Essential Knowledge

For
Potential
Offshore
Installation
Managers

Written by
Tim Allsop & Charlie Bell

Copyright 2010

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TableofContents
Author notes
Introduction
Installation Design Criteria
Health Safety & Environment Considerations
Leadership Qualities
Training & Standards
Qualifications & Accident Investigation Processes
Environmental Considerations
Emergency Response Procedures & Incident Command Systems
Distributed Control Systems
Permit To Work
Planned Maintenance Systems
Production, Process & Drilling Operations
Oil Spill Response Principles
Summary

3
5
8
13
18
21
30
37
40
43
47
52
53
79
100

PREFACE
This book is the combined efforts of Charles Bell & Tim Allsop originally from different backgrounds, but
who share a common passion and understanding of what it takes to hold the position of Installation Manager
on an offshore Production Facility.
Due to the growing global demand for combustible fuels, and the challenging and demanding environments we
are now forced to go looking for these fuels in, the world has taken on a new respect for the environment and
part of this process is to hold the operators through their managers both responsible and accountable for
ensuring a safe and reduced risk (as low as practicable) environment and process for the exploration, refining
and delivery of hydrocarbons to us the general public.
This book is not the be all end all definitive description of what it takes to perform the roles and
responsibilities of an Offshore Installation Manager, but it does touch on enough relevant subjects to allow the
readers to have a better understanding of what it does take to be an Offshore Installation Manager.
It is important to take into consideration that information gives you knowledge, this is a one dimensional
approach to the situation and position, what makes a more proficient OIM is the confidence he has to deal with
the daily grind and challenges he will face working in an offshore environment, there is no substitute for
experience, what we are always looking for when assessing and teaching existing & perspective OIMs is the
confidence needed to do the job.
If that experience is lacking we must assess it through simulation, observation, demonstration, theory, written
or witnessing forms these are some of the approaches, more recently we are using simulated situations and
experience during these situations where we can to fast track some processes for our perspective managers.

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Charles Bell who answers to Charlie started his career as a primary school teacher on the Island of Hoy in
the Orkney Islands off the far north of Scotland. This put him in an extremely good position to join in the
Scottish Black Gold Rush which was happening at around that time. The Occidental Consortium which was
building an Oil Terminal on an adjacent island was actively seeking potential terminal operations staff. This
proposal did not hang around for long and started Charlie off in a long career with Occidental which eventually
led him from onshore to offshore within the organisation and then back to onshore to provide support during
the Piper Alpha enquiry. This could have been a low point in anyones career but Charlie saw it as an
opportunity to take on the new responsibilities to come out of the Lord Cullen Report and actively grasp the
role of ensuring training and competency requirements in the new regime were pursued. Along with the
training requirement came the additional requirement for new and updated procedures. And this was a task that
brought Charlie half way around the world to carry out the same level of upgrades for Talisman Malaysia with
Operating Procedures and a rewrite of their Permit to Work System. Since then Charlie has provided
Competence and Assessment profiles for Prosafe Production and worked closely with Tim Allsop in providing
the best training for the oil and gas industry of South East Asia. Charlie, as with a lot of oil and gas personnel
reigning from Scotland, finds every opportunity to put himself on a golf course somewhere around the world.

Tim started his working career in the Australian military, initially as a radio operator at the age of 15 and then
after a few years joined the Special Forces section of the military (book note Refined Aggression), his skills
were diverse amongst the SF community however proved of little value outside when he left the military at age
30. Synchronizing into both the community and work force was challenging for him as his entire working
career had been spent in a uniform of one sort or another. Tim found his way into commercial diving offshore
and then managing fuel outlets in each and every district of Timor Leste (East Timor), having spent a number
of his military postings as a teacher and mentor for new and junior operators, it was inevitable that he would fit
back into a teaching position within the only industry that in most cases aligns itself with the military
(challenging environment, high risk & potentially hostile locations & extended periods of time away from
family and friends) this career move saw him work in Indonesia, Vietnam, China, Nigeria, Brazil, Azerbaijan,
Thailand, Australia, Saudi Arabia & Malaysia where he now calls home.

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During these appointments across the world one thing has remained constant, his ability to adapt, improvise
and identify immediate and long term needs of his clients, probably the most valuable skill he was taught in the
SF branch. Tim has been instrumental in setting up not less than 7 internationally accredited training centres
for the development and accreditation of Offshore Installation Managers. In support of the physical
infrastructure he has put in place around the globe, Tim has also developed materials such as his Incident
Management Software (CIMS) and MOME training simulators, designed CBTA programs which would ensure
complete development personnel to meet nationalization programs. It is a combination of Sweat ware,
Wetware & Shelf ware that ensures a comprehensive model to build upon. Tim currently consults for a
number of his competitor companies around the world, whilst running a training and competency company in
Malaysia with his business partner Charlie, in the past 7 years over 500 Offshore Installation Managers have
passed through their doors from over 12 different countries, and the number is rising each year.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
There are a number of very useful published materials available that we have extracted some material from, the
following sources;
Existing Operating Procedures from ABAN, KNOC, TML, JVPC, PROSAFE, BP
Existing Oil Spill Response Procedures
Industry Guidelines from UKOOA, IDAC, IMO, ICAO
Regulatory bodies OPITO (the Oil & Gas Academy), PMA08 Competencies, NFPA & IMCA
The Cullen Report (Public inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster)
The Making & Enforcement of HS Law by Francis W Peebles

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INTRODUCTION
The OIM is the most senior management representative of the operating company to be continuously present
on the offshore facility. That facility may be a drilling rig, an FPSO or a production platform.
Historically.
TheOIMpositionhadariseninpartfromtheInquiryintothe1965SeaGemdisaster,inwhichtheSeaGemdrillingrig
collapsedandsankinthesouthernsectoroftheNorthSeawithalossof13lives.TheInquiryrecommendedthat"...
thereoughttobea'master'orunquestionedauthorityontheserigs"andthat"...thereoughttobetheequivalentofa
shipmaster'sdailyroundwhenthe'master'couldquestionthoseresponsiblefordifferentaspectsofthedaytoday
managementofthewhole."TherecommendationsfromtheSeaGemInquirywereformalizedintheMineralWorkings
(OffshoreInstallations)Act1971whichrequiresaregisteredOIMtobeinchargeofeachinstallation.

This is the background to the position and, certainly in the UKCS, all oil production companies have adhered
to this requirement.
The Job Description.
The exact requirement from individual oil companies will vary but not by a tremendous amount. The following
is a fairly generic Job Description for an Offshore Installation Manager.

TheOIMshallefficientlymanagethehealth,safetyandwelfareofallpersonnelonboardtheinstallation.
Heshallensurethatallcontractualobligationsaresatisfiedasthecompanyrepresentative.
Heshallensurecompliancewithallapplicablelegislation,guidelines,companypoliciesandprocedures.

Principle Functions of the position.

The OIM shall plan and coordinate with the Superintendents all production and maintenance activities, so as to
achieve production targets.
He shall ensure implementation of the Company Safety Management System, that is, compliance with
legislation, company policies, standards and procedures, monitoring compliance by all other personnel.
The OIM shall promote a safety culture where all personnel have an understanding of the Operations
procedures and Safety studies and operate rigorously in accordance with it.
He shall ensure strict implementation of the Permit to Work (PTW) System.
He shall ensure all documentation and certification is in order and up to date.
The OIM shall facilitate constructive working relationships with all personnel, encouraging open
communication, both vertically and laterally.
He shall promote team building, training and development and ensure that the Company Competence
Assurance System is progressed.
He shall ensure that regular Emergency Response Drills are carried out in compliance with regulations.
The OIM shall ensure compliance with obligations laid down in any Collective Bargaining Agreement.
He shall provide relevant reports to the Concession Owners representative as per their requirements.
Academic Achievements.

TechnicaltrainingtoHigherNationalDiplomaortheequivalent.
DegreeorequivalentinEngineering/Science.

Vocational Qualifications.

CompetenceStandard,ManagingOffshoreInstallationscontrollingEmergencies.
WorkplaceAssessorD32/D33ortheequivalent.
InternalVerifierD34ortheequivalent.
SupervisoryManagementLevel4.
OffshoreSurvival/FirefightingincludingHUET.
CoastguardSearchandRescue.

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MajorEmergencyManagement.
MajorEmergencyManagementAssessment.
OIMRegulations.
PermitToWorkLevel3.
OilSpillResponse.
Accident/IncidentInvestigation.

Knowledge-Skills.
The OIM shall have a thorough understanding of the relevant requirements of (Country) offshore Health
Safety and Environmental legislation, official guidance and industry guidelines including legislation
governing Waste Management and Pollution Prevention.
He shall have a thorough knowledge of the Installation Emergency Response Organization and Plans,
Escape, Evacuation and Rescue methods including helicopter and stand by vessel operation, alerting and
SAR routines. (OIM Search and Rescue Manual).
Understanding the FPSO mooring system, ballasting and safe operating envelopes.
Understanding of the purpose of control systems and the cause and effects of significant alarm trips.
The OIM shall have a thorough knowledge of the PTW system and Risk Assessment procedures.
He shall have a comprehensive knowledge of the Company Computerized Planned Maintenance and
inspection systems. (SAP, Maximo). Safety Critical Elements.
The OIM shall have a thorough understanding of procedures including emergency procedures and the
use of the telemetry system.
Understanding of Production Operations.

TheOIMshallunderstandtheprinciplesofallhydrocarbonsystemsandtheirsafetycriticalinterfacesand
dependencies.
HeshallunderstandProcessShutdownlogicanditseffects.
Heshallunderstandthemethodsandconsequencesofisolationanddepressurization.
TheOIMshallunderstandtheconsequencesofprocessupsetsandprocesstroubleshootingtechniques.
TheOIMshallunderstandthepurposeofthemajorwellheadandwellheadcompletioncomponents.
Heshallunderstandthehazardsassociatedwithpipelines.
SimultaneousOperations.
TheOIMshallfullyappreciatetheconsequencesassociatedwithanyLossofContainment.

Understanding of Marine Operations.

TheOIMshallunderstandthebasicprinciplesandeffectsoflossofstabilityanditscontrol,whererelevant.
Thebasicprinciplesoftheeffectsofthelossofmooring.
Marinedamagecontrolandhisunderstandingoftheeffectsofenvironmentalconditions,thepotentialeffects
ofcombinedoperations,andexternaloperations,suchasdiving,supplyvessels,standbyvesselsand
helicopters.

The OIM shall have an awareness of human factors including:

Stressinducedreductioninperformance.
Humancontributoryfactorsinfailures.
Decisionmakingprocessesandmodels.

Experience.

Minimumof10yearsoffshoreexperienceincludingatleast5yearsinasupervisory/managementposition.
PreviousexperienceasanOIM.
PreviousFPSOexperience.

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FamiliaritywiththeplantandsystemsoftheinstallationtowhichtheOIMisappointedthrough,forexample,
involvementincommissioningactivitiesand/oranintroductionperiodoffshorewithanexperienced
incumbent.

This is a very brief overview of what may be required in order to fulfil the basic requirements of an Offshore
Installation Manager. What does it all mean and how do you get there?
The OIM shall efficiently manage the health, safety and welfare of all personnel on board the Installation.
Men and women all over the World go to work every day and come home again each evening. The Offshore
worker does not.
Like a seaman, he goes to work and does not come home until his trip is finished, usually in two or
Three weeks.
Furthermore, because of the location of his workplace, it is necessary for his employer or his
Employers client to transport him to and from that workplace.
The offshore workplace is usually defined as having the potential to cause Major Accident Hazard.
That means that there is risk that personnel could be killed or seriously injured or that severe damage to
property could occur if those hazards are realized.
Additionally the Offshore Worker will by necessity be required to not only work in this hazardous environment
but also sleep, eat and socialise. Coupled to all of this is the fact that all of this goes on in one of the most
inhospitable environments on earth.
If you employ five or more people you must, by law, have a written statement of your health and safety policy.
This should be your own statement, specific to your firm, setting out your general policy for protecting the
health and safety of your employees at work and the organization and arrangements for putting that policy into
practice.
The statement is important because it is your basic action plan on health and safety which all your employees
should read, understand and follow.
The legal requirement aside, a safety policy statement can bring real benefits. If it is well thought out, has your
backing, commands respect and it is thoroughly put into practice, it should lead to better standards of health
and safety. Managers and employees will see the importance of the policy and will be encouraged to cooperate.
The OIM shall ensure that all contractual obligations are satisfied as the Company Representative.
In order to state this simply, the OIM must ensure that production targets are achieved.
He must understand the work involved in the preparation of the budget for individual installations and the day
to day control of the budget. He must be aware of his signing authority limitations.
The OIM must be aware of any sales agreements and gas nomination requirements and how to meet these. He
needs to understand how these long term agreements are prioritized. These targets will have to be visualized
alongside any planned maintenance routines that have related impacts.
In order to meet these long term obligations the OIM must be aware of the stable day to day operation of his
facility, the forecast productivity of the asset reservoir against actual production, any unforeseen water
breakthrough within the formation and how to control this and the careful monitoring and maintenance of all
metering facilities that provide reporting of the sales product.

Productivity is related to Reservoir Engineering and Planned Maintenance routines.

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Reservoir engineering monitors the down hole condition of the reservoir and gives guidance on which wells
should be flowing at what rates to achieve a healthy and progressive exploitation of the field over the longest
and most cost effective period.
Planned maintenance routines are drawn from the company computerized maintenance management system
which takes information on routine maintenance periods from vendor projections or a planned inspection
program. These routines may form a compliance program which could drive shut down
activities.
The OIM shall ensure compliance with all applicable legislation, guidelines, company policies and
procedures.
This is a large section, there is no avoiding that. It must be remembered that no individual countrys legislation
is applicable to all regions of oil production. Individual oil companies may require their own corporate policies
to be implemented on their facilities within a country where the national legislation does not support these
policies.
Firstly, when building a facility it must meet certain standards.
DESIGN OF AN INSTALLATION
The duty holder shall ensure that the designs to which an installation is to be or in the event is constructed are
such that, so far as is reasonably practicable(a) It can withstand such forces acting on it as are reasonably foreseeable;
(b) Its layout and configuration, including those of its plant, will not prejudice its integrity;
(c) Fabrication, transportation, construction, commissioning, operation, modification, maintenance and repair
of the installation may proceed without prejudicing its integrity;
(d) It may be decommissioned and dismantled safely; and
(e) In the event of reasonably foreseeable damage to the installation it will retain sufficient integrity to enable
action to be taken to safeguard the health and safety of persons on or near it.
The duty holder shall ensure that an installation is composed of materials which are (A) Suitable, having regard to the requirement of the above; and
(B) so far as is reasonably practicable, sufficiently proof against or protected from anything liable to prejudice
its integrity.
Operation of an installation
(1) The duty holder shall ensure that the installation is not operated in such a way as may prejudice its
integrity.
(2) The duty holder shall ensure that the installation is not operated unless (a) Appropriate limits within which it is to be operated; and
(b) The environmental conditions in which it may safely operate have been recorded.
(3) The duty holder shall ensure that a record of the matters described in paragraph (2) is kept on the
installation, readily available to any person involved in its operation.
(4) The duty holder shall ensure that the matters described in paragraph (2) are reviewed as often as may be
appropriate.
Maintenance of integrity
(1) The duty holder shall ensure that suitable arrangements are in place for maintaining the integrity of the
installation, including suitable arrangements for(a) Periodic assessment of its integrity; and
(b) The carrying out of remedial work in the event of damage or deterioration which may prejudice its
integrity.

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Organization of the installation

1. The layout and configuration of an installation, including its plant, shall be such that risks to persons in it are
reduced to the lowest level that is reasonably practicable.
2. An installation shall be kept sufficiently clean, with any hazardous substances or deposits removed or
controlled in order not to endanger the health and safety of persons on the installation.
3. Arrangements shall exist for the collection at source and removal, in such a way that persons are not at risk,
of harmful substances which could accumulate in the atmosphere.
4. Workstations must be designed and constructed with a view to the safety and ease of action of persons at
work, taking into account the need for them to carry out activities there.
Ventilation of enclosed workplaces
5. A supply of fresh or purified air shall be maintained in enclosed workplaces which are sufficient, having
regard to the working methods used and the physical demands placed on the persons at work.
6. If a mechanical ventilation system is used, it must be maintained in working order. Any breakdown must be
indicated by a control system where this is necessary for the health of persons on the installation.
7. If air-conditioning or mechanical ventilation systems are used they must operate in such a way that persons
are not exposed to draughts which cause discomfort.
8. Any deposit or dirt likely to create an immediate danger to the health of persons by polluting the atmosphere
must be removed without delay.
Room temperature
9. During working hours, the temperature in enclosed workplaces must be reasonable, having regard to the
working methods being used and the physical demands placed on the persons at work.
10. The temperature in rest areas, changing rooms, rooms containing facilities for washing, lavatories, messrooms, galleys and sick bays must be appropriate to the particular purpose of such areas.
11. Sunlight let into workplaces via any window or skylight shall not be excessive, having regard to the nature
of the work and the workplace.
Floors, walls and ceilings of rooms
12. The floors of workplaces must have no dangerous bumps, holes or slopes and must be fixed, stable and not
made of material which is or is liable to become slippery.
13. Enclosed workplaces must be adequately insulated against heat, bearing in mind the type of undertaking
involved and the physical activity of the persons at work.
14. The surfaces of floors, walls and ceilings in rooms must be such that they can be cleaned or refurbished to
an appropriate standard of hygiene.
Transparent or translucent surfaces
15. Every window or other transparent or translucent surface in a wall or partition and every transparent or
translucent surface in a door or gate shall, where necessary for reasons o f health and safety (a) Be of safety material or be protected against breakage of the transparent or translucent material; and

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(b) Be appropriately marked or incorporate features so as, in either case, to make it apparent.
Roofs
16. Access to roofs made of materials of insufficient strength must not be permitted unless equipment is
provided to ensure that the work can be carried out in a safe manner.
17. Every workplace must be provided throughout with lighting capable of supplying illumination sufficient to
ensure the health and safety of persons therein.
18. Workplaces must, as far as possible, receive sufficient natural light and be equipped, taking into account
climatologically conditions, with artificial lighting adequate for the protection of safety and health.
19. Lighting installations in workplaces and in passageways must be placed in such a way that the type of
lighting does not present a risk of accident.
20. Workplaces in which persons are especially exposes to risks in the event of failure of artificial lighting
must be provided with emergency lighting of adequate intensity.
Windows and skylights
21. Windows, skylights and ventilation devices which are meant to be opened, adjusted or secured must be
designed so that these operations can be carried out safely. They must not be positioned so as to constitute a
hazard when open.
22. It must be possible to clean windows and skylights without undue risk.
Doors and gates
23. The position, number and dimensions of doors and gates, and the materials used in their construction shall
be determined by reference to the nature of and use of the rooms or areas.
24. Transparent doors must be appropriately marked at a conspicuous level.
25. Swing doors and gates must be transparent or have see-through panels.
26. Sliding doors must be fitted with a safety device to prevent them from being derailed and falling over
unexpectedly.
27. Doors and gates opening upwards must be fitted with a mechanism to secure them against falling back
unexpectedly.
28. Doors for pedestrians must be provided in the immediate vicinity of any gates intended essentially for
vehicle traffic, unless it is safe for pedestrians to pass through; such doors must be clearly marked and left
permanently unobstructed.
29. Power-operated doors and gates must function without risk of accident to workers. They must be fitted with
easily identifiable and accessible emergency shutdown devices and, in the event of a power failure, it must be
possible to operate them by hand.
30. When chains or similar devices are used to prevent access at any place, these should be clearly visible and
appropriately identified by signs denoting any prohibitions or warning.
Traffic routes
31. It must be possible to reach workplaces without danger and leave them quickly and safely in an emergency.
32. Traffic routes must be sufficient in number, in suitable positions, and of sufficient size to ensure easy, safe
and appropriate access for pedestrians or vehicles in such a way as not to endanger persons at work in the
vicinity of these traffic routes, having regard to the number of potential users and the type of undertaking.
33. If means of transport are used on traffic routes, a sufficient safety clearance must be provided for
pedestrians.
34. Sufficient clearance must be allowed between vehicle traffic routes and doors, gates, passages for
pedestrians, corridors and staircases.
35. Traffic routes must be clearly identified for the protection of persons.

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Danger areas
36. If the workplaces contain danger areas in which, owing to the nature of the work, there are risks including
that of the worker or objects falling, the places must be equipped, as far as possible, with devices preventing
unauthorised workers from entering those areas.
Room dimensions and air space in rooms - freedom of movement in the workstation
37. Enclosed workplaces must have sufficient surface area, height and air space to allow workers to perform
their work without risk to their safety, health or welfare.
38. The dimensions of the unoccupied area at the workstation must allow workers sufficient freedom of
movement and enable them to perform their work safely.
Rest room
39. Where the safety or health or workers, in particular because of the type of activity carried out, or the
presence of more than a certain number of workers, so requires, workers must be provided with an easily
accessible rest room.
40. Paragraph 39 does not apply if the workers are employed in offices or similar workplaces providing
equivalent during breaks.
41. Rest rooms must be large enough and equipment with an adequate number of tables and seats with backs
for the number of workers.
42. If working hours are regularly and frequently interrupted and there is no rest room, other rooms must be
provided in which workers can stay during such interruptions, wherever this is required for the safety or health
of workers.
43. Appropriate measures should be taken for the protection of non-smokers in the rooms referred to in
paragraphs 41 and 42 against discomfort caused by tobacco smoke.
Outdoor workplaces
44. Workstations, traffic routes and other areas outdoors which are used or occupied by the workers in the
course of their work must be organised in such a way that pedestrians and vehicles can circulate safely.
45. Workplaces outdoors must be adequately lit by artificial lighting if daylight is not adequate.
46. When workers are employed at workstations outdoors, such workstations must as far as possible be
arranged so that workers (a) Are protected against inclement weather conditions and, if necessary, against falling objects;
(b) Are not exposed to harmful noise levels;
(c) Are able to leave their workstations swiftly in the event of danger or are able to be rapidly assisted; and
(d) Cannot slip or fall.
People with disabilities
47. The arrangement of an installation shall take due account of the health, safety and welfare of any persons
with disabilities who may work on it.

Sanitary facilities

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48. Appropriate changing rooms must be provided for workers if they have to wear special work clothes and
where, for reasons of health and propriety, they cannot be expected to change in another room.
49. Changing rooms must be easily accessible, be of sufficient capacity and be provided with seating.
50. Changing rooms must be sufficiently large and have facilities to enable each worker to lock away his
clothes during working hours.
51. If circumstances so require, lockers for work clothes must be separate from those for ordinary clothes.
52. Provision must be made to enable wet clothes to be dried.
53. Provision must be made for separate changing rooms or separate use of changing rooms for men and
women.
54. If changing rooms are not required under paragraph 49, each worker must be provided with a place to store
his clothes.
Showers and Washing facilities
55. In addition to those facilities provided in any accommodation area, suitable showers and washing facilities
must, if necessary, be provided in the vicinity of workstations.
Lavatories and washbasins
56. In addition to those facilities provided in any accommodation, lavatories and washbasins must, if
necessary, be provided in the vicinity of workstations.
57. Provision must be made for separate lavatories or separate use of lavatories for men and women.
Accommodation
58. If the nature, scale and duration of operations so require, persons on the installation shall be provided with
accommodation which is (a) Suitably provided with ventilation, heating and lighting;
(b) Protected against noise, smells and fumes likely to be hazardous to health from other areas, and against
inclement weather; and
(c) Separate from any workstation and located away from dangerous areas.
59. Accommodation must contain sufficient beds or bunks for the number of persons expected to sleep on the
installation.
60. Any room designates as sleeping accommodation (a) Must not be overcrowded
(b) Must contain adequate space for the occupants to store their clothes; and
(C) shall, so far as is reasonably practicable, be occupied only by such number of persons as is consistent with
reasonable privacy and comfort, having regard to the features of the room.
61. Accommodation must include a sufficient number of showers and washing facilities equipped with clean
hot and cold running water.
62. Showers must be sufficiently spacious to permit each worker to wash without hindrance in suitably
hygienic conditions.
63. Accommodation must be equipped with a sufficient number of lavatories and washbasins.
64. Where there are both men and women on an installation there shall be separate (a) Sleeping rooms;
(b) Shower rooms, or provisions for separate use of shower rooms; and
(c) Lavatories and washbasins, or provision for separate use of lavatories and washbasins, for men and women.
65. Accommodation and its plant must be maintained to adequate standards of hygiene.

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Noise and vibration of plant

66. (1) Measures shall be taken to ensure that the exposure of a person on an installation to a risk to his health
or safety from noise or vibration of plant shall be prevented or, where that is not reasonably practicable,
adequately controlled.
(2) The measures required by sub-paragraph (1) shall, so far as is reasonably practicable, be measures other
than the provision of personal protective equipment.
Company procedure should compliment these guidelines wherever the facility is installed.
Operating procedures should reflect the materials on board the facility and how these materials shall be used.
These procedures are an amalgamation of industry best practice, vendor manuals and the practical experience
of relevant company engineers and technical authors. They shall refer to equipment that is actually on the
facility. They shall exactly identify this equipment and its position within the process. They shall contain
drawings of the equipment and relevant cause and effects for the operation of this equipment. These procedures
shall leave the operations staff in no doubt as to how this equipment is to be utilized, that is, started, stopped,
limits of operability, high and low parameters, trips and maintenance requirements.
However it remains the responsibility of the facility OIM to formally accept these procedures as the relevant
documentation whereby the facility processes will be operated.
Corporate documentation exists at a level primarily above that of Operating Procedures and is relevant not only
to individual installations and facilities but throughout the company organization. These are the means by
which the Company state how they shall meet government guidelines and directives related to their core
business of oil production. This documentation may have several titles and levels and include an over-riding
company policy statement, but will generally be in the form of a Health, Safety and Environmental
Management System. Within this documentation can be found how the Company intends to deal with
Pollution, Waste Management, Providing a safe place of work and other necessities dictated by government
legislation.
HSE POLICY
ANY OIL COMPANY.
HEALTH, SAFETY, AND ENVIRONMENT POLICY
Our demonstrated ability to conduct our activities in a safe and environmentally responsible manner has direct
bearing on our people, reputation, operational flexibility, and business success. Consequently, we will work to
improve our capacity in this regard, guided by the following high-level objectives:
Provide Safe and Healthy Operations:
We will strive for continuous improvement in creating a working environment where accidents will not
occur and in which employees, contractors, and the public are not exposed to health and safety hazards.
We will achieve this through education, workforce engagement, and effective work planning and
supervision, with a focus on critical risks and behaviours.
Reduce Our Environmental Impact:
We will work to reduce the impact of our activities on the environment. We will achieve this through
education, effective project planning and execution, careful waste management, and by using energy
and other resources as efficiently as practicable.

Respect the Interests of Neighbours and Other Stakeholders:

We will communicate openly with those who may be affected by our activities, to promote mutual
understanding and co-operation. We will participate actively with governments and other stakeholders

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to resolve health, safety, and environmental issues associated with the Companys development plans
and operations.
Our corporate and regional policies, planning processes, and management systems will support the effective
implementation of these objectives across our global operations.
We will maintain appropriate measurement and reporting systems to demonstrate our health, safety, and
environmental performance to Company management, the Board of Directors, and our external stakeholders.
Workplace health and safety and environmental protection are responsibilities shared by every member of the
Talisman workforce. Our leaders create the capacity for effective individual performance through role
clarification, training, and competency verification, and they are expected to lead by example.

John Macaroni
President and Chief Executive Officer
Any Company.
Plan and coordinate with the Superintendents all production and maintenance activities so as to achieve
production targets.
Where do production targets come from?
These are the targets set by Production Managers in accord with Reservoir management teams based on a
testing regime designed by them to ascertain the fields productivity index.
These targets are modelled from information gained from well testing carried out on the installation and using
the platform metering systems.
These targets assume no down time. That is, these targets are set with the intention that all wells are fully open,
flowing with no interference from other wells, there is no substantial change in water cuts and if the field is gas
deficient, that there are no compressor or related equipment, trips.
Therefore, it can be assumed that these targets can be modified by planned maintenance or breakdown
maintenance or water breakthrough or sand production.
Actually, No.
As I have said, these targets assume, no down time. These are targets that have been set to meet tanker
allocations, when a tanker will arrive with empty tanks and leave with full tanks or with partially filled tanks to
achieve a certain blend or; gas nominations when a country will start up a gas power station because it has
experienced a weather change.
Normally the platform shall strive to achieve maximum production, safely. Careful monitoring of equipment is
required to reach this target. Planned maintenance and inspection may be deferred until a suitable planned
shutdown. Production targets do allow for planned shutdowns.
Maintenance activities may be achieved successfully and production targets reached if the facility has a degree
of built in redundancy. By this I mean that to achieve a certain production target, the facility needs to generate
a certain amount of injection/lift gas from the compressor trains. This amount of gas can be reached by two
compressor trains and the facility contains three compressor trains. It is quite possible to maintain the required
amount of lift gas for the production wells from two compressors and carry out a rotating maintenance program
on the standby machines.
This whole dilemma tends to resemble a two edged sword, in that, the production targets will be related to
someones KPIs. Key Performance Indicators. This is an incentive, related to a possibly monetary or status
bonus and an invidious habit that nevertheless is seen in some quarters as good business.
On the majority of installations operation and maintenance are irreducibly linked. One cannot hope to achieve
full production without well maintained equipment. If equipment has reached such a run time that it requires to
be shut down for the change out of operating parts and the next planned shutdown is in the distant future then a
compromise on continuous production may have to be reached.

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Having said this, it should be remembered that once equipment is shut down, every effort should be made to
optimize the maintenance program. All departments should be involved and all maintenance requirements
drawn together.
A thorough inspection of changed out parts by the company inspection department may, in some cases, allow
for the increase in periodic maintenance in accordance with results found. All results shall be referred to the
Company Computerized Maintenance System for any approved schedule changes.

An example of a Computer Maintenance Management system.

Ensure implementation of the Company Safety Management System, that is, compliance with legislation,
company policies, standards and procedures and monitor compliance by all other personnel.
Company Safety Management Systems are the means whereby Companies comply with government legislation
that has been developed through Acts of Parliament or State, Statutory Instruments and from Public Inquiries
that may have been derived from Industry Incidents. It could be said that this is where we learn the hard way.
Flixborough-England-July 1974, led to COMAH legislation.
Seveso-Italy-July 1976, led to European Community legislation on dioxins.
Bhopal-India-December 1984. The largest industrial disaster on record led to directives on corporate
responsibility.
Piper Alpha-Scotland-July 1988. The public inquiry produced 106 recommendations for our industry.
There are perfectly good reasons why you must wear the appropriate eye protection when using a cutting tool.
For example.
This equipment shall be provided by the company to the employee if he is required to carry out this task. It has
been proved that wearing eye protection during this task will prevent injuries to the eyes. However, does this
task have to be carried out? Can the task be replaced by different equipment being used? Can the task be
engineered differently? Can the procedure be changed?

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However if it has been found that in order to carry out this task safely, the operator must wear eye protection,
how can we ensure that the operator adheres to this requirement?
It is workplace legislation.
It is company policy.
It is part of an operating procedure.
It is highlighted on his Permit to Work and part of the Risk Assessment.
He has been informed of its requirement in the Tool Box talk.
There is appropriate signage at his workplace and throughout the installation.
If there is adequate ventilation, at the job, he will not remove the eye protection because of misting.
Legislation, company policies, standards and procedures are produced for the continuing safety and protection
of the working man/woman and ourselves.
Promote a safety culture where all personnel have an understanding of the Operations procedures and Safety
studies and operate rigorously in accordance with them.
1. Leadership. Senior management is committed to safety. They set the example by making safety a key part
of all strategic planning efforts and know safety makes for smart business actions. Maintain a safety champion
and an executive-level owner.
2. Empowerment. All employees have the right and responsibility to stop work if they see an unsafe situation,
even if it compromises timelines or budgets. From day one of joining the team safety is demonstrated by the
company's leaders.
3. Training. Safety training is required. New employees complete safety training within 30 days of being
hired. Through numerous training sessions, fairs, and luncheons at individual work sites throughout the
company work-place accidents can be reduced. The fairs include demonstrations of safety equipment,
discussion sessions and lectures on safety issues ranging from fall protection and scaffolding to hazops and
writing safety plans. All workers on the installation as well as in the office attend safety training fairs.
4. Benchmarks and Goals. Goals and objectivessuch as zero accidents, no lost time, education/training,
performance improvement, and attitude and commitmentare set and the team performance is tracked.
5. Incentives. Recognition programs help to foster performance improvement and loyalty as well as increase
the quality of projects. Employees work hard to maintain a safe environment and they are recognized for their
efforts and results.
Ensure strict implementation of the Permit to Work (PTW) system.
A robust Permit to Work system is one of the prime recommendations of the Lord Cullen Public Inquiry into
the Piper Alpha disaster. A permit is not by itself permission to carry out work. The permit is an indication that
the senior management on the installation have;

Agreedthattheworkcanbecarriedoutwithintherestrictionsandreservationsindicatedonthepermitto
work.Bysignature.
Communicatedtoallrelatedpersonnelthatthisworkwillbecarriedoutatthattimebythatperson.
Indicatedthattheequipmenttobeworkedonhasbeenappropriatelypreparedwithreferencetooperating
proceduresandthatallhazardshavebeenidentifiedandprecautionsputinplace.
Ensuredthatallappropriatedocumentationrelatingtotheworkpermit,drawings,vendorsmanual,risk
assessment,chemicalhazardsheets,jobcardshavebeenattachedtothePermit.
Allocatedatimefortheworktobecarriedout.
Ensurethatallpossibleescalationrouteshavebeenidentifiedandalternateplansproposed.

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All personnel shall be trained and tested in the Permit to Work system at the level appropriate to the individual
candidate and his position within the company. This must be seen as a statutory requirement by everyone,
which shall be repeated at two yearly intervals. A Computer based training system is the best means of
carrying out this requirement. The computer is impartial and it gives a ready reference for the checking of
personnel who may feel that I did that only last year, I am still in date. Contract personnel will visit many
installations as part of their normal work cycle, they need to be reminded that this is the way that this company
does work.
A permit is a certificate that prescribes areas of hazard and precautions that need to be taken. It has to be
relevant for all activities on the installation and all installations across the company. As such it will not meet all
these requirements. The system needs supporting documentation. First amongst this supporting documentation
shall be a risk based job safety analysis wherein all hazards associated with the particular job are identified,
perhaps from a historical reference, and precautions identified that shall be put in place/utilized. The permit
shall refer to this JSA and this shall be used by senior management on the installation to ascertain that the
proper consideration has been given by the participants to the safety of themselves, others on the installation
and to the safety of the installation itself before, during and after the commencement of the proposed work.
Further supporting documentation may include installation drawings wherein the exact position of the work to
take place is highlighted, any isolations required are annotated, any draining and purging points, entry points,
exit points and escape routes identified. The amount and type of supporting documentation can vary according
to the activity planned, it must however, be sufficiently adequate and relevant that senior management are able
to make informed judgments regarding the approval or otherwise for the commencement of the work.
Permit to Work audits are the means of ensuring that work is being carried out safely to the requirements of the
Permit to Work system. A simple audit off ongoing work shall provide the assurance that personnel are
following the restrictions of the permit as designated by JSA and formalized by senior management in signing
to approve the work. A monthly audit of completed permits shall ensure that the same standards of safety are
being sought throughout the installation and by differing crews. An annual audit by onshore senior
management shall ensure that corporate policy is being followed by all installations and that a Safe System of
Work is in place.
Ensure all documentation and certification is in order and up to date.
It has long been the case that personnel are not allowed to travel offshore without having attained the required
certification to do so. The certification guarantees that the personnel have achieved a minimum standard of
competence in attendance at a pre-determined series of exercises run by an accreditation centre.
It is also the case that equipment must be regularly tested, as fit for purpose and certified by accredited
specialists. This applies significantly to all lifting equipment whether it is lifting gear, as in shackles, strops,
containers, tanks or as lifting equipment as in cranes, fixed or travelling. Safety equipment requires regular
testing and maintenance. Life boats, life rafts, fire extinguishers and emergency generators are just some of the
pieces of equipment that carries an annual or biennial certification requirement.
HSE Case will specify how much and how many articles are required to meet identified hazards. For example,
water based fire extinguishers in offices and CO2 extinguishers in switch rooms, where differing hazards have
been identified. However, how many radio operators are required, and of what type, do you need a full time
medic if everyone is a trained first aider.
These are not questions that require to be answered. You will employ a medic. He may also carry out the duties
of the Helicopter Landing Officer, Document controller and HSE advisor but, you will employ a medic. This is
a slightly disconcerting trend in multi-disciplining. It has also been seen in areas where the crane driver may
also take the role of radio operator and HLO. This use of personnel can be proved to be erroneous, as in the
case of emergency management, however it is so engrained into the management psyche now that only
legislation will alter it.

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Documentation, yes you will be required to keep all relevant installation Operating Procedures up to date. That
means having a complete library available in hard copy. You will have read and approved all of this
documentation and signed for it. You will also have to let Document Control know that you have received all
this information by returning a signed copy of the delivery note.
This information will be needed by the crew and the simplest way to do this is to update the computer folder on
the installation only drive. An e-mail around the departments will alert personnel to new or updated
procedures. You will need to ensure that all previous revisions of documents are no longer available as only up
to date procedures can be used to support Permit to Work.
Document control as part of a document management system is driven from onshore. It shall provide the means
of disseminating legislation, policy, procedures and in some cases vendor manuals.
The Company Computerized Maintenance System shall contain all the required information regarding regular
certification periods of equipment. This system will flag up the need to re-certify equipment as part of a
planned maintenance routine. Some of the systems currently in use are Maximo and SAP. Installation
technicians will not generally have the appropriate qualifications to re-certify equipment such as lifting
equipment, fire extinguishers, life boats and other safety equipment. Specialist vendors will need to be
contacted to carry out this certification.

LEADERSHIP, DEMEANOR & PERSONALITY PROFILING

Facilitate constructive working relationships with all personnel encouraging open communication, both
vertically and laterally.
Traditionally leaders were either elected or fought for their position through conflict, the position of OIM is a
leadership position it has since the Piper Alpha been a position of Authority & Responsibility, by definition
Authority is a single voice this is not a democratic society we live in offshore, there has to be a strong structure
which will not fail, a chain of command and report ability, especially relevant when dealing with emergency
situations offshore, Responsibility means you will be held accountable for the outcomes be then good or poor,
having said that we need to ensure harmony amongst the personnel onboard, the best way to explain this is by
using a metaphor, the one I like to use is we must take on the position of the coach of a football team
(mentoring position) years ago we were taught to be the captain of the team and physically play the game, it is
vital now that we lead from the side line, getting the best from our team is by distancing our selves from them
to the side line, the position of the coach still has you on the field but in a more commanding position capable
of seeing the big picture and focus on all aspects of the game. We have effectively shared the authority to act
but retained the responsibility for outcomes obtained. Let me ask you a simple question when did you last
attend a leadership course or program, for some of you never would be the answer, we tend to associate leaders
with personnel from the military, police or fire services, people who work under a rank system, from personal
experience each time I was up for promotion I had to be assessed within my chosen skill (profession) then
attend a leadership program which taught me how I must now react & report to those above me and below me,
this course bore more weight than my skills exams, yet in the Oil & Gas industry as with many industries there
is no such leadership program available for managers as they take the giant leap from operator to supervisor
I am not saying that ex-military or uniformed personnel make better leaders on the contrary they often make
poor leaders, what I am saying is as a leader we must know how to delegate, motivate, & most importantly
communicate. A good communicator will ultimately make a good leader, think about that a while, look at
leaders of countries the ones who achieve the most are those who will listen and speak with authority, a strong
leader can lead anyone. A good leader can develop a workable strategy and with applied tactics achieve a
suitable outcome to any situation, the magic word that will link strategy (planning phase) with tactics (action
phase) is communications, we are not looking for acceptance or every one to agree with our plan we are

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looking that they understand why we are doing this way and what their part to play in the plan is, we can this
justification.

Leadership relies on getting things done in a climate of two-way communication and trust. True leadership
develops ownership in the team and is empowered by directing individual energy towards the common goal.
Support of the team by the leader is critical to the success of the teams performance. Team members
supporting each other will work as a cohesive unit not individuals. The ethos of team support starts from
management to leader to team member. A leaders support of the team must be shown by deed and stated when
required.

An effective leader will forge a close relationship between team members and themselves. An effective leader
will foster an environment of continuous improvement that encourages individuals to perform at their best and
strive to be better. The greatest challenge to any leader is to understand what motivates a particular person. A
leader must aim to create an environment that challenges an individual and the team by establishing
benchmarks. Once a benchmark has been met the leader must review the performance, provide feedback and
establish a new goal in agreement with the team.

Effective leadership is recognized as being:

Futureorientated
Peoplefocused
Principlecentered
Achievementmotivated

An example of a good supervisor is someone that never assumes that his people know that they are doing a
good or below average job. When people know that their Supervision or work colleagues will pick them up on
their at risk behaviour they tend to monitor their behaviour and consequently change how they do things.

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Promote team building, training and development and to ensure that the Company Competence Assurance
System is progressed.
Personnel who are employed in the offshore environment have their homes in all quarters of the country. The
only ties that many have with the company are when they gather for the trip offshore from the heli-base. This
way of operating can impose an unacceptable lack of understanding amongst personnel who must face the next
fourteen days or more in a tight environment where personal habits and personality traits may cause
unnecessary tensions. This can be the basis for unacceptable working practices and potentially unsafe actions.
It is the OIMs task to identify these tensions and take action to relieve them. He must attempt to promote an
atmosphere where good team work is encouraged and a safe working environment fostered.
Team building activities are an acceptable method of gathering personnel together in a non-offshore
environment. None of the offshore tensions are apparent beyond the interpersonal relationships. This is the
specific function of Team Building exercises. To provide an environment whereby personnel may achieve
certain pre determined tasks of an innocuous nature which by their non confrontational nature encourage close
cooperation between personnel. When these activities, with a high achievement level, are carried out in a non
threatening environment by personnel who also work together on the installation, an opportunity is being given
for new alliances to be made and good working practices between personnel encouraged.
Team building is not training, training is an expansion of knowledge that may be academic or work related. It
is in the company interest to provide training for personnel whether it is to raise the educational level of the
workforce by academic excellence or provide vendor training of new equipment (or old equipment that is not
understood). It provides a level playing field of knowledge. There is a natural turnover of staff in every
industry. Sometimes it is felt invidious that training is expended on personnel just to have them move on and
take that information with them. Remember you are not the only industry faced with this problem. Where has
your workforce come from? Education levels are not a means of ensuring that personnel are capable or
competent. Training is a means of providing a known level of understanding for everyone. Assessment is the
means of testing that level of understanding.
In order to assess competence we must establish targets. These targets are the levels of knowledge that we
expect the workforce to have achieved in order to perform their work effectively. These targets will be set by
discipline experts; OIM, Operations managers, Supervisors. The form that this knowledge takes will be well
defined.

Intimateknowledgeofaparticularprocedurecanbetestedbyquestionandanswersessionsortesting.
Thelineupofapieceofequipmentshallbetestedbyademonstrationoftheactivity.
Thisopportunitymaybetakenaspartofanactuallineuporasasimulatedactivitywhichisobservedand
assessed.
Awitnessstatementbyafullyassessedindividualorasupervisorshallalsoprovideadequaterecognitionof
competenceforassessmentpurposes.

The knowledge set of the elements shall be grouped, as related, in Safety awareness, Emergency procedures,
Fault finding, Operational knowledge, Administration and such headings as shall be relevant. The appraisal of
the workforce knowledge, as set by the standards, shall be carried out by a trained and approved assessor. This
can be someone who is part of the workforce but by nature of his experience and maturity may not take an
active development role but by his impartiality is uniquely qualified to carry out this assessment and mentoring
role.

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TRAINING & STANDARDS

There are a number of courses each person must do before they can proceed offshore to work, many of these
safety related courses stem from the lessons learnt in 1988 from the Piper Alpha disaster, along with the
mandatory safety training courses, each person is to be suitably trained and proficient in their trade be it
cooking in the galley, erecting scaffolding for painters right through to managing the process machinery and
equipment essential to refinement of the product, at the top of the training tree we have the OIM and his
courses, once again we go back to the Piper Alpha and the identified need for OIM to hold a recognized level
of proficiency in leading teams during an emergency situation on an offshore facility, this course is commonly
called the MOME (Management of Major Emergency) course where candidates are put through their paces in
decision making, working under stressful situations, and planning, this is what Charlie and I have been doing
for most of the super major oil companies around the world for the past 8 years.
Along with the mandatory safety training such as HUET, BOSIET, Fire Training and now OIM MOME
training we are seeing an increase in Legislative training awareness, this is a customized program for offshore
managers to understand the legal framework of the area they are operating in, we have started conducting these
courses recently, these programs have been in place in Europe for a number of years but as we are expanding
out of Europe to other continents we are seeing legislation courses being developed and presented to managers
offshore they cover a wide range of subjects such as local environmental laws right through to loss of life
whilst at work and the legal frame work of accountability, these have popped up after the incidents in America
on onshore refiners were seen to be poorly managed by the onsite managers, it is a program to protect and
ensure the understanding of managers not to apportion blame, blame is a poor word for a consequence that
results of a failure in either a system or a person. The following is an insight into some globally recognized
standards and how they are conducted.
He shall ensure that regular Emergency Response Drills are carried out in compliance with regulations.
In 1991, the United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association produced a set of guidelines for offshore
emergency response training (UKOOA, 1991). It states that Offshore Installation Managers and their Deputies
should:

Haveagoodworkingknowledgeoftheinstallationoperations.
Bewellversedintheinstallationsemergencysystemsandprocedures.
Beaware,onadaytodaybasis,ofparticularoperationsandspecialcircumstancesapprovedunderthepermit
toworksystemwhichmayaffecttheabilityoftheinstallationtorespondtoemergencies.

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Betrainedandbeabletoassessandtocontroldevelopingemergencysituationswiththeobjectiveof
safeguardingpersonnelandtheinstallation.
Beabletoactascoordinatorbetweentheinstallationandtheonshoreandoffshoreresponsestothe
emergency.
Beabletoactasonscenecommanderwhereaseriousincidentoccursonanearbyinstallation.

These guidelines are as relevant today as they were then, in the wake of the Piper Alpha enquiry. During the
incident, personnel gathered in the accommodation because that is where they had been trained to expect
assistance to arrive. Those who used their initiative generally survived those who didnt, do. Nobody ever told
Ian MacIntosh (Radio Operator) that he could survive a jump from the helideck, 200 feet above the water. In
fact it was perceived wisdom that he would not. (10 days later he was on the Claymore working for me).
The regulations state that emergency response exercises shall be carried out every week. I do not consider a
muster drill as an adequate emergency response exercise. Once a week is little enough time to spend on what
may prove to be a life saving exercise. The installation management should generate a series of credible
scenarios that are relevant to their own installation. These scenarios should be carried out on a regular basis to
test the response of teams, individual personnel and the understanding of installation alarms and shutdown
systems.

The offshore oil industry has clearly accepted the recommendations made by Lord Cullen on the need to
ensure that their offshore managers are competent to handle emergencies. The development of a standard of
competence by OPITO on Controlling Emergencies for OIMs has provided a valuable focus for those tasked
with reviewing selection methods, improving training and establishing formal competence assessment
programs.

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There is still a need in some organizations to formalize and document procedures of selection and appraisal
particularly with respect to emergency command responsibilities. Offshore training organizations and
consultants appear to be working with the industry to refine and develop both selection methods and the quality
of training provision.

One of the difficulties of defining selection criteria and conducting training needs analysis for the OIM
population as a whole is that they manage a wide range of installations with very different operational
demands. It would seem entirely appropriate that the assessment of their competence to manage an emergency
is based on the type of emergency they are likely to have to manage, that is in relation to the safety case of a
particular installation.

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Simulations of emergency exercises can take one of the following formats:

Simulationscanbeconductedoffshore,usuallyorchestratedbyexternalconsultantspresentingthecontrol
teammemberswithanunseenemergencyscenario.
Onshoresimulationscanbeconductedwithinpurposebuiltpremises,withhighfidelityequipmenttomirroran
offshorecontrolroomorradioroom,otherkeyoffshorelocations,andcommunicationsequipment.
Onshoretabletopscenariosareanotherformofexercise,oftenconductedinanumberofroomstorepresent
differentoffshorelocations,withtelephonesandportableradiostorepresentoffshorecommunications
systems.
Onshoresimulator:
Thepurposebuiltsimulatorcontainedthreerooms;acontrolroomwithwhiteboards,telephone,radios,PA,
platformalarmsandfireandgasstatusinformation,
aradioroomwithradiosandtelephones,and
Afireteamorresponseteamleader'sroom.
Thecontrolroomisundervideosurveillance.Thetrainerscanproduceaplatformalarm,powerfailure,
communicationsbreakdown,fireandgasinformation,soundeffectsandcancontrolallequipmentinthe
simulatedcontrolroom.
Theoffshorecontrolteamcanbegatheredtogethertoroleplaytheirown,orothers'offshorepositions.

The simulator can be based on a mythical fixed platform or a real installation, and the POB list, offshore
contact personnel and scenario can be organized to reflect the installation participants usually work on. The
exercise aims to enhance the following skills:
Model making (being able to mirror in one's mind what is happening at the scene of the incident),
Pre-planning skills, information gathering, planning, problem solving, decision-making, delegation, and
Communication skills.

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The scenarios usually last for up to one hour, run in 'actual time elapsed' in scenario development. That is,
although participants are asked to imagine a start time (e.g. 6 a.m.) time elapsed thereafter is at actual pace.
After each exercise, a structured feedback session is conducted, with each of the main response groups
providing constructive comment on other groups' behaviour.
Onshore table-top:
The table-top scenario was located in two separate rooms, with a written emergency scenario for participants to
follow based on a real platform.
Two offshore locations, the control room and scene of the incident were imitated by placing staff in two
separate rooms. Portable radios and telephones imitated offshore communications systems. Participants were
faced with various unseen written scenarios ranging from a general work situation fire to a major offshore oil
and gas emergency.
Offshore scenarios were written to match the type of installation the participants worked on, but were not run
in real time. The offshore control team role played their own and each others posts during these
Scenarios. The exercise aimed to provide participants with knowledge of their company's emergency
procedures, onshore support and the role of the emergency services, and decision making in stressful
situations.
There was no assessment of participants performance by the course trainers but feedback was provided.

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Each type of scenario presentation has its own merits and weaknesses. The simulator is essentially generic but
it can be purpose built to the specifications of a single installation; also it can be adapted for particular
installations by using their station bills, telephone numbers and their emergency response procedures.
It can also provide a convincing degree of realism in simulating the offshore environment which a table top
presented scenario cannot do.
A simulator also does not suffer from the distractions often present in hotel rooms or in the company offices
and can therefore usually elicit more realistic responses from participants and generate a more stressful
atmosphere.
An advantage of both types of onshore simulation is the opportunity to simulate major offshore emergencies
(e.g. blowouts and explosions), and the degree of control the trainers have compared with an offshore location.
What both types of onshore exercise lack is practice in using the equipment of the participants' installation, and
any advancement of their knowledge of the installation and the responses of crew members apart from the
emergency control team. It appears that there are probably merits in using both onshore and offshore exercises
to train OIMs in emergency command.

The OIM shall ensure compliance with any obligations laid down in the Installation Collective Bargaining
Agreement.
This is a feature of the way that individual countries deal with offshore remuneration packages for their
workforce. In some countries this will have been achieved through long discussion and possibly arbitration.
This may involve how individuals are treated in the offshore environment. Hours worked and rest periods
being taken into consideration. It may be necessary for the OIM to enter hours worked into the Installation Log
Book. This is a function that will definitely vary with location.
The OIM shall provide relevant reports to the Concession Owners representatives as per their requirements.
Time is currency. Take time to ensure the information that you present to your company or client is correct.
Far reaching decisions will be made based on the figures that are produced from your installation.
I asked an OIM of an FPSO recently, why there were no off load meters on board the installation. He
suggested that the tank dips and the figures from the shuttle tanker would be adequate. I must admit that I was
horrified by this level of complacency.
Today, levels of atmospheric emissions of vent gasses from toilets are monitored so that greenhouse gas
emissions are more fully accounted for, for example.

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In the oil industry there are many vested interests. As an OIM you are not only responsible for the personnel on
your installation you are also responsible to every single share holder in the company that pays your wages. It
is a very rare situation, world-wide, where a single company owns the oil in the ground, the facility produced
to, the means of transportation, the refining capacity and the downstream sales outlet.
Consider this, a mature oil production platform on the UKCS. Originally owned equally by 4 major companies.
The platform is tied into a pipeline to onshore also shared by 4 other facilities one of which is also a partner.
The operator decided to carry out some development drilling on a promising block nearby. He looks to the
industry for some venture capital to spread the financial risk. 5 small institutions risk some money in this
enterprise. The field is proven and several wells are developed and tied back to the mother platform. This is a
separate field and requires a facility built on the mother platform to process the hydrocarbon for shipment. It is
a prolific find and extends the life of the mother platform considerably. One of the major shareholders decides
to sell out as there are some troubles at home and 10 new shareholders join the club. What do we have now?
We have a facility that has a main partner owning about 25% of the production and many small companies
owning as little as 1% of production. In fact some of the small companies may only own the production from
certain wells.
Now tell me that you think you will rely on tank dips.
As the senior manager on the installation you will know exactly how much your facility can produce on any
given day. You will be confident that the numbers you divulge to partners will be correct, to two decimal
places. Your metering will be correct and it will be checked on a regular basis. Your meters will be proved by
using meter provers. Variables that affect these meters shall be monitored and minimized as much as is
practicable. Water cuts, the amount of water produced from individual wells shall be minimized by separation
and disposal. Scale deposits, calcium carbonate from the formation dropped out when pressure drops are
experienced, shall be minimized by the addition of chemical scale inhibitors. Temperature, pressure, density
are all factors that influence meter accuracy. As such compensatory adjustment will be made for these factors.
Monitoring of these factors really is the job for an accredited third party.
I have already mentioned atmospheric emissions; this has much to do with your carbon footprint. If your power
is generated by thermal engines, not windmills, then you will know how much CO2 they produce when in use.
What might not be so obvious is the amount of carbon emission from diesel tank vents for the emergency fire
pump motors. Someone will require this information on a daily basis.
How many people do you have on board? They all require to be fed and looked after. If everyone works for the
parent company there is not a problem. Do you have contract staff on board? How many and how often? Is
their food and board part of your companys responsibility? Of course it is, but there must be true
accountability for this. Part of your report.
Downtime. There is no allowance within the production targets for downtime. Any planned maintenance that
requires plant to be taken out of action, off-line, affecting production must be identified as deferred production.
This will be acceptable to the specialists onshore who may only see the bottom line. Deferred production is
identified by some companies in one way and by other companies another way. There is no rhyme or reason
for it but one company will consider oil that is not produced today as lost oil, whereas another company will
say that they can get the production back over an extended period. Find out your companies viewpoint and try
to adhere to it.
All installations are subject to the annual shutdown, this may take place every six months or every two years or
any period in between. This can be a bit of a head ache for the OIM. You will have lost one of your best men
for several months while he pulls together a shutdown plan with the beach bound planning team. All of those
jobs that have been deferred to a suitable shut down time will be presented for inclusion. Vendors will put
forward modifications to their equipment that must be carried out at this time. Installation modifications may
also be planned for this period. All of this activity also puts enormous pressure on that most finite of resources,
bed space. Make sure that part of the plan includes numbers required on the installation in excess of the normal
workforce.
The future of how we record things and report to people is finally coming in line with how others do it ashore
due to our location and the challenges faced with getting to and from us we are seen as remote, however we

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have seen the introduction of the VDR (Voyage Data Recorder) on marine vessels, this was initially to be a
panic button concept but has evolved into more of a black box down loading vital data pertinent to location,
movements, machinery and personnel data to authorities 24/7.
I have personally designed and registered such a piece of equipment that does this and much more, but due to
the sometimes dinasouric nature of our industry it is too much too early, having said that I am seeing younger
OIM candidates come on line, these are the people who have grown up with using a laptop in school, I live by
a famous quote, Simplicity is the art of making the Complex clear going further down the IT highway is
where we are headed, I have enclosed some pictures of my software that is in use offshore now with some of
my clients and working as a fit for purpose tool, the goal was to support managers in their processes not to
hinder them in any way.

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QUALIFICATIONS
Academic Achievements.
You do not need a degree to be an OIM. Having the discipline required to gain a degree would certainly be of
benefit to a candidate for the position of OIM. The position of OIM requires a very broad spectrum of
knowledge to successfully handle all eventualities. The ability to express oneself confidently on many levels is
a more valuable quality. A relevant technical qualification in a science or engineering discipline is a valuable
resource for the aspiring OIM. Any company that employs an OIM will have recognized the ability of an OIM
whether he has a degree or not. Any company that requires a degree can provide the appropriate candidate with
a suitable training program to meet that requirement. Academic qualification is not a direct indication of ability
to do the job.

Vocational Qualifications.
Offshoresurvival/firefightingwithHUET.Thisisthestandardcourse,forallpersonnelworkingoffshore,
heldatmanycentersthroughouttheoilexploitationregions.Afourdaycoursefortheinitialexercise
andthentwodayrefreshercoursesatfouryearlyintervals.Thecourseisabasicentrylevel
comprisingfirstaid,survivaltechniques,helicopteruse,emergencyactionsandliferaftboardinginan
environmentalpool.Firefightingisrestrictedtolimiteduseoffirefightingtechniquesincarefully
controlledsituations.HUETisanacronymforHelicopterUnderwaterEvacuationTraining.Asit
suggestsitistraininginhowtoescapefromahelicopterthathasditchedinthewater.Evenwhenthe
helicopterisupsidedown.Useofarebreatherwhichallowsthewearertobreathewhileunderwater
foranextendedperiod,outwithholdingyourbreath.
PermittoWorkCourse,inthiscaseLevel3.ThisisatrainingcoursewhichwillberunbytheHSE
departmentofanyoilcompany.AllaspectsofthePermittoWorkaredealtwithinminutedetail.The
OIMwillberequiredtopassthefinalexamwiththeabsoluteminimumofmistakes.ForanOIMI
wouldsuggestthatapassmarkof90%isrequired.
OilSpillResponse.AstrongworkingunderstandingofOSRorganizationssuchasPIMMAGandEARLand
yourinvolvementandaccountabilitytoreport,monitorandreducecontaminationtothe
environment.
EmergencyManagementandassessment,ascoveredinthisbookintherelevantsection.
OIMRegulations.Asthemanagerofanoffshoreoilproductionfacilityyouareobligedtobeawareof
alltherelevantlegislationassociatedwiththefunction.Therearecoursesavailablethatdealwith
this,verydrysubject.Theintensitywithwhichyouarebombardedbythissubjectwilldependonthe
nationalcurriculumthatisinforce.Thisispresenteddifferentlyindifferentstates.Readingmaterial
thatIwouldsuggestshouldinclude.TheHealthandSafetyatWorkActinyourcountry.SafetyofLife
atSea.ISMCode.COSHHRegulations.Marpol.ISPSCode.Safcon.MODUCode.Thisisaverybriefand
nonexhaustivelistwhichdoesnotincludeareasthatIconsiderimportantsuchas,OilSpillResponse.
SearchandRescue.DangerousGoodsTransport.

ACCIDENT & INCIDENT INVESTIGATION

1.1 All accidents, incidents and dangerous occurrences should be investigated in the first instance to find out
what happened and why it happened in order that measures can be taken to prevent a repeat of this or a
similar accident.
1.2 Investigation of accidents should also be undertaken for the following reasons:
a. To ensure that all accidents are properly dealt with.
b. To identify the causes and apply remedies to prevent a recurrence.

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c. To demonstrate the positive approach to Safety Management System

d. To identify accident trends.
e. To determine the accident potential for major loss.
f. To comply with Statutory Legal Requirements.

2. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PHASES

2.1 All accidents involving injuries to persons and damage to plant or equipment should be thoroughly
investigated so that immediate action can be taken to prevent recurrence. The following may be useful as a
guide to the steps to be taken:
2.2 The steps of an investigation are as follows:
1. Initial Response.
2. Establish Facts.
3. Analysis
4. Short Term Preventive Action.
5. Recommendations.
6. Reports.
2.2.1 It is items 2, 3 and 4 that we must concern ourselves with directly. These steps are the ones requiring
knowledge and skill for their safe and successful execution.
2.2.2 They are inevitably the responsibility of the managers and supervisors carrying out the work and they
must put themselves in a position where they can meet the very serious requirements of their responsibilities.
This can only be done if Pre-planning is carried out by all concerned.
2.3 Pre-Planning.
2.3.1 It is true to say that the first actions in an Accident Investigation take place long before the accident
occurs. This action is preparing for such an accident.
Naturally, the company will have carried out the Statutory Risk Assessments and will have done everything to
prevent accidents from happening. Nonetheless, mitigation is most important and being prepared is far better
than attempting to get things right when under the pressures of a real emergency.
2.3.2 We may be aware that the Government Enforcing Authority will be arriving and carrying out their own
investigation. It may be Company Policy that a Head Office Team will carry out Accident Investigations. It is
nonetheless vital that the people on the spot carry out those actions that will prevent re-occurrence in the short
term. Provided we do not contaminate evidence or interfere with their activities, we are fully justified and wise
to conduct our own local investigation.
2.3.3 The Manager responsible should establish sufficient Accident Investigation Teams. He should brief each
team regarding the areas they may be required to carry out investigations in, should there be an accident there.
These teams will need to train and rehearse their roles in the event of an accident.
2.3.4 Ideally the teams should be made up of a Senior Supervisor from one Department, a less senior
Supervisor from another Department and say three Safety Representatives. The second Supervisor should have
a nominated replacement in case the accident occurred in his own department.
2.3.5 The Installation Manager should not head up the Investigation Team if at all possible. He should reserve
himself for approving or otherwise the team's report and recommendations. After all, the accident will have
occurred in his area of responsibility and he may not be totally objective during the analysis.
2.3.6 For similar reasons, the Safety Advisor or Safety Officer should not be part of the Investigation Team. He
should be available to give advice to the team and the Manager but should not be lost to the overall
investigation by getting involved in the detail.
2.3.7 Each team will normally be familiar with one another and with those Areas and Departments that they
might be required to investigate in the event of an accident.

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2.3.8 Any uncontrolled event is an accident. It may be called an incident in some circles, but if it was not
intended then it was accidental. There is no such thing as an unimportant accident. The results of an accident
may be classified as 'minor' but this in no way means that the accident itself is minor. The 'ripple effect' of an
apparently minor accident may have serious consequences if not properly dealt with.
E.g. the infection that started from an unreported minor cut may be able to lead to the amputation of a limb.
2.3.9 The unreported accident becomes a 'time bomb' waiting to be detonated. The next time, this unimportant
event occurs, the consequences may be disastrous.
Incidents, Near misses, Dangerous occurrences or any uncontrolled event is an opportunity. It is an opportunity
to:
a. Prevent re-occurrence and possible escalation.
b. Train the Accident Investigation Teams in the various skills they must acquire.
2.3.10 getting good at Accident Investigation needs effort and application. Senior Management should make
the resources available to allow these various incidents to be properly investigated. Doing this can change the
culture of the work force. In studying Accident Investigation, people become aware of Accident Prevention
which seems to occur more naturally.

2.4 Initial Response

2.4.1 Whenever an accident occurs, personnel in the vicinity will immediately respond in accordance with their
individual training. If injury is involved, First Aid and the Medic, Nurse or Doctor will be summoned and the
appropriate care administered.
2.4.2 The danger is that what has just happened might escalate. So when the expression "secure the site" is
used, it means four things:
a. Attend to injured persons.
b. Ensure isolation of equipment and safety of plant.
c. Ensure that nothing is disturbed.
d. Segregate witnesses to prevent collusion before they make their statements.
2.4.3 At this point the Accident Investigation Team should be mobilized; with the plant shut down they will be
aware that they are required. The team leader should take charge as soon as possible. The person in charge of
the area should be aware that this is going to happen and hand over to him as appropriate and as soon as
possible.
2.5 Establish the Facts.
2.5.1 Facts are established in many ways. It is important that those members of the Accident Investigation
Team, employed to collect these facts achieve the following:
a. Collect ALL the Facts.
B. Ensure that those Facts collected are TRUE and not distorted or misleading.
c. Do NOT allow themselves to leap to premature conclusions. This will prevent collection of ALL the facts.
2.5.2 The methods employed to collect the facts include:
a. Inspection of the Site. Photographs, Notes and Sketches.
b. Interviewing Casualties, being discrete, but gathering as much information as possible.
c. Interviewing eyewitnesses. Taking Statements for later analysis.
d. Interviewing the Persons in Charge of the Area and the Operation.
e. Collecting Samples if applicable.
f. Recording Environmental Conditions including Weather, Temperature, Lighting, Surface Wetness,
Slipperiness, and Humidity etc.
2.5.3 Interviewing is a most important part of Fact Collection. It is very difficult to hit the ideal atmosphere
especially under the tensions that might prevail. The interviewer should consider two important factors:
a. NOT to allow the interviewee to lead to an early conclusion.
b. NOT to antagonise the witness but to be sympathetic and just Collect the Facts.

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2.5.4 The Police inject one important factor. If a death has occurred, it may still be desirable for preliminary
investigation to be achieved by those responsible, but care should be taken not to contaminate evidence.
Witnesses should be asked to write statements themselves, without the assistance of interviewers.
When this "uncontaminated" statement is completed, it is perfectly all right to interview the witnesses and to
fill in the gaps in a separate statement.
3. INVESTIGATE PROMPTLY
3.1 The sooner the investigation is started the better, provided it is safe to do so.
Delay may lead to non-availability of vital witnesses. Witnesses may discuss evidence and be influenced by
other interpretations.
3.2 Engineers and managers will be anxious to find ways and means of repairing damage, but their first priority
should be to establish the cause of the accident.
Evidence may be disturbed or tampered with.
3.3 Safety specialists and supervisors will be concerning themselves solely with the safety implications and
preventing recurrence but if they do not know the cause they may enhance the risk of a similar accident
happening.
3.4 It is important that the investigation is properly supervised and organised.
Extreme care must be taken not to disturb the workplace or machinery until the appropriate authority has given
permission for the site to be disturbed. Failure to observe this might comprise a serious breach of the law.
4. THE INJURED PERSON
4.1 Certain basic facts about the injured person(s) have to be recorded. In addition to employer records, the
following details are required:
a. Full name, sex and age of injured person.
b. Company Employee Number and Department.
b. His or her permanent address.
c. Marital Status.
d. Job Title or Normal occupation.
e. Date and time of accident.
f. Date and time of commencing and ceasing work.
4.2 Interviewing the Injured Person.
4.2.1 This should be an early priority; even the briefest description of the accident should suffice initially.
4.2.2 The physical and mental state of the injured person will need to be considered and tact and patience may
be required during the interview. The injured persons should be in a fit state to answer questions coherently.
4.2.3 The patient should be encouraged to talk about how the accident happened and it is important that he has
confidence and trust in the listener. Any hint of a "company cover up" or "self blame" must be strenuously
avoided.
4.2.4 Questioning should not take the form of an interrogation. Someone well known to the injured person is
likely to be the best person to communicate with him.
Do not be surprised if he did not see anything.
5. INTERVIEWING WITNESSES
5.1 Tact, patience and skill are required when interviewing. Witnesses should be interviewed as soon as
possible after the incident, before they talk to others. They should not be isolated for more than five or so
minutes before the interview starts. When people talk to others, or when they sleep, they edit their
Memories. Their recollections should be recorded before their memory changes.
5.2 Witnesses should be interviewed separately and privately. The witness should be put at ease. If the witness
wishes to say anything or talk about any matter before notes are taken, they should be allowed to do so. The
interviewer should select a setting that is comfortable to the witness. Walking through the
Facility or the site of the incident can sometimes be satisfactory.
5.3 There are many methods used when interviewing. Some like to use two interviewers, one conducting the
interview while the other takes notes. This is a bit heavy on resources, especially when there are a lot of
interviewees and often causes the witness to be a little nervous. One on one is recommended along with the use

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of a tape recorder. This makes for an interview unhampered by note taking while the witness is talking and
allows a "second cut" before the statement is finally made.
5.4 The witness should be put at ease at the start and it should be emphasized that the objective is fact finding
not fault finding. Statements from witnesses should contain such details as date of birth, employer, company
ID, job title, home address and telephone number etc. and the time and date of the
Interview should be indicated at the end of the statement.
5.5 Skilled interviewers will allow witnesses to tell things in their own way, only to prompt and to elicit
answers where necessary. Questions should be impartial and should be recorded together with the answers. The
interviewer is only the conduit through which the Facts will be passed. He is only there to assist the witness to
recall and record the facts. If he is not doing this he becomes a negative element in the process.
5.6 Open ended, non-leading questions should be asked. For example, "What did you see next?" NOT "Was
that when the pipe fell?" It is a good trick to try and avoid using "you". If it is not used, the interviewee cannot
be accused or attacked. Always remember, his objective is to gather ALL THE FACTS. He should avoid
making the witness feel threatened or resentful. The good interviewer will show respect, gaining his confidence
and extracting facts.
5.7 Interviewers should seek answers to the following basic questions:
a. What did the witness see, hear, feel, smell or taste?
b. What was the witness doing at that time?
c. What was the proximity of the witness to the accident or occurrence?
d. What actions did he take?
e. What actions did others take before and after the accident?
f. What was the condition of the workplace at the time?
g. What hazardous or unsafe conditions existed?
h. What unsafe acts were performed?
I. The probable cause(s) of the accident or occurrence. The interviewer should have a checklist to ensure that
all of those answers are obtained. If the witness offers the information without being questioned then there is
no need to ask the question.
6. QUESTIONING THE PERSON IN CHARGE
6.1 The person in charge may be the injured person's supervisor or manager, the person in charge of the
workplace where the work was being carried out, or both.
6.2 The normal jobs and tasks of the injured person should be established from the person-in-charge. In
particular whether the activity that led to the accident was part of the casualty's normal job requirement.
6.3 Examples of questions, which may be asked, are:
a. What task or type of job was being performed?
b. Was it planned or part of a planned activity?
c. At what stage of the work did the accident occur?
d. Was the person involved in these activities trained and if so, when?
e. Was the person authorised to carry out that type of work or to use machinery in that location?
f. What instructions had been given?
g. How many other people were or should have been involved in the activity?
h. Was the activity or task covered by statutory regulations, a code of practice or company procedures?
I. Were correct and safe procedures being observed?
j. Did an unsafe act cause the accident?
k. Did an unsafe condition contributed to the accident?
l. What safety equipment or protective equipment was available and in use?
m. Were other contractors' employees or plant and machinery involved?
n. Had the injured person been in previous accidents?
7. INSPECT PLANT FOR MISUSE AND DEFECTS
7.1 Inspection of plant immediately after an accident may reveal signs of misuse or defects, which may or may
not have contributed to the accident.

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7.2 Assistance from specialists or persons directly involved or familiar with the type of plant or machinery in
question can provide information not obvious to a person without expert knowledge.
8. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
8.1 May be provided to support the truthfulness and accuracy of the evidence already given. The confirming
evidence may take the form of,
a. Site records.
b. Plant maintenance records.
c. Written procedures.
d. Work schedules.
e. Work permits.
f. Safety instructions.
g. Inspection reports.
h. Accident reports.
I. Other safety reports.
9. ANALYSIS.
9.1 This is the point when the Accident Investigation Team gathers together in a Private place, away from all
witnesses and others that can interfere with their train of thought. It is important that the Team Leader takes
charge. He is the person who will make the report, assisted by the members of the team and possibly others
who have expertise in specialist areas. Before the formal analysis commences, it may be useful to establish the
Sequence of Events and to record this sequence for later reference.
9.2 Evidence gained from interviews and from inspection of the workplace, plant and equipment, should give
an indication of the sequence of events leading up to the accident. Those events should be written down in the
chronological order of their occurrence. This is sometimes called the Time Line.
9.3 This process is not only useful for later reference and analysis purposes, but it allows all of the team
members to become familiar with the available facts and their relevance at different points in the lead up to the
incident. They will have been concentrating on the task they were given by the team leader and will not have
been aware of all the facts collected.
9.4 A description of the accident should be agreed. This description should encompass the whole accident but
take only one sentence to achieve this.
E.g. the unstable stones in the bank rolled into the ditch causing the worker to lose his balance and fall,
breaking his leg and fracturing his collar bone.
9.5 This is where the analysis starts. The analysis can take the form of a
Causation or Why Tree. The accident statement is written in a rectangle at the top of a chart and the question
why? Is asked. The facts are inspected and those that fit or answer the question why are recorded in rectangles
below.
This is the beginning of our Tree. It is useful to achieve this tree in the first instance using Post-it Notes. They
are easily moved about for further analysis.
If they are not available, then ordinary pieces of paper cut up to manageable
3' x 2' tickets can be used.
9.6 Those first answers to the question why our Primary Causes are. There may be three or four of these or only
one. Primary Causes are sometimes called Basic Causes, Immediate Causes or Principal Causes.
9.7 Now, each one should have the question Why applied to it and the answer derived from our list of facts.
Again, there may be more than one answer to each question, and these should be recorded. These are the
Secondary Causes. They may be called Underlying Causes or Contributory Causes. This process can continue
until there are no more facts to be used. The Why Tree is a most useful tool for writing the Accident
Investigation Report, but most of all it leads us to make recommendations to prevent recurrence of the incident.
9.9 Types of Causes. Three types of causes are generally recognized:
1. Human Error
2. Physical Cause

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3. System Cause
Human Error means the action or lack of action by an individual person which causes an accident. A human
error is one where an individual carries out an action which directly causes himself or someone else to have an
accident. If a supervisor fails to tell a worker of a dangerous situation, even though the
Procedure states that he should, and then it is possible that this is a human error.
Physical Cause is the failure or change in a device, mechanism or component. Many people rate this as a
System Failure, arguing that devices do not fail if they are subject to a competent maintenance program. This is
an acceptable viewpoint but others now argue that complex parts like computers and electronic engine
management systems are known to fail despite careful maintenance. Further, it is essential that if there is a risk
that machinery will fail, it must fail safely and not cause further failures or accidents.
System Failure includes the lack of or incorrect procedure, working system, training or supervision. This is
sometimes called a Management Failure.
9.10 We have observed that over 80% of causes are due to Management, Physical or System failure and only
20% are due to human error. This is an empirical statistic and has no scientific basis. Perhaps it could be
argued that the System oversees all activities, so it is more likely that it will be involved in more
Errors than the individuals who carry out the tasks. In our analysis, we must look for ALL causes of the
accident and it is quite likely that we may find all three failures
9.11 Ultimately, we are looking to discover the ROOT Causes of the accident.
These Root Causes are the ones which underlie all of the more obvious System Failures and if corrected would
prevent the accident from occurring.
There are root Causes of Human Error and they are quite numerous, they include Personal Distress, Conflict,
Tiredness, ill Health, and many more.
Careful thought should be given before they are included in an Accident Report because they are personal and
inevitably will result in blame being allocated, which is not our objective.
10. ACCIDENT REPORTING.
10.1 Accident report forms may differ from company to company, but the information required on the form is
fairly standard. Experience indicates that certain facts need to be established in every accident investigation,
therefore every report will show:
a. Who had the accident?
b. Where and when did the accident happen?
c. What were the direct causes?
d. What were the underlying causes?
e. How were the direct and underlying causes permitted?
f. How can a similar accident be prevented?
10.2 Apart from the Company Accident Investigation Report there is likely to be a statutory requirement to
make a report to the Governmental Agency through their reporting system.
10.3 Company Policy plays a large part in this matter. Some companies insist that the experts at Head Office
fill in all the forms. This may be welcomed at the site. It is nonetheless of value if a copy of the written report
and related material is retained at site.
10.4 When the Report is written, it will be checked, usually by the Safety Advisor and then signed by the
Installation Manager. They should check that the following are adequately addressed:
a. Description of the Accident.
b. Potential consequences of the Accident.
c. Primary Cause(s)
d. Secondary Cause(s)
E. Immediate Remedial Actions taken.
f. Appropriate changes to prevent recurrence.
10.5 Within the body of the report there should be contained:
a. A summary of events.
b. Evidence gained during the investigation.

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c. Losses or Injuries resulting from the accident.

d. Conclusions.
e. Recommendations.
F. Witnesses Statements.
g. Other Supporting Material.
It is worth recommending that there is a school of thought that ascribes that the Accident Investigation Team
should not make any recommendations regarding Corrective Action. They say that this is like telling Line
management how to do their jobs. They say that the Team's job is to discover inadequacies and failures and to
bring these to the notice of Management. The Investigation Team need not possess the in depth technical
knowledge to make long term corrections, neither will the Safety Officer. Management should be left to put
their own house in order.
ENVIRONMENTAL KNOWLEDGE & SKILLS
Thorough understanding of the relevant requirements of the offshore Health Safety and Environmental
legislation of that country with regard to official and industry guidelines concerning Waste Management and
Pollution Prevention.
Until fairly recently, not a great deal of attention was paid concerning the effects of pollution caused by
Exploration and development of the oil industry throughout the oil provinces across the world.
From 1988 until 2005 there had been a declining trend in the amount of oil recorded as spilled into the seas.
Notwithstanding the very recent events in the Gulf of Mexico: there is a changed climate and a much more
rigorous approach is adopted to environmental matters now. Much of the recent legal developments have come
about through International Conventions leading in turn to new environmental regulations in many areas.
In 1982 the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) set out a duty on states to ensure the
protection and preservation of the marine environment. Pollution from installations and associated hardware
was specifically addressed.
There had already been Conventions related to discharges from ships and which included installations,
MARPOL 1973 being the most notable, in that rules applicable to ships of over 400 tonnes also applied to
installations and required the keeping of oil record books and prohibited the discharge of oil or oily mixtures
into the sea.
The International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation (OPRC) 1990
requires installations to have approved emergency plans, developed in coordination with the states emergency
plans.
The bulk of detailed regulations, although much influenced by these Conventions, come about through national
regulations. These are coupled with a government licensing regime using powers contained within local acts
and by the use of these two mechanisms, Regulations and Licenses, environmental aspects are addressed.
With reference to the Regulations in place some of the requirements that will be submitted for consideration
prior to any exploration or production shall be:
a) A statement of general environment policy
b) A summary of the management system for implementing the policy
c) How the management system will be applied to the proposed work program.
Oil spill emergency plans.
This plan must reflect the results of a risk assessment of any possible spill. There can be a joint plan covering
pipe lines and groups of installations provided the individual action plan for each installation is clearly
identified.
For new facilities the plan must be produced, at least, 2 months before the facility comes into being, or before
activities start on the installation.

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Review and resubmission is required every 5 years, or, where a major change occurs, amendment or
submission of a new plan within 2 months of the change becoming known.
Every person in charge of an installation or pipeline must report any oil spill to (the relevant authority)

Environmental Assessment.
A license may be required and can only be granted following the full assessment where the operations
comprise-a) The start or restart of drilling at a well.
b) The extraction of petroleum if more than 500 tonnes per day or 500,000 metres of gas, or,
c) The construction of any structure for the extraction of petroleum.
Prior consent is also required for a mobile being intended for the same use.
No consent will generally be granted for a relevant project without an environmental statement containing
the results of an assessment unless the designated authority decides that the project would not be likely to have
a significant effect on the environment.
The Designated Authority cannot give a direction for the non- production of an environmental statement where
the project is for--a) Taking more than 500 tonnes or 500,000 cu metres of oil and gas respectively otherwise than in the course
of the drilling or testing of any well
b) to the erection of any structure in relation to the scale of the above activities or the construction of a pipeline
of 40 km or more and a dia of 800 mm or more
c) Or another member state wishes to participate in the procedure in terms of related regulations.
There are other detailed requirements which need not be examined here.
Although an environmental statement is not specifically asked for decommissioning any likely effect on the
environment should be examined in the statement previously submitted.
An environmental statement must include at least the matters referred to previously.
On receipt of the statement the appropriate environmental departments must then be notified by the Designated
Authority and other actions need to be taken by him.
Consent may be refused where there is no comprehensive externally viable Environmental Management
System.
Discharge of oil
Primarily this will be the affect of oil discharge from installations.
Certain legislation shall apply to discharges into territorial etc waters and discharges into designated waters, of
oil or a mixture containing oil.
Within the United Kingdom North Sea area the 1996 Regs require
Installations to comply with the requirements imposed on ships of over 400 GT and above, and must therefore
carry
a) Oil Pollution Prevention Certificate
b) Oil Record Book
c) Oil pollution emergency plan
They also require being equipped, as far as practicable, with oil discharge monitoring and control systems, oily
water separating and filtering equipment and oil residue or sludging tanks.

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Further under reg 32(2) discharges into the sea must not exceed 15 parts per million or more of oil into the sea.
Production or displacement water discharges are dealt with under the 71 Act exemptions.
My understanding of these regulations is that 100 parts per million (ppm) is considered as an oil slick and must
be reported as such to the monitoring agency. 40ppm is considered as the normal running limit and must not
be breached. 25ppm is the limit sought by operating companies.
The Pollution Prevention and Control Act 1999 in the UKCS is aimed at improving environmental control of
offshore oil and gas activities amongst other things. This very important Act grants powers to the Secy of State
for the making of regulations in connection with pollution activities, the prevention of pollution after accidents
on installations, and waste management licences.
The most important legislation becoming law recently is the Offshore Combustion Installations (Prevention
and Control of Pollution) Regulations 2001 which came into effect on 19 March 2001.
Under this legislation installations, where the aggregate thermal input of combustion plant on connected
platforms exceeds 50MW (but excluding flares and certain other activities), will be brought under the
Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) scheme.
The Regs apply to combustion installations which means any technical apparatus in which fuels are
oxidised to use the heat thus generated and includes gas turbine, diesel, and petrol fired engines and any
equipment on a platform which could have an effect on emissions..or could otherwise give rise to
pollution, but does not include any apparatus the main use of which is the disposal of gas by flaring or
incineration. These regulations have been accepted worldwide and legislation put in place in all countries with
the exception of China and the USA.
The best available techniques (BAT) is the standard required to prevail and this is defined in the Regs.
The matters to be taken into account when deciding BAT`s, bearing in mind the likely costs and benefits, of a
measure and the principles of precaution and prevention.
The main polluting substances including amongst other things, sulphur dioxide, carbon monoxide, asbestos and
so on. (Local legislation may also apply).
An existing qualifying combustion installation does not require a permit until 30 Oct 2007 unless it becomes
subject to a major change.
New builds are required to comply with IPPC control immediately.
Chemical pollution
Regulations are in place now implementing an OSPAR Decision 2000/2 for the identification of chemicals
that are, or may be considered, hazardous and to ensure their substitution by less or non-hazardous ones.
Operators are required to apply for a permit on a single installation basis to cover their use and potential
discharge of chemicals into the marine environment. A Risk Assessment will be required. The permit does not
have a time limit but it will be subject to a 3 yearly review.
Pre-screening of chemicals will have to be established to assess their hazardous characteristics.
Non-oil pollution
Under the Food and Environment Protection Act 1985 a licence is required to make deposits in or under the
seabed from an installation or floating container. The licensing authority must consider the practical
availability of other methods of disposal. This is of particular relevance in areas of delicate marine
environments. Particularly sensitive coral reef, whale breeding grounds and turtle migration routes.
Exclusions include

Cablelayingormaintenance
Depositsfortreatingoilontheseasurface(withexceptions)
Equipmentforthecontrolofoil,etc.,onthesurfaceofthesea
Scientificinstrumentsetc.,
Thelaunchingofvesselsormarinestructures

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Exempt activities are likely to require licensing.

The Merchant Shipping (Prevention of Pollution by Garbage) Regs 1998 are the UKCS implementation of
MARPOL, an internationally agreed regulation, and control the discharge of garbage and sewage from
installations or from any ship alongside or within 500 metres of it.
Garbage is:All kinds of victual, domestic and operational waste generated by operation of the installation and disposed of
either occasionally or continuously but excepting sewage and fresh fish and their parts.
Comminute food wastes ground to the appropriate standard may be disposed off into the sea from an
installation or ship provided more than 12 miles from the land.
Placards must be displayed on board defining the prohibition.
There must be a garbage management plan which must be implemented.
There must also be a garbage record of garbage handled including any discharge, escape or accidental loss.
Under MARPOL sewage may be discharged through an approved sewage treatment system if more than 4
miles from land and the sewage is disinfected and comminute as required.
Thorough knowledge of the Installation Emergency Response Organization and Plans, Escape Evacuation and
Rescue methods including helicopter and standby vessel operation, alerting and SAR routines.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURES & INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM
Every offshore facility has a comprehensive set of ERP (Emergency Response Procedures) there are one of
many operating procedures that are part of the safety case material, we tend to think they belong to the HSE
department quite the contrary they belong to the Operations Department. Your ERP document should in its
entirety amongst other systems explain how an identified threat or risk is dealt with, from what the alarm will
sound like, where you will go to muster and why, and what should happen with people, systems, equipment
etc I have seen ERP documents change from words to flowcharts (visual guides starting from the top and
moving downwards with action boxes) I have written several sets of ERPs myself and once again I must
explain that in an emergency situation I have found that simplicity is the key to understanding the situation and
developing a suitable response. With this in mind I have chosen to show you some ERPs that I believe work
well and are currently in use by operators around the world, like I say in all my classes we dont need to
reinvent the wheel here we are all faced with the same challenges and should perform the same tasks as our
needs are all the same.

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The process for writing ERP documents is quite simple we follow the ICS (Incident Command System)
philosophy, this is a process generating from the U.S it is designed to allocate teams to functions and works on
delegation of authority. ICS is a great system, we some times get confused because it is written in a language
that we might not understand, I dont mean in English I mean in naming regime, having said that it appoints
teams/groups or personnel to the following areas;
Planning
Operations
Control
Security
Logistics
Finance
HR & Administration
These departments all rely on communications as the process to link them together with out it they will fall
away and not meet their design or purpose.

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It is vital that all personnel onboard your facility understands the ERP document and has input into its
functionality, it will be one of the many reference materials that will be used during an accident investigation it
is designed to demonstrate how we respond to an emergency and who does what. Make no mistake if we say
we are going to behave in this manner (as stated in the ERP) we better make sure we do on the day, if we play
lip service to the document by this I mean train one way but fight another then we will be providing a leverage
point which will be opened up and inside that cavity will lie what we commonly call blame and that will be
issued to someone or something. What I am trying to say here is do what we have written and if what is
written is not how we do it then rewrite it, and test that it works, this is done during our scheduled drills &
exercises, no one dies on a training day. This is how the military have been doing it for years.
I have further simplified the process of Emergency job delegation, understanding & performance into a wheel
that is both easy to use and in line with industry best practices, I have put one together for the offshore
personnel and one for the onshore support team personnel, who fall into the ICS system in the coordination,
finance, support, logistics areas, please see following picture.

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DISTRIBUTED CONTROL SYSTEMS

Understanding the FPSO Mooring system, ballasting and safe operating envelopes.
Not required for Managers of production platforms but very necessary if your facility is a converted drilling
rig, not piled directly into the sea bed or a spread moored Floating Production Storage and Offloading vessel.

The above is a diagram of a turret mounted FPSO with a nine anchor, spread moored pattern. The Oil and gas
production lines and the Water injection and Gas injection lines are laid out in a lazy S formation with mid
ocean saddles to provide buoyancy and take some weight off the attachments in the bow.
In this particular vessel, oil is processed on board and stored in the cargo tanks which run from bow to stern
along the length of the vessel. Ballast water is stored in the tanks that form a double skin between the oil
storage and the sea. Ballast water is taken in and pumped out to maintain the balance of stresses and moments
throughout the vessels hull. It is quite possible to break a vessels back by putting the weight of the cargo in the
wrong place. In this vessel the product is off loaded to another vessel over the stern. The crude oil pumps are
also in the stern area and the offloading plan stipulates that there should be a stern deep attitude to the vessel
for offloading.
The offloading plan is very important for an FPSO and this plan must be followed rigorously. It is unlikely that
production will be shut down in order to off load and it will be important to resolve tank dips.
Understanding of the purpose of control systems and the causes and effects of significant alarm trips.
A Distributed Control System (DCS) typically uses custom designed processors as controllers and uses both
proprietary interconnections and communications protocol for communication. Input and output modules form
component parts of the DCS. The processor receives information from input modules and sends information to
output modules. The input modules receive information from input instruments in the process and transmit
instructions to the output instruments in the field. Computer buses or electrical buses connect the processor and
modules through multiplexer or demultiplexers. Buses also connect the distributed controllers with the central
controller and finally to the Human Machine Interface (HMI) or control consoles.

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Elements of a distributed control system may directly connect to physical equipment such as switches, pumps
and valves or may work through an intermediate system such as a SCADA system.
DistributedControlSystems(DCSs)arededicatedsystemsusedtocontrolmanufacturingprocessesthatarecontinuous
orbatchoriented,suchasoilrefining,petrochemicals,centralstationpowergenerationandpapermaking.DCSsare
connectedtosensorsandactuatorsandusesetpointcontroltocontroltheflowofmaterialthroughtheplant.The
mostcommonexampleisasetpointcontrolloopconsistingofapressuresensor,controller,andcontrolvalve.Pressure
orflowmeasurementsaretransmittedtothecontroller,usuallythroughtheaidofasignalconditioningInput/Output
(I/O)device.Whenthemeasuredvariablereachesacertainpoint,thecontrollerinstructsavalveoractuationdeviceto
openorcloseuntiltheprocessreachesthedesiredsetpoint.LargeoilrefinerieshavemanythousandsofI/Opointsand
employverylargeDCSs.Processesarenotlimitedtoflowthroughpipes,however,andcanalsoincludethingslikepaper
machinesandtheirassociatedvariablespeeddrivesandmotorcontrolcentersandmanyothers.
AtypicalDCSconsistsoffunctionallyand/orgeographicallydistributeddigitalcontrollerscapableofexecutingfrom1to
256ormoreregulatorycontrolloopsinonecontrolbox.Theinput/outputdevices(I/O)canbeintegralwiththe
controllerorlocatedremotelyviaafieldnetwork.Todayscontrollershaveextensivecomputationalcapabilitiesand,in
additiontoproportional,integral,andderivative(PID)control,cangenerallyperformlogicandsequentialcontrol.
DCSsmayemployoneorseveralworkstationsandcanbeconfiguredattheworkstationorbyanofflinepersonal
computer.Localcommunicationishandledbyacontrolnetworkwithtransmissionovertwistedpair,coaxial,orfiber
opticcable.Aserverand/orapplicationsprocessormaybeincludedinthesystemforextracomputational,data
collection,andreportingcapability.

There is, in several industries, considerable confusion over the differences between SCADA systems and DCS.
Generally speaking, a SCADA system usually refers to a system that coordinates, but does not control
processes in real time. The discussion on real-time control is muddied somewhat by newer telecommunications
technology, enabling reliable, low latency, high speed communications over wide areas. Most differences
between SCADA and DCS are culturally determined and can usually be ignored.
ThetermSCADAusuallyreferstocentralizedsystemswhichmonitorandcontrolentiresites,orcomplexesofsystems
spreadoutoverlargeareas(anythingbetweenanindustrialplantandacountry).Mostcontrolactionsareperformed
automaticallybyRemoteTerminalUnits("RTUs")orbyprogrammablelogiccontrollers("PLCs").Hostcontrolfunctions
areusuallyrestrictedtobasicoverridingorsupervisorylevelintervention.Forexample,aPLCmaycontroltheflowof
coolingwaterthroughpartofanindustrialprocess,buttheSCADAsystemmayallowoperatorstochangethesetpoints
fortheflowandenablealarmconditions,suchaslossofflowandhightemperature,tobedisplayedandrecorded.The
feedbackcontrollooppassesthroughtheRTUorPLC,whiletheSCADAsystemmonitorstheoverallperformanceofthe
loop.

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DataacquisitionbeginsattheRTUorPLClevelandincludesmeterreadingsandequipmentstatusreportsthatare
communicatedtoSCADAasrequired.Dataisthencompiledandformattedinsuchawaythatacontrolroomoperator
usingtheHMIcanmakesupervisorydecisionstoadjustoroverridenormalRTU(PLC)controls.Datamayalsobefedto
aHistorian,oftenbuiltonacommodityDatabaseManagementSystem,toallowtrendingandotheranalyticalauditing.
SCADAsystemstypicallyimplementadistributeddatabase,commonlyreferredtoasatagdatabase,whichcontains
dataelementscalledtagsorpoints.Apointrepresentsasingleinputoroutputvaluemonitoredorcontrolledbythe
system.Pointscanbeeither"hard"or"soft".Ahardpointrepresentsanactualinputoroutputwithinthesystem,while
asoftpointresultsfromlogicandmathoperationsappliedtootherpoints.(Mostimplementationsconceptually
removethedistinctionbymakingeverypropertya"soft"pointexpression,whichmay,inthesimplestcase,equala
singlehardpoint.)Pointsarenormallystoredasvaluetimestamppairs:avalueandthetimestampwhenitwas
recordedorcalculated.Aseriesofvaluetimestamppairsgivesthehistoryofthatpoint.Itisalsocommontostore
additionalmetadatawithtags,suchasthepathtoafielddeviceorPLCregister,designtimecomments,andalarm
information.

An important part of most SCADA implementations is alarm handling. The system monitors whether certain
alarm conditions are satisfied, to determine when an alarm event has occurred. Once an alarm event has been
detected, one or more actions are taken (such as the activation of one or more alarm indicators, and perhaps the
generation of email or text messages so that management or remote SCADA operators are informed). In many
cases, a SCADA operator may have to acknowledge the alarm event; this may deactivate some alarm
indicators, whereas other indicators remain active until the alarm conditions are cleared. Alarm conditions can
be explicit - for example, an alarm point is a digital status point that has either the value NORMAL or ALARM
that is calculated by a formula based on the values in other analogue and digital points - or implicit: the
SCADA system might automatically monitor whether the value in an analogue point lies outside high and low
limit values associated with that point. Examples of alarm indicators include a siren, a pop-up box on a screen,
or a coloured or flashing area on a screen (that might act in a similar way to the "fuel tank empty" light in a
car); in each case, the role of the alarm indicator is to draw the operator's attention to the part of the system 'in
alarm' so that appropriate action can be taken. In designing SCADA systems, care is needed in coping with a
cascade of alarm events occurring in a short time, otherwise the underlying cause (which might not be the
earliest event detected) may get lost in the noise. Unfortunately, when used as a noun, the word 'alarm' is used

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rather loosely in the industry; thus, depending on context it might mean an alarm point, an alarm indicator, or
an alarm event.
Industrialsafetysystemsarecrucialinanyhazardousplantssuchasoilandgasplants.Theyareusedtoprotect
personnel,theenvironment,andplantincasetheprocesswentbeyondthecontrolmargins.Asthenamesuggests,
thesesystemsarenotintendedforcontrollingtheprocessitselfbutratherprotection.Processcontrolisperformedby
meansofprocesscontrolsystems(PCS)andisinterlockedbythesafetysystemssothatimmediateactionsaretaken
shouldtheprocesscontrolsystemsfail.
Processcontrolandsafetysystemsareusuallymergedunderonesystem,calledIntegratedControlandSafetySystem
(ICSS).IndustrialsafetysystemstypicallyusededicatedsystemsthatareSIL2certifiedatminimum;whereascontrol
systemscanstartwithSIL1.SILappliestobothhardwareandsoftwarerequirementssuchascards,processors
redundancyandvotingfunctions.
Therearethreemaintypesofindustrialsafetysystems:

Process Safety System or Process Shutdown System, (PSS).

Safety Shutdown System (SSS): This includes Emergency Shutdown-(ESD) and Emergency
Depressurization-(EDP) Systems.

Fire and Gas System (FGS).

ThesesystemsmayalsoberedefinedintermsofESD/BDVlevelsas:

ESD level 1: In charge of general plant area shutdown, can activate ESD level 2 if necessary. This level
can only be activated from main control room in the process industrial plants.

ESD level 2: This level shuts down and isolates individual ESD zones and activates if necessary EDP.

ESD level 3: provides "liquid inventory containment" and is

PSS
Theprocesssafetysystem(sometimescalledprocessshutdownsystem)mustcarryouttheprocessshutdownfunction,
actingonthelowestlevelofprotection.Theyshallgenerallyactasanadditionalloopthatprotectsand/ortrips
equipmentandapplicabletothefirezonesortheprocessunits.

SSS
Thesafetyshutdownsystemshallshutdownthefacilitiestoasafestateincaseofanemergencysituation,thus
protectingpersonnel,theenvironmentandtheasset.SafetyShutdownSystemshallmanageallinputsandoutputs
relativetoEmergencyShutdown(ESD)functions(environment&personnelprotection).Thissystemmightalsobefed
bysignalsfromthemainfireandgassystem.
FGS
Themainobjectivesofthefireandgassystemaretoprotectpersonnel,environment,andplant(includingequipment
andstructures).TheFGSshallachievetheseobjectivesby:

Detecting at an early stage, the presence of flammable gas,

Detecting at an early stage, the liquid spill (LPG and LNG),

Detecting incipient fire and the presence of fire,

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Providing automatic and/or facilities for manual activation of the fire protection system as required,

Initiating signals, both audible and visible as required, to warn of the detected hazards,

Initiating automatic shutdown of equipment and ventilation if 2 out of 2 or 2 out of 3 detectors

Initiating the blow down system.

ESD
EmergencyShutdown(ESD)systemsareaimedatisolating(closing)anyhazardousvalvesinaprocessduetoabnormal
conditions.
BDV
DuetoclosingESDvalvesinaprocesstheremaybesometrappedflammablefluidsandthusmustbereleasedinorder
toavoidanyundesiredconsequences(suchaspressureincreaseinvesselsandpiping).ForthisreasonBlowdown
(BDV)SystemsareusedinconjunctionwiththeESDsystemstorelease(toasafelocationandinasafemanner)such
trappedfluids.

PERMITTOWORKSYSTEM
ThoroughknowledgeofthePTWsystemandRiskAssessmentprocedures.
ThePermittoWorksystemcoversthecontrolofallactivitiesrelatingto,maintenance,hazardousworkandnonroutine
activities,whichmayresultininjurytopersonnelordamagetoprocessequipment,andharmtotheenvironment.
ThePermittoWorksystemispartofanoverallHSEManagementSystem.Theproceduremaybesupportedbyrisk
assessmentsorguidancenotesandsafetynotices.Asafeenvironmentcanonlybeachievedthroughplanning,good
communication,training,implementingsafeguards,monitoringoftheworksiteandinspectionuponcompletionofthe
work.
TheobjectivesandfunctionsofthePTWsystemcanbesummarizedasfollows:
Systematicallyassessingthepotentialhazardsinaplannedscopeofwork.
Specifyingtheisolationsandprecautionsrequiredpreventingpotentialhazardsbeingrealized.
Providinganadministrativesystemtoclarifyresponsibilitiesofpersonnelinvolved.
Ensurethatallnonroutineworkiscoordinatedandcontrolled.
Providearecordtoshowthatasafesystemofworkhasbeenusedandthenecessaryprecautionshavebeen
consideredandimplemented.
Controllingtheinterfacebetweendifferentworkactivitiesandworksiteconditions.
Toestablishconditionsthatwillenabletherequestedworktobeundertakeninaspecificlocation,ata
particulartime,withoutdangertopersonnelorthefacility.
Toensureeffectivecontrolincaseofconcurrentconflictingwork,thisindividuallymaynotcompromisesafe
workingprocedures,butincombination,couldcreatethepotentialformoreserioushazards.
Toensurethatallpersonnelincludingsubcontractorsandvisitorswillreceivestructuredtrainingintheuseof
thePTWsystematwhichtimetheircompetencywillalsobeassessed.
Tocomplywiththestatutoryprovisionswithregardtoworksitesafetyandrelatedmatters.

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 Asacommunicationtoolbetweensuperintendents,supervisorsandtheworkforcetocontrolactivitiesand
simultaneousactivities.
ThePermittoWorksystemprovidesameansofsystematicallyassessingthepotentialhazardsinvolvedinaplanned
scopeofwork.Thesystemfunctionsthrough:
Asystemofdefinedlevelsofresponsibility.
Forwardplanningoftheworkincooperationwithaffectedpersonnel.Thismustestablishtheprecisetasktobe
accomplishedandthesequentialcompletionofthetask.
Cleardefinitionoftheareaandthesystem/equipmentwhereanduponwhichtheworkistobecarriedoutand
anyhazardswhichmayarisefromsuchwork.
Determiningiftheworkwillaffectanyotherarea,systemorequipment,eitheradjacentorremote,orconflict
withanyotherworkorsafetyrequirements.
Communicationsoftheseplanstothosewhowilldotheworkandallotherpersonnelwhocouldbeaffectedby
thework.
Carefulcheckingandimplementationofprecautionstobetaken,includingthesafetyofequipmentand
personnel,theprovisionofprotectiveequipmentandextrapersonnelforsafetymonitoring.
Controllingandobservingsafeworkingpracticeswhiletheworkisbeingcarriedout.
Leavingtheworksiteclean,clearandsafeuponcompletionoftheworkandensuringthatnothingisleftina
condition/statewhichmightendangeranypersonneloraffecttheoverallsafetyandintegrityofthe
installation.
Thesystemusesaformwhich,authorizesspecificwork,inaspecifiedareaandliststheprecautionsrequiredto
ensuresafetyduringtheauthorizedperiodoftimeallocatedforthework.APermittoWorkisnotatransfer
ofresponsibilityforapieceofequipment,plantorarea.Theissueofapermitbyitselfdoesnotmakeajob
safe.Thosewhoarepreparingandcarryingouttheworkcanonlyachievetheserequirements.

Risk assessment is a structured and systematic process for identifying and analyzing HS&E hazards associated
with an activity/ operation, developing mitigation and control measures to manage and mitigate the risks to an
ALARP level. The assessment is important as it shall determine the order of priority based on the level of risk
and appropriation of corrective/preventive measures.
Risk assessment techniques, ranging from a simple qualitative method of hazard identification to a more
complex advanced quantitative method shall be employed to highlight how hazards can occur and provide a
clear understanding of their nature and possible consequences.
In general, the commonly used risk assessment techniques are:
HAZard Identification (HAZID) Study
HAZID (HAZard IDentification) is a high-level, systematic assessment of a facility, system or operation
intended to identify potential hazards. This method is often used as a basis for risk assessment.
HAZard and OPerability (HAZOP) Study
HAZOP (HAZard & OPerability) is a well established method for identifying potential safety and operational
problems associated with the design, maintenance or operation of a system. A HAZOP is a formal and
objective process, where different parts or sections of a given system are assessed with the aid of
"Guidewords". This ensures a systematic and well documented evaluation of potential

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problems/hazards.
Job Safety Analysis (JSA)
A Job Safety Analysis (JSA) is a method that can be used to identify, analyse and record the steps involved in
performing a specific job, the existing or potential safety and health hazards associated with each step, and the
recommended action(s)/procedure(s) that will eliminate or reduce these hazards and the risk of a workplace
injury or illness.
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)
An Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is an assessment of the likely positive and/or negative influence a
project or operation may have on the environment. The purpose of the assessment is to ensure that
environmental impacts are considered before deciding whether to proceed with new projects.
Environmental Risk Assessment (ERA)
The assessment on environmental effects based on data concerning hazards and environmental sensitivities
to identify where environmental effects may be encountered and then to evaluate their nature, severity and
likelihood of occurrence.
Health Risk Assessment (HRA)
The identification of health hazards in the workplace and subsequent assessment of risk to health. The
assessment takes into account existing or proposed control measures. Where appropriate, the need for further
measures to control exposure is identified.
Chemical Health Risk Assessment (CHRA)
Chemical Health Risk Assessment is a process that combines available information on chemical and exposure
to estimate the probability that someone will experience adverse health effects as a result of exposure to the
chemical
Other risk assessment techniques may be used if deemed necessary. The use of appropriate methodology shall
be taken into consideration the scope of study and complexity of the activity or operation. A multidisciplinary
team approach shall be applied to ensure every foreseeable hazard and its associated risks are identified,
considered, elaborated and documented.
Risk Assessment Team
The Risk Assessment Team shall consist of multidisciplinary personnel. The team leader shall be led by a
competent person and responsible to assemble team members based on the following criteria:
Sound knowledge of the study scope and methodology;
Expertise;
Availability; and
Discipline represented.
Risk Assessment Process
The risk assessment process shall consist broadly of the following three main steps:
Hazard identification;

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 Risk evaluation (a function of severity and frequency of occurrence); and

Risk mitigation and control.
Hazard Identification
The objective of this step in the risk assessment process is to identify all possible hazard(s) that can cause harm
to people and the environment.
Risk Evaluation
Once hazards/ risks have been identified, they shall then be evaluated as to their potential severity of loss and
to the probability of occurrence. This can be achieved via a qualitative or quantitative approach.
Depending on the type of risk assessment technique used, qualitative, semi quantitative or quantitative
approach shall determine the extent of the risk associated with the identified hazards. The use of a semiquantitative risk assessment shall make reference to an HS&E Risk Assessment Matrix that requires the team to
assign the likelihood of occurrence with existing safeguards based on exposure and probability, and severity of
consequences without safeguards.
Any risk that is evaluated to fall under Category I and II shall be addressed immediately; a Category III risk
should be addressed while risk that falls under Category IV or V should be monitored.
The use of a Quantitative Risk Assessment shall describe the chance of risk to personnel/ public,
environmental and/or economic as a result of exposure to a hazard. The UK Health and Safety Executives
Tolerability of risk from nuclear power stations (1992) criteria should be used to set the limit for maximum
tolerable risk of a fatal accident to personnel and public as presented below:

Risk to Personnel.

Risk to the public.

Risk Mitigation and Control

Results from the risk evaluation shall be used to develop risk mitigation or control alternatives. Mitigation
and/or control alternatives should take into account feasibility, risk reduction potential and cost. The preferred
hierarchy of measures is to prevent the occurrence of the hazard than to mitigate the consequences caused by
the hazard; and should be addressed using one or more controls in the following hierarchy:
Elimination: controlling the hazard at source;
Substitution: replacing one substance or activity with a less hazardous one;
Isolation/enclosure: separate the hazard from the work area;
Engineering control: modify existing machinery or facility;
Administrative control: develop work methods/procedures and/or provide training to recognize hazards and
reduce conditions of risk; and
Personal Protective Equipment: the last option that should be considered to deal with the hazard, where the
hazard cannot be removed or reduced by any other means.

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The cost-benefit analysis (CBA) shall be used for the evaluation of various risk mitigation and control
measures, notably for the level of risk within the ALARP region. CBA cannot be regarded as a substitute for
engineering judgment, but may assist in the decision making process where potential upgrades or modifications
are under consideration. The table below provides the guidance in assessing potential
Design changes, modifications and upgrades.
Cost to Avert One Fatality (MYR)
Assessment
0 Highly effective always implement
5000 Effective, always implement
50000 Effective, implement unless risk is
Negligible
500000 Consider, effective if individual risk
Levels are high
5000000 Consider at high risk levels or where
There are other benefits
50000000 Ineffective
PLL should be utilized to calculate ICAF (Implied Cost of Averting a Fatality), a measure of the cost
effectiveness of a potential design change, modification or upgrade and method to demonstrate ALARP. The
relationship between ICAF and PLL is as follows:
ICAF = Cost of modification
(Initial PLL Reduced PLL)
A low ICAF for a proposed risk mitigation and control measure implies that it is highly effective, because the
cost is low compared to the risk reduction achieved.
Conversely, a high ICAF implies a relatively ineffective risk reduction measure, indicating that perhaps the
money should be diverted to an alternate.
Follow-up and Stewardship
The result of the specific risk assessment shall be documented. Personnel assigned and timeframe to implement
the recommended risk mitigation and/or control measures shall also be documented. The initiator of the risk
assessment shall develop a tracking mechanism to follow-up on the recommended risk mitigation and/or
control measures, ensure closures and report to his superior.
An audit should be performed by the HS&E Department to ascertain that all recommended risk mitigation
and/or control measures are closed out.

Training

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Appropriate training shall be provided to personnel involved in risk assessments to ensure that they are capable
of identifying and successfully executing risk assessment activities. Appropriate training shall be provided to
the Risk Assessment Team to ensure they are capable of carrying out the risk assessment activities.
PLANNED MAINTENANCE
Knowledge of the Computerized Planned Maintenance and Inspection systems.
The computerized planned maintenance system is the application chosen by the parent company to manage all
maintenance within the company installations. There are several systems in use worldwide. Maximo is one and
SAP another. Whichever application is employed it will provide electronic links and interfaces with document
management, the engineering database, finance system, site equipment registers and ex registers.
The Planned Maintenance Routine is a pre defined set of tasks, issued at regular intervals by the maintenance
management system (via a Work Order) that details maintenance activities to be executed on a particular
system, process or piece(s) of equipment.

The PM is an object within the system that generates the PMR. It defines the equipment, process or system to
be maintained by reference to an Operating location (tag), the frequency, priority and schedule of the activity.
The PM record also references the Job Plan (work instruction) to be carried out.
The Job Plan is an object within the system that details the specific work to be carried out. The Job Plan holds
a generic detailed work instruction stored within the document management system. This work instruction is
printed with the associated work order.
All PMRs fall within the Permit to Work system. No maintenance can be carried out without the full appraisal
of supervision. The intention behind a Planned Maintenance Routine is that all aspects of maintaining

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performance and usability will be addressed. Safety Critical Elements will receive the same level of scrutiny as
more mundane material. The CMMS also provides a record of actions carried out, materials used and service
history. Equipment that is being replaced at each service interval may require a review of the service interval
and vice versa, if no actions are required. The more history that is added into the CMMS the better the system
works for everyone. Full service carried out. This tells the next person to carry out the work nothing if he has a
lot of material to replace.
Supervision must sign off on CMMS work. They also may have to comply with prioritized work schedules.
Safety Equipment always has a high priority. It is usually a function of continued operation that certain safety
critical equipment is never omitted from regular maintenance.
It may be found that the CMMS planned maintenance routines do not meet installation requirements. This may
happen when vendor suggestions are included into CMMs without a formal review. A procedure can be used to
overcome this problem. Engineering changes, if agreed by management and supervision are used to adjust
CMMS requirements.
PRODUCTION & PROCESS
Thorough understanding of procedures including emergency procedures and the use of telemetry system.
Operating, Maintenance and Management Procedures are the written means whereby equipment and systems
are set up, maintained and safely operated according to vendor manuals, best practice and agreed principles.
These procedures may be written by the operators who are going to use them or professional writers who have
been given an exact brief. Whatever the source of the procedures they need to be accurate, safe and meet the
approval of management. The OIM as the senior manager of the installation accepts the procedures on behalf
of and for the benefit of the installation.
A library of all the relevant material pertinent to the installation shall be maintained on the facility. This
material shall be the most up to date available and contain all the plant specific information that is available.
All of this material shall be reviewed and updated on a regular basis. This material shall form the installation
accessible controlled documentation. The OIM shall accept new procedures, on behalf of the installation,
ensure that the library is updated, disseminate the new information throughout the workforce and ensure that
previous examples are removed from circulation. He shall ensure that reviewed and updated material for the
procedures is accurate, meets requirements and is in compliance with relevant regulations and legislation. He
shall forward any installation derived procedures to onshore management for approval and document control.

Understanding of Production Operations.

The offshore installation is a small self contained town but it is still essentially an oil exploitation facility. As
the senior manager of this oil exploitation facility the OIM should have an understanding of the principles that
make the facility work.

Separation.
The term Oil and Gas Separator in petroleum production terminology, refers to a pressure vessel which is
designed to separate reservoir fluids into liquid and gaseous components. Any process which is designed to
separate substances relies on the fact that the substances are different from each other in some way. The fluids
must not be the same mass per unit volume, that is: They must have different densities.
Oil and Gas Separators depend on a force to take advantage of the differences in Densities between the
components by separating them. The force we depend on to separate the fluids is Gravity. Since a separator
depends upon gravity to separate the fluids, the ease with which two fluids can be segregated depends upon
their Relative densities. The greater the difference in the density of each of the components to be separated the
more readily they will separate.

Page54

That is the theory, the more time that is available; the more complete will be the separation. Reservoir fluids, a
mixture of oil, gas and water, under pressure will separate if allowed to stand still long enough. However this is
not the way that it is done in our industry. We need to produce separated fluids out with the bounds of natural
separation. By listing a set of objectives for a separator, we will have a better understanding of what functions
we want the separator to perform. There are Four Separator objectives listed as follows:
Cause a primary phase separation of the liquid hydrocarbons from those which are mostly gas.
Refine the primary separation by means of a secondary phase separation which removes the entrained
liquid mist from the gas.
Further refine the separation by removing the entrained gas from the liquid.

Dischargetheseparatedgasandliquidfromthevesselundersteady,controlledconditionsandensurethatnore
entrainmentofonephaseintotheothercanoccur,inotherwordsstabilisethecrudeoil.

Of course whilst these objectives are stated as separator objectives it may be necessary to use more than one
separator to achieve complete separation of the fluids into the gas, oil and water components. To achieve these
objectives a separator must be designed to:
Control and disperse the energy of the feedstock.
Ensure that the gas and liquid flow rates are low enough so that gravity segregation and an approach to
vapour-liquid equilibrium can occur.
Control the accumulation of froths and foams in the vessel. The size of the droplets.
The Density of the liquid droplet compared to the density of the gas.
The velocity at which the gas stream is travelling through the separator.
The Turbulence which exists in the flowing gas stream.
Ofthesefactors:

The difference in density between oil and gas and the droplet size will be determined by the composition of
the well stream.
The Velocity of the gas stream is determined by the size of the separator and its throughput.

Fluid flow is the result of a pressure gradient, consequently when well fluid flows through the formation,
tubing, chokes, reducing regulators and surface lines; there is a falling pressure gradient in the downstream
direction. At some point on the flow path the pressure reduction is sufficient to initiate the escape of gas from
the liquid. This free gas flows through the system in contact with the liquid (in which the remaining gas is still
dissolved). This process is known as flash separation.
As the reservoir fluids enter the vessel an initial separation of gas and liquid takes place. This happens because
of:

AreductioninVelocity.
AreductioninPressure.

A Change in Flow Direction.

The Velocity of the inlet stream is reduced as the fluids flow from a relatively small diameter pipeline into the
large volume of the separator. The Pressure is reduced by maintaining a controlled pressure on the vessel lower
than that of the inlet stream. The change in flow direction is accomplished by placing some form of
deflector/baffle at the inlet to the separator.
The secondary separation of liquid droplets from the gas by gravity settling will not usually remove very small
particles. These particles tend to remain in the gas stream in the form of mist. In order that the gas leaving a
separator is as free as possible from liquid, a final Mist Extraction section is built into the vessel. Mist
extraction is accomplished using either an impingement or a centrifugal force mechanism. The most common
mist extraction device is the knitted wire mesh pad which is an impingement mechanism.
You will remember that a 3 phase separation process not only removes gas from liquid, as we have just seen,
but also separates oil & water. This, in effect, adds a fifth part to the total process within the separator. Oil and
water do not mix. If theses liquids are left long enough in a vessel, separation will occur and the oil will float
on top of the water. Oil & Water will separate faster than gas will be liberated from the oil. So, if the Separator

Page55

is large enough to allow efficient gas separation, then the retention time required for oil and water separation
will be exceeded.
Example:
LiquidResidenceTimeInSeparators

Separator Size:

Diameter = 2 m
Length=11m
Volume
=
(R2L)
2
= ( 2 x 11) = 34.6m3
2
Add 10% for volume of Heads 3.5m3
Total Volume 38.1m3
Liquid volume at 1/2 full: 18,05m3
Maximum Oil Flow Rate: 530 m3/hr or 8.8m3/min
18.05
Oil Residence Time =
= 2 min
8.8

In most cases this is sufficient time for both gas and water to be separated.
Wellhead fluid from the HP and MP manifolds are routed to the HP separator A or B where gas, condensate
and any produced water are gravity separated. To reduce the incoming liquid momentum, a diffuser is installed
at the inlet nozzle of the separator. The inlet diffuser has directional vanes to control and direct the incoming
liquids into the catchments baffle below the inlet. The liquid is directed into an area for gravity separation of
the oil and water. This section at the base of the separator is baffled which reduces fluid velocity. The liquids
also pass through a restriction orifice which is used to control slug flow should it occur. The baffles are vertical
plates which extend above the normal level of the liquid and are arranged to force the liquid stream into an S
path improving separation and water phase removal. The water is routed to the HP produced water hydro
cyclone for subsequent cleanup and disposal. The hydrocarbons flow over a weir into a hydrocarbon
compartment where the liquid outlet is located. A 2in vent line passes through the catchments baffle allowing
any released gas to pass up into the top section of the separator.
Horizontal separators are almost always used for:
High Gas/Oil ratio well streams.
For foaming well streams.
Liquid-from-liquid separators.
Horizontal separators are:
Easier to skid mount.
Easier to service.
Easier to hook up.

Page56

The horizontal gas flow does not oppose the settling of liquid particles as it does in a vertical separator.
There are circumstances, however, where space constraints may rule out the use of horizontal separators. In
Horizontal separators, Gas flow does not interfere with downward flow of liquid drops.

Having developed objectives for oil, water & gas separation, discussed the Ideal separator situation and
decided what the criteria for the quality of the phases are to be, it follows that:
A single, high pressure separator of practical and economic size cannot be expected to produce dry gas.
Sales quality oil.
Produced water which is of a quality suitable for dumping without further treatment.

Page57

ControlofSeparators

Pressure and liquid level are features of the process which can vary. Each can increase or decrease with
variations in separator throughput. In order to obtain optimum separation, the pressure and liquid level must be
maintained at a constant value.
Separators have two major controls:
Liquid level control
Pressure control
Let us consider the basic fundamentals of process control. In any continuous process there are a number of
factors which must be kept within certain limits.
These are called the process variables
The four most common are:
Liquid Level
Pressure
Temperature
Fluid Flow
Thebasicmethodofachievingcontrolappliestoallfour
TheControlLoop

There are four main elements in a typical control loop:

The Process variable
The Measuring unit
The Controller
TheCorrectingUnit

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TheProcessVariable
Thisisthatpartoftheprocesswhichhastobecontrolledwithincertainlimits(i.e.separatorLevelandPressure).The
actualvalueoftheprocessvariablewhichtheoperatorwishestomaintainiscalledthedesiredvalue.Thisvalueis
commonlycalledthesetpoint.

TheMeasuringUnit

This unit measures the actual value of the variable. The measuring unit obtains the measured value, i.e. the
actual level or pressure in the separator.
TheController

It is the job of the controller to compare the measured value of the process variable with the desired value. If
the controller senses a deviation between the two it then sends a correcting signal to the final element in the
control loop, the correcting unit.
For example, suppose you wanted to maintain the separator at 250psi, but the pressure had increased to 275psi.
The desired value is 250psi and the measured value is 275psi.
The controller would sense this deviation and instruct the unit to send the appropriate correcting signal. The
controller may be operated using air (pneumatic operation) liquid (hydraulic operation) or electronics.
TheCorrectingUnit

This part of the control loop is usually a valve. On receipt of a signal from the controller it opens or closes to
alter the process variable. The measured value is then returned to the one indicated by the desired value. This
valve is commonly known as the level control valve.

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SeparatorLevelControl

Basically each separator has a level control system as previously described which regulates the position of a
control valve (LCV) in the oil outlet line. The oil outlet line leads the oil to the next link in the process train.
This could be a lower stage of separation, storage or transfer pumps.
If the level in the separator falls the controller closes the control valve to raise the level. If the level in the
separator rises the controller opens the control valve to lower the level via the liquid outlet.
The controller displacer (float) is housed in a stilling well. The stilling well is normally a slotted pipe with the
displacer fitted internally. The purpose of the stilling well is to reduce the turbulence across the displacer.
In a 3 phase separator the water/oil interface is controlled by an interface level controller. This controller
operates over a small range. Detecting the interface and controls it by adjustment of a control valve in the
water drain line. Liquid turbulence, emulsions and silt can affect the accuracy of interface control.
Liquid Level Control is required to maintain a constant level to allow time for gravity separation and to prevent
liquid carry over through the gas outlet to downstream equipment.
To help maintain pressure in a 3 phase separator, prevent oil flow through the water outlet or vice versa. To
ensure optimum retention or residence time in most cases the optimum operating level in the vessel would be
approximately 50%.
PressureControl

As with level control, the basis of a pressure control loop is the same. The controller and the control valve
work in the same way as the units used in level control. However, the measuring unit is obviously going to be
different as pressure is being measured instead of liquid.
Separator pressure is controlled to maintain optimum separation conditions and to provide the necessary
pressure to discharge the liquid to the next separation stage. A constant pressure is maintained by means of a
controller which regulates a control valve (PCV) in the gas outlet line.
When gas recompression and treating facilities are in operation the gas from the various stages of separation
flows directly to them. The separator pressure being controlled by the back pressure in the downstream gas
plant.
In this mode of operation the pressure indicating controller (PIC) on each separator shall be set slightly above
the back pressure the gas plant is holding on them. If the gas plant shuts down or throughput decreases the
separator pressure increases. When the pressure reaches the set point, the separator controller (PIC) opens the
pressure control valve (PCV) to vent the excess gas to flare.
SeparatorSafetySystems

We have looked at the control of the two main process variables in a separator i.e. Level and Pressure. These
two control systems normally operate with relatively few problems; however there is always the possibility that
for some reason they fail to maintain control.
This may happen, for example because of instrument malfunction. If this should occur a potentially hazardous
situation will arise.
These are some of the possible malfunctions in a 3 phase separator.
Oil level goes to high
Oil level goes to low
Pressure continues to increase
Pressure continues to decrease
Water level goes to high
Water level goes to low
If the oil level goes too high, oil could get carried over with gas, causing problems downstream. If the oil level
goes too low, there is a danger of the gas leaving the separator through the oil outlet.
If the pressure increases too much, there is the risk of exceeding the safe working pressure of the separator. In
the situation where the pressure falls too much, there will be insufficient pressure to push the liquids from the
separator.

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If the water level rises above the internal weir, water will contaminate the oil leaving the separator. Should the
water level go to low, oil will flow from the separator through the water outlet.
To prevent such hazardous situations arising separators have the following protection facilities installed:
low level alarm
low level shutdown
high level alarm
high level shutdown
high pressure alarm
high pressure shutdown
high pressure relief valves

Where crude cooling is required prior to final stage separation, the following protection devices may also be
fitted:
high temperature alarm
high temperature shutdown
Regardless of what process variable is being monitored, the alarm and shutdown sequence remains the same.
The first up is the alarm allowing the operator to take corrective action. If no corrective action is taken or the
action is ineffective further deterioration occurs and shutdown results.

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LevelControlSafetySystems

What would be the sequence of events if the oil level continued to rise? Remember from the previous section
that an increase in level will cause the level control valve to open.
This is a simple illustration of a level control loop. LC 01 is the level controller and LCV 01 is the level control
valve. In this case an increase in level causes LC 01 to open LCV 01. However, the level may continue to rise
and approach a hazardous situation.
In order that the operator can be warned of the situation alarm signals are generated by the controller. On the
illustration you will see LAH 01 connected to the controller LC 01. LAH stands for Level Alarm High.
If the level reaches the setting of LAH 01 an audio/visual alarm would be generated. This alarm would be
actuated locally in the vicinity of the process equipment and at the central control room which is normally
manned.
If a falling level is the problem a similar alarm is generated by LAL 01. If the situation is not rectified and the
level continues to rise or fall, then the separator must be protected by automatic shutdown systems.
This final degree of protection uses float operated level switches. These switches will actuate Emergency
Shutdown Valves (ESDV). These switches are mounted on the separator independent of the level controller.
Theseswitchesaredesignatedasfollows:

LSHH:LEVELSWITCHHIGHHIGH

LSLL:LEVELSWITCHLOWLOW

If the level reaches the setting of either of these switches, a signal is sent to the ESD system which
automatically isolates the vessel by closing the appropriate ESD valve.
PressureControlSafetySystems

An increase or decrease is potentially hazardous. There are several degrees of pressure protection on a
separator.
PC 01 is the pressure controller and PCV 01 is the pressure control valve. If the pressure in the separator
increases or decreases, PC 01 sends a signal to PCV 01 instructing it to open or close as required.
In addition PC 01 activates alarms PAH 01 and PAL 01 if the pressure is too high or too low:
PAH:- PRESSURE ALARM HIGH
PAL:- PRESSURE ALARM LOW
There are separate pressure switches mounted externally on the vessel shell; these switches would probably be
designated as PSHH 01 and PSLL 01
They would be connected to the ESDV system:
PSHH:- Pressure Switch Low Low
PSLL:- Pressure Switch Low Low
If either of these switches were activated, the separator would shutdown, be isolated and made safe by closure
of the ESD valves.

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SEPARATOR PROBLEMS.
Emulsions
A common problem is that caused by the water and oil forming an emulsion. This is a mixture of two
immiscible liquids. Where one of the liquids is dispersed throughout the other in the form of small droplets. In
hydrocarbons the dispersed liquid is usually water.
Emulsion are categorised as tight or loose (often referred to as stable or unstable). The type will
depend on the nature of the oil and the amount of water present.
Loose emulsions are the more usual type encountered in hydrocarbons.
They are easier to break down. The dispersed droplets are usually large enough for gravity separation to take
effect quickly as long as no turbulence is encountered.
It is more difficult to break down tight emulsions because the dispersed droplets are smaller. It takes a long
time to break tight emulsions effectively by gravity separation.
Low gravity and high viscosity crude oil tend to form tight emulsions. In some emulsion situations, the
separator internal mechanical devices alone will not separate the liquids. Various methods can be used to
enhance the separation of the fluids.

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Heavy crude streams may be heated to reduce the viscosity of the mixture, thereby allowing the coalescers to
separate the fluids. In extreme cases it is necessary to use electrostatic grids or chemical treatment. Chemical
treatment involves the injection of chemicals into the well fluids just prior to separation.
This chemical, which is called a demulsifier assists in breaking down the emulsion and allows the separator to
do its job. Emulsion is one of the main problems of three phase control is that it makes interface level control
difficult.
The interface is not a clear division of oil and water, but an emulsion of the two. The displacer of the water
level controller often intersects the oil/water interface. The displacer may become totally immersed in
emulsion.
Consequently the level control action will be erratic.
Foaming

Separator capacities may be greatly reduced and the proper functioning hampered due to foaming of the
crude. Foaming occurs when the oil fails to release the gas quickly enough as it passes through the vessel,
causing gassing within the body of the liquid. This causes a layer of oily bubbles to form on top of the liquid
surface.
The displacer of a level controller is designed to match the specific gravity of the oil in which it operates. It
cannot float in foam.
Therefore with this significant change in specific gravity the level control device will react erratically or will
not function at all. When the displacer sinks a false low level is indicated and the oil outlet LCV will close.
This can result in a carryover of liquids in the gas stream.
Foam has an extremely low apparent density and therefore occupies more than its appropriate share of space
inside the vessel. When the foam blanket is uncontrolled, it may become nearly impossible to remove separated
gas or degassed oil from the vessel without entraining some of the foam material in the liquid or gas removed.
Foams, so far as this problem is concerned, fall into two broad categories: surface type foam and body type
foam.
The surface foam, the more common and more readily understood type, is created when change of pressure or
temperature results in a liquid phase material changing, in part, to gas within the body of the liquid. Resulting
bubbles quickly rise to the surface. Under normal conditions they break through the surface in company with a
fine spray of liquids and finally leave as gas phase material; however, when, as a result of emulsifying or
surface active agents, the nature of the liquid prevents the clean liberation of the gas bubbles through the
surface, surface foam results.
Body foam is a more complex type of structure restricted generally to the low gravity and high viscosity
material. Here again, conditions supporting gas liberation within the body of the liquid would normally result
in bubbles which would quickly make their way to the surface, dissipate, and separate. Due, however, to the
presence of certain emulsifying agents within the liquid, or the surface active characteristic of the liquid in
company with its viscosity and gravity characteristics, the gas forms and remains in relatively stable spherical
traps within the liquid. Many of these do not make their way to the surface because of the interference of other
like globules with which they join and remain relatively stable within the liquid body. As noted, they are
prevented from readily reaching the surface as a result of the viscosity or low gravity of the liquid until
eventually the entire gas-liquid mass becomes essentially one biphasic body.
There is no line of strict demarcation between surface type and body type foams as defined here but, generally
speaking, when there is an essentially determinable gas-foam line above the biphasic material and a true liquid
below, the foam involved is surface foam.
Internal mechanical devices for combating foam are not recommended. They are considered to be ineffective.
They can even be counterproductive by offering surfaces which stabilise the foam.
The foaming problem is usually overcome by the injection of a defoaming agent upstream of the separator. The
most commonly used defoaming agent is silicone.
Chemical defoamers either prevent the generation of foam by de-activating the surface active components, or
break the foam already formed by altering the surface tension of the oil film surrounding the gas bubbles.

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Chemical treatment is the most effective method of combating the problem of foam but the cost is rather high.
Equally good results can sometimes be achieved by heating the crude. This is well worth considering in the
design phase.
Slugging
Slugging occurs when there is an intermittent, rather than a constant flow of well fluids into the separator. In
some instances the flow may cease altogether for a very short time and then a slug will arrive. This is more
likely to occur in mature oil fields.
If the liquid enters the separator in slugs this can cause rapid fluctuations in levels and pressures. The control
systems could become unstable in attempting to control this situation. In severe cases this could cause a
shutdown. Take for example the level control system. If the control system does not react fast enough to allow
the liquid to drain down. When the next slug arrives there could be a loss of level control. This situation could
cause a high level in the vessel, possibly resulting in a high high level shutdown of the separator. This can be
overcome by lowering the level set point on the controller. By lowering the operating level, the volume of the
vessel is increased within the operating band. Thereby allowing time for the control system to react when a
slug arrives. Lowering of the level controller proportional band will speed up the response of the level control
system.
In some case it may be advantageous to install a valve positioner on the level control valve. This effectively
allows the level control valve to open more rapidly.
The above solutions could also be tried if difficulties where encountered with pressure control. However, it
must be emphasised that any adjustments to the operating parameters must be carried out in small steps.
After each small adjustment the parameters in the separator must be observed over a reasonable period of time
before proceeding with further adjustments.
LiquidLevel

The importance of maintaining the correct liquid level cannot be over-emphasized. Should the level be too low,
the retention time will be insufficient. This could prevent complete break-out of gas bubbles in the liquid to
take place.
Should the level be too high, the volume of the vapour disengaging space may be reduced below that necessary
to ensure adequate settling of liquid droplets in the gas stream?
CarryOverofLiquidsintheGasStream

A separator and its internal components are designed or selected to suit the condition under which they will be
working. A significant departure from design value of any of the operating conditions is therefore likely to
reduce the effectiveness of the separation process. Excessively high inlet gas flow rates are likely to impair
separator efficiency.
For example by re-entrainment of liquid droplets in the gas, the gas flow rate should be checked. If too high
reduce to the design value.
A separator component (particularly a mist extractor) may become plugged with dirt, wax or hydrates. If
possible check the pressure drop across the component at design flow rate.
A pressure drop higher than 0.2 bar indicates plugging. The plugging may be severe enough to produce a
pressure differential across the component that it can collapse or tear it from its mountings.
In this case the component is bypassed and the pressure drop will be zero.
The temperature and pressure should also be checked to determine if hydrate formation is possible.
The space above the liquid surface should be sufficient to allow liquid droplets to settle out. If the liquid level
is too high this space is reduced. Adjustments should be made to the level control system to ensure liquid level
is operated at design parameters.

Page65

Solids

Solid particles such as sand in the well fluids can cause erosion of equipment, blockages to control valves and
damage to rotating equipment.
Gas/solid separation can be carried out in gravity settlers, cyclones and impingement devices. However when
the quantity of dust in the gas is small, filtration is the most common method.
The filter may be a woven bag, witches hat, through which the gas flows or a removable cartridge containing a
filter element. Filters should not be used where paraffin's are present.
Liquid/solid separation can be carried out using similar methods as used for gas. However, in order to deal
with a well stream containing an appreciable amount of sand a separator may be fitted with a sand cone and
water jets (e.g. Sparge pipes). The water jets wash the sand down into the cone into a drain from which it can
be removed. In cases of high sand production a vessel may be taken out of service for internal cleaning.
GAS COMPRESSION.
The Separation process is often called the heart of the process. If that is the case then Compression is the lungs
of the process.
The process equipment referred to as The Compressor is designed to increase gas pressure. The need for gas at
increased pressure is usually to fulfil one or more of the following criteria:
i)
gas export via pipeline,
ii)
Injection into the reservoir for pressure maintenance,
iii)
use in wells for artificial lift (gaslift),
iv)
liquid product recovery,
v)

Fuel gas.

In order to increase pressure of gas to the appropriate level required to carry out the above processes a number
of different methods may be utilized. However the vast majority of compressors used for production operations
in the oil industry are:
Reciprocating Type Compressors. This category of compressor operates on a positive displacement
principle using a piston within a cylinder. They operate at relatively low speeds compared to the centrifugal
type.
Centrifugal Type Compressors. This category of compressor utilises the effects of centrifugal force to
increase gas pressure and operates at high speed. It has far less moving parts than the reciprocating type of
compressor.
Other types of compressor include axial flow and positive displacement type screw, lobe vane and slide vane
units.
Gas from the separation process is used within the gas compression process for the above purposes. However
the way that that gas is used depends on a variety of variables which are:

Reservoir pressure

Ratios of oil and gas volumes produced (the field Gas Oil Ratio G.O.R).

Pressure requirements of platform gas facilities.

In order to recombine the gas from each stage for further use, the pressure of the gas leaving the 2nd stage of
separation must be increased to the pressure of the 1ststage.

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After compression from 2nd to 1st stage separator pressures, all the gas is now at a pressure of 250 psi.
However, in our example, the gas requires drying (dehydrating) and will have some of its constituents liquefied
in a gas liquids recovery plant. This requires the gas to be at an even higher pressure. A further stage of
compression is therefore required at this point. In our process plant the pressure is raised from 250 psi to 1000
psi for drying and liquids recovery.

Page67

The residual gas, after dehydration and gas liquids recovery, may be used for three things:

Gaslift
GasExport

Gas re-injection into the Reservoir

In order to export the gas from the offshore location to a terminal onshore a much higher pressure is now
required at the platform. Similarly, extra pressure is needed to inject the gas into the well for gas lift. At this
point in our example, therefore the pressure is raised to 2500 psi by further compression.

Evenatthishighpressure,wemaynotbeabletoreinjectthegasintothereservoir.Theactualpressurerequiredtodothisdependsonanumberoffactorssuchas:

Reservoir depth

Reservoir pressure

Type of reservoir rock

If more than 2500psi is required then probably another stage of compression would be required.
The above example considers the gas flow on an oil production platform. Gas, which is produced from a
reservoir, may not be associated with oil. It may be purely a gas field.
In the early days of production from a typical gas field, the pressure of the gas at the surface will be sufficient to
transport it by pipeline. As the life of the field progresses the natural pressure of the reservoir declines. A point
is reached where this pressure is no longer sufficient to transport the gas.

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When this happens, it is necessary to install gas compression plant on the platform.
The purpose of a compressor is to raise gas pressure and the process of compression causes heat
generation and hence temperature rise. It is necessary to know how to inter-relate pressure, temperature
and that other important parameter, gas volume, to be able to quantify the gas compression process.
EffectofPressureonGasVolume

Gas pressure is increased by squeezing it together to reduce its volume. A simple experiment to try to find a
relationship between gas pressure and volume will illustrate this.
Commencing with a standard cubic metre of gas defined by the conditions existing at 15C and 1.0 bar a (to
simplify matters a standard pressure of 1.0 bar a has been used), increase the pressure on it, at constant
temperature, and look at the effect. Take a cylinder of one standard cubic metre capacity and force a piston
into it noting the volume of gas at various pressures.

Note that there is a relationship between the volume (V) and the absolute pressure (P). Algebraically it can be
said:
V=

1
P

The general relationship, which expresses Boyle`s Law, is

V=

k
where k is a constant.
P

In the experiment the units of pressure and volume are such that
k = 1.
The equation can be extended to evaluate the pressure or volume under other conditions provided the pressure
and volume at the initial conditions are known.
Let V1 and P1 denote the volume and pressure at atmospheric conditions. V2 and P2 denote any other
conditions.

Rearranging the equation:

Page69

V1 =

k
P1

P1V1 = k
And
P2V2 = k
Therefore
P1V1 = P2V2
And
V2 =

P1V1
P2

Apply the formula to the following example:

What will be the volume of gas in the cylinder if the pressure is raised to 15 bar g?
Use the formula
V2 =

P1V1
P2

Where
P1 = 1 bar a
V1 = 1 m3
P2 = 16 bar a(15 bar g + 1)
Therefore
V2 =

1x1
= 0.062 5m3
16

Conversely if there is a measured volume in the cylinder the pressure can be determined.
It has been assumed so far that the temperature remained constant when conditions of pressure and volume
changed. A change in volume or pressure also causes the temperature to vary. To conduct the previous
experiment it would have been necessary to allow the temperature to stabilise each time the volume was
changed before reading the pressure.
EffectofTemperatureonPressure

The effect of increasing the gas temperature is to increase the pressure. In this experiment there is an enclosed
constant volume and the pressure in the system, as measured by the gauge, varies as heat is applied. The
temperature rise can be monitored by the installed thermometer.

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Proceeding further with the experiment would verify the pattern that is beginning to form in the above table i.e.
absolute pressure doubles when absolute temperature doubles.
In this case taking k' as a constant, and observing that the experiment was conducted with the volume
remaining constant, the relationship can be written
P = k' T where T is the absolute temperature
Or

k' =

P
T

Proceeding in a similar manner to that of the pressure - volume analysis, it is found that
P1 P2

T1 T2

Effect Of Temperature On Volume

The effect of increasing the gas temperature is to increase the volume. If by experiment the enclosure is
maintained at a constant pressure and the volume varies as heat is applied.

Temperature
Abs. Temp
Volume
0
217 C
500K
1 m3
7170C
1000K
2 m3
17170C
2000k
4 m3
The relationship can be written as an equation for calculation purposes:
V1 = V2
T1 T2
This relationship is known as Charles' Law.
Ideal Gas Law
Combining the equations derived above the following equation appears

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P1V1 P2 V2

T1
T2

Which is the Ideal Gas Law?

In practice a compressibility factor has to be incorporated in the ideal gas equation to correct for non-ideal
behaviour; this factor is a function of pressure and temperature as well as being dependent on the type of gas
under consideration. Accurate calculations, therefore, can only be performed if this information is known.
Pressure,VolumeandTemperature

It is now clear that a pressure increment is accompanied by an increase in temperature; hence the discharge
temperature of gas from a compressor is greater than the suction temperature.
Adiabatic, Isothermal and Polytrophic Compression Curves
An Adiabatic compression involves no heat flow to or from the compression chamber and the final temperature
will be greater than the initial temperature.
An Isothermal compression means that heat must be transferred from the compression chamber as the gas is
compressed so that the temperature remains constant. Such a process would require:
i)
The compression to be achieved very slowly, and
ii) Low thermal resistance in the chamber wall to allow heat flow into an efficient cooling medium.
The normal operating speed and cooling facilities of compressors are such that the compression
cannot be isothermal; in practice, the compression is closer to adiabatic than to isothermal. Such a
process, being neither isothermal nor adiabatic, is called Polytrophic, and the expression describing it is
PVn = constant
where 'n' is termed the 'polytrophic exponent'.
The figure below shows compression curves for different values of n, as determined when the process is
isothermal, adiabatic, or polytrophic.

For the isothermal process, n = 1 and the expression is simply the Boyles law relationship PV = constant.
When the process is adiabatic
n=
Where
=

Cp
Cv

Page72

Cp and Cv being the specific heat capacity of the gas at constant pressure and the specific heat capacity at
constant volume respectively. The value of depends on the type of gas under consideration, typical values
being 1.4 for air and 1.3 for natural gas depending on its composition.
A compression process, for an ideal gas, will be such that 1 < n < since, as previously stated, it will not be
isothermal but the value of n will be less than that of by an amount determined by the efficiency of the
compressor cooling system. Most calculations however are based on the adiabatic case with reasonably
accurate results.
There is another factor which supports use of the adiabatic exponent. The discussion so far is based on the
ideal gas where is constant. For many real gases varies with the pressure, the tendency being for to
increase as the pressure increases. It is easy to see that such a variation in, and hence n, will cause the
compression curve to be steeper than if n is constant, and has the effect of cancelling the reduction in n due to
cooling. In fact, was Cp to increase significantly relative to Cv as the pressure increases, then it would be
possible for n to be greater than the initial value of.
All compressors fall into one of two main groups:

Positive displacement/intermittent flow compressors (these are commonly known as positive

displacement compressors).

Continuous Flow Compressors

General
A positive displacement compressor works on the principle of pushing a gas from a vessel by partially, or
completely displacing its internal volume. This is usually achieved by mechanical means.
Because the vessel is alternately emptied and refilled the flow is intermittent. The intermittent flow into and
out of the compressor causes the pressure to pulsate on both the inlet (suction) and outlet (discharge) sides.
Positive displacement compressors will develop sufficient pressure to overcome any resistance to flow and the
operational limits are essentially determined by the driver power and the strength of the compressor parts.
Positive displacement compressors fall into two types. They are:

Reciprocating Compressors
Rotary Compressors
ReciprocatingCompressors

Reciprocating compressors play a very important role in the oil and gas industry. They fall into two types:
PistonType
DiaphragmType

The action of the fluid-transferring parts is the same in each. A piston or diaphragm is made to pass, or flex,
back and forth in a chamber. In the more complex types of compressor, the chamber is equipped with valves on
the inlet and outlet to control the flow of the gas being compressed.
The operation of these valves is linked to:

The motion of the piston or diaphragm

The rise and fall of the pressure in the chamber

Rotary compressors have a variety of uses in the oil and gas industry.
In this type, the displacement of the fluid is produced by the rotation of one or more elements within a
stationary housing. The most common types of rotary compressor found in the oil and gas industry are the:

Screw compressor

Lobe compressor

Page73

Sliding vane compressor

Liquid ring compressor

ContinuousFlowCompressors

The second group of compressors is the Continuous Flow Compressors. In these compressors the
movement imparted to the gas is continuous and constant. Continuous flow compressors fall into two
types:

Dynamic Compressors

Fluidic Compressors
DynamicCompressors

Dynamic compressors have a system of elements (called impellers) that are arranged on a shaft. The impellers
rotate with the shaft and impart energy of the gas by increasing its velocity. The amount of energy, which is
imparted to the gas by a dynamic compressor, is mainly determined by:

The design of the impellers

The number of impellers used

The speed at which the impellers rotate

The density of the gas which is being compressed.

There may be as few as one impeller, or as many as twenty or more impellers, on a shaft. The shaft may be
rotated at speeds which exceed 30,000 rpm. When the gas leaves each impeller it is allowed to slow down. As
this happens, kinetic energy is replaced by pressure energy
Dynamic compressors are classified according to the manner in which the gas flows through the compressor.
Within this category are:

Centrifugal Compressors where, in each stage, the gas flows radially outwards.

Axial Flow Compressors here, the gas flows along the line of the shaft.

MixedFlowCompressorsacombinationofcentrifugalandaxialtypes.

FluidicCompressors

A variety of compressors are available to perform the task of raising the pressure of a gas. The choice of
compressor for a particular application will often be based on two factors:
Compression ratio
Capacity
However, many other factors may influence this choice. Some of these are listed below:
Nature of gas hot or corrosive gases may restrict the choice because of the requirement for special
sealing or lubricating systems, or special materials used in construction.
Reliability for continuous running applications
Costs not only the initial capital costs, but service and maintenance costs may have to be
considered
Power availability the power available to drive the compressor could influence the choice of machine.

Of course, compression ratio and capacity are of critical importance when choosing a machine. The following
Figure shows typical pressure and capacity ranges over which various types of compressor usually operate.
You should note that the Figure shows very approximate range and some compressors may be capable of
operating outside the ranges indicated.

Page74

As previously stated separation could be considered the heart of the production process and compression
by the same analogy, the lungs of the process. I would now like to ignore the personification and consider
the Drilling aspect. I am aware that drilling is considered an aspect in itself. However, it has long been
the case that drilling is very unlikely to be carried out without the intention of production being carried
out thereafter.
I would now like to consider aspects of drilling as being carried out on a production facility. For this
consideration the OIM must take command of all activities on board. What does the OIM need to know
about Drilling? As usual everything. The Drilling facility for this example is part of the Operating
Platform. It is not an adjunct, subsea completion, NUI or wellhead platform, it is integral to the facility.
At some point in time a production facility which has wellheads attached to the production facility will
require the attention of a drilling rig. The OIM will find that his area of responsibility is vastly increased
and that drilling is not carried out in anything like the same fashion as normal production. For instance,
normal drilling practice is to work with an open hole, something that would suggest loss of
containment to an Operations person.
Let us not get too close to these technicalities straight away, let us have a look at the equipment that goes
to make up a drilling facility.

Page75

The above facility is a first generation integrated oil production and drilling platform.
This platform would have a permanent staff of production and maintenance personnel and a contract crew of
drilling personnel. Historically all the drilling crew work for a dedicated drilling contractor, Bawden, Noble,
KCA Deutag, Global Santa Fe or Transocean. The Operations staff, including the OIM, tends to be employed
by the field owner, Shell, BP. Exxon Mobil, Talisman or Petronas.
Drilling crew will be assembled from a team that have worked together successfully in the past. Drilling
operations tend to encourage certain working constraints that do not always seem appropriate to Operations
personnel. Drilling logos such as Get on bottom early, This trip faster than last, Bottoms Up Full tanks.
These all suggest speed and money driven targets that do not correlate with Maximizing hydrocarbon
recovery safely which has been a Production logo for many years. Indeed the time is money attitude of
many drilling concerns is such that it is often through good luck more than good judgment that accidents are
avoided. Yes, I was a production hand and I still find drilling a slightly scary business.
I have attached a diagram of the pieces that make up a drilling facility. There are some bits that I have not
included, such as, a hydraulic package, water treatment plant, but these could just as easily be part of the
production platform. The individual pieces are just part of the drilling story. Drilling is entirely about
completing a well. What makes up a well? Without going into geology, drilling a well involves getting a
production tube into the reservoir and supporting the tube to the surface where it is attached to a X-mas tree of
valves which provide the secure shut off, control and direct the oil to the production facility.

Page76

1. Mud tank Where the mixture of fluids and chemicals is mixed together to form the mud that will cool
and lubricate the drill bit when drilling through rock formations.
2. Shale shakers The screens and vibrating conveyer belt that separates out the returning formation rock
from the mud returns.
3. Suction line (mud pump)
4. Mud pump Pumps mud down into the well bore to provide weight in the tubing to prevent
hydrocarbons breaking out, and to cool and lubricate the drill bit.
5. Motor or power source Electrical power from marinised diesel motors.
6. Vibrating hose
7. Draw-works Winch that is attached to the travelling block for raising or lowering the casing string.
8. Standpipe The mud delivery hose attached to the drill rig structure.
9. Kelly hose Flexible hose connected to the casing.
10. Goose-neck Casing attachment for the Kelly hose.
11. Travelling block Lifting block for running in or pulling out casing.

Page77

12. Drill line Winch wire running from the Draw works.
13. Crown block Stationary block at top of drilling derrick.
14. Derrick The structure housing the drilling material.
15. Monkey board Position from which the derrick man manipulates the top of lengths of drilling pipe.
16. Stand (of drill pipe) three lengths of drill pipe together make a stand of 90 feet.
17. Pipe rack (floor) Storage space on drill floor for ready use drill pipe.
18. Swivel (On newer rigs this may be replaced by a top drive) Where the non rotating equipment meets the
rotating equipment.
19. Kelly drive Profiled pipe for attaching tubing.
20. Rotary table Engine driven chuck for the drill pipe.
21. Drill floor Base plate for the rig, all depths measured from here.
22. Bell nipple
23. Blow-out preventer (BOP) Annular type hydraulically activated ram for protection from annular
leakage.
24. Blow-out preventer (BOP) Pipe ram & blind ram hydraulically activated ram for shutting off tubing
leakage.
25. Drill string The pipe work that is being lowered or retrieved from the well.
26. Drill bit Diamond tipped or tungsten carbide tipped trepanning machine.
27. Casing head or Wellhead Christmas tree connections for production tubing tie ins.
28. Flow line Return line from the formation to the Shale shaker and mud tanks.
How is the hole drilled?
Firstly a large drill bit is used to drill a short interval of hole. This diameter is usually 20 or larger and is
known as conductor pipe. It will be drilled down to about 200 below the mud level. This is then cased and
cemented on the outside to keep the hole from collapsing. This is very much a supporting casing.
Next a smaller bit is run inside the first casing. This bit drills out the bottom of the casing and drills a new hole.
This hole may be drilled to about 500. This new hole is also cased off with 13 casing and cemented in.
Again a smaller hole is drilled out and a smaller casing is run to keep the hole from falling in. This casing is 9
casing and may extend to 1000s of feet. In this way the hole is drilled in stages until the target reservoir rock is
penetrated. At this point the geologists must figure out if there is oil or gas in it. They do this by running logs
across the zone. Logs are run on electric cable, (wire line) which records the physical properties in the rock
such as, resistively, porosity, density, radioactivity and pore pressure. If the well looks good a final string of 7
casing is run into the production zone and cemented in place. The cement provides a barrier from the formation
and the production string.
Perforating guns are now run into the hole and perforate the casing across the production zone. This essentially
allows reservoir fluid to migrate into the well bore and the completion is subject to reservoir pressures and
temperatures unless controlled by mud weight.
Production tubing is now run into the hole with a packer to isolate the producing zone from the casing above.
Finally the well is produced into a pipeline through the X-mas tree on top of the production tubing and into the
production facility on surface.
OIM

Page78

He has the overall responsibility for the safety of the installation and personnel onboard. He will be in
communication at all times with the Senior Supervisors within both the Operations and the Drilling
departments. All planned Permits to Work will be discussed at meetings where a full complement of
Platform Senior Supervision is present. The OIM shall actively participate in the planning of all
operations or delegate overall responsibility for the Well Control operations to the Assistant Rig
Manager if required. He shall however ensure a log of events and WC operations is maintained. The
OIM shall communicate the well control plan forward to the vessel captain, barge engineer, motor man,
and electrician so that they can maintain the rig in proper order while well control operations are ongoing.
TOOLPUSHER
He verifies proper on / off tour crew deployment. He shall communicate the status of operations to the
Rig Manager on a continuous basis. He shall be present on rig floor during the start of well control
operations. Ensure that all equipment is working properly.
DRILLER
This guy has ultimate responsibility for kick detection and well shut-in. He will initiate a Kick Log and
continue logging important well control information and actions taken throughout the well control
operation. He notifies the Assistant Rig Manager that the well is shut-in and assists the OIM /
TOOLPUSHER as directed. Ensures that the space out is correct. He shall supervise the drill crew
while monitoring the shut-in well. He shall man and operate the pump controls during circulation and
well killing. When circulating out a gas kick, the driller or his designate will monitor the conditions of
the mud gas separator (MGS) and adjust circulating rates as warranted.
AD / DERRICKMAN
He lines up the mud gas separator, mixing pumps, and degasser as instructed by OIM, TOOLPUSHER,
or Driller. He works with the Mud Engineer and ensures proper mud mixing. He checks the Mud Gas
Separator for proper alignment and ensures that the rig pumps are operating properly. He shall be in
constant communication with the driller as to volumes, leaks, or any unusual conditions.
FLOORMEN
They assist the Driller in shutting in the well and report to their assigned well control station. When
needed, they are responsible for stabbing the safety valve and closing under direction of the Driller.
They also monitor the BOP stack; choke manifold and valves for any leaks.

Page79

OIL SPILL RESPONSE PLANS.

An oil spill response is now a particularly necessary feature of the OIMs duties. I have sourced a good
example from the UKCS. This belongs to Talisman and is dedicated to the Piper and Tweedsmuir fields in the
Central North Sea.
This document has been prepared for the Talisman Energy operated Piper, Chanter and Tweedsmuir Field
Systems and sets out the actions that might be taken by personnel working offshore on the Piper platform in the
event of an oil spill to the sea from infield facilities. These procedures are also applicable to personnel onboard
drilling units and vessels engaged in development drilling and well intervention activities within the Piper,
Chanter and Tweedsmuir Fields. In the event that onshore support is required to respond to an oil spill, then
Talismans Onshore Procedures for Oil Spill Response, which details the roles and responsibilities of
Talismans Emergency Response Team onshore, would be implemented.
These documents have been prepared in accordance with the requirements of the Merchant Shipping (Oil
Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation Convention) Regulations 1998. In addition, the onshore
procedures meet the requirements of the Offshore Installations (Emergency Pollution Control) Regulations
2002. Recommended use of this plan is as follows:

It is stressed that despite the guidance given in this manual, it is the OIMs priority in the event of a spill to
take measures to ensure the safety of personnel and the installation, and to prevent escalation of the incident.
Piper and Chanter Fields

Page80

Operator

Talisman Energy (UK) Limited

North Sea Sector

Central North Sea

UKCS Block(s)

UKCS Block 15/17a (Piper and Chanter)

UKCS Block 21/1 (Tweedsmuir)
58 28 N, 0 22 E
57 59 N, 011 E (Tweedsmuir North
Producer)
57 57 N, 0 11 E (Tweedsmuir South
Producer)
Fixed production platform with a subsea
satellites Chanter and Tweedsmuir.

Location

Field Facilities
Approx. Distance to UK coast

Approx. Distance to Median line

Water depth
Function

Approximately 160km from Wick (Piper &

Chanter)
Approximately 125km from Scottish coast
(Tweedsmuir)
75km to UK / Norwegian Median Line (Piper &
Chanter)
92km to UK / Norway Median Line
(Tweedsmuir)
145m (Piper & Chanter)
130m (Tweedsmuir)
Processes well fluids from Piper, Chanter and
Tweedsmuir Fields. In addition it receives oil from
Saltire and also from third parties (ConocoPhillips
MacCulloch Field)

Hydrocarbons produced

Crude Oil and NGLs

Export method

30 Main Oil Line to Flotta Terminal, Orkney

Hydrocarbon inventories

Infield Oil Spill Response

Facilities

Crude Oil (Topsides)

366m3
Largest crude oil vessel
110m3
Diesel tanks
430m3
Largest diesel vessel
195m3
Flow lines
570m3
Tweedsmuir to Piper 12 flow line
3,460m3
Tweedsmuir South to North 8 flow line 130m3
Equipped for Infield Tier 1 Dispersant Spraying
Capability Held on SBV

Supply Base

Peterhead

Operations Base

Aberdeen

Page81

Action

Responsible Position

Procedures

Platform / Drilling Rig

Alert / Notify

Report spill to Main Control Room immediately. Provide

Location of spill (if known);
Estimate size of spill;
If ongoing;
Type of oil spill e.g. crude oil, diesel;
Notify OIM.
If spill noticed by third party e.g. surveillance aircraft, assume
that spill has occurred from installation until disproved.

Person observing spill

/Person observing spill

Determine source of spill. If leak location cannot be readily

identified, follow through appropriate Oil Spill Checklist
provided in Supporting Information to assist in check.
Take appropriate remedial action to stop or control spill.

As required / As
required

Identify Source
of Spill

CR Operator (on duty)

/CR Operator (on duty)

Confirm spill
size
&
allocate spill
category

Confirm spill size. If necessary a visual estimate may be made

using the information from the table given in Sec. 4.

Estimate direction of movement of spill using wind direction and

tidal data;

Allocate spill into appropriate Tier (refer Spill Size Estimation

and Tier Classification in Section 4)
For environmental sensitivity information refers to Sec. 9. For slick
movement data refer to Supporting Information, Section 10.7

As required / OIM /
Offshore Rep

Report Spill

Report spill; do not delay reporting if you do not have complete

information. This can be sent with a follow-up report. However,
report as accurately as you can. Use PON1 Proforma
Follow through spill reporting requirements in Section 5.

OIM / OIM / Offshore

Rep

Obtain Sample
& Photographs

A sample of the spilt oil should be taken prior to any dispersant

spraying response. In addition photographs of the incident should
be obtained. This may be important for post-incident inquiries.
Procedures for sampling are provided in the Supporting
Information, Section 10.4

OIM / OIM

Spill Response

For Tier 1 spills initiate monitoring or chemical dispersion

response as necessary, request presence of SBV

For Tier 2/ 3 contact Duty Emergency Co-ordinator without

delay
Follow through Decision Guide in 7 & Response Options in 8.

OIM / OIM

Incident Log

Open & maintain incident log, which should include:

Accurate timing of events;
Reports made and times when reporting has
taken place;

Actions taken;

Contacts made / received.

As directed by OIM /
OIM / Offshore Rep

On closure of incident ensure incident log is collated and sent to

Duty Environment Contact, Talisman House.
Carry out incident investigation and report using usual
channels.

OIM / OIM / Offshore

Rep

Incident Standdown

OIM / OIM / Offshore

Rep

SPILL SIZE ESTIMATION AND SPILL TIER CLASSIFICATION

It is important to determine the size of the spill and to classify it. The best estimate of spill size will come from
plant information, for example, the volume of oil in pipe work, vessels, pumping rate and duration, diesel in
transfer hose etc. If the spill size cannot be determined from plant information, an estimate of spill size can be
made by observing the size and colour of the slick on the sea surface (see the tables below). Visual inspection
can be carried out from the installation or standby vessel, but best estimates are made during aerial surveillance

Page82

flights. When using the colour method to estimate spill size, bear in mind that the slick is likely to be patchy
and that the entire area of the slick may not be visible (see below for oil coverage estimation chart).
Using Oil Colour to Calculate Oil Quantity
Estimate total size of the area as a square or rectangle (in km) i.e. maximum
1.
extremities of the slick (if area estimated in nautical miles, conversion is one
nautical mile = 1.85km).
Assess the area affected by the slick in km2 calculated as a % of the total area in
2.
(1). See oil coverage estimation chart below.
Estimate the area covered by each colour of oil listed in the table below, calculated
3.
as a % of the total area affected. See appendix 10.8 for detailed description of
appearance.
Multiply the area covered by each colour by the appropriate figure in the oil
4.
quantity table below.
Adding all of the colour figures will give the total quantity of oil in m3 within the
5.
slick. Using the quantity range for each colour, observers should calculate the
maximum and minimum volume.
e.g.: If the total area of a rectangle is 12km2 and the area within that covered by oil is
estimated to be about 90%, then total area affected is 10.8km2. If the proportion of the oil
slick covered by sheen is 50%, then that will equal 0.2 to1.6m3 (i.e. 10.8 x 50% x 40 to 300
litres); area covered by rainbow oil is 30%, then that will be 0.97 to 2.7m3; area covered by
Metallic oil is 15%, then that will be 8.10 to 81.0m3; area covered by True oil colour is 5%,
then that will be 108.0 to >108.0m3. Therefore the total amount of oil spilt will then be
about a minimum of 117m3 and a maximum of >193m3.
BONN Agreement Oil Appearance Codes
Code
Description Appearance
Layer Thickness
Litres per km2
Interval (um)
1
Sheen (silvery/grey)
0.04 to 0.30
40 - 300
2
Rainbow
0.30 to 5.0
300 5,000
3
Metallic
5.0 to 50
5,000 50,000
4
Discontinuous true oil colour 50 to 200
50,000 200,000
5
Continuous true oil colour
> 200
>200,000

Spills are classified as follows:

Tier 1 small spill where events are largely controlled by on-site resources.
Tier 2 A larger infield spills that will require assistance from onshore and may require mobilisation of
additional resources.

Page83

Tier 3 A major loss of containment that will require full mobilization of Talisman Energy resources and may
require access to national resources.
The infield response capability is 5 tonnes of dispersant and dispersant spraying equipment on the SBV. This
is sufficient to treat about 100 tonnes of amenable crude oil under ideal conditions. However, for spills that
does not involve a major loss of containment; use the following guide to determine where a Tier 1 could be
escalated to a Tier 2. If any of the following apply, classify the spill as Tier 2:
Spills that require aerial surveillance
Spills of crude oil that are persisting and moving towards rafts of seabirds
Spills of crude oil that are persisting and cannot be treated by infield dispersant spraying capability
Spills that are persisting and the prevailing wind is onshore
What to Report:
The following must be reported as per the Petroleum Operations Notice No. 1 (PON1)
Oil Spills
Any spillage of hydrocarbons into the sea, including spills of diesel, lubricating oil and hydraulic oils.
Any oil spotted in the vicinity of the installation, whether it is believed to be associated with the installations
operations or not.
Chemical Spills
Any spillage of chemicals (including oil based muds) to the sea either from topside or subsea leaks.
Permitted Discharge Spills
Either from produced water or drainage systems where:
There is more than 1 tonne of oil discharged to sea in any 12 hour period, or,
The discharge causes a sheen which appears more significant when compared with a sheen observed during
normal operations and weather conditions and extends out with the installations 500 metre zone.
Please note, for Produced Water Discharge, if the oil in water concentration exceeds 100mg/l, an OPPC non
compliance notification must also be submitted. (See HSE-PRO-TLM-070)
How to Report:
For reporting follow communications plan below and contact details overleaf.

Page84

OFFSHORE

Standby
Vessel

Talisman Facility
Spill / Third Party
Tieback Spill

Mobile Drilling
Unit Spill

OIM of
Talisman
Installation

OIM of Drilling
Rig

Standby
Vessel

Talisman Offshore
Drilling Supervisor

Drilling
Contractor
Onshore

Talisman House
Switchboard /
Security

ONSHORE

Duty
Emergency Coordinator

TalismanDuty
Duty
Talisman
EnvironmentContact
Contact
Environment

KEY

SEERAD
SEERAD

DTI
DTI

Internal Immediate
Notification for all
spills to sea

Telephone
Immediately 24 hours
for spills > 1 tonne

Initial Statutory
Reporting Route as
per PON1

Follow-up and liaison

route

JNCC
JNCC

HM
HMCoastguard
Coastguard
MRCC
MRCCAberdeen
Aberdeen

Telephone during
office hours for spills
< 1 tonne

Statutory
Reportees

It is the responsibility of the offshore installation to report all spills IMMEDIATELY. Spills should be
reported to all organisations below. All reporting is to be undertaken using the PON1 Oil Spill Report form
provided in the Supporting Information. The platform / rig have been provided with an electronic copy of the
PON1 proforma to facilitate completion and submission internally by e-mail.
There would be inserted in this position the telephone numbers of various agencies mentioned in the figure
above.

The tables below give the likely fate and behaviour of the Piper and Chanter field system crude oil and diesel
and potential response options.

Page85

PIPER FIELD SYSTEM CRUDE OIL PROPERTIES & BEHAVIOUR WHEN SPILT
Physical Properties

Chemical Properties

Relatively high evaporative losses; ca. 27-30% by volume

from the sea surface in the first few hours following spill.
After 1-2 days ca 40% will be lost.
Moderate density oil classified as Group III which is a
medium weight, medium volatility crude oil (Chanter and
Piper specific gravity 0.84, Tweedsmuir 0.83;)

Moderate asphaltene content; Piper 0.6%; Chanter 1.1%,

Tweedsmuir 0.22%; these quantities will result in the
formation of stable emulsions that can persist untreated for
several days or longer
Moderate wax content; will contribute to persistence of oil
on the sea surface (Tweedsmuir 7.7%)

Water in Oil Emulsion Properties

Natural Dispersion

Very rapid water uptake esp. with higher wind speeds;

maximum water content ca 80%. This will significantly
increase the volume of spilt oil (refer Supporting
Information Risk Assessment for detail).

Natural dispersion into water column will occur, but will

be controlled by wind and sea state; increasing natural
dispersion will occur with increasing wind speed. At wind
speeds of 5m/s more than 50% of the oil can be expected
to remain after 12 days; in wind conditions of up to 1020m/s it may persist for up to 6-12 days

Chemical Dispersants

Mechanical Recovery

Dispensability testing indicates that Piper and Chanter oil

is dispersible in winter and summer when freshly spilt, or
within the first few hours of the spill. The most effective
dispersant is Dasic Slickgone LTSW which is held on the
SBV. The window of opportunity for dispersant use for
winter and summer at low wind speeds (2-5m/sec) is
several days; at wind speeds of 10-20m/s, it is <1 day.

At sea containment and recovery will require specialist

offshore equipment and substantial logistical support
Will be limited by sea state conditions

DIESEL OIL PROPERTIES & BEHAVIOUR WHEN SPILT

Physical Properties

Chemical Properties

Moderate evaporative loss, may be ca. 15-20% or more

within first hour of spill. Spills unlikely to persist

no asphaltenes
negligible wax content

Water in Oil Emulsion Properties

Natural Dispersion

Unlikely to form emulsions.

Very rapid natural dispersion into water column; 50% or

more within first few hours of spill especially with higher
wind speeds. Spills likely to drift ca. 3-4kms from spill
location and disperse within ca. several hours of spill

Chemical Dispersants

Mechanical Recovery

Diesel spills should not be treated with dispersants

Generally unlikely to be necessary or feasible for diesel

which usually spreads to form sheens.

Page86

TIERED OIL SPILL RESPONSE GUIDE

Hydrocarbon
Spill

YES

NO

Is Spill Tier 1?

OIM to manage
response

Is Spill
dispersing
naturally?

NO
OIM to inform Duty
Emergency Co-ordinator

YES
Undertake a natural
dispersion and
monitoring response

For diesel spills request SBV

to move through slick if safe
to do so and break up using
propellers

Onshore consult with OIM,

OIM authorise spraying from
SBV if required

NO
Is Spill still
dispersing?
Onshore to mobilise back-up
Tier 2 and/or 3 response as
required

YES

Continue response until

slick removed from sea
surface

End Response

Page87

RESPONSE OPTIONS
Natural Dispersion and Monitoring Guidelines
Available Equipment: Standby Vessel / Surveillance Aircraft
-
Monitoring of large spills should always be carried out using surveillance aircraft. Contact Duty
Emergency Co-ordinator and request assistance.
-
For smaller spills, and if its safe for
the standby vessel to move away from the
installation, attempt to identify perimeter of
spill and identify heaviest concentrations of
oil using the colour guide table in Section
4. The figure opposite shows rainbow
sheen of crude oil arranged in windrows.
Use oil colour and percentage
-
coverage guide in Section 4 to estimate
quantity of spill if this is not known.
Follow patches of heaviest oil
-
concentration, watch and report on break
up of slick.
-
The slick will spread mainly in the
downwind direction, with large variation in
film thickness and may break up into windrows or patches (see photograph above)
-
Determine and report direction of movement of other oil patches; report to Duty Emergency Coordinator / Duty Environment Contact. If necessary carry out manual method of slick movement (see
Supporting Information Section 10.7 for detail).
-
Watch for and report any large flocks of birds on the sea surface.
Determine progress of natural dispersion or emulsion formation.
-
-
Report on effectiveness of response. Note that crude oil spilled at sea will undergo changes in
appearance due to weathering. Thicker patches of crude oil will usually appear as dense black areas, but as
emulsification occurs the colour will change to brown or orangey-brown
Estimation of Slick Movement
Computer prediction of oil slick movement will be undertaken by onshore personnel utilising the data from the
PON 1 oil spill report form. Offshore personnel can also make predictions of oil slick movement using the
slick trajectory vector method with the two rules of thumb that the oil slick will move at approximately 100%
of the current speed and 3% of the wind speed. A full description of the methodology is contained in Section
10.7 of the Supporting Information.
Pollution movement should, whenever possible, be verified by aerial or vessel surveillance
Vessel Mounted Chemical Dispersant Response
Available Equipment: Standby Vessel fitted with spraying equipment and 5 tonnes of dispersant located in
field. This quantity of dispersant should treat about 100 tonnes of amenable crude oil. The normal standby
vessel on the Piper Field is the Normand Skipper which has a dispersant stock of Dasic Slickgone LTSW. The
nominated relief vessel for the Piper Field is the Dea Mariner which carries a stock of 3 tonnes of Agma OSD

569.

Page88

Unless personnel or the facility are at immediate risk, only apply dispersants after consultation with Duty
Emergency Co-ordinator and approval has been given by the licensing authority (SEERD FRS-ML). The
application rate will depend on the circumstances of the spill, in particular the properties of the oil that has
been spilt and the thickness.
Application Guidelines to Follow After Start Up

Dispersant Application Rates

Once the go-ahead has been given for spraying,

carry out a test spray. See Section 10.5 for methods.
If at all possible use a spotter plane to control larger
spraying operations, or ones where the slick has
become fragmented

The application rate will depend on

the circumstances of the spill; in
particular the type of oil, the amount
of evaporation that has taken place
and the thickness of the oil.
Control of the application rate may be
achieved by either varying the pump
discharge rate or by varying the vessel
speed; standby vessel should refer to the
dispersant spraying operations manual.
The general relationship between the
variables required for calculating
dispersant application rate is as follows:
discharge rate = 0.003 x application rate
x speed x effective swath

Begin at the edge posing the greatest threat, for

example at the edge most likely to impact the
coastline or rafts of seabirds first.
Spray thicker patches of oil rather than thin films or
sheens, which will more easily disperse through
natural processes.
Try and avoid cutting across the slick

There are two ways of spraying see diagrams

below, but if possible treat slick with parallel and
continuous runs to cover the whole area; treat slick
into the wind
If dispersion is taking place there may be a smoke
plume (light brown or creamy cloud) evident in upper
water layers
DO NOT spray sheens. These will rapidly disperse
naturally. Do not attempt to spray very viscous or
semi-solid oils.
If in doubt about dispersants working, test
amenability using test given in Supporting
Information Section 10.5. Note that once
dispersant has been applied you may observe
colour changes in emulsions as the
demulsifying action of the dispersant reduces
the water content and viscosity of the emulsion

Droplet size should be about that of an average

rain drop. Too fine a spray will be ineffective and
may blow off target. Too large a drop will
penetrate the oil and become quickly diluted.
Note that the limit for dispersant spraying is
about 25-30 knots wind speed

(Dispersant deployment drills are

carried out on a monthly basis and
dispersant stocks are periodically
tested for efficacy in line with
DEFRA guidelines).

There are two ways of spraying a spill; spraying around the edges of the spill in an inward spiral (left) or spray
long parallel runs from one end to the other (right).

Page89

ENVIRONMENTAL SENSATIVITIES
The table below provides a summary of the environmental sensitivities in the defined region around the Piper
and Chanter Field System facilities that may be affected by a spill.
Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Jul

Aug

Sep

Oct

Nov

Dec

Biological Features
Benthic Fauna
Fauna typical of the offshore central North Sea. Characteristic species include the molluscs Mysella didentata and
Chaetoderma nitidulum and the polychaete Scolopos armiger.
Plankton
The area may be an important area for the copepod Calanus finmarchicus, an important food source for juvenile fish. The
copepod Metridia lucens and the pteropod Spiratella retroversa are also important species in the area.
Seabird Vulnerability in the Vicinity of Piper and Chanter
Species commonly found around the Piper site include guillemot, fulmar, kittiwake, gannet, razorbill, and puffin.
Seabirds in the Piper area are most vulnerable to surface oil pollution between July and November when large numbers of
moulting auks become flightless and spend a large amount of time on the water surface.
Piper and Chanter
3

Tweedsmuir
3
3

Fish Spawning & Nursery Grounds

Piper Field lies within an area of the central North Sea where spawning is of regionally low-moderate significance. Norway
Pout spawning occurs in the area (peak spawning Feb-March); Nephrops spawn all year but with peak spawning in MarchMay and lemon sole spawn April-September. The field lies in an ICES rectangle that acts as a nursery ground for Norway
Pout, Blue Whiting, and Nephrops
Piper and Chanter UKCS 15/17

Tweedsmuir UKCS 21/1

Cetaceans
White-sided dolphins, minke whale and harbour porpoise are the most commonly
sighted cetaceans in the Piper and Chanter area, with low densities of the species
recorded in May and August.
Socio-Economic Features
Commercial Shipping
The Piper Field lies in an area of relatively low shipping activity. Traffic likely to
include merchant vessel and oilfield traffic.
Commercial Fisheries
The sea area in the vicinity of the Piper Field lies in ICES rectangle 45FO. The fishery
comprises Nephrops shellfishery, and a significant trawl effort for demersal (bottom
dwelling). There is little pelagic fishing effort (mid water column species). Fishing activity
occurs all year round, but with higher catches in the first half of the year and again in SeptOct. Relative overall value of the fishery is high due to Nephrops catches.

Key:

Sensitivity to surface oil spills

1
Very High Vulnerability
2
High Vulnerability
3
Moderate Vulnerability

Low Vulnerability

Unsurveyed

Use the checklist below to help identify the spill source if unknown.

Page90

AREA
1

PRODUCED WATER SYSTEM

SUPPLY BOAT OPERATIONS

Hose transfer operations: coupling leakage; hose rupture

Diesel storage tank vents; overfilling & overflow

WELLHEADS
Check for signs of leaking from wellheads, signs of oil
running down well caissons/risers.

SATELLITE

Control panels subsea wells and manifolds status

Pipeline/flowline integrity status

CLEANING

Check oil removal system is operational within oily water

caisson or sump pile.

Check all modules for signs of oil spillage into the open
drainage system.

OILY WATER DRAINAGE SYSTEM

Check all liquid process lines and flexible risers for

leakage

OPEN DRAINS

Check interface levels on separators.

MAIN DECK AREA

Take sample of produced water and analyse for oil-inwater. If high, check separators.

SEPARATORS

CHECKED

Check if any wash down or degreasing operations in

progress

INFORM:

Field vessel & request they check integrity of systems;

possible pipeline leaks

Instruct Field vessel to investigate area between drill

centre and satellite for possible infield line leaks.

10 HOT OIL SYSTEM

Check hot oil system heat exchanger for signs of leakage.

11 PIGGING

Check if there has been recent launching / retrieving of

pigs. If so check containment.

12 RISERS

Check for changes in export pipeline pressure; check for

surfacing of oil around risers.

TIME SPILL/SLICK REPORTED:

TIME CHECK COMPLETED:
CHECK CARRIED OUT BY:

Page91

REMARKS

Mobile Drilling Unit Oil Spill Checklist

AREA
1

DRILLING OPERATIONS

Check with deck crew to determine if any heavily

oiled areas have recently been washed down and
degreased

VESSEL ALONGSIDE

Deck crew to check diesel storage day tanks for

signs of overflow; check for leaking/punctured drums

CLEANING

Request personnel to check for signs of oil spillage

into the open drains system

DIESEL STORAGE & SUPPLY

Check overflow

OPEN DRAINS

Check correct operation of system

OILY WATER DRAIN TANK OVERFLOW

Check any operations being carried out that could

cause spillage

MACHINERY AREA OILY WATER DRAINAGE

SYSTEM

CHECKED

Discharges during diesel transfer

Bilges discharges

THIRD PARTY SLICK

Request SBV to check oil is not coming from third

party

TIME SPILL/SLICK REPORTED:

TIME CHECK COMPLETED:
CHECK CARRIED OUT BY:

Page92

REMARKS

PON 1 Pro-forma for reporting Oil and Chemical Spills from Offshore Installations and Pipelines

Identity of Observer/Reporter
Full Name:
Contact Telephone No:

Organisation/Company:
Contact E-Mail:

Incident Details
Operator/Organisation/Company Responsible for Incident:
Date of Incident:
Time of Incident:
Installation/Facility:
Fixed / Mobile (delete as applicable)
Latitude:
Longitude:

Field Name:
Quad & Block No.:

Oil Spill / Chemical Spill or Permitted Discharge Notification (tick below and complete column details as applicable)
Oil Spill Notification:
Max Spilled (tonnes):
Min Spilled (tonnes):
Type of Oil:
Tier of Response (1,2 or 3):
(As per Oil Spill Contingency Plan)

Chemical Spill Notification:

Quantity Spilled (kg):
Chemical Name:
Chemical Use:
% oil if OBM or base oil:
Warning label:

Permitted Discharge Notification:

Max oil discharged (tonnes):
Min oil discharged (tonnes):
Type of Oil:
Oil Conc. in discharge:
Discharge rate m3/hr:

Appearance:

Appearance:

Appearance:

Approx. spill area on sea surface

(m2or km2):

Approx. spill area on sea surface

(m2or km2):

Approx. sheen area on sea surface

(m2or km2):

Is Spillage Ongoing? YES / NO (If YES PON1 must be updated & reported each 24 hr period unless otherwise directed by DTI/MCA)
Spillage since last report (tonnes):
Source of pollution:

Total Spillage to date (tonnes):

Cause of pollution:
Steps taken to prevent re-occurrence/respond to spill:
Spill likely to reach Median line YES / NO : Shore YES / NO If YES approx location/time:
Photographs taken:
YES / NO
Samples taken for Analysis:
YES / NO
Weather Conditions
Wind Speed (knots):
Beaufort Scale (1-12):

Wind Direction (0-3600):

Wave Height (metres):

Sampling of Spilt Oil Checklist

It is essential that samples are taken of spilt oil, with preferably three samples to be made available from each
sampling session. For large spills it may be necessary to sample the slick once a day. The OIM should request
the Master of the standby vessel to collect a sample of the oil as long as this does not comprise the primary
safety role of the vessel. Use VHF radio on normal working channel for communication with standby vessel.
Note that the SBV has been supplied with a dedicated sampling kit that includes all the equipment necessary
for sampling.
The following points should be noted when taking the sample.

Page93

NO.

ACTION

NOTES

The sample should be taken in a

clean glass container as provided
in the spill sampling kit.

Metal or plastic containers should be avoided since

they may interfere with subsequent fingerprinting

Care should be taken to sample

the oil only.

The field vessel is provided with dedicated oil

sampling kits which include all the equipment
necessary for the sampling of spilt oil on the sea
surface

Minimum of two samples should

be taken, preferably three. The
following sample sizes provide
guidance to what is required for
laboratory analyses.

For freshly spilled, relatively non-emulsified oils take

at least 30ml to divide between the 3 10ml sample
sizes required for lab analysis;
For emulsions take at least 500ml, to be divided
between the three samples required for lab analysis
If these quantities cannot be obtained a sample
should still be taken.

Carefully store samples; these

should be sealed to avoid
tampering. All samples, once
bottled, should be placed in
plastic bags and sealed.

Ensure jars are stored in safe place and in a cool

dark area away from heat (preferably (<5C)

Label
or
accompanying
documentation should contain the
following information.

Sample Identification No. and initials of person in

charge of sampling
Description of samples (e.g. crude oil, fresh,
weathered, water-in-oil emulsion, sheens)
Date, time and place of sampling;
Name of Company;
Method of sampling;
Purpose for which sample was taken;
Source if known or suspected;
Metocean conditions at time of sampling
Particulars of any photos or supporting evidence

Send onshore for analysis as

soon as possible. Arrange for
courier transport to the address
opposite.

Gordon Todd
Senior Chemist
ERT (Scotland) Ltd
Research Park South
Herriot-Watt University
Edinburgh EH14 4AP

Field Testing for Dispensability of Spilt Oil

If the dispensability of the spilt oil is in doubt, or the ability of the dispersant to treat the oil type spilt, run a
field dispensability test using dispersants and equipment available on the standby vessel.
Two tests may be run.
1
The first test may be carried out by obtaining a sample of spilt oil and testing for dispensability on the
SBV.
2
The second test is to carry out a test run on the slick.
Procedures for these tests are given in the table below.
Table 2 Field testing for Dispensability of spilt oil

Page94

AT-SEA VESSEL MOUNTED DISPERSANT SPRAYING TESTING

STEP

ACTION
Test the amenability of the spilt oil to dispersants following the sampling of
the slick. Do this as quickly as possible after taking the sample.
Test carried out as follows: fill a clean screw top jar with seawater; obtain a
sample of spilt oil by carefully putting a bucket over the side of the vessel
and obtaining a sample (this will also contain seawater).
Allow the spilt oil to rise to the surface of the bucket and skim it off.

Carefully place about 25ml of spilt oil on the surface of the seawater in the
jar.
Add about 1 ml of dispersant (ca. 2 drops) onto the surface. Shake the jar;
if the oil does not rise again to the surface but breaks up into tiny droplets in
the seawater, the slick should be amenable to dispersant spraying.
This should be compared against a control where the above process is
repeated but without adding the dispersant to the jar. This will allow the
effect of adding the dispersant to be established.

Undertake calculations to select correct pumping rate and boat speed in

relation to nozzle size of equipment.

Spray boat should enter the oil on surface at recommended speed to spray
at a constant rate and agitate the area. Carry out a test run by entering the
leading edge of the slick. Spray 1 run.

Watch oil for evidence of dispersion

As dispersion is achieved it will produce a "smoke plume" in the water. The

dispersion will vary in colour between dark and light brown.

If dispersion is not taking place large oil droplets will be evident.

If this is the case STOP spraying.

Oil Spill Trajectory Analysis

Page95

The figures below show the results of oil spill trajectory modelling that has been carried out for the
Piper and Chanter Field System. A 310m3 spill was modelled, which is representative of a failure of
the export line from Piper to the Claymore wye housing. This scenario considers the control
measures in place and assumes a loss of inventory following damage in the 500m safety zone.
Figure 1 Deterministic Slick Trajectory Modelling
Figure 1 shows the results of
deterministic modelling of a slick.
This shows the most rapid time to
beaching on the UK shore for a
slick under constant 30 knot
onshore wind conditions. Of the
310m3
spill
modelled,
approximately 90m3evaporated
140m3 naturally dispersed and
180m3 beached on the UK coast
within about 61 hours.

59 0' N

58 0' N

57 0' N
3 0' W

2 0' W

1 0' W

0 0' E

Figure 2 shows the results of the

stochastic modelling.
The
advantage of this modelling is
that it determines the progress of
the slick towards the shore under
prevailing wind and current
conditions.

Figure 2 Stochastic Modelling Results

The results of the stochastic

modelling show that there is only
a very small chance (1-5%) of
spilt oil reaching either the
shorelines of the UK or Norway.
However, movement of spilt oil
towards the UK shore could
impact sensitive offshore bird
populations if oil is spilt between
the months of July and October.
Note
that
the
stochastic
modelling indicates all potential
points of impact; the actual point
of impact on the coastline will
depend on prevailing wind
direction at the time of the spill.

Page96

Frequency Of Occurrence of Spills from the Piper, Chanter and Tweedsmuir Field System
Spills may occur from a range of sources and result in a number of different hydrocarbon types being spilt to
the marine environment. The figure below shows the range of sources of spillages for installations such as
those in the Piper Field System. The most frequently occurring spills from fixed steel facilities are crude oil
spills from process equipment. Spills are also common from utilities and supply operations, with these spills
being mainly diesel.
Figure 3 Sources & Types of Hydrocarbon Spills from Fixed Production Facilities

Utilities
Unknown
Supply
Storage
Process
Off_loading

Crude
Diesel

Mud System

HC Product

Miscellaneous

Other

Infield_Flowline
Export_Pipeline
Export Hose
Drilling
Burner Boom
0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

Page97

30%

35%

Spill Frequency Analysis: Piper and Chanter Field System

Facility
Type

Export
Method

Spill Size
Category

Piper
Bravo

Fixed Steel
Production
Facility

Export
pipeline
(30 Main
Oil Line
from.
Claymore
to Flotta).

<1 tonne
<10 tonnes
<100 tonnes
<1000 tonnes
>1000 tonnes

Chanter

Subsea
tieback to
Piper

Subsea

Tweedsmuir

2 well
Subsea
tieback to
Piper

Subsea

Field

Facility

Piper

<1 tonne
<10 tonnes
<100 tonnes
<1000 tonnes
>1000 tonnes
<1 tonne
<10 tonnes
<100 tonnes
<1000 tonnes
>1000 tonnes

Frequency of Spills
per installation year
by Spill Size Class
2.67E-01
3.02E-02
4.92E-03
1.02E-03
9.78E-04

2.29E-03
4.18E-04
4.19E-04

2.29E-03 (4.58E-03)
4.18E-04 (8.36E-04)
4.19E-04 (8.383E-04)

3.13E-01 spills per field year or 1 spill

every 3.19 field years

Field System total all spill sizes

Table 4 below gives the environmental risk of spills that could occur from the Field System. The
environmental risk assessment has been carried out using the Talisman Energy methodology HSE-PRO-TLM042. This assessment combines the likely frequency of occurrence of the spill occurring, that is the spill
probability, with the potential magnitude of the impact that is the consequence, to determine the level of risk.
It is important to note however, that when assessing the consequence, only the potential environmental impact
was taken into account. Other potential consequences such as impact to company reputation and legal
compliance were not included in this assessment.

Environmental Risk Assessment

Probability
Consequence
1
2

3
1-10
tonnes

Negligible
10-100
tonnes
100-1000
tonnes

Minor
Moderate
Major

>1000
tonnes

The table above is interpreted as follows:

Probability (Categories 1-5) is estimated as follows:

Page98

4
< 1 tonne

1
Calculate frequency of occurrence of spills occurring in the five size categories given in Table 3.
2
Using the Talisman Energy Probability Assessment Categories, which are as follows?
5 Likely: > 1 spill per year
4 Possible: 1 spill in 1-10 years
3 Unlikely: 1 spill 10 -100 years
2 Remote: 1 spill in 100-1000 years
1 Extremely remote: 1 spill in > 1,000 years
Allocate the frequency of occurrence of spills into the Talisman Energy probability assessment groups
(e.g. in Table 3 spills occurring in the < 1 tonne size class total a frequency of 2.67E-01 or 1 spill every 3.7
field years). This would then group into Category 4.
3
Estimate consequence based on the following
Distance to the shore of the field;
Slick trajectory analyses;
Crude oil characteristics;
Prevailing environmental sensitivities
4
Estimate risk to the environment based on the following:
Low risk
not significant.
Medium risk Significant.
High risk
Significant.
Manual Slick Prediction Method
The oil slick will move at approximately 100% of the tidal current speed and 3% of the wind speed. The
forecast of slick movement is commonly carried out by computer simulation. Slick movement may also be
predicted by manual vector addition offshore or in an emergency when access to a computer programme is not
feasible. The manual method of prediction of slick movement is based on a simple vector calculation where
the vectors of wind speed and tidal current are added together utilising 3% of the wind speed value and 100%
of the tidal current speed. The procedure for the method is outlined below.
It is important to remember that this method can only provide an approximation of slick movement, and in no
way should be regarded as a substitute for continuing monitoring actual slick movement throughout the oil
spill response or for the more sophisticated slick predictions generated by computer models. However, the
method is rapid and can provide a valuable rough guide to possible slick movement, which may assist in the
formulation of an appropriate response strategy. The following stages and diagram below outline the method:

SEA

W IN D V E C T O R
0 9 0 0T R U E
0 .3 5 K N O T S ( 3 .5 C A B L E S )

D r a w w in d v e c to r f r o m t h e e n d o f t h e
tid a l v e c to r . T h is g i v e s p o s itio n o f th e s lic k
a f te r t h e e f f e c ts o f 1 h o u r o f w in d & tid e

NO RTH

T ID A L V E C T O R
0200 TR U E
1 .5 K N O T S (1 .5 N M )

SPILL LO C A T IO N

R E SU LT A N T SPILL T R A JE C T O R Y D U E
T O E F F E C T O F W IN D A N D T ID E

Establish the position of the slick.

Page99

2
Establish the tidal rate or strength (in knots) and direction (in degrees) for as many hours as is required.
This information is available from hydrographic data such as from tidal stream atlases, charts and nautical
almanacs etc.
3
Plot the position of the slick on the most appropriate chart.
4
From that position, draw a vector in the direction that the tide is moving. The tidal rate for the first hour
in this example has been established as being 1.5 knots (1.5 nautical miles per hour) and the direction is 0200.
From the initial slick position, measure 1.5 nautical miles along the tidal vector. This position is where the
slick would have travelled to in that first hour if it had been driven by the tide alone.
5
Obtain as accurate an assessment of the wind speed and direction as possible (the vessel on scene may
be able to supply this information). If necessary, convert the wind speed into knots. Multiply the wind speed
by 0.03 (the slick is affected by 3% of the wind speed). In this example the wind speed was 11.5 knots which
when multiplied by 0.03 is 0.35 knots and the direction is westerly (illustrated by a 900 wind vector).
Therefore, in one hour the slick would have moved 0.35 nautical miles in the direction of the wind. The above
information will allow a wind vector to be drawn.
6
The slick will be driven by both the wind (3%) and the tide (100%) so it is necessary to combine the
two vectors. The wind vector (calculated in step 5) should be drawn from the end of the tidal vector.
A line drawn from the initial position of the slick to the end of the wind vector is the resultant vector and
indicates the direction and the distance the slick will travel in that hour.
To predict the likely movement of the oil for another hour, the process should be repeated using the resultant
position as the start point for drawing subsequent vectors.
10.8 BONN Agreement Colour Codes - Description of the Appearance
Code 1 Sheen (< 0.3 m)
The very thin films of oil reflect the incoming light slightly better than the surrounding water and can therefore
be observed as a silvery or grey sheen. All oils in these thin layers can be observed due to this effect and not
the oil colour itself.
Oil films below approximately 0.04 m thickness are invisible. In poor viewing conditions even thicker films
may not be observed.
Above a certain height or angle of view the observed film may disappear.
Code 2 Rainbow (0.3 m 5.0 m)
Rainbow oil appearance represents a range of colours, yellow, pink, purple, green, blue, and red, copper,
orange; this is caused by an optical effect and independent of oil type.
Depending on angle of view and layer thickness, the distinctive colours will be diffuse or very bright.
Oil films with thicknesses near the wavelength of different coloured light, 0.2 m 1.5 m (blue, 400nm or
0.4 m, through to red, 700nm or 0.7 m) exhibit the most distinct rainbow effect. This effect will occur up to
a layer thickness of 5.0 m. Bad light conditions may cause the colours to appear duller.
A level layer of oil in the rainbow region will show different colours through the slick because of the change in
angle of view. Therefore if rainbow is present, a range of colours will be visible.
Code 3 Metallic (5.0m 50 m)
The appearance of the oil in this region cannot be described as a general colour and is oil type dependent.
Although a range of colours can be observed, blue, purple, red and greenish the apparent colour is not caused
by interference of light or by the true colour of the oil. The colours will not be similar to rainbow. Where a
range of colours can be observed within a rainbow area, metallic will appear as a quite homogeneous colour
that can be blue, brown, purple or another colour. The metallic appearance is the common factor and has
been identified as a mirror effect, dependent on light and sky conditions. For example blue can be observed in
blue-sky conditions.
Code 4 Discontinuous True Colours (50 m 200 m)
For oil slicks thicker than 50 m the true colour will gradually dominate the colour that is observed. Brown
oils will appear brown, black oils will appear black. The broken nature of the colour, due to thinner areas
within the slick, is described as discontinuous. This is caused by the spreading behaviour under the effects of
wind and current.

Page100

Discontinuous should not be mistaken for coverage. Discontinuous implies true colour variations and not
non-polluted areas.
Code 5 True Colours (>200 m)
The true colour of the specific oil is the dominant effect in this category.
A more homogenous colour can be observed with no discontinuity as described in Code 4.
This category is strongly oil type dependent and colours may be more diffuse in overcast conditions.
This is an acceptable Oil Spill Response and I recommend the information contained within it to your
consideration.

SUMMARY
You will agree that there were a lot of subjects covered in just a hundred short pages, these were written as a
guide to helping you along your journey to the position of Offshore Installation Manager, it is not a job for the
weak at heart and requires a high level of understanding, analytical, interpersonal & decision making skills, the
salary usually compensates for the hours worked, but make no mistake about it, this is not for everyone it
comes with a high level of responsibility that some would think out weights the salary package.
A general rule of thumb is that systems of a mechanical nature tend to do as we want them to do, this is part in
due to technology getting better as time goes on, what I have found personally is that the human factors dont
always travel at the same speed, nor do people do what we want them or plan for them to do when the pressure
is on them, in particular when we find ourselves as the only English speaking person onboard an installation or
in a country we cant even spell let alone pronounce, both Charlie and myself have worked in these
environments as a lot of our colleagues have, this is the industry today. With all that in mind we can purchase
piece of mind if we train well and communicate openly, nothing I have found is perfect, however by
practicing and asking the odd stupid question we can be better prepared, for the unexpected.
This book has a lot of technical input which is the by-product of years of working on the tools, this book was
not written to take away the need for skills/technical training it was to show a balance of both technical and
personal skills essential for the person who fills the position of Offshore Installation Manager.
Make no mistake about it the OIM can perform for years in a challenging environment safely and will meet a
lot of wonderful people who will make up his extended family of friends, but during an emergency situation
when things are at their worse , he and only he is expected to step up and take the lead, he is required to
function when others are not, he is expected to lead, and develop workable strategies (plans) that will satisfy
the needs of the situation with a hope that they will contain and extinguish the situation, this is how it will be
written in his job description.
Both Charlie and I hope this book has in some way helped you along your way, you can obtain further
information about any of the above in more detail and much more from contacting us at either;

www.major-emergency-management.com
www.wildgeese.com.au

See you out there somewhere

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