PHIL 181: Metaphysics

Identity Through Change

Alternative Theories
Eric T. Olson , The Paradox of Increase
In our ordinary conceptual scheme it seems obvious that things can get larger by acquiring parts.
There is an argument, attributed to Zeno, that this is impossible: the Paradox of Increase.
The Argument
Consider an object A.
(Let A be anything that can gain a part if anything can gain a part.)
We wish to make it bigger by adding part B.
(Let B be the sort of thing that can become a part of A.)
Conjoin B to A.
(By doing whatever it would take to make B become a part of A, if this is possible.)
Figure 1

before

after:

Is this sufficient to make B part of A?

It seems not.
1. Either:
Conjoining B to A merely attaches B to A without making B a part of A.
The conjoining gives A a new neighbor, but not a new part.
Or:
Conjoining B to A does make B a part of something, but that something is not A.
Rather it is the thing made up of A and B after they have been conjoined.
But
That thing didnt gain B as a part; that thing cannot gain any new parts.
It cannot gain any new parts because
Either:
It didnt exist before A was conjoined to B, and conjoining A to B brought it into existence.
But then it didnt gain a new part.
or
It did exist before A was conjoined to B, but as a scattered object.
But then it didnt gain a new part.

Since this argument is completely abstract, making no assumptions about the nature of the
objects or about the nature of conjoining.
Therefore, nothing could ever increase in size by gaining a new part.

The very idea of growth by addition of new parts is incoherent. 242

A Genuine Paradox
This is a genuine paradox: it derives from premises which seem unassailable, and its conclusion
is unacceptable.

Now I believe that some things can grow by acquiring parts, but it takes a good deal of
controversial metaphysics to show how they can(W)e cannot resist [the paradox] without
accepting something that looks nearly as bad. 242
A Paradox of Decrease
Consider an object X.
(Let X be anything that can lose a part if anything can lose a part.)
We wish to make X smaller by removing part Y.
Detach Y from X.
(By doing whatever it would take to make Y no longer a part of X, if this is possible.)
Figure 2

before:

after:

I 0
X?

Is this sufficient to make Y no longer a part of X?

It seems not.
X is made up of Y and something else: the rest of X (call this Z)
Either
Detaching Y from Z causes X no longer to exist.
But then detaching Y from X doesnt make X smaller (unless non-existence is the limit of
shrinking).
Or:
Detaching Y from X merely scatters X.
But then detaching Y from X doesnt make X smaller; X becomes just a scattered object
which has the size it always did.
If these arguments are sound then there we must accept as a metaphysical principle a particular
doctrine:
The Doctrine of Mereological Constancy
Necessarily, if x is a part of y at some time, then x is a part of y at every time when y exists.

This is different from Mereological Essentialism, which was defined in the Metaphysics Toolkit
as:
Necessarily, if a is part of b, then if b results from the substitution of a by (the
nonidentical) a, then b is not identical to b.
Or in Olsons formulation:
Necessarily, if x is a part of y at some time, then necessarily x is a part of y at every time
when y exists.
Mereological Constancy rules out a change in parts, but it doesnt make the parts an object has
essential to it.
Possibly the object might have had other parts than it did throughout the whole of its existence.
Mereological Essentialism also rules out a change in parts precisely because an objects parts
are essential to it.
Mereological Essentialism entails Mereological Constancy, but not vice versa.
The Consequences of Mereological Constancy
Two possible views:
Either,
Bicycles and mothers do not exist for more than a moment.
What appears to be a persisting object is in reality a series of numerically different beings,
succeeding each other with inconceivable rapidity.
Or,
If the parts that are parts of the object that is your mother at a particular time remain parts of that
object, then the object that is your mother at a time has existed for billions of years.
Over that history it coalesced from interstellar matter to be your mother. Then it existed very
briefly as your mother (just long enough to give birth to you), and then began to disperse,
eventually to become interstellar dust again.
This Seems Incredible
Either way, the objects we recognize are momentary.
And the momentariness of objects under the assumption of Mereological Constancy undermines
many beliefs, institutions, and practices
Defending Mereological Constancy
The Revisionary Proposal
We could revise our conception of an object and grant Mereological Constancy.
Despite appearances, none of the things we say and do when engaged in our ordinary business
of life assert, imply, or presuppose that anything persists through time.
Everything we say or do is compatible with Mereological Constancy.
Consider the sentence:
Judy was a schoolteacher in 1980 and is now retired.
From the viewpoint of Mereological Constancy this sentence only seems to suggest that there is
one and the same object which was a schoolteacher in 1980 and is now retired.
In fact what it really asserts is that
there was a momentary object in 1980 that was a schoolteacher
and
there is a momentary object in the present that bears a relation to that momentary object
that was a schoolteacher in 1980,
but

that relation is not identity but perhaps some kind of spatio-temporal or psychological
continuity
The Reactionary Proposal
Mereological Constancy applies to other objects, but not to persons.
Persons have no proper parts.
We are mereologically simple.
An Alternative View
In The Argument above, the attempt to make A grow by attaching B either produced a third thing
or turned that third thing from a scattered object into a connected one.
Consider an alternative view:
Conjoining B to A does make it part of A.
A+B do not yield some new thing; instead, A comes to be made of B and something else.
Figure 3

before

after:

Ie, B I
A

That something (call it C) seems to be identical to A: it is

the same matter as A
the same form as A
Conjoining B to A did not bring C into existence.
The result of conjoining B to A may bring into existence something that is made of those two
objects. But it would be very odd to say that such conjoining brought into existence something
just like one of the original objects before conjoining.
To see this, run the process in reverse:
A is made up of C and B. To make A smaller, detach B.
Does detaching B destroy C?
It would seem not. It seems equally odd to assert that we can destroy an object merely by
detaching it from something that was never a part of it.
So it would seem that C existed before the conjoining.
C is the same size as A.
C and A occupied exactly the same space before B was attached.
Their relation is more intimate than mere co-location.
C and A share all their proper parts.
There are some things that compose A and also compose C before B is attached.
C and A coincide mereologically.
Can two different things coincide mereologically?
Can two different things be made of the same matter at the same time?
Can the same parts make up two different wholes at once.

It seems not.
If that is right, then A = C before the attachment of B.
But this destroys the coherence of the alternative view.
i. A acquired B as a part.
But
ii. C didnt acquire B as a part.
Yet,
iii. A = C
This is an inconsistent triad.
If (ii) and (iii) are true, then (i) is false.
So on this alternative view, it becomes paradoxical that A can acquire B as a part.
The Argument for Mereological Constancy
1. A acquires B as a part.
[Assumption for Reductio ad Absurdum (Indirect Proof)]
2. When A acquires B as a part, A comes to be composed of B and C.
3. C does not acquire B as a part.
4. C exists before B is attached.

[By the inconsistency of (i)-(iii)]

5. C coincides mereologically with A before B is attached. [from (2)-(4), given that C doesnt
grow or shrink when B is attached]
6. No two things can coincide mereologically (at the same time).
7. C = A

[from (5), (6)]

8. A does not acquire B as a part

[from (3), (7)]

There are five ways to resist Mereological Constancy.

I. Rejecting the Validity of the Argument, or The Way of Funny Logic
C = A before B is attached, but C A after B is attached.
Identity is time-relative: things might be identical at one time and non-identical at another.
What follows from (5), (6) is not
(7) C = A
but something like
(7) C =@t A, but not C =@t+1 A
C and A are one thing now but two tomorrow. Tomorrow B will be part of A, but not of C.
II. Rejecting (2), or The Way of Sparse Ontology
Deny that there ever was such a thing as C.
That is, that there was ever one such thing as C.
One way to conceptualize this alternative to think of A as itself made up of parts D, E, and F.
When what-is-composed-of-D-E-and-F gains B, D, E, and F do not compose anything
Figure 4

before:

~
A

This contradicts the universality of composition (what the Metaphysics Toolkit call the Fusion
Principle).
And the Fusion Principle is an unappealing view anyhow.
However, denying the universality of composition, or the Fusion Principle has some surprising
consequences.
For instance, if you build an addition on to your house, it is natural to think that there is some
object which is the original part of the house.
But strictly and literally there isnt. Those materials left undisturbed by the addition no longer
compose any object at all.
III. Rejecting (4), or The Way of Funny Persistence Conditions
Accept that C exists after B is attached, but deny that it existed before B was attached.
Attaching B to A brings C into existence.
This eliminates the temptation to think that C = A.
If you add on to your house, the addition brings into existence an entirely new object which might
be called the rest of your house.
It couldnt be called the original part of the house.
My house (A) was built in 1938.
Suppose I added a room (B) in 2005.,
This brought a new entity into existence which cannot be called the original part of the house
because it only began to exist in 2005, not in 1938.
(It may be that all the parts of that entity began to exist in 1938, but the entity itself didnt.
IV. Rejecting (6), or The Way of Coincidence
Admit the possibility that two or more things can coincide mereologically.
C exists and is not identical to A even before B is attached to it.
When B is attached to C A gets bigger, but C doesnt.
As Olson says, this is a little bit odd.

If A gets bigger, why doesnt C? (255)

A can grow (by being conjoined to B), but C cant.
A has the capacity to grow; C doesnt.
This requires explanation.
After all, as Olson points out,
Arent A and C exactly alike before the attachment?
The have the same parts arranged exactly the same way.
They are physically identical. (??)
The have the same past history.
The appears to be no difference between A and C that could account for their different
capacities.

The Identity of Indiscernibles Again

Now comes the payoff for studying the Identity of Indiscernibles.
Its now possible to see what all the fuss was about.
Recall Bargles two spheres: they had all their properties in common, yet were two different
spheres
A and C are a real-world case of this. In A/C before the attachment there were two entities with
all the same properties including the same location.
We cant tell A and C apart in the real world. But this should not lead us to conclude the A = C.
Mereological coincidence is not identity.
Olson both points out, and directs our attention away from, the fact that the world is full of entities
that display precisely the pattern displayed by C and A.
Indeed, it would be fair to say that most of the objects we countenance display this pattern or this
structure.
The most obvious examples are organisms, multi-cellular ones in particular.
Sammy the Spider Again
Sammy the Spider begins as a zygote.
A = Sammy
C = unicellular zygote
C divides into C and B.
Now A = C+B
And so on
On this conception, at any moment there is a spider body which constitutes, or realizes, Sammy.
But that spider body cant catch flies it doesnt exist long enough to.
But Sammy can catch flies.
Call the spider body that realizes Sammy at a particular time Rupert.
Rupert cant catch flies.
Is Rupert alive?
This is a funny question.
My answer is no.
And Rupert lacks the capacity to live, precisely in virtue of being the kind of thing Rupert is,
namely a mereological entity, an entity for which mereological constancy applies.
Sammy on the other hand is not a mereological entity. He is a spider.
Spiders are alive.

Sammy is alive precisely because, in accordance with biological necessity, he loses parts and
gains others in a systematic fashion: in the processes of metabolism and mitosis.
Sammy, being a spider, has the capacity to be realized successively in mereologically different
spider bodies.
How is this possible?
Because Sammy is the kind of thing that can successively change parts: he is an animal.
Olson Again
This wont satisfy Olson.
He would say, Youve said what kind of thing Sammy would be if it were possible for him to have
different capacities that Rupert.
But you havent yet shown how it is possible.
This objection is similar to Blacks objection to Zeno: You have shown how long it takes Achilles
to catch the tortoise if it is possible for Achilles to catch it.
In response, if an apparent phenomenon is this widespread and basic to our conceptual scheme,
then we must grant it respectful attention. Recall that we had to pay respectful attention to the
apparent fact that Achilles passes the tortoise, arrows hit targets, etc.
We must countenance something if it we must refer to it in order to account for everything that is
so.
But were not there yet. There is another possible solution, one that is consistent with
Mereological Constancy in a way that The Way of Coincidence isnt

V. Another Way to Reject (6): The Way of Temporal Parts

A, B, and C are 4-dimensionally extended objects.
Anything capable of changing its parts has temporal parts.
Suppose that:
(i) the only part A ever acquires is B
(ii) B ceases to exist when A does.
Thus A is composed of C + the temporal part of B located after it is attached.
Figure 5

c
B

Things have their parts timelessly. Strictly speaking A doesnt change by acquiring B as a part.
Nothing changes, strictly speaking.
It is more precise to say that earlier time slices of A do not overlap B, but later ones do.
The way of temporal parts denies that no two things can coincide mereologically at a time.
For this view things coincide at a time if they share the temporal parts present at that time.
This view makes coincidence less mysterious.
It doesnt have to say that things can differ in their capacities without differing in their makeup.
Problems with Temporal Parts
First difficulty:
Since time is infinitely divisible, an ordinary object will have an infinite number of sub-beings
consisting of all the possible stretches of time.
You exist now, so does the segment of you consisting of you from age five until now, from age six
until now, from age six until age forty-three, etc. etc.
Instead of a sparse ontology a desert landscape we have triple canopy rainforest.
All these entities came to your birthday party. Theyre thinking your thoughts, wanting your
presents, and eating your birthday cake. And not one of them sent you a birthday card (unless
you sent yourself one).
Modal Paradox
A second difficulty.
Recall the modal paradox that we think some objects might have been smaller by lacking parts
they actually have.
But if we try to imagine an object, X, without one of its parts, Y, the result is only a situation in
which the complement of Y, Z, is not attached to Y.
Figure 6
actual:

-----.J8

_z

possible:

z
X?

X itself either didnt exist at all or it still exists and still has all the parts it ever had, but now
scattered.
The Ways of solving the Paradox of Increase can also apply to the modal paradox as well.
1. The Way of Funny Logic
X and Z, though actually distinct, are identical in the merely possible situation.
(But remember: such identity statements, if true, are necessary.)
2. the Way of Sparse Ontology
There is no such thing as Z; just a lot of smaller things that jointly fill that space.
3. The Way of Funny Persistence

In the merely possible situation Z doesnt exist.

4. The Way of Coincidence
In the merely possible situation X coincides mereologically with Z.
These four responses give a way of saying that X exists in a possible situation where it lacks Y as
a part.

5. The Way of Temporal Parts

The Way of Temporal Parts gives an account of how a house can lose a brick.
But it doesnt give us a hint how a house could have had a brick missing all along.
Van Inwagen argues that the house could not have existed with a brick missing:
If Y were not a part of X, and neither were any replacement for Y, then X could exist only
by coinciding mereologically with Z:

Fig. 7
actual:

possible:

X??
But in the possible world, X cant be identical just to Z.
Because that would mean that in that possible world X coincides mereologically with Z.
But four-dimensionalism denies that any two things can coincide mereologically.
So it looks as if X could not possibly exist without having Y as a part.
Nothing could exist without having the parts it actually has.
Timeless Mereological Constancy
Necessarily, if a temporal part of x located at t is a part of the temporal part of y located at t,
then every temporal of y has a temporal part of x as a part.
Timeless mereological constancy seems (by the argument we just saw) to imply timeless
mereological essentialism:
Timeless Mereological Essentialism
If x is a part of y, then it is not possible for y to exist without having x as a part.

Notice that timeless mereological essentialism does not imply timeless mereological constancy.
That is, it should be possible for the four-dimensional career of the object X to have temporal
parts of object Y at some times, and at others not.
Just so long as Y doesnt get switched with something else.
Conclusion
A solution to the paradox of increase that lands us with mereological essentialism is hardly a
solution at all.
It is simply the acknowledgement that the paradox of increase is insoluble.
In order to avoid Mereological Constancy, you have to accept one or the other of the Five Ways.
My moneys on a form of IV: Aristotelian substantialism.
In the temple in 400 B.C theres a ship, ship A..
There is also a structure composed of planks, call it P
A and P coincide mereologically.
But theyre not identical.
For one thing, A can survive a change in planks. Indeed, it has over 800 years survived a
complete change in its planks (much like Rosinante, my Karmann Ghia).
P cant survive a change in planks.
P is the matter of the Aristotelian substance A.
Its form is the form of a ship.
Ships are the kind of thing that can survive plank changes.