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Argumentation Theory
Argumentation
An International Journal on Reasoning
ISSN 0920-427X
Argumentation
DOI 10.1007/s10503-012-9280-9
1 23
1 23
Ch. Rapp
Lehrstuhl fur Philosophie III, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitat, Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1,
80539 Munich, Germany
e-mail: Office.Ch.Rapp@lrz.uni-muenchen.de
T. Wagner (&)
Institut fur Philosophie, Humboldt-Universitat zu Berlin, Unter den Linden 6,
10099 Berlin, Germany
e-mail: tim.wagner@hu-berlin.de
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Aristotles writings provide a fundamental point of reference not only for historical
approaches to argumentation theory, but also for some important modern theories of
argumentation. This does not mean, of course, that all contemporary argumentation
theorists are necessarily Aristotelians in one way or another; it only implies that
down to the present day argument theorists have been profoundly inspired by
Aristotles theory of argumentation.
It is a remarkable coincidence that the founding fathers, as it were, of modern
argumentation theory (MAT), Cham Perleman and Stephen Toulmin, define their
projects by almost identical references to Aristotle: Both of them stress that logic in
the sense that Aristotle calls analytical must be complemented by a project that
corresponds to what Aristotle has delineated as dialectic.1 They also converge in
emphasizing that this dialectical dimension has been unduly neglected by the recent
development of philosophical logic. Against the alleged one-sidedness of formal
logic they both appeal to ancient dialectic in general and Aristotelian dialectic in
particular for the study of real argumentation between concrete interlocutors in
concrete situations. What they actually understand by Aristotelian dialectic can
best be seen when one examines their own theoriestheories which set the agenda
for major parts of an emerging, modern argumentation theory; the program that is
carried out in The Use of Arguments2 and in The New Rhetoric elaborates on
something like a blend of Aristotles Topics and Rhetoric, where Toulmins
argumentation scheme seems to be closer to the Topics, while the systematics of
Cham Perlemans and Lucie Olbrechts-Tytecas work is closer to the Rhetoric.
Some subsequent developments of MAT put more stress on the notion of fallacy,
thus also taking Aristotles treatise Sophistical refutations into account.3 In all these
cases the recourse to Aristotle is significantly more than a revival of a historical
position. The adaptation of selected Aristotelian theorems by MAT presupposes
specific theoretical interests in the theory of argumentation and requires a
theoretical framework like the one that has emerged from certain developments
in twentieth-century philosophy. If we therefore speak of Aristotelian sources of
MAT, we do not imply that these theorists have just picked up ready-made
Aristotelian theorems that were waiting in textbooks and manuals to be rediscovered; we express, on the contrary, our awareness of the fact that these theories
together with their Aristotelian ingredients are the result of the ongoing debate on
how one can make the best sense of the rich, but sometimes ambiguous and
inconsistent, Aristotelian material that has come down to us and of how this material
fits best with the theoretical interests we happen to have.
In this contribution we comment on just this sort of discussion; we try to lay bare
some of the presuppositions made by some of the main representatives of MAT
about the directions of the Aristotelian texts, and we attempt to point out theoretical
options that, to our mind, are present in the Aristotelian texts. Thus, we will touch
not only on Aristotelian theorems that were actually taken up by modern
1
Cf. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969, 5), and Toulmin (1986, 62).
Toulmin (1958).
Cf. e.g. Walton and Krabbe (1995), Woods and Walton (1989). On the state of the art in the study of
fallacies see van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004, chapter 7).
123
argumentation theorists, but also on Aristotelian ideas that are congenial with
certain strands of MAT, but have not yet been explicitly used, finally on points
where the direction of the Aristotelian texts seems to diverge from the modern ideas
they inspired. Of course, we cannot do justice here to the complex state of
discussion in MAT, therefore, we let our agenda be informed by what strike us as
some of the core convictions of the aforementioned founding fathers of MAT, as
well as by a more or less random selection of recent developments in MAT that we
have lately encountered.
123
123
But this is not a major surprise since this third book is most likely an appendix or
even a later addition to the agenda of the second book of the Topics.
Just as the Topics is, thus, interested in conclusiveness and validity, the Rhetoric
deals with persuasiveness. And just as the Topics distinguishes between the valid and
the only seemingly valid, the Rhetoric distinguishes between what is persuasive and
what is only seemingly persuasive.8 Finally, just as the Topics promises to develop a
method by which we can argue for and against any given thesis, the Rhetoric attempts
to determine what can be considered persuasive on any given topic.9 Hence, both
disciplines, dialectic and rhetoric, are, in principle, thematically unrestricted and
attempt to determine the conclusive and the persuasive, respectivelyregardless of
whether the case in question is rather true than false or rather good than bad. Still,
although the Rhetoric provides considerations that might be significant for persuasion
in all possible fields of discourse, the three-book treatise that has come down to us
under the title of rhtorik techn, turns out to be interestedas already indicated
only in persuasion in the realm of public speaking. Due to this limited field of
application, the Rhetoric is mostly concerned with particular, non-general topics, such
as whether, say, Alcibiades is guilty or not, but not with what it means to be guilty in
general, or whether, for example, it is useful for the Athenians to build a wall here and
now, but not with whether walls in general contribute to the flourishing of a city,
let alone the question of what the flourishing of a city consists in.
It seems, then, that for Aristotle dialectic and rhetoric are, at least in some
respects, complementary: Dialectic applies to dialogical, face-to-face disputations
about general topics, while rhetoric applies to speeches delivered to mass
audiences on non-general, particular topics. Such a division of labour between the
two projects might be taken as an indication that there is something like an ongoing project involving the two disciplines of dialectic and rhetoric and the
corresponding treatises the Topics and the Rhetoric. However, we must not forget
that even if we take both treatises together, thus obtaining complementary aspects
of a general theory of argumentation, the Topics and the Rhetoric as such do not
provide a general, let alone exhaustive, analysis of argumentation; what we get
are, for example, analyses of particular, contingent issues presented to a public
audience and analyses of general philosophical questions discussed in the
characteristic questionanswer format that distinguishes Aristotelian dialectics;
what we do not get, however, is an analysis of, say, arguments about particular
and contingent issues presented in a dialogical face-to-face-situation. Nor do we
get, if our description of the two sub-projects is right, the complementary analysis
of the persuasiveness of arguments in the non-public sphere (given that it is not
the purpose of dialectic to actually persuade or convince an opponent, but to bring
him take positions from which his original position can be defeated). We can
state, then, as an interim result that MAT is perfectly justified in assuming that, to
a certain extent, Aristotles Topics and Rhetoric present something like an ongoing project that covers different aspects of a general theory of argumentation.
At the same time it is important to note that none of these writings aims at
8
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explicitly developing such a general theory, but that all pertinent writings, the
Topics, the Rhetoric and the Sophistical Refutations confine themselves to certain
narrow fields of argumentative discourse; taken together they fill some important
spots on the map of different fields and types of argumentation, but they are far
from providing a complete picture.
10
Cf. the papers that are collected in van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2002) as well as van Eemerens
contribution to this issue.
11
Rhetoric is a counterpart to dialectic: Rhetoric I.1, 1354a1; it is an offshoot of dialectic and the study of
character: I.2, 1356a2527, it is a part of dialectic: I.2, 1356a30 et seq., it is similar to it: I.2, 1356a31.
123
for Aristotles attempt to align rhetoric with dialectic becomes obvious from the
following train of thought:
The activity of persuasion is, as Aristotle points out at the beginning of the
Rhetoric, a kind of proof or proving.12 Why so? People are most convinced, or so
Aristotle says,13 when they take something to have been proven. It is therefore
legitimate to model the persuasive endeavour of the rhetorician as a kind of proof
(apodeixis). Given that all proofs are kinds of sullogismoiwhich we take to be
deductive argumentspersuasion can essentially be described in terms of
sullogismoi, i.e. deductive arguments. What Aristotle seems to presuppose is that
persuasion essentially follows the structure of a deductive premise-conclusion
argument: In order to convince the audience of a suggested thesis or suggestion, the
orator has to infer this thesis from what the audience already believes. In a similar
vein, Aristotle claims in the De Anima that each doxa, each opinion in the proper
sense, derives from an inference (sullogismos)and this is, in Aristotles view, the
reason why animals cannot have opinions in the proper sense.
Within whose purview does the deductive argument fall? We would probably say
within the purview of the logician. Aristotle, by contrast, says that it falls within the
purview of the dialectician14regardless of whether he simply had no word for
logic in our sense or whether he really meant that it is the dialectician, if anyone,
who is the real expert for all kinds or applications of the sullogismos.
However this may be, if it is true that all sullogismoi fall within the purview of
the dialectician and if the syllogistic, i.e. deductive, premise-conclusion structure is
essential for all persuasive endeavours, then it follows that rhetoric, if it is
concerned with persuasion, essentially relies on the part of dialectic that is
responsible for the sullogismos. Indeed, Aristotle says in the Rhetoric that it is the
dialectician who is in fact responsible for all kinds of sullogismos and that the
dialectician will also become the master of the rhetorical argument if he only
acknowledges the differences between the dialectical and the rhetorical sullogismos.
On this account, there is no fundamental conflict between dialectic and rhetoric.
Furthermore, if sound arguments guarantee the reasonableness of argumentation and
if arguments are thought to be an efficient means of persuasion, neither is there a
fundamental conflict between reasonableness and effectiveness. This, we think, is
the essential rationale behind the dialectical turn of rhetoric initiated by Aristotle;
against rhetorical predecessors who, from Aristotles point of view, were too much
concerned with effectiveness, he aspires to show that arguments are central to
persuasion and not less effective than certain techniques by which the rhetorician is
instructed to speak outside the subject. Of course, no argument is thought to be
persuasive as it stands; it is one of the most crucial ingredients of Aristotles
rhetorical theory of argumentation that the general dialectical account of arguments
must be adjusted to the hearers and the subject matters of a public speech. And it is
of course true that Aristotles theory of persuasion includes moments beside mere
argumentation: Among the three technical means of persuasion (pisteis) there are
12
13
14
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also the emotional state of the audience (pathos) and the character or credibility of
the speaker (thos); to this list we might add the linguistic form (lexis) and the order
of the parts of speech (taxis). There have been many scholarly debates about how
these non-argumentative means of persuasion (or should they also be called
argumentative in some way? See Sect. 6, below) are related to logos, argument15;
however, there are many indications that the introduction of these non-argumentative means of persuasion are not meant to relativize the central role of
argumentation; after all, almost three-fourths of the text of Rhetoric I and II are
dedicated to argumentation in the narrow sense, and when Aristotle turns to the
discussion of lexis in Rhetoric III, he stresses that this is only a secondary concern.16
Also, when Aristotle says that it is necessary not only to look at the argument, but
also to present oneself as a certain kind of person and to prepare the emotional state
of the audience, as rhetoric always aims at the judgment of the audience,17 it seems
as if the non-argumentative means are required just to stabilize the audiences
judgment formation and thus to enhance the effect of the given arguments.18
However one construes these aspects of the Aristotelian theory in detail, it seems
clear that the model he offers for reconciling dialectic and rhetoric is one in which
rhetoric is firmly based on dialectic, and rhetorical effectiveness is thought to flow
from reasonable argumentsassuming they are suitably chosenand to not ask too
much of the audience of a public speech.19
16
17
18
19
Put in such general terms, this goal seems to be congenial with more recent developments in MAT:
The Aristotelian rhetorical norm of successful persuasion is not necessarily in contradiction with the
ideal of reasonableness that lies at the heart of the pragma-dialectical approach (van Eemeren and
Houtlosser 1999, 165). We owe this reference to Kientpointner (2011).
20
21
Cf. e.g. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969, 14), Perelman (1994, 85).
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23
24
25
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we should not expect the formally restricted canonical sullogismos that we know
from the syllogistic theory, with exactly two premises and three terms, one of which
is the middle term, etc. The Topics seems to be entirely untouched by this theory
and hence it is no surprise that the arguments we do find in the Topics and in the
Rhetoric do not obey to any formal restriction of this kind. That they are formally
less rigid than the arguments from Aristotles syllogistic theory does not mean,
however, that they are meant to be logically more relaxed. On the contrary, the
definition quoted makes clear that the conclusion of a sullogismos is something that
follows of necessity from the premises.
According to Aristotles definition, it is certainly true of the sullogismos that it
includes a constellation of propositions put forward in order to justify the
proposition that is expressed as the conclusion. On the basis of the same definition it
seems, however, that the justification is only seen as successful if the conclusion
follows of necessity from the premises. In comparison to modern accounts, which
only expect that in argumentation we try to make our standpoint more acceptable or
reasonable or that we justify it one way or another, this would be a much more
severe constraint. It is also clear that the notion of the sullogismos is neutral with
respect to the difference between demonstration and (dialectical) argumentation.
The definition of the sullogismos that is used either with scientific principles in order
to provide a scientific demonstration or with (only) accepted opinions in order to
serve as a dialectical argument is the same in both cases. This corresponds to the
fact that, as opposed to the MAT definitions we mentioned, the audience and the
expected effect on the audience is not mentioned in Aristotles definition of the
sullogismos.
On the basis of this brief and preliminary comparison we can state the following
possibly substantial discrepancies (disregarding the fact that, as we said, the notion
of sullogismos covers only one of the two species that fall under the generic notion
of argument): (1) In comparison to a rich notion of argumentation that includes a
reference to the addressee the notion of the sullogismos seems to be rather
underdetermined. Looking from this perspective, it seems promising not to take the
bare, as it were, notion of sullogismos as possibly equivalent to the MAT notion
of argumentation, but to look at the class of arguments with endoxic premises, i.e.
premises that are accepted by certain addressees.26 (2) According to somenot
allMAT-accounts of argumentation, the addressees readiness to find a standpoint
acceptable can be increased by many means, both verbal and non-verbal, and not
only by putting forward premise-like constellations of propositions. From this point
of view, the Aristotelian premise-conclusion model of argumentation may seem too
narrow. One possible response would be to include means of persuasion that do not
belong to logos, as Aristotle puts it, in the notion of argumentation (see Sect. 6,
below); there is the risk, however, that we might broaden the notion of
argumentation to the point where everything that is possibly persuasive is rated
as argument, which is most probably not Aristotles intention. Another, more
conservative response would be to look for places where Aristotle himself
cautiously broadens the concept of argument. One such passage, e.g., would be the
26
See Sect. 4, below; there will be, however, different uses of the accepted premises.
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28
There is a long-standing tradition that takes the enthymeme to be an incomplete syllogism. This is not
Aristotles view: see below, Sect. 4.
29
Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric. I.2 1356b1517. For a different interpretation cf. Burnyeat (1994).
123
seems that this is not Aristotles view, for he seems to be happy with saying that
what follows from a for-the-most-part premise is a for-the-most-part conclusion, but
that this modally qualified conclusion still follows of logical necessity (If suchand-such is for the most part true, then it follows of necessity that something else is
for the most part true). On this account, Aristotle is being generous in granting that
due to the contingent subject matter of a public speech the premises and the
conclusions of rhetorical arguments very rarely express necessities, but he is still
insistent on his view that the deductive scheme can be used for relating for-themost-part premises to for-the-most-part conclusions.30
In recent scholarship the deductivist reading of Aristotles enthymemes has come
under scrutiny by interpreters who are obviously interested in bringing Aristotle
closer to the insights of MAT. Here, it seems quite clear that it is not Aristotle who
inspired MAT, but MAT that encouraged certain readings of Aristotle. Whichever
reading will prevail in the long run, it seems fair to say that Aristotle heavily relied
on his deductive scheme, that he stressed the less stringent character of rhetorical
premises rather than the possibility of less rigid inferences and that, if he was really
willing to deviate from the deductive scheme, he was not quite explicit in doing so.
At this point the supporter of relaxed rhetorical arguments could refer to one type of the signenthymeme, which, as Aristotle says, does not yield a sullogismos, but is nevertheless rated as
enthymeme. The status of such arguments, however, is precarious, since in some passages Aristotle
treats them straightforwardly as fallacies (see below, Sect. 7).
31
32
123
34
35
36
Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric II.1217. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969, 20), refer to these chapters as
contributions to the rhetoricians knowledge of the audience.
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assigns the traditional rhetorical term enthymeme, he stresses that the rhetorical
proofs must not be taken from too far away, because the typical hearer of a public
speech is supposed to be a simple person who is not able to follow long chains of
argument.37 Due to a long-standing interpretative tradition which understands
Aristotelian enthymemes to be abbreviated arguments in which one of the required
premises is suppressed, commentators have often taken this remark as a comment
on the suppression of premises. In fact, what Aristotle says is that enthymemes must
not be as precise as a scientific demonstration and that they should be shorter than
ordinary dialectical arguments. This, however, is not to say that the enthymeme is
defined by incompleteness and brevity. The orator can avoid lengthy chains of
arguments by selecting the right premises, i.e. premises that are not too far from the
intended conclusions. On this reading, it seems that it is essential for the rhetorical
argument that it be adjusted to the capacity, expectation and intellectual horizon of
the given audience. The drawback, however, is that Aristotles effort to adjust
arguments to public audiences remains rather one-dimensional, as all these
arrangements are made with a view to the intellectual insufficiency of a public
mass audience.
38
Cf. De Pater (1965) and the introduction to Brunschwig (1967); for a brief summary of the scholarly
discussion see also Wagner and Rapp (2004, 2935).
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only this inventive but also a probative function in that it also guarantees the
transition from the premises to the conclusion (if the topos, e.g., says that whatever
holds of the genus, must also hold of each species, then the same topos is a warrant,
as it were, for the transition from a premise concerning a particular genus to a
conclusion about its species).
What we should add about the use of topoi is this: the use of topoi is essential for
both projects, the Topics and the Rhetoric. In the Topics the topoi deployed are not
dependent on specific subjects or themes. Therefore, the topoi here are mostly taken
from semantic, logical or otherwise general rules. In the Rhetoric Aristotle
distinguishes between general and specific topoi, where the general correspond to
the topoi of the Topics39 and the specific are such in the sense that they can only be
used to construe arguments with a specific predicate, for example arguments about
what is good, just or noble. If Aristotle says that the latter type of topoi, the specific,
are more appropriate for rhetorical use, this certainly reflects the difference we
already alluded to, i.e. that dialectic is mostly about general topics, while rhetoric
aims at judgments about particular states of affairs.
The Aristotelian technique of topoi has generally met with sympathy and
approval by the proponents of MAT. Quite generally, the Aristotelian topoi are
often invoked as role models when the notion of an argumentation scheme is
introduced. In particular, Toulmins general analysis of the structure of argumentation introduces the important notion of an inference warrant,40 and it has often
been observed that the role of these warrants resembles that of the topoi in
Aristotle41at least in its probative function. In legal theory Viehweg appealed to
Gian Battista Vicos contraposition of the old rhetorical/topical and the new critical/
geometrical method42; Viehweg attempts to show that within the realm of
jurisprudence, the topical method (for which he explicitly refers to Aristotle and
Cicero) is far superior to the axiomatic-systematic approach. Perelman, too, often
highlights that in jurisdiction there are remnants of the old rhetorical art of
argumentation. He regards Aristotelian topoi as the most general premises, but
wishes to distinguish his own use of loci from the Aristotelian one; first, he attempts
to get rid of what he takes to be a metaphysical contamination of Aristotelian
39
Even if most of the general topoi in the Rhetoric are not really general in the same sense as the topoi of
the Topics are; most are general only in the sense that they can be used in all three genres of speech, while
the specific ones are always peculiar to one such genre or to one of the key notions of a genre, just in
the judicial speech, good in the forensic speech, and noble in the epideictic speech. Still, the notion
of a general topos in the Rhetoric clearly refers back to the project of the Topics, though only five out of
28 general topoi in Rhetoric II.23 clearly resemble the topoi of the Topics (1397a719, 1397a2023,
1397b12174, 1397b17427, 1399a69). Insofar as the topoi in the Topics rest on, as we have said,
semantic, logical or otherwise general rules it makes little sense to stress, as Warnick (2000, 111 et seq.)
does, the cultural dependency of these topoi. As an example Warnick introduces the topos from the
oppositesthat if a and b are opposites and a has the quality q, the opposite of quality q can be predicated
of b. To our mind, this is just one application of Aristotles complex logical system of opposites and does
not indicate specific cultural preferences. Revealingly, Warnick uses the example that Aristotle gives
afterwards to make her point, not the general scheme.
40
41
42
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topoi,43 and second, he tries to preserve the term for premises about what is valuable
and preferable.44 Others have tried to show that the argument schemes that
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca unfold in The New Rhetoric45 broadly correspond to
the common topoi in Aristotles Rhetoric II.23. Indeed, several accounts of
argumentation schemes have been development in MAT quite independently from
Aristotle, but with an awareness of the historical origins of such schemes, e.g.
Kientpointner and Walton, to mention only two, have worked extensively on such
an argumentation theory.46 Kienpointner and Rigotti have also stressed the
inventive/generative aspect of Aristotelian topoi; Rigotti has even labeled them as
argument generators.47 Tetens observes that formal logic is of limited use for
argumentation training. He refers to the ancient tradition in general and the
Aristotelian tradition in particular, which abstracted paradigmatic arguments to
more general argumentation schemes which are limited to certain fields and themes,
and are not universally applicable. The formulation of such argumentation patterns
and the use of such patterns in making students sensible of differences between
good and bad argumentation belong, as Tetens puts it, to the realm of topics, as
originally formulated by Aristotle.48
In the light of these few examples it seems that the success of Aristotles
technique of topoi in MAT is undisputed. We would nevertheless like to point out
some differences between Aristotles use of topoi and the various uses that MAT
has made of them:
43
What Perelman means by metaphysical is Aristotles system of the four predicables (definition,
accidental predicate, genus, proprium), by which the topoi of the Topics are structured and from which
many of the general rules that make up the topoi are taken. It is certainly true that, e.g., the difference
between essential and accidental predicates rest on a certain metaphysics; it is still disputable whether this
topical system is therefore metaphysically loaded. After all, the way in which the predicables are
introduced in the Topics gives clear criteria for the distinction of four sorts of predicates and does not
appeal to specific theorems of Aristotles metaphysics.
44
This is obviously the reason for Perelmans somewhat surprising interest in the topoi of Aristotle,
Topics III (Cf. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 21, and Perelman 1994, Chapter II.4). This narrow
focus is surprising, since, as we already said, the topoi of book III of the Topics are in several respects
exceptional within the Topics, most notably because they (also) apply to practical-particular and to
philosophical-general questions.
45
Cf. Warnick (2000, 109): I. The quasi logical ones: contradiction, incompatibility (1), identity,
definition, analyticity, tautology (2), reciprocity, rule of justice (3), transitivity, inclusion, division (4),
weights, measures, probabilities (5), II. The ones based on the structure of reality: (liaisons of succession
(6), liaisons of coexistence (7), symbolic liaisons, double hierarchies, differences of degree and order (8),
III. The ones establishing the structure of reality: example (9), illustration (10), model and anti-model
(11), analogy and metaphor (12), IV. Dissociation.To be honest, we find not only Warnicks general
account of the general topoi questionable (see footnote 39 above), but also regard many of the similarities
between Aristotle and The New Rhetoric she wishes to discover quite superficial. The problem is that
many of the common or general topoi of the Rhetoric aredue to Aristotles use of historical speeches
too narrowly formulated and not really abstracted from the examples used.
46
Cf. Kienpointner (1997). Among the many titles by Walton we just want to mention one of his most
recent works on argumentation schemes: Walton et al. (2008). This latter book generously includes a
historical survey of argumentation schemes (chapter 8). Unfortunately, the section on Aristotelian topoi
turns out to be quite distorting, so that no informative conclusion about Waltons view of Aristotle can be
drawn. For Kienpointner on Aristotle see Kienpointner (2005, 2011).
47
48
Cf. Tetens (2011), in particular, 491 et seqq., see also Tetens (2004, 54).
123
Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Arist. Top. II, 135, 2 et seq. (Wallies); for the idea of grouping
several topoi under more general headings, see also Rapp (2000).
50
The same is also true of rhetorical arguments or enthymemes, which are defined as sorts of sullogismoi
(see above, Sect. 3).
123
53
Some attempts at construing specific topoi not as ready-premises, but as tools that are supposed to
generate arguments, are made in Rapp (2002, vol. II, 290298).
123
can be coordinated to the three vertices of the triangle of speaker, hearer and subject
matter. The theory of persuasion as it is laid out in the Rhetoric thus broadens the
scope of the analysis. Whereas the theory of the Topics neglected or idealized the
vertices of speaker and hearer (by imposing artificial procedural rules on them), the
Rhetoric seems to raise them to the same level as the subject matter and the
corresponding means of persuasion, i.e. proof or argument.
The aspects of persuasion which we may call non-argumentativejust for the
purpose of contrasting them with proofs or arguments in the narrow sensemay
interfere with or impede the intended persuasion process. If the audience does not think
that the speaker is trustworthy, the best argument will fail to achieve the desired effect.
And if the hearers happen to be in an emotional state that prevents their minds from
forming clear thoughts, they will presumably not even be able to follow the speakers
train of thought. Conversely, the rhetorician may use the strong personal impact he
makes or the emotional disposition he arouses for emphasizing or highlighting those
aspects of the subject matter that are capable of influencing the audiences judgment.
Aristotle does not give a very detailed account of the non-argumentative means
of persuasion. And the little he actually says about them is stated rather negatively,
in that it tells us what should be avoided, rather than positively instructing us on
how to support the argumentative strategy; persuasion may be accomplished by
showing character virtues the lack of which would prevent the audience from
believing that the speaker is trustworthy. If the speaker does not display practical
intelligence, the audience will not be inclined to believe that he has anything true to
say about the case at hand. But it may also be the case that a person is competent
and intelligent but seems to lack moral integrity. If the hearers have doubts about the
virtuous character of the speaker, they may concede that he is clever but refrain
from accepting what he says because he may pursue aims which are not acceptable
to them. And if the speaker is perceived as competent and virtuous, the possibility
still remains that he has, for whatever reason, an aversion to the audience. If the
speaker appears to lack goodwill for the audience and seems to display subtle
hostility or arrogance, the readiness to adopt his views will completely disappear.
If the rhetorician succeeds in presenting himself as a trustworthy person, the
audience forms a second-order judgment that what is put forward by a credible
person should be accepted. This second-order judgment has nothing to do with the
subject matter of the speech. And even though Aristotle does not give detailed
instructions on exactly how character should be displayed, he clearly seems to
prefer using rather indirect forms to express personal virtues. A speaker who opens
his speech by explicitly praising his intelligence, his virtuous character or his
benevolence before the audience, will come across as a suspect individual who
aspires to distract from some other hidden motif.
Some short remarks in the Poetics show how practical instructions on how to
display a persons character might look. In a tragedy the character of a person can be
seen when it comes to a choice (prohairesis) between different possible actions
hence there is no room for character in a speech in which the speaker does not
show what he chooses or avoids.54 Conversely, character can be displayed in a
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speech in which the speaker shows how he would choose. If the speaker uses this
means of persuasion there are two possibilities: either an element of the speech can
be stated only to serve the goal of producing a certain appearance without its being
related to the subject matter of the speech, or a statement about the subject matter of
the speech serves at the same time as a means to show the speakers character. But
even if the latter is the case it should not be confused with an argument that is
merely about the case at hand. The moment the hearer accepts what the speaker says
not only because of the content but also because of the speakers credibility, the
argument is no longer independent of the person who presented it.
The means of persuasion that is related more directly to the hearer, the arousal of
emotions (pathos), allows for a greater range of variation. Aristotle introduces this
subject as the analysis of emotions.55 The rhetorician has to know the complete
definition of an emotion in order to be able to arouse it. Aristotle therefore offers
accounts of different emotions in some detail. If the rhetorician knows, e.g., that
anger is a desire accompanied by pain, for a conspicuous revenge for a
conspicuous slight at the hands of men who have no right to slight oneself or ones
friends,56 he will be able to arouse anger by presenting a case that instantiates this
definition. Definitional knowledge allows one to model a given case correctly. For
example, anger cannot be directed against universal entities like man in general, but
must be directed against individuals, because only individuals can commit slights.
That anger is a kind of desire implies that it is followed by a certain pleasure which
arises from the expectation of revenge. It is pleasant to think that one will attain
what one aims at. Therefore, the rhetorician should rather highlight the possibility of
taking revenge than neglecting it. The rhetorician who wants to arouse a certain
emotion can do so by emphasizing aspects of the subject matter of his speech in
such a way that the persons involved and the courses of action seem to be in
accordance with the definition of the emotion. Thus, the rhetorician can steer the
hearers emotional state by making them believe that, for example, a slight has been
committed by someone who was not entitled to do so; and the emotional state
resulting from such a belief is likely to have an impact on the judgment the hearers
finally make.
As we have seen, both the display of the speakers character (thos) and the
arousal of the hearers emotions (pathos) work on the basis of inferences or
judgments made by the hearer, even though they cannot be reduced to these
inferential aspects. How can the dividing line between proper argumentation and
non-argumentative means of persuasion be drawn? Obviously, it is not sufficient to
check whether or not inferences and judgments come into play. What matters is the
relationship between the premises and the target conclusion. If the speaker wants to
make the addressee accept a certain claim (for example the claim that a city wall
should be built), an argument in the proper sense should be directly relevant to this
claim. The second-order judgment that the speaker is a trustworthy person has no
direct bearing on such a claim. The emotional state of fear or anger that influences
the hearers judgment formation does not necessarily depend on pertinent premises.
55
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Whereas within the realm of rational argumentation a premise that turns out to be
false can no longer be used in building a sound argument, emotional states may
maintain their efficacy independently of the truth value of the premises they are
based on.
The fact that inferences and judgments are involved when the speaker presents
himself as trustworthy or arouses the emotions of the audience should not blind us to
the differences between non-argumentative means of persuasion and pertinent
argumentation. It is no coincidence that Aristotle distinguishes thos and pathos
from logos and seems not to see these means as instances of a wider notion of
argumentation. His definition of a deductive argument (sullogismos) stresses the
causal role of the premises for the conclusion. The conclusion comes about
through the premises or because of them. If the addressee accepts a claim
because of the presumed character of the speaker or under the influence of an
emotional state, these factors may not be pertinent in the same sense as the premises
of a proper argument. Aristotle takes the non-argumentative factors into account,
gives a neutral explanation and sketches methods for exploiting their potential; he
does not incorporate them into his notion of an argument. The concept of pertinence
or relevance that is central here, nevertheless, still awaits detailed reconstruction.57
57
Although, of course, MAT has already incorporated the concept of relevance into its agenda; cf. e.g.
van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004, chapter 4).
58
This second criticism resembles a motif that we already encountered in Perelman: cf. footnote 43.
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Some commentators think that in Rhetoric I.2 Aristotle regards sign-enthymemes as acceptable
arguments, even if they are non-conclusive. However, he does not express his appreciation for signenthymemes in so many words. In Rhetoric II.24 he straightforwardly classifies sign-enthymemes as
fallacies. The example given in this latter chapter clearly involves a dilution; possibly, Aristotle thinks
that people could accept the sign-examples in Rhetoric I.2without being deluded. For the ancient and,
in particular, Aristotelian treatment of fallacies see also Pieter Sjoerd Hasper and Christof Rapp (eds.),
Ancient Fallacies. In Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 15, forthcoming.
61
Cf. van Eemeren et al. (1996, 284: Rule (8) with fn. 23).
62
63
64
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views are generally accepted and what the experts think; they have to be capable of
foreseeing the consequences of a statement; they should neither block the partners
strategy nor go down without a fight; and they should be able to establish valid
deductions. If they fail to do the latter, they commit what Aristotle would call a
fallacy. If a dialectician fails to comply with one of the other implicit rules, this is
noted in subsequent evaluations of his argumentative capacities, but is not called a
fallacy. All in all, the set of possible violations of discursive rules Aristotles
dialectic is aware of clearly extends beyond his own notion of fallacies; the spirit of
some of these rules is not too far from certain pragmatic fallacies in MAT.
8 Conclusions
Modern argumentation theorists frequently focus on oppositions such as dialectic
versus rhetoric, analytical versus topical, reasonable versus effective, formal versus
informal, or normative versus descriptive. Many of these pairs are related to the
ancient tradition of public speech and argumentative discourse, in particular to
Aristotles treatises the Topics and the Rhetoric. The conceptual field that they
survey and map with the help of these distinctions is broad and not always clearly
delimited. Even though Aristotle did not treat the multifaceted aspects of
argumentation under one common heading, one may see the different theoretical
elements that center around his notion of a sound argument as parts of a coherent
project. This project might anachronistically be called Aristotles argumentation
theory. Aristotle himself did not see argumentation as a single field of research. He
studied logical and semantical relations that could be used to find or establish
premises, he analysed the relations between the terms of standardized deductive
arguments, he systematized and evaluated accepted opinions, and he accounted for
the factors of persuasion processes. In doing so, he raised many of the questions that
are still discussed in contemporary argumentation theory. His answers to these
questions are sometimes formulated in a language that sounds unfamiliar and seems
to be far away from the modern world. But under the surface of texts that may be
difficult or sketchy, we find a coherent and self-contained approach that combines a
realistic view of what people actually do when the dispute, argue, or try to persuade
others with the normative emphasis of how people should construct and present
sound arguments. This approach has set the agenda ever since and has provoked
criticism ever since. In one way or another the elements of Aristotles theory still
remain important sources for modern argumentation theory.
References
Bird, Otto. 1961. The re-discovery of the Topics. Professor Toulmins inference warrants. Mind 70:
534539.
Burnyeat, Myles F. 1994. Aristotle on the logic of persuasion. In Aristotles Rhetoric: Philosophical
essays, ed. David J. Furley and Alexander Nehamas, 355. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Brunschwig, Jacques. 1967. Aristote, Topiques, tome I, livres I-IV. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
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