Академический Документы
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Stark Draper
Ethnic and Racial Studies
Volume 20, Number 1
January 1997
(preprint version)
Abstract
The communist era of the mid-twentieth century was a pivotal period for the
coalescence of many national identities. Often communism provided the first modern,
stable, state governments and infrastructures upon which overarching ideas of
identity, such as nationalism, could readily grow. The communist era was certainly a
crucial one for Albanian national ideology and thus it is important to reevaluate
Albanian nationalism in light of the recent ebb of communist hegemony in Eastern
Europe. Placing the current issues confronting Albanian ideas of self in perspective
by tracing their historical background, we find that the situation of
Albanian-identifying communities, divided among three or more states and caught
between Eastern and Western influences, is forcing upon Albanian ideas of self an
extreme change from a decidedly introverted to an extroverted ideal. Such forces are
counterpoised by prior ideology regarding Albanian nationalism and the history of
the Albanian people, as well as by the perennial Albanian insecurity over issues of
religion. It is from this interplay that the Albanian character will evolve and endure.
determining factor for inclusion within an Albanian nation, but language was, Albanianspeaking Orthodox communities of the south had also to be included within the definition.
While religion continues to play a very minor constructive role in defining Albanian
national ideals, the fear of certain religious communities was the main catalyzing force behind
early Albanian national movements. However, many changes were needed in the society and
government of the Albanian state, which was founded in 1912, before national conceptions
could finally become one of the primary loyalties and forms of identification of the states
subjects, a time when an Albanian nation could truly be said to exist.
itself.
Since nationalism is suppose to be, at its base level, a popular form of self-identification,
it is useful to investigate what kind of prerequisites there are before an individual can view
themselves as truly belonging to a national community. First there must be a need that
identification in a national manner can potentially address. After the creation of a political
movement stressing national themes, people must share both a culture and a belief that they
belong to the same overarching national community before the movement can be emotionally
appealing for the individual. Culture necessitates the existence of an infrastructure upon
which a community can exist, and belief in community, a mental attitude binding a person
to others they have never met. We will look for these characteristics of need, commonalties,
and belief when investigating Albanian nationalism.
A frequent criticism of the modernist analysis is that nationalist movements have emerged
in non-industrial, non-western societies. This is a legitimate criticism that cannot be answered simply by citing the global spread of western culture and ideas through commerce,
colonialism and western-educated elites, and thus seeing non- western national movements as
movements only by imitation. However, the central idea of the modernists, that nationalisms
are dynamic and ever-changing movements can be applied without regard to geography, as
can the search for the motivating characteristics of nationalism as enumerated above. In this
paper we will apply modernist ideas to Albania, a non-industrial, peripherally western state,
and we will see that the tools presented by this type of analysis can still lead to valuable
insights.
The commission did not specify how they would have identified Greek nationals, had there
been any, but it seems that there were both religious and intellectual motivations on the part
of a significant proportion of the population to avoid one of the primary objectives of the
Albanian nationalists, the formation of an autocephalous Albanian Orthodox Church. This
report, along with the failure of the international commissions even to attempt to set the
border according to national criteria, indicates that rather than having highly intermingled,
but distinct, sets of nationals, the inhabitants of the region had never before needed to
identify as such. It was unclear to all to what community they belonged, and even if they
did belong to a national community at that time.
Both Greek and Albanian representatives to the Paris Conference contended that the
area should be included within their respective states according to the principle of national
self-determination, a principal that each side believed favored it. The set of characteristics
to which the two delegations looked to demonstrate the populations Greek or Albanian
nationality were mutually exclusive. The Greeks asked whether the area should be assigned
according to race and language, or culture and religion, thinking that the latter two criteria
favored them (Stickney 1926, p. 87). The Albanian representatives disputed these bases
for national identification and held that although Greek was the language of commerce,
education, and religion, Albanian language schools had been banned by the Ottomans and
now that the Ottomans had left, there would be an Albanian renaissance. They also identified
a separate Albanian race as a major differentiation.
We will see that Albanian national ideology, as formulated by the communists, holds
the importance of social continuity dating back centuries to be a basic tenant. In outlining
the debates at the Paris Peace Conference we see that such continuity cannot be taken
for granted. Continuity implies an unbroken cultural progression, but the dispute between
the Greeks and Albanians contradicts this. It seems as though the Greek and Albanian
representatives in Paris were not so much arguing that the notions the other side championed
were invalid, but rather that those were not the crucial points to national identity. The simple
fact that these national representatives could hold an argument of such a flavor indicates that
they had a far different view of a nation from that held today. They understood that these
5
future Greek and Albanian citizens had multiple, and conflicting, influences and that they,
the representatives, were themselves making overtly conscious choices in helping to define
the nation and who belonged to it, rather than rejuvenating a dormant entity. To argue
that a cohesive, unitary community existed for all time is specious; to argue that in a certain
area there were many similar cultures, dialects and methods of identification is not. The
transformation began when people took such proto-nationalist similarities and emphasized
some to the exclusion of others, eventually formulating a national ideal that in retrospect
appears defining.
Postwar developments
When the communists came to power following the Second World War they were in a strong
position to help solidify the sense of an Albanian nation among Albanian citizens. And,
as foreign relations with Yugoslavia soured and internationalist ideals tarnished, the communists increasingly subscribed to national slogans. No longer was the socialist badge of
the Albanian Communist Party (ACP) enough, nationalism was also needed to augment
the right of the communists to lead. Indeed, this change meshed well with the war where
1
The ancient name of the lands encompassing the present borders of Albania.
Albania had been liberated by her own partisans with little outside help; and in the telling of
the story of war-time resistance this self-reliance was increasingly accented.2 The partisans
could truly claim to be a popular national movement that derived its legitimacy from the
Albanian nation, rather than from internationalist ideals and associations.
It was in this era that Albania created the infrastructure necessary to sustain a national
creed. The communist reforms focused on roads, land, the media, and education. Prior to
the war people had remained relatively isolated in their mountain clans or as sharecroppers
on farms in the lowlands. The agrarian reforms of 1946 broke up the large estates and
distributed land among the people, resulting in a tremendous increase in the interactions of
citizens with the state and with each other (Sjoberg 1991, p. 84). Mass literacy campaigns,
and a corresponding explosions in sources of news and literature, also increased the sense
of an Albanian community. Seven year schooling followed the war and became mandatory
in 1952 (Sjoberg 1991, p. 65). In the following years a bureaucracy educated exclusively
in these new schools began to emerge, and with them an underlying vision of the Albanian
nation as an overarching, all-encompassing entity.
As a product of the new curriculum, and a foundational material for it, Albanian socialrealist literature is one of the best places to locate the official ideology of Albanian nationalism. It was here that the connection between Skanderbeg and the partisan struggle was
fully developed. Now the five hundred years between Skanderbeg and the League of Llesh
(1444), and Enver Hoxha3 and the liberation of Tirana (1944), was seen as the story of an
oppressed, freedom-loving people, who were continually fighting to throw off the yoke of
foreign oppression (Pipa 1978, p. 170), a struggle that culminated successfully only with
the partisan victory in 1944. Whether this interpretation of the areas history had anything
to do with the situation of the (mainly Muslim) local populace in the Ottoman Empire is
not really relevant. What is relevant is that the partisan resistance fit in perfectly with this
romantic image, and nationalism seemed to be a priceless tool for the Communist Party.
Ironically, this interpretation of history led Albanian writers to portray the archetypal
Albanian as an isolated northern Gheg mountaineer, rather than as a Tosk southerner who
fell under the sway of the Ottoman governor.4 But it was the Tosk southerner, and not
the Gheg northerner, who formed the power base of the ACP. The idea of the archetypal
Albanian is further reflected in the character of the bandit. This character first emerged in
the literature of the Arbresh Albanians of Italy whose forefathers emigrated from Ilyria after
Skanderbegs death. Many of these soldiers were too proud to work the land and supported
themselves as mercenaries or bandits. The image of the noble bandit later became prominent
in their descendants literature and was afterwards co-opted by the communists (Pipa 1978,
p. 110). The communists further used such images to draw Albanians in the light of a
rogue people, unable to be subservient to any foreign authority, a concept that they used to
justify their successive breaks with each of Albanias patron states. Albania broke first with
Yugoslavia in 1948, then with the Soviet Union in 1960, and finally with China in 1978.
Albanian social-realist literature also tended to focus on the stories of the peasantry,
2
It should be noted, however, that while the importance of Yugoslav help to the Albanian Partisans has been deemphasised
since Albanias split with Yugoslavia in 1948, Yugoslav assistance was almost certainly crucial in the formation of the Albanian
Communist Party and in the organization of the partisan resistance.
3
Enver Hoxha was the partisan and post-war leader of Albania until his death in 1985.
4
Albanians are divided into two rough ethnic/ linguistic/ cultural groups: northern Ghegs and southern Tosks.
rather than those of the townsfolk. By championing the peasant the communists hoped
to inspire agricultural workers to achieve self-sufficiency, and to reinforce the idea of the
continuity and purity of the isolated Albanian people. During the centuries of Ottoman
administration the town areas were greatly influenced by the cultures of the Empire. Isolated
rural mountain villages provided a much better environment for the preservation of what
could be said to be typically Albanian. Therefore romantic writers focused on them. Thus,
Albanian social-realist literature was used to spread the ideals of the Albanian nation to its
increasingly literate and politically conscious people. But for the most part this literature
avoided the complexities of Albanian society that the ACP was trying to homogenize.
Ismail Kadare, who rebelled against the idea of literature as a weapon in the hands
of the Party (Pipa 1991, p. 33), revealed the struggle between old and new, between
Albanians of the communist era and the remnants of pre-war societies, in his book, Kronik
ne Gur (Chronicle in Stone). In the course of the story the young narrator experiences
Italian, German, Balli Kombetar,5 and partisan rule and must, for the first time, confront
the concept of Albania.
I listened carefully, raking my brain trying to understand exactly what was this Albania they were so worried
about. Was it everything I saw around me: courtyards, breads, clouds, words, Xhexhos voice, peoples eyes,
boredom, or only a part of all that? (Kadare 1987, p. 108)
It was a tough problem, figuring out what was Albania. The tensions between town and
country, rich and poor, Muslim and Christian, the recurring blood feuds, all were obstacles
impeding the creation of a single Albanian national identity. When the older generation
thought about being Albanian they considered all these thing and said, Its a complicated
business, all right... Albania. (Kadare 1987, p. 108) But when the youth of the country
thought about being Albanian, they saw these complexities as only remnants of old that
would be done away with in the new society promised by the communists. Although traditional forces were substantially weakened by the victory of the partisans, they did leave
marks on Albania. Urban-rural differences, north-south divisions, and multiple religious affiliations were all impediments to the new order and needed to be dealt with by the communist
program.
Such influences become especially apparent in investigating how well the reality of the
communist era corresponded to communist ideology. At Paris in 1921 a number of defining
characteristics of a nation had been proposed. The communists managed to adopt almost all
these criteria (Albanian and Greek) in their attempts to define what it meant to be Albanian.
They established a comprehensive state schooling system; normalized the disparate local and
non-written cultures of the country into a single high culture; isolated the Albanians from
other peoples; and, succeeded in standardizing the Albanian language. However, one characteristic remained problematic for the Albaniansreligion. While in their official teachings
they professed otherwise, the communists believed religion to be such a potentially divisive
issue that in 1967 Albania became the first, and only, officially atheist state in the world.
Whether religion was as divisive an issue among the Albanian people as the communists
believed it to be is unclear, but it is apparent that today the reintegration of religion into
Albanian national conceptions is one of Albanias greatest challenges.
5
Apart from religion, urban-rural differences were a great impediment to the establishment
of a unified society. The communists continually strove to equalize the standard of living
throughout the country, but rural areas consistently lagged behind. Following the war there
was an initial migration from urban to rural areas, but this trend was markedly reversed
after the first five-year plan was inaugurated in 1950. In accordance with its attempts to
attain agricultural self-sufficiency, the Party worked hard to get people to stay on the land.
Tax incentives, assignment of technical graduates to rural tours, and barriers to migration all
helped stabilize the urban-rural ratio at 1:2 by the late 1960s (Sjoberg 1991, p. 52). Although
lowland farms were collectivized in the mid-50s, the push to collectivize in mountain regions
did not even begin until over a decade later, evidence that even under the communists
highland society took a long time to come into line with that of the lowlands (Sjoberg 1991,
pp. 86, 95-6).
North-south divisions were still more blatantly divisive than urban-rural ones. In 1947
a peasant rebellion in the northern city of Shkoder was crushed by the communists, but
established the north as staunchly anti-communist, and communism as a Tosk phenomenon.
The suppression of this rebellion was followed by the persecution of the northern Catholic
priesthood, one of the most energetic sources of pre-war Albanian nationalism (Sinishta
1976). North-south discrimination continued throughout the communist years. It is most
evident in the creation and adoption of Unified Literary Albanian which is based upon a
Tosk grammatical structure, relegating Gheg to rounding out the dictionary (Pipa 1989,
p. 224). This standardization is especially important when considering Albanian identity
because Albanian nationalists have always looked to language as the central differentiating
characteristic of Albanians. The adoption of Tosk as the basis for standardized Albanian
implies that Tosks are more truly Albanian than are Ghegs, no matter what the literature
says, an assertion perhaps borne out by the relative lack of important communist leaders
from the north.
The great irony of the communist period is that communist ideology is avowedly internationalist and therefore anti-national, but by providing much of Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union with its first modernized infrastructure, communism set the foundation for the
coalescence of many national identifications and, as had happened elsewhere, for many nationalisms besides those officially endorsed. Communisms central planning system provided
a most fertile ground for national developments as dissent was not allowed. Therefore, as the
conception of an Albanian nation was crystallizing, it was not so hampered by competing
influences as it had been earlier in the century. While initially an advantage, this later led
to tension because the officially formulated national ideology was very static and resisted
evolution. The Albanian Communist Party used nationalism as a tool to legitimize its control of the government, to unify the disparate elements of Albanian society, and to give the
citizens of the state a sense of dedication to an encompassing wholethe nationdedication
that the communists then tried to convert into belief in the Party. There were some major
aspects of life in communist Albania that did not mesh with the view of the Albanian nation
championed by the communists. The ways in which the Communist Party dealt with these
issues were defining tests for the Party and for the evolving Albanian nation. Today, with
the ebb of communism, competing aspects of Albanian national identity are becoming more
apparent and the communist triumph of a single national ideal is beginning to fade.
10
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the precarious position of the Macedonian state has led to increasing friction between Albanian and Slavic communities. Thus, both communities are strongly attracted to the idea of
increasing their political influence through an alliance with Tirana.
Indeed, early in his tenure President Sali Berisha pursued an aggressive policy with
respect to Albanian minorities abroad, though more recentlyand under western pressure
he has grown increasingly clear in his support for the moderates in each community and for
the sanctity of regional borders. I expressed my view that the Albanians are not seeking a
change of borders by force, he said in the spring of 1994, but on the other hand Albanians
will react as a single nation towards every massacre or practice of ethnic cleansing that
anyone may undertake against them. (FBIS 1994, p. 1) Such a shift in position reflects
a realization of the weak pull that irredentism has for most Albanians who are much more
concerned with feeding their families than with nationalist agendas and who, in addition,
watch CNN reports on the events in Bosnia each night on the roughly 250,000 (EIU 1994b,
p. 63) satellite- dish-equipped televisions in the country. Realizing the weakness of their
position, most Albanians would shy away from irritating their neighborsSerb, Macedonian,
and especially Greek as there are hundreds of thousands of Albanians working illegally in
Greece who support their families back home.
While often the prime objective of nationalist politicians is reunification, Berisha manages to voice the single community ideology of nationalism while at the same time undercutting that objective. He can do so, to speak of having a unity of purpose with the Kosovar
Albanians while reaffirming borders, because Albania is so plainly unable to carry on any
military action that his words do not alarm Serbia as irredentism disguised. What is more
interesting, however, is not that Berisha doesnt have to fear Serbian retribution, but that he
doesnt really have to be too concerned with Yugoslav Albanian interest in reunification either; though this might change if the situation of the Kosovar Albanians continues to decline.
That is, Berishas statement implies that Albanians are unified in purpose and organization,
but such organization suggests coordination and, just as the Albanians feel that Yugoslav
Albanians are taking advantage of them in business, Prishtina and Tirana have such different agendas that large-scale cooperation would not be an easy matter. The problems of any
Greater Albania would parallel those of 1930s Yugoslavia where the divergent experiences
of the Croats and Serbs made the idea of an overarching Yugoslav nation untenable. Thus
Berisha can advocate this pseudo-nationalist agenda without worrying over the prospect of
sharing power with Prishtina. Indeed, the idea of the Albanian communities acting in concert, as if belonging to one nation, is perhaps all the more workable if the Albanians never
do have an opportunity for unification.
What this reveals about nationalist conceptions in general, and Albanian ones in particular, is that there are many tiers of national identity. Just as Yugoslav citizens could identify
as Yugoslav on one level, and as Serb or Croat on another, Albanians can today identify as
Albanian on one level and as Albanians from Albania proper or from Kosovo on another. The
common conception of being Albanian which extends across sections of Albania, Macedonia, Kosovo and even Montenegro, could be termed a lowest-common-denominator national
identity. This lowest-common- denominator nationality seems to serve more to differentiate
the Albanians from surrounding communities than to unite them. Although this national
feeling is differentiating, since its unifying aspect is so weak it betokens a more extroverted
12
view of the world than most nationalisms. Such a view is forced upon the Albanians because
even if they wish to react as a single nation, since they cannot be unified (in geography or
purpose), each community must individually seek to deal with its own problems. In doing
so, being forced to look outward for options rather than inward for strength, Albanian communities have often elected to follow a moderate, conciliatory path in regional politics. Such
forced openness and moderation hints at the constructive role that the Albanians might play
in Balkan affairs.
This new openness of Albanian nationalism is also important when Albanians question
where they place themselves mentally and emotionally in the world community. Considering
both the historical ties between Albania and the Ottoman Empire, and the religious makeup
of the country, there are many reasons why Europe and America are not the only places
that Albania can look for assistance in reinvigorating her economy and society. Albanians,
however, have always viewed themselves as European, and so integration into Europe is one
of their top priorities. Such thinking traces back at least to Skanderbeg, who today seems
to be a popular figure across religious lines. One might therefore hypothesize that if religion
does not matter to Albanians to the extent that the Muslim majority can accept a Christian
(and more importantly anti-Muslim) national hero, then the idea of looking to the Muslim
world for help, as well as to the Christian European one, should not really be an issue either.
This, however, is not the case.
In December 1992 Albania joined the Organization of the Islamic Conference (RFE/RL
1993, p. 28). Since ratifying that agreement President Berisha has been attacked by both
the socialist and democratic oppositions as tying the country to the fundamentalist Muslim
world and turning away from Europe. But, with a Muslim majority in the country, with
Albanian Islamic leaders tense as a result of the inroads Christianity is making in traditionally
Muslim areas (World Council of Churches 1992, p. 4), and with the high conversion rate
among young Albanians job-seekers in Greece,7 Berisha had many good reasons to make
this decision. And, as he argued, the Albanian economy is in such poor shape that Albania
should be looking to all possible sources of support. Accordingly, by 1994 many of the relief
organizations operating in Albania and much of the investment coming into the state was of
a non-European, non-American origin.
Although ties with the Muslim world, and Turkey in particular, have increased greatly
over the past few years, this does not mean that ties with European states have been slackening. In fact, Albanias most important trading and investment partners are all members of
the EC (Tribune Ekonomike Shqiptare 1991, p. 5; EIU 1994a, p. 64) and Albania has been
the biggest per capita recipient of western aid in post-communist Europe (EIU 1994c, p. 71).
Above and beyond such trade and investment, the Italian operation Pelican brought relief
supplies and personnel to Albania between 1991 and 1993 and saved Albania from mass
starvation, an effort for which the whole country is grateful (EIU 1994a, p. 56). Finally,
it is the influx of hard currency from the economic refugees in Greece and Italy that has
stabilized the Albanian currency, raised the standard of living, and filled shops with goods;
remittances that were estimated to be worth $500 million in 1994 alone (EIU 1994a, p. 57).
Albanias European connections are paramount, and in no way will Albania isolate itself
7
Albanian Muslim workers often get Baptized and adopt Orthodox names as this tends to better their treatment by the
Greek police. (Interviews with young Albanian refugees in Tirana, Gjirokaster, and Saranda, 16-20 August 1993.)
13
14
Yugoslav wars. One of these is Nicholas Rizopoulos who writes that Athens and Belgrade
(see themselves) emerging as defenders of the res publica christiana vs. the hordes of Muslim barbarians once again knocking on Europes eastern gates. (Rizopoulos 1993, p. 4)
Greece and Serbia are the two communities that have pressed Albania in the past and make
Albanians feel that Islam is a stigma attached to their nation. In addition, the idea of an
Athens-Belgrade alliance is most distressing to Albanians because it implies that political
decisions should rely on religious identifications. It is this final thought that penetrates the
Albanian insecurity over religion and over their political allegiances to Europe and the Muslim world. The prime Albanian modus operandi is that religion does not matter in politics,
that Albania is a secular state and should be evaluated as such. The idea of a Greco-Serbian
alliance based on a common Christian Orthodoxy and distrust of Muslims contradicts such
ideals.
Conclusion
Nationalism is a dynamic process. Albanians are continually making choices: to be practicing
Christians or Muslims; to think in terms of an eastern or western community; to support
the return of land to its pre-communist owners, or to keep it distributed as it is currently.
Each person in the Albanian communities must decide upon their own position in regard to
each of these questions. The sum of these opinions, the gestalt, determines the character of
the nation. This is the idea of democratic nationhood in which each individuals opinions
contribute to defining the nation, and it is an idea that is becoming increasingly ascendant
in modern societies. But since ones opinions are continually developing and changing, so
must the character of the nation. While Albanian nationalism gained wide acceptance as a
means of self-identification only in the communist era, it was a crafted identity that became
formalized and therefore resisted evolution. Because people were politically disenfranchised
a democratic form of nationhood could not emerge. However, Albanian citizens had to be
given the tools with which to conceive of themselves as a nation in order for the communists
crafted identity to have purchase among them. Now, with the democratizing of the politics
and society of Albania, there has been a shift towards a more democratic form of national
ideology. While new influences on and ideas about Albanian nationalism may clash with
those of the communists, to a great degree they collaborate as well. Such is the momentum
of history: conceptions of self rarely change abruptly, rather they evolve slowly. Earlier
identities will continue to affect the way in which Albanian nationalism, now of a more fully
democratic nature, develops today. It is the influences that persist throughout all political
and social upheavals, such as the enduring questions of religion and Albanian identity, that
are the true defining concerns of the Albanian nation. Only by appreciating such themes and
acknowledging the influences of the communist era will people be able to come to a fuller
understanding of Albanian nationalism and post-communist nationalisms in general.
The modernist analysis of nationalism is developed from the direction of democratic
nationalism, a form not predominant in Albania until recently. Even so, the tools that it
contributes were valuable in examining this non-industrial, peripherally European society,
and made clear the defining questions of Albanian nationality in the past and today. There
is no reason these questions must be answered in the same way in each of the three Albanian
16
communities discussed herein or even for each member of a single one of these communities.
Albanian nationalism will remain a strong force in the Balkans Peninsula, but for it to be a
successful and constructive force, given the widely differing challenges facing each community,
it must develop an ideology which runs counter to that of most nations. It must nurture
a very open and cosmopolitan ideal that readily spans state borders. The unique situation
and character of the Albanian peoples forces this challenge upon them; whether they can
meet the challenge and help to stabilize the Balkans is, as yet, unclear.
17
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STARK DRAPER is a doctoral candidate in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. This paper grew out of a thesis he originally
wrote for the Department of History, Stanford University. During the 1996-97 academic year
he will be doing research as a Fulbright Fellow in Albania.
ADDRESS: 18 Bellevue Street, Newton MA, 02158 U.S.A.
E-mail: ktaadn@mit.edu
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