members
2761convened in session, upon the concurrence of at least a majority.
2762
2763Final Decisions Not Reviewable
2764-

A final resolution or decision of an administrative agency also binds the Office of the

2765President even if such agency is under the administrative supervision and control of the
2766latter.
2767-

Administrative decisions must end sometime, as fully as public policy demands that

2768finality be written on judicial controversies.


2769Appeal in Contested Cases
2770-

Appeal is not part of due process, but a statutory privilege which may be exercised

2771only in the manner and within the period prescribed by law as it is mandatory and
2772jurisdictional.
2773In the absence of any specific rules applicable to a particular agency, the appeal
2774should comply with Book 7 of the 1987 Administration Code Secs. 19-22.

2775-

The appellate should assign errors committed, the general rule being that the

2776appellate body may not pass upon errors not assigned.


2777
2778Administrative Review
2779-

Review -> reconsideration or re-examination of a decision or ruling of a subordinate

2780officer by a superior officer or higher administrative agency.


2781-

Review by a superior officer or department head may be undertaken motu proprio if

2782the decision has not yet become final, in the exercise of his control power over the acts of
2783his subordinate.
2784-

While there is no disputing the authority of administrative superiors to reverse the

2785findings of their subordinates, this power must be exercised sparingly and only upon a clear
2786showing error.
2787-

General Rule: evidence not formally submitted during the hearing before an

2788administrative agency may not be submitted, for the first time, on appeal and the reviewing
2789administrative body may not, therefore, consider it.
27902791

Exception: when an issue was not raised before the lower administrative
agency and evidence on connection therewith was not accordingly

2792but which issue was resolved by the latter in its decision, the

presented,

adverse party, on appeal,

2793was entitled to present rebuttal evidence on said issue and the refusal of the reviewing
2794agency to consider such
2795offered

rebuttal evidence on the ground that the same was not formally

during the hearing constituted grave abuse of discretion and left decision on

2796appeal without substantial basis to support it.


2797Presumption of Legality
2798

General Rule: The legal presumption that official duty has been duly performed is

2799particularly strong as regards to acts of quasi-judicial agencies in connection with the


2800enforcement of laws affecting particular fields of activity, the proper regulation or promotion
2801of which requires a technical or special training, aside from a good knowledge and grasp of
2802the overall conditions relevant to said field.

2803

Exception: There is no presumption of regularity of any administrative action which

2804results in depriving a taxpayer of his property through tax sale.


2805
2806Finality of Decision of Appellate Agency
2807

- In any contested case, the decision of the appellate agency shall become final and

2808executor fifteen days after the receipt by the parties of a copy thereof, unless a motion for
2809reconsideration is seasonably filed or a petition for review of such decision is filed with the
2810Court of Appeals within fifteen days from receipt of the decision or of the denial of the motion
2811for reconsideration.
2812
2813Res Judicata
2814-

The doctrine of res judicata applies to decisions or orders of administrative agencies

2815that have become final. Such decisions or orders are conclusive upon the rights of the
2816affected parties as though a court of general jurisdiction had rendered the same.
2817-

The rule which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by

2818competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive
2819or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as the judgments of
2820courts having general judicial powers.
2821
2822When Res Judicata Disregarded
2823

General Rule: Once a litigants rights have been adjudicated in a valid judgment by a

2824competent court he should not be granted an unbridled license to come back for another try.
2825

Exceptions:

28261.

When there are supervening events which make it imperative, in the higher interest

2827of justice, to modify said judgment to harmonize the disposition with the prevailing
2828circumstances, especially where no private individual will be financially prejudiced by
2829overturning the final judgment.

28302.

The rule may also be overlooked where the same has been waived or has not been

2831timely raised as a defense, where the application of the principle, under the particular facts
2832obtaining, would amount to a denial of justice or a bar to a vindication of a legitimate
2833grievance.
28343.

The principle may be disregarded if its application would involve the sacrifice of

2835justice to technicality.
2836

General Rule: The principle does not operate between persons who, having been co-

2837parties in the first case, are opposing partied in the second case.
2838

Exception: Where the individual claims of such co-parties in the first case were raised

2839in issued, litigated and determined, res judicata applies to such co-parties.
2840
2841
2842Power to Issue Writ of Execution to Enforce Judgment
2843

In the case of GSIS vs. Civil Service Commission, the Supreme Court sustained the

2844power of the CSC to order execution of its final decision issued in the exercise of its quasi2845judicial or adjudicatory authority, as there is no law which denies it such authority.
2846

It would seem quite obvious that the authority to decide cases is inutile unless

2847accompanied by the authority to see that what has been decided is carried out.
2848

Unless the law vesting quasi-judicial power to an agency provides otherwise, the

2849agency promulgating its decision has the implied power to issue a writ of execution to
2850enforce its decision.
2851
2852
2853
2854
2855

CHAPTER VI
DOCTRINES OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION AND EXHAUSTION
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

OF

2857
2858

Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

2859-

Definition: it requires that a plaintiff should first seek relief in an administrative

2860proceeding before he seeks a remedy in court, even though the matter is properly presented
2861to the court, which is within its jurisdiction.
2862
2863-

It also requires that if the case has been filed in court, it should suspend the judicial

2864proceedings until the matter shall have been threshed out by the administrative agency
2865which has been vested with authority to resolve the same. Also been referred as doctrine of
2866prior resort, or exclusive administrative jurisdiction or preliminary resort.
2867
2868-

Under the doctrine, the courts cannot and will not determine a controversy involving

2869a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the
2870questions demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
2871knowledge, experience and services of the tribunal to determine technical and intricate
2872matters of fact and where a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of
2873regulatory statute administered.
2874
2875-

Reasons: to take advantage of administrative expertise and to attain uniformity of

2876application of regulatory laws this can be secured only if determination of the issue is left to
2877the administrative body.
2878
2879-

Doctrine does not apply: if the administrative agency has no jurisdiction over the

2880case and any of the exceptions under the Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative remedies.
2881Also questions of law may appropriately be determine in the first instance by courts because
2882uniformity may be secured through review by a single Supreme Court and that unifying
2883influence will involve neither factual determination not the exercise of special judgment.

2884
2885-

Distinguish from Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative remedies:

2886Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts,
2887the judicial process being suspended pending referral of certain issues to the administrative
2888agency for its review whereas Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative remedies applies
2889where a claim is cognizable in the first instance by the administrative agency alone, judicial
2890interference being withheld until the administrative process has run its course and the
2891agency action is ripe for review.
2892
2893
2894

Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative remedies

2895-

Definition: court action cannot prosper until all the remedies have been exhausted t

2896the administrative level.


2897-

It requires that where a remedy before an administrative agency is provided and can

2898still be resorted to by giving the said agency every opportunity to decide a matter that comes
2899within its jurisdiction; relief must be first sought by exhausting this remedy before bringing an
2900action in or resorting to the courts of justice.
2901
2902-

Effect of failure to exhaust remedies:

2903It does not affect the jurisdiction of the court BUT the non-compliance will deprived the
2904complainant of cause of action which is ground for a motion to dismiss and if not invoked at
2905the proper time it is deemed waived. The court can take cognizance of the case and try it.
2906
2907-

Reasons:

2908o

First, to ensures an orderly procedure which favors a preliminary shifting process,

2909particularly with respect to matters peculiarly within the competence of the administrative
2910agency, avoidance of interference with functions of the administrative agency by withholding

2911judicial action until the administrative process had run its course, and the prevention of
2912attempts to swamp the courts by resort to them in the first instance.
2913o

Second, to provide less expensive and more speedy solutions to dispute.

2914o

Third, to give the administrative agency the opportunity to act and correct the errors

2915committed in the administrative forum.


2916o

Lastly, separation of power, which enjoins upon the judiciary a becoming policy of

2917non-interference with matters coming primarily within the competence of the other
2918departments.
2919
2920
2921
2922

Under the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction (or Prior Resort), courts cannot and

2923will not resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an
2924administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound
2925administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the
2926administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
2927
2928

The Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, on the other hand,

2929requires that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre2930condition that he should have availed first of all the means of administrative processes
2931afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to
2932by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that
2933comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before the courts
2934judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of courts jurisdiction is fatal to ones
2935cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible
2936of dismissal for lack of cause of action. Non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is not,
2937however, jurisdictional. It only renders the action premature, i.e., claimed cause of action is

2938not ripe for judicial determination and for that reason a party has no cause of action to
2939ventilate in court. (Carale v. Abarintos, 269 SCRA 132)
2940
2941
2942

This doctrine, however, is disregarded in the following instances:

29431) when there is a violation of due process;


29442) when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
29453) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
2946jurisdiction;
29474) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;
29485) when there is irreparable injury;
29496) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
2950President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter;
29517) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;
29528) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
29539) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceeding;
295410) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and
295511) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
2956(Paat v. CA, 266 SCRA 167)
2957
2958Exceptions to the Rule
2959Not applicable where public interest requires immediate court resolution
2960

In Arrow Transportation Corp. v. Board of Transportation, the Supreme Court ruled

2961that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies may be overlooked where public
2962interest requires immediate court resolution of the issue raised.
2963Not applicable where administrative act is a nullity
2964

Where the acts of a quasi-judicial agency are patently illegal, the doctrine of

2965exhaustion of administrative remedies does not come into play.

2966
2967

Foremost among the exceptions to the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies

2968is when the assailed act, order or decisions is patiently illegal or was performed or issued
2969without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction.
2970
2971
2972Not applicable where administrative remedy is not adequate
2973

Where the decision of the department secretary is, by law, executor after a certain

2974fixed period, the aggrieved party need not exhaust administrative remedy as an appeal to
2975the President will not be as sufficient, adequate and expeditious to grant him relief as a
2976judicial relief, such as a writ of preliminary injunction.
2977
2978Not applicable where judicial relief is required to prevent violence
2979

Problems of public order whereby one party had resorted to violence to prevent the

2980other from cutting and hauling logs, the aggrieved party can immediately resort to court
2981action by seeking injunctive relief without awaiting the outcome of the administrative case,
2982for intertwined with the issue of boundary are the questions of public order and the
2983determination of contractual relations which only the courts of justice have jurisdiction.
2984
2985Not applicable apply where agency acted with no jurisdiction
2986

Where the law then applicable provides that a decision of an administrative agency is

2987appealable to the department secretary and then to the Office of the President, exhausting
2988such administrative remedies of appeal is not necessary where the agency acted without
2989jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of a belated appeal from
2990decision of a lower level administrative body which had become final and thereafter
2991reversing it.
2992
2993Not applicable where there is yet no administrative order

2994

It follows that there has to be some sort of decision, order or act, more or less final in

2995character that is ripe for review and properly the subject of an appeal to a higher
2996administrative body or officer, for the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies to
2997operate. If there is none, and at issue is whether or not the investigation to be conducted by
2998an administrative officer is within his competence, then a suit for prohibition may lie against
2999said administrative officer.
3000
3001Not applicable where there is estoppels
3002

Exhaustion is not necessary where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking

3003the doctrine or on the part of the administrative agency concerned. Thus, where an
3004administrative agency in its questioned order ruled or implied that aggrieved party may either
3005accept its ruling or questioned it in court, the agency in a court suit to challenge the same is
3006stopped from invoking non-exhaustion of administrative remedy to defeat the court suit, as it
3007led the aggrieved party to believe that only a court ruling would be accepted by it.
3008
3009
3010Exceptions to the Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
3011
3012NOT APPLICABLE WHERE THERE IS URGENCY OR IRREPARABLE DAMAGE
3013When a writ of preliminary injunction is sought in which the petitioner has shown there is
3014substantial controversy between the parties and the respondent is committing an act or
3015threatening the immediate commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy
3016the status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case,
3017which relief may not be available in the administrative proceedings.
3018Case: Aquino v Luntok, 184 SCRA 177 (1990)
3019When resort to administrative remedies will be fruitless and petitioner will incur irreparable
3020damage or injury arising from the immediate implementation of the administrative action
3021sought to be nullified.

3022
3023Case: U.P. Board of Regents v Rasul, 200 SCRA 685 (1991)
3024
3025NOT APPLICABLE WHERE QUALIFIED POLITICAL AGENCY DOCTRINE APPLIES
3026

The doctrine of qualified political agency states that department secretaries are alter

3027egos or assistant of the President and their acts are presumed to be those of the latter,
3028unless disapproved or reprobated by him. The rule must be qualified to avoid confusion.
3029Final orders or decisions of the Office of the President (OP) issued in the exercise of quasi3030judicial powers are appealable to the Court of Appeals by petition for review on questions of
3031fact, of law or of mixed questions of law and fact. This presupposes that the petitioner has
3032exhausted all administrative remedies which means that he had appealed the decision of the
3033department secretary to the OP whose decision on appeal can be subject of the [petition for
3034review. An aggrieved party affected by a decision of a cabinet secretary need not appeal to
3035the OP and he may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, without
3036exhausting administrative remedy of appeal to the OP.
3037
3038

Case: Callusing Bayan v Dominguez, 205 SCRA 92, 110 (1992)

3039

Case: Alamine v CA, 177 SCRA 796 (1989)

3040
3041NOT APPLICABLE WHERE ISSUE IS PURELY LEGAL
3042Where pure questions of law are raised, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
3043remedies does not apply because issues of law cannot be resolved with finality by the
3044administrative officer; only the Courts can.
3045
3046

Case: Madrigal v Lecoroz, 191 SCRA 20 (1990)

3047
3048NOT APPLICABLE WHERE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY IS PERMISSIVE

3049The doctrine does not apply where, by the terms or implications of the statute authorizing an
3050administrative remedy, such remedy is permissive only, warranting the conclusion that the
3051legislature intended to allow the judicial remedy even though the administrative remedy has
3052been exhausted.
3053

Case: Corpus v Cuaderno, 4 SCRA 749 (1962)

3054
3055NOT APPLICABLE WHERE DOCTRINE WILL RESULT IN N ULLIFICATION OF CLAIM
3056The doctrine does not apply where insistence on its observance will result in nullification of
3057the claim asserted or where the administrative agency has no power to grant the relief
3058sought in civil action, such as claims for damages.
3059
3060

Case: Quisumbing V Gamban, 193 SCRA 520 (1991)

3061

Case: Esuerte v CA, 193 SCRA 541 (1991)

3062
3063
3064NOT APPLICABLE IN QUO WARRANTO CASES
3065Where a public officer has been removed in favour of another or who has been unlawfully
3066excluded; from his position in favour of another, it may be desirable that administrative
3067remedies be first resorted to, however, no one is compelled or bound to do so and as said
3068remedies are neither pre-requisites to nor bar the institution of quo warranto proceedings.
3069Thus, the aggrieved party should file the proper judicial action within the reglementary
3070period. Public interest requires that the right to public office should be determined as
3071speedily as practicable.
3072
3073

Case: Gravador v Manigo, 20 SCRA 742 (1967)

3074NOT APPLICABLE WHERE THERE IS NO LAW REQUIRING REMEDIES


3075Where there is no law or regulation requiring that administrative steps be taken against an
3076administrative action as a condition precedent to the filing of an action in court, the fact that

3077an appeal therefrom has been taken by the aggrieved party to the OP does not preclude him
3078from withdrawing the appeal and filing a court action to question the administrative action.
3079
3080

Case: Agudo v Arnaldo, 108 PHIL 293 (1960)

3081
3082NOT APPLICABLE WHERE AGENCY HAS NO JURISDICTION
3083Where a land in dispute has already b been titled as a private land, the Bureau of Land no
3084longer has jurisdiction over the subject matter.
3085
3086

Case: Marcos v Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 829 (1992)

3087
3088
3089
3090
3091
3092
3093
3094
3095
3096
3097
3098
3099
3100

CHAPTER VII

3101

JUDICIAL REVIEW

3102

3103
3104A. JUDUICIAL REVIEW in general
3105a. Review means a reconsideration or re-examination for purposes of correction.
3106(Part of the system of check and balances which is a limitation on the separation of powers
3107among the three branches of the government and which forestalls arbitrary and unjust
3108adjudication)
3109
3110Purpose
3111Keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect substantive rights of parties
3112affected by its act, rule, or decision.
3113
3114Modes of judicial review
3115
3116
3117
3118
3119
3120

Ordinary court action


Appeal
Petition for Review
Petition for writ of Certiorari
Petition for Prohibition
Petition for Mandamus

3121Vary according to statutes and nature of the agency.


3122Some statutes especially provide for such judicial review others are silent.
3123Mere silence of the law does not necessarily imply that judicial review is unavailable.
3124As a general rule judicial remedy is to be filed in the court of general jurisdiction (RTC)
3125
3126AGENCY ACTION whole or part of any agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief or its
3127equivalent or denial thereof, maybe either non-judicial or quasi-judicial
3128
3129Ordinary complaint for injunction
3130

Purely administrative or executive acts and rules and regulation.

3131Ordinary Appeal

3132

Maybe availed of enabling statute specifically provides that decisions of quasi-judicial

3133body may be appealed as in ordinary civil case within specified period.


3134
3135B. LIMITATIONS
3136
3137b. Purely administrative function may not be interfered with by the courts.
3138
3139General rule:
3140Courts have no supervising power over the proceeding and actions of administrative
3141departments of the government
3142Reason:
3143Strong presumption of regularity and correctness is accorded in their decisions.
3144
3145Exception:
3146
3147
3148

Grave abuse of discretion


Goes beyond his statutory authority
Exercise unconstitutional powers

3149Review is justified
3150
3151
3152
3153
3154
3155

Denial of due process


Mistake of law
Fraud
Collusion
Arbitrary action
No substantial evidence

3156In the administrative proceeding


3157reviewing court has no power to admit and consider evidence not adduced during the said
3158investigation.
3159
3160The court is free to make 3 inquiries

3161
3162
3163
3164

Whether the rule is within the delegated authority of the administrative agency
Whether it is reasonable
Whether it was issued pursuant to proper procedure

3165The exercise if administrative agencies discretion is a policy decision which should not be
3166interfered with by the courts.
3167
3168Discretion
3169Right conferred upon the officer by a law or acting officially under certain circumstances
3170according to the dictates of his own judgment or conscience of others.
3171
3172Doctrine of political question
3173

It is now a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that this exercise of presidential

3174judgment is beyond judicial scrutiny


3175
The court is merely to check, not that it erred or has a different view
3176The Right to appeal is merely a statutory right may be exercised only in the manner and in
3177accordance with the provisions of law.
3178

Failure to do so will cause loss of the right to appeal and render the decision final.

3179Courts may no longer interfere final decisions of administrative bodies .


3180
3181Administrative bodies have upon their finality, the force and binding effect if a final judgment
3182within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata.
3183Public policy demands that finality be written on judicial controversies.
3184Statute providing that the decision of a specific quasi-judicial agency is appealable directly to
3185the Supreme Court if enacted without the advice and concurrence of the supreme court is
3186not effective and the appeal therefrom must be taken to the court of appeals under Rule 43.
3187
3188c. Petition for Review

3189
3190
3191

under rule 43 of the rules of court


to be filed in CA

3192Example of administrative agencies which file for this mode of appeal


3193
3194
3195
3196
3197
3198
3199
3200
3201
3202
3203
3204
3205
3206
3207
3208
3209
3210
3211
3212
3213
3214
3215
3216

Civil service Commission


Central board of assessment appeals
Securities and exchange commission
Office of the president
Land registration commission
Social Security Commission
Civil aeronautics board
Bureau of Patents
Trademarks and technology transfer
National Electrification Administration
Energy regulatory board
National telecommunications Commission
Department of agrarian reform
Government service Insurance System
Employees compensation commission
Agricultural inventions board
Insurance commission
Philippine atomic energy commission
Board of investment
Construction commission
Voluntary arbitrators
The office of the ombudsman
NLRC special civil action

3217Excluded from the coverage of rule 43


3218
3219

Commission on election
Commission on audit

3220May be questioned under rules 64 & 65


3221Rule 43
3222
3223
3224

Ordinary appeal
Petitioner exhausted all administrative remedies
Final order or decision has been rendered by the administrative body in the exercise

3225of quasi-judicial functions


3226

3227Recourse through court action cannot prosper until after such administrative remedies shall
3228have been first exhausted
3229
3230Questions of fact
3231
3232
3233
3234

Doubt or difference as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts


Query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence
Considering the credibility of witnesses
Existence and relevancy of surrounding circumstances

3235Questions of law
3236
3237
3238

Doubt or difference of opinions as to what the law is on a certain state of facts


Does not call for an examination of probative value

3239May Review
3240
3241

Errors of fact
Errors of judgment

3242A petition which substantially complies with the requirement of rule 43 should be
3243given due course.
3244The Court of appeals may require the respondent to file a comment on the petition, not a
3245motion to dismiss within 10 days from notice, or dismiss the petition if it finds the same to be
3246patently without merit
3247
3248

Prosecuted manifestly for delay


Questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration

3249Comment:
3250
3251
3252

Point out insufficiencies or inaccuracies of petitioners statement of facts and issues.


State the reason why the petition should be denied or dismissed.

3253

The finding of facts of the court or agency concerned when supported by substantial

3254evidence, shall be binding in the Court of appeals.

3255

If it decides to dismiss the petition it is usually in the form of a MINUTE

3256RESOLUTION
3257
If the decision is given dues course the court will render full length decision of the
3258merits of the case.
3259
3260Common Requisites of petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are the
3261following:
3262
32631.
32642.
32653.
32664.
32675.
32686.

The petition must be verified


When and where to file petition
Jurisdiction to issue writ
Who should be the respondents
Contents of the petition
Non-forum shopping certification

3269

A petition for review on certiorari or an appeal to the Supreme Court by certiorari from

3270judgment or final order of the court of appeals, the Sandiganbayan, and the regional trial
3271court or other courts whenever authorized by law is not a matter of right but is a matter of
3272sound discretion.
3273
3274
3275
3276
3277
3278
3279
3280
3281
3282C. PETITION FOR REVIEW under Rule 43 of Rules of Court
3283
3284Rules governing appeals from judgments of quasi-judicial agencies

3285

A petition for review is a mode of appeal from the decisions or final orders of quasi-

3286judicial agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions filed with the Court of Appeals pursuant
3287to Sec. 9 of B.P. 129 and Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court. 32
3288

It is provided for under Section 1, Rule 43 that it shall apply to appeals from

3289judgments or final orders of Court of Tax Appeals and from onwards, judgments, final orders
3290or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi3291judicial functions.33
3292

Among these quasi-judicial agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central

3293Board of Assessment Appeals, Security and Exchange Commission, Land Registration


3294Authority, Social Security Commission, Office of the President, Civil Aeronautics Board,
3295National Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under R.A.
32966657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission,
3297Agricultural

Inventions

Board,

Insurance

Commission,

Philippine

Atomic

Energy

3298Commission, Board of Investments, and Construction Industry Arbitration Commission.34


3299

Excluded from the coverage of Rule 43 are the decisions of the Commission on

3300Elections and the Commission on Audit, whose decisions may be questioned by means of a
3301petition for certiorari under Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules of Court filed with the Supreme
3302Court within thirty (30) days from notice thereof.35
3303
3304Where to appeal
3305

An appeal may be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner

3306provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact
3307and law.

3432 Agpalo. Administrative Law, Law on Public Officers and Election Law
3533 Sec. 1, Rule 43, Rules of Court
3634 De Leon. Administrative Law: Text and Cases
3735 Agpalo. Administrative Law, Law on Public Officers and Election Law

3308

However, appeal by petition for review pursuant to Rule 43 requires that the

3309petitioner has exhausted all administrative remedies and that final order or decision has
3310been rendered by the administrative body in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.36
3311
3312
3313Period of Appeal
3314

The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of award, judgment,

3315final order or resolution or from the date of its last publication if publication is required by law
3316for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioners motion for reconsideration duly filed in
3317accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo.
3318

Only one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. Upon proper motion and the

3319payment of the full amount of the docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary
3320period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional fifteen (15) days only within which to file
3321the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling
3322reasons and in no case to exceed another period of fifteen (15) days.
3323
3324
3325How appeal taken
3326

Appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review in seven (7) legible copies

3327with the Court of Appeals, with proof of service of a copy thereof on the adverse party and on
3328the court or agency a quo. The original copy of the petition intended for the Court of Appeals
3329shall be indicated as such by the petitioner.
3330

Upon filing the petition for review, the petitioner shall pay to the Clerk of the Court of

3331Appeals the docketing and other lawful fees and deposit the sum of Php. 500.00 for costs.
3332Exemption from payment of docketing and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs may
3333be granted by the Court of Appeals upon a verified motion setting forth valid grounds

3836 Garcia v. CA, 358 SCRA 416

3334therefor. If the Court of Appeals denies the motion, the petitioner shall pay the docketing and
3335other lawful fees and deposit for costs within fifteen (15) days from notice of the denial.
3336
3337
3338Contents of the petition
3339

The petition for review shall:

3340(a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without impleading the court or agencies
3341either as petitioners or respondents;
3342(b) contains concise statement of the facts and issues involved and the grounds relied upon
3343for the review;
3344(c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the
3345award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies
3346of such materials portions of the record as referred to therein and other supporting papers;
3347(d) state all the specific material dates showing that it was filed within the reglementary
3348period provided herein;
3349(e) contain a sworn statement against forum-shopping as required in Revised Circular No.
335028-91.
3351
3352Effect of failure to comply with requirements
3353

The failure of the petitioner to comply with the foregoing requirements regarding the

3354payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the
3355petition, and the contents of and the contents of and the documents which should
3356accompany the petition shall be sufficient grounds for the dismissal thereof.
3357
3358Action on the petition
3359

As provided for under Section 8, the Court of Appeals may require the respondent to

3360file a comment on the petition, not a motion to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice.

3361

The Court however, may dismiss the petition if it finds the same to be patently without

3362merit prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein are too substantial
3363to require consideration.
3364
3365Contents of comment
3366

The comment shall be filed within ten (10) days from notice in seven (7) legible

3367copies and accompanied by clearly legible certified true copies of such material portions of
3368the record referred to therein together with other supporting papers.
3369

The comment shall: (1) point out insufficiencies or inaccuracies in petitioners

3370statement of facts and issues; and (2) state the reason why the petition should be denied or
3371dismissed.
3372

A copy thereof shall be served on the petitioner, and proof of such service shall be

3373filed with the Court of Appeals.


3374
3375Due Course
3376

If upon the filing of the comment or such other pleadings or documents as may be

3377required or allowed by the Court of Appeals or upon the expiration of the period for the filing
3378thereof, and on the bases of the petition or the record , the Court of Appeals finds prima
3379facie that the court or agency concerned has committed errors of fact or law that would
3380warrant reversal or modification or the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be
3381reviewed, it may give due course to the petition, otherwise, it shall dismiss the same.
3382

The findings of the fact of the court or agency concerned, when supported by

3383substantial evidence, shall be binding on the Court of Appeals.


3384
3385Transmittal of record
3386

Within fifteen (15) days from notice that the petition has been given due course, the

3387Court of Appeals may require the court or agency concerned to transmit the original or a
3388legible certified true copy of the entire record of the proceedings under review. The record to

3389be transmitted may be abridged by agreement of all parties to the proceeding. The Court of
3390Appeals may require or permit subsequent correction of or addition to the record.
3391
3392Effect of Appeal
3393

The appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be

3394reviewed unless the Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem
3395just.
3396

The general rule is that judgments by lower courts or quasi-judicial tribunals or

3397agencies become executor only after they become final and executor.37 Execution pending
3398appeal of a decision is allowed only where the law so provides, as an exception to the
3399general rule.38
3400

Even those decisions which, by law, are not stayed by the appeal, the Court of

3401Appeals, upon motion of the appellant, may stay the execution upon such terms as it may
3402deem just, like issuing a status quo order or writ of preliminary injunction.
3403
3404
3405Submission for decision
3406

If the petition is given due course, the Court of Appeals may set the case for oral

3407argument or require the parties to submit memoranda within a period of fifteen (15) days
3408from notice. The case shall be deemed submitted for decision upon the filing o the last
3409pleading or memorandum required by the rules or by the Court of Appeals.
3410

The above rules do not apply to judgments and final orders or resolutions issued

3411under the Labor Code.39


3412

The rule that an appellate court may only pass upon errors assigned, as well as its

3413exceptions, is also applicable to administrative bodies. There is no reason why it should


3414not.40
3937 Agpalo. Administrative Law, Law on Public Officers and Election Law.
4038 Ibid.
4139 Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, May 10, 1995.
4240 Diamonon v. Department of Labor and Employment, 327 SCRA 283.

3415

In resolving appeals from quasi-judicial bodies, it is within the discretion of the Court

3416of Appeals to have the original records of the proceedings under review be transmitted to it.41
3417

The decision or final resolution of the Court of Appeals is appealable to the Supreme

3418Court by petition for review in accordance with Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
3419
3420
3421
3422Substantial Evidence Rule; Administrative findings and constructions are generally
3423binding and conclusive
3424

The Court will then decide whether to dismiss the petition or give it due course. If it

3425decides to dismiss the petition, it is usually in the form of a minute resolution. If the petition is
3426given due course, the Court will render a full-length decision on the merits o the case.
3427

The findings of fact of the court or agency concerned, when supported by substantial

3428evidence, shall be binding on the Court of Appeals. In other words, all that is necessary to
3429sustain the findings fact is that said findings are supported by substantial evidence. This is
3430known as the substantial evidence rule.
3431

The general rule is that, courts will not disturb on appeal the factual findings of

3432administrative agencies acting within the parameters of their own competence so long as
3433such findings are supported by substantial evidence. The substantial evidence rule is a
3434limitation upon the scope of judicial review in administrative cases.
3435

The rule is that findings of fact of administrative agencies are entitled to great weight,

3436if not finality, if supported by substantial evidence, or negatively stated if the findings are not
3437shown to be unsupported by evidence.
3438
3439
3440Exceptions to substantial evidence rule

4341 Torres, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 793.

3441

The rule that factual findings of administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial

3442powers are accorded respect and even finality if supported by substantial evidence admits
3443exceptions,42 namely:
3444
3445(1)
3446

When the factual findings of administrative agency and the initial fact-finding agency
are conflicting;

3447(2)

When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;

3448(3)

When the interference made by the quasi-judicial agency from its findings of fact is

3449

manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;

3450(4)

When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;

3451(5)

When the administrative agency, in making its findings, goes beyond the issues of

3452
3453(6)
3454
3455(7)
3456

the case, and such findings are contrary to the admissions of the parties;
When the judgment of the administrative agency is premised on the misapprehension
of facts;
When the administrative agency fails to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion;

3457(8)

When the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;

3458(9)

When the findings are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on which

3459
3460(10)
3461

they are based; and


When the findings are premised on the absence of evidence but such findings are
contradicted by the evidence on record.

3462
3463

While factual findings of the administrative agencies are generally not disturbed on

3464appeal, their findings of fact are not conclusive and, may be reviewed and set aside in any of
3465the above instances.

4442 Fuentes v. CA, 268 SCRA 703.

3466

An action or ruling of an administrative agency or officer may be set aside where the

3467latter acted without jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction or committed grave abuse of
3468discretion.
3469
3470
3471Illustrative Cases:
34721. Lower court issued an injunction to restrain implementation the order of the Secretary of
3473Education, Culture and Sports directing the closure of medical college.
3474Facts:
3475

Upon recommendation of the Board of Medical Education, after two team of

3476inspectors reported that respondent medical college fell very much short of the minimum
3477standards set for medical schools, the Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture
3478and Sports (DECS), as Chairman of the Board, ordered the closure of the school effective
3479May 1989. The local judge issued a writ of preliminary injunction. Subsequently, he held that
3480there was no evidence supporting the findings in the report and declared that based on his
3481ocular inspection, the deficiencies reported were non-existent.
3482

This is a petition for certiorari files by the Board assailing the injunction order issued

3483by the lower court to restrain the order of implementation of the order of the closure.
3484Issue:
3485

Does the lower court have the power to make its own independent determination of

3486whether or not respondent medical institution has complied with the minimum standards laid
3487down for its continued operation?
3488Ruling: No
3489(1)

No court has the competence to substitute its own opinion for that of the DECS

3490Secretary.
3491(2)

Decision of the DECS Secretary is within the scope of his power not subject to

3492judicial review.

3493

The only authority reposed in the Courts in the matter is the determination of

3494whether or not the Secretary of DECS has acted within the scope of powers granted him by
3495law and the Constitution. As long as it appears that he has done so, any decision rendered
3496by him should not and will not be subject to review and reversal by any court.
3497(3)

Judgment of DECS more qualified inspectors on the matter certainly better than that

3498of respondent judge.


3499(4)

Courts have no supervisory power over the proceedings and actions of the

3500administrative departments of the government involving the exercise of judgment and


3501findings of fact.
3502

It is a well-settled doctrine that courts of justice should not generally interfere with

3503purely administrative and discretionary functions; that courts have no supervisory power over
3504the proceedings and actions of the administrative departments of the government involving
3505the exercise of judgment and findings of facts; because by reason of their special knowledge
3506and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction, the latter are in a better position to
3507pass judgment on such matters and their findings of facts in that regard are generally
3508accorded respect, if not finality, by the courts.
3509

There are, to be sure, exceptions to the general rule but none of those obtain in this

3510case. (Board of Medical Education vs. Alfonso, 176 SCRA 304.)


3511
3512
35132. Judicial Review by the Supreme Court is questioned on the ground that it is not provided
3514by governing statute.
3515Facts:
3516

It appears that Y was dismissed by SMC for alleged illegal trafficking in company

3517medicines. The old National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ordered the reinstatement
3518of Y with backwages, which decision was affirmed by the Secretary of Labor. Its motion for
3519reconsideration of the decision was affirmed by the Secretary of Labor. Its motion for

3520reconsideration of the decision having been denied, SMC instituted the certiorari proceeding
3521in the Supreme Court.
3522

Y raised a jurisdictional question which was not brought up by respondent public

3523officials. He contended that Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to review the decisions of the
3524NLRC and the Secretary of Labor under the principle of separation of powers and that
3525judicial review is not provided for in Presidential Decree No. 21.
3526Issue:
3527

Whether or not the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to review the decisions of the

3528NLRC and the Secretary of Labor.


3529Ruling: Yes.
3530
3531(1) Power exists though not expressly given by statute.
3532The contention of Y is a flagrant error. It is generally understood that as to administrative
3533agencies exercising quasi-judicial or legislative power, there is an underlying power in the
3534courts, to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even
3535though no right or review is given by statute.
3536(2) Purpose of judicial review.
3537The purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and
3538protect substantial rights of parties affected by its decisions. It is part of the system of checks
3539and balances which restricts the separation of power and forestalls arbitrary and unjust
3540adjudications.
3541(3) When judicial review proper.
3542Judicial review is proper in case of lack of jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion, error of law
3543or collusion.
3544
3545

The courts may declare an action or resolution of an administrative authority to be

3546illegal because it violates or fails to comply with some mandatory provisions of the law or

3547because it is corrupt, arbitrary or capricious. (San Miguel Corporation vs. Secretary of


3548Labor, 64 SCRA 57.)
3549
3550
3551Finality of administrative action for purposes of review
3552
35531. Policy of Courts
3554

Courts are reluctant to interfere with action of an administrative agency prior to its

3555completion or finality, the reason being that absent a final order or decision, power has not
3556been fully and finally exercised, and there can usually be no irreparable harm. It is only after
3557judicial review is no longer premature that a court may ascertain in proper cases whether the
3558administrative action or findings are not in violation of law, or are free from fraud or
3559imposition or find substantial support from the evidence.43
3560
35612. Order of decision
3562

Statutes relating to judicial review of action of administrative agency commonly

3563provide for review of orders, any order, final orders, final agency action, or final
3564decisions.
3565
35663. Threatened pending actions
3567

Judicial relief or review is often denied for lack of finality where action of the

3568administrative agency is only anticipated, even though threatened, or where the action is still
3569pending without final disposition.
3570
3571Several different grounds stated by court in denying relief or review:
3572(a) Jurisdiction lies in the administrative agency rather than in the courts;

4543 Matienzi v. Abellera, 162 SCRA 7.

3573(b) An administrative officer to whom public duties are confided by law is not subject to the
3574

control of the courts in the exercise of the judgment and disrection which the law

3575

reposes in him as part of his official functions;

3576(c) Determinations by subordinate officials, acting under the instruction of their official
3577

superiors, are, in the nature of things, under the control of and subject to review by

3578

their official superiors;

3579(d) The courts will not render a decree in advance of the agencys action and thereby render
3580

such action nugatory;

3581(e) It is not for a court to stop an administrative officer from performing his statutory duty for
3582

fear e will perform it wrongly, particularly where the statute is not unconstitutional on

3583

its face, that to interfere with action which is simply threatened would render a

3584

statute unworkable and unenforceable and would unduly hamper the discharge by

3585

the administrative agencies of their responsibility; or

3586(f) Prior to final administrative determination, the party seeking relief has not suffered a
3587

present injury.44

3588
35894. Action Requiring approval by superior
3590

An order required to be submitted to a superior for approval is not final for purposes

3591of review. However, the fact that in some circumstances, the grant of relief might have to be
3592submitted for approval does not detract from the finality of an order denying relief.45
3593
35945. Pendency of rehearing or administrative appeal
3595

The pendency of an application for a rehearing or recommendation filed within the

3596time prescribed by law ore regulations deprives the original order of finality. However , a
3597statute may provide otherwise.46
3598
4644 2 Am. Jur. 2d 415, 416.
4745 Id., at 417.
4846 Ibid.

35996. Rules and regulations


3600

Regulations of an administrative agency are addressed to and set a standard of

3601conduct for all to whom their terms apply.


3602
36037. Purely administrative matters
3604

It is a well-recognized principle that purely administrative and discretionary functions

3605may not be interfered by the courts.


3606
36078. Preliminary, procedural and interlocutory determinations.
3608

The universal rule is that appeal to the courts will not lie from an interlocutory order

3609unless such order affects the merits.


3610Exceptions to the doctrine of finality
3611
3612(1) Review at an initial or intermediate stage of administrative action
3613
3614

The requirement of finality is subject to exceptions and limitations which permit

3615judicial relief for review at an initial or immediate stage of an administrative action. Thus, the
3616fact that particular determination is not a final order for purposes of statutory review has
3617been held not to preclude the availability of judicial review:
3618

(a) to an interlocutory order affecting the merits of a controversy;

3619

(b) to grant relief to preserve the status quo pending further action by the

3620
3621
3622
3623
3624
3625
3626

administrative agency;
(c) when it is essential to the protection of the rights asserted from the injury
threatened;
(d) when an administrative officer assumes to act in violation of the Constitution and
other laws;
(e) where such order is not reviewable in any other way and the complainant will
suffer great and obvious damage if the order is carried out; and

3627

(f) to an order made in excess of power, contrary to specific prohibition in the statute

3628

governing the agency and thus operating as deprivation of a right assured by

3629

the statute.

3630
3631(2) Review allowed by statutory provisions
3632

In some instances, exceptions to the requirement of finality or limitations on such

3633requirement flow directly form statutory provisions


3634
3635
3636
3637Petition for Review and Petition for certiorari distinguished
3638

A petition for review under Rue 43 of the Rules of Court is an ordinary appeal from a

3639final order or decision of a quasi- judicial body to the Court of Appeals, filed by an aggrieved
3640party after exhausting administrative remedies within fifteen (15) days from receipt of said
3641decision or resolution denying a motion for reconsideration, on questions of fact, of law, or
3642mixed questions of fact and law. The appellate court may review errors of fact or errors of
3643judgment in a petition for review.
3644
3645

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a special civil action,

3646seeking to nullify or modify an order or resolution of an administrative body exercising


3647judicial or quasi-judicial functions, which acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
3648grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and there is no
3649appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, files within
3650sixty (60) days from receipt of the questioned judgment, order or resolution by an aggrieved
3651party with the Supreme Court, or Court f Appeals or the Regional Trial Court, as the Rules of
3652Court or as applicable law provides. He may only raise questions of law and errors of
3653judgment, except where he can show that his case falls under any of the exceptions which
3654warrant a review of facts.

3655

Review includes digging into the merits and unearthing errors of judgment, while

3656certiorari deals exclusively with grave abuse of discretion, which may not exist even when
3657the decision is otherwise erroneous.47
3658
3659
3660
3661D. Petition for Certiorari
3662
3663Sec. 1 Rule 65 of the Rules of Court:
3664 When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
3665without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
3666lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
3667remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
3668in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
3669rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
3670and granting such incidental reliefs ass law and justice may require.
3671The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
3672resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
3673thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the paragraph of
3674Section 3, Rule 46.
3675
3676Purpose:
3677To annul or modify the questioned act or ruling. It is intended to annul void proceedings, to
3678prevent unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal authority, and to provide for a fair and
3679orderly administration of justice.
3680
3681
4947 Aratuc v. COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251.

3682Requisites:
36831.

It is directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial

3684functions.
36852.
The tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
3686grave abuse of discretion.
36873.
There is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
3688course of law.
3689
3690Error of jurisdiction correctible by certiorari
3691

An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its

3692jurisdiction, which is reviewable only by an appeal or petition for review as a mode of appeal.
3693An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of is issued by the court, officer or
3694quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
3695which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, which is correctible by extraordinary
3696writ of certiorari.
3697

A petition for certiorari seeks to correct errors of jurisdiction, while a petition for

3698review seeks to correct errors of judgment, which include errors of procedure or mistakes in
3699the courts findings.
3700
3701Petition for Prohibition
3702
3703Sec. 2 Rule 65 of the Rules of Court:
3704 When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
3705without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
3706lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
3707remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
3708in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
3709rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceeding in the action

3710or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and
3711justice may require.
3712
3713The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
3714resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
3715thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the paragraph of
3716Section 3, Rule 46.
3717
3718Prohibition is a remedy to prevent a tribunal, board or officer from usurping or exercising a
3719jurisdiction or power which the law does not vest in any of them. Its function is to prevent the
3720unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal authority and to provide for a fair and orderly
3721administration of justice. It is directed on proceeding that are about to be done but not
3722against an accomplished act except where the wrong act is continuing or the questioned act
3723is a nullity, done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and
3724there being no appeal or other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
3725law.
3726
3727
3728Petition for mandamus
3729Sec. 3 Rule 65 of the Rules of Court:
3730 When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
3731without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
3732lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
3733remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
3734in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
3735rendered commanding respondent, immediately or at some other specified by the
3736court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to

3737pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
3738respondent.
3739The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
3740resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
3741thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the paragraph of
3742Section 3, Rule 46.
3743Mandamus lies under the following:
3744a.

Against any tribunal which unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the

3745law specifically enjoins as a duty


3746b.
In case any corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an
3747act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station
3748c.
In case of any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully excludes another
3749from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is legally entitled.
3750
3751Requisites:
37521.
37532.
37543.

Applicant must have a clear legal right to the thing demanded.


Such right is well defined, clear and certain.
The corresponding duty of the defendant to perform the required act must also be

3755clear and specific.


3756The availability of mandamus depends on the nature of the power conferred upon, and
3757required to be performed by, public functionaries. Generally mandamus will lie to compel
3758the doing of ministerial act. It does not lie to control discretion, although it may issue to
3759compel the exercise of discretion but not the discretion itself.
3760Exceptions:
3761

When there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of

3762authority equivalent to denial of a settled right to which the petitioner is entitled, and there is
3763no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. (First Phil. Holdings Corp. vs. Sandiganbayan)
3764
Gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of authority (Kant
3765Kuong vs. PCGG)

3766
3767E. APPEAL BY CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT (Petition for Review on
3768Certiorari under Rule 45)
3769Sec. 1 Rule 45 of the Rules of Court:
3770

A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of

3771the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts wherever
3772authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari.
3773The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
3774
3775A petition for review on certiorari or an appeal to the Supreme Court by certiorari from
3776judgment or final order of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, and the Regional Trial
3777Court or other courts whenever authorized by law is not a matter of right but is a matter
3778of sound discretion. Appeal by petition for review on certiorari is a continuation of
3779judgment complained of, while that under Rule 65 is an original or independent action. The
3780special civil action of certiorari will not be allowed as a substitute for failure to timely file a
3781petition under Rule 45.
3782

The petition must raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth as

3783distinguished from questions of fact because the findings of fact of the lower courts are
3784generally binding upon the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court can no longer go over the
3785proofs presented by the petitioner in the lower courts and analyze, assess and weigh them
3786to ascertain if the court a quo and the Court of Appeals were correct in their appreciation of
3787evidence.
3788

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