Royal Institute of Philosophy

Is Existence a Predicate?
Author(s): Vera Peetz
Source: Philosophy, Vol. 57, No. 221 (Jul., 1982), pp. 395-401
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Royal Institute of Philosophy
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4619584 .
Accessed: 12/12/2014 13:51
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Cambridge University Press and Royal Institute of Philosophy are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,
preserve and extend access to Philosophy.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 193.63.81.241 on Fri, 12 Dec 2014 13:51:03 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Is

Existence

Predicate?

VERA PEETZ

According to Kant, existence is not a real predicate, that is, 'a predicate
which is added to the concept of a subject and enlarges it';1 and modern
philosophical analysis would seem to support Kant's view. One argument
to show that existence is not a predicate is the following. In order to
predicate something of X, it must be presupposed that X exists. So, if
'exists' is a predicate, then, for example, 'Tame tigers exist' will be tautologous and 'No tame tigers exist' will be self-contradictory, but, since
neither of these is the case, 'exists' cannot be a predicate.
It has been suggested that there are cases where 'exists' does function as
a predicate. Mr David Pears,2 for example, thinks that 'exists' is a predicate
when the subject (which is presupposed to exist at one time) is said to exist
at another time (for example 'Euston Arch no longer exists') or when
existence is presupposed in one world and asserted in another (for example,
'The house I dreamt about really exists'). Professor W. P. Alston3 also
argues for different kinds of existence, existence in the real world, existence
in fiction, existence in imagination, and so on. Although it might be said
that other modes of existence depend on real existence, I am inclined to
think, although I do not want to argue for it here, that there is some point in
distinguishing various modes of existence and, certainly, as Alston says,
ordinary language does. Alston, like Pears, suggests that if X is presupposed to exist in one mode we can predicate of it existence in
another mode. However, he argues that since we can predicate of X only
what is appropriate to X's mode of existence (for example, I cannot say of
the fictional Mr Pickwick that he really went to Bath), we cannot predicate
of a subject which exists in one mode that it exists in another mode.
Existence is, therefore, not a predicate and 'The legendary King Arthur
really existed in the sixth century' is to be translated as a conjunction of two
existential statements thus, 'King Arthur existed in legend and King
Arthur really existed in the sixth century'. I do not think this translation is
adequate, for it fails to establish a connection between the two King
Arthurs. Also, Alston's argument would not rule out Pears' instances of
something being presupposed to exist at one time being said to exist at
another time, for example, 'Euston Arch no longer exists'.
1 The
Critiqueof Pure Reason, Second Division, Transcendental Dialectic,
Ch. 3, Sect. 42 'Is Existence a
Predicate?', in PhilosophicalLogic, P. F. Strawson (ed.)
Press,
(Oxford University
1967).
3 'The OntologicalArgumentRevisited',PhilosophicalReviewLXIX (i960).
Philosophy57 1982

This content downloaded from 193.63.81.241 on Fri, 12 Dec 2014 13:51:03 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

395

Discussion

Leaving this problem for the moment, I want to look now at the distinctions which G. E. Moore4drew between 'exists' and an undoubtedly
properpredicatesuch as 'growls'.If we compare'Tame tigers growl' with
'Tame tigers exist', then, whereasall of the followingA set
AI. All tame tigers growl
A2. Some tame tigers growl
A3. Some tame tigers do not growl
A4. No tame tigers growl
make perfectlygood sense, of the followingB set
Bi. All tame tigers exist
Bz. Some tame tigers exist
B3. Some tame tigers do not exist
B4. No tame tigers exist
only B2 and B4 have a clear sense; BI and B3 'are puzzling expressions,
which certainlydo not carrytheir meaning,if they have any, on the face of
them'.5 (Moore does suggest a meaning for B3, and one could similarly
give one for Bi, in terms of real peopleimagining,havinghallucinationsof
... tame tigers, but such an interpretationwill involve a differentsense of
'exists'.)
It might seem then that thereis a differencebetween'exists'and ordinary
predicateslike 'growls'.However,considerthe followingexamples:
(C) Rain fell in Nottinghamtoday
(D) Spots cover his face
(E) Tame tigers growledin SherwoodForest
Of the following
CI. All rain fell in Nottinghamtoday
Cz. Some rain fell in Nottinghamtoday
C3. Some rain did not fall in Nottinghamtoday
C4. No rain fell in Nottinghamtoday
only Cz and C4 have a clear sense, and it is doubtful whethera meaning
could be given to CI and C3. We get a similarresultfor the set DI-D4 and
the set EI-E4.
One thing that we should notice is that the insertionof 'the' before the
subject-termmakesa differenceto all these sets of examples.In sets B and
C, the insertion of 'the' before, respectively, 'tame tigers' and 'rain'
implies a presupposition of the existence in one case of a particular group
4

'Is Existence a Predicate?',Proceedingsof the AristotelianSociety Suppl.

Vol. XV (1936).
5 Op. cit.

396

This content downloaded from 193.63.81.241 on Fri, 12 Dec 2014 13:51:03 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Discussion

of tame tigers and in the other of a particularfall of rain.All the examples

have a clear sense (suggestedexistentialpresuppositionsin brackets):
B'I. All the tametigers(whichexist) exist
B'2. Some of the tame tigers (which exist) exist
B'3. Some of the tame tigers (which exist) do not exist
B'4 None of the tame tigers (which exist) exist
C'I. All the rain (which fell in Britaintoday) fell in Nottingham
C'2. Some of the rain (which fell in Britaintoday) fell in Nottingham
C'3. Some of the rain (which fell in Britaintoday) did not fall in
Nottingham
C'4. None of the rain (which fell in Britaintoday) fell in Nottingham
and similarlywith the correspondingsets D'I-D'4 and E'I-E'4. (I could
have chosen a presuppositionfor the B' exampleswhich would have made
them examplesmore likely to be used-for example, 'All the tame tigers
(which existed in the safari park) (still) exist'-but for various reasons I
have chosen the presuppositiongiven above.) In the B' set, B'I and B'2
are tautologousand B'3 and B'4 are self-contradictory,but, in this case,
this does not imply that 'exists' is not a predicate(although,as Kant says,
it adds nothingto the conceptof the subject).When we insert 'the' before
the subjectin the B, C, D and E examples,therefore,we get B', C', D' and
E', all of which make sense.
The insertionof 'the' before 'tame tigers' in the A examplesalso makes
a difference.Whereasthe A examplesdescribea characteristicwhich all or
some tame tigers do or do not have, the A' examples(for example,'All the
tame tigers growl')describewhat all or some of a particulargroup of tame
tigersare doing or not doing now. In the A examples,'growl'is being used
in its habit sense, in the A' examplesit is being used to describewhat is
happeningnow. This is also a differencebetween the A examplesand the
B, C, D, E examples:none of the B, C, D, E examplesis used to describea
characteristicwhich the subject possesses or does not possess; they all
describe what is happeningat a particulartime. However, there is this
differencebetweenthe B examplesand the C, D, E examples:whereasthe
verbs 'fall', 'cover'and 'growl'can all be used in appropriateexamplesto
describe a characteristic,it can never be a characteristicof anything to
exist.
Why is there a differencebetween the B, C, D, E examplesand the B',
C', D', E' examples?Why do the latter go through all the Aristotelian
quantifications,but not the former?Let us look first at the C and C' sets.
In the C' set, we are referringto a particularamountof rain, namely,the
rainwhich fell in Britaintoday; in the C set, however,we are not referring
to a particularamountof rain. C is equivalentto (F) 'Nottinghamhad rain
today' and C' is equivalentto (G) 'Nottinghamhad the rain which fell in
397

This content downloaded from 193.63.81.241 on Fri, 12 Dec 2014 13:51:03 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Discussion

Britaintoday'. All of
GI. Nottinghamhad all the rain which fell in Britaintoday
G2. Nottinghamhad some of the rain which fell in Britaintoday
G3. Nottinghamdid not have some of the rain which fell in Britain
today
G4. Nottinghamhad none of the rain which fell in Britaintoday
have a clearsense, but of the correspondingF set only
Fz. Nottinghamhad some rain today
F4. Nottinghamhad no rain today
have a clearsense.
In the G set of examples,we are referringboth to Nottinghamand to the
rain which fell in Britaintoday and predicatingof Nottinghamthat it had
(or did not have) all (or some) of that rain. In the F set of examples, we
are referringonly to Nottinghamand predicatingof it that it had (or did
not have)rain.In the G examples,the existenceof both Nottinghamandthe
rain which fell in Britainis presupposed,whereasin the F examplesonly
the existenceof Nottinghamis presupposedand the examplesthemselves
assert the existence (or non-existence) of rain in Nottingham. Having
establishedthe existenceof rain in Nottingham,we can then talk about the
rain which fell in Nottingham. The definite description,'the rain which
fell in Britaintoday'which occursin the G and C' examplesis being used
as a referringexpression; the indefinite description 'some rain', which
occursin F2 and F4 and Cz and C4 ('No rainfell' is equivalentto 'It is not
the case that some rain fell') is not being used as a referringexpression.
This will perhapsbe moreobviouswhenwe considerthe B and B' examples.
If we comparethe B example 'Tame tigers exist' with the C example
'Rain fell in Nottinghamtoday', what has been said about the C example
would suggestthat in 'Tame tigers exist', 'tametigers'is not being used as
a referringexpression.There are also other considerationswhich help to
confirmthis view. The B' examples,although either tautologousor selfcontradictoryand, therefore,not likely to be uttered very often, all make
perfectlygood sense. 'Exists'in these B' examplesseems to functionas any
other predicate(althoughhere perhapsnot a realpredicatein Kant'ssense).
Nor does it seem that the sense of 'exists' in the B' examplesis different
from the sense of 'exists'in the B example,'Tame tigers exist', so, in spite
of what is said, it seems that 'exists'is here a predicate.But, as Alston puts
it,6 'beforewe can attachany predicateto anything.., we must presuppose
that it exists'. As we have seen, if in 'Tame tigers exist' we were to presuppose that tame tigers exist, then 'Tame tigers exist' would be tautologous, which it is not. This would seem to confirmthe suggestionalready
6 Op.cit.

398

This content downloaded from 193.63.81.241 on Fri, 12 Dec 2014 13:51:03 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Discussion

made when comparing'Tame tigers exist' with 'Rain fell in Nottingham

today'that 'tametigers'is not herebeing used as a referringexpression(for
a referringexpressionpresupposesthe existenceof what is being referred
to). If, however,'tametigers'is not here a referringexpressionand 'exists'
is a predicate,and if in orderto attacha predicateto somethingwe have to
presupposethat it exists, of what is 'exists' being predicated?
Let us rememberthat 'Tame tigers exist' is equivalentto 'There are
tame tigers' and let us rememberalso the parallelbetween 'Tame tigers
exist' and 'Rain fell in Nottinghamtoday'. 'Rainfell in Nottinghamtoday'
is equivalent,as we have seen, to 'Nottinghamhad rain today' and the
sentencesreferto Nottinghamratherthan to rain. I would suggest, therefore, that 'there'in 'There are tame tigers'is not non-locative(as has been
assumed)but refersto the world of existenceaboutwhich we are talkingthe realworld,the worldof fiction,the worldof dreams,and so on. 'Exists',
that is, is ratherlike 'free'-it needs to be supplementedas in 'exists in the
real world', 'exists in fiction', and so on. Usually when we use 'exists'
without any furtherqualification,it is understoodfrom the context which
mode of existence we are talking about. Thus, 'Tame tigers exist' will
normallymean 'Tame tigers exist in the real world' and this is equivalent
to 'The real world containstigers'; that is, we are predicatingtame tigers
of the real world,just as we predicaterain of Nottingham.
From anotherpoint of view, it is also obviousthat 'tametigers'in 'Tame
tigers exist' is not a referringexpression(and, therefore,not the logical
subject of the sentence). If 'tame tigers' were here a referringexpression
then it would presupposethe existenceof tame tigers,that is, it would presuppose another existential statement about tame tigers; and if 'tame
tigers' in this second existentialstatementis a referringexpressionthen it
presupposes a third existential statement, . . . and so on, ad infinitum. It

might be objected that this criticism will also apply to 'The real world
containstigers', for here the real world must be presupposedto exist. The
realworld, of course,must be takento exist, it must be takenas given, but
this does not generate an infinite regress. When we presupposethe real
world to exist, we get the tautology 'The real world exists' or 'The real
world containsthe real world'.
One question which this discussionof existence has raised is when an
expressionis being used as a referringexpression,a subject about which
there seems to be some confusion.For example,ProfessorP. F. Strawson,1
in spite of his distinctionbetween 'A man fell over the edge' and 'The man
fell over the edge' neverthelesstalks about 'a man' and 'the man' as referring expressions, although, comparing Strawson's examples with the
examples I have been discussing in this article, I would have said that
whereas 'the man' refers 'a man' does not. In 'A man fell over the cliff',
7 Introduction to Logical Theory (London: Methuen,

1952), 186-187.

399
27

This content downloaded from 193.63.81.241 on Fri, 12 Dec 2014 13:51:03 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Discussion

we are talking about the cliff (which is presupposedto exist) and establishing the existenceof (puttinginto the picture)a man with some relation
to the cliff (fallingoff it); that is, we are predicatingsomethingof the cliff.
Expressions can be used to refer only when existence, at some level, is
presupposed; when existence is not presupposed the expressions can be
used only predicatively. We can go through the range of (Aristotelian)
quantifiers only with those expressions where existence is presupposed.
To talk of something is not always to refer to it. Roughly speaking, one
might say that definite descriptions can be used as referring expressions,

statements,indefinite descripwhereas, except in characteristic-ascribing

tions cannot, but this requires qualificationand refinement,something
that would take too long within the limits of this article.
What can we say then about existence?
(i) There are examples, the B' examples ('The tame tigers exist'), where
it would seem that 'exists' is being used to predicate something of
tame tigers although only tautologously or self-contradictorily.
(2) In the B examples ('Tame tigers exist') 'exist' is being used as a

predicate, but not to predicate something of tame tigers, but to

predicate something of, say, the real world; this is probably the most
useful use of 'exists'.

(3) It does seem plausibleto say that in 'EustonArch no longer exists'

'exists'is a predicate,predicatingsomethingof EustonArch.It might
be argued that 'Euston Arch no longer exists' is equivalent to
'Euston Arch exists at time ti and Euston Arch exists at time t2', but
since 'Euston Arch' is a referring expression and therefore presupposes the existence of Euston Arch, then, even in this translation
'exists at time tl (t2)' is a predicate predicating something of Euston
Arch. However, I am inclined to agree with Alston that in 'The
legendary King Arthur really existed in the sixth century' 'existed'
is not being used to predicate real existence of the legendary King
Arthur, although, unlike Alston, I do not think that this means that
'exists' is not a predicate. My interpretation of the sentence is this,

althoughI would not wantto insist on it: that a king called Arthuris
predicatedof the world of legend and a king called Arthuris predicated of the real world and there is some sort of identity between
the King Arthurof legend and the King Arthurof the realworld.
(4) One thing which emergedwhen 'Tame tigers growl' was compared
with 'Tame tigers exist' was that 'exist' could never be used in a
habit sense. 'Exists', as Kant said, is not 'a predicate which is added
to the concept of a subject and enlarges it'. And even when we
construe 'Tame tigers exist' as saying something about the (real)
world, we cannot say that it is characteristic of the world to contain
tame tigers.
400

This content downloaded from 193.63.81.241 on Fri, 12 Dec 2014 13:51:03 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Discussion

(5) 'Exists'has this peculiaritynot possessedby otherpredicates:that in

orderto predicateanythingof X, even 'exists' itself, we must first of
all presupposethat X exists, that is, that some world containsX.
It is not true, then, to say that 'exists'is not a predicate,but it cannotbe
used, as most other predicatescan, to describe a characteristic(or habit)
which somethinghas. This is probablywhat Kant meantwhen he said that
existencewas not a real predicate.It is, however,to use Pears'expression,
'a peculiarsort of predicate'.

Universityof Nottingham

401O

This content downloaded from 193.63.81.241 on Fri, 12 Dec 2014 13:51:03 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions