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VOLUME 6
by
Paul J. Bagley
LEIDEN BOSTON
2008
ISSN 1873-9008
ISBN 978 90 04 16485 7
Copyright 2008 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.
Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing,
IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP.
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printed in the netherlands
For my parents
James Edward III and Lorraine Marie
CONTENTS
Foreword .....................................................................................
Acknowledgements .....................................................................
ix
xi
Introduction ................................................................................
Part One
Philosophy ................................................................
27
Part Two
Theology ..................................................................
81
Politics ...................................................................
143
187
Epilogue
227
245
251
Part Three
FOREWORD
The reading of Benedict Spinozas Tractatus theologico-politicus presented
in this book is based upon the standard edition of the Latin work
contained in Spinoza Opera, ed. Carl Gebhardt, 4 vols. (Heidelberg:
Universittsbuchhandlung, 1925). The Tractatus theologico-politicus is
located in the third volume of the Gebhardt edition, pages 3267.
The Tractatus theologico-politicus also will be referred to as the treatise
in this book. Quotations from the treatise in this book, or references to
passages from the treatise or other writings contained in the Gebhardt
edition of the Opera, will be cited in the footnotes by reference to the
volume number and the page number(s) where the passage(s) may be
found. In the footnotes, Tractatus theologico-politicus will be abbreviated
TTP and therefore a reference to the first page of the Preface to the
treatise would appear in the footnote as TTP 3: 5. Translations from
the Latin text into English have been made by the author.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This book would not have been possible without the generous assistance
and support of numerous people and institutions. I am grateful to Loyola
College in Maryland for awarding me a senior faculty sabbatical leave
that facilitated my research and writing. I also especially am indebted
to the Program Officer, the President, and the Trustees of the Earhart
Foundation for the award of a fellowship research grant that permitted
me to focus exclusively on the completion of the manuscript for this
book over an extended period of time. I wish to recognize the teachers,
colleagues, and friends who have encouraged me in my work: Richard
Kennington; Gary B. Herbert; David Berman; Rev. Aidan Manning,
S.T.; Martin D. Yaffe; William Desmond; L.S. & P.; Douglas Den Uyl;
Vigen Guroian; Robert Miola; Gregory Cowart; Rev. Joseph Rossi, S.J.;
Rev. John Conley, S.J. I gratefully acknowledge and thank my children,
Katherine Sarah and Michael Hugh, for their patience with me and
Susan for her friendship and joy.
INTRODUCTION
The title page of the TTP bears the publication date of 1670 and it lists the publisher as Henricus Knrath of Hamburg; the treatise was published anonymously. After
the initial printing of the TTP, three other impressions of the book were distributed
and each bore the 1670 publication date. During 1673 and 1674, four other printings
of the book appeared from Amsterdam or Leiden but only one of them was published
under the original title, Tractatus theologico-politicus: see Jacob Freudenthal, On the History
of Spinozism, Jewish Quarterly Review 8 (189596): 3031. According to Pierre Bayle
in his Dictionary article on Spinoza, from 1681 until the close of the 17th century the
TTP was translated two or three times into French under the titles, Trait des ceremonies
superstitieuses des Juifs, La clef du sanctuaire, and Rflexions curieuses dun esprit dsintress: see
An Historical and Critical Dictionary, 4 vols. (London, 1710) 4: 2789; and compare Ira O.
Wade, The Structure and Form of the French Enlightenment, 2 vols. (Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1977) 1: 183. In Epistle 44 to Jarig Jelles, dated 17 February
1671, Spinoza requested that his correspondent intercede to prevent the publication of
a Dutch translation of the TTP. The entreaty of Jelles to those intending to publish
a Dutch translation of the TTP was honored and the publication of the treatise in
Dutch did not appear until 1693 after both Spinoza and Jelles had died.
1
introduction
2
TTP title page: Tractatus theologico-politicus continens Dissertationes aliquot, quibus ostenditur Libertatem Philosophandi non tantum salve Pietate, & Republicae Pace posse concedi: sed
eandem nisi cum Pace Reipublicae, ipsaque Pietate tolli non posse; and compare 3: 7; 11; 179;
24043; 24647.
3
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan or the Matter, Forme, and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil (London: Thomas Crooke, 1651).
4
Compare chapters 1920 of the TTP with chapter 42 of Hobbes Leviathan.
5
The different kind of relationship is reflected in Spinozas conclusions about the
subordination of theology or religion to civil governance: e.g.: After that, I show that
those who hold supreme authority are the interpreters and appropriators not only
of civil but also sacred right (TTP 3: 11); and we conclude that nothing is more
prudent for a republic than that piety and Religion are comprehended only in the
exercise of Charity and Justice, and the right of the supreme powers, in respect of
the sacred as with the profane, is referred only to actions rather than to thoughts or
words (3: 247).
introduction
introduction
introduction
A predicament then seems to present itself. If theologico-political solutions to human questions or human problems are illustrated best in the
cases of theocratic regimes yet Spinoza rebuffs the theocracies of the
Muslims and the Hebrews, what sort of theologico-political teaching
is it that will be propounded by Spinoza in his book? What question
or problem is it that he is handling in a theologico-political fashion?
Moreover, what, if any, theocratic dimension might be involved in the
theologico-political solution to the question or problem that is before
Spinoza in his theologico-political treatise?
It is plain that there is a theological teaching of the treatise; and it
equally is plain that there is a political teaching of the treatise. But it
is not at all plain that there is a philosophic teaching of the treatise.13
Whereas Spinozas book contains a chapter on prophets, a chapter
on the interpretation of Scripture, a chapter on the mission of the
apostles, a chapter on the foundations of a republic, and a chapter
on the liberty of thought and speech in a liberal republic, there is no
chapter on philosophers, no chapter on the reading of philosophic
books, no chapter on the task of philosophizing, and no chapter on the
foundations of philosophy. The only chapter of the treatise in which
the word Philosophy appears in the title is chapter fourteen; and
Spinozas declared purpose in that chapter is to elucidate the foundations of theology for the sake of demonstrating that they are entirely
separate from what is germane to philosophy. Though chapter fourteen
describes what theology is at some length, based upon Spinozas account
of it, the part of the chapter concerning philosophy concludes abruptly
with only the succinct assertions that philosophy simply is different
from theology; each has its own basis; and each has its own goal.14
However useful and important the conclusion about the separation of
philosophy from theology may be to the overarching purpose of the
book, and the reader is reminded at the beginning of chapter fourteen
that to separate faith from Philosophy has been the chief intention of
13
The title of the TTP explicitly states that securing the liberty of philosophizing is a principal ambition of the book. However it does not state that philosophy is
the subject of the book. It is important to discern whether the TTP simply is a book
about theology and politics written from the philosophic point of view or whether
the book contains a philosophic teaching in addition to its theological teaching and
its political teaching.
14
TTP 3: 179. The words philosophy, philosophize, and philosophical appear
only seven times in chapter 14, the only chapter of the TTP which explicitly mentions
the word Philosophy in its title. It also is noteworthy that the word philosopher
does not appear in chapter 14 of the TTP at all.
introduction
TTP 3: 17374.
Within the treatise, the opinions, sentiments, and dictates founded on religious
prejudices or superstitions regularly are cast against the claims or perspectives that
might be advanced by appealing to reason alone. Nevertheless the contrasting of the
views attained by reason and the views that derive from superstition do not seem to
be sufficient to afford the reader of the TTP a grasp of what Spinoza maintains that
philosophy is. Indeed the less than conspicuous development of a position in the TTP
on what constitutes philosophy is probably a main reason why many scholars, including
Fokke Akkerman, Edwin M. Curley, Herman De Dijn, Errol E. Harris, H.G. Hubbeling, Alexandre Matheron, Lee C. Rice, Steven B. Smith, Andr Tosel, Yirmiyahu
Yovel, et al., regard the treatise as being at best only a kind of a nonphilosophic version
of the complete philosophic teaching of Spinoza that is presented only in the Ethica
ordine geometrico demonsrata (1677). The verdict of those scholars might receive some
support from Spinozas own claim in the Preface to the TTP that the chief things
raised in his book have been recognized more than enough by Philosophers; though
Spinoza still addresses the TTP directly to the the one who reads Philosophically (3:
12) and therefore the teaching of the treatise is intended for the reader who possesses
some philosophic acumen.
17
TTP 3: 19395; 245; and compare Tractatus politicus, chapter 2 4 and 1517; chapter 5
2 and 46; chapter 11 1.
18
TTP 3: 179: The object of Philosophy is nothing other than truth . . . The bases
of Philosophy are common notions and one is bound to endeavor to obtain them only
from nature itself ; and 3: 195: And thus I believe I have shown clearly enough the
basis of a democratic regime (imperium); I chose to advance it before all others because it
15
16
introduction
political life that agrees with human nature, especially the democratic
kind of political life that is propounded by Spinoza in the treatise.
Hence philosophy and politics appear to be compatible.
According to Spinoza, everything that we properly desire may be
referred to three chief things: (1) comprehending things through their
primary causes; (2) acquiring the habit of virtue and subduing the passions; and (3) living securely with a healthy body. Of the three proper
objects of desire, Spinoza asserts that the first and second objects may
be attained by the powers that are contained within human nature
itself. That is, knowledge and the acquisition of virtue depend solely
on the laws of human nature and [they] may be acquired solely
through our power. But the achievement of the third proper object
of desire, living securely and preserving the body, occurs principally
because of things external to us. Hence a cardinal source of our
security and preservation owes more to fortune than it does to human
planning or guidance. As a result, Spinoza concedes that the ignorant
and foolish may be just as happy or unhappy as the prudent and
vigilant. Nevertheless, in order to maximize the probability of realizing
the third proper object of desire, Spinoza advocates the formation
of societies with certain laws and he maintains that the task can be
aided greatly by human direction and human vigilance.19 Rather than
societies being arranged by fortune or chance it is better that they be
established and arranged by sensible and attentive human beings. In
other words, it is possible, desirable, and perhaps even necessary that
philosophy and politics act in concert with each other at least for the
sake of satisfying the third proper object of desire.
A similar consequence, however, may not be realized with respect
to the relationship between philosophy and theology. In point of fact,
the professed intention of Spinozas treatise is to demonstrate that
philosophy and theology have nothing in common; each rests solely
appears the most natural and agrees the most with the liberty that is conceded to each
by nature. In his excellent translation of the Tractatus theologico-politicus, Martin Yaffe
notes the difficulty of translating the Latin word imperium uniformly into English and so
he chooses to retain the Latin word throughout his translation of the TTP, see Spinozas
Theologico-Political Treatise (Newburyport, Massachusetts: The Focus Philosophical
Library, 2004) p. 256. The Latin word imperium may connote such diverse things as
authority, direction, command, right or power of command, sovereignty,
empire, dominion, government, jurisdiction, etc. I translate the Latin word
imperium with the English word regime for the reason that regime encompasses the
variety of meanings that are available in the Latin word imperium.
19
TTP 3: 4647.
10
introduction
on its own proper basis; the foundation of each disagrees with the
other; and neither is handmaid to the other.20 The disagreement
between philosophy and theology is introduced early to the reader of
the treatise through Spinozas critique of theology or religion and the
ways in superstition and prejudiced opinions had infected theological
or religious dogma and doctrine with the result that theology and
religion simply had become hostile to philosophy. Moreover, according to Spinoza, the bias that philosophy must be ancillary to theology
or religion is the chief impediment that prevents human beings from
philosophizing.21
Five years prior to the publication of the treatise, Spinoza sent a
letter to his friend and regular correspondent, Henry Oldenburg, who
recently had been appointed joint secretary of the Royal Society in
London. The epistle began with a response to Oldenburgs missive
which contained information about various scientific researches that
were being conducted or debated in England, as well as on the continent. Spinozas letter to Oldenburg also communicated a general view
he held about human nature and the defect of human ability, or the
simple human unwillingness, to understand the whole of nature in a
more coherent way. Spinoza then informed Oldenburg that he had
been composing a treatise on his interpretation of Scripture. He said
that three causes had induced him to write such a book. First, human
beings had been prevented from applying their minds to philosophy
because of the prejudices of the theologians and so Spinoza planned
to expose those prejudices in order to remove them from the minds
of the more sensible sort of person. Second, he wished to avert the
opinion that the vulgar had of [him] as being an atheist; that accusation, he said, must be averted as far as is possible. Third, Spinoza
proposed to secure the liberty of philosophizing and saying what we
think because those liberties typically were suppressed by the excessive
authority and petulance of the haranguers of the people.22
introduction
11
autumn 1665. In the context of the letter to Oldenburg, Spinoza is referring to the
theologians and the preachers as the haranguers of the people.
23
TTP 3: 89; 16768.
12
introduction
introduction
13
Religion beyond its outward devotion [externum cultum] (by which the
vulgar are seen to flatter God more than to adore him).24 Without
defining the alternative tradition, Spinoza suggests that there can be
a condition of theology or a heritage of religion that does not suffer
from the corruptions inherent in the prevailing tradition of theology
or religion and perhaps it even may be possible to recover that more
basic, original, and uncorrupted condition of theology or religion.
Prior to the advent of theological arrogance, theological prejudice,
or theological corruption, Spinoza suggests that there was a Religio
antiqua though only the vestiges of it remain in the prevailing condition of theology or religion. If the current state of theology or religion
may be characterized as inherently hostile to philosophy and reason, is
it possible that once there was an expression of theology or religion that
was not hostile to philosophy? In perhaps one of its most interesting
respects, the argument of the treatise involves the attempt to reclaim a
supposedly uncorrupted tradition of theology or religion and reestablish
it as the valid and vital one. Moreover, that reclaimed tradition will
confirm that the basic, original, and uncorrupted theology or religion is
not at all hostile to philosophy or reason. On the contrary, the proper
interpretation and understanding of the matter will demonstrate that
the actual posture of theology or religion toward philosophy is one of
indifference.25
Spinoza argues in the treatise that the basic teaching of theology
is simple, uncomplicated, and easily comprehensible to anyone who
wishes to seek it.26 The source of that teaching is the Bible which
contains the Hebrew Scriptures and the Christian Scriptures.27 Thus
Spinozas account of theology or religion, that is, his attempt to arrive
at an understanding of the original message and meaning of the
Scriptures focuses on the Judeo-Christian tradition; and his reading,
understanding, and interpretation of that tradition was received with
nearly universal denunciation upon the publication and circulation of
the treatise.28 Because it was believed that so many of the claims of
the treatise would be recognized to be patently heterodox by readers
TTP 3: 8.
TTP 3: 10; 174; 17982; 188; 24547.
26
TTP 3: 16273.
27
TTP 3: 167.
28
Some of the edicts passed by the United Synods of The Netherlands against the
publication and distribution of the TTP have been reprinted in Jacob Freudenthals Die
Lebensgeschichte Spinozas: In Quellenschriften, Urkunden und nichtnamlichen Nachrichten (Leipzig,
24
25
14
introduction
1899). The reception of the TTP also was detailed by Freudenthal in On the History
of Spinozism, The Jewish Quarterly Review 8 (189596).
29
For example, in Deism Examind and Confuted in Answer to a Book intitled Tractatus
Theologico-Politicus (London: Charles Brown, 1697), Mathias Earbury maintained
that it was not necessary to read past chapter 7 of the TTP to realize its errors and,
in fact, it probably was not necessary to read past its first two chapters. A number of
denunciations of the TTP appeared in 1674 and each of them condemned the book
as blasphemous and atheistic. But perhaps more intriguing than the refutations of
the book that can be found was the variety of opponents Spinoza had incited. They
included Jacob Veteler, a Remonstrant preacher; Regner van Mansvelt, a Professor of
Theology at Utrecht; Spitzelius, a Lutheran minister; Musaeus, a Professor of Theology
at Jena; Willem van Blyenbergh, a merchant and correspondent of Spinoza during
1665; and Lambert van Velthuysen, an Utrecht physician.
30
Jean-Baptitste Stouppe, La Religion des Hollandois reprsente en plusieurs lettres crites par
un Officier de larme du Roy un Pasteur & Professeur en Thologie de Berne (Cologne: Chez
Pierre Martineau, 1673) pp. 6567.
31
Jean Brun, La veritable Religion des Hollandois, avec une apologie pour la Religion des EtatsGenereaux contre le Libelle diffamatoire de Stouppe (Jena, 1675). Despite Bruns loyal defense
of the Dutch ministers against Stouppes allegation, it is of course more than a little
ironic that his defense partially relied upon the assumption that the TTP actually had
been printed in Hamburg as the title page of the book indicated. But a year prior to
the writing and publication of Bruns book a work already had appeared from Jena
confirming that Spinoza was a resident of The Netherlands and that the TTP actually
had been printed in Amsterdam and not Hamburg: see, Musaeus, Tractatus theologicopoliticus ad veritatis lumen examinatus ( Jena, 1674).
introduction
15
32
When Spinozas Tractatus Theologico-Politicus first came out, Mr. Edmund Waller
sent it to my lord of Devonshire and desired him to send him word what Mr. Hobbes
said of it. Mr. H. told his lordship: Ne judicate ne judicemini. He told me he had outthrown him a bars length, for he durst not write so boldly in Andrew Clark, ed., Brief
Lives, chiefly of contemporaries, set down by John Aubrey, between the years 1669 and 1696, 2 vols.
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1898) 1:357.
33
TTP 3: 1516. With respect to human knowledge of things divine, Spinoza states
that there is nothing that impedes God from communicating in some other form [viz.,
revelation] what we know by the natural light.
34
TTP 3: 9; 4547; 57.
35
TTP 3: 10; 6869.
36
TTP 3: 81; 87.
16
introduction
introduction
17
18
introduction
42
introduction
19
43
Spinoza never expressly contests or denies the existence of God in the TTP nor
does he do so in his other writings. However, the report of an Inquisition spy who
was traveling in The Netherlands in the late 1650s offers another perspective on the
matter. Fr. Toms Solano y Robles attended a meeting of the Collegiants, a group of
Dutch freethinkers, on 10 August 1659. Solan y Robles reported that Spinoza was
present at the meeting and the priest described Spinozas confession of his atheism in
this way: [E]staban contentos en tener el herror de el ateismo, porque sentian que
non havia Dios sino es filosofalmente (Como he declarado). The report is reprinted
and discussed in I.S. Rvahs Spinoza et le Dr. Juan de Prado (Paris: Mouton, 1959) pp.
3132; 64.
44
TTP 3: 188. The theological part of the TTP is contained in chapters 115.
45
The initial and early receptions of the TTP confirm that Spinozas teaching in
that book was considered heretical and atheistic by the majority of its readers. But
over time Spinoza has enjoyed a kind of rehabilitation which perhaps owes to the fact
that his successors have adopted his of method of Biblical criticism. In his assessment
of Spinozas teaching on theology or religion, one scholar has concluded that as a
whole his doctrine is a representation of that liberal moral type of Christianity: see
H.G. Hubbeling, Spinozas Methodology (Assen, The Netherlands: Van Gorcum Company,
1967) pp. 5859; and Hubbeling, Spinoza (Freiburg/Mnchen: Verlag Karl Alber, 1978)
pp. 96110.
20
introduction
46
introduction
21
47
22
introduction
introduction
23
48
49
50
51
52
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
3:
3:
3:
3:
3:
188.
7375; 18992.
5.
18990.
7677.
24
introduction
introduction
25
53
One might propose that Spinoza imitates Plato. That is, just as Socrates tames
Thrasymachus in the Republic (350d354b) so too Spinoza tames the theologians and
preachers in the TTP. Both Socrates and Spinoza wish to purge the content from the
doctrines of their opponents while simultaneously leaving the mode of communication
for their opponents doctrines intact. Just as Socrates empties Thrasymachus teaching
of its content but saves its form, namely, the rhetorical art, Spinoza purges theology or
religion of its harmful prejudices and superstitions so that he may continue to appeal to
theologys rhetorical prowess to move ordinary human beings toward sociability (TTP 3:
180; 188; compare Republic 398a400 and Leo Strauss, The City and Man [Chicago and
London: University of Chicago Press, 1964] pp. 8085); for human beings by nature
are inclined toward theology or religion (TTP 3: 57; and compare Republic 386a392a).
Platos justification for appealing to the rhetorical art of Thrasymachus, if not the
teaching of Thrasymachus, might be said to owe to the fact that human beings are
moved first, and perhaps most, more by music than they are moved by mathematics.
Spinoza is more straightforward about the matter in the TTP. According to Spinoza,
if one wishes to persuade or dissuade anyone about anything that is not self-evident
[per se notum non est] he must deduce the matter from what is accepted by his audience;
he will speak in accordance with their capacity for being moved; he will grant their
presumptions; he will rely on what they have experienced; and he will not resort to
lengthy proofs that involve long chains of reasoning or demonstration (TTP 3: 7677).
26
introduction
54
PART ONE
PHILOSOPHY
1
TTP 3: 173. Spinoza uses the words faith and theology interchangeably in
the TTP (3: 179).
2
TTP 3: 189.
3
TTP 3: 89.
30
part one
philosophy
31
human affairs, the knowledge that explains the order and operations of
the world, and the knowledge that will lead all human beings to their
ultimate wellbeing or salvation. Indeed, theology or religion claims to
possess such knowledge exclusively. Any endorsement of philosophizing,
therefore, would be taken to insinuate that theology or religion in fact
might not possess or supply what it is that human beings need to know
and to do in order to achieve their complete salus.9 Were philosophy
to be considered a legitimate alternative to theology or religion then
theology or religion would cede its authority and cease to enjoy its
privileged position among the people. To safeguard itself and its station,
theology or religion adopts an antagonistic posture toward philosophy;
theology or religion prevents human beings from turning their minds to
philosophy; and theology or religion induces ordinary human beings,
the nonphilosophers, to regard philosophy with suspicion, contempt,
or trepidation.10
The treatise seeks to demonstrate that philosophy can coexist peacefully with theology or religion and politics; and there is a significant
point made in Spinozas statement of the express aim of his book. He
maintains that allowing people the liberty to philosophize will not prove
to be an inconvenience either to piety or the public peace. The title
of the treatise, the summary of the chief aim of the treatise contained
in the Preface to the book, and the concluding sentiment found on the
last page of the treatise each repeat the promise that philosophy will
not be either a private or a public nuisance.11 However, the avowed
purpose of the treatise must be read against another declaration also
made by Spinoza early in his book.
In the Preface to the treatise, Spinoza states that the Dutch have
the rare happiness of living in a Republic where each is conceded
complete liberty of judging and revering God from his own native bent
[ex suo ingenio] and where nothing is held more estimable or agreeable
The ambiguity of the Latin word salus must be borne in mind throughout the
reading of the TTP. For in one context, the word simply may convey a sense of personal wellbeing which can be neutral to any theological or political considerations.
But in most contexts, Spinoza intends the word to bear the theological connotation
of religious salvation or the political connotation of civic welfare. The latter two
connotations bear a number of implications that can involve precepts or practices that
are either mutually inclusive of each other or mutually exclusive of each other.
10
TTP 3: 68.
11
TTP 3: 1; 7; 243; 247.
9
32
part one
than liberty.12 If the complete liberty of judging or the high estimation and approval of liberty were facts of the age, and the Dutch
circumstance in particular, then the stated ambition of Spinozas treatise
would be not only superfluous but also absurd. Why should Spinoza
seek to win a liberty that already existed and which already was said to
be enjoyed by every citizen? Spinozas assessment of the contemporary
situation in The Netherlands continues, however, and he notes that
religious and political prejudices as well as superstitions remain
the chief obstacles that prohibit the specific kind of liberty that he is
advocating. Indeed, the passage from the Preface about the Dutch situation makes it quite plain that the prevailing tradition of theology or
religion and the prevailing tradition of politics are susceptible to the very
sort of collusion that could reduce human beings, especially the most
vulnerable ones, namely, the passionate ones who constitute the majority of humankind, to a condition of servitude of thought. The not
so subtle warning against the undesirable consequences of collusion
between theology and politics should remind the reader of Spinozas
complaint against the Turkish regime wherein collusion between theology and politics had prevented liberal and open public discourse as well
as independent judgment. It also is worthwhile to note that Spinozas
complaint against the Turkish regime in fact appears at the top of the
same page of the Preface to the treatise where Spinoza comments on the
putatively salutary contemporary circumstances of The Netherlands.13
One implication that may be drawn from the proximity of the two
statements would be that the conditions in The Netherlands ran the
risk of becoming more similar rather than less similar to the conditions
associated with the Turkish regime. The reader should be struck by
an inconsistency. On the one hand, in the treatise Spinoza explicitly
pleads for a liberty of philosophizing. Yet, on the other hand, Spinoza
categorically asserts that liberty of judgment, liberty of worship, and a
seemingly widespread love of liberty already universally are approved
in The Netherlands. Because of the inconsistency between Spinozas
statements, it would seem fair for a reader of the treatise to infer that
the liberty imputed to The Netherlands by Spinoza is something that
may have been honored in speech but not really welcomed in deed.14
One ambition of the treatise is to correct that problem.
12
13
14
TTP 3: 7; 246.
TTP 3: 7.
TTP 3: 24446.
philosophy
33
TTP 3: 239.
TTP 3: 56; 8; 14; 8182; 9092; 167; 173; 18082.
TTP 3: 6.
34
part one
philosophy
35
18
19
36
part one
20
TTP 3: 180. The Latin title of chapter 15 is Nec Theologiam Rationi, nec Rationem
Theologiae ancillari, ostenditur, & ratio, qua nobis S. Scripturae authoritatem persuademus. The
ironic sense of handmaid can be exhibited in the fact that notwithstanding Spinozas
assertions about the separation of theology from philosophy there is every indication
that theology increasingly is subordinated to reason or philosophy in the treatise. For
example, Spinoza lists three criteria by which a prophecy or revelation may be certified as valid but in the final analysis the validity of a prophecy or revelation will rest
on the reasonability of the doctrine or message that it imparts (compare TTP 3: 31
and 18587).
21
TTP 3: 1112; 239.
22
TTP 3: 11; 16465; 172; 17779.
23
TTP 3: 179.
24
TTP 3: 15859; 17576 and compare 6970; 161.
philosophy
37
25
On the crucial differences between Christ and Moses, see TTP 3: 2021 and
6465.
26
TTP 3: 206.
27
Exodus 19:8; 1821 and Deuteronomy 5:2232; 18: 1516. Spinozas account of
the passages emphasizes the fear that was experienced by the Hebrews. But another passage at Deut. 19:1625 also makes plain that God had forbidden the people to approach
the mountain and God set a boundary which if crossed would result in the death of
anyone who violated the boundary. The prohibition applied to human beings as well
as to animals. Fear of death is what prevented the Hebrew people from approaching
God. Moses did not suffer from the same fear that possessed the Hebrews and he was
exempted from observing the boundary that had been established by God.
28
TTP 3: 205207.
38
part one
philosophy
39
some way toward representing philosophy in that light. Still, the view
that philosophy inherently threatens piety or the public peace is an
opinion formidably endorsed by the prevailing traditions of theology
and politics. As a result, animosity toward philosophy from either theology or politics typically occurs and Spinozas version of the teaching
of theology in the treatise is designed to counteract that outcome. The
account of theology or religion given in the treatise represents the prevailing received theological view about philosophy as a prejudice; and
Spinozas version of the teaching of theology in the treatise reflects
a doctrine of benign indifference on the part of theology or religion
toward philosophy. The recovered original and basic meaning of theology or religion can tolerate the existence and practice of philosophy
for the reasons that theology and philosophy have no commerce nor
affinity with each other; each has its own province and its own foundation; neither serves as the handmaid to the other; and faith itself is
shown to concede the highest liberty to philosophizing.31 Nevertheless,
Spinoza must persuade his readers that philosophy can be tolerated
and he must argue his case before an audience which naturally may
be unsympathetic to his claim but which demonstrably has been made
unsympathetic to his claim historically.
Given the aims of his book, Spinoza was required to introduce
his readers to philosophy; or, at least, he was required to present his
readers with a number of propositions that were of a philosophical
character or which were deducible from philosophy. But taking the
prevailing state of theology and politics into account, it was necessary
for Spinoza to communicate the teaching of philosophy in the treatise
only in an indirect way. To make it possible for there to be a liberty
of philosophizing philosophy has to confront the obstacles to philosophizing. Philosophy has to expose and then rebut those elements
of the prevailing traditions of theology or religion and politics that
prove most prohibitive of the liberty to philosophize. But philosophy
also has to undertake its task without alienating itself further from its
adversaries. Philosophy thus has to disclose enough of itself to combat
its theological and political opponents while simultaneously indicating
that philosophy in itself is not a lethal danger to those who oppose it
nor does philosophy corrupt those who are the followers of those who
are opposed to philosophy. In other words, if it is necessary to introduce
31
TTP 3: 17980.
40
part one
32
The almost immediate condemnations and refutations of the TTP by theologians,
preachers, and other philosophers, as well as the banning of the publication, distribution, and sale of the book, all would appear to confirm the view that if Spinoza were
trying to protect philosophy from its adversaries then it must be conceded that he failed
quite miserably. But two points may be offered to counter that conclusion. First, almost
every plea for reform or every demand for change initially is met with recriminations,
denunciations, or counterclaims. The reaction does not invalidate the worth of the
plea. Second, Spinozas teaching in the TTP generally was esteemed scandalous but
that fact does not mean that his teaching was understood in its entirety or that it was
understood correctly or even especially well.
philosophy
41
of philosophy in his book only indirectly for the sake of the security
and health of his audience.
Bearing in mind that the third proper object of desire is basic and
universal, the philosopher recognizes that human beings cling, and often
they cling tenaciously, to whatever they believe will provide them the
greatest likelihood of satisfying their desire for security, health, prosperity, and preservation. Most human beings presume that the prevailing
traditions of theology or religion and politics have proved to be, and
they will continue to prove to be, the most apt means to providing them
with security, health, preservation, and some degree of prosperity in
their lives. Therefore human beings will not abandon their theology
or their politics dispassionately; and theology or politics will attempt to
intimidate them with the loss of security and health if they forsake
theology or politics.33 Philosophy therefore concludes that it is unwise
to vitiate the opinions, convictions, sentiments, or hopes of ordinary
human beings without providing a satisfactory alterative to them.
Even while philosophy performs a useful service by exposing the
aspects of the prevailing tradition of theology or religion that had
come to corrupt and obscure the more benign elements of the ancient
Religion, it still would have been imperative for Spinoza to avoid being
seen to subvert certain pieties or civic principles too openly, though
philosophy itself actually might contest the merit, validity, or rectitude
of many of those pieties or principles.34 The philosopher thus expresses
himself guardedly in the presence of the nonphilosophers, especially
those theologians, preachers, orthodox believers, and ordinary human
beings or civic authorities, who are disinclined to suffer what philosophy
professes. Some of the disaffection toward philosophy exercised by the
nonphilosophers results from the ignorance, bias, intolerance, or antipathy that is endemic to human nature in cases where someone encounters
something novel, unconventional, or different from what he generally
expects to experience. But the superstitions and prejudices defended
by the prevailing tradition of theology or religion, together with any
political use or manipulation of those superstitions or prejudices, serve
only to compound whatever natural disaffection for philosophy any
individual already may possess.35
TTP 3: 89; 24243.
TTP 3: 74; 183; 24345.
35
One might recall the second motive for writing the TTP that Spinoza communicated to Oldenburg in 1665. According to Spinoza, it is necessary to avert the
accusation of atheism as far as it is possible to do so.
33
34
42
part one
philosophy
43
44
part one
they are disinclined to accept what philosophy teaches yet he knows that
the nonphilosophical things which they have been taught and which
they believe are not entirely useless. The nonphilosophical doctrines
can impact the lives of the nonphilosophers in broadly positive ways.
Perhaps then Spinoza decided to present the philosophic teaching of
the treatise at one remove from the more conspicuous theological and
political teachings of his book as much for the sake of protecting the
nonphilosophers from certain of the doctrines that philosophy does
teach as it may have been for the sake of shielding philosophy from
the hostility of theology or politics.42
Spinozas old book raises a philosophic problem. The philosophic
problem concerns human nature and the prospects for human sociability.
The treatise provides a theologico-political solution to that philosophic
problem while philosophy itself largely is understated and operates
from the recesses of the book. If the declared intentions of Spinozas
book are to separate philosophy from theology and to secure the
liberty of philosophizing43 then it would seem that philosophy and the
teaching of philosophy should have been displayed more prominently in
the treatise and they should have been allotted more attention. But the
teaching of philosophy is not perspicuous in the treatise; and that fact
has occasioned different interpretations and explanations of Spinozas
old book among various scholars.
There are many scholars who argue that the purpose of the treatise
is to address a contemporary set of questions or problems that affected
The Netherlands at the close of the 1660s. Defenders of the republican
movement were pitted against the monarchists and their supporters.
The Calvinists also were contending with a variety of dissenting religious sects. Spinozas book takes sides in both of those conflicts. Thus
a significant portion of Spinoza scholars maintain that the treatise is
mainly a timely critique and treatment of the difficulties of its age.
made the following confession: I became ever more attentive to the manner in which
the heterodox thinkers of earlier ages wrote their books. As a consequence of this, I
now read the Theologico-political Treatise differently than I read it when I was young. I
understood Spinoza too literally because I did not read him literally enough (p. 31).
42
Though the motive of protecting nonphilosophers from philosophy and the motive
of shielding philosophy from the nonphilosophers both could have influenced Spinozas
decision to write the TTP the way he did, the former is the more controversial and the
more neglected of the two motives. I have discussed my view on the matter in On
the Practice of Esotericism, Journal of the History of Ideas 53 (1992): 23147.
43
TTP 3: 7; 10; 17980; 188; 247.
philosophy
45
44
In B.d.S. Opera Posthuma (Amstelodami, 1677). Part 4 of the Ethica contains
propositions that would align best with the view claiming that the TTP at most only
foreshadows the eventual systematic formulation of Spinozas teaching in the Ethica;
see, e.g., Propositions 3637 which concern political life.
45
Among those who have expressed the kind of perspective sketched here, one would
include Abb Antoine Sabatier de Castres, Apologie de Spinoza (Paris, 1766); A.E. Renthe,
Probatio quod B. de Spinoza graviter errans non fuerit atheus (Coethen, 1766); A.W. Rehberg,
Treatise on the Nature of Forces [trans. Anonymous] (Berlin, 1779); James Martineau, A
Study of Spinoza (London: Macmillan and Company, 1882); Frederick Pollock, Spinoza:
His Life and Philosophy (London: Duckworth and Co., 1899); Henry A. Wolfson, The
Philosophy of Spinoza, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
1934); Alexandre Matheron, Le Christ et le salut des ignorants chez Spinoza (Paris: Aubier,
46
part one
In other words, at best and at most, the treatise may contain some
hints of the fully articulated philosophy of Spinoza that yet was to
come; and, at a glance, there may be much in the treatise and in the
history of Spinoza scholarship to support the plausibility of that sort
of conclusion which has been reached by many, if not to say most,
Spinoza scholars. However, their conclusion can be maintained only at
the expense of dismissing Spinozas explicit declaration in the Preface
to the treatise that his book is addressed to philosophic readers and the
nonphilosophers are asked to leave the book alone lest they become
annoying by interpreting it perversely.46
On the other hand, it can be concluded from the statements made
in the treatise itself that the teaching of philosophy occupies a covert
position in Spinozas book, or the philosophic teaching of the book is
communicated only indirectly, because philosophy not only is separate
from theology or religion but philosophy also fundamentally is at odds
with theology or religion.47 Insofar as theology or religion emphasizes
that its source or foundation rests on matters that surpass human grasp
(captum humanum superat) and insofar as it regularly affirms the occurrence of supranatural events, the teaching of theology and the teaching
of philosophy must be at odds with each other. The tension between
them owes to their very divergent regards for the status of reason and
its ability to provide an account of nature. The source of theology
or religion is revelation;48 and, according to the teaching of theology
or religion, revelation provides a valid knowledge of the world and a
valid teaching about the conduct of human life and the governance of
human affairs that is superior to the knowledge of the world and the
philosophy
47
48
part one
philosophy
49
Because of the opposition between theology and philosophy, a philosopher can endeavor to manage the situation in one or another of
a variety of ways. Philosophy can ignore its opponent; it merely can
decide that theology or religion is an unavoidable nuisance and obstacle
that probably will continue to persist. But ignoring the opponent will be
insufficient for the purpose of lessening the opposition between theology or religion and philosophy since the philosophers decision would
have no effect on theology or religion. That is, if philosophy ignores
theology or religion there is no guarantee that theology or religion will
ignore philosophy in return. Another option is for philosophy simply
to destroy theology or religion and eliminate the opponent. Philosophy
thereby might secure itself to some degree; philosophy will have removed
a principal cause of the aversion to philosophy that is felt by many
human beings and which feeling was prompted by theology or religion.
But the attempt to eliminate theology or religion would only bring
philosophy into more disrepute than it already suffers. Furthermore,
the elimination of the prevailing prejudiced and superstition-ridden
theology or religion would do nothing to preclude the emergence of
another equally prejudiced and superstition-ridden theology or religion
to succeed the one that just has been eliminated. Even a more liberal
or putatively enlightened theology or religion might yet come to be
permeated by vulgar and obtuse views for the reason that all human
beings by nature are prone to superstition.55 In other words, theology
or religion just may be a fact of life and human nature that can be
neither ignored nor eliminated by philosophy.
Still, another option may be feasible for philosophy. The philosopher
can attempt to tame his opponent. The taming of theology or religion
involves neutralizing the opponents capacity to harm philosophy or to
hinder the liberty of philosophizing.56 The taming of theology or religion
50
part one
involves a modification of certain basic elements of the prevailing tradition together with a renovated assessment of which elements of that
tradition actually constitute the indispensable principles or tenets of
theology, religion, or faith.57 Furthermore, if philosophy succeeds in its
task and it manages to tame theology or religion, the natural human
inclination toward things theological or religious also continues to be
appeased. The disposition of nonphilosophic human beings to look
above or to look beyond nature for the satisfaction of their needs and
desires still is accommodated; and the positive effects of theology or
religion on human behavior still can be maintained. Consequently,
the taming of theology or religion is more possible, more desirable,
and more prudential than either of the alternatives of ignoring it or
eliminating it. However, the philosophic work of taming theology or
religion requires considerable subtlety. Philosophy has to put forward
a teaching of theology or religion that remains credible and which
allows theology or religion to continue to exert influence over the lives
of the faithful. However, the teaching of theology or religion that is
presented by philosophy also must prevent theology or religion from
exercising any authority over philosophy. To achieve the task of taming
theology or religion, philosophy must navigate a complicated path. It
has to establish the legitimacy of separating philosophy from theology
or religion. But philosophy must achieve the objective of neutralizing
theology or religion without subverting it entirely. Thus Spinozas teaching in the treatise involves a literary practice whereby he theologizes
overtly while he simultaneously philosophizes covertly.
Deciding neither to ignore nor to eliminate its opponent, philosophy
seeks to correct the prevailing tradition of theology or religion through
knowledge then surely it does not intersect with what is attainable through the use of
ordinary or natural knowledge alone, namely, what can be attained by reason; on the
contrary, revelation communicates sure knowledge of some matter that supersedes
reason. Moreover (b) it is hard to take seriously the claim that revelation approves what
reason concludes about the divine law. If that were the case then revelation would be
superfluous; reason would be sufficient. Spinoza tames theology or religion by making
an appeal to a particular reading of Scripture. On the basis of that reading, he can
curtail the authority of theology or religion to contest the competence of philosophy
or reason in grasping or interpreting the meaning of the divine law. Theology or religion is preserved and a certain respect for it is conceded. But the power and authority
associated with theology or revelation also has been mitigated.
57
Both Plato and Spinoza demand that the poetry about god(s) be submitted to a
certain hygienic supervision so as to assure that the right tales about god(s) are told. The
tales remain basically familiar but they omit whatever may tend to provoke controversy
or discord; compare TTP 3: 17780 and Republic 377b394b.
philosophy
51
an exposure of its missteps, its errors, and its corruptions. The ostensible
purpose of exposing the traditions mistakes is to occasion a return to
a more original and basic understanding of the sense of theology or
religion that retrieves and accentuates what are said to be the most
indispensable principles or tenets of faith. But if the teaching of theology or religion and the teaching of philosophy in fact collide with each
other then Spinoza cannot propose with seriousness that philosophic
readers of the treatise approve his version of the teaching of theology
or his version of the recovered ancient Religion. Philosophy must
propound a version of theology or religion for the nonphilosophers
that will incorporate the utility of the tamed theology or religion and
still permit it to fulfill its unique function in respect of the salvation
of almost everyone. As Spinoza himself states it, except that we have
Scripture or theology or revelation or religion or faith we would doubt
the salvation or wellbeing of nearly all human beings.58 The tamed
theology of the treatise is stripped of the most harmful elements of
the prevailing tradition of theology or religion, namely, useless superstitions and ignorant prejudices. But the remaining elements of the
tradition that the teaching of theology in the treatise retains continue
to be attractive to the passionate, nonphilosophic inclinations and
aspirations of ordinary human beings. Theology or religion remains
based on the Scriptures and from the outset they have been devised to
lay hold of the imaginations of those who read or hear them so as to
appeal to their passions, sentiments, prejudices, opinions, and experiences.59 But the one who reads philosophically, that is, the one to
whom the treatise is addressed, will be drawn in a different direction.
The one who reads philosophically will be pointed toward the covert
philosophizing or the indirect teaching of philosophy that is contained
within the treatise.
Lambert van Velthuysen was a contemporary of Benedict Spinoza.
He was educated at the University of Utrecht where he studied philosophy, theology, and medicine. Upon the completion his studies, he
remained in Utrecht and established himself as a physician. He also
continued to involve himself in scholarly pursuits and he embroiled
himself in debates about a few public controversies. During his time at
the university, van Velthuysen had become a disciple of the philosophic
58
59
52
part one
philosophy
53
religion. Still, more striking was how van Velthuysen concluded that
Spinoza had accomplished the task of subverting theology or religion
in the treatise. For van Velthuysen ended his letter to Oostens with the
accusation that Spinoza had endeavored to teach atheism in the treatise
by hidden and disguised arguments [tectis et fucatis argumentis].
The correspondence between van Velthuysen and Oostens was available to readers of Spinozas writings as early as 1677; the letter was
published among the contents of the Opera posthuma. The fact that van
Velthuysens missive appeared in the posthumously published collection
of Spinozas writings is a matter of more than passing interest. One
curious aspect of the letters inclusion in the volume is the fact that
van Velthuysens epistle was not written to Spinoza. Van Velthuysen
did not know who the author of the treatise was. Instead his critique
of the treatise was presented in a letter that he wrote to Jacob Oostens
who then passed the epistle to Spinoza, presumably because Oostens
thought that van Velthuysens refutation of some of the chief points
of the treatise was worthy of Spinozas attention. The presence of
the van Velthuysen epistle in the Opera posthuma at first seems justified
only inasmuch as it contains the criticisms of the treatise to which
Spinoza was responding in a letter that he wrote to Oostens.63 In fact,
Spinozas letter to Oostens begins with the acknowledgement that he
undertakes the correspondence out of obligation. That is, Spinoza
says to Oostens that there is no reason to answer [van Velthuysens]
letter other than to keep my promise [to you]. Still, the editors of
the Opera posthuma, who were intimate friends of Spinoza, chose to
include the van Velthuysen letter in the publication of that volume;
and the letters that were printed in the Opera posthuma were deemed
by the editors to be worthy of inclusion in the posthumous volume
for the reason that they contributed not a little to the elucidation of
his other works. Contained within the Opera posthuma were the works
entitled Ethica ordine Geometrico demonstrata, Politica, De emendatione intellectus,
Epistol & ad eas Responsiones, and Compendium grammatices lingu Hebr.
In the most obvious sense, the letters and responses contained within
the Opera posthuma well might serve to elucidate the other works found
in the posthumously published volume. But since multiple references
63
The letter appears as Epistle 49 in the Opera posthuma and as Epistle 43 in modern
editions of Spinozas correspondence.
54
part one
64
The title of the treatise is cited incorrectly in van Velthuysens letter as Discursus
theologico-politicus. But Spinoza does not dissociate himself from the book being discussed
by van Velthuysen, nor does he disclaim his authorship of it, in the letter he writes
to Jacob Oostens. Of course, by 1673, Spinoza generally had been acknowledged to
be the author of the TTP.
65
The Latin word methodus means way of teaching or a way of proceeding.
philosophy
55
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
3:
3:
3:
3:
3:
3:
3:
3:
910; 2930; 36; 43; 88; 97102; 114; 118; 167; 180; 183; 24647.
180.
179.
15.
179 and 187.
184.
185.
91.
56
part one
nonhuman nature.74 However, Spinozas view of philosophy is intrinsically problematical to theology since theology also claims to supply an
account of human nature and nonhuman nature that derives from a
very different and superior source. That is, Spinoza identifies theology
with revelation75 and he asserts that the foundations of theology are the
stories and the language that are obtained from Scripture and revelation alone.76 Yet theology or revelation communicates what surpasses
human grasp or what exceeds the limits of human understanding.77
Theology or revelation, therefore, imparts what is beyond, above, or
divergent from reason. Hence what theology or revelation communicates also may be contrary to reason. But what is contrary to reason,
on Spinozas view, is absurd and therefore also is refutable.78 Spinoza
is clear in his assertion that philosophy and theology are separate
from each other. The separation of the two means that neither should
interfere with the other.79 An accommodation between philosophy and
theology could be reached if each were to constrain itself within its
respective province and neither were to attempt to constrain the other.
But Spinozas statement about what is within the sphere of reason and
what surpasses human grasp makes any serious or genuine accommodation between philosophy and theology extremely unlikely. For if
philosophy concedes that theology does teach what surpasses human
grasp or what exceeds the limits of human understanding then philosophy also must concede without complaint that theology legitimately
can teach what is contrary to reason and hence absurd.
Because the domain of philosophy and reason is truth, it would seem
incumbent upon philosophy and reason to expose not only the errors or
mistakes that philosophy or reason has discerned in theology or religion
74
In the unfinished De intellectus emendatione, Spinoza defines the highest good of
human beings as the attainment of a nature that entails the knowledge of the union
that the mind has with the whole of Nature . . . To do so it first is necessary to understand
as much of Nature as suffices to acquire such a nature (Opera, ed. Gebhardt, 2: 9);
compare Republic 534 and Sophist 234e.
75
TTP 3: 184.
76
TTP 3: 179. In a set of passages in chapter 15 of the TTP, Spinoza establishes
that there is equivalence among the terms theology, faith, revelation, Scripture,
and piety by using the words interchangeably in relation to the unique doctrine that
human beings can be saved by obedience alone (3: 17985).
77
TTP 3: 1516; 2021; 28; 95; 9899; 114; 15556; 16263; 168; 170; 18485;
188; 198200.
78
TTP 3: 91.
79
TTP 3: 1011; 169; 18788.
philosophy
57
58
part one
83
84
85
86
87
88
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
3:
3:
3:
3:
3:
3:
180.
188.
185; 188.
13536.
80.
9798; 11213; 182.
philosophy
59
89
TTP 3: 44. Following that declaration, Spinoza immediately adds that true happiness will not involve any sense of vainglory. Ones happiness will not be identical
with ones conviction that he is wiser than others or that others are less knowledgeable than he is. By contrast, one could note that the prevailing tradition of theology
or religion fosters vainglory among its members by demanding that they endorse one
interpretation of the meaning of Scripture as being superior to another interpretation
of the meaning of Scripture; or certain traditions of theology or religion cast one
religious sect as being more valid than another religious sect. Such practices in the
tradition of theology or religion only encourage the impudence of the theologians and
the preachers; and hence they encourage disdain for reason and philosophy among
ordinary human beings.
90
TTP 3: 172; 17880.
91
TTP 3: 46.
92
TTP 3: 69; 7374.
93
TTP 3: 30.
94
TTP 3: 73.
60
part one
95
TTP 3: 56; 1516; 29; 4345; 5859; 6870; 8185; 9598; 118; 17375;
17985.
96
TTP 3: 5859.
97
TTP 3: 7375.
98
TTP 3: 165; 17678; 188.
99
TTP 3: 188.
philosophy
61
62
part one
philosophy
63
between power and right. Natural right and natural power are identical. That which a thing can do it has a right to do; or natural right is
coextensive with determinate natural power.107 Spinoza, however, also
goes farther. The philosophic teaching of the treatise posits that nature,
considered in itself, involves a kind of moral neutrality. What human
beings consider to be ridiculous, absurd, or evil, in respect of what
they experience, derives only from human ignorance of the order and
coherence of the whole of nature. Human beings typically perceive
or conceive things only as discreet parts and consequently they fail to
appreciate the ultimate integrity of things as a whole. Human beings
gauge events and circumstances according to their own interests and
designs. Hence when natural power or natural right causes events
and consequences that do not conform to what a particular human
being or a group of human beings anticipates or desires then human
beings decry such events. What human beings call evil or good is not
follow from Spinozas proposition. First, if the power of nature is the power of God
but the power of nature also is nothing other than the same power of all individuals then the latter power also must be acknowledged to be identical with the power
of God. Or, individual power, natural power, and divine power are interchangeable
terms. Second, if the power of God is the power of nature and the power of
nature is the power of all individuals then God or nature must be understood to be
capable of acting against itself just as one individual can and does act against another
individual. That is, inasmuch as the highest law of nature is self-preservation and
each individual preserves itself without regard for any other thing but itself (TTP 3:
189) then self-preservation can involve the injury or the destruction of other individuals.
While such a consequence might be reconcilable with a broader philosophical view
of natures order and operation, that is, for example, things can come into being and
things can pass away, it is much more difficult to reconcile the consequence of mutual
injury or mutual destruction, as may be implied in Spinozas claims about power
and right, with any conventional sense of theology or religion. On the thesis that the
power of nature is the power of God is the power of all individuals one would
be compelled to acknowledge the logical implication that as individuals come into
being or individuals pass away so also the same thing must apply to divine coming into
being or passing away; such a tenet however is unacceptable to conventional theology
or religion. If Spinozas claims are interpreted to represent some attempt at a natural
theology one at least must recognize that such claims also are wholly subversive of
revealed theology; and the realization of the genuine tension between philosophy and
theology in the TTP cannot be obscured or neglected indefinitely.
107
Spinozas claim is reminiscent of the position advanced by Thomas Hobbes in
the first three paragraphs of chapter 14 of Leviathan (London, 1651) where he provides
definitions of The Right of Nature, Liberty, and A Law of Nature. Hobbes
asserts that The Right of Nature, which Writers commonly call Jus Naturale, is the
Liberty each man hath to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation
of his Nature, that is to say, of his own Life, and consequently of doing anything
which, in his own Judgment and Reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means
thereunto (p. 64).
64
part one
philosophy
65
where the water is impure neither greater fish nor lesser fish are
able to survive. Thus nature and the conditions of nature can facilitate
or impede what an individual achieves in respect of self-preservation
or in respect of achieving a secure and healthy life. The preservation
of both greater fish and lesser fish depends upon external things
and the same principle applies to human beings in terms of their preservation. Human nature will be a source that facilitates or impedes an
individuals fulfillment of the highest law of nature and the individuals
realization of the third proper object of desire.
By the right and plan of nature Spinoza says that he means nothing other than the rules of the nature of each individual according
to which we conceive each as naturally determined to existing and
operating in a certain manner. The ius et institutum naturae applies to
water, to lesser fish, to greater fish, and to every individual in nature.
Thus the ius et institutum naturae applies to human beings in the same way
that it applies to all of the other individuals of nature. The philosophic
teaching of the treatise does not establish nor does it acknowledge any
difference between human beings and the other individuals of nature
with respect to the fundamental principle or the basic practices implied
in the right and plan of nature, the highest law of nature, or the
identification of natural right with natural power. In terms of the law
that determines individuals to persevere in their own conditions and the
observance of that law by human beings, philosophy or the teaching of
nature admits no distinction between human beings who exercise reason
and human beings who are ignorant of true reason. Neither does the
philosophic teaching about human nature in the treatise discriminate
between rational or reasonable human beings, on the one hand, and
fools or madmen, on the other hand. Whatever any individual does, on
the basis of its own nature, it does with summum ius inasmuch as it is
existing and operating as it naturally is determined to do and it cannot do otherwise. Therefore, as long as human beings are considered
as living solely under the regime (imperium) of nature, anyone who does
not yet employ reason or anyone who does not yet possess the habit of
virtue lives solely under the influence of appetite with the same highest
right of nature as does the individual who conducts his life under the
guidance of reason. That is to say, just as the sensible human being
(sapiens) has the highest right to do all that reason dictates, namely, to
live in accordance with the laws of reason, so, too, an individual who
is ignorant of reason and who is wanton has the highest right to do
66
part one
philosophy
67
114
115
116
TTP 3: 190.
TTP 3: 190.
TTP 3: 73; 19092.
68
part one
117
Spinozas reflection on the reason why human beings naturally may tend to
consider others as enemies is more subtle than the doctrine rendered by Thomas
Hobbes. In his account of the natural condition of human beings in chapter 13 of
Leviathan (Of the Natural Condition of Mankind, as Concerning their Felicity, and
Misery), Hobbes characterizes pre-political life as a condition which is called war.
In the eighth paragraph of chapter 13, he states that the condition is such a war as
is of every man against every man; moreover, mere threats, suggestions, or suspicions
of violence are sufficient to constitute the condition of war (Leviathan [London, 1651]
p. 62). Thus Hobbes argues that war is a necessary consequence of the pre-political
condition of human beings. Spinoza does not seem to go so far. He makes clear that
there are imminent difficulties for human beings under the right and plan of nature
and the various but excessive exercises of natural right and natural power. But, unlike
Hobbes, Spinoza does not say flatly that nature is war.
118
TTP 3: 19092. Human beings pursue what they pursue on the basis of the
perceived usefulness or uselessness of the objects before them. The objects that appear
to conduce to someones wellbeing will be the objects that are sought by him; and the
objects that appear to be hindrances to his wellbeing will be avoided by him. What
human beings call useful, then, they also call good; and what they call useless, they also
call evil. The intimate relation between the concepts of utility and goodness, and the
subjective manner by which such things are determined, is demonstrated by Spinozas
account in the treatise of the making and keeping of pacts (3: 192; 196).
philosophy
69
70
part one
than they are governed by reason then it is difficult to conceive how the
choices, decisions, and actions of the vast majority of human beings
can be brought under the guidance of the dependable dictates of
reason that alone equips human beings with what is truly useful or
advantageous to them. The philosophic account of the ius et institutum
naturae formulated by Spinoza in the treatise discloses the obstacle that
human beings confront when they endeavor to persevere in their respective states or when they seek to achieve security and health. Human
beings, by nature, simply are drawn to whatever may be attractive to
any one of them. They are self-interested. Whatever anyone esteems
as useful to him he also esteems as a worthy object of desire since he
perceives it to contribute to his preservation and wellbeing. Accordingly,
he longs for it and he pursues it. Anyone who has the natural power to
acquire any object that he desires also has a natural right to acquire it.
One may deceive another, cheat another, steal from another, threaten
another, connive with another, and injure or kill another in order to
satisfy the desires or needs that one selfishly regards as indispensable to
his own preservation, security, health, or wellbeing. The natural condition of human beings then is fundamentally egocentric and isolated.120
But there is no guarantee that what each human being esteems and
pursues actually will satisfy his desires or allow him to achieve the end
he seeks because each individual typically judges, decides, chooses, or
acts in terms of what appears to each individual to be the most useful
or the most successful mode of attaining a greater good or of suffering
a lesser evil at any given instant. Mistaken perceptions, confused judgments, or erroneous opinions and the deeds that follow from them can
have dire consequences. It is quite possible that in the attempt to satisfy
the desire for preservation it will happen that evil rather than good
may befall individuals in the natural condition with the result that their
security, health, and wellbeing actually may be forfeited. In other words,
beyond the commonplace problems raised by human subjectivity and
human selfishness, the attempt by human beings to fulfill the lex summa
naturae through the exercise of the ius naturae that is intrinsic to the ius
et institutum naturae entails that life itself can be fraught with perils and
120
One may be reminded of Hobbes characterization of the life of man in the
state of nature as being solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short (Leviathan, chapter
13, paragraph 9 [London, 1651, p. 62]).
philosophy
71
achieving the third proper object of desire will be require more than
a little effort and skill.
Each natural individual exists and operates as it naturally is determined. Human nature is determined more by cupidity and power
than it is determined by sound reason. The prevalence of desire and
power over reason in life owes to the fact that human beings are born
ignorant of reason, its uses, and its advantages. Nevertheless it remains
possible to implement the faculty of reason. What is needed, perhaps,
is the establishment of a basic situation through which true reason
can be cultivated. For example, one could speculate that if the liberty
of philosophizing were granted to everyone then a greater number
of human beings would be introduced to the advantages of reason
and the advantages of living life in accordance with the advantageous
dictates that issue from reason. With the liberty to philosophize, more
human beings might come to appreciate the usefulness of the faculty
of reason and so they might consent to the use of it in respect of their
own interests or they even might elect to employ it themselves with more
frequency than they customarily do. But just establishing the liberty of
philosophizing probably is not enough; for even the general education
of human beings itself appears to present an obstacle to philosophizing.
That is, according to Spinoza, even in their rudimentary education and
training, most human beings develop habits and temperaments that
hinder them from developing reason fully and employing it to acquire
a true course of living and the habit of virtue.121
In the context of the claims of the treatise, Spinozas remarks about
education, training, and the prospects for the complete development
of reason among all human beings are significant. It is clear that the
theologians, for example, together with the educators in general, as well
as the people who are instructed by them, are educated human beings.
They have knowledge of various languages, arts, sciences, literatures,
histories, and so forth. But if Spinoza is correct that education and
training do not provide for a true course of living and the habit of
virtue then one must conclude that traditional education is unable to
convey what is needed in order to satisfy the second proper object of
desire. In other words, traditional education and training are inferior
to reason and philosophy which themselves enable human beings to
master the passions and acquire the habit of virtue. The defect of
121
TTP 3: 190.
72
part one
the traditional education and training cited by Spinoza may owe to the
fact that traditional education and training toward acquiring a true
course of living and the habit of virtue already are corrupted by the
handmaiden thesis about the relationship between philosophy and
theology which is the chief impediment to any sort of philosophizing
in earnest by human beings.122 Under the influence of the prevailing
tradition of theology or religion, human beings are told that philosophy or reason or the natural light is inadequate to define or guide the
proper conduct of life or the governance of human affairs; and hence
human beings come to believe that philosophy is unable to teach a
true course of living and the habit of virtue. Traditional education and
training teach that philosophy or reason or the natural light cannot lead
human beings to security, health, or wellbeing. Instead it is maintained
that the correct path to human wellbeing is found in teachings that
relate something that is above or beyond reason and philosophy. Thus
human beings educated or trained in the traditional manner do not
possess or cultivate an unfettered reason. The faculty of reason that
they develop and employ is tainted by the biases of a theological or
religious tradition which itself may be rooted in a variety of contrarational and contranatural superstitions and prejudices that are opposed
to philosophy and which also are opposed by philosophy.
The issue that is raised and addressed by the philosophic teaching of the Tractatus theologico-politicus is the conduct of human life and
the governance of human affairs. The opening sentence of Spinozas
old book sets the problem that is to be solved by treatise: If human
beings were able to govern all their affairs with dependable counsel,
or if fortune always bore prosperity for them, in no way would they
be mastered by superstition.123 Human beings may conduct their lives
and govern their affairs in a variety of ways. But three particular kinds
of life are delineated by Spinoza. The question posed by the treatise
reduces to this: If human beings can conduct their lives and govern
their affairs with dependable counsel, and presumably they can prosper
and preserve themselves by doing so, why do they rely on fortune or
turn to superstition in the conduct of their lives and the governance of
their affairs? The answer to that question is not especially complicated.
TTP 3: 14.
TTP 3: 5: Si homines res omnes suas certo consilio regere possent, vel si fortuna ipsis prospera
semper foret, nulla superstitione tenerentur.
122
123
philosophy
73
The turn to other recourses, to recourses other than reason, is connected with the basic facts of human nature. If human beings relied on
reason alone then they would enjoy a true course of living and they
would acquire the habit of virtue. But by nature human beings are
determined more by desire, passion, carnal instincts, and power than
they are determined by reason; and they also naturally are prone to
superstition.124 Yielding to passion and self-interest, human beings initially rely on fortune to influence their circumstances and they anticipate
that fortune will bestow on them whatever satisfies their needs, desires,
or concerns. But fortune does not always meet human expectations.
So human beings look to some other recourse that promises to meet
their expectations and alleviate their anxieties about their wellbeing
or their prosperity. Eventually human beings turn to superstition and
the tenets surrounding it in order to adopt a course of living that will
offer them the promise of the preservation, security, health, wellbeing,
or prosperity for which each individual human being longs.
Human beings judge, decide, choose, and act in selfish ways. They
opt for things on the basis of the apparent usefulness of those things
and in terms of which of the things appears to afford them greater
goods or which of the things will allow them to suffer lesser evils,
presuming that some evil must be endured. Human beings may try
to conduct their lives and govern their affairs on the basis of fortune
alone. In the past, perhaps, or even in the present, things that were
desired and sought were attained without the exercise of reason, without making any appeal to reason, and without expending any effort.
Fortune simply favors some human beings. But reliance on fortune as
a means to assuring ones own preservation and wellbeing can be risky;
for fortune involves external, unpredictable, and unexpected events that
follow from sets of causations or relations among things about which
the one who relies on fortune is entirely ignorant.125 Fortune may afford
an individual what he wants; it may not afford him what he wants; or
it even may afford more than he wants on any one occasion. If fortune
seems to afford what someone desires here and now it is likely that
the same person will expect fortune to give him what he desires or
seeks on a continual basis. But even if fortune proves to be stingy on
some occasion it is not necessarily the case that someone will seek an
124
125
74
part one
alternative to it. Provided one does not suffer too greatly under the losses
that fortune may prompt, that is to say, so long as fortune does not
become oppressive, it is likely that one will continue to rely on fortune
in the conduct of his life and the governance of his affairs.
The difficulty of conducting ones life based on fortune is that fortune
is inconstant. If fortune always bore prosperity for men then life
would be comfortable, pleasant, and for the most part satisfying. But
human beings typically do not enjoy such a life. Instead fortune brings
both good fortune and bad fortune. Fortune does not favor everyone
equally and even those whom it appears to favor sometimes suffer debilitating reversals of fortune. Fortune does not always bear prosperity for
human beings; on the contrary, it is fickle. When fortune favors human
beings they consider themselves to abound in good sense indeed they
are overconfident, boastful, and haughty. But when fortune fails to
favor them they despair, they panic, and they beseech counsel from
anyone, nor is there anything to be heard that is so inept, absurd, or
vain, that they would not follow it.126 Human beings who rely on fortune fall prey to the vicissitudes of it and then they are subjected to the
throes of vacillating between the hopes that accompany their anticipations of good fortune and the fears that accompany their anticipations
of bad fortune. Every human being hopes for what is useful to his
preservation, his security, his health, his wellbeing, or his prosperity. But
every human being also fears that his hopes will be frustrated or that
his longings will go unrealized. To assuage the fear that ones hopes
will not be realized or to assuage the fear that ones wellbeing could
be compromised, passionate human beings abandon their reliance on
inconstant fortune and they take refuge in superstition and its tenets
which promise the fulfillment of ones needs and desires; or, failing
that, they embrace superstition and the tenets surrounding it because at
least they supply some explanation for why a particular need or desire
has gone unfulfilled. When fortune fails to deliver the things which
human beings hope to possess they turn to superstition and fear is the
motive for that turn.127 Common to both fortune and superstition is
the acknowledgement that the source for satisfying ones needs and
desires resides in a power that relies upon external, unpredictable, and
unexpected causes or events to effect human well being. The difference
126
127
TTP 3: 5.
TTP 3: 56.
philosophy
75
76
part one
131
132
133
philosophy
77
uses the wherewithal at its disposal to attain that goal. Few individuals
rely on reason only. Most yield to passion only. Perhaps some individuals, to whom both the power of reason and the power of passion are
available, sometimes rely on reason and sometimes fall prey to passion
depending upon which alternative strikes them as being more useful
and successful in gaining the things or goods that promote security and
health or avoiding the things or evils that impede security and health.
Whether one follows reason or passion in the conduct of his life and
the governance of his affairs, the philosophic teaching of the treatise
makes plain that everyone longs to live securely without fear134 but
security is undermined wherever hatred, anger, lust, or deceit reign in
lieu of the laws and dependable dictates of reason which alone are
directed to what truly is useful for human beings. Reason or philosophy
may not succeed in convincing passionate human beings about the
advantages of attaining knowledge of the causes of things and acquiring
the habit of virtue. Thus the teaching of reason or philosophy may not
succeed in helping human beings to achieve the first and second proper
objects of desire. Still, reason or philosophy yet may aid and serve the
advantage of passionate human beings by informing those laws and
dependable dictates of reason that do forestall hatred, anger, lust, or
deceit and which thereby mitigate and moderate the fears that erode
human efforts to achieve security.
Whereas knowledge of nature, or knowledge of the causes of things,
and knowledge of virtue are attainable by human beings through their
own nature and power, the attainment of a secure and healthy life,
and hence the prospect for self-preservation, rests chiefly in external
things. Therefore fortune, in one form or another, always continues
to play a role in the ability of human beings to observe and fulfill the
lex summa naturae. The effects of fortune improve the human situation
or the effects of fortune worsen it. But when human beings encounter
fortune and then augment their experiences of it with convictions about
the reliability of portents, sacrifices, or invocations of extraordinary
powers or agents then those human beings live superstitious lives. When
human beings encounter fortune and augment their experiences of it
with a study of nature and knowledge of the causes of things then those
human beings start to conduct their lives sensibly and they govern their
affairs with dependable counsel. For all human beings, life initiates with
134
TTP 3: 191.
78
part one
philosophy
79
138
139
TTP 3: 47.
TTP 3: 7677.
80
part one
PART TWO
THEOLOGY
1
TTP 3: 184. Spinoza also refers the reader to chapter 12 and what was established
there (3: 16264) in respect of the view that the Word of God does not consist of
a certain number of books; the subject matter of chapter 12 of the treatise is the
sacredness or the divinity of Scripture.
2
TTP 3: 17980. The goal of Philosophy is nothing other than truth: Faith however, as we abundantly show, is nothing but obedience and piety. The foundations of
Philosophy are common notions and they must be obtained from nature itself alone:
Faith on the other hand owes to the stories and the language that are obtained from
Scripture and revelation alone (3: 179).
3
TTP 3: 17680; and compare 165; 18788.
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part two
other than to feel about God such things that when they are ignored
obedience toward God is annulled and when this obedience is posited
such things necessarily are posited.4 Human obedience consists in the
observance of the Divine Law which teaches simply, unambiguously,
and without adulteration that the basis of Scripture or revelation or
faith or piety is nothing other than the instruction to love God above
all things and to love a neighbor as oneself.5 Indeed, if one is obedient
to the law that commands love of God and love of a neighbor then
ones faith or piety is established and his salvation is assured; for all
who yield obedience to God by this plan of living alone are saved,
however the rest who live under a regime of pleasure are lost.6 The
fundamental teaching of theology presented in the treatise promises
salvation to the obedient and it warns of perdition for those who pursue a plan of living that is devoted to pleasure and self-indulgence.
The doctrine characterized by Spinoza as representing the universal
faith or the fundamental premise of the whole of Scripture7 also is
a doctrine that cannot be investigated by the natural light, or at all
events there has been no one who has demonstrated it, and therefore
revelation was very necessary.8 Spinoza is confident that his version of
the account about the foundation and meaning of theology or religion
is accurate, authentic, and indispensable for a proper understanding by
the faithful of what faith really entails. Moreover, he maintains that his
version of the account about the foundation and meaning of theology
or religion is not presented with a view to introducing novelties but
with a view to correcting depravities that have infected both faith
(or piety) and the interpretation of Scripture (or revelation). Spinozas
account of theology or religion in the treatise purports to be a representative form of that more original and more basic Religio antiqua
which had existed prior to the corruption of theology or religion by
those prejudices, superstitions, and fantasies that various theologians,
preachers, or churches had introduced into dogma and worship over
time.9 The theological teaching of the treatise, therefore, recommends
itself as a correction of the flaws and distortions that have come to
4
5
6
7
8
9
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
3:
3:
3:
3:
3:
3:
175.
165; 168; 174; 17677.
175; and compare 178.
177.
185.
8.
theology
85
10
TTP 3: 811; 1516; 2729; 35; 42; 4748; 61; 6465; 7886; 96; 9799; 109113;
116118; 122; 128; 131; 141; 15860; 163; 16670; 17474; 18088.
11
TTP 3: 98.
12
TTP 3: 184; and compare 98.
86
part two
theology
87
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
3:
3:
3:
3:
3:
3:
88
part two
23
24
25
theology
89
26
27
28
29
30
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
3:
3:
3:
3:
3:
3236.
31.
4243; and compare 35; 8788.
42.
17.
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part two
solely toward the fair and the good.31 Satisfaction of the three criteria
would assure the faithful of the legitimacy of the prophecy or revelation
and Scripture itself warns the faithful to guard against succumbing to
the deceptions of false prophets.32 Nevertheless, a difficulty arises. In
respect of the three criteria to which one can appeal for the certification
of the authenticity of a prophecy or revelation, readers of the prophecies or revelations contained in Scripture simply are not competent to
pass judgment on the first criterion. Readers of the Scriptures cannot
ascertain whether or not a prophecy or revelation in fact was imagined
very vividly. Perhaps those whom the prophets first addressed may have
enjoyed the possibility of assuring themselves of the vividness of a
prophets revelation because of his evident enthusiasm in proclaiming
the revelation, for example. But subsequent readers of the Scriptures
have no basis on which to assess the vividness of a prophets revelation and therefore the first criterion cannot be applied reliably as an
element in the certification of the authenticity of any prophecy or
revelation. Taking that fact into account, Spinozas theological teaching
in the treatise then proposes that the certification for the authenticity of
a prophecy or revelation must rest with the other two criteria: the sign
and the teaching. Yet Spinoza also notes that it is possible for someone
to work a true sign but also predict or teach falsely and Scripture
itself recommends that someone who commits such acts deserves to be
put to death. In the absence of a confirmation of the actual vividness
of the prophecy or revelation and because of the fact that true signs
can accompany false sayings or predictions, Spinoza concludes that
it follows that a true Prophet is distinguished from a false one by the
doctrine and the miracle together.33
Since one cannot vouchsafe the vivacity of the prophetic imaginings,
the authenticity of a prophecy or revelation will have to be certified on
the basis of the teaching that is revealed and the sign or miracle that is
worked to confirm it.34 However, readers of the treatise will know that
chapter six of Spinozas book is dedicated to establishing the proposition that miracles cannot occur. On the contrary, in keeping with the
TTP 3: 31.
TTP 3: 186.
33
TTP 3: 186.
34
The identification of signs with miracles in the teaching of the TTP is
established by Spinozas use of the example of the sun standing still for Joshua to
illustrate an instance of a sign (3: 36) and his use of the same example later in the
TTP, in chapter 6, De Miraculis, to illustrate an instance of a miracle (3: 92).
31
32
theology
91
hypothesis that the power of nature is the power of God,35 the theological teaching of the treatise contends that miracles are absurd;36 nothing
can be learned or known about God from so-called miraculous events,
least of all do they establish the existence of God;37 and miracles themselves are nothing other than the anthropocentric misinterpretations of
the order and operations of nature that are rendered by human beings
who hold vulgar and ignorant opinions about the natures of things.38
Still, the theological teaching of the treatise acknowledges that the narratives of Scripture contain numerous references to miraculous events
and the prophets themselves embraced them. Spinoza resolves the
matter by concluding that although Scripture does teach that miracles
occur it is not the case that the Scriptures teach their occurrence as
lessons necessary to salvation; rather each is free to consider them as
he feels is better for himself for sustaining worship of God and religion
with a renewed spirit.39 In other words, attention to the miracles related
in Scripture serves the aim and object of piety and faith, or theology
and Scripture, only to the extent that interest in miracles can encourage or enable human beings to accept and follow the divine law more
wholeheartedly. If the belief that an event is miraculous serves as a
motive for human beings to accept a particular prophecy or revelation
as authentic and those human beings are moved to obey God by loving God above all things and loving their neighbors as themselves then
the belief in miracles by human beings is to be tolerated and such a
belief even may be considered salutary, despite the fact that the belief
in miracles is predicated upon an absurd conception of the order and
operations of nature.40
Readers of the Scriptures cannot adjudicate the vivacity of the
imaginative words or figures experienced by any prophet and so the
force of prophetic imagining cannot be used as a criterion for certifying whether a prophecy or revelation was authentic. Furthermore,
belief in miracles only results from mistaken views about the order
and operations of nature. The very name miracle, says Spinoza,
cannot be understood except in respect of human opinions and it
TTP
TTP
37
TTP
(3: 87).
38
TTP
39
TTP
40
TTP
35
36
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part two
signifies nothing else than a work the natural cause of which we are
not able to explain by the example of some other accustomed thing.41
So-called miracles then are events which occur neither in ways that
are contrary to nature nor are they events that occur in ways that
are above nature; Spinoza considers each of those expressions to
imply the same thing, namely, a violation of the fixed and unchangeable order of nature, and he regards any such event as an absurdity.42
Readers and interpreters of the Scriptures therefore should not appeal
to miracles as corroboratory evidence of the authenticity of a prophecy
or revelation. At best and perhaps at most, references to miracles in
the Scriptures, in connection with a prophecy or a revelation, seem to
serve the purpose of inducing human beings to embrace a particular
lesson or doctrine more steadfastly. For example, at most and at best,
references in the Scriptures to the occurrence of miraculous events in
connection with prophetic warnings or revelatory promises might lead
an individual to obey the divine law with greater devotion in the hope
that his salus would be secured by doing so. But at worst, miracles can
be wrought by false prophets and so one might be led astray from the
authentic foundation and meaning of faith and piety. It therefore would
seem to be the case that the authenticity of a prophecy or revelation
will rest almost entirely on the doctrine that is imparted together with
the presumption that the prophet had a spirit that was inclined solely
toward the fair and the good. It is the content of the prophecy or
revelation, then, that supplies the certification for its authenticity.
Prophecy or Revelation is sure knowledge of some matter revealed
by God to human beings. A prophet, in addition, is he who interprets the
matters revealed by God to those who are unable to have sure knowledge
of the matters revealed by God yet who are able to embrace the matters revealed simply by faith. One may conjecture that each prophet
is convinced of the authenticity of his own prophecy or revelation. But
others must embrace the matters revealed simply by faith. Their faith
in the prophecy or revelation is said to be certified by the power of
the prophetic imagining, the sign or miracle that confirms it, and the
presumption of the prophets devotion to fairness and goodness. Since
one cannot make legitimate appeals to the first two criteria in order
to certify the authenticity of the prophecy or revelation, only the third
41
42
TTP 3: 8384.
TTP 3: 86; 91.
theology
93
criterion can serve to warrant ones embrace [of ] the matters revealed
simply by faith. The fairness and goodness of the prophet and the
extent to which the prophecy or revelation instructs human beings to
embrace fairness and goodness then are of paramount importance for
certifying the authenticity of a prophecy or revelation. But prophecy
or revelation still occurs through words or figures or a combination of
the two; and the production of those words or figures is either true
or it is imaginary. Consequently, the fairness and goodness of the
prophet or the prophetic utterance also could be either true or
imaginary. In the former instance, the words or figures actually were
experienced or they actually occurred just as the prophet heard or saw
them whereas, in the latter instance, words or figures were imagined
so vividly that the prophet was convinced that the words or figures
appeared just as he believed he had imagined them.43 However, if one
cannot determine the power of the imaginative faculty of a prophet to
whom imaginary revelations were made then one cannot determine
whether a prophecy or revelation that owes to the imaginative faculty
was sufficiently vivid to demand ones assent to it as being the sure
knowledge of some matter revealed by God to human beings; so ones
assent is given only on the basis that the prophet and the content of
the prophecy or revelation genuinely were fair and good. The process
for certification of the authenticity of a prophecy or revelation involves
a serious problem. The process for the authentication of a prophecy
or revelation becomes self-vitiating.
The reader of the Scriptures has to embrace revelation by faith alone;
the validity of a revelation involves the power of the imaginative faculty
of the prophet, a corroborating sign, and the prophets devotion to fairness and goodness. One cannot appeal to the power of the imaginative
faculty of the prophet to certify the authenticity of the prophecy or
revelation since that power cannot be gauged adequately or accurately
by the reader of the Scriptures. Nor can one validly make an appeal to
some claim of a corroborating sign or miracle to certify the authenticity
of the prophecy or revelation since such occurrences in fact simply are
not possible. Hence, in order to certify the authenticity of a prophecy
or revelation, one can rely only on the character of the prophet and
the character of the doctrine that is professed by the prophet when
one accepts a prophecy or revelation as the sure knowledge of some
43
TTP 3: 17.
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part two
44
45
TTP 3: 35.
TTP 3: 1720; 3034; 4243.
theology
95
God in all of the Scriptures.46 Moses is set apart from all of the other
prophets, whose prophecies or revelations are categorized by Spinoza as
imaginary, by the fact that his revelation alone incorporated the use of
a true voice. Thus the revelations or prophecies of Moses are accorded
an authority that exceeds the testimony of other prophets. Still, notwithstanding the superiority accorded to Moses, the uniqueness of his prophetic experience, and his enunciation of the sure knowledge contained
in the divinely revealed law that he imparted to the Hebrew people,
an even greater distinction is imputed to Christ. By contrast with all
of the others who may have received revelations from God, Christ is
exceptional for the reason that the communications between Christ and
God were undertaken mind to mind. The revelations to Christ neither
involved nor required any mediation through words or figures, as was
the case with all other prophets, including Moses; what was revealed to
Christ was not contained in the first foundations of our acquisition of
knowledge nor can it be deduced from them, his mind necessarily must
be more eminent and more excellent than the human one; no one else
achieved such perfection other than Christ; and so in this sense we
also are able to say that the Wisdom of God, that is, a Wisdom that
surpasses human nature, assumed human nature in Christ, and Christ
was the way of salvation (Christum viam salutis fuisse).47
Although Moses and Christ are said to be distinct among the persons
in the Scriptures to whom revelations were made, it also is the case that
Christs distinction supersedes the distinction imputed to Moses. Though
God employed a true voice and spoke with Moses face to face, a
mode of communication not used with any other prophet, the revelations to Moses still included sensory mediation: real words or real figures
which were external to Moses were employed in Gods communication
with him. No such mediation, however, was required by Christ who
communed with God mind to mind, who possessed a mind more
46
TTP 3: 17; 21. Spinoza argues that God used a true voice when enunciating the
Decalogue based on the fact that Exodus 24 asserts that the Jews heard God speaking
to Moses (3: 19). Thus the truth of the words or figures of the revelation at Mount
Sinai, rather than the imagination of them, was assured because of the claim that
the words or figures were external and presumably the words or figures also could be
heard or seen at least obliquely by other sentient human beings who accompanied
Moses when the Law was revealed.
47
TTP 3: 21.
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excellent than the human one; who assumed the Wisdom of God
in his own nature; and who therefore was the way of salvation.48
Moses and Christ are separated from all of the others to whom
prophecies or revelations were made. Yet there also are a number of
important disparities between Moses and Christ. A principal disparity
concerns the claim that God spoke to Moses face to face whereas God
communed with Christ mind to mind; and the implication of that
disparity extends further because of Spinozas claim about the character
of the law that each one of them revealed. The law revealed by Moses
was designated for the Hebrew people but the law revealed by Christ
was designated for the whole human race. In addition, Moses and
Christ are different in respect of the fact that Christ perceived what
was revealed truly and adequately as eternal truths whereas Moses
perceived what was revealed to him as precepts and ordinances and
as laws prescribed by God; accordingly Christ was not so much a
Prophet as the mouth of God (os Dei ).49 While due stature is given to
Moses and his teaching, it is clear that Spinoza intends to emphasize
the dissimilarity between the mode of revelation implemented in the
case of Moses and the mode of revelation implemented in the case
of Christ. The dissimilarity between the two modes, together with the
dissimilarity between their respective perceptions of what was revealed
to each of them, particular laws, on the one hand, and eternal truths,
on the other hand, as well as the respective audiences addressed by
each of them, the Hebrew people and the entire human race, sets the
teaching of Moses and the teaching of Christ apart from each other
but perhaps also they are at odds with each other.
Moses and Christ are unique among all of the others to whom
prophecies or revelations were given by God. Yet there can be no doubt
that the teaching of Christ must be acknowledged as the consummate
teaching of the Scriptures for the reasons that Christ alone perceived
48
In the sentence that immediately follows Spinozas acclamation of Christ as the
way of salvation, he warns his readers that he is not speaking of what some Churches
assert about Christ nor do I negate it; for I freely acknowledge that I do not grasp it.
The preeminence granted to Christ by Spinoza is in conformity with the Christian belief
that Christ is the Son of God. Indeed, Spinozas estimate that Christ had a more than
human mind, the Wisdom of God assumed human nature in Christ, and Christ
was the way of salvation, all tend toward the orthodox Christian position that Christ
is God incarnate. But Spinozas disclaimer concerning what some Churches assert
about Christ at least also suggests that one need not conclude that Spinoza subscribes
to the Christian view even though his other remarks might appear to affirm it.
49
TTP 3: 64.
theology
97
50
Though prophecy and prophets are the subjects of two different chapters in
the TTP, Spinoza makes clear the intimate connection between the two by virtue of
the fact that prophecy, and what is revealed through it, is defined as being inextricably
linked with the temperaments, dispositions, and opinions that are held by each of the
prophets; none of the prophets, says Spinoza, was made more learned by prophecy
nor were his basic opinions altered by it (TTP 3: 2931).
98
part two
was not different from the other prophets. That is, Moses conceived
of God as a legislator or king and consequently God was revealed
to him, and Moses revealed God to the Hebrew people, as such a
being. In fact, on the basis of his own impression of what the nature
of God would involve, Moses revealed the very existence of God to
the Hebrew people as a law to be obeyed rather than as an eternal
truth to be acknowledged.51 Moreover, the introduction of the divine
law involved an extraordinary component. It was accompanied by a
terrifying event, the appearance of a burning fire that provoked fear
and violent trembling among the Hebrew people.52 In the broader
context of prophecy or revelation, then, one can understand why the
faithful particularly would look to uncommon modes or instances of
communication when they thought of the form of prophecy or revelation. God had spoken to Moses face to face with a true voice in
the midst of a burning fire that engendered awe among the Hebrew
people. Accordingly, the faithful would argue that it was appropriate to
dismiss the possibility of any merely natural knowledge being competent to disclose or relate anything worthwhile about God. Natural
knowledge somehow might fall under the broad rubric of prophecy, as
Spinoza explains the proposition in chapter one of the treatise, but it
could not be a real source of sure knowledge about God that would
be most prized and most sought by those who were true followers of
God. On the contrary, the faithful would be much more disposed to
receiving and responding to authoritarian prescriptive edicts, precepts,
or commands that emanated from a divine legislator-king who conveyed
his designs for the Hebrew people through prophets, or interpreters
of God, in ways that would seize the attention and imagination of
the chosen people. The communications from the prophets and the
interpretations of the prophecies or revelations that they made known
also would conform to an authoritarian, legalistic tradition that was
predicated upon dutifulness to the law.53 Indeed, the primacy of the law
was so central to Mosaic theology or faith that the need for a certifying
sign to authenticate a prophecy or revelation was excused in all cases
where a prophecy or revelation offered nothing novel or nothing that
exceeded or excluded the Law of Moses.54 Spinoza himself expresses
51
52
53
54
TTP 3: 6364; 207208; and see Exodus 20:16 and Deuteronomy 5:111.
Exodus 19: 1622 and Deuteronomy 5:15.
TTP 3: 9798; 15153.
TTP 3: 32.
theology
99
100
part two
long; and the security and prosperity that are attained by human beings
further confirm the belief of the faithful in the inextricable connection
and indubitable relation among prophecy or revelation, prophets, the
law, providence, and the authority of the Scriptures.60
The Christ model for comprehending theology, revelation, faith,
piety, and the Scriptures also affirms the inextricable connection and
indubitable relation among prophecy or revelation, prophets, the law,
providence, and the authority of the Scriptures. But it does so in a very
different fashion from the Moses model. Christ is exceptional among all
of those to whom prophecies or revelations were made for the reason
that Christ was of one mind with God.61 Thus prophecy or revelation in the case of Christ must be considered superior to every other
instance of prophecy or revelation that may be found in the Scriptures.
Christ did not require any use of the imaginative faculty nor was any
corporeal mediation needed in order for him to communicate with God.
Every other prophet, including Moses, required such mediation. Christ
alone is distinct from everyone else in the Scriptures because he was the
mouth of God and the Wisdom of God took on human nature in
Christ. For those reasons, Spinoza asserts that only Christ perceived
truly and adequately what was revealed by God. The revealed teaching
communicated by Christ involved the expression of an eternal truth
rather than a legislative precept that was to be followed in order either
to continue enjoying the advantages bestowed by God or to avoid the
terrors to be suffered as a consequence of transgressing the law.62 Unlike
the law revealed by Moses, a law dedicated to the promise of material
or bodily rewards and temporal happiness, the law revealed by Christ
offers the promise of a spiritual reward instead.63 Part of that reward
involves the acknowledgement and acceptance of the eternal truth that
the highest human good and blessedness consist in knowledge and love
of God; but furthermore knowledge of nature offers the possibility of
yielding an ever increasingly more perfect knowledge of God.64 In the
broader context of prophecy or revelation, then, natural knowledge
or the natural light may be considered prophetic or revelatory insofar
60
TTP 3: 9798; 56; 910; 15; 31; 44; 5860; 69; 8182; 97. Compare Strauss,
How to Study Spinozas Theologico-Political Treatise, Persecution and the Art of Writing,
pp. 16566.
61
TTP 3: 21.
62
TTP 3: 41; 70.
63
TTP 3: 71.
64
TTP 3: 60; 1516.
theology
101
102
part two
70
Of course, one could go farther and contend that most religions conceive their
supreme being as a legislator-king.
71
TTP 3: 65.
72
TTP 3: 6869.
73
TTP 3: 6061.
74
TTP 3: 102; 165; 167; 16970; 17477.
theology
103
other than obedience to God which consists in love of God above all
things, love of neighbor, and the performance of acts of justice and
charity that spring from ones love of God.75 The real tension or difference between Moses and Christ then is that the former establishes
laws as a lawgiver whereas the latter proceeds as a teacher giving
instructions; for Christ did not wish to correct external actions as
much as to correct the spirit.76
The Christ model of the revealed teaching of theology involves a
correction to the Moses model of the revealed teaching of theology in
the following ways. Human beings long for security and prosperity; the
phenomenon of prophecy or revelation establishes that a suprahuman
agent is willing to offer security and prosperity to them; the suprahuman
source makes itself and its design known to human beings through the
revealed teaching professed by Christ, who reveals the plan of living
that must be adopted and obeyed by human beings if they are to live
securely, prosperously, and attain salvation. Furthermore, in Spinozas
account of the Christ model for comprehending the revealed teaching
of theology, interest in the working of miracles becomes insignificant
because the Wisdom of God has taken on human nature in Christ
and the divine teaching is said to be knowable by the natural light.
Therefore it is not an article of faith or piety that the faithful believe
that Christ actually worked miracles.77 The true plan of living that
guarantees the security, prosperity, and salvation for which each human
being longs is first revealed through Moses who teaches that God is
to be loved and obeyed. But Christ, who is the way of salvation,
reminds human beings of the fact that the fundamental premise of the
law, namely, obeying God by loving God and loving ones neighbor, is
indeed the sum of the divine law itself. Ceremonies, rituals, and institutions may serve to foster faith and piety in human beings. But ceremonies, rituals, and institutions are not requisite for human blessedness;78
TTP 3: 177.
TTP 3: 103.
77
TTP 3: 68 and 90; and compare 4344; 96; 15658; 163; 168.
78
Spinoza asserts that the ultimate significance of the Scriptures is identical with
their ability to move human beings to adopt a particular manner of living. He says that
if one reads the Scriptures but is unaffected by them, that is, if one does not change
his life, then it is as if he had read the Koran or the Fictitious fables of the Poets
(TTP 3: 79). Readers of the Bible would find reading the Koran a poor substitute
for learning the true plan of living. So too a reader of the Koran would find reading
the Bible a poor substitute for learning the true plan of living. But common to reading the Bible, reading the Koran, or even reading the fables of the Poets, perhaps
75
76
104
part two
in fact, they can have the potential to debase and corrode the essential
message of theology or revelation and therefore they are not mandatory
for faith or piety.79 According to Spinoza, the plan of living that makes
salus available to human beings and which enables human beings to
live securely and prosperously can be received with equal effectiveness
as an eternal truth or as a law which must be obeyed. The prophets
have given an instruction that simply is moral in character and their
prophecies or revelations are meant only to amplify the divine law as
it eventually was articulated by Christ. Because that law applies to all
of humankind there is no one nation or group that enjoys a privileged
place among others in respect of their receipt of the law, their comprehension of the law, or the advantages that accompany obedience to that
law. Furthermore, since the law is universal and eternal, there are no
incidents of miracles or cases of special providence, that is, there are
no contranatural events caused by a suprahuman agent, which would
afford security and prosperity for only one people to the exclusion of
the remainder of the human race.80 Instead the security and prosperity for which every human being longs is achieved through belief in
the divine law and faithful adherence to it. The Scriptures express the
divine law simply and unambiguously.81 Therefore wearisome contentious disputes about the interpretation of the Scriptures are pointless.82
The fundamental message of the Scriptures is easily intelligible and
it is directed to the whole human race. Moreover, the intention of
prophecy or revelation is only moral and thus one should not impute
any authority to Scripture, faith, theology, revelation, or piety in matters
pertaining to philosophic speculation, mathematical demonstration, or
the knowledge of nature.83 Each may judge for himself about the basic
meaning of theology, revelation, Scripture, faith, or piety because the
instruction is simple as well as universal; and, in addition, each may
judge for himself what messages, teachings, or instructions from the
narratives of the Scriptures best serve the purpose of enhancing his
the works of Homer or Virgil for instance, is the issue of the power that each of the
writings has to affect how human beings conceive of themselves and how they then
conduct their lives and govern their affairs.
79
TTP 3: 10; 6972; 76; 7980; 200.
80
TTP 3: 4748; 50; 5657.
81
TTP 3: 102; 165.
82
TTP 3: 104; 11617; 17880; 18485; 188.
83
TTP 3: 170.
theology
105
piety, that is, his obedience to God.84 The difference between the Moses
model for comprehending the revealed teaching of theology and the
Christ model for comprehending the revealed teaching of theology is
perhaps most clearly illustrated by the claim that all of the prophets
command whereas the apostles teach.85 The prophets issue edicts,
warnings, and threats; the apostles argue and persuade. Hence the
prophets are promulgators and enforcers of the divine law but the
apostles strive to inspire human beings to understand the divine law
and adopt it.
On the basis of the dissimilarities between the Moses model of understanding theology or revelation and the Christ model of understanding
theology or revelation, one may say that the delivery, implementation,
and observance of the fundamental teaching and meaning of the Scriptures may be distinguished in terms of what follows in accordance with
the prophetic mission, on the one hand, and what follows in accordance
with the apostolic mission, on the other hand. The prophetic mission
appears to be driven by an impulse to reign over those who adopt the
faith by compelling them to remain faithful while the apostolic mission seems to be driven by an intention to persuade and invite human
beings to be faithful.86 The prophetic mission is ordained for the Hebrew
people only; the apostolic mission is ordained for all of humankind. The
prophetic mission is autocratic and authoritarian; orthodox tenets are
established and issued; the observance of them is strictly determined;
and ones faith is gauged by ones unwavering adherence to the law.
The interpretation of theology or revelation or the Scriptures is a matter reserved for those who are sufficiently trained or for those who are
sufficiently gifted to undertake the task. However, it also often is claimed
that the Scriptures and the interpretation of them are fraught with mysteries that are beyond human comprehension or explication; but the
mysteries must be conceded nonetheless.87 The prophetic mission also
entails the working of miracles to certify the authenticity of a prophecy
or a revelation. But the credibility of miracles itself emanates only from
a vulgar and ignorant conception of the order and operations of nature
which absurdly posits the feasibility of contranatural events. What is
restrictive, exclusive, and conservative about the prophetic mission and
84
85
86
87
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
3:
3:
3:
3:
168; 179.
15154.
156.
9798; 104105; 109; 11113.
106
part two
88
89
90
theology
107
108
part two
assures the reader of the treatise that the the foundation of the whole
of religion, namely, obedience to the instruction to love God and to
love ones neighbor, cannot have been adulterated or written by an
errant scribe because if the Scriptures had taught any other doctrine
then it necessarily would have had to teach the remainder in another
manner and the whole fabric falls to ruin.95
The teaching of theology or revelation or Scripture or faith or piety
is one. Furthermore, it is a doctrine that cannot be investigated by
the natural light, or at all events there has been no one who has demonstrated it, and therefore revelation was very necessary.96 In other
words, according to Spinoza, the revealed teaching about love of God,
love of ones neighbor, and obedience to Gods command to love
ones neighbor by living justly and charitably, is a lesson that cannot be
demonstrated by reason or the natural light but it nevertheless remains
a doctrine to which our judgment may assent because we at least
may embrace what already has been revealed with moral certainty and
what was revealed by the prophets is to be accorded moral certainty,
as already was shown in Chapter 2 of this Treatise.97
The theological teaching of the treatise proposes that there is a
divine law that has been revealed through the Scriptures. The principal
advocates and promulgators of the divine law are said to have been
Moses and Christ; though Christs instruction should be regarded as
superior to the instruction of Moses since the Wisdom of God took
on human nature in Christ, Christ was the way of salvation, and
Christ was sent to teach the entire human race.98 The theological
teaching of the treatise posits that the reading, understanding, and
interpretation of theology, revelation, or the Scriptures basically are
private and personal matters. The public matter of how one reads,
understands, and interprets theology, revelation, or the Scriptures is
exhibited in ones living a life that is conspicuously just and charitable
and doing so in obedience to Gods command to love ones neighbor.
Ones faith or piety therefore is demonstrated by ones actions rather
than by ones convictions and, according to Spinoza, it follows that
also implicitly applies to the New inasmuch as the authors of both testaments were
Hebrews and so their mode of expression even in the New Testament basically also
was Hebraic (3: 100).
95
TTP 3: 165.
96
TTP 3: 185.
97
TTP 3: 185.
98
TTP 3: 21; 6465.
theology
109
TTP 3: 177.
TTP 3: 11617; 17879.
101
Spinoza ostensibly recovers a more basic sense of theology or religion that accords
with his sense of what had been sacrificed or corrupted in theology or religion by the
various churches over time. Spinoza thus affords the reader a recovered sense of the
ancient Religion. But one should not miss the irony. That is, the recovery of the more
pristine ancient Religion is achieved only at the expense of the scathing critique of
the prejudices of an ancient people, namely, the Hebrews, that is executed by Spinoza
(3: 8; 81; 180; 222). In other words, on the one hand, the term ancient connotes
venerable but, on the other hand, the term ancient in the treatise also is used to
signify rude and obsolete; see Leo Strauss, How to Study Spinozas Theologico-Political
Treatise, Persecution and the Art of Writing, p. 194.
102
TTP 3: 179.
99
100
110
part two
103
104
TTP 3: 175.
TTP 3: 175; 17778.
theology
111
TTP 3: 17778.
A different interpretation of Spinozas point would be that if one doubted Gods
justice and/or mercy then one could opt for a life of pleasure rather than a life of
obedience to God; and, furthermore, one could do so without compunction because
divine reward and punishment would not be assured.
107
TTP 3: 178.
105
106
112
part two
108
TTP 3: 178.
theology
113
109
110
111
TTP 3: 17879.
TTP 3: 178; and compare 175.
TTP 3: 17577.
114
part two
of living that leads toward human salus; and Spinoza assures the reader
of the treatise that the lesson of prophecy or revelation, and hence
the lesson of theology, the Scriptures, faith, or piety, expresses moral
certitude even though it may not be competent to impart mathematical
or speculative certitude. How an individual conducts his life and how
an individual governs his affairs are the sole means for assessing that
persons faithfulness or piety; and an individuals faithfulness or piety,
that is, his obedience to God, is made practicable only because one
believes each of the seven fundamental dogmas of the universal faith.
Disputations concerning the complicated significances of Scriptural
passages, or scholastic controversies about the merits of one tradition
of theological doctrine over another, or conflicts about ceremonies and
religious practices have no bearing on the authenticity of an individuals
faith or piety. On the contrary, despite the fact that there may be differences of opinion among believers about specific aspects of the dogmas
of faith, only one criterion ever may be invoked to determine whether
an individual is faithful or pious: namely, if the works are good he
still is faithful [since] faith without works is dead.112 Indeed, Spinozas
theological teaching in the treatise goes so far as to assert a curious
and extreme principle: faith does not require true so much as pious
dogmas, that is, such as move the spirit to obedience though there are
many among them that do not have a shadow of truth.113
The theological teaching of the treatise affirms that human salvation
depends upon obedience to God; and obedience to God depends upon
ones belief in the seven fundamental dogmas of the universal faith.
The dogmas themselves need not be true; they only need to be pious
or they only need to be such as to promote piety in human beings.
That is, the dogmas only need to advocate and encourage obedience
to God. Whatever one may think of Spinozas liberal orthodoxy, there
is something odd in his remark about the relation between piety and
truth. If we assume the premise of the treatise that theology and philosophy in fact are separate from each other, and neither is handmaid
to the other, then perhaps it may be said with some legitimacy that the
piety of a dogma is far more important than the truth of it since the
dogmas of faith are revealed dogmas and what is revealed customarily
surpasses human grasp and hence is it beyond rational demonstration.
112
113
TTP 3: 175.
TTP 3: 176.
theology
115
Or, because the revealed dogmas are held to convey only moral certitudes then they should not be expected to convey mathematical certitudes. In that sense, the piety of the dogma is more significant than the
truth of it because the piety of the dogma involves a kind of empirical
verification that the truth of the dogma does not. For example, we
are able to see the faithful acting piously by their performance of works
of justice and charity; in other words, we are able to see the faithful
acting lovingly toward their neighbors. On the other hand, however, we
are not able to see the faithful embracing the actual omnipresence of
God rather than the potential omnipresence of God; nor are we able
to see the faithful believing the unity of God, the mercy and grace of
God, the ability of God to remit sins, etc. The reader of the treatise,
perhaps especially the one who reads philosophically to whom the
book is addressed,114 might be perplexed by Spinozas assertion that
the fundamental dogmas of the universal faith only need to be pious
rather than true.115 But Spinoza seems to make some attempt to alleviate concern about the unconventional character of his declaration
by the fact that he strongly recommends the teaching of revelation,
theology, the Scriptures, piety, or faith for the reason that the essential
lesson of Scripture has been transmitted uniformly, without error or
corruption;116 and he states that one may accept the testimony of the
prophets and the apostles who reliably bear witness to the authenticity
of theologys lesson.117
The distinctive teaching of theology is the teaching of obedience
to God. The seven fundamental dogmas of the universal faith are the
TTP 3: 12.
TTP 3: 179. Spinozas liberal orthodox Christianity possesses other features that
also might strike one who reads philosophically as being rather curious in character.
For example, with respect to the performance of ceremonies, Spinoza argues that
the Hebrew regime employed various ceremonies for the sake of establishing greater
social coherence and identity but the ceremonies in fact did not have any bearing on
the blessedness of the Hebrew people. Christian ceremonies also are said to have
no bearing on blessedness; even Baptism and the Lords Supper are said to have no
blessedness or any Sanctity in them (3: 76). During the 17th century, the controversy
with the Anabaptists was significant and so was the controversy over the Eucharist
and the issue of transubstantiation. If Spinozas teaching of theology in the treatise is
accepted then his position on ceremonies effectively neutralizes disputes about those
matters. Also, with a view to the ability of the natural light to apprehend the divine
law, Spinoza affirms that our natural faculties have that competence and so it is not
necessary to accept the divine law on the basis of ones conviction in the passion
and resurrection of the carnal Christ (3: 68).
116
TTP 3: 16566.
117
TTP 3: 163; 174; 18688.
114
115
116
part two
TTP 3: 17778.
TTP 3: 168.
120
TTP 3: 170. I continue to translate the Latin verb, sapere, as to have sense or
discernment or to be sensible. My reason for choosing to translate the word in that
way may be found in note 113 in Part One of this book.
121
TTP 3: 4445; 6061.
122
TTP 3: 68.
123
Compare Strauss, How to Study Spinozas Theologico-Political Treatise, Persecution
and the Art of Writing, p. 170.
118
119
theology
117
118
part two
Insofar as piety and faith derive from revealed teachings but knowledge of the causes of things and virtue derive from human nature,
one could distinguish between the kind of life that involves obedience
to God, which is engendered by revelation, and the kind of life that
involves knowledge and love of God, which arises from human
power alone and the laws of human nature. Furthermore, inasmuch
as nonphilosophers are more prone to follow their passions and to look
chiefly to fortune in order to conduct their lives, govern their affairs, and
satisfy their desires, whereas the philosophers follow reason and look to
knowledge of nature and knowledge of the causes of things in order
to conduct their lives, govern their affairs, and satisfy their desires, one
may question whether the philosopher is able to live piously at all.127
Moreover, if natural knowledge and prophecy or revelation are
equivalent,128 it is unclear why the former will lead to knowledge of God
but the latter only can lead to obedience to God. Indeed, according to
the teaching of the treatise, the teaching of revelation or theology or
the Scriptures or faith or piety does not even require that the doctrines
which promote obedience to God even be true. The only doctrines
that are required by the universal faith are ones that sufficiently lead
human beings to obey God by living justly and charitably; and human
beings adopt that plan of living only because it has been revealed to
them. They do not adopt the revealed plan of living because it emanates
from natural knowledge or reason; for no one knows by nature that
he owes any obedience to God, nor indeed does he attain it by reason,
but someone is able to adopt it only on account of revelation confirmed
by signs.129 Consequently, the appeal of theology or revelation, and
with it the prospect of inducing human beings to obey God, is tied
to the appeal of revelation confirmed by signs. Yet in terms of the
127
The question of the relationship between piety and philosophy, of course, is the
theme of Platos Euthyphro, as well as being a critical element of The Apology of Socrates.
In the case of Socrates, the tension between the philosopher and the city is reflected
in the tension between reason and piety. A similar tension seems to be present in the
TTP. One illustration of the tension and Spinozas attempt to repair it appears in his
intent to demonstrate in the TTP that philosophy, and the liberty of philosophizing,
need not be detrimental to piety and the public peace.
128
TTP 3: 1516.
129
TTP 3: 198. Philosophy and reason have truth as their common object and philosophy is founded upon common notions that are sought on the basis of nature alone
(3: 17980; compare 183 and 188). Accordingly, if one cannot know by nature that
he owes any obedience to God then it also follows that one cannot know the doctrine
of obedience to God on the basis of philosophy or reason.
theology
119
130
131
132
133
134
135
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
3:
3:
3:
3:
3:
3:
31.
153.
3536.
84.
86.
18586.
120
part two
136
137
138
139
140
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
3:
3:
3:
3:
3:
186.
18687.
79.
5961.
61.
theology
121
141
One should recall Spinozas confession that he does not understand certain
things put forth about Christ by certain churches (TTP 3: 21) as well as his claim that
one may accept the revealed teaching of Christ without being required to accept the
passion and resurrection of the carnal Christ (3: 68).
142
TTP 3: 156.
143
TTP 3: 53. Because Spinoza identifies the external aid of God with fortune
(3: 46), the claim that is made about Moses by Spinoza insinuates that Moses understood
just how much fortune, or apparently some kind of extraordinary good luck, would
be needed so as to keep the Hebrew people orderly and united.
144
TTP 3: 15.
122
part two
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
3:
3:
3:
3:
71.
233; and compare 64.
6465.
64.
theology
123
149
150
151
TTP 3: 65.
TTP 3: 64; 17172.
TTP 3: 65.
124
part two
152
TTP 3: 63.
theology
125
153
154
TTP 3: 65.
TTP 3: 70; 7374.
126
part two
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
3:
3:
3:
3:
theology
127
that whoever says that one must believe that there are particular attributes of God without affording a demonstration of them is someone
who certainly is jesting. What is the reader of the treatise to conclude?
More to the point, what should the one who reads philosophically
conclude about Spinozas odd or discrepant statements?159 At the very
least, a philosophical reader of the treatise can be assured of this consequence. If theology is revelation160 and the teaching of revelation is
the teaching of obedience to God161 and obedience to God is achieved
only through conviction in the seven fundamental dogmas of the universal faith162 then one must acknowledge that on the basis of Spinozas
arguments in the treatise, that is to say, his philosophical argument or
philosophical teaching in the treatise, it is necessary to conclude that
however much the fundamental dogmas of faith may assure piety
they also continue to teach vulgar, intellectually defective, and erroneous characterizations of the deity and Spinoza already explicitly has
renounced those vulgar depictions of the deity previously in his book.163
The seven fundamental dogmas of the universal faith require the faithful
or pious to regard God as highly just and merciful; to regard God as
a judge; to regard God as directing all things through his fairness
and justice; to regard God as having supreme right and dominion
over everything; and to think of God as forgiving and as directing
all things by his mercy and his grace.164 However, Spinoza himself
159
At this juncture it could be tempting to rehearse the history of the debate over
the question about the sincerity of Spinozas theological teaching in the TTP. That is,
one could address the question of whether the TTP contains both an exoteric teaching
that is designed for nonphilosophers and an esoteric teaching that is designed for the
potential philosopher or for one who reads philosophically. It is not my intention to
resolve that issue here in its entirety. I have defended the proposition that exoteric/
esoteric literature is possible in On the Practice of Esotericism, Journal of the History
of Ideas 53 (1992); and I have demonstrated Spinozas use of such literature in Harris,
Strauss, and Esotericism in Spinozas Tractatus theologico-politicus, Interpretation: A Journal
of Political Philosophy 23 (1996) and in Spinoza, Philosophic Communication, and the
Practice of Esotericism in Piety, Peace, and the Freedom to Philosophize, ed. Paul J. Bagley
(Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999).
160
TTP 3: 184.
161
TTP 3: 185.
162
TTP 3: 175 and 178.
163
TTP 3: 6265. This is but one instance where Spinoza demands that his reader
pay close and careful attention to statements made in the book that are inconsistent
with each other directly or that are inconsistent with each other indirectly or by implication. In the seven fundamental dogmas of the universal faith, Spinoza is encouraging
inattentive readers to accept what Spinoza himself philosophically rejects as vulgar,
defective, and erroneous.
164
TTP 3: 17778.
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part two
rejects each of those characterizations of the deity for the reasons that
they are erroneous and anthropomorphic. Hence to be faithful or pious
in the manner demanded by the theological teaching of the treatise is
to forsake any accurate understanding of the deity and to embrace a
vulgar, intellectually defective, and anthropomorphic apprehension of
the nature of God. The theological teaching of the treatise therefore
endorses and advocates as the foundational doctrine and lesson of
revelation, theology, the Scriptures, faith, and piety a teaching that
Spinoza himself contests and dismisses as vulgar and mistaken. Still,
Spinozas theological teaching may prove to be palatable to most of
his readers inasmuch as it is more liberal and it is not as superstitionridden as he says the traditional teaching of theology or religion had
become.165 Nevertheless, the one who reads philosophically will have
noted the fact that the theological teaching of the treatise demands
that the faithful or pious, or all those who long to count themselves as
faithful or pious for the sake of achieving salus, adopt a set of tenets
which the author of the treatise deems to be patently untrue. But if
that is the case then what purpose does the theological teaching of the
treatise serve? The answer to that question is complex.
The theological teaching of the treatise conforms to Spinozas definition of theology in this sense. Theology is revelation and Spinoza holds
that revelation teaches obedience to God. Furthermore, theology or
revelation teaches obedience to God through love of God and love of
ones neighbor and those kinds of love are displayed in acts of justice
and charity. Spinoza says that the teaching of revelation or theology
or the Scriptures or faith or piety always has been uniform. Obedience
to God, love of God, love of neighbor, and the performance of acts
of justice and charity are the essential components of the revealed
teachings of the sacred books as well as the foundational elements
of the revealed teachings of Moses and Christ.166 With respect to the
165
TTP 3: 89. In place of the traditional teachings of theology or religion which
emphasize senses of prophecy, prophets, law, miracles, and the interpretation of sacred
books that reflect an extreme kind of superstitious orientation, Spinozas versions of
those elements of revealed theology, as they are presented in the TTP, may be said
to promulgate a sort of enlightened superstition rather than a merely crude one. I
have treated the issue in Spinoza, Biblical Criticism, and the Enlightenment, Modern
Enlightenment and the Rule of Reason, ed., John McCarthy (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic
University of America Press, 1998).
166
TTP 3: 16566. Spinozas claim that the Hebrews hatred of other Nations
preserves them considerably (3: 56) and his conclusion that hatred of other nations
was identical with piety for the Hebrew people (3: 215) intimate that there may be a
theology
129
legitimate and serious question about the uniformity of the Scriptures teaching about
love of a neighbor. Spinoza himself acknowledges the discrepancy between the
revealed teaching of Moses and the revealed teaching of Christ in chapter 19 of the
TTP where he draws the readers attention to the passage from Matthew 5:43: it has
been said to you love your neighbor and hate your enemy (TTP 3: 233).
167
TTP 3: 4445; 205209.
168
TTP 3: 156; 65.
169
Chapter 4 of the treatise bears the title, De Lege Divina. However, a few pages
into the chapter Spinoza refers to the divine law as the natural divine law (TTP
3: 6168). In effect, Spinoza blurs any profound distinction between the revealed
divine law and the universal laws of nature (3: 57). The shift made by Spinoza is
most unorthodox.
170
TTP 3: 5961.
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part two
or the natural light can attain. Hence one simply could set aside the
teaching of Christ, to say nothing of the revealed teaching of Moses.
One could set aside those revealed teachings except for one persistent
fact: Still it is impossible for carnal human beings to understand this
[namely, that the highest good can be attained by reason] since it seems
vain to him who has an extremely barren knowledge of God and also
he finds nothing in this highest good that he can caress, eat, or finally
have affect his flesh, which delights him the most, because [the highest
good] consists solely in speculation and it is purely in the mind.171 In
other words, the revealed teaching of Christ, the apostles, Moses, and
the prophets might be expendable if it were not for the fact that human
nature is disinclined to exercise the natural light and seek a knowledge
of nature, human nature is not inclined to acquire the habit of virtue
through the use of reason, and human nature is not inclined to achieve
salus through native powers of the intellect. Instead, human beings
are inclined to function in accordance with their fleshy instincts and
what the appetite urges.172 Therefore the revealed teaching of Christ,
like the revealed teaching of Moses, is indispensable so long as human
beings remain driven more by passion than by reason, or for so long
as there are more nonphilosophers than philosophers.
The revealed teaching of Christ is situated between two orientations. On the one hand, Christ reveals eternal truths but, on the other
hand, Christ pronounces laws. When Christ reveals eternal truths, the
truths equally can be apprehended by the natural light and so revelation becomes redundant. But when Christ pronounces laws it seems
that he is the mouth of God and he acts the part of God which
suggests that unique revelations or pronouncements from Christ are
necessary for inculcating the appropriate plan of living that will make
human salus possible. The revealed teaching of Christ is bifurcated.
In one respect, it is a teaching that can be attained by reason left to
its own devices. In the other respect, the revealed teaching of Christ
imitates the revealed teaching of Moses in terms of enunciating the
indispensable instruction that leads to human salus as a law that is to
be followed. Christs imitation of Moses and his indebtedness to the
mode of the revealed teaching of Moses is illustrated in the gospels.
On the decisive occasion in the New Testament when Christ is asked
171
172
TTP 3: 61.
TTP 3: 73; 18990.
theology
131
173
174
132
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each other in the most important respect. Both revelation and reason
or the natural light can teach love of God. Only revelation teaches
obedience to God whereas only reason or the natural light teaches
knowledge of God. Knowledge of God and obedience to God are
not the same thing. Indeed the revealed teaching of obedience to God
is predicated upon a set of dogmas that Spinoza himself describes as
vulgar, intellectually defective, and anthropomorphic. The dogmas
are pious, or at least they are deemed to be the sort of tenets that will
induce human beings to obey God but the pious dogmas do not have
to be true. So long as one is ignorant of the falsity of a dogma and
remains obedient to God, his piety is assured; though Spinoza also suggests that one who becomes aware that a dogma is false necessarily
will become rebellious.175 Thus ignorance of the falsity of a dogma
conduces to piety but awareness of the falsity of a dogma will lead to
impiety, that is, it will lead to an inability to embrace the fundamental
dogmas of the universal faith. Disbelief in any one of those dogmas,
or awareness of the falsity of any one of those dogmas, means that
one cannot be pious in the sense defined by Spinoza in the theological teaching of the treatise. That is, disbelief in any of the dogmas
or awareness of the falsity of any one of the dogmas of the universal
faith is sufficient to preclude an individual from living piously, which is
to say, disbelief in any of the dogmas of the universal faith precludes
an individuals obedience to God. Nonetheless, Spinoza also maintains
that we nevertheless can embrace by our judgment what already has
been revealed with at least a moral certitude since the certitude of the
prophetic testimonies concerns only moral matters.176 The combined
worth of theology, revelation, the Scriptures, faith, or piety and the
pious fundamental dogmas of the universal faith is contained in the
fact that all are able to embrace them and thus all are able to adopt a
plan of living based upon obedience which is salutary. But knowledge
of the first causes of things,177 acquisition of the habit of virtue, and
knowledge of a true plan of living, which owe to our power alone or
TTP 3: 176.
TTP 3: 185.
177
TTP 3: 46. The first of the three proper objects of desire is to know things
through their first causes [res per primas suas causas intelligere]. If God is the cause of
all things as Spinoza affirms, that is, if God is the first cause (3: 60; 8485), then it is
curious that Spinoza defines the first proper object of desire as involving the knowledge
of the first causes of things which suggests more than one first cause.
175
176
theology
133
to the laws of human nature alone, are not objectives that are achieved
equally by all human beings.
Theology, revelation, the Scriptures, faith, or piety offers a rhetorically powerful, imaginatively appealing, and passionately compelling
teaching that can be embraced by the vast majority of human beings.
The doctrine of theology or revelation posits that human salus can be
obtained by obeying God through loving God and performing just and
charitable deeds toward ones neighbor. An individual does not require
a speculative or mathematical knowledge of God or the doctrines and
dogmas of theology or faith in order to be faithful or pious; an individual only needs to believe certain things about God that will make
mandatory obedience to God by that individual inevitable. Moreover,
the theological teaching of the treatise proposes that even if one fails
to live a life dedicated to obeying God, through the performance of
acts of justice and charity toward ones neighbor, it still is possible
for him to enjoy the remission of his sins, that is, the remission of
his disobedience, if he repents and is delivered by Gods mercy and
grace. Still, no particular fundamental dogma of theology, revelation,
Scripture, piety, or faith needs to be true; it only needs to be pious.178
178
A significant example will help illustrate the matter. In chapter 7 of the treatise,
Spinoza examines the difficulty of determining the meaning, rather than the truth, of
any Scriptural statement. He then illustrates the difficulty by raising the question of
how one is to understand the assertion of Moses that God is fire and the assertion
of Moses that God is jealous. Spinoza maintains that each assertion individually is
perfectly clear in its meaning. But in respect of their relation to one another he says
that the two statements are very obscure (TTP 3: 100). In chapter 2 of the treatise,
Spinoza remarked that God was revealed in accordance with each prophets opinions
and preconceptions about the divine nature. Consequently, it was revealed to Moses
and he taught nothing other than that [God] was merciful, benign, and extremely
jealous, as is evident from many places in the Pentateuch. Finally, he believed and he
taught that this being differed so much from all other beings that the image of nothing visible could express it nor could it be seen (3: 38). The claim that God is fire
and the claim that God is jealous are assimilated by Spinoza through reference to
a declaration by Moses found at Deuteronomy 4:24. The passage there helps Spinoza
to explain that the name fire also pertains to anger and jealousy (See Job 31:12), so
the statements of Moses are easily reconciled, and thus we legitimately conclude that
the two statements God is fire and God is jealous to be one and the same in meaning (3:
101). In chapter 7 of the treatise, Spinozas interest in the two propositions is limited
to their meaning only. But later in the treatise a very different verdict is reached with
regard to the utterances of Moses. In chapter 15 of the TTP, Spinoza argues that
there are numerous places in Scripture which speak in accordance with the received
opinions of the prophets or the received opinions of the vulgar, teach falsely, and involve
contradictions (3: 18086). Among the examples cited are the statements of Moses that
God is fire and God is jealous. Rebutting the proposition of Alpakhar that one
passage contradicts another only by implication but not directly, Spinoza declares that
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part two
The most basic dogma of the universal faith only needs to establish with some credibility that God demands obedience from human
beings; God demands that human beings treat their fellows with justice
and charity; and God promises the forgiveness of sins, together with
the prospect of redemption, if one repents and becomes obedient to
God. That set of claims can offer a compelling inducement for human
the statements of Moses involve a direct contradiction. That is, Moses directly affirms
that God is fire (see Deut. 4:24) and he directly denies that God holds any likeness with
visible things (Deut. 4:12) [3: 183]. The direct contradiction attributed to Moses in
chapter 15 of the treatise involves the same statements Spinoza previously treated and
reconciled in chapter 7 of the book. In the earlier treatment of the statements, Spinoza
assigned a reason for the Mosaic claim that God is jealous. According to Spinoza,
the claim itself is contrary to reason and hence it is absurd. But however repugnant
the doctrine of a jealous God may be to reason, Spinoza says that one plainly must
conclude that Moses believed it himself or at least he wished to teach it (3: 101).
Because Spinoza says that the statements God is fire and God is jealous are the
same in meaning, one may resolve the direct contradiction between the statements
of Moses about Gods appearance as fire and Gods inability to be seen in a similar
fashion to the way the statements were reconciled in chapter 7. That is, it may be
postulated that Moses himself believed that God was fire or at least he wished to
teach it. From his explanation of the statements made by Moses, one may infer that
Spinoza imputes to Moses the practice of teaching exoterically. That is, since the revelation of the Decalogue at Exodus 19:1718 attests that God descended on Sinai as
fire when the tablets were conferred to Moses, the continued affirmation of the claim
at Deuteronomy 4:11 that God is fire focuses the attention of the Hebrew audience on the uniqueness of that event. Indeed, Deuteronomy 4 concerns the fidelity
of the Hebrew people to God. It is a reminiscence of the past glories of the Hebrew
people, their historic mission, and the promise of their future greatness. By rehearsing
the doctrine of Gods jealousy and the doctrine of Gods appearance as fire, as the
passages from Deuteronomy recount, Moses is reminding the Hebrew people of the
unique status of their election, their receipt of the Law, and Gods demand for obedience and loyalty from them. Moses is proposing that continued adherence to the plan
of living which he established will assure the Hebrew people of future acts of divine
providence. What Moses teaches, in respect of Gods jealousy or Gods appearance as
fire, may not be trueand Spinoza asserts that the statements plainly are contrary
to reason (3: 183)but the teaching of Moses certainly was pious in the sense that
it prompted the Hebrew people to recommit their obedience to God. In addition to
the surface argument about Gods jealousy and Gods bearing a likeness with visible
things, Spinoza exposes the self-contradiction of Moses which indicates another facet
of the vulgar and intellectually defective character of Scriptural statements and
the theology or faith that is based upon them. The exposure of the self-contradiction
indicates that the Scriptures profess irrational things. For one who reads philosophically, the exposure of the irrationality of certain Scriptural claims, e.g., God is fire
or God is jealous, should raise a crucial question: Which passages or doctrines of
the Scriptures, if any, were ones that the speaker or writer of it really believed and
which were the ones that the speaker of writer simply wished to teach? Spinozas
use of hidden and disguised arguments, as Lambert van Velthuysen called them, to
expose the irrationality of theological claims is intended to serve as a prompt for the
philosophical reader of the TTP.
theology
135
136
part two
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
3:
3:
3:
3:
77.
185.
179.
98.
theology
137
of the Scriptures are especially appealing because they affirm that acts
of divine providence are performed in order to bestow good fortune
or the greater of two goods upon faithful human beings.187 Hence,
whereas reason may not be effective at persuading human beings to
adopt a plan of living that will help them to achieve the basic objects
of their desires, namely, security and health, it may be the case that
the impressive narratives of Scripture and their accounts of marvelous wonders will fare better in persuading human beings to embrace a
plan of living that will offer them what they need most.188 Even those
who live in accordance with reason, those who pursue knowledge of
nature, and those who follow the natural light are aware of the influence exerted by some stories on human dispositions as well as human
actions; and philosophers will know that nonphilosophical tales are
more likely to move or persuade nonphilosophers than rational arguments and proofs.189
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According to Spinoza, faith in the histories found in the Scriptures cannot yield knowledge of God.190 Nevertheless, the reading of
the histories and an acquaintance with the basic features of them is
highly necessary for the vulgar who are not intellectually competent to
grasp things clearly and distinctly.191 What the narratives of Scripture
affirm and repeat is that God exists; God sustains and directs all things;
and God cares for human beings.192 Without belief in the existence
of God, the direction of God, or the care of God for human beings,
it would be difficult for human beings to obey God and embrace the
revealed plan of living that assures them of their salvation. Indeed,
if one were to reject the existence of God there would no reason for
one to obey God rather than pleasure193 and for that reason Spinoza
asserts that disbelief or lack of confidence in the narratives of Scripture
is impious.194 That is to say, disbelief in the narratives of Scripture
will prevent human beings from obeying God and following a plan of
living that will assure their salus.
(3: 110). In other words, although the substance of various stories basically can be the
same, the purpose the story serves will be different depending upon the intent of the
author who wrote it. The same story can serve the purpose of amusement, political
instruction, or the inculcation of some theological view; and, with respect to telling
tales, Spinoza also emphasizes in chapter 5 of the TTP that there are important
consequences that accompany the telling of a tale. That is, Spinoza asserts that the
reading of the Scriptures is of worth only insofar as it affects how one lives: If one
were to have faith in everything he were to read in the Sacred Scriptures but not attend
to the doctrine that it intends to teach [viz., obedience to God] nor correct his life, for
him it would be just as if he read the Koran, the Fictitious fables of the Poets, or the
common Chronicles with the attention the vulgar usually do (3: 79). In the end, the
intent of the author and the tale that is told merge in the realization of a particular
consequence for the behavior of the reader. If one reads and believes the Scriptures
but does not alter and improve his life by having read them then it is as if he had read
some profane or common book. But there also seems to be another equally plausible
implication. If the consequence of reading the tale is decisive, i.e., if reading it makes
one live better, then could it not be said that reading the Koran, poetical fables, or
common chronicles could be just as effective as reading Sacred Scripture in exhorting
human beings to live in some desired way? The Koran presents a revealed teaching
that provides an instruction concerning the conduct of ones life. The superiority of
the Scriptures over the Koran, the fable, or the chronicle seems to be decided by the
fact that the opinion the reader has of the author and the tale is determinative
of how the story is received and understood; and for Spinozas audience the moral
authority and force of the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures enjoy preeminence over
other books.
190
TTP 3: 61.
191
TTP 3: 78.
192
TTP 3: 77.
193
TTP 3: 178.
194
TTP 3: 78.
theology
139
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
3:
3:
3:
3:
9799.
18089.
8197; 15158.
6980; 16768; 175.
140
part two
that they occasion a more fervent obedience to God. One should look
to the testimonies of the prophets, the chroniclers, the apostles, and the
authors of the gospels for the moral lessons that may be gleaned from
their writings; but one should not invoke the words of the Scriptures
to solve speculative or philosophical questions. One should be moved
by the Scriptural accounts of formidable historical events, and even
the mention of the unusual occurrences that accompanied them, only
insofar as those accounts may enhance ones faith but one should not
take the accounts literally; on the contrary, one must regard miraculous
events simply as instances of causally unexplained good fortune which
have befallen people.199 Finally, whatever theology or revelation or the
Scriptures or faith or piety seem to impart, each individual is permitted
to take from it what is most consonant with his own sense of matters
and what will contribute most to his obedience to God for the sake of
his own salvation. It is not important that the doctrines or the dogmas
of theology be true; it only is important that the doctrines or dogmas
encourage one to live piously. Insofar as the piety of the foundation,
meaning, teaching, and dogmas of theology is more crucial than the
truth of those things, Spinoza can conclude the theological teaching
of the treatise with a seemingly unqualified endorsement of theology;
or at least an unqualified endorsement of the theological teaching that
is propounded by him in the treatise. But perhaps the reason given
by Spinoza for his endorsement of theology is more interesting than
the endorsement itself. For Spinoza reminds the reader at the close of
chapter fifteen of the treatise that the utility and necessity of Sacred
199
A connection exists, I think, between miracles, as events for which the natural
causes are unknown (TTP 3: 8384) and fortune, as the occurrence of unexpected
events which advantageously favor someone (3: 46). The same event can be called a
miracle or an episode of fortune depending upon ones suppositions about nature.
That is, the one event that occurs unexpectedly and for which no causal account can
be given will be called a miracle by the person who believes that God contravenes
the order and operations of nature in order to display his power and providence for
one group of human beings rather than another group of human beings (3: 8182; 84).
But that same event that occurs unexpectedly and for which no causal account can be
given will be called fortune by two other kinds of person. The first kind of person
is the one who sees the order and operations of nature as determined and inviolable;
for him nature simply is acting in a way that he did not anticipate but still it is acting
in accordance with the laws of nature. For the second kind of person, nature is an
unknown and so he regards all events as matters of chance; the difference between good
fortune and bad fortune is the same as the difference between what satisfies the person
and what does not satisfy him. Fortune, for Spinoza, is defined as an occurrence that
as yet is the causally unexplained external aid of God but the same description also
equally applies to a miracle (compare 3: 46 and 96).
theology
141
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
3:
3:
3:
3:
188.
176.
183.
179.
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PART THREE
POLITICS
1
The Latin word Politica appears once in the TTP. Citing the teaching of Solomon,
Spinoza says that knowledge of God contains true Ethics and Politics (TTP 3: 67).
2
TTP 3: 73.
3
TTP 3: 191.
4
TTP 3: 7375. One should recall Spinozas remark at the close of chapter 14
of the TTP about the salutary effects of theologys teaching of obedience and the
performance of works of justice and charity with respect to peace and harmony in a
Republic (3: 179). Spinoza also distinguishes the teaching of Sacred Scripture, theology,
or faith for its utility and necessity in leading human beings to salus (3: 188). It is at
least interesting that the double criteria of utility and necessity are applied almost
exclusively to politics and theology in the TTP.
5
TTP 3: 73.
146
part three
TTP 3: 191.
TTP 3: 193200. In footnote 18 to the Introduction of this book, I explained my
reason for translating imperium as regime.
8
TTP 3: 69. The overarching point of Spinozas argument is that the divine law
is universal in character and the Hebrew ceremonial laws simply were customs or
traditions observed by the Hebrew people as a particular nation. The ceremonial laws
were not required for salvation (TTP 3: 7880; and compare 48).
9
TTP 3: 73. The natural inclination toward society, as described by Spinoza,
has an ancient pedigree. That is, both Plato (Republic 369ad) and Aristotle (Politics
1252a241253a18) acknowledge that an awareness of the basic human insufficiency
to live well on ones own, that is, the fact of human need, is what initially compels
human beings to enter into social or political arrangements with one another.
6
7
politics
147
148
part three
inasmuch as political life emerges from a natural inclination and political life serves as
a correction to natural insufficiencies, as well as natural deficiencies. In explaining the
political teaching of the treatise it will be necessary to recall certain features of the
philosophic teaching of the treatise.
14
TTP 3: 189.
15
The absolute primacy of the human desire to pursue pleasure is presupposed
even in the sixth dogma of the fundamental dogmas of the universal faith. That
is, the sixth dogma states that only those who obey God by performing acts of justice
and charity are saved; all others, who live under the regime of pleasure are lost.
The dogma continues by asserting that if human beings did not believe in salvation
through works then there would be no reason why they would obey God rather than
follow their pleasures (TTP 3: 177). Spinoza posits a basic tension between a life of
obedience to law and a life dedicated to the pursuit of pleasure alone.
16
TTP 3: 73.
17
TTP 3: 73; 19192.
18
TTP 3: 7374.
politics
149
TTP 3: 18990.
Compare Hilail Gildin, Spinoza and the Political Problem, Spinoza: A Collection
of Critical Essays, ed. Marjorie Grene (Notre Dame, Indiana: The University of Notre
Dame Press, 1973).
21
TTP 3: 73 and compare 4648; 19091; also see Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan
(London, 1651) p. 62.
19
20
150
part three
to see why such a plan of living satisfies their own selfish, appetitive
interests. In principle, that task appears to be achievable if one can
move passionate individuals to perceive and embrace social or political
life as a greater good and to regard continuing in their natural conditions as a lesser good, or perhaps even a greater evil. If passionate
individuals can be moved to that way of perceiving social or political
life then only one other task remains. The viability of any society or
a republic, says Spinoza, depends upon the elimination of the natural
right to act deceitfully.22
Each individual per ius et institutum naturae may do as he pleases in
order to achieve what he believes to be conducive to his own interests,
desires, or hopes. Each individual, therefore, may deceive others in
order to obtain the things for which he longs. One can profess oaths,
one can negotiate terms of agreement for an exchange of goods, or
one can promise to perform a service or function for another individual but then violate the oath, forsake the agreement, or renounce
the promise, if the individual comes to conclude that honoring his
word to someone else amounts to a lesser good or a greater evil.23
For the force and validity of any oath, any agreement, any promise,
or any kind of pact whatsoever depends entirely upon the perceived
utility of it. If the pact is perceived as useful by the individuals who
enter into it then the pact will be honored as binding but if the pact
comes to be regarded as useless by any individual who has entered
into it then the pact does not need to be honored at all.24 One way
to forestall the breaking of promises and prevent the natural tendency
to violate a pact when it comes to be regarded as having no use or
advantage to one of the parties to the pact is to construct a social or
political arrangement in which each participant transfers his private
right to the collective right of the society or the regime. Under such a
condition, what initially might be construed by individuals entering such
a regime as a greater evil, namely, the sacrifice of ones unlimited
natural right to acts as one pleases, could be presented persuasively
as being the realization of a greater good inasmuch as all of the
other members of the political society also will lose right or power
22
23
24
TTP 3: 192.
TTP 3: 19192.
TTP 3: 192.
politics
151
individually but each also will gain right or power collectively.25 The
mode by which passionate human beings are converted from being
asocial or unsocial individuals to becoming social individuals can be
rather simple and basic. Taking into account the fundamental dispositions of human nature toward what is regarded as good, passionate
human beings must be promised the hope of a greater good for their
participation in society and their cooperation with other individuals or
they must be threatened with the fear of a greater evil if they do not
participate in society and cooperate with other individuals. The name
of the society to which human beings, even passionate ones, can be
drawn in a collaborative endeavor to preserve and sustain themselves
is a democracy; it is established on the basis of a pact which binds
every member of the polity to abide by the terms of the pact and
to keep the promises that he makes to others; and more than just
providing for the wellbeing of its citizens, the political regime called
a democracy serves the express ambition of following the dictates of
reason and more particularly the democratic regime aims to avoid the
absurd things of the appetite.26 The democratic regime, therefore, is
the political arrangement that is most consonant with human nature
and it is optimal for maximizing the satisfaction of the third proper
object of desire, namely, security and health.27
For those who may be interested in the advantages of political life, or
for those who already are inclined toward it, the avoidance or elimination of absurd things in favor of reasonable or sensible things would
seem to be an attractive feature of a society, a republic, or a regime.
Indeed, Spinoza affirms that it is a fact of human nature that there is
25
Spinozas manner of discriminating between goods and evils is based upon
the criterion of utility (TTP 3: 19091; 196). As a result, however, what is useful and
hence good to one person may be considered useless and hence evil to another
person. A possible exception to the egoistical and subjective measure of useful and
useless things is the fact that every individual has the essential endeavor to persevere
in its state. Hence, a common motive for individual human beings to enter into social
or political association is the promise of sustenance and conservation which such
associations make feasible. As each citizen surrenders his right to do as he personally
pleases, it also is the case that every other member of the polity has surrendered his
right to do as he pleases and while each ones individual right to act impulsively
is lost it also is the case that each individuals collective right to be protected from
the impulsive, the deceitful, and the injurious acts of foreigners or fellow citizens has
been gained.
26
TTP 3: 194.
27
TTP 3: 19395; 245.
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no one who does not wish to live securely without fear but that condition is exceedingly difficult to achieve where each individual is permitted
to do as each one pleases and reason has no more right than hatred
or anger.28 It would be natural then for citizens or potential citizens
to presume that a polity would endeavor to curb the absurd things,
namely, the longings, urges, impulses, actions, or behaviors, of passionate human nature. But in the course of the treatise Spinoza has not
spoken of absurd longings, urges, or impulses; nor has he spoken of
absurd actions or behaviors. Spinoza is prevented from making such
declarations on philosophical grounds. For by the right and plan of
nature whatever an individual does in accordance with its own nature,
whether what he does follows from the dictates of reason or whether
what he does follows from the urgings of the passions, it is perfectly
legitimate for the individual to do as he does because by nature there
are no absurd longings or absurd actions. Rather what individual
human beings consider ridiculous, absurd, or evil owes only to the
fact that human beings, for the most part, remain ignorant of the order
and coherence of nature.29 From the perspective of philosophy, the
absurd is what is contrary to nature; and what is contrary to nature
also is contrary to reason.30 No longing, urging, passion, action, or
behavior is contrary to nature; if it were contrary to nature then it
also would be impossible.31 In the teaching of the treatise, the only matter that explicitly is designated absurd is the miracle;32 and by virtue
of that designation it may be inferred that there can be circumstances
in which the teaching of theology and the teaching of politics may not
be consonant with one another. For example, the dependence of the
prevailing tradition of theology or religion on miracles or signs as
certifications of the authenticity of a prophecy or revelation will cause
traditional orthodox theology or religion to come into conflict with the
political teaching of the treatise which advocates a democratic regime
that avoids absurd things. But the version of theology that is defended
TTP 3: 191.
TTP 3: 191.
30
TTP 3: 91.
31
TTP 3: 8687.
32
TTP 3: 86. One will recall that earlier in the treatise Spinoza had denounced
superstition, which often is a basis for theology or religion, as having turned rational
beings into beasts (3: 8). In the end, superstition, theology, and religion are connected
through a basic tendency of each toward unreasonable or insensible predilections that
ought to be resisted by a regime that is dedicated to fostering the development, the
exercise, and the advancement of reason.
28
29
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153
33
34
35
TTP 3: 194.
TTP 3: 24041.
TTP 3: 8.
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part three
third proper object of desire.36 The plan of living will involve the enactment of laws which serve the defense of life as well as the republic37
and the laws will be framed so as to encourage citizens to do their duty
not from fear but from a hope for some good which they desire.38
But given the proclivities of human nature, it will be a delicate chore
to inspire human beings to forsake unlimited exercises of natural right
and to conform to laws that serve the interests of the individual as well
as the welfare of the political society as a whole. For human beings by
nature are driven more by passion than by reason. They also naturally
are inclined toward superstition and hence they are inclined to believe
absurd things, follow rash impulses, suffer from credulity, and adopt
unreasonable opinions and behaviors rather than live in accordance
with reasonable or sensible designs. In one very significant sense, the
teaching of the treatise has as a goal the correction of the prevailing
conditions surrounding human nature by offering an alternative to the
life that is conducted in accordance with the passions or superstitious
urgings and opinions; though the alternative to the life of passion is
not the life of the philosopher. Instead it is the life of the reasonable
or sensible human being who lives in accordance with the dictates of
reason whether they issue from his own nature or whether they have
been issued to him by those reliable human beings who are reasonable
or sensible and who also have the authority to devise a plan of living
for all of those who inhabit a democratic political regime. Politics can
avoid the absurd things and it can safeguard the wellbeing of citizens
and the republic because of its ability to offer a plan a living that is
reasonable or sensible. Indeed, the very necessity of providing such a
plan is reflected in the opening sentence of the treatise. Bearing in mind
the natural proclivity of human beings toward that which is passionate,
superstitious, or nonrational, the overarching goal of the treatise is to
propose a teaching that will persuade both reasonable and passionate
individuals of the advantages of democratic political life.
The Preface to the treatise commences with an unqualified and
universal declaration: If human beings were able to govern all their
affairs with dependable counsel, or if fortune always bore prosperity for
36
37
38
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them, in no way would they be mastered by superstition.39 The opening sentence of the Preface delineates three distinct manners whereby
an individual may conduct his life and govern his affairs. An individual
may proceed in his thinking, choosing, or acting on the basis of some
kind of sure or reliable deliberation, that is, a dependable counsel.40
An individual may rely on fortunes favor. Or an individual may live
under the sway of superstition. It is evident from the Preface to the
treatise, and even from the first sentence of it, that Spinoza regards the
conduct of ones life or the governance of ones affairs by a reliance
upon superstition as a plan of living that is to be avoided. Superstition
is an extreme recourse for the individual who cannot achieve the satisfaction of his interests or his desires by any other means than wishing
for extraordinary interventions by suprahuman agents on his behalf.
Indeed, superstition is embraced only as a result of the combined facts
that someone lacks a dependable counsel for the conduct of his life and
39
Si homines res omnes suas certo consilio regere possent, vel si fortuna ipsis prospera semper
foret, nulla superstitione tenerentur (TTP 3: 5). The opening sentence of the Preface to
the TTP may be translated in a variety of ways. For example, the noun res principally
means thing but it also signifies a matter or affair or circumstance. Regere may
be translated to guide, to conduct, to direct, to keep straight, to rule, to
manage, to control, to govern, or to have sway or supremacy over someone or
something. But the verb also means to keep from going wrong. Given the purpose
of the argument of the Preface to the TTP, the latter sense of the verb is most apt.
That is, in the first sentence there is an appeal to some kind of certum consilium as
an alternative to forestall what can go wrong when individuals naturally are driven
to embrace fortune or superstition as a guiding principle in the conduct of their lives
or the governance of their affairs.
Alternative English translations of the opening sentence of the Preface may be found
in A Theologico-Political Treatise, trans. R.H.M. Elwes (New York: Dover Publications, 1951
[originally published London: G. Bell & Son, 1883]): Men would never be superstitious,
if they could govern all their circumstances by set rules, or if they were always favored
by fortune (p. 3); Tractatus theologico-politicus, trans. Samuel Shirley (Leiden, New York,
Kbenhavn, Kln: E.J. Brill Publishers, 1989): If men were able to exercise complete
control over all of their circumstances, or if continuous good fortune were always their
lot, they would never be prey to superstition (p. 49); A Spinoza Reader, trans. Edwin
Curley (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994): If men could manage all their affairs by a certain plan, or if fortune were always favorable to them, they
would never be in the grip of superstition (p. 6); and Theologico-Political Treatise, trans.
Martin Yaffe (Newburyport, Massachusetts: Focus Publishing, 2004): If human beings
could regulate all their affairs with certain counsel, or if fortune were always favorable
to them, they would not be bound by any superstition (p. xv).
40
The Latin word certus means resolved, determined, fixed, settled, or purposed. With respect to moral matters, the word signifies sure, unerring, faithful,
and to be depended upon. I submit that what Spinoza intends by the word certus is
closest to the last alternative and therefore I translate the Latin phrase certo consilio
by the English words by dependable counsel or with dependable counsel.
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part three
the governance of his affairs and fortune does not always bring that
individual the prosperity for which he longs. Accordingly, there are three
distinct ways in which one can conduct his life and govern his affairs;
or, Spinoza proposes that there are three basic plans of living. One
can employ dependable counsel; one can rely on fortune; or one can
turn to superstition. It may be possible that some combination of those
alternatives, or a combination of degrees of each of the alternatives,
might be attempted for the conduct of ones life and the governance
of ones affairs. But the opening sentence of the Preface insinuates that
the three plans of living are reciprocally exclusive of one another and,
indeed, the remainder of the Preface to the treatise demonstrates how
and why human beings ruinously succumb to superstition as a mode
for conducting their lives and governing their affairs. Little is said in
the treatise about fortune. But, perhaps even more curiously, Spinoza is
virtually silent about what dependable counsel is or what it involves.
Yet if dependable counsel is the reliable plan of living that is advocated
by Spinoza in the treatise then it is necessary to determine precisely
what certum consilium means.
The first sentence of the Preface to the treatise is the answer to a
question that has not been asked expressly. The question is: Why do
human beings become superstitious? The question is raised because of
the prominence of the phenomenon of superstition and the philosophic
proposition of the treatise that human beings by nature are inclined
toward it.41 However, the question also is raised because superstition
constitutes a plan of living that is adopted by a great many human
beings who live and act under the influence of various traditions of
theology or religion. The actual turn toward superstition appears to
be prompted by a combination of three factors. Human beings often
are driven into difficulties where their own counsel or deliberation fails
them; nevertheless they still long inordinately for the uncertain goods
of fortune; consequently, fluctuating miserably between hope and fear,
they become most prone to believing any thing whatever; the cause
which encourages, conserves, and gives rise to superstition therefore is
fear.42 Spinozas argument reduces to this: Human beings are desirous
beings who seek the satisfaction of their own desires.43 But human
TTP 3: 6.
TTP 3: 56.
43
TTP 3: 18990. The principal desire and endeavor of any individual thing is
to conserve itself; and although the human impetus to conservation of oneself may
41
42
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beings also are aware that on some occasions they will fail to realize
the satisfaction of their desires. Thus an individuals wish or hope that
the fulfillment of his desire will be realized also often is cast against the
same individuals fear that his wish or hope will not be realized. When
the conduct of his life or the governance of his affairs by means of
dependable counsel yields success, one conceives himself to abound
in good sense and he shuns any who wish to give him counsel; but
when adversity befalls them, such individuals beseech counsel from
anyone, nor is there anything to be heard that is so inept, absurd, or
vain, that they would not follow it.44
An individual may attempt to employ his own counsel or even follow
the counsel of another for the purpose of satisfying his desires. Regardless of whether that individual succeeds or fails in his attempts to satisfy
his desires, Spinoza notes that such an individual will continue to seek
the goods of fortune. Thus it may be inferred that individuals tend
to presume that they will satisfy their desires for various goods either
through fortune itself or through their own agency and planning. Yet
a difficulty persists inasmuch as the goods sought from fortune are not
assured; and human agency itself also may prove to be ineffective at
obtaining what an individual wants or needs. Superstition, therefore,
can appear to be as worthy an option as any other one when individuals are confronted with having to choose the plan of living that they
will adopt based on their perception of which plan will be the most
successful in satisfying their desires and which plan will permit them to
conduct their lives and govern their affairs with some advantage.
In the conduct of ones life and the governance of ones affairs, the
turn to superstition shares a common element with the turn to fortune.
Human beings hope, indeed they expect, that their desires will be satisfied. When the objects of their desires are easily obtained, without much
be universal, the means to it and the demands of it are quite idiosyncratic. A similar
characterization of the matter is found in chapters 13 and 14 of Thomas Hobbes
Leviathan. Hobbes defines conatus, or the endeavor of a thing to persevere in its state, as
a principle of physical motion in De Corpore, chapter 15, article 2; but he also defines
conatus as a principle of psychic motion in Elements of Law, chapter 7, paragraph 2.
The term conatus does not appear in the TTP. But in Part 3 of the Ethica ordine Geometrico
demonstrata, Spinoza defines the endeavor [conatus] of a thing to persevere in its own
being as the actual essence of a thing (Propositions 67).
44
TTP 3: 5. I have translated the Latin word sapientia as good sense rather than
wisdom which is the word used in the translations of the TTP by Elwes (p. 3), Shirley
(p. 49), Curley (p. 6), and Yaffe (p. xv). My reason for translating the Latin word sapientia
as sensibility or good sense was explained in note 113 to Part One of this book.
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part three
of their own agency or much of their own planning, then they conclude
that fortune favors them. Moreover, there is nothing to indicate that
fortune would not or should not favor them again. Reliance on fortune
is effortless. One simply anticipates that desirable things will happen to
him. In chapter three of the treatise, Spinoza provides a definition of
fortune in the context of his account of the Election of the Hebrews:
by fortune I understand nothing other than the direction of God to the
extent that he directs human affairs through external and unexpected
causes; and Spinozas definition of fortune occurs within his account
of the ways through which an individual human being achieves conservation in [his] being.45 Relying on fortune is one way whereby the
direction of human affairs may be accomplished by an individual.
But in addition to fortune, which involves unexpected and hence
unpredictable causes and events, Spinoza maintains that an individual
may direct his affairs through his own efforts or through some kind of
external assistance.46 Yet experience confirms, sometimes painfully, that
our hopes and desires often are either frustrated or forsaken when we
rely on fortune or even on our own dependable counsel.
In the sense that is most crucial to the teaching of the treatise, the
decisive question of Spinozas book concerns which plan of living
human beings adopt for the conduct of their lives and the governance
of their affairs. What options are available to human beings? And in
which directions are they usually drawn? The answer to the decisive
question of what plan of living human beings adopt influences the sort
of society or regime that human beings establish and it also determines
how the third proper object of desire will be achieved. Reliance upon
fortune is the easiest of the options for a plan of living inasmuch as it
requires the least effort, or no effort at all, on the part of human beings.
45
TTP 3: 46. The precise form of Spinozas claim is threefold. (1) Where perseverance in being is achieved through ones own nature and power then, strictly speaking,
it is achieved through the internal aid of God since the power of Nature is the
power of God and the power of human nature is an expression of the more comprehensive power of nature itself. (2) Where things useful to perseverance in being
owe to causes external to human beings then such things express the external aid of
God. (3) Where perseverance in being owes to unanticipated external causes then
fortune is said to be at work. However, to those ignorant of the order and operations
of nature, the external aid of God is likely to be confused with fortune; and
that confusion only tends to confirm for most passionate or vulgar human beings the
authority and validity of certain teachings propounded by the prevailing tradition of
theology or religion about things like miracles.
46
TTP 3: 46.
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Still, fortune is fickle. When fortune fails to deliver the goods that one
anticipates, he turns to superstition. Fearful that he will not acquire
what he seeks, desires, or needs, or fearful that he will suffer what he
opposes, an individuals fear drives him to find a solution to his predicament through an appeal to god(s) or some divine agent(s). Consistent
with his belief in supranatural causes and agencies, an individual then
regards unusual and unexpected events as portents of things that will
bring him prosperity or distress.47 But recourse to superstition as a plan
of living also is related to ones understanding and experience of the
world. Ignorant of the order and operations of nature, superstitious
individuals impute the satisfaction of their desires to forces, causes, or
beings that are willful in their provision of the goods that individuals
seek, desire, or need. What fortune does not yield and what planning
does not provide will impel human beings to plead or sacrifice and
promise service, worship, or obedience to whichever numen they deem
to be responsible for providing the things for which they long. As a
consequence, human beings are willing to yield to any delirium, fantasy, or extravagance, in the hope that they may obtain what they seek.
Such fear, says Spinoza, makes human beings insane; furthermore,
those individuals will castigate human good sense as vain and they will
call reason blind.48 The choice of a plan of living that is based upon
superstition presumes an ignorance of nature and an abdication of
reason, as well as the implicit consequence that one must embrace any
number of absurd things. The superstitious life, as Spinoza defines
it, and the political life, as Spinoza defines it, do not intersect.49
TTP 3: 5.
TTP 3: 5. The obvious English translation of the Latin verb insanire is to be
insane. But the Latin verb also means to be of unsound, unhealthy mind, to be
without reason, to be senseless, or to be mad. The turn to superstition thus
must be recognized as an abandonment of reason, albeit sometimes only a temporary
one. Spinoza suggests that one can vacillate between reliance upon superstition and
reliance upon some sort of dependable counsel as is demonstrated by the example
of Alexander the Great. When suffering from the terror of the unknown outcome
of battle at the Gates of Susa, Curtius reports that Alexander turned to soothsayers
for predictions about the result of the conflict. After Darius was defeated, Alexander
abandoned such interests. However, [Alexander] was led back to superstition again,
says Curtius, when his situation was unsettled (3: 6).
49
If superstition and the plan of living that derives from superstition involve belief
in absurd things, e.g., miracles, but the goal of politics is to avoid absurd things and
promote reasonability then the superstitious life and the political life cannot converge.
Obviously the Turkish theocracy and the Hebrew theocracy exemplify instances where
superstition, as understood by Spinoza, and politics were integrated. But Spinoza
eschews both of those regimes. In lieu of those kinds of theocracy, Spinoza will introduce
47
48
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From the opening line and the first page of Spinozas Preface to
the treatise it may be inferred that human beings embrace superstition
largely because fortune and dependable counsel fail them when
they try to acquire what they believe will serve their conservation and
their interests. Here it should not be inferred that an individuals dashed
hope over the loss of one desired object, for example, or his unfulfilled
desire to attain what he seeks, would of necessity drive an individual to
espouse superstition as the only basis for the conduct of his life and the
governance of his affairs. Nevertheless, one cannot ignore a simple fact.
The fear of the failure to satisfy desires is what impels an individual to
turn to superstition as a source of hope; and the fear that causes him
to turn to superstition owes to his uncertainty about there being any
reliable alterative means for satisfying his desires or conducting his life
and governing his affairs prosperously. In other words, in the attempt
to obtain what he seeks, desires, or needs, an individual human being
will embrace whatever plan of living he perceives to be most conducive
to the attainment of his ends. The attainment of the end, therefore,
effectively justifies the means.50 Or, the perceived likelihood that some
means will enable an individual to achieve his ends or to secure the
objects of his desires is what justifies an individuals choice of his plan
of living.
Fortune and superstition are quite similar in one significant respect.
The turn to fortune and the turn to superstition involve an ultimate
dependence upon external and unexpected causes. Neither fortune
nor superstition involves an individuals reliance upon his own power
to conserve himself; and neither implies an individuals employment
of the power of external causes for the sake of his own conservation.51
According to Spinoza, the satisfaction of the third proper object of
desire, namely, the achievement of security and health, will require and
depend upon external things, that is, security and health will require
a theocratic regime that involves a mitigated superstition or an enlightened superstition
which restrains the excesses of the prevailing traditions of theology or religion.
50
TTP 3: 190.
51
TTP 3: 46. The passage from the TTP identifies an individuals own power within
himself as the internal aid of God and it designates an individual human beings
use of the power of external causes as the external aid of God. The external aid
of God may be said to be different from fortune or superstition for the reason that
the latter two are said to involve unexpected or unpredictable causes whereas the
external aid of God simply involves the regular order and operations of nature
which can be comprehended by human beings and used by them to facilitate their
own conservation.
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and depend upon fortune; but Spinoza also insists that human
direction and vigilance are of great assistance.52 Consequently, if an
individual chooses to trust either fortune or superstition as appropriate
means for the conduct of his life or the governance of his affairs, the
choice of either fortune or superstition implies that the individual has
forsaken his own agency and surrendered his conservation to external,
unpredictable influences or forces. Still, if fortune always were to afford
prosperity to human beings then they never would fall prey to superstition. But human beings never would fall prey to superstition nor would
they ever rely on the vacillations of fortune if they could govern all their
affairs with dependable counsel,53 that is, if they had a plan of living
that generally assured them of maintaining their security and health
and which offered them the greatest hope of living prosperously.
Whereas Spinoza defines fortune in the treatise and gives an account
of the causes of superstition in his book, he is almost silent about
what certum consilium is. The word consilium appears nineteen times in
the treatise and it is used preponderantly in connection with passages
quoted from the Scriptures, both the Old Testament and the New
Testament. For example, Spinoza refers to the breath or spirit of God
as expressing Spiritus sapientiae, counsel or fortitude.54 In another
passage in the treatise, he notes the difficulties associated with interpreting the histories conveyed in the Scriptures and he argues that
an individuals understanding of those histories cannot be made to
depend, for instance, on the reader actually having heard the quarrels of Isaac or the counsels of Achitophel given to Absalom;55 and
Saul went to the Prophet Samuel on his servants counsel in order
to learn where to find his lost animals.56 It further is reported that the
Apostle Paul maintained that he gives counsel by Gods grace; and
Spinoza observes that the apostles choices of their places to preach
were taken on their own counsel.57
If dependable counsel is the worthy alternative to fortune or superstition as a plan of living it yet remains unclear what that kind of counsel
involves or requires. Still, based upon the passages from the Scriptures
52
53
54
55
56
57
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
3:
3:
3:
3:
3:
3:
47.
5.
22.
78.
89; 131.
151.
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58
TTP 3: 15155. The account of the matter is related at Acts of the Apostles
15:3640.
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passage from Scripture testifies that both Paul and Barnabas proceeded
in their respective missions with success. Still, Pauls reliance on his own
counsel and the action he undertook pursuant to it must be deemed
the cause of some disturbance, aggravation, or conflict with his colleague, Barnabas. In other words, Pauls consilium was not such that it
guaranteed the satisfaction of his interests, aims, or desires. Pauls own
counsel moved him to travel in one direction but it did not move or
persuade Barnabas to accompany Paul. As advice, due consideration,
determined purpose, or deliberated plan of action, Pauls specific plan
of living and his consequent action illustrate that counsel or ones
own counsel may not always yield what one intends. Paul wanted
Barnabas to return with him to the places where they had taught or
preached together. Barnabas, however, presumably on his own counsel,
chose not to do so and went his own way to Cyprus with John Mark
while Paul and Silas traveled to Syria and Cilicia. There is no indication in the passages from Scripture, or from Spinozas assessment of
them, that the failure of Pauls own counsel to secure the object of
his interest led him to embrace fortune or surrender to superstition as
plans of living. Nevertheless, the failure of consilium in Pauls governance of his affairs with Barnabas could invite one to opine that Paul
actually did no better by his own counsel than he might have done
had he turned to fortune or superstition to attain his aim. With respect
to achieving success in the governance of ones affairs, fortune and
superstition are problematical. Neither supplies constant relief. But
neither is it clear that ones own counsel or dependable counsel
provides a consistently worthy alternative to fortune or superstition as a
plan of living. Very little is said in the treatise about certum consilium.
However, in addition to the opening sentence of the Preface, there is
only one other occurrence of the phrase certo consilio in the treatise.
The words appear in chapter nine of the treatise.
Chapters eight through ten of the treatise contain Spinozas examination of how the various books of the Bible have come to be arranged
and received. In chapter nine of the treatise, Spinoza devotes special
attention to the first five books of the Scriptures and the matter of
Ezras responsibility for the final version of the Pentateuch, as well as
the marginalia that accompany those writings. A question arises about
whether some textual defects in the Pentateuch were accidental or
contrived. According to Spinoza, one learned tradition holds that the
readings did not happen by chance. On the contrary, obvious mistakes
in the text were left uncorrected so that later students of the books
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could conclude that such flaws were made with dependable counsel
by the first Writers, in order that they signify something by them.59
Spinozas reference to that learned tradition is in connection with the
spelling of the Hebrew word for girl in the Pentateuch. Spinoza
asserts that the word is incorrectly spelled on all occasions in the texts
of the five books except one; but adjacent to the misspelled word is the
correct spelling of the word in the marginalia. At issue is the question
why the erroneous spelling in the texts was allowed to persist when
the correct spelling was present in the marginalia. Spinoza explains
that competing readings of the texts were allowed to stand in order to
avoid the replacement of the correct sense of the text by an incorrect
one. The general conclusion proposed by Spinoza is that the Scriptures
have suffered a variety of impositions over time and therefore their history, sources, authors, and compositions present myriad difficulties for
interpreters.60 Indeed, in many cases, it simply is impossible to recover
the original meanings of the texts at all.61 Still, the present purpose is
to learn what the phrase certo consilio means and one useful inference
may be drawn from what Spinoza says about dependable counsel with
regard to the first Writers of the Scriptures. What is said to have been
done by dependable counsel (certo consilio) is set against what might
have happened in the Scriptures by chance (casu). Spinoza therefore
uses the terms dependable counsel and chance as antonymous to
each other. Since he also maintains in the treatise that words have a
fixed meaning through their use alone62 the reader of the treatise may
conclude that what happens in accordance with dependable counsel
TTP 3: 137: Igitur cum hae lectiones casu non contigerint, nec tam clara vitia correxerint, hinc
concludunt, haec certo consilio a primis Scriptoribus facta fuisse, ut iis aliquid significarent.
60
Spinoza does not believe the claim advanced by the one interpretive tradition
about the first Writers of the Scriptures; he does not believe that there are profound
mysteries hidden in them (TTP 3: 13536; 167). Nor does Spinoza recite what factors or reasons might have prompted the first Writers to take the course of action
that is imputed to them by some interpreters of the sacred books. Still, rather than
explain the episode as being something that just happened by chance, Spinoza says
that dependable counsel was the cause. However antithetical it may have been to a
chance event, the practice imputed to the first Writers failed to accomplish what
the interpreters claimed it was designed to achieve. Instead of signifying something
specific by the intentional flaws, the first Writers appear only to have occasioned more
confusion about the sacred books. Acting with dependable counsel moved them to
leave textual errors uncorrected and subsequently the errors were compounded further
over time by the misinterpretations of others (3: 13741).
61
TTP 3: 13637; and compare 109111.
62
TTP 3: 160.
59
politics
165
63
64
65
TTP 3: 4647.
TTP 3: 47.
TTP 3: 5; 2930.
166
part three
66
67
TTP 3: 56.
TTP 3: 189.
politics
167
68
TTP 3: 19192.
168
part three
politics
169
what State all Men are naturally in, and that is, a State of Perfect Freedom to order
their Actions, and dispose of their Possessions and Persons, as they think fit, within
the bounds of the Law of Nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the Will
of any Man. The equal power and jurisdiction of which Locke speaks also is the
equal power of each man to say what is right for him. The primacy of subjective
bias in ones conceptions and judgments also is recognized by Francis Bacon in Novum
Organum, Book 1, Aphorism, 49.
72
Oeuvres de Descartes, 6: 910.
73
TTP 3: 192.
74
TTP 3: 56; Oeuvres de Descartes, 6: 12.
170
part three
bon sens nor certum consilium is infallible. Spinoza admits that sometimes
human beings are driven into difficulties such that their own counsel
fails them;75 and Descartes concedes that an individuals good sense
can cause him to suffer from the consequences of his judgments and
therefore bon sens is not flawless. However, Descartes does propose a
remedy. After conceding at the close of the first paragraph of part one
of the Discours that an individual will be satisfied with himself when he
successfully exercises good sense, Descartes reminds the reader of his
book that it is not enough to have a good mind [esprit] the chief thing
is to apply it well.76 Human beings can seek the satisfaction of their
interests, desires, and needs through the simple reasoning of a man
of good sense or they may employ something more perfect, namely,
a pure and solid reason as though it were had from birth;77 and to
possess the latter, superior, optimized sort of good sense, an individual
only needs to apply the rules of the method for rightly conducting
reason and seeking truth in the sciences which are articulated in part
two of the Discours de la Mthode.78 In other words, Descartes supplies
the reader of his book with a standard against which the exercise of
ones own reason or the application of ones own good sense may
be measured. In a broadly similar vein, Spinoza acknowledges that the
proper exercise of dependable counsel might well involve the conduct
of ones life and the governance of ones affairs not just on the basis of
what ones own simple, selfish counsel might exhort (something akin to
Descartes simple reasoning) but he also might judge, choose, and act
in accordance with what reason dictates (something more akin, though
not identical, to Descartes methodical pure and solid reason). No
one can doubt, says Spinoza, how much more useful it is for human
beings to live in accordance with laws and the dependable dictates of
reason.79 But to what rational dictates would the individual who follows dependable counsel adhere or defer? If ones own judgments are
subjective and often erroneous, what corrective standard can be invoked
to improve them? Descartes gives a solution to that problem by advocating the use of a method for the right conduct of reason, which
involves avoiding rash and precipitate judgment as well as reasoning
75
76
77
78
79
politics
171
clearly and distinctly.80 If one employs and applies the method for
the right conduct of reason then it is proposed that each individual
will achieve the satisfaction of his interests, his desires, or his needs.
Moreover, the satisfaction of them will be certain.81 Spinoza offers no
such method in the treatise. Although Spinoza does seem to imply that
even on the basis of egoistical experience there is some merit in relying
upon common sense. Thus, Spinozas alternative to the method of
Descartes in the Discours is the dutiful citizens reasonable or sensible
cognizance of the advantages to be enjoyed by him when conducting
his life and governing all his affairs in accordance with the dictates of
reason that are established by the regime in which he lives. That is,
political life advantageously can affect an individuals security, health,
and prosperity in ways that are evident even to the most egoistical
human beings.
It is evident that any individuals own counsel may not always be
sound. On the contrary, the counsel of each human being is subjective;
it typically derives from passion rather than from reason; and therefore
an individuals native endeavor to persevere in his being ironically may
become the very cause for frustrating that ambition; or it even can
contribute to his own demise. Therefore dependable counsel would
be superior, more desirable, and more efficacious in securing each
individuals ultimate goal, namely, self-preservation, security, and health,
when the dependable counsel issues from the collective counsel of the
political authority, or the highest power, reflected in the democratic
political regime that serves the interests of its citizens, requires the ceding of some rights or powers by each of the citizens, and guarantees
adherence to the laws of the regime through force, if necessary.82
Ceding individual, unlimited right or power to some external authority would appear to be counterintuitive to human beings whose lives
are governed more by passion than by reason. But Spinoza assures
the reader of the treatise that yielding individual right or power, even
when it is done by passionate individuals, is a task that may be undertaken easily inasmuch as the sacrifice of such rights or powers in
fact represents a lesser evil than the basic human condition in which
172
part three
83
84
85
politics
173
86
87
174
part three
engagement with the result that the position of the city involved in the
conflict also happens to be strengthened and improved. But despite the
advantage gained by the regime from the individuals action, Spinoza
maintains that the fellow who violated his oath to the commander
deserves condemnation as a traitor for the reason that he usurped
the commanders authority and power. Whatever may have been the
citizens reason for doing so, and Spinoza affirms that the individual
acted with good counsel (bono consilio) and he acknowledges that there
was a successful, useful, and advantageous outcome for the city from the
assault, any individual who acts on is own counsel and undermines the
right of the supreme power, or the power(s) assigned to its representatives, is a traitor to the regime.88 According to the political teaching of
the treatise, even the good counsel of a citizen may be considered
detrimental to the regime because the preservation of the Republic
is the highest good and only the regime can provide the conditions
through which security, health, prosperity, and peace, are made available for all of its citizens.89
The example of treason in the political teaching of the treatise
establishes that an individuals endeavor to persevere in his own state
requires that he submit to the dictates or the dependable counsel of
the regime in which he lives regardless of any advantage or utility that
might be obtained from his reliance on his own bonum or certum consilium.
For the sake of sociability, peace, and as much health and security as
may be extended to individuals by a polity, it is both necessary and
useful that citizens adhere to the reasonable or sensible dictates of the
democratic political regime. Citizens should adhere to the dependable
counsel of the supreme authority or power if they hope to conserve
themselves and sustain a social and political condition that makes
their self-preservation practicable. Where an individuals own good
counsel or his own dependable counsel does not come into conflict
with the dispositions and dictates of the regime then the individual is
free to feel or to think or to speak or to act as he wishes; for the goal
of the Republic really is liberty.90 Still, the goal of the Republic is
unachievable if every individual simply does as he pleases and the goal
of the Republic is unachievable where reason has no greater standing
88
89
90
TTP 3: 197.
TTP 3: 192.
TTP 3: 241.
politics
175
91
Based on the teaching provided by Spinoza in the TTP, it may be said that any
reader of the book will recognize that there is some need for law. However, given the
idiosyncratic character of human assessments about matters of personal interest and
personal utility, it is likely that any reader of the TTP will recognize that laws are necessary mostly for other human beings rather than for themselves. But the philosophic
reader of the TTP will acknowledge something else. The philosophic reader of the
treatise will know that by nature passion is as legitimate as reason in the conduct of
life and the governance of human affairs and therefore unreasonable human beings
will require greater inducements to adopt reasonable or sensible behaviors. In other
words, it may be necessary to have recourse to unreasonable inducements to move
vulgar or passionate human beings to become law-abiding citizens.
92
TTP 3: 7374; 191 94.
93
TTP 3: 192.
176
part three
94
95
96
TTP 3: 57.
TTP 3: 58.
TTP 3: 57.
politics
177
97
98
TTP 3: 58.
TTP 3: 58.
178
part three
99
The Latin word, possibilis, involves the sense of contingency expressed in those
two phrases.
100
TTP 3: 189; and compare 5758 and 8184.
101
TTP 3: 6365; and compare 21; 2829; 4144.
politics
179
102
103
104
105
TTP 3: 58.
TTP 3: 5859.
TTP 3: 57.
Compare TTP 3: 61 and 205207.
180
part three
Most human beings do not grasp the true aim of laws.106 For them
to do so would require that passionate human beings, unreasonable
human beings, insensible human beings, or the vulgar exercise the faculty of reason in ways that they habitually eschew. Therefore legislators
establish another aim for law. They use law to entice human beings to
adopt a plan of living that promises them what they desire most. The
true aim of law, however, is to curb the vulgar appetites and impulses
of passionate, unreasonable, or insensible human beings. An accurate
apprehension of the true aim of laws presupposes that a human
being possesses the reasonableness and the capacity to seek nothing
other than what true reason indicates as being useful or advantageous
to him. Reasonable or sensible human beings recognize that simple
moral lessons are sufficient to instruct reasonable or sensible human
beings about how to conduct their lives and how to govern their affairs
prosperously. But the majority of human beings are neither reasonable
nor sensible. Consequently, virtue, which is contained within human
nature and principally depends upon human power alone,107 is quite
rare in any age among all human beings.108 The majority of human
beings therefore must be persuaded or coerced to apply standards of
reasonableness or sensibility to the conduct of their lives and the governance of their affairs by being curbed. The guiding or true aim of
human law, as defined by Spinoza, is the attempt to curb the passionate,
impulsive, and lustful behaviors of human beings. The law succeeds in
that aim when the multitude are induced to become law-abiding citizens
of a democratic political regime, or human beings who adhere to the
dictates of the dependable counsel of the democratic political regime,
because it promises them what they admire and love most or because
it threatens them with what they detest and hate most. Human law
will not succeed if it announces its true aim. Human law will not
succeed if it announces that its purpose is to curb the vulgar impulses
and appetites that are shared by the majority of human beings. Still,
human laws must not oppress; they should persuade. Quoting Seneca,
Spinoza reminds the reader of the treatise, and perhaps especially the
one who reads philosophically, of the need for moderate regimes109
106
107
108
109
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
3:
3:
3:
3:
5859.
46.
102.
74.
politics
181
182
part three
the use of the intellect alone.114 Hence the highest good of human
beings remains largely unattained by most human beings for the reason
that they fail to employ the faculties of human nature that make such
knowledge possible. Still, because many things may be referred to God,
especially things in the superlative degree,115 it also is the case that a
plan of living may attain the status of a divine law where the human
law aims at what is highest, or superlative, and if it has been ratified
by revelation [for] in this sense, the Law of Moses can be called the
Law of God, or the divine Law.116 In other words, the plan of living
contained in the Law of Moses is regarded as divine law to the extent
that it inculcates and fosters one half of the highest good of human
beings, namely, love of God.
Knowledge of the necessary laws of nature, knowledge of things
through their primary causes, and acquisition of the habit of virtue are
aims that may be achieved through the exercise of the human intellect
alone. The achievement of those goals depends principally on human
power or the laws of human nature.117 Accordingly, the highest good
attainable by human beings is something that can be realized through
human agency and effort.118 Moreover, the highest good attainable by
human beings is such that it is its own reward and failure to attain
the highest good is evinced in the life of those who suffer slavery of
the flesh, or an unsteady and vacillating spirit.119 The vulgar do not
pursue the highest good because it demands the exercise of the intellect
and because it requires speculation and a clear mind whereas the
passionate multitudes pursue only what they are able to touch, eat, or
have affect their bodies.120 Nonetheless, the majority of human beings
who are driven by their passions, who neglect reason, and who behave
insensibly must be prompted to develop the habit of virtue if they are
to preserve themselves and prosper; or, more to the point, they must
TTP 3: 61.
TTP 3: 3841.
116
TTP 3: 61.
117
TTP 3: 46.
118
TTP 3:229. At the close of chapter 5 of the TTP, Spinoza recounts the views
expressed by Rabbi Joseph, son of Shem Tov. According to Rabbi Joseph, the ethical teaching of Aristotle omitted nothing concerning true Ethics. But the teaching
of the Greek philosopher was incapable of contributing to ones salus for the reason
that Aristotles teaching was derived from reason alone and it therefore could not be
embraced as a lesson revealed prophetically (TTP 3: 80 and compare 3: 79).
119
TTP 3: 62.
120
TTP 3: 61.
114
115
politics
183
121
The possible compatibility of human law with divine law is illustrated in Spinozas
claims about the reasonableness that ultimately should be reflected in each kind of law.
That is, Spinoza goes so far as to assert that the Hebrew people during their enslavement were obligated to follow even the Egyptian laws if those laws did not conflict
with the natural divine law (TTP 3: 72).
122
TTP 3: 6162; 7677; and compare 16870.
123
TTP 3: 165; 168; 17580. Spinozas account of the various kinds of law in
chapter 4 of the TTP is reminiscent of Platos account of law in Minos which commences with the question: What is law? (313a). The focus of the dialogue is political
law but in order to establish the significance of political law Socrates contrasts it with
two other definitions of law. At one extreme, law is defined as things customarily
accepted (313b) or what also may be characterized as the official opinion [doxa] of
the city (313c). At the other extreme, law is an art which implies knowledge of what
is (314b; 317d). Between those extremes, political law is defined as the wish to be
the discovery of what is (315a). According to Socrates, the official opinion of the
city can incorporate divine elements (318c). The scheme of law in Minos involves
184
part three
politics
185
and it is confirmed by experience alone.125 In other words, the teaching of the Scriptures is capable of moving and persuading the majority
of human beings to adopt a plan of living that is sensible and which
contributes to their security and health. Moreover, the teaching of the
Scriptures which is the teaching of revelation, theology, faith, or piety
is one that demands obedience to law; it cultivates virtue and sociability
by encouraging love of a neighbor; and it offers the promise of salus to
all human beings in both theological and political terms.126
125
126
TTP 3: 118.
TTP 3: 6971.
PART FOUR
1
A sense of the separation of the theological teaching of the treatise from the
political teaching of the TTP is reflected in the title of the anonymously published
first complete English translation of Spinozas book, A treatise partly theological and partly
political, containing some few discourses, etc. (London, 1689). Prior to the 1689 publication
of the treatise in English, Charles Blount had incorporated an English translation
of chapter 6 of the TTP (De Miraculis) into his own anonymously published book,
Miracles, No Violations of the Laws of Nature (London, 1683). Familiarity in England with
Spinozas teachings in the TTP is confirmed by the fact that the interpolation by Blount
of chapter 6 of the TTP into his own book was denounced quickly by Thomas Browne
in his work, Miracles, Works Above and Contrary to Nature (London: Samuel Smith, 1683).
Some of the ideas expressed in Part Four of this book initially were introduced in
my essay, On the Unity of Spinozas Tractatus theologico-politicus, Jewish Political Studies
Review 7 (5755/1995): 107143.
2
TTP 3: 201 and 221.
190
part four
191
192
part four
to favor them in accordance with their wishes or hopes.10 In such circumstances, human beings take refuge in the teachings of theology or
religion. The doctrines and dogmas of theology or religion promise
individuals the satisfaction of their hopes and desires, as well as the
alleviation of their miseries, if the individuals adhere to a prescribed
plan of living that has been approved by theology or religion. More
particularly, because they are ignorant of the order and operations of
nature, the vast majority of human beings come to adopt the theological
or religious prejudice about the existence of a supranatural agent that
is concerned with human wellbeing and the agents existence is said to
be most manifest when the familiar courses of nature seem to be interrupted or contravened with an accompanying event that proves to be
satisfying for those human beings who gain some advantage from the
putative display of divine providence.11 Anyone who would seek to
explain the unaccustomed event or the good fortune that follows from
it by an account that involves natural causation rather than miraculous
agencies is perceived by the vulgar to be an opponent of the existence
and the power of God; and hence such individuals are charged with
discrediting belief in the existence of the supranatural agent that most
human beings regard as the source of human fortunes and misfortunes.12
The alternative to the plan of living that is determined by a reliance
on superstition and chance events is the one that is despised by prejudiced and vulgar human beings. The alternative to the plan of living
that is based upon superstition or fortune is the life of reason or the
philosophic life13 which relies neither upon absurdities nor luck.
Notwithstanding the liberating of the teaching of theology or religion from its corruptions and the liberalizing of its doctrines in the
TTP 3: 5.
TTP 3: 8184.
12
TTP 3: 8182; and compare 30.
13
The degradation of reason by those who succumb to religious prejudice and
superstition is a pronounced theme of the Preface to the TTP: [W]e see that it is
especially those who greedily long for uncertain things who are the readiest victims
of superstition of every kind, and it is especially when they are helpless and in danger that they implore Gods help with prayers and womanish tears. They call reason
blind . . . and they call human sensibility vain, while the delusions of the imagination,
dreams, and other childish absurdities they take to be the oracles of God. Indeed,
they think that God, spurning the sensible (imo Deum sapientes aversari) has written his
decrees not in mans mind but in the entrails of beasts, or that by divine inspiration
and instigation these decrees are foretold by fools, madmen, or birds. Fear makes
human beings be insane (3: 5).
10
11
193
14
15
16
17
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
3:
3:
3:
3:
179.
46.
73; 19091.
191.
194
part four
right. For the immediate purposes of the surface argument of the treatise, Spinoza focuses on the threats to the liberty of thought, speech,
and action that are posed by the prevailing tradition of theology or
religion in the Dutch situation of the late 1660s. He seeks to expand
liberty while remaining mindful of the dangers of license. But in fact
Spinozas teaching in the treatise reflects his awareness of the perennial
tension that persists between those whose lives are led according to their
passions and those who lives are led in accordance with reason.18
The first mention of the tension between the life of passion and the
life of reason occurs early in the theological part of the treatise. In
the discussion of the ceremonial law and the Hebrew regime, Spinoza
seeks to demonstrate that the particular rituals observed by the Hebrew
people were ordained for them only in respect to the temporal happiness of the body and the tranquility of the regime, and therefore
they could have been of use only while their regime was standing.19
Spinozas conclusion about the Hebrew imperium enables him to confirm
his narrow view of the condition of the Hebrew election, the condition
of the Hebrew regime, and implicitly the condition of the Hebrew
religion. But it also permits him the opportunity to introduce his teaching about the constitution of human societies by making an argument
from universal foundations.20 Spinoza says that the formation of a
society is necessary and useful to human beings because it provides for
18
That the treatise concerns the deeper question about the claim that is laid upon
human life by passion and superstition as distinct from the claim that is laid upon human
life by reason is indicated by a remark made by Spinoza in the Preface to the TTP.
Even though Spinoza says we have the rare good fortune to live in a Republic where
liberty of judgment is fully granted to the individual citizen and he may worship God
as he pleases, and where nothing is esteemed dearer and more precious than liberty,
nevertheless he also claims that he is undertaking no ungrateful or unprofitable task
in demonstrating that not only can [the liberty to philosophize] be granted without
endangering piety and the peace of the Republic, but also that the peace of the Republic
and piety depend upon this liberty (3: 7). If nothing truly were esteemed dearer and
more precious than liberty then Spinoza would have no need to defend the liberty
of philosophizing in the TTP. Instead, however, he recognizes that the natural liberty
to philosophize was in jeopardy because of the restrictions upon the civil liberties of
thought and speech that were being advanced by the more zealous anti-republican
alliances between sectarian religious forces and monarchists in The Netherlands during the 1660s. Still, the immediate historical situation only mirrors the more natural
and basic problem inherent in the tension between the life of passion and the life of
reason, as well as the dire consequences of that tension for the prospect of achieving
the third proper object of desire.
19
TTP 3: 69.
20
TTP 3: 73.
195
mutual security and the division of labor. Indeed, human beings would
lack both the skill and the time to support and conserve themselves to
the greatest extent possible if they did not afford each other mutual
assistance. Moreover, life in society brings with it developments in the
arts and sciences which also are indispensable for the perfection of
human nature and its blessedness; for one sees that those who live
in a barbarous way with no civilizing influences lead a wretched and
almost brutish existence.21 While human societies are founded for the
purposes of overcoming human insufficiencies, promoting human convenience, and establishing the terms for mutual aid and security among
their members, the satisfaction of needs, desires, and interests in social
life is contingent upon the observance of certain codes of behavior by
the citizens who inhabit any particular society or political regime. For
instance, as the Hebrew imperium enacted ritual ceremonies to enhance
loyalty and conformity to the Hebrew political regime or the Hebrew
plan of living, every political society, according to Spinoza, requires
laws to regulate the behavior of its citizens in respect of the conduct
of their lives and the governance of their affairs. The justification of
the need for laws is conveyed through Spinozas account of human
nature that is propounded in his discussion of ceremonial laws. Spinozas
contention is that ceremonial laws, rituals, observances, etc., are not
required by the natural divine law;22 nor do ceremonial laws have
any bearing on the blessedness or the virtue of human beings.23 Rather
the ceremonial laws, rituals, and observances that were formulated by
the Hebrew regime for its people served the purpose of maintaining
order and discipline among the people as well as order and discipline
within the regime itself. Laws which constrain certain behaviors are
needed because human beings naturally seek their own advantage to
the neglect of others.24 Furthermore, human beings typically pursue
their own advantages on the basis of their passions, lusts, or immoderate
21
TTP 3: 73. One might compare the similarity between Spinozas account of
the origins of political association based upon mutual security and the division of
labor with Platos account of the origins of the city of natural necessity at Republic
369b3ff. On the disadvantages of life outside political society, compare Spinozas
remarks with the view offered by Thomas Hobbes in chapter 13 of Leviathan, where
life in the state of nature is described as solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short
(London: 1651), p. 62.
22
TTP 3: 62.
23
TTP 3: 6971; 76.
24
TTP 3: 189.
196
part four
197
achieving one of the most basic human desires. Yet the success of any
society or regime in achieving its aims turns on the dispositions of its
members and their willingness to embrace political life and the terms
or the conditions that accompany it.
According to the philosophic teaching of the treatise, the right and
plan of nature is nothing other than the rules that determine the nature
of any individual thing to act and to exist in a certain way: Fish swim;
and big fish eat little fish because it is their nature to do so. Whatever
any individual thing does by its own nature and through its own power
it has the highest right to do because the right of the individual is
coextensive with its determinate power.30 The identification of natural right with natural power extends to every individual in nature and
therefore the identification of natural right with natural power extends
to all aspects of human nature as well. In other words, a human being
who is not yet acquainted with reason or has not yet acquired a virtuous disposition lives under the control of appetite alone with as much
right as he who conducts his life under the rule of reason. Or, just as
the reasonable or sensible human being has the highest right to do all
that reason dictates, that is, he may live in accordance with the laws
of reason, so too a human being who is ignorant and wanton has the
highest right to do all that is urged on him by his appetites, that is, he
may live according to the laws of appetite.31 Furthermore, since it is
the highest law of nature that each thing endeavors to persist in its state,
as far as it is able to do so, taking no account of any other thing but
itself, it follows that each individual has the highest right to exist and
to operate as it is naturally determined. In the exercise of rights or
powers by any individual there is no distinction made between human
beings who have discovered the advantages of the use of reason and
human beings to whom true reason is unknown or between fools,
madmen, and the sane.32 Whatever any individual thing does by the
laws of its own nature, it does with the highest right inasmuch as it
acts as it is determined to do by nature.
The philosophic teaching of the treatise which is the teaching of
nature and which contains an account of the ius et institutum naturae
exposes the root of the natural or philosophic problem. That is, the
30
31
32
TTP 3: 189.
TTP 3: 18990.
TTP 3: 190.
198
part four
33
TTP 3: 190.
199
34
In accordance with the philosophic teaching of the treatise, that is, the teaching
of nature, the life of passion and the life of reason are equally natural and equally
legitimate. Still, the conclusion that the life of reason is superior to the life of passion
is supported by Spinozas identification of living in accordance with the dictates of
sound reason and living in accordance with ones true advantage (TTP 3: 7374).
Moreover, if a human beings true happiness demands knowledge of the truth
(3: 44) and only philosophy or reason is devoted to truth (3: 179) then the life of reason must be superior to the life of passion and the various ways that the passionate
life can express itself, including the acceptance of various forms of religious prejudice
and superstition. Common to both the passionate life and the superstitious life are the
emotions of anger, hatred, and deceit (3: 6; and compare 190); and Spinoza plainly
affirms that superstition itself originates from the most powerful kinds of affect and
not from reason (3: 6).
35
TTP 3: 74; and compare 5859.
200
part four
36
37
201
202
part four
41
42
TTP 3: 192.
TTP 3: 192; and compare 5859.
203
That is, if all human beings easily could be induced to follow reason
alone and to recognize the supreme utility and the necessity of the
Republics existence then they would foreswear deceit entirely. Because
of their desire to secure this highest good, namely, the preservation of
the Republic, all human beings would abide by their agreements or
pacts with others in complete good faith and they would regard their
most important civic function to be keeping their word since honesty
is the strongest shield of the Republic. However, the majority of
human beings are not readily induced to be guided by reason; for
each of them is drawn by his own pleasure, and the mind frequently is
so occupied by avarice, glory, envy, hatred, etc., that no place remains
for reason. Therefore although human beings may make promises by
certain signs of simple spirit, and pledge themselves to keep faith, no
one can be assured of anothers faith unless something else attends the
promise; for everyone by the right of nature is able to act deceitfully
and no one is bound to stand by a promise except in the hope of a
greater good or the fear of a greater evil.43
Human beings can be enticed to enter into political associations
because of the assistances or conveniences that a regime is able to
offer to them. Human beings can be enticed to live in political societies
because they promise a greater good to them. But human beings will
abide by the promises they make in political life principally because
of the threat of the supreme penalty universally feared by all.44 It is
the fear of some punishment or it is hope for some reward to which
Spinoza alludes when he asserts that one cannot depend on anothers
pledge of faith unless something else attends the promise. For many
human beings, the threat of punishmentbe it severe or mildmay
be enough to prompt them to adhere to established laws, fulfill the
terms of their agreements or pacts with others, and to participate
fully and advantageously in political life. But daily experience plainly
confirms that even threats of the severest punishments do not curb all
injurious behaviors or excessive acts by human beings. Those human
beings who are guided only by their carnal instincts regularly ignore
laws, violate their agreements or pacts with others, and frequently they
escape any reprisal for their injurious or excessive behaviors. If human
TTP 3: 19293.
TTP 3: 193. The supreme penalty universally feared by all obviously would be
death since death is the antithesis of self-preservation.
43
44
204
part four
beings can act viciously toward others with impunity, even within the
precincts of political life, then the hope of human beings for secure,
healthy, and prosperous lives becomes compromised. Where greater
goods or lesser evils are decided principally on the basis of their
utility to individuals who are driven by their own selfish desires and
power then there is only a scant possibility that carnal human beings
will comply with established laws or that they will fulfill all of the terms
of their obligations to other human beings in political life. Accordingly,
an exclusively political solution to the natural or philosophic problem
is undercut by the implications of what Spinoza himself calls a law
so firmly inscribed in human nature that it should be placed among the
eternal truths which no one is able to ignore, namely, no one ever
completely forswears the right to act deceitfully.45
With respect to the formation of a political society or regime, the
philosophic account in the treatise of the right of nature and natural
power exposes the friction that occurs between a human beings interest
to satisfy his own desires and the regimes interest to have individual
human beings restrain themselves for the sake of the welfare of the
political community as a whole. But that friction is compounded by
another element of Spinozas account of human nature; for the philosophic teaching of the treatise establishes that the phenomenon of
obedience cannot be known from nature and therefore the legitimacy of
it cannot be established by philosophy or reason.46 In other words, the
very thing that is required in order for human beings to enter political
life and to comply with the laws established there, namely obedience,
is something that the philosophic teaching of the treatise, which is
to say, the teaching of nature, does not provide. Consequently, some
alternative nonphilosophic means must be employed to introduce the
doctrine of obedience that is necessary to support any political solution
to the natural or philosophic problem; and to that end, Spinoza resorts
to the teaching of theology.
After describing the founding of a democratic political regime, Spinoza defines various matters which pertain to political life including
justice, injustice, civil right and wrong, who is an ally and who is an
enemy, etc.47 According to Spinoza, the perpetrator of the crime of
45
46
47
TTP 3: 19293.
TTP 3: 86; and compare 9899.
TTP 3: 19599.
205
treason, for example, is the one who for whatever reason endeavors to
seize the right of the highest power even if the regime were assured of
gaining some advantage from that individuals action.48 The matter of
treason, which in the example cited results from an action based upon an
individuals appeal to his own good counsel, recalls Spinozas account
of the right of nature and natural power in terms of the interests of
the individual and the interests of the regime. At issue in the crime
of treason is the question of the relationship between the right and
sovereignty of the regime over and against the right and sovereignty
of the individual.49 However, the return to a consideration of right and
power in the context of the political discussion of the act of treason
incorporates a reflection on the obligations of individuals to the terms
of divine right and the teaching of theology that are presented in the
treatise. That is, Spinoza wonders whether an individual human being
who lives entirely by appetite alone, even though he has the highest
natural right to do so, is not in clear contradiction of the revealed
divine right which demands that everyone equally is required by Gods
command to love his neighbor and avoid doing injury to others since
the command applies to everyone whether he uses reason or not.50 In
the example, Spinoza asserts that the regime gains from the endeavor
of the individual who is said to have acted treasonously; and there is no
evident sense that the action involved some failure of the individual to
love his neighbor or that any injury to his neighbors, that is, his fellow
citizens, was involved. On the contrary, his actions secure the advantage
of the regime and therefore his action served the advantage and welfare
of his fellow citizens. Nevertheless, using the example of a crime of
treason as a conduit, Spinoza asks the more penetrating question about
whether the right or power of nature is superior to the right or power
of the revealed divine law. The answer to the question is that the claim
about a contradiction between the right of nature and divine right can
be resolved easily; for if we attend only to the natural state, we easily
are able to respond that it is prior to religion in nature and in time. No
one knows by nature that he owes any obedience to God. Indeed, this
knowledge cannot be attained by any process of reasoning. One adopts
the teaching of obedience only on account of revelation confirmed
48
49
50
TTP 3: 19798.
Compare the discussion of treason on pp. 17375 of this book.
TTP 3: 197.
206
part four
by signs. Therefore prior to the revelation of the divine law and the
teaching of obedience to God no one can be bound by a divine right
which he is not able to know.51 According to the philosophic teaching
of the treatise, the life of passion is as legitimate as the life of reason.
In the context of the natural state, each individual human being
may do as he pleases, that is, each individual may do as his right or
power permit, whether he is led by his appetites, impulses, and lusts
or whether he is led by the sound dictates of reason that derive from
his own deliberations. In the political state, however, promulgated
laws established by the dependable counsel of the supreme power of
the regime establish limits to ones behaviors in respect of the conduct
of ones life and the governance of ones affairs; and in the theological state the revelation of the divine law is the promulgation of the
terms of divine right and the limits it sets upon human behavior with
respect to the conduct of human life and the governance of human
affairs. Nature, however, prescribes no restraints upon human behavior.
Whatever limits to action or behavior one experiences in nature follow
from an individual human beings own exercise reason and his sensible
perception of what accrues to his true advantage.
With respect to the crime of treason, Spinozas account is rather
conventional. Where political societies have been formed, the sovereignty
and right of the regime is to be acknowledged above the sovereignty
and right of the individual and his interests. Private right must yield
to public right and those individuals who prefer to pursue the former
rather than submit to the latter can be punished to the maximum
degree. But Spinoza also raises another question that introduces a
very different set of considerations. In the absence of political regimes
with established and promulgated laws, that is to say, in the natural
state, is it not the case that human beings still are bound to restrain
their injurious tendencies and behaviors in accordance with the divine
law and the divine right which obliges everyone to love his neighbor?
Spinozas reply to the question is that human beings are not bound
by any such obligation if they are conceived in accordance with their
natural condition alone; for the state of nature is prior to religion both
in nature and in time. Consequently, for Spinoza, the origin of religion
is identical with the origin of a civil state. That is, the establishment of
political life and the establishment of theological or religious life each
51
207
52
TTP 3: 198.
208
part four
a pact to live in a certain way with other individual human beings, that
the phenomenon of obedience comes into existence at all. For just as
no one knows by nature that he owes any obedience to God prior to
an express covenant with God, surely no one knows by nature that he
owes any obedience to his fellow human beings, that is, to others who
are his equals, prior to his pledging his faith to adhere to the laws,
rights, responsibilities, obligations, and adjudications of the supreme
power or the acknowledged authorities.53 Thus obedience, either to
God or to other human beings, derives from an artificial contractual
construct rather than a natural fact and that realization returns us to
the core of the natural or philosophic problem.
In accordance with the ius et institutum naturae, human beings legitimately can seek to preserve themselves and pursue their interests either
through a life of passion or through a life of reason. The reasonable
or sensible human being acts for his true advantage whereas the
passionate human being acts as he is drawn by his own pleasure.54
The pursuits of pleasure that are connected with base interests, like the
carnal instincts and emotions, produce greed, ambition, envy, anger,
and other causes of strife. Human beings can protect themselves against
the perilous consequences of the carnal, emotive, or passionate life by
agreeing to live with other human beings in a peaceable and secure
manner. Entrance into a pact with other individual human beings and
forming a political society would seem to be an attractive alternative
to conducting ones life and governing ones affairs in an environment
where uncurbed passions, desires, impulses, urgings, or lusts carry every
bit as much sway and legitimacy as reason does. But one significant
and problematic feature of human nature persists. By natural right and
natural power human beings may enter into pacts with other human
beings and then break those pacts arbitrarily. In order for a political
society to offer the hope of a providing a greater good to its citizens,
individual human beings must be made to be obedient since they are
not obedient by nature. However, it also is a fact that the natural tendencies of the vast majority of human beings are insufficient, if not to
say simply opposed, to adopting the habit of obedience.
The rational or the reasonable or the sensible human being who
understands what conduces to his true advantage conducts his life
53
54
TTP 3: 199.
TTP 3: 19093; 7374.
209
and governs his affairs by the dictates of sound reason or by his reliance upon some dependable counsel (certum consilium) in both the natural
condition and in the political condition. Furthermore, human actions
that are rationally self-determined do not involve acting at the bidding of another and therefore such actions do not involve any kind
of obedience.55 The fact that the rational and self-determined life does
not entail obedience helps to explain Spinozas conclusion that no
one knows by nature that he owes any obedience to God; moreover,
knowledge of obedience cannot be attained by any process of reasoning.
Instead, the phenomenon of obedience must be inaugurated through
the suprarational and supranatural means of revelation confirmed
by signs.56
Passionate human beings reject the dictates of sound reason, as well
as the pronouncements issued by the dependable counsel of the political regime, because such dictates or pronouncements are contrary to
what the appetites of passionate human beings esteem. The individual
who conducts his life or governs his affairs on the basis of his passions
desires, impulses, or lusts, will comply with rational, reasonable, or
sensible decrees only if he is made to do so. Whereas the reasonable
human being can live peaceably without obedience to law, the security
of all human beings is put in doubt if the passionate human being is not
made to be obedient. Yet if nature and reason do not and cannot teach
obedience, what hope is there for moderating the behaviors of passionate human beings? Even those who conduct their lives and govern their
affairs in accordance with passion rather than with reason also seek to
55
TTP 3: 74: Denique quoniam obedientia in eo consistit, quod aliquis mandata ex sola
imperantis authoritate exequatur. Rational self-determination excludes the phenomenon
of obedience inasmuch as no one can be said to obey himself.
56
TTP 3: 198. The need for a compelling medium to justify human obedience to
law is obvious given Spinozas account of human nature. But the questionability of that
medium from a philosophic perspective also is warranted because of the basis for the
foundation of the doctrine. That is, the doctrine of obedience is apprehended only on
the basis of revelation confirmed by signs. For Spinoza, however, that statement means
that the doctrine of obedience is known only through a phenomenon that presumes the
possibility of miracles and Spinoza rejects the possibility of miracles as absurd. Thus
Spinoza disingenuously affirms the possibility of miracles for the sake of establishing
the doctrine of obedience on grounds that appeal to prejudiced or superstitious human
beings for whom only what is extraordinary and seemingly contranatural is sufficient
to command their attention. In effect, then, for the purpose of compelling passionate
human beings to become peaceful and moderate in their behaviors, Spinoza appeals
to the very prejudices and superstitions that they embrace, even if the prejudices and
superstitions have been mitigated by the liberated and liberating principles of the
theological teaching of the treatise.
210
part four
211
57
58
59
212
part four
60
TTP 3: 191; compare 3: 7071; 8485; and 17780 which express the specific
practical implications of the divine law for human behavior and action in everyday
situations.
61
TTP 3: 198.
62
TTP 3: 203; and compare 74; 204; 21112.
213
63
64
65
TTP 3: 199200.
TTP 3: 16772.
TTP 3: 30; 32; 179; 18586.
214
part four
66
67
68
69
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
3:
3:
3:
3:
61.
62.
177.
17778.
215
70
TTP 3: 22829 and 231. According to Spinoza, it is a responsibility of a good
republic to set conditions so that it cannot be expedient for evil human beings to
be evil (3: 104).
71
TTP 3: 74.
216
part four
72
At first glance, my claim may seem strange. The TTP is written and published in
Latin which would seem to prevent the reading of the book by singularly passionate
and superstitious human beings, that is, the language in which the book was written
and published would seem to prevent a reading of it by vulgar human beings. Yet
one must remember that at the close of the Preface to the TTP Spinoza explicitly says
that he asks the vulgar and those who suffer like affects as the vulgar not to read
his book (3: 12). Thus Spinoza recognized that there would be Latin readers, that is
to say educated people, who nevertheless embraced vulgar passions and superstitions.
I have described such readers as the learned vulgar in Spinoza, Biblical Criticism,
and the Enlightenment, Modern Enlightenment and the Rule of Reason, ed. John McCarthy
(Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1998).
73
TTP 3: 6.
217
218
part four
the wish to be the discovery of what is (Minos 315a); even though the law or wish
often must incorporate and accommodate persuasive official opinions of the city which
yet may not be worthy opinions (Minos 313a314e). For Spinoza, knowledge and
virtue are achieved on the basis of the realization of a philosophic account of what is:
Nature observes an order that functions in accordance with its own determinate plan.
What philosophy teaches the polity to be and to do is to seek to represent a wish
to discover what is while acknowledging that what is may oppose what passionate
human beings desire, expect, or hope. In lieu of simply indiscriminately communicating a knowledge of what is to all human beings, philosophy influences the polity to
teach its citizens what the knower of what is recommends as powerful, convincing,
but also tolerable tales that serve to induce human beings to embrace political life as a
greater good rather than being simply a lesser evil by the fact of their obedience
to the dependable counsel of the democratic political regime.
76
TTP 3: 193 and 245.
77
TTP 3: 24041.
78
TTP 3: 191.
219
220
part four
83
84
85
221
TTP 3: 179.
TTP 3: 19899.
88
The word law conveys a sense of binding or constraining human behavior. But
it also is the case that laws are what serve as the bond, or the principle of binding
together, that distinguishes one political regime from another.
86
87
222
part four
subverted. Theologys teaching, on the other hand, contains a suprahuman command to obedience and it offers enticements for obedience
that neither philosophy nor politics can deliver. That is, the form and
content of the teaching of theology are persuasive or moving to the
imaginative-affective faculties of the vast majority of human beings in
three important respects: theologys teaching of obedience is suprarational and supranatural in character; adherence to theologys teaching
promises a presumably eternal reward and blessing for compliance
with the divine law but it also threatens a presumably eternal perdition for resistance to it; and theologys teaching holds out the hope for
what passionate and superstitious human beings desire most, namely,
wellbeing now and in an afterlife at the behest of a provident deity. It
is no mere coincidence that the theological teaching propounded by
Spinoza in the treatise happens to supply precisely what philosophy and
politics cannot supply individually or together for the sake of solving
the natural or philosophic problem, namely, a compelling justification
for human obedience to law. But that does not mean that what the
teaching of theology in the treatise advances is true.89 On the contrary,
philosophy and reason know that the teaching of obedience to another
cannot be known or learned from nature. But philosophy and reason
also know that human beings naturally are inclined toward superstition
and only a powerful, persuasive, suprarational and supranatural doctrine
of obedience will suffice to transform human behaviors and actions
so as to correct the natural or philosophic problem of human selfishness, even if that doctrine must involve certain superstitious and absurd
89
One example will suffice. The third dogma of the universal faith asserts that
God directs all things by the fairness of his Justice (TTP 3: 177). The third dogma
establishes the omnipresence of God which entails that nothing can escape Gods notice
or nothing can be hidden from God and therefore divine justice is absolute. In other
words, conviction in the theological doctrine of Gods omnipresence is necessary if
human beings are to be moved to obedience either because of their hope for a divine
reward or because of their fear of a divine punishment. But Spinoza also maintains
in the treatise that God acts and directs everything from the necessity of his own
nature and perfection and hence the imputation of justice to God owes only to a
vulgar conception of the divine nature based upon a defect of the intellect (3: 65).
A number of contradictions or inconsistencies can be discovered in the pages of the
TTP. But Spinozas own ultimate verdict regarding how to resolve the discrepancies
appears to be given in his conclusion that the Scriptures expressly affirm many things
that are said in accordance with the opinions of the Prophets and the vulgar and
which only reason and Philosophy, but not Scripture, teach to be false (3: 183; and
compare 10013).
223
ruit.
TTP 3: 67.
TTP 3: 165.
TTP 3: 165: hoc totius religionis fundamentum est, quo sublato tota fabrica uno lapsu
224
part four
93
TTP 3: 194: quod fundamentum si tollatur, facile tota fabrica ruet; and compare 3: 228.
The Latin word fabrica signifies the workshop of an artisan, the skill or profession of an artisan, as well as any skillful production, fabric, or building. But
the word also can mean a crafty device or stratagem.
94
TTP 3: 198.
225
its emphasis upon obedience through works of justice and charity, has
brought great solace to mortals.95
To solve the natural or philosophic problem of human selfishness,
Spinoza devises a theological teaching that advances obedience to laws
of either divine or human origin;96 he makes the terms of theological
salus identical to the terms of political salus;97 and he makes the terms of
divine justice coincident with human justice.98 To assure the prospect of
preservation, security, health, prosperity, liberty, and tranquility, within
the democratic political regime, as well as the prevention of sectarian
strife, Spinoza goes so far in the treatise as to dictate that there must
be a subordination of religion to civil governance and he justifies that
conclusion on the basis of the philosophic, theological, and political
teachings in the treatise. That is, because the theological teaching of
the treatise asserts that God is the God of all nations,99 and therefore
God has no special kingdom or care over any particular nation, it then
follows in the political teaching of the treatise that public worship and
the exercise of piety must be accommodated to the peace and utility
of the Republic.100 Spinoza further asserts that it is established both
from experience and from reason that divine right depends solely
on the dictate of the highest powers; and since the welfare of the
people is to be the highest law [salutem populi summam esse legem] it is
the function of the highest powers [of the regime] to determine by
which plan each must practice piety to a neighbor, that is, by which
plan each is bound to obey God.101 Accordingly, it is appropriate to
conclude that the teaching of theology in the treatise is indispensable
for introducing the notions of piety and obedience but it remains
for the teaching of politics in the treatise to determine the precise
manner by which piety and obedience will be practiced or exhibited
in the democratic political regime.
The theologico-political teaching of Spinozas old book is a fabrica
devised by a philosopher for the sake of solving the perennial natural
or philosophic problem of human selfishness or human unsociability.
What the treatise proposes then is the framework for a modern liberal
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
3:
3:
3:
3:
3:
3:
3:
226
part four
EPILOGUE
1
2
TTP 3: 67.
TTP 3: 221.
230
epilogue
theologico-political regime of the Turks. For example, the more generous disposition within the Hebrew circumstance is intimated by the fact
that Spinoza himself acknowledges that there were various traditions
of Scriptural or religious interpretation among faithful Hebrews; and
although Spinoza contests most of the conclusions reached by both the
orthodox and the dissenting traditions it yet must be recognized that
differing interpretive traditions existed and there was some tolerance
of them among the faithful adherents to the Jewish religion.3 Still,
authority over the determination of the meaning of the Scriptures
or the meaning of theology or religion and the implications of it to
daily life ultimately resided with the appropriate councils that were
appointed or approved to decide such matters, even from the time of
Moses.4 The theocratic situation of the Hebrews thus may be seen to
have been superior to the theocratic situation of the Turks in at least
that one significant respect: theological or religious debate, perhaps
even a rationally informed debate, was allowed. But despite that advantage of permitting scholarly disputes about Scriptural interpretation,
the basic features of the Hebrew theocratic regime also consisted of
objectionable elements such as the required performance of ritual or
ceremonial observances which, according to Spinoza, added nothing to
human blessedness5 and which, in the end, may have made the people
effeminate;6 as well as the exceptional belief of the Hebrew people that
their theocratic regime was founded by God for the sake of the Hebrew
people alone to the exclusion of all the other nations.7
The attractiveness of the Hebrew theocratic regime as a model for
Spinozas teaching in the treatise, and the extent to which it is imitable
in some respects, rests on the fact that it was the kind of theocratic
regime that expressly was able to moderate spirits and contain those
who were ruling as well as those who were ruled so that they were not
rebellious on the one hand nor were they Tyrants on the other hand.8
Spinoza turns to the Hebrew theocratic regime as an instructive model
231
9
It is worth observing that Spinozas treatment of Moses is ambiguous. For example,
in the teaching of the treatise, the definition of prophecy and the very function of
the prophet are illustrated through the example of Moses (TTP 3: 15). The appeal to
Moses as the model for prophecy and the function of the prophet in the treatise also
seems to rest on the premise that Moses actually did everything that is imputed to
him in the first five books of the Scriptures; and the authority and stature of Moses
seem linked to the presumption of the Mosaic authorship of the first five books of
the Scriptures. But Spinozas final word is that it is clearer than light at midday that
the Pentateuch was not written by Moses (3: 122). Thus Spinoza elevates Moses but
he also subverts him in the treatise.
10
TTP 3: 208; 21415.
11
TTP 3: 206.
12
TTP 3: 207; 20811.
13
TTP 3: 222.
14
TTP 3: 21216.
15
TTP 3: 21516; and compare 69, 195.
232
epilogue
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
3:
3:
3:
3:
216.
4849.
16566.
239.
233
submitted that there were beings who (without doubt by the order
and command of God) carried the weight of the role of God, that
is, beings to whom God gave authority, right, and power to direct
nations and to provide and to care for them.20 In other words, Moses
himself taught the Hebrew people that God could anoint beings to
carry the weight of the role of God, though Spinoza also says that
Moses never defined the nature or the creation of such beings, and
therefore it can be doubted whether Moses himself actually believed
that beings who carried the weight of the role of God were uniquely
created by God.21 On Spinozas view, Moses endorsed the proposition,
at least rhetorically, that God can institute a plan of living for a nation
by acting or speaking through an intermediary. Moses, of course, also
was the intermediary to whom the Hebrew people turned to interpret
and to promulgate the utterances of God when the Decalogue and
the terms of the covenant between God and the Hebrew people were
revealed.22 Hence although it may be said that God was the author
of the Hebrew theocratic regime, it also must be said that Moses was
the first to proclaim the laws or the plan of living of that the Hebrew
people would adopt for their security, health, or salus and so Moses
rather than God launched the Hebrew theocratic regime.
Spinoza claims that Moses excelled others in divine virtue; Moses
was able to persuade the people that he possessed it by demonstrating
it to the people; and therefore he easily could retain his rule over the
regime.23 The ease with which Moses was able to establish himself as
TTP 3: 38.
TTP 3: 39. Spinozas assertion is curious. On the one hand, the assertion suggests that God creates vice-regents to rule on earth. The assertion suggests that Moses
endorsed a divine right of kingship which would be consistent with the function of
Moses within the Hebrew theocracy. But on the other hand, Spinoza says that it can be
doubted whether Moses himself actually believed such a thing. A reader of the TTP,
perhaps especially one who reads philosophically, would recall Spinozas account
of the declarations by Moses that God is fire and God is jealous. According to
Spinoza, both claims are absurd; and Spinoza concludes that either Moses believed
such things or at least he wished to teach them (see note 178 in Part Two of this
book). Since Spinoza says it can be doubted whether Moses actually believed that
God creates beings to carry the weight of the role of God perhaps Moses simply
wished to teach such a doctrine even though he himself did not believe it. The phrase
carried the weight of the role of God in Latin is quae vicem Dei gerebant. A similar
phrase also appears in the treatise in reference to the teaching of Christ where Spinoza
holds that when Christ ordained laws, in that respect, he played the role of God [in
re vicem Dei gessit] (3: 65).
22
TTP 3: 206207.
23
TTP 3: 75.
20
21
234
epilogue
235
virtue signifies. But even if it derives from God as a gift it also seems
that divine virtue is something at which a human being, like Moses,
can become proficient; or it is something at which a human being can
excel, based on the exercise of ones own native human powers.
Spinozas claim that Moses by virtue and by divine order introduced
religion into the Republic involves a subtle but interesting contradiction
that reflects the problem of the difference between divine virtue and
the kind of virtue that is attainable by human beings in accordance
with their own intrinsic powers. According to Spinoza, virtue is acquired
by the power of human nature itself; no other power is required for
the acquisition of virtue. The power of human nature or the law of
human nature that makes the acquisition of virtue possible is contained
in the exercise of reason or the application of the laws and dictates of
reason by human beings.28 For the human being who conducts his life,
governs his affairs, adheres to a plan of living, or simply practices the
life that is directed by reason, the need to follow orders is superfluous
since the life of reason already pursues what truly is advantageous to
human beings.29 Therefore if Moses instituted the Hebrew theocratic
regime by virtue then his founding of the regime together with his
introduction of religion into it would be more a consequence of his
being a reasonable or sensible man than it would be a consequence
of his having submitted to an order issued from another source. In
other words, there may be a question about whether the introduction
of religion into the Hebrew theocratic regime by Moses followed from
his possession of a divine virtue or whether it followed from the fact
of his possession of a different kind of virtue which may have been
excellent but also quite human.
Spinoza speaks in the treatise about the status and function of
Moses in respect of the establishment and the framing of the Hebrew
theocratic regime. After the Hebrew people initially had transferred
their right to God at Mount Sinai, Spinoza says that they were in a
condition similar to a democracy; that is, everyone who had engaged
in the pact with God was equal. But when the Hebrew people went
to meet with God to learn what would be commanded of them, they
within the laws of human nature, the latter terms are symptoms of the prevailing
tradition of theology or religion.
28
TTP 3: 80.
29
TTP 3: 74.
236
epilogue
237
stubbornness, which would have to be overcome or corrected if preservation, security, health, prosperity, and the stability of the regime were
to be achieved. His acknowledgement of those basic features of human
nature influenced how Moses determined the modes by which he would
devise a plan of living for the conduct of the lives and the governance
of the affairs of the Hebrew people. The virtue or excellence of Moses
impressed the Hebrew people. But perhaps Moses was most impressive
to them because of their belief in his ability to work miracles on their
behalf and thereby his ability to assure the providence of God for
the elected Hebrew people. Such demonstrations of providence only
would confirm the preeminence of Moses over the Hebrew people; and
Spinoza asserts that the received perception of the ability of Moses to
work miracles enhanced his claim to possess divine right, it suggested
his possession of a peculiarly divine virtue, and it enhanced his rule
over the Hebrew people and their regime.32 In particular, Spinoza cites
the significance for the Hebrew people of the liberating miracle of the
parting of the Red Sea. That feat was taken by the Hebrew people as
a demonstration of the power of Moses to call upon God to perform
acts of beneficence for them and the power of Moses to invoke the
power of God led the Hebrew people to perceive the virtue of Moses
as being a uniquely divine virtue.33 Indeed, Spinoza says quite plainly
that because Moses knew something about human nature, and because
he experienced that nature in the Hebrew people, Moses resolved
that he would not be able to complete what he had begun with the
Hebrew people through the institution of their regime without very
great miracles and he further realized that without the invocation of
the special external aid of God it would be difficult to convince the
Hebrew people that God wanted them to be conserved.34 Recognizing
the native selfishness and the native stubbornness within human nature
itself, and not just the particular selfishness and stubbornness in the
disposition of the Hebrew people,35 Moses determined that extraordinary means would be required to convince the Hebrew people of the
utility and advantages of adopting a plan of living that would provide
for their security, their health, and their salus. In effect, of course, the
successful functioning of the regime instituted by Moses also would
32
33
34
35
TTP
TTP
TTP
TTP
3:
3:
3:
3:
205208.
75.
53.
217.
238
epilogue
facilitate the attainment of the third proper object of desire. But Spinoza
also acknowledges that there was suspicion among the Hebrews about
the divinity of the virtue possessed by Moses;36 and Spinoza indicates
to the one who reads philosophically that what appeared to most of
the Hebrew people as divine virtue may have been more akin to an
adroit form of political virtue.
At the close of chapter six of the treatise, De Miraculis, Spinoza
quotes a passage from Antiquitates Judaicae by Flavius Josephus which
relates the parting of the Pamphylian Sea by the deity for the sake of
Alexander the Great so as to aid the Greeks and destroy the Persians.37
Josephus suggests that the event occurred because of the will of God
and therefore he concludes: Let no one, in truth, disbelieve in the
word of the miracle. Spinoza, however, relies on the passage from
Josephus to serve another purpose. Spinozas interest is to corroborate
his own conclusion that although the Scriptures may teach that there
are miraculous events, and perhaps many prophets professed that
unusual events were miracles, it ought to be understood that belief in
those events as being miracles is irrelevant to faith or piety inasmuch
as belief in such events as being miraculous is not really necessary for
salvation. Belief in miracles or disbelief in miracles, says Spinoza, has
no bearing on faith, piety, or salvation.38 That is, even if the parting
of the Pamphylian Sea were perceived by human beings to be a miracle
the event itself could have had nothing to do with the salvation of
the Greeks since the Greeks were heathens. Belief in the parting the
Pamphylian Sea as a miracle wrought by the power of God to spare
the Greeks from the Persians or belief in the parting of the Red Sea
as a miracle to spare the Hebrews from the Egyptians has nothing to
do with the salvation of any human being since neither faith nor
piety is predicated upon a belief in miraculous events. Still, for the
one who reads philosophically, the similarity between the situation
of the Hebrew exodus and the Egyptian pursuit in the context of the
parting of the Red Sea and the situation of the Greek retreat and the
Persian pursuit in the context of the parting of the Pamphylian Sea
is quite striking;39 and in chapter seventeen of the treatise Spinoza
36
TTP 3: 239. Spinoza states that jealousy was the motive for the suspicions
raised against Moses.
37
TTP 3: 96; and compare Antiquitates Judaicae 2. 34748.
38
TTP 3: 8889.
39
Spinoza cites the story of the Greeks and the Persians from the Antiquitates Judaicae
of Josephus to indicate that many people are susceptible to belief in miracles. One
239
240
epilogue
TTP 3: 21819.
TTP 3: 203204.
47
TTP 3: 21516.
48
TTP 3: 165; and compare 168; 17475; 17780; 187.
49
TTP 3: 165. In a number of other passages, however, Spinoza says that philosophy
teaches something very different from those claims or those claims are the product of
vulgar prejudices and a defect of the intellect; compare TTP 3: 6365; 175; 183.
45
46
241
50
51
52
TTP 3: 165.
Exodus 20:118 and Deuteronomy 5:123.
TTP 3: 70.
242
epilogue
243
theology or a new religion. Instead, Spinoza turns to the existing teaching of theology or religion, which is to say that Spinoza invokes his
own version of an interpretation of the revealed teaching of Christ, to
serve the purpose of grounding the belief in the existence of God, the
belief in the need for obedience to established laws and to established
authorities, the belief in the remission of sins, the belief in salvation
for loving a neighbor as well as the belief in perdition for neglecting a
neighbor, and belief that faith and piety have little to do with theological disputes and everything to do with the performance of the acts of
justice and charity which are encouraged, approved, and monitored by
the appropriate authorities in a democratic political regime. By making
theological salus and political salus identical in the teaching of treatise,
Spinoza imitates the model of the Mosaic Hebrew theocratic regime.
By making piety and patriotism indistinguishable in a liberal democratic
regime which espouses a liberal Christian theology, Spinoza introduces
a theologico-political solution to the natural or human problem of
human selfishness or unsociability that imitates the basic features of
the formula employed by Moses in establishing the Hebrew theocracy.
Perhaps it may be said that Spinoza was a New Moses56 who has
instituted a new theocracy predicated upon the natural or philosophic
knowledge of the importance of satisfying the third proper object of
56
It is clear from the teaching of the treatise that the virtue of Moses, whether
it was divine or simply political, distinguished him from other human beings. Spinoza
remarks in the treatise that anyone who would hold a regime has to have something
above common human nature, or at least he must endeavor to convince the vulgar
that he possesses such a nature. The virtue of Moses accomplished that aim and it
permitted him to hold the regime. Spinozas imitation of Moses does not extend to
his own attempt to hold a regime. Spinoza advocates a liberal democratic regime. But
it still can be said that Spinoza possesses something above common human nature
by the fact that he dramatically and convincingly alters the received conceptions of
theology and politics in the 17th century and beyond that time. As Moses liberated the
Hebrew people from their captivity in Egypt, Spinoza aims to liberate his contemporaries
and his successors from the kind of theological or political captivity that follows from
ignorance, prejudice, or superstition. The theologico-political plan of living instituted
by Moses involves an autocratic regime because of the obstinacy of human nature; the
theologico-political plan of living instituted by Spinoza involves a democratic regime
also because of the obstinacy of human nature. In both plans, however, there is the
presumption that the wellbeing of the individual is best secured and maintained where
the wellbeing of the regime is assured. Moses assumed that human selfishness was too
great an obstacle to political stability and so his laws, according to Spinoza, made the
people effeminate (TTP 3: 57). Spinoza, on the hand, assumes that human selfishness
can be harnessed to advance the interests of both the regime and its citizens so as to
secure the wellbeing of both (3: 19395). Rather than curtailing selfishness, Spinoza
seeks to establish the conditions for a more orderly and productive exercise of it.
244
epilogue
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246
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248
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