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T R E A T I N G S E X U A L H A R A S S M E N T VVITH R E S P E C T
Anita Bernstein*
H7 ta 5 sexual harassment? Individuis in the workforce need to know. Judicial
opinions do not fully inform them, and academic commentary has not linked doctrine tu
everyday wcrk ext erience or to an intelligible ethical philosophy that is widely
understood and shared. In this Article, Professor Bernstein undertakes to explain sexual
harassment using the concept o f respect. She arges that a defendant charged with
hostile environment sexual harassment ought to be held to the standard o f a respectful
person. This doctrinal device improves on approaches that now prevail, particularly
those emphasizing reasonableness. After detailing the shortcomings o f current law,
Professor Bernstein describes the virtues o f a legal rule that affirms respect. These
virtues which extend beyond sexual harassment include the resonance o f respect as
a valu among ordinary people, the history o f inclusin based on human dignity that
informs respect, the orientation o f respect around the conduct of an agent (rather than
the reaction o f a complainant, the focus o f current ndes), and congruence with a
tradition, foun d in many other areas o f American law, o f calling on citizens to render
respect.
IX T R O L ) U C T IO N
* Professor o f Law and Norman & Edna Freehling Scholar. Chicago-Kent College of Law
B A. 1981, Queens College; J.D. 1985, Yale. I acknowledge with deep thanks the inspiration. and
chalienges, of Carolvn Raffensperger. Chicago-Kent Class of 1994. who first proposed that we
write together on this subject. Carolvns commitments later precluded hcr from being co-author
or indeed sol author o f this Article. In my role of adoptive parent, I hope I have not betraved 'h? promise of her early ideas. A r other former student from the same class. John Franczyk. J .. u ad e several helpful remarks as I ;m riaxted. Thanks also to Patricia O Brien and Beth
Miller *or research assistance; Ian Ayres. Jacob Corre. Paul Fanning. Steven Heyman, Richard
Gonzlez, Herma Hill Kay, Peggie Rene Smith. and Alisen Steele for sharing their ideas abouf
respect and sexual harassment; and the Marshal! Ewell fund for financia! support.
1 See C a t h a r i n e A . M a c K i n n o n , F e m i n i s m U n m o d i f i e d 106 (19 8 7).
2 See Guidelines on Discrimination Because o f Sex, 29 C.F.R $ 1604 (1996).
J Numerou writings on sexual harassment spectacles include D a v i d B r c x k . 7 HE R e a l
A
n it a
H i l l (19 9 2 ); J a n e M
ayer
& J il l A
bram so n
. St r a n
ge
J u s t ic e : T
he
S e l l in o
of
446
( ,^ 3 .
1997]
447
Attem pting to fill this void, legal scholars have struggled to observe
the rigors of doctrine and at the same time to understand sexual h a
rassment as it is experienced. Appropriatelv focusing on hostile en vi
ronment sexual harassment in the workplace.'* these commentators explain this phenomenon as expressions of gender hierarchy,5 econom ic
inefficiency,6 free speech,7 and m isplaced pluralism.8 But few o f these
descriptions have achieved widespread acceptance in the judicial or
academ ic communities.9 Am ong those who undertake to describe the
nature of sexual harassment,10 a divisin has emerged. One group o
writers, expressing a sunny view o f human relationships, offers a
paradigm of workplace hostile environment sexual harassment as miscommunication. These observers envision a man who provokes fear
or anger, perhaps unintentionally, when he approaches a colleague or
,4
v a g u e n e s s o f th e term h a r a s s m e n t, see E u g e n e V o lo k h .
4 S e x u a l h a ra s s m e n t o c c u r s in a v a r ie ty o f s e ttin g s ; w it h in c a s e la w th e w o r k p la c e is th e m o st
im p o r t a n t o f th e se se ttin g s.
W o r k p la c e s e x u a l h a r a s s m e n t. a c c o r d in g to a n e a r ly m a n ife s t b y
See C a t h a r i n e A . M a c K i n n o n . S e x u a l H a r a s s m e n t
of
32 <19 79).
f o r m a d v e s in c e its fo rm u la tio n
Q u id p ro q u o h a r a s s m e n t. o r e x p lic it s e x u a l b l a c k m a i l, o c c u p ie s
om en
a m in u s c u le f ra c t io n o f s e x u a l h a r a s s m e n t c a s e la w ; o n ly e x tr a o r d in a r ilv r e c k le s s a n d b la t a n t b e-
See S u s a n E s t r ic h , Se.x at
Work, 43 S t a n . L . R e v . 8 13 , 8 34 (19 9 1). A c c o r d in g ly , m u c h h a r a s s m e n t h a s b e e n d i v e r t e d in to
h a v i o r b y a h a r a s s e r p e rm its a p l a in t if f to p u r s u e th is c a u s e o f a c tio n .
R e v . 5 3 , 6 0 -6 7 (1992).
6 See M a r ie T. R e illy, A Paradigm fo r Sexual Harassment: Tm ard the Optimal Level o f Loss,
e v 4 2 7. 4 3 6 - 7 6 (19 9 4 ); c f G ill ia n K H a d f ie ld ; Rational Women A Test for SexRased Harassment, 83 C a l . L R e v . 1 1 5 1 . 1 1 5 7 (19 9 5 ) (d e fin in g s e x u a l h a r a s s m e n t -as c o n d u c t
47 V a n d . L . R
448
[Vol. 111:445
1997]
449
HARVARD LA W REVIEW
450
[Vol. 111:445
th ers
3 5 - 3 6 (19 8 5 ).
997]
451
respect addresses the concerns o f both those who identify with the imperfect hum anity of the accused harasser and those who seek forem ost
to purge sexual coercion from the workplace. Respect also reconciles
competing perspectives on fault, simultaneously recognizing the tortlike w rong o f sexual harassm ent and the Title V II emphasis on vvorkplace discrimination.39 It gives shape to a problem whose outlines
have been blurred and contested. Despite its apparent novelty, the re
spectful person standard is intelligible, easy to execute, and not especially vulnerable to abuse or confusion. In short, it is likely to help re
duce the incidence o f hostile environment sexual harassment an d to
provide a rem edy for injured plaintiffs.
This proposed standard m ay eventually achieve acceptance in other
areas of law: it is im aginable that hostile environment sexual h arass
ment can serve as a circum scribed testing ground for a respectful person standard that w ill develop more general utility. Just as the nineteenth-century reasonable man w ent on to find a place in doctrines
other than negligence, where he first flourished, the respectful person
is a device that may w ork well outside of sexual harassment. For now ,
however, I confine m y argum ent to the bounded, though expanding,
territory of hostile environm ent sexual harassment.
This limited approach m ay not satisfy some readers, inasm uch as
respect resembles other affirm ative ideis such as altruism and charity.
Indeed it is nearly a tenet that in the liberal state legal rules cannot be
deployed solely to dctate virtue or, in the more commonly evok ed
phrase, to legislate morality.40 In this view, the virtues that law is com -
tress). On equalitv and autonomy the ideis honored by the respectful person standard see
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. W ade, 63
N .C . L . R e v . 375, 383 (1985), in which Ginsburg finds the concepts important to an understand
ing of sex discrimination in the abortion context.
39 S o m e c o m m e n ta to r s o n T it le V T I e x a g g e r a t e th e d ic h o t o m y b e tw e e n to r t-lik e d i s c r i m in a t io n -a s -w r o n g a n d d is c r im in a t io n - a s - s o c ia l-in e q u a lit y .
p r o d u c t iv e .
T o th e m , fa u lt in q u in e s a p p e a r c o u n t e r -
c a u s e th e y h o ld w o m e n to t r a d itio n a l m a le a n d fe m a le n o r m s a n d d o n o t f a c ilta t e e q u a l it y ) ;
D e n n is P. D u ffy , Intentional Injliction o f Emotional Distress and Employment at Will: The Case
Against Tortification o f Labor and Employment Law , 74 B.U. L . R e v . 387 (1994)- L e g i s l a t i v e
h is to r y d o e s n o t s u p p o r t a r e je c t io n o f th e f a u lt - b a s e d a p p ro a c h .
See M a c k A . P l a y e r ,
E m p l o y m e n t D i s c r i m i n a t i o n L a w 2 0 1 -0 2 (19 8 8 ) ( n o tin g th e a b s e n c e o f tra d itio n a l s o u r c e s o f
le g is la t iv e h isto ry ).
c e n te r s ta g e .
O n e m a jo r r e v is i n o f T it le V I I , th e C i v i l R ig h ts A c t o f 1 9 9 1 , b rin g s f a u l t to
d ie s fo r in te n tio n a l d is c r im in a t io n a n d u n la w f u l h a r a s s m e n t in th e w o r k p la c e .
o f 19 9 1, P u b . L . N o . 10 2 -16 6 , 3 (1), 105 S t a t . 1 0 7 1 , 10 7 1 (19 9 1).
C iv il R ig h ts A c t
O n th e b u rg e o n in g ro le o f f a u l t
1 1 7 , 1 1 9 (19 9 5 ), w h ic h re fe rs to th e w h o le r e g im e o f fa u lt o n w h ic h e m p lo y m e n t d i s c r i m in a t io n
la w h a s b e e n b a s e d . Id.
of
452
[V ol. 111:445
petent to enforce do not extend m uch beyond nonaggression and tolerance.41 Although a strong lternative tradition, w hich m aintains that
the liberal State ought to overcom e its agnosticism about virtue and
promote an edifying visin o f the good life 42 opposes this view, I believe that m y proposal is consistent with a traditional liberal outlook.
For current purposes, consider the Latin etym ology o f respect
respicere, to look back, or to take a second look.4J T h e reader is invited to regard again this fam iliar word, apart from its connotation of
moral virtue.
Respect more than other w ords expresses w hat is w rong about
the creation or m aintenance o f a hostile w orking environment. As
philosophers have elaborated, a fundamental m eaning o f respect, apart
from a separate m eaning of esteem, is recognition o f a persons inherent worth. Respect in the sense o f recognition is owed to all persons,
and thus w orkplace sexual harassm ent betrays the ideal of recognition
respect, regardless o f whether the harassed w orker deserves high es
teem. Respect also illum inates w hat is appropriate about the search
for a legal rem edy of this w rong and, more generally, w hich goals are
attainable in the la w s continued endeavor to shape conduct. T he
w ord is at the center o f a rich philosophical literature, yet is equally
integral to ordinary lives, suggesting that it can unite ideis w ith dayto-day practice. L egal recognition of respect, then, does not merely
exhort a citizenry to im prove its moris; it enhances the function and
the intelligibility o f doctrine.
The functioning o f respect as an element of sexual harassm ent law
emerges in a study undertaken in the five parts o f this Article. I begin
w ith Title V II doctrine.44 A plaintiff alleging hostile environm ent sex
ual harassm ent in violation o f this statute must prove two elements
about the challenged conduct, one subjective and one objective. She
must contend that she perceived her environment to be hostile or abuL
aw
( 19 6 1 ). A ls o , O
l iv e r
en d ell
Ho
lm es,
he
ommon
aw
1 1 5 ( M a r k D e W o lfe H o w e
Id.
41 See J .S . M i l l , O n L i b e r t y 68-69 ( P e n g u in B o o k s 1982) (1859). B u il d i n g u p o n th e v vo rk s
o f M ill a n d R a w l s , t h is p o s t u r e is a v a r ia t i o n o n a cla im t h a t th e r ig h t is p r io r to th e g o o d . See
J o h n R a w l s , P o l i t i c a l L i b e r a l i s m 218 (1993); J o h n R a w ls , The Priority o f Right and Ideas o f
the Good, 17 P h i l . & P u b . A f f . 251, 260-64 (1988). B e c a u s e n o v is i n o f th e g o o d m a y b e d e m e d ., 1963), d is d a in s th e p u r p o s e o f im p r o v in g m e n s h e a rts.'
o n s t r a t e d a s s u p e r io r to a n o t h e r , th e State in t h is v ie w m a y n o t p r o m o t e a n y id e is e x c e p t th o se
t h a t p r o t e c t o r e x p a n d th e a u t o n o m y o f in d iv id u is . See S t e p h e n A . G a r d b a u m , Why the Liberal
State Can Promote Moral Ideis After All, 104 H a r v . L . R e v . 1350, 1351 i 1991).
42 See W i l l i a m A . G a l s t o n , L i b e r a l P u r p o s e s . G o o d s , V i r t u e s , a n d D i v e r s i t y i n
t h e L i b e r a l S t a t e 252-55 (1991): A m y G u t m a n n , D e m o c r a t i c E d u c a t i o n 46 (1987); K e n n e t h K a r s t , B e l o n g i n g t o A m e r i c a : E q u a l C i t i z e n s h i p a n d t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n passim
(1989); W illia m A . G a ls t o n , Two Conceptions o f Liberalism, 105 E T H IC S 516, 518 (1995); S u z a n n a
S h e rry . Responsible Republicanism: Educating fo r Citizenship, 62 U. C h i . L. R e v . 131, 132 (1995).
43 See R o b in S. D illo n , Respect and Care: Toward Moral Integration , 22 C A N A D IA N J . P h i l .
105, 108 (1992).
44 T it le V I I d o c tr in e is in im p o r t a n t r e s p e c t s c o n g ru e n t w it h th e p l a i n t i f f s b u rd e n o f p r o o f in
d i g n it a r y - t o r t a c tio n s a ll e g in g in j u r y c a u s e d b y s e x u a l h a ra ssm e n t.
453
sive; put another way, she must have regarded the challenged conduct
as unwelcom e at the time it occurred. T he environm ent m ust also
have been objectively hostile or abusive.4S W hen considering the objective element of the prim a facie case, virtually all courts resort to the
words reason or reasonable. Throughout this Article, I m aintain
that the concept of respect lies below, undetected, while references to
reason purport to govern case outcomes.
Part I details the futility of reasonableness standards for sexual
harassment law. Hostile environment sexual harassment is an indignity, not a violation of norms about prudence or cost avoidance; thus
inquiries about reason or reasonableness have little to say about hostile
environm ent sexual harassment. This point has been made by writers
at opposite ends of the political spectrum.46 Elaborating on these
foundational objections to a reasonableness standard, I contend in Part
I that the standard cannot be salvaged, no m atter w hich m eaning is
used for the word reasonable. If this word means characterized by
reason, as some arge,47 then it can tell us nothing whatsoever about
whether any given defendant harassed a plaintiff. Reference to reason
in hostile environment sexual harassment m ay be worse than beside
the point: it subtly denigrates some claimants and minimizes or denies
the nature of their injury. If the word instead means som ething like
sensible, moderate, centrist, or w illing to accept shared norm s, the
standard is equally opaque; like the definition of reasonable as ra
tional, this alternative meaning is also capable o f doing harm by
tending to m arginalize and oppress subordinated groups.
W orking w ith similar themes, writers have built a vast critical literature about reasonableness standards. These judicial and academ ic
efforts to revise the objective criteria of hostile environment sexual
harassment are examined in Part H, where I discuss the consequences
of a m isplaced commitment to reasonableness in Am erican sexual ha
rassment law. W ith reasonable locked firm ly into doctrinal place,
courts and scholars use it to modify various nouns: reasonable wom an,
reasonable victim , and more. This unending process of m odification is
a quandary because, as advocates of each standard arge cum ulatively,
all reasonableness standards are defective. Reasonable person has
been challenged by reasonable w om an, w hich has been attacked in
turn by w hat I cali the tinkerers, whose revisions (reasonable target,
reasonable victim , reasonable person of the same gender as the victim ,
45 The prima facie case includes other elements less pertinent to this Article. See Henson v.
C ity of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-05 (n th Cir. 1982) (applying a five-part burden of proof).
46 Compare pp. 448-49 (summarizing the views of Justice Scalia), with Ehrenreich, supra note
8, at 1230-32.
47 See supra pp. 448-49 (noting the views of Justice Scalia); see also Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr.,
The Reasonable Man of Negligence Law: A Health Report on the Odious Creature, 23 O k l a . L.
R e v . 410, 420-24 (1970) (distinguishing the reasonable man from the average man, the attentive
man, the ideal man, the composite man, and the subjective standard).
454
H ARVARD L A W RE VIEW
(V o l. 111:445
997]
45 S
R eason
and
hey
P e r t a in
to
T h e g o a l o f r e s p e c t is a ls o a n im p o r t a n t t h e m e in w r i t i n g s
a b o u t w o m e n in t h e w o r k p l a c e t h a t f o c u s o n c la s s .
.T h e L iv e s o f W o r k in g W o m e n
in
See J o a n S a n g s t e r , E a r n i n g R e s p e c t :
110 -16 (1995); cf.
S m a l l - T o w n O n t a r i o 19 2 0 -19 6 0 , a t
T o n i G ilp in , G a r v I s a a c , D a n L e w in & J a c k M c K iv ig a n , O n S t r i k e f o r R e s p e c t : T h e
C le r ic a l & T e c h n ic a l W o r k e r s S tr ik e a t Y a le
U n iv e r s ity
( d is c u s s in g th e in t e r s e c t io n o f c l a s s a n d r e s p e c t in th e la b o r s t r ik e co n te x t) .
H ARVARD LA W R E VIEW
[V o l. 111:445
53 See A l f r e d N o r t h W h i t e h e a d , T h e F u n c t i o n o f R e a s o n 1 - 2 8 (19 2 9 ).
54 See G.J. W a r n o c k , Reason, in 7 E n c y c l o p e d i a o f P h i l o s o p h y 8 3 , 8 4 ( P a u l E d w a r d s e d .,
r e p r i n t e d . 1 9 7 2 ).
( d e s c r ib in g a r e a s o n a b l e p e r s o n s t a n d a r d t h a t in c o r p o r a t e s a l l o f th e s h o r t c o m i n g s a n d
m e a n in g s s u c h a s i n d i v i d u a l p e r f e c t i o n a n d a c o m m u n it y i d e a l ).
58 See Susan Ehrlich M artin, Sexual Harassment: The Link Joining Gender Stratification,
Sexuality, and Womens Econom ic Status, in W o m e n : A F e m i n i s t P e r s p e c t i v e 2 2 , 2 5 , 32 (Jo
Freem an ed., 5th ed. 1995) (correlating traits o f women with the experience o f being harassed at
work).
59 T h is v iew is a common one, notwithstanding Judge Posners effort to conjoin the two. See
R ic h
ard
A. P
o sn er
, Sex
an d
eason
(19 9 2 ).
1997]
457
am ong hum an beings.60 From ancient G reece through nineteenthcen tu ry E urop e and beyond, intellectual leaders ju stified social and
p olitical inequality w ith reference to the transcendent gift o f reason.
T h ose w h o could reason best were m ost fit to govern, to control property an d its law s, and to m ake use of lesser creatures.61
O n this subject, great minds thought alike.62 A cco rd in g to Aristotle, the deliberative facu lty in the soul is not present at a ll in a
slave; in a fem ale it is present but ineffective; in a child present but
un develo ped .63 A n d for Aristotle there could be no good life w ith o u t
reason: thus a w o m a n s life is alw ays slavish, never fu lly h u m an .64
K a n t w rote that w om en were not capable o f principies65 a n d that
their ph ilosophy is not to reason, but to sense.66 For H egel, w om en
could not attain to the ideal o f rational thought: T h e d ifferen ce betw een m en and w om en is like that betw een anim als and p la n ts.67
R ousseau denounced w om en as incapable o f thought and u n su ited to
education;68 his highest accolade69 for a w om an w as O h lo vely ignoran t fa ir!70 Schopenhauer described w om en as in every respect
b a c k w a rd , lack in g in reason and reflection.71 T h e great B ritish Enlightenm ent philosophers, notably H obbes, L ocke, and A d a m S m ith,
did not cra ft m isogynous aphorism s abou t reason as they constructed
their vie w o f the state. Rather, their w ritings, w hich refer con tin u ally
to the individ ual, presum e the absence o f w om en s thought, consent,
and d ecision m aking.72
60
61
C
o n tem po rary
e m in is m
g yn y
to
2 9 - 3 1 , 8 5, 1 4 1 , 1 9 5 - 9 6 ( 2 d e d . 19 9 3 ) ( d e s c r ib in g th e r e c u r r e n t a r g u -
m e n t in w e s t e r n p o l it i c a l t h o u g h t t h a t m e n s h o u ld h a v e p o lit ic a l p o w e r o v e r w o m e n b e c a u s e o f
m e n s s u p e r io r a b i li t y t o re a s o n ).
(19 9 2 ).
w n
65 I m
m an u el
Ka
n t
, O
b s e r v a t io n s o n t h e
e e l in g
of th e
Bea
u t if u l a n d
Su
b l im e
eg el
, Ph
il o s o p h y o f
R ig
h t
2 6 3 ( T .M . K n o x t r a n s ., O x f o r d U n iv . P r e s s 1 9 6 7 ) ( 1 9 5 2 ) .
(17 6 2 ) .
69 S u
70
san
r o w n m il l e r
, F
e m in in it y
10 9 (19 8 4 ).
Id. ( q u o t i n g 3 J e a n -J a c q u e s R o u s s e a u , E m i l i u s ( E d i n b u r g h , A . D o n a l s o n t r a n s ., 17 6 8 )
( 17 6 2 )).
71 A r t h u r S c h o p e n h a u e r , On Women, in S e l e c t e d E s s a y s o f S c h o p e n h a u e r 3 3 8 , 3 4 6
(Ernest Belfort Bax ed. & trans., 1926).
72 See C a r o l e P a t e m a n , T h e S e x u a l C o n t r a c t 4 3 - 5 0 , 5 2 - 5 3 ( 19 8 8 ) (discussing H obbes
and Locke); id. at 5 0 - 5 2 (alluding to the subordination o f women in classical contract theory).
45
[V o l. 111:4 4 5
A s the history o f fem ale ed u cation dem onstrates, these beliefs abou t
the n ature o f w om en have ju stified the exclusin o f girls and w om en
from schoolin g and h ave p erp etu ated the im age o f w om en as incom peten t to reason. T h e b elief that intellectual training should be ava ila b le
to fem ale persons has been w id ely held in the U nited States for less
than a cen tury.
S p eak in g in the am e of reason, au thority figures
h a ve lon g used the lan gu age o f Science to keep w om en u n ed u cated .74
V estiges o f these historical beliefs persist,75 as girls and w om en con
tin u to learn th at reason rem ains m asculine territory.76
T h is territory is also w hite: a parallel tradition links reason w ith
r a c e .77 In his classic, The M ism easure o f Man, Stephen J a y G o u ld recounts the perp etu al effort to equ ate cognitive strength w ith the traits
o f w h ite E u rop ean men: again and again com m entators h ave falsely
claim ed th at intellect correlates w ith skull size, brain w eight, facial
features, geograph ic origin, and other constructs o f physical anth ropology.78 G o in g fu rther than the w hite-suprem acist researchers that
73 See M
C
h eat
yr a
ir l s
Sa
& D
d ker
1 5 - 4 1 ( 19 9 4 )
a v id
Sa
d ker
, F
a il in g
at
F a ir n
e ss:
ow
m e r i c a s
Sc h
o o ls
States).
74 One prom inent physician, E d w ard C larke, wrote in 1873 to a heeding audience that girls
should not pursue prolonged education because the effort involved would divert blood needed for
m enstruation from their w om bs to their brains. See id. at 30-31, 231.
75 T od ay A m erican girls and wom en are more likely than their male classm ates to face neglect,
condescension, sexual exploitation, and biased measurement o f their school perform ance. See id.
a t 1-1 4 . A tta ck s on the S a d k ers w ork, which have not refuted this general conclusin, are summ arized in C a ri H orow itz, Does Education Cheat Females?, I n v e s t o r s B u s . D a i l y , O ct. 21,
1 9 9 4 , at A i , available in L E X I S , N ew s Library, Arcnew s File.
76 A c o n t i n u i n g n a t io n a l p r e o c c u p a t io n w i t h g e n d e r d iff e r e n c e m a y n o w e x a c e r b a t e u n e q u a l
a c c e s s t o t h e d o m a in o f r e a s o n .
B o t h f e m in i s t s a n d a n t i- fe m in is ts h a v e e n d e a v o r e d t o h a r m o n iz e
t h e id e a o f r e a s o n w i t h th e f e m a l e e x p e r i e n c e .
I n o n e f a m o u s e f fo r t , C a r o l G i l l i g a n a r g e s t h a t
m o r a l r e a s o n in g e n c o m p a s s e s c a r e a n d c o n n e c t io n to o th e rs , a p e r s p e c t iv e t r a d i t i o n a l l y a s s o c ia t e d
w it h w o m e n .
W
o m en
S D
See C a r o l G
evelo pm en t
il l ig a n
, In
6 4 - 6 6 , 10 5 ( 19 8 2 ).
if f e r e n t
o ic e
: Ps y c h
o l o g ic a l
h eo ry
an d
S o m e r e a d G i l l ig a n a s c o n s t r u in g m o r a l it y a s a n
i n t e r t w i n i n g o f e m o t io n , c o g n i t io n , a n d a c t i o n , n o t r e a d ily s e p a r a b l e , w h e r e a s t h e c o n t r a s t i n g
p e r s p e c t i v e , id e n t i f i e d w i t h t h e p s y c h o l o g is t L a w r e n c e K o h lb e r g , e m p h a s i z e s f o r m a l r a t i o n a li t y .
L aw ren ce A .
C
a r e
: F
B lu m ,
e m in is t
an d
In
t e r d is c ip l in a r y
t h ic
OF
P e r s p e c t i v e s 4 9 , 52 ( M a r y J e a n n e L a r r a b e e e d .,
A l t h o u g h it is t o o e a r ly
t o p r e d ic t h o w G i l l i g a n s r e v is i n w i l l u lt i m a t e l y a f f e c t th e w a y r e a s o n is u n d e r s t o o d , t h u s f a r it
a p p e a r s t h a t h e r e t h ic o f c a r e h a s e x p a n d e d th e t e r r a in of| r e a s o n w h ile l e a v i n g its t r a d i t io n a l u n
d e r s t a n d i n g in t a c t .
77 See A
sh ley
o ntagu
, T
he
atu ral
Su
p e r io r it y o f
om en
4 6 ( re v . e d . 1 9 9 2 ) ( E v -
e r y t h i n g t h a t h a s b e e n s a id a b o u t a l m o s t a n y a lle g e d ' i n f e r i o r r a c e h a s b e e n s a id b y m e n a b o u t
w o m e n . ).
78 S ee S t e p h e n J a y G o u l d , T h e M i s m e a s u r e o f M a n 1 1 3 - 2 2 ( 1 9 8 1 ) . G ould critiques a
controversial m odern continuation o f this argument in Stephen Jay G ould, Mismeasure by Any
Measure, in T h e B e l l C u r v e D e b a t e : H i s t o r y , D o c u m e n t s , O p i n i o n s 3 , 4 - 5 (Russell Jacoby & N aom i G lauberm an eds., 19 9 5 ).
1997]
459
G ould surveys, one w riter claim ed in 1868 that reform ers and
friends o f h u m an ity w ere hopelessly n aive to struggle a g a in st the
m anifest design o f G o d :7 A b lack man, w rote John Van E vrie, is incapable even o f w a lk in g erect, let alone of learning on par w ith w hite
m en.80 P hysicians o f the nineteenth century com m only b elieved that
b lack w om en w ere brutes, entitled to little recognition as h u m an creatures o f reason.81 T h e naturalist O liver G oldsm ith blam ed a h o t A frican clim ate for relaxing the m ental pow ers o f the local po pu lation ,
rendering A frican s stu p id and indolent.82
N a tiv e A m erican s received a sim ilar judgm ent from the w h ite men
w ho colonized them in the N ew World. Spanish com m entary d iv id e d
betw een n oble-savage condescension ( G od created these sim ple people
w ith ou t evil and w ith o u t guile, w rote Bartolom de L as C asas83) and
hatred ( W h a t could one expect from a people w hose skulls are so
thick and hard that the Spaniards had to take care in fighting not to
strike on the head lest their sw ords be blunted?84). A m erican s o f
B ritish descent had a sim ilar view of the native population; th e ir concept o f a va st frontier conveniently presupposed that no ratio n a l be
ings popu lated the A m ericas before the settlem ent o f J am estow n and
Plym outh R ock.8S
T h e last cen tury has eroded these beliefs.86 A n d a cen tu ry o r tw o
earlier, to be sure, reason prodded the Enlightenm ent, helping to effect
79
J .H . V
an
, W
v r ie
Su
h it e
prem acy
x per ts
d v ic e
TO W
Su
egro
n g l is h
, F
or
b o r d in a t io n
er
w n
ood
9 3 -9 4 ( N e w
: 150 V
Y ork ,
ears of
(19 7 8 ) ( d e s c r ib in g th e u se o f A f r i c a n - A m e r i c a n w o m e n
in s u r g ic a l e x p e r im e n t s ) ; C h a r l e s
e ir d r e
ii2
om en
and
Ed
egro
u c
. 3 2 8 , 3 3 4 ( 19 3 4 ) ( c it in g a c o m p a r is o n o f b l a c k w o m e n to
m o n k eys).
82 1 O
l iv e r
o l d s m it h
, A H
is t o r y
of th e
arth
and
n im a t e d
2 1 3 ( G la s
atu re
g o w , B l a c k i e & S o n 18 60 ).
83 L
e w is
a n k e
,T
Span
he
is h
Str
u g g le for
( 19 4 9 ) ( q u o t i n g B a r t o l o m d e L a s C a s a s ,
J u s t ic e
in t h e
o n q u est o f
m e r ic a
i i
Coleccin de tratados 7) ( in te rn a ] q u o t a t io n m a r k s o m it -
ted ).
84
f e r n a l q u o t a t io n m a r k s o m it te d ) .
85 See W
Pr
alter
esco tt
ebb
86 Y e t it r e m a in s r e s p e c t a b l e
, T
h e
p o s s e s s a t y p e o f in t e l li g e n c e d i f f e r e n t fr o m
in f e r i o r in t e lli g e n c e .
reat
r o n t ie r
e v e n f a s h i o n a b le
3 & n .3 (19 5 2 ).
f o r s e r io u s w r it e r s to a r g e t h a t w o m e n
that o f m e n , a n d t h a t A f r i c a n - A m e r i c a n s p o s s e s s a n
O n t h e p e c u l ia r n a t u r e o f w o m e n s in t e llig e n c e , se e B r o u g h t o n , c i t e d a b o v e
in n o t e 76 , a t 1 1 3 , w h ic h d e s c r i b e s L a w r e n c e K o h l b e r g s c o n c lu s i n t h a t a d u l t m e n r e a s o n a t w leg a l i s t i c s t a g e 4 w h il e a d u l t w o m e n la n g u is h in c o n f o r m is t s ta g e 3 , a n d c o m p a r e G
G
il d e r
, M
en
and
r e p r o d u c t iv e ro le s , a n d P o
F o r a l l e g a t io n s
C
h arles
if e
sn er
supra n o te 5 9 , a t 8 8 -9 8 , w h ic h id e n t ifie s th o s e s a m e d i f f e r e n c e s .
o f A fr ic a n -A m e r ic a n
u rray
, T
he
2 6 9 - 3 1 5 ( 19 9 4 ) , a n d A
e ll
eorge
5 - 1 8 (19 8 6 ), w h ic h id e n t ifie s g e n d e r d i f f e r e n c e s r e s u l t i n g fr o m
a r r ia g e
rth ur
in t e l le c t u a l in fe r io r itv , se e
urve
: In
R. Je n
t e l l ig e n c e a n d
sen
, G
e n e t ic s a n d
R ic h
lass
ard
St r
J. H
u ctu re
e r r n s t e in
in
&
m e r ic a n
E d u c a t i o n 1 6 0 - 6 3 < 19 72 ).
T he O.J. Sim pson crim inal-trial verdict of October 1995 revealed a belief held am on g some
white observers that A frican-Am ericans applaud Sim psons acquittal because of the an tirational-
H ARVARD L A W R E V IE W
4 o
[V ol. 111:445
r a in
1 9 1 - 9 6 ( 19 9 4 ); D
a v id
u m e
, A
In
q u ir y
o n c e r n in g
th e
P r in
10 5 ( C h a r l e s W . H e n d e l e d ., L i b e r a l A r t s P r e s s 1 9 5 7 ) ( 1 7 5 1 ) ; S u s a n B a n d e s ,
h i.
L. R
e v
. 36 1,
a c t in c o n c e r t t o s h a p e o u r p e r c e p t io n s a n d r e a c t i o n s .).
c ip l e s o f
orals
Empathy, Narrative,
36 8 (19 9 6 ) ( E m o t io n a n d
For
a s u m m a r y o f v a r io u s p h i lo s o p h ic a l
c r i t i q u e s o f t h e d i c h o t o m y b e t w e e n e m o t io n a n d r e a s o n , s e e P a u l G e w ir t z , On / Know It When I
S e e I t , 10 5 Y a l e L .J . 1 0 2 3 , 10 3 0 (19 9 6 ).
89 See, e.g., S t e p h e n L . D a r w a l l , I m p a r t i a l R e a s o n ( 19 8 3 ) ( e q u a t i n g r e a s o n w it h ju s tic e ) ;
see also W h i t e h e a d , supra n o t e 5 3 , a t 72 ( d e s c r ib in g r e a s o n a s a t e n d e n c y u p w a r d s t h a t e r e a t e s u n i v e r s a l o r d e r ).
90 See Payn e v. Tennessee, 501 U .S. 808, 856-57 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91 O n e f o u n d i n g f a t h e r o f r e a s o n a s a n
A m e ric a n
le g a l s t a n d a r d , O l i v e r W e n d e ll H o lm e s ,
v i e w e d h is o w n t e m p e r a m e n t a l d e t a c h m e n t a s a n a s s e t .
B
eaco n
il l
: T
he
if e a n d
im e s o f
l iv e r
See L i v a B a k e r , T
en d ell
Holm
es
he
Ju
289 ( 1 9 9 1 ) .
s t ic e
from
B a k e r e la b
r a l e s t h a t H o l m e s s c o m m i t m e n t to th e e x t e r n a l s t a n d a r d , th e o b je c t i v e c r it e r io n . . . a l l o w e d h im
t o i n d u l g e a p e r s o n a l t e n d e n c y t o d e t a c h m e n t f r o m h u m a n a f fa ir s . . . .
h e n e e d n e v e r f a c t o r e i t h e r t h e h u m a n m in d
o r h e a r t in t o
C o m m i t t e d to o b je c t i v i t y ,
a j u d i c i a l d e c is i n .
Id.
c o g n i t io n
1997]
m iller elaborates, this stereotype o f fem inine emotion does not com pn
sate for its alleged deficiencies by encom passing a deeper em otional
ran ge or a greater sen sitivity to nature or subtle feeling.94 W h en ascribed to w om en, em otion m erely buffets. O n ly reason, d ep loyab le by
those w h o possess the facility, can conquer emotion. A n d because o f
the perceived dichotom y betw een reason and em otion, valorizatio n o f
the one m ay be had only at the expense of the other. A ccord in gly, a
legal standard that rests on reason m ism easures the em otional elem ent
o f sexual harassm ent and underdescribes its effects.
Sexual harassm ent is incom prehensible w ithou t the lan gu ag e o f
em otion. A hostile w o rk in g environm ent is necessarily a cau ld ron o f
intense feelings. A s a law su it progresses, emotions often escalate, especially the rage o f harassers95 and the harassed.96 H eadaches, fa cia l
tics, card iac ailm ents, gynecological com plaints, and clinical depression
are am ong the m any ph ysical effects o f em otional distress that ha
rassed w orkers have reported to the courts.97 B elow the su rface o f
court pleadings, one w ill often discern contem pt, glee, sym pathy (for
exam ple, the em otional support o f friends that encourages a w o rk e r to
persist in her com plaint), cravings for revenge, and stubborn resolve.
94 B r o w n m i l l e r , supra note 6 9 , at 208. Regina Austin notes that the emotion stereotype
generally applies only to the white bourgeoisie. A lthough working class women and wom en of
color escape the em otional adjective, they do not achieve its opposite designation, ration al.
T h e adjective opposite to em otional, applied to them, is physical carnal, brutelike, a resource to be used. Regina Austin, Rem arks at the Association of Am erican L a w Schools W orkshop on Torts, Washington, D .C . (June 7 , 1996); cf. C entral R.R. v. W hitehead, 74 G a. 4 4 1 , 4 5 0
(18 8 5 ) (Hall, J., dissenting) (explaining the custom o f assisting white female passengers b u t not
their black counterparts).
95 See J a c k s o n - C o ll e y v . D e p a r t m e n t o f A r m y C o r p s o f E n g rs, 6 5 5 F. S u p p . 1 2 2 , 1 2 7 ( E .D .
M i c h . 1 9 8 7 ) ( s u m m a r iz i n g t e s t im o n y t h a t th e d e f e n d a n t h a b it u a l l y c u r s e d a t th e s k y ( in t e r n a l
in t if f
L it ig
a t in g
and
th e
Defen
Se x
se
u al
237, 2 4 1-4 7
tto r n eys
Har
assm en t
ase
( J u a n it a B . L u i s e d .,
19 94 ) [ h e r e i n a f t e r
] ( d e s c r ib in g th e e m o t io n s a n d p s y c h o l o g y o f h a
ra s se rs).
96 See P e g g y C r u ll , The Impact o f Sexual Harassment on the Job: A Profile o f the Experiences
o f 92 Women, in S e x u a l i t y i n O r g a n i z a t i o n s : R o m a n t i c a n d C o e r c i v e B e h a v i o r s a t
W
o rk
6 7 , 6 9 - 7 0 ( D a il A n n N e u g a r t e n & J a y M . S h a f r i t z e d s ., 1980) ( r e p o r t in g t h a t 9 6 % o f h a
62 ( c it in g a s u r v e y in w h ic h 7 8 % o f h a r a s s m e n t
462
HARVARD L A W R E VIEW
[Y o l. 111:445
98 See H arris v. F orklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (referring
to conditions [m aking] it more d ifficult to do the jo b (quoting D avis v. M onsanto Chem ical Co.,
858 F.2d 345, 349 (6th Cir. 1988)) (internal quotation m arks omitted)); Steiner v. Show boat Opera tin g Co., 25 F.3d 1459, M63 (9th Cir. 1994); M art v. D r Pepper Co., 923 F. Supp. 1380, 1384 (D.
K a n . 1996); Paterson v. State, 915 P.2d 724, 728 (Idaho 1996).
99 See C iv il R igh ts A ct o f 1991, Pub. L. N o. 102-166, 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (1991) (codified at 42 U .S.C . 1981a).
100 P O S N E R , supra n o t e 5 9 , a t 1 ( q u o t i n g A R I S T O T L E , N lC O M A C H E A N E t h i c s , b k . V I I , a t X I )
( i n t e r n a l q u o t a t i o n m a r k s o m it te d ) .
101 See id. at 4 (noting that his project m ay seem quixotic); id. at 9-10 (suggesting that one
w h o writes scholarship about sex is apt to be thought a little off); id. at 116 (referring to [t]he
ten d en cy to think o f sex in terms o f biological or psychological compulsin*)-
1997]
463
the in d ivid u al because o f her sex.102 R eason m ust understand an d explain an instance o f sex.
H ere the futility of reason as a standard becom es evident. U nless
courts and juries are com m itted to a fem inism that view s sexu al aggression as coercion and dom inance follow in g the w ritings o f Susan
B ro w n m ille r on rape103 or C atharine M a cK in n o n on p o rn ograp h y104
the presence o f sex in the p la in tiffs story w ill tend to suggest am big u ity and m ystery, beyond the ken o f reason. C ou rts and juries m ay
see sexual overtures as cool extortion or open hostility bu t also as dem ands th at orignate determ inistically, in n atu re.105 U n w an ted and
un return ed sexual attention m akes some observers think o f rom ance,
beauty, and poignant courtship.106 C ru d e w orkin g environm ents have
received indulgent treatm ent by w riters w h o com bine a sociobiological
o u tlo ok w ith w him sy.107 O nce cast as sex, w orkp lace conduct can dem u r to the inquiries o f reason.
T h is line o f thought suggests that attem pts to com bine sexual beh a vio r in the w orkplace w ith reason are likely to m ake the w orkp lace
m ore like a state o f nature, w ith hostile or abu sive conduct rendered
un to E ros, and reason cast aside as irrelevant to the inquiry. A t the
sam e tim e, how ever, the opposite danger also lurks: reason m a y be
ta k en too seriously, as opposed to ignored. T h e em ployer inform ed by
reason (that is, the reasonable person, if reason ab le is deem ed to
refer to the cap acity for ratiocination) m ay fear sexu ally im pelled beh avior because it generates risks and costs. T akin g reason seriously
m igh t ju s tify strong efforts to keep sexu ality ou t o f the w orkp lace; the
reason-driven em ployer m ight try to purge a w orkp lace o f flirtation
102 It is true that this phrasing conflates the possible meanings o f sex sex as gender an d sex
as sexuality. B u t this overlap reflects the current state of doctrine in sex discrimination an d sex
ual harassment case law. See generally Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from S e x and
S exu a l Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Fem inist Jurisp-rudence, 105 Y a l e L.J.
1, 16 -18 (1995) (discussing judicial confusion about the meanings o f sex, gender, and sexual orien
tation). T h e idea o f sex, despite the definitional inadequacy, serves the taxonomical function of
bringing allegations o f sexual harassment together, as a category within legal doctrine.
103 See S u s a n B r o w n m i l l e r , A g a i n s t O u r W i l l : M e n , W o m e n , a n d R a p e passim ( 1 9 7 5 ) ;
B r o w n m i l l e r , supra n o te 6 9 , a t 2 0 0 -0 1 .
104 See C a t h a r i n e A . M a c K i n n o n , Not a Moral Issue, in F e m i n i s m U n m o d i f i e d , supra
n o t e 1 , a t 14 6 ; C
a t h a r in e
A. M
ac
in n o n
, O
nly
ords
9 -1
(19 9 3 ).
105 See N ichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 510 (9th Cir. 1994) (expressing reluctance to chill the
incidence o f legitm ate romance and stating that increased proxim ity breeds increased volitional
sexual activity); M iller v. Bank o f Am., 418 F. Supp. 233, 236 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (noting that sexual
attraction is a natural part o f w ork life), revd, 600 F.2d 211 (gth Cir. 1979).
106 See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 (gth Cir. 1991) (suggesting an analogy to C yran o de
Bergerac).
107 See, e.g., Jones v. Wesco Invs., Inc., 846 F.2d 1154, 1157 n.6 (8th Cir. 1988) (declaring that
too m uch liability for sexual harassment would cause either the collapse o f our com m ercial system or the end o f the human race (quoting B rief for Appellants at 23, Jones (No. 87-1992)) (inter
nal quotation m arks omitted)); Lloyd R. Cohn, Sexual Harassment and the I m w , S o c i e t y ,
M ay/June 1991, at 9 (recalling nostalgically a female colleague who groped the male author at
work).
HARVARD L A W R E V IE W
464
[V oi. 111:445
1997]
465
496 ( 1995 )l -0 I d .
121 See Kathryn Abrams, G ender Discrimination and the Transformation o f Workplace N orm s,
42 V
an d
. L. R e
. 1 1 8 3 , 1202 (19 8 9 ).
HARVARD LA W R E VIEW
466
[V o l. 111:445
T h e m a le s t u d e n t s r e p o r t e d n o t h in g ; t h e w o m e n t a l k e d a b o u t
l o o k i n g i n t o t h e b a c k s e a t s o f t h e ir c a r s b e f o r e g e t t i n g in , s le e p in g w i t h l o c k e d w i n d o w s in h o t
See L y n n
Is the Law Male?: Let M e Count the Ways, 6 9 C h i . - K e n t L . R e v . 3 9 7 , 4 0 6 - 0 7
w e a t h e r , c a r r y i n g f ir e a r m s , a v o i d i n g d a r k p u b li c p la c e s , a n d o t h e r q u o t i d i a n d e t a ils .
H e c h t S c h a fra n ,
(
1993 ).
W e l l i n g t o n L . R e v . 10 5 , 1 0 5 - 0 6 , 1 1 0 (19 9 3 ).
2S T h e Restatem ent o f Torts states the negligence standard as that o f the reasonable man. See
( S e c o n d ) o f T o r t s 283, 291 (1965). T he current edition o f B la cks Law Dictionary provides an entry for reasonable m an but not reasonable w o m an or reasonable perso n . B l a c k s L a w D i c t i o n a r y 1266 (6th ed. 1990).
R
estatem e n t
997]
467
casebook; [t]he form used here is the reasonable, prudent p erso n .126
O b v io u sly ? I f the history o f the reasonable person reveis a n yth in g, it
reveis disagreem ent about w h at the term means. Perhaps the reason
able person is inevitably a reasonable man, as Leslie B en d e r
ch arges,127 incapable o f assim ilating that w hich is not m ale, w h ite,
and prop ertied .128 O r perhaps the reasonable person a d octrin al
d evice frequ en tly turned over to a cross section o f lay citizens is
m ore lik e ly to prom ote progress and d iversity w ithin authority than
are the elites w h o decry it.129 Those w h o despair that the reasonable
person can shed its gendered origins believe that the shift from m a n to
person is sem antic, too shallow to penetrate the longstanding a ttitu d e
that the reasonable person is w hat Susan E strich once called a real
m a n .130 Judges, w h o in the past read the w ord person sp ecifica lly
to exelude w om en ,131 m ay be vulnerable to the sam e biased tradition.
B u t these conclusions are speculative; the m eaning o f reasonable person rem ains a cipher.
2.
Ideologies Em bedded in Reasonableness. A lth o u gh the rea
sonableness stan dard lacks clear content, it is also vu ln erab le to the
opposite criticism : below the universalism on its surface, reason ab le
ness contains ideologies that are particularistic and oppressive. B ecause these m eanings o f reasonable are covert, it is difficult to say
how m uch danger they represent. N evertheless, attention to these em
bed d ed biases suggests the futility of an y progressive rem edial sta n
d ard based on w h a t is average, shared, or centrist.
a.
Pluralism,. In her im portant article on hostile en viron m en t
sexual harassm ent, N an cy Ehrenreich attacks the assum ption b eh in d
the reasonableness standard that sexual harassm ent law fu n ctio n s in
an egalitarian and pluralistic w orld.132 A ccord in g to E h renreich, the
id eology o f pluralism contains certain tenets. First, the ideal dem ocratic society is com prised o f com peting subgroups, writh none d om inating. Second, this society denies the existence o f absolute truths.
126 J o
ser
, W
h n
W. W
ad e an d
ad e
Sch
, V
c t o r
w a r t z s
E. Sc h
w artz,
ases an d
Ka th
ryn
a t e r ia l s o n
K
T
elly
orts
& D a v id
F. P a r t l e t t , P
ro s-
14 6 ( g t h e d . 19 9 4 ).
san
s t r ic h
, Re
a l
R a p e 65 (19 8 7 ).
131 See B rad w ell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 442, 445 (1873) (construing person" in an Illinois
attorney license statute to mean m an); Parker, supra note 124, at 109 n.28 (describing one c o u r ts
construction o f a statute to exciude women from practicing law, even though the statute u sed the
w ord persons rather than men and specifically provided that every w ord im porting the masculine gender only shall extend and be applied to a female as well as a m ale).
132 Ehrenreich, supra note 8, at 1230-31.
468
H A RV A RD L A W RE VIEW
[V o l. 111:4 4 5
139 S ee Dolores A. D onovan & Stephanie M. W ildm an, Is the Reasonable Man Obsolete? A
C ritical Perspective on Self-Defense and Provocation, 14 L o y . L.A. L. R e v . 435, 436-37, 462-67
(1981).
140 Cf. L in d a R. Hirshman, Is the O riginal Position Inherently M ale-Superior?, 94 C OLU M . L.
R e v . 1860, 1881 (1994) (criticizing Rawls).
1997]
469
table m arker o f w ho they are, and heterosexual men are not m u ch preoccupied w ith gender and sexual orientation. E v e ry hum an b ein g is
en dow ed w ith particularistic traits, but some groups experience their
particulars m ore consciously and intensely than others, and these
groups w ill find dissonance in the cali to be reasonable. A s G u id o
C alab resi and others arge, this asym m etry means that the reason
ableness inquiry reinforces m ajority dom inance.141 Im p licitly it posits
a norm in w hich men and m ajority groups occupy the center a n d oth
ers the periphery.142
In denying group iden tity and self-concepts that extend b eyon d the
ind ivid ual, the reasonableness standard is im plicitly opposed to conscious political or historical postures. T h is resolute inattention to
group-based m em ory is contrary to the kind o f thinking that ignites
sexual harassm ent claim s. It m ay be surm ised, for instance, th a t min ority w om en are m ore likely than w hite w om en to choose to bring
sexual harassm ent claim s because their experience w ith past d iscrim i
nation causes them to conclude, m ore q u ick ly and certain ly than
w o u ld w hite wom en, th at their w ork environm ent is not benign. D ifferent histories yield differen t judgm en ts o f w orkin g conditions, de
spite the claim s o f u n iversality im plicit in the reasonableness stan dard.
L ifted out o f context, one incident at w ork m ay seem trivial; history
and political affiliation m a y cast the incident in a more m alevolen t
lig h t.143
c.
Assum ption o f R isk and Consensus. A s C atharine M a cK in n o n
has pointed out, the reasonable person standard carries the risk that
ju d ges and others m ight infer that the reasonable person w ou ld a ccep t
ord inary or w idespread behavior, so that the pervasiveness o f an
a b u se could m ake that conduct non-actionable.144 W hen V ivien n e
141
See, e.g., C a l a b r e s i , supra note 1 2 4 , at 2 7 - 3 2 .
142
See Bender, supra note 1 2 4 , at 25; Ehrenreich, supra note 8, at 1 2 1 3 .
143 For an illustration o f this point, consider the recurring problem o f pin-ups and nude photographs o f women in the workplace. Comm entators disagree about whether such displays cau se or
indcate a hostile environment. A t the center of this disagreement is a dispute over how these im
ages o f women objectified, flattened into two dimensions, physically exposed relate to the
wom en who work am idst these depicons. Perhaps the reasonable person know s an d cares
nothing about M acKinnonite talk o f objectification and subordination; such a person m igh t think
that wom en at work are individuis unaected by pictures of others. E qually plausible, th e reasonable person m ight believe that these images function to give women in the im m ediate envi
ronment a message that they are nothing but flesh, to be used and despised. Although neither
view is precluded by a reasonableness standard, the latter approach requires a level o f o v e rt po
litical engagement that the standard appears to disdain.
144 M a c K i n n o n , supra note 1, at 115. M acK innon w as quoted with approval in R oin son v.
Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1526 (M .D. Fia. 1991). Tort law has long recognized the dangers o f inferring reasonableness from the pervasiveness of a particular behavior. In
a landm ark torts case, Judge Learned H and wrote that custom alone does not determine reason
ableness: an entire industry or sector could be wrong, and the custom unreasonable. S e e N ew
E ngland C oal & Coke Co. v. Northern Barge Corp. (The T.J. Hooper), 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir.
470
H ARVARD L A W R E V IE W
[Vol. 111:445
1997]
471
W h eth er Professor Lester is right to lay these sins a t the feet o f the
reasonable person standard m ay be debated; although fem ale plaintiffs
h a ve a rg u ab ly had more success using the reasonable w om an stan
d a rd ,153 the reasonable w om an hardly guarantees victo ry .154 B u t one
m ight agree that the va cu ity o f the term reasonable person could
cause a ju d icia l m ind to w ander and becom e distracted b y hem lines or
testim on y about raunch y office talk. O ne student com m entator m akes
a sim ilar point b y arguing in favor o f a reasonable w om an stan dard
despite endorsing an objective standard; he m aintains that the reason
able person is so am orphous that judges and ju rors can not form any
im age w h en the standard is used.155 W hether one thinks that u n iversalism should be exalted or despised, the reasonableness stan d ard can
not d eliver it.
II.
o c t r in a l
R e v is i n : T
he
uandary
T h is P art o f the A rticle advances tw o propositions. First, b y revie w in g cases and academ ic literature, it underscores the point m ade
by Justice Scalia in his Harris concurrence: no satisfactory stan dard
for hostile environm ent sexual harassm ent now exists.156 Ju d ges and
scholars h ave proved that they can neither fram e an app rop riate ob
je c tiv e standard, or arge convincingly that the o b jective stan dard
ought to be dropped. These circum stances suggest d octrinal trouble
and the need for an alternative. Second, this Part urges the read er to
d ra w a pointed inference. A s discussed above, reasonable person
p rovides neither gender neutrality or m eaningful content. T h e further failure o f reasonable w om an to im prove on reasonable p erso n ,
the fu tility o f continuing to tinker ad absurdum , and the perils of
aban d on in g ob jectivity add up to a strong condem nation o f a n y stan
dard based on reasonableness. T h e inference urged is that the a d je c
tive, rather than the noun, needs replacem ent.
A.
T h e id ea of a reasonable w om an in the law has long p ro v o k ed titters. R ecall A lan H erb erts fam ous little joke:
T h e v iew that there exists a class of beings, illogical, im pulsive, careless,
irresponsible, extravagant, prejudiced, and vain, free for the m ost p a rt
from those w orthy and repellent excellences w hich distinguish the R easo n
able M an , and devoted to the irrational arts o f pleasure and attraction, is
one w h ich should be as welcome . . . in our C ourts as it is in our d raw in g -
H ARVARD L A W R E V IE W
472
[V o l. 111:4 4 5
.1S7
?163
1994 ).
160 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). E lliso n is considered the leading case. H ow Ellison achieved
this stature is not quite clear. It w a s not the first federal court opinion to adopt the reasonable
w om an standard in a reported hostile environm ent sexual harassm ent case; that honor probably
goes to Yates, see 819 F.2d at 637. Professor Forell, however, describes E llison as the first case to
explicitly ad op t a fem inist versin o f the standard. Forell, supra note 124, at 797.
161 See E lliso n , 924 F.2d at 878-79. A student commentator elaborates that the reasonable
w om an has reasonable expectations con cem in g w h at is appropriate and inappropriate, w h at is
fa ir and unfair. . . . [She assesses] th at w hich is fair, proper, just, and suitable under the circum stances, while takin g into consideration a backdrop o f female life experiences. Bonnie B. Westm an, N ote, The Reasonable Woman Standard: Preventing Sexu a l Harassment in the Workplace,
18 W
162
.M
it c h e l l
L. R
ev
. 7 9 5 , 8 1 9 (19 9 2 ).
6 8 5 -8 9 (19 9 1).
P
163 D orothy Atcheson, Defending Pomography: Face to Face w ith the President o f the A C L U ,
, Feb. 1 9 9 5 , at 3 7 , 39 .
la ybo y
1997]
473
164 See A ngela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Fem inist Lega! Theory, 42 S t a n . L. R e v .
581 passim (1990).
165 See supra p. 465.
166 See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Lesbian Perspective, Lesbian Experience, and the Risk o f E ssen
tialism, 2 V a . J. S o c . P o l y & L . 43 (1994); Harris, supra note 164; see also Merle H. Weiner, D om estic Violence and the Per Se Standard o f Outrage, 54 M d. L. R ev . 183, 226-27 & n.200 (1995)
(describing evidence o f class and race bias in attempts to generalize about women).
167 See E lizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges o f F em inist Theory
and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N .Y .U . L. R ev . 520, 566 (1992) (Th ere is no single
reasonable w o m an .).
168 See K athryn Abram s, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Fem inist Legal Theory, 95
C
o lu m
HA RV A RD L A W R E V IE W
474
[V o l. 111:445
171 See
N o rb ert
A.
S c h le i,
Forew ord
to
arbara
L.
Sc h
lei
&
Paul
ro ssm an
m plo ym en t
CONG. R
e c
is c r im in a t io n
aw
a t x i - x i i ( 2 d e d . 19 8 3).
. 2 5 7 7 - 8 4 ( 19 6 4 ) ( s t a t e m e n t o f R e p . S m it h , a s p o n s o r ) ( W o u l d y o u h a v e a n y s u g g e s -
t io n s a s to w h a t c o u r s e o u r G o v e r n m e n t m i g h t p u r s u e to p r o t e c t o u r s p i n s t e r f r i e n d s i n t h e ir
r i g h t t o a n ic e h u s b a n d a n d f a m i l y ? ).
1997]
475
tions h ave not proved their ability to respond w ell to sexual harass
m ent. T h e y ju st d o n t get it, w ent the fem inist clich circa 19 9 1:172
w hether the harm is rape, incest, inadequate research abou t treatm ents
for disease, lack o f access to abortion, vio len t or d egrad ing pornography, un equal pay, unequal education, or a n y other gender-related inju stice, the U nited States legal system is m ore slothful and com placent
in its responses to harm s than m any fem inists w ou ld like. G ive n a re
cord o f failures, some find it hard to sum m on any optim ism for a reasonable w om an standard that could prevail in a hostile, or at least uncom prehending, environm ent.
j . Condescension, Stereotyping, and the Pedestal. Some w riters
are offend ed by the reasonable wom an standard, fin d in g it patron izin g
to w o m e n .173 To one critic, the standard divides hu m an ity into persons and w om en.174 It also seems to contm plate a fragile, ultrasensitiv e victim whose m ale counterpart is incapable o f self-con trol.17S The
stan dard encourages each p lain tiff to tell a fam iliar sto ry o f fear, degradation, and failure at self-help. She needs rescue in the form o f a label that credits her w ith sensitivity and defenselessness.176 T h e reasonable w om an standard also reminds som e w riters o f prior m isplaced
efforts to shield w om en from a harsh w orld by restricting their free
d o m .177 O ne com m entator arges that w hile the reasonable person
172 See A nth on y Lewis, Abroad at Home: Wages o f Cynicism , N .Y . T i m e s , O ct. n , 1991, at A31
(faulting members of the Senate Judiciary Committee for insensitivity to w o m en s experience and
feelings).
173 W omen in particular tend to be skeptical o f the reasonable wom an standard, to offer altern atives that refer to context and perspective, or to praise the reasonable wom an in guarded
terms. Some women can scarcely contain their contempt for the idea. See, e.g., Tam a Starr, A
Reasonable Woman, R e a s o n , Feb. 1994, at 48, 49 ([I]s the menstrual cycle itself the signifier of
fem ale reasonableness? Do our courts and legislators intend that businesses be run on a lunar
cycle, w ith preordained times for mass edema, irritability, and ovulation?); Cam ille Paglia, R e m arks on Crossfire (C N N televisin broadcast, Nov. 26, 1993), available in L E X IS , N ew s Library,
Script F ile (stating that women must learn how to play hardball rather than expect the protection o f a reasonable woman standard). One well-respected conservative ju d ge, Edith Jones, has
disapproved o f the standard, ruling that harassment must rise to the level o f destroying
[w om en s] equal opportunity in the w orkplace to create a hostile environm ent claim. D eAngelis
v. E l Paso M un. Plice Officers A ss n, 51 F.3d 591, 593 (sth Cir. 1995) ( N o w that most Am erican
wom en are w orking outside the home, in a broad range o f occupations and w ith ever-increasing
responsibility, it seems perverse to claim that they need the protection o f a preferential stan
d ard.). In an opinion written by another distinguished wom an judge, the N ew Jersey Suprem e
C o u rt ventured a compromise between the reasonable person and reasonable wom an standards.
See Lehm ann v. Toys R Us, 626 A .2d 445, 453 (N.J. 1993).
174 See Finley, supra note 124, at 64.
175 See Adam s, supra note 162, at 686.
176 See N aom i Cahn, The Looseness o f Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard in
Theory and in Practice, 77 C O R N E L L L . R e v . 13 9 8 , 1 4 1 6 (19 9 2 ).
177 Cf. Kathleen A. Kenealy, Sexual Harassment and the Reasonable Woman Standard, 8 L a b .
L a w . 2 0 3, 2 0 4 (19 9 2 ) (warning that the reasonable woman standard could become as controversial
as another altruistically intended reform, race-based affirm ative action). O ne exam ple o f these
reform efforts is the protective labor legislation of the early twentieth century that, like the reasonable w om an standard, celebrated female vulnerability. B y excluding wom en from hazardous
H A RV A RD L A W R E V IE W
476
[V ol. 111:4 4 5
jo bs, lim iting their work hours, excusing them from overtime, or keeping their reproductive organ s aw ay from idenfed toxins, protective labor legislation rem oved some harshness from
w o m en s w o rk lives. But by rem aining eloquently silent about other dangers that harm wom en
w here they w o rk poisonous cleaning agents, household drudgeiy, sexual assaults, domestic
violence such legislation revealed its la ck o f real interest in protecting women from harm. Unlike other law reforms that are sensitive to gender difference, such as the elimination o f the uearnest resistance requirement from rape, see Stephen J . Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy S e ri
ously: Rape Law and Beyond, 1 1 L a w & P h i l . 35, 37 (1992), the reasonable woman standard does
little to advanee w om ens autonomy.
178 See Kenealy, supra note 177. at 204.
179 Id. at 208.
180 See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 n . n (9th Cir. 1991). Bu t see Forell, supra note 124,
a t 799 n.148 (arguing that even for m ale com plainants the better standard could be the reasonable
wom an).
181 See B e r n s t e in , supra n o t e 1 3 , a t 1 2 7 9 . T h i s m is p la c e d e m p h a s i s is n o t c o n f in e d t o la w .
C o n s i d e r t h e t w o - m il le n n ia l l i t e r a r y t r a d i t i o n b r a c k e t e d b y t h e s t o r y o f J o s e p h a n d P o t i p h a r s
w ife
at one end,
C r i c h t o n , D i s c l o s u r e ( 19 0 4 ).
B o t h w o r k s d e s c r i b e a p r e d a t o r y w o m a n w h o im p o r t u n e s a
m a n fo r s e x , is r e j e c t e d , a n d t h e n f a l s e l y a c c u s e s h im .
a n c i e n t E g y p t a n d is p r o b a b l y m u c h o l d e r t h a n
T h e P o t i p h a r s w if e s t o r y d a t e s b a c k to
Genesis , w h o s e e a r li e s t p o r t io n s a r e m o r e t h a n
c o n t in e s t h r o u g h D a v id M a m e t s
a n d p o in t in g o u t t h a t [f]o r t h e p a s t f i v e y e a r s , s e x u a l h a r a s s m e n t c l a i m s f ile d b y m e n w i t h th e
f e d e r a l E q u a l E m p lo y m e n t O p p o r t u n i t y C o m m i s s i o n h a v e m a d e u p le s s t h a n 1 0 p e r c e n t o f th e
Disclosure is b y f a r t h e b e s t - s e l li n g f ic t io n a l t r e a t m e n t o f s e x u a l h a r a s s m e n t .
S ee M a r a L . O n t iv e r o s , F ictionalizing Harassm ent Disclosing the Truth, 93 M lC H . L. R e v .
t o t a l c h a r g e s f i l e d ).
r
3 73 > 1373
n .3 ( 19 9 5 ) .
F a ls e a c c u s a t i o n s o f h a r a s s m e n t a n d r a p e t h a t h u r t m e n , in s h o r t , a r e m o r e
p r o m in e n t W e s t e r n c u lt u r a l t r o p e s t h a n a r e r e a l h a r a s s m e n t a n d r a p e .
1997]
477
Judicial efforts to im pro ve on the reasonable person stan d ard include such constructs as the reasonable person o f the sam e gen d er as
the v ic tim ,186 the reasonable person o f the same gender and race or
color as the plain tiff,187 the reasonable person w ith the defin ing traits
o f the accuser,188 and the reasonable target.185 Som e courts have used,
and various academ ics and com m entators have ad vocated , the rea so n
able victim standard;190 a contextualized reasonable victim stan
182 Cf. E llison, 924 F.2d at 884 (Stephens, J., dissenting) (pointing out that wom en are not the
only targets o f sexual harassment and that a court should use terminology that w ill m eet the
needs o f all w h o seek recourse under . . . Title V II).
183 Cf. Francisco Valdes, Sex and Race in Queer Legal Culture: Ruminations on Id en tities &
Inter-Connectivities, 5 S . C a l . R e v . L . & W o m e n s S t u d . 2 5 , 3 0 (19 9 5 ) (noting that the author, a
man, w ill sometimes claim inclusin in the lesbian category to poke at the sex/gender essentialisms that rigidly and absurdly confne us all).
184 See Tracy L. TYeger, Com m ent, The Reasonable Woman? Unreasonable! Ellison v. Brady,
14 W
h it t ie r
L. R
ev
. 6 7 5 , 6 8 3 (19 9 3 ).
185 Cf. id. (arguing that if the reasonable woman standard is correct for sexual harassm ent, then
the reasonable person standard in torts should logically be replaced by standards such as reason
able blind person or reasonable elderly person); Orlando Patterson, Race, Gender and Liberal
Fallacies, N .Y . T i m e s , Oct. 20, 1991, at 4, 15 (suggesting that what m ay look like sexu al har
assment to white observers m ay be a down-home style o f courting to African-Am ericans).
186 See A ndrew s v. C ity o f Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (d Cir. 1993).
187 See Stingley v. Arizona, 796 F. Supp. 424, 428 (D. Ariz. 1992).
188 See N ichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 5 11 -1 2 (9th Cir. 1994).
189 See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 884 (9th Cir. 1991) (Stephens, J., dissenting).
190 See E lliso n , 924 F.2d at 877-79.
478
HARVARD L A W RE VIEW
[Vol. 111:445
191 Jane L. D olkart, H ostile Environm ent Harassment: Equality, Objectivity, and the Shaping
o f Legal Standards, 43 EMORY L.J. 151, 154 (1994)192 Forell, supra note 124, at 811 n.198 (attributing this view to Professor Jean Love).
193 M a rth a C h am allas, Fem inist Constructions o f Objectivity: M ltiple Perspectives in Sexual
and R a cia l Harassment Litigation, 1 T e x . J. W o m e n & L. 95, 140 (1992). A lthough Professor
C h am a lla s is skeptical o f the idea o f objectivity, her prescription falls w ithin the o bjectivity tradi
tion in th at she does not favor a purely subjective standard. See supra pp. 464-71.
194 In her critique o f standards that replace the reasonable person, Kathleen K enealy mentions
Vanee v. Southern B ell Telephone, 863 F.2d 1503 ( n t h Cir. 1989), in w hich co-w orkers o f the A fri
can-A m erican p laintiff hung a noose over her w o rk station. K en ealy suggests that a reasonable
A frican -A m erican standard, if used in Vanee, w ould have been not only unnecessary but insulting. Kenealy, supra note 177, at 208 & n.26; see also G arca v. A ndrew s, 867 S.W .2d 409, 412 (Tex.
C t. A pp . 1993) (rejecting the reasonable wom an standard in favor of even-handed disposition of
all claim s w ithout regard to whether the p laintiff is a woman or a m an, is young or od, or is a
m em ber o f any one o f numerous and varied sub-groups in our society).
195 See Forell, supra note 124, at 815. W hen Caroline Forell polled eleven practitioners in Oregon o f whom four represented m ostly plaintiffs, six represented m ostly em ployers, and one represented both sides asking them to ame the standard they preferred, the reasonable woman
com m anded a clear majority, even though the lawyers were free to suggest some contextualized
alternative to the reasonable person. Professor Forell surmises that livin g under the N inth Circ u its E lliso n rule led these lawyers to ad just to this legal novelty. See id.
1997]
479
196 R obert U nikel, Comm ent, Reasonable Doubts: A Critique o f the Reasonable Woman Stan
dard in American Jurisprudence, 87 N w . U. L. R ev . 326, 372 (1992).
197 See id. a t 3 7 3 11.295.
198 See C h a m a l l a s , supra n o te 1 9 3 , a t 1 3 5 37 199 See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 877-80 (91 Cir. 1991); Note, Sexual Harassment Claims
o f A busive Work Environm ent Under Title VII, 97 H a r v . L. R e v . 1449, 1459 (1984); S a lly A.
Piefer, Com m ent, Sexual Harassment from the Victims Perspective: The Need fo r the Seventh Cir
cu it to Adopt the Reasonable Woman Standard, 77 M a r q . L. R e v . 85, 99 (1993) (equating reasonable w om an w ith v ictim s perspective); see also Adam s, supra note 162, at 683 (stating that
the reasonable victim standard effectively divides the w orld into reasonable men and reasonable
w om en).
200 In describing the objective referent in sexual harassment, the Harris C ourt referred to the
reasonable person. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993). See generally L ie sa L.
Bernardin, Note, Does the Reasonable Woman Exist and Does She Have Any Place in H ostile
Environm ent Sexual Harassment Claims Under Title V II After Harris, 46 F l a . L. R e v . 291, 299301 (1994) (explaining that the Harris Court chose the reasonable person standard over the district co u rts reasonable wom an standard).
201 See R adtke v. Everett, 501 N.W .2d 155, 158 (Mich. 1993).
202 See, e.g., W atkins v. Bowden, 105 F.3d 1344, 1356 ( n t h Cir. 1997) (holding that a reasonable
person ju ry instruction was proper); Gillming v. Simmons Indus., 91 F.3d r 168, 1172 (8th Cir.
1996) (holding that a reasonable person instruction w as not reversible error); see also F o w ler v.
K ootenai County, 918 P.2d 1185, 1189 (Idaho 1996) (favoring the reasonable person over the reasonable woman).
H A R V A R D L A W R E V IE W
480
[V o l. 111:4 4 5
fru stratio n or w earin ess w ith the en tire endeavor o f tin kerin g.203 To
som e com m en tators, the n ext step is obvious. B elow I exam ine their
c la im th a t the o b je c tiv e criterio n o f hostile environm ent sexual h a
rassm ent m u st be jettiso n ed .
C.
1997]
hostile or abu sive.209 A s another fem inist arges in a d vocatin g a subje c tiv ist revisin o f negligence, su b jectivity is congruent w ith a n y d o c
trine o f com pensation (w hich necessarily takes account o f the harm
suffered b y the victim ), w hereas ob jective standards com port m ore
w ith the crim inal law .210
O f the com m entators w an tin g to dispense w ith the ob jective stan
d ard in hostile environm ent sexual harassm ent, Eileen B la c k w o o d goes
furthest, arguing forth righ tly for su bjectivity.211
A c c o rd in g to
B la ck w o o d , a p lain tiff should reach the ju r y on the barest prim a facie
case: sex-related behavior in the w orkp lace, and an aggrieved w o rk e r
w h o has indicated to her em ployer that this behavior is u n w elco m e.212
Less starkly, Jane D o lk a rt advocates w h a t she calis an in d iv id u a lized
test, w h ich she describes as a renam ed equ ivalen t to a su b jective approach .213
O ne o f the m ost influential w ritings on the subject offers a v a ria tion on the su b jective standard that w ou ld be achieved through a shift
in the burden o f proof.214 K a th ryn A b ram s proposes th at the p la in tiff
be required to show th at sex-related behavior occurred in the w o r k
place, and that this behavior affected her w orkin g environm ent. U po n
such a show ing, the burden w o u ld shift to the em ployer to sh o w that
the p la in tiffs reaction w a s idiosyncratic or unreasonable.21s P rofessor
A b ram s thus preserves the analytic distinction between su b jective and
ob jective criteria but establishes a rebuttable presum ption that su b je c
tive and ob jective approaches w ill yield the same conclusin a b o u t
w h a t happened at a w orksite.216
T h ese w ritings deserve serious reception. D oubts abou t the relevan ce o f ob jective reasonableness in hostile environm ent sexu al h a
rassm ent are persuasive. T here is even evidence that as hard -head ed a
fem inist as Justice G in sbu rg shares these doubts217 w ith her colleagu e
H A R V A R D LA W RE VIEW
482
[V o l. 111:445
h e
e s p e c t f u l
Pe
r so n
1997]
483
m ore vague, contains rich and useful connotations. A respectful person standard, therefore, ought to preserve the benefits that both w ord s
offer.
To understand the link betw een reason and respect, one m ay begin
w ith the w ork o f Im m anuel K an t, w h ich contends that entitlem ent to
respect originates in hum an reason. T h e cap acity to be rational, accordin g to K ant, sets hum an beings ap art from other livin g creatures.224 T h is trait allow s hum an beings to escape brute causality; persons overcom e the straits o f nature through their thinking and
choices.22S A id ed b y reason, hum an beings can favor one course o f action and disdain an alternative, and thereby express their m oral
agency. Reason also gives persons a w a y o f experiencing the p a st and
the future: w ith the help o f reason the past becom es intelligible, a
source o f perfecting oneself, and the basis o f plans for on es life. B ecause o f these characteristics all o f them variations on and outgrow th s o f reason hum an beings, accord in g to K an t, possess intrinsic va lu and are entitled to respect.226
T o accept a respectful person standard, one need not endorse a ll of
this valorization o f reason, b u t the association betw een reason an d re
spect is useful in the construction o f such a legal standard. K a n tia n
ethics, w id ely (although not universally) esteemed for their b read th
and com pelling clarity,227 com port w ith the w orldview s of m an y per
sons indeed, m any religions and societies228 and suggest a consensus upon w hich law m ak in g m ay build. M oreover, the connection
betw een reason and respect indicates th at a respectful person stan dard
for hostile environm ent sexual harassm ent does not depart significan tly from existing doctrine. T h e K a n tia n fram ew ork also p rovides
guidance about the particulars o f a respectful person standard.
A.
1.
Recognition Respect. O f the m any m eanings associated w ith
the w ord respect, the m ost pertinent to sexual harassm ent is w h at
224 See I m
Ph
il o s o p h y
m anu el
of
Ka
Ka
n t
n t
: Im
m anu el
roundw ork o f
th e
e t a p h y s ic o f
orals
7 7 ( H .J . P a t n
t r a n s ., 2 d e d . 19 5 3 ).
HARVARD L A W R E V IE W
4&4
[V o l. 111:445
S tep h en D a r w a ll calis recognition resp ect.229 R ecognition respect consists o f the a ck n o w led gm e n ! th at another person is a free, separate,
u n iq u e, and in d epen d en t hum an being. D ictionary definitions o f re
sp e c t as a n oun in this recognition sense include an a ct o f noticing
w ith attention; the giv in g o f atten tion to; consideration.230 A s a verb,
resp e ct in its recogn ition sense m eans to consider, deem or heed
so m eth in g .231 R ecogn ition respect looks at the object w ith the intent
o f d eterm in in g h o w to a ct vis- -vis th a t object.232 N o adm iration is
n ecessa rily ren d ered.233
T h e com p etin g m eaning, appraisl respect, is briefly noted for purposes o f contrast: appraisal respect is high or special regard: deferentia l regard as from a servan t to his m aster: esteem ; or the q u ality or
State o f being esteem ed.234 A s a ve rb , to respect in the appraisal sense
is to trea t or regard w ith deference, esteem , or honour.235 A p p raisa l
resp ect, u n lik e recognition respect, considers the question o f excellence.
W h e n a professor respects her colleagu e because he has w ritten the
b est b ook in his field, she renders appraisal respect, grounded in a
com p ariso n or a scale o f merit.
A s D a r w a ll arges, K a n tia n respect for persons qua persons falls
w ith in the categ o ry o f recognition respect.236 A p p raisa l respect, ren
d ered for excellen ce, is not ow ed to all persons,237 w hereas to have
recogn ition respect for persons is to g iv e proper w eigh t to the fact that
th e y are p erso n s238 a form u lation in the tradition o f K an t. It is
229
s o p h i c a l l it e r a t u r e o n r e c o g n it i o n , d e r i v e d f r o m t h e w o r k o f H e g e l a n d o th e r s , e m p h a s i z e s th e
See
cf. J r g e n H a b e r m a s , B e t w e e n F a c t s a n d
r i g h t s a n d d u t i e s t h a t a r e i d e n t if i e d b y t h e a c k n o w l e d g m e n t t h a t p e r s o n s a r e fre e a n d e q u a l.
R o b e r t R . W illia m s , R e c o g n it io n
( 19 9 2 );
N o r m s 1 6 - 1 7 ( W i l l i a m R e h g t r a n s ., 1 9 9 5 ) ( e s t a b l is h i n g m u t u a l r e c o g n it io n a s a p r e d c a t e t o d is co u rse).
23
231 d.
W e b s t e r s T h i r d N e w I n t e r n a t i o n a l D i c t i o n a r y 1 9 3 4 ( 3 d e d . 1 9 8 1).
232 Stephen H udson identifies three categories o f respect that correspond to D a r w a lls recogni
tion respect: obstacle respect, directive respect, and institutional respect. See Stephen D. Hudson,
T h e Nature o f R espect, 6 S o c . T h e o r y & P r a c . 69, 70 (1980). Robin Dillon notes that exam ples
o f obstacle respect include the tennis p layers respect for an opponents backhand and the mountain clim b ers respect for the elements. See D illon, supra note 43, at 1 10 -11 . D irective respect
lies behind the regard for the content o f contracts, constitutions, and corporate bylaw s. See id.
In stitutional respect is expressed in terms like yo u r Honor, bowed heads during prayer, and referen ces to the president o f the U nited States as the President even by those who know him intim ately. S ee id. In all o f these situations o f recognidon respect, the agent acknowledges the catego rical im portance o f the object, even if she thinks the tennis player a fool, the U nited States
C o n stitutio n flaw ed, the judge corrupt, the prayer vacuous, or the president an ordinary man.
S e e id. at m .
233 See D a r w a l l , supra n o t e 2 2 9 , a t 4 5 - 4 7 .
234 W e b s t e r s T h i r d N e w I n t e r n a t i o n a l D i c t i o n a r y , supra note 230, at 19 3 4 .
235 O
xfo rd
n g l is h
ic t io n a r y
7 3 2 - 3 5 ( 2 d e d . 19 8 9 ).
1997]
4 S
also recognition respect that Robert N ozick, claim ing the m antle o f
K a n t, has in m ind w hen he faults utilitarianism for its failure to re
sp ect and take account o f the fact that [the ind ivid u al] is a sep arate
person, that his is the on ly life he has.239 S im ultan eously prem ised on
the ideas that all hum an beings have respect-w arrantin g traits in
com m on and that each person is uniquely free,240 recognition respect
unites the disparate ideis o f autonom y and equality.241
A lth o u gh recognition respect im plies freedom , it also m andates duties. In this sense, respect is different from other attitudes particu la rly affection or liking that an agent m ay h ave tow ard an o b je c t.242
B ecau se it originates in a trait o f the object, respect m akes its ow n
dem ands. T h e agent is not free to w ithhold or furnish respect based
on a w him .
T h e dem ands o f recognition respect are w ell k now n not on ly w ith in
sexual harassm ent law, w h ich affirm s these ideis o f d ign ity and free
dom , but also in a v a riety o f legal and extralegal settings.243 O n e ex
tralegal exam ple is self-respect, a varian t o f recognition respect that
im plies duties and entitlem ents.244 Recognition respect for persons is
im p licit in the legal and extralegal concept o f consent, esp ecially inform ed consent.245 In the political arena, the dem ands o f recognition
respect are eclectic. T h e y buttress both a claim to m nim um incom e
an d certain argum ents in favor o f abolishing w elfa re,246 for instance,
an d support fem inism w h ile raising questions abou t the righ t to abortion .247 T h e y also cast doubts on affirm ative action as w ell as on raco b e r t N o z i c k , A n a r c h y , S t a t e a n d U t o p i a 33 (1974).
240 See M argaret A. Farley, A Fem inist Versin o f Respect fo r Persons, 9 J. F e m i n i s t S t u d .
R e l i o i o n 183, 194-96 (1993).
241 See R ichard Norm an, Respect fo r Persons, Autonomy and Equality, 43 R e v u e I n t e r n a
t i o n a l e D E P h i l o s o p h i e 323 (1989); see also Christopher W. G owans, Intimacy, Freedom, and
Unique Valu: /I Kantian" Account o f the Irreplaceable and Incomparable Valu o f Persons, 33
Am . P h i l . Q . 75, 84-85 (1996) (arguing that both uniqueness and equality o f persons derive from
their exercise o f freedom).
242 A ffection or adm iration originates in the caprice of an agent. One m ight be fond o f a person
for any reason or for no reason, but respect implies certain criteria. Put another way, respect is
object-generated, whereas affection is agent-generated. See Dillon, supra note 4 3 , at 1 0 9 - 1 0 .
243 See infra pp. 512-21 (describing recognition respect in current Am erican legal doctrine).
244 See Robn S . Dillon, Self-Respect: Moral, Emotional, Political, 10 7 E t h i c s 2 2 6 , 2 3 0 ( 1 9 9 7 )
(noting the dem ands and expectations generated by self-respect). T he phrase have you no selfrespect? urges another to recogniz:. the rights and responsibilities of being a person. S e e Darw all, supra note 2 2 9 , at 4 7 .
245 See Bernard v. Char, 903 P.2d 6 6 7 , 6 7 1 - 7 5 (Haw. 19 9 5 ); Sm ith v. Reisig, 6 8 6 P.2d 2 8 5 , 288
(O kla. 19 8 4 ); A d ler ex re. Johnson v. Kokemoor, 5 4 5 N.W .2d 4 9 5 , 5 0 0 -0 3 (Wis. 19 9 6 ); D an u ta
M endelson, H istorical Evolution and M odem Implications o f Concepts o f Consent to, and Refusal
of, M edical Treatment in the Law ofTrespass, 17 J. L e g a l M e d . i , 1 - 6 (19 9 6).
246 O n this paradox, see James W. Fox, Jr., Liberalism, Democratic Citizenship, and Welfare
Reform: The Troubling Case o f Workfare, 74 W a s h . U. L.Q. 103, 123-24 (1996).
247 See Farley, supra note 240, at 195; Don M arquis, Justifying the Rights o f Pregnancy: The
Interest View, C r i m . J u s t . E t h i c s , Winter-Spring 1994, at 67 (book review) (discussing the relationship between the personhood concept and abortion ethics).
239 R
486
H ARVARD L A W RE VIEW
[V ol. 111:4 4 5
ism .248 F am ilia r from o rd in ary life experience as w ell as legal precep ts, the dictates o f recogn ition respect have in com m on their insisten ce th a t one m ust tak e certain considerations seriously as reasons
fo r a ctin g or forb earin g to a ct.249 It is this last idea the d u ty to
fo rb e a r to a ct th at expresses th e po w er o f recognition respect to d e
scrib e, p reven t, and rem edy hostile en viron m ent sexual harassm ent.
2.
A D u ty to Refrain. T h e d ivisin betw een positive and negativ e liberties, fam ou sly exp ou nd ed b y Isaiah B erln ,250 is fun dam en tal
in A m e ric a n law .251 C ou rts d escrib e the Constitution and the B ill o f
R ig h ts as ch arters o f n egative liberties.252 A ccord in g to m an y scholars,
co n cep ts o f n ega tiv e rights w ere w id e ly shared am ong those w h o b u ilt
th e A m e ric a n repu blic, w hereas po sitive rights rested on less stu rd y
su p p o rt.253 A tradition traceab le to B erln and beyond associates n ega
tiv e rig h ts w ith freedom and p o sitive rights w ith the affirm a tive com m a n d s o f a d ictator.254 E ffe c tiv e la w reform honors the distinction b e
tw e e n n e g a tiv e and positive rights, fa vo rin g n egative liberty because it
d escrib es leg al change in rela tiv ely unthreatening term s.25S A lth o u gh
p o sitive d uties o f respect m a y ta k e shape in the future, n egative ones
n ecessa rily m u st com e first.
248 See M . C ath leen Kaveny, D iscrim ination and Affirmative A ction, 57 T h e o l o g i c a l S t u d .
286, 295-300 (1996).
249 D a rw a ll, supra note 229, at 48.
250 See I s a i a h B e r l n , Tw o Concepts o f Liberty, in F o u r E s s a y s o n L i b e r t y 118, 122-23
(1969). B erln finds positive and negative lib erty to be the central conceptions o f liberty, am ong
m ore than 200 types. See id. at 118.
251 C riticism s o f the dichotom y in the la w reviews include Susan Bandes, The Negative Consti
tution: A C ritiq u e , 88 M lC H . L . R e v . 2271, 2318-20 (1990), and Steven J . Heym an, Positive and
Negative L ib erty , 68 C h i . - K e n t L . R e v . 81, 81-8 3 (1992). A s one writer notes, however, there is
n o indication th a t the Suprem e C o urt or the low er courts will abandon the dichotomy. Susan
Stefan , Leaving C iv il Rights to the E xperts : From Deference to Abdication under the Professio n a l Judgm ent Standard, 102 Y a l e L .J . 639, 667 n.138 (1992).
252 S ee B o w e rs v. D e Vito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (71 Cir. 1982); see also Olm stead v. U nited States,
277 U .S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandis, J., dissenting) (proclaim ing the right to be let alone the
m ost com prehensive o f rights). In D eShaney v. Winnebago County Department o f Social Ser
v ices, 489 U .S. 189 (1989), the Suprem e C o u rt ruled against the plaintiff after characterizing his
la w su it as a d em an d for positive rights. See id. at 194-97. In dissent, Justice Brennan recast the
issue as one o f governm en t action rather than inaction a stance that underscores the pow erful
ap p eal o f n egative lib erty arguments. See id. at 203-05 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
253 T h e clash betw een the Federalists and anti-Federalists over political theory closely mirrors
th e debate o ver positive and negative liberty. See W illiam YV. Fisher III, Ideology, Religin, and
th e C o n stitution al Protection o f Prvate Property 1760-1860, 39 E M O R Y L.J. 6 5 , 71-7 5 (1990);
Jo h n P atrick D iggins, Class, Classical, and Consensus Views o f the C onstitution, 5 5 U. C h i. L.
R e v . 5 5 5 , 5 5 6 (19 8 8 ) (book review) (noting the anti-Federalist opposition to the establishm ent o f a
centralized federal governm ent).
254 See, e.g., B e r l n , supra note 2 5 0 , at 131 (claim ing that proponents o f the theory o f negative
lib e rty regard the notion o f positive liberty as no better than a specious disguise for brutal tyra n n y ); H eym an, supra note 2 5 1 , at 82 (attributing B erlin s dichotom y to the C oid W ar backdrop
ag ain st w hich he wrote).
255 See A n ita Bernstein, B etter Living Through Crime and Tort, 76 B.U . L. R e v . 16 9 , 1 8 2 - 8 3
( 1 9 9 6 ) (describing uses o f negative and positive liberty in law reform efforts).
1997]
487
256
See A lan Wolfe, Before Justice , N e w R e p u b l i c , M a y 27, 1996, at 33, 34 (crediting this
v iew to political philosopher Judith Shklar).
257 See id.
258 O f the m any variations on the Golden Rule surveyed by the B ah scholar H .T.D. R ost, the
Confucian versin is noteworthy for stating the maxim in negative terms: W h at you do n o t w ant
done to yourself, do not do to others. R o s t , supra note 2 28, at 49 (internal quotation m arks
omitted). Centering on the fundam ental principie o f social propriety, id. at 4 7 , C onfucian ethics
posits a respectful person w ho know s his place in the social order, rather than one who fu lfills a
religious or spiritual ideal, see id. at 4 7 - 4 8 , a social reform ers approach to the G old en Rule
that m ay be better suited to em ulation by reformers than are religious models.
I do not mean to continu the academ ic folly of overdrawing the distinction betw een positive and negative liberty. F or a pertinent warning on this danger, see H eym an, cited a b o v e in
note 2 5 1 , at 8 2 . Statutory and common law protections against sexual harassment im ply a modicum o f governm ent energy and action that is contrary to a simple-minded endorsement o f nega
tive rights paired with a repudiation o f positive rights. T he basic duty, though em bellished w ith
affirm ative incidentals in the w orkplace, see infra pp. 4 9 5 - 9 6 , remains one o f forbearance and
restraint.
259 See K a n t , supra note 2 2 5 , at 9 5 - 9 6 , 1 0 2 - 0 3 . One philosopher elaborates that to be treated
sim ply as a means rather than an end in oneself is to be disparaged as to ones stances, determ inations, commitments, and points o f view all aspects of human choice. See Bernard W illiam s,
The Idea o f Equality, in M o r a l C o n c e p t s 1 5 5 , 1 5 9 - 6 3 (Joel Feinberg ed., 19 6 9 ).
260 C f A v i s h a i M a r g a l i t , T h e D e c e n t S o c i e t y i ( 19 9 6 ) ( A c i v i li z e d s o c ie t y is o n e -w h o se
m e m b e r s d o n o t h u m ilia t e o n e a n o t h e r . . . .).
261 C f Elizabeth V. Spelm an, On Treating Persons as Persons, 88 E t h i c s 150, 152 (1977) (ar
guing that treating another as a person implies that one has authority over o n es own defin ition o f
oneself).
488
H A RV A RD L A W RE VIEW
[V o l. 111:4 4 5
1997]
489
ported incompetence at work). Starting from the som ewhat contrary premise that sexual harass
ment law must not overlook m otive and fault, the respectful person standard offered here also
relates these tw o strands o f libidinous harassment and animus-based harassment; I arge th a t the
tw o are alike not only because they subordnate wom en but because they vilate the d u ty not to
treat others sim ply as the means to an end.
M a r g a l i t , supra note 260, at 121.
267 Id. at 124-25.
268 See id. at 13-15, 22-23.
269 T h e landm ark case is Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 655-56 (D .D .C . 1976), vacated
sub nom. W illiam s v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Later decisions also note the hum ilia
tion o f sexual harassment. See W illiam s v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1995); Ascolese v.
Southeastern Penn. Transp. Auth., 925 F. Supp. 351, 360-61 (E.D. Pa. 1996); cf. Con ey v. D epart
ment o f H um an Resources, 787 F. Supp. 1434, 1443 (M.D. Ga. 1992) (noting the hum iliation of
racial harassment); M artone v. State, 611 A.2d 384, 385 n.i (R.I. 1992) (observing that the plaintiff-employee, who had been terminated, deserved a severe sanction for having caused h um ilia
tion through harassment).
270 H arris v. F orklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-23 (* 993 )-
266
490
H A RV A RD L A W R E VIEW
[V o l. 111:445
491
1997]
public, com m unal dim ensin, even w h en the offending behavior takes
place behind a closed door. B ein g hum iliated at w ork can d im inish
settled beliefs abou t o n e s com petence and relative status v is- -vis
other w orkers. H um iliation can also m ake a w orker w onder w h a t her
jo b description really is and w hether prior feed back m ust be reinterpreted in light o f an erosion o f her dignity.281 T h is response is n atu ral,
alm ost universal, and so the harassing em ployer m ust be presum ed to
understand that his actions hum iliate.
c.
Personhood. T h e three statem ents o f negative duty express
the obligations o f a respectful person through separate em phases
rather than sharp contrasts. T h e d u ty not to treat others sim ply a s the
m eans to an end serves as a w arn ing about aggregation and consequentialism . T h e duty not to hum iliate em phasizes dignity and c o m
m unal status.
T h e d u ty not to vi late the personhood and selfconception of another, w hich com pletes the negative duties o f recogn i
tion respect, expresses a concern abou t the boundaries that sep arate
ind ividuis from one another.
E v e r y object is distinct from every agent; and in situations pertinent to sexual harassm ent rules, both agent and object are persons
w h o are com petent, autonom ous, and separate. D istinct life p lan s
designs that create order ou t o f diverse experiences and com m itm ents
distinguish persons. N o tw o life plans, and no tw o persons, c a n be
exa ctly the same. These designs w arran t recognition respect.282
E xam ples m ay help to cla rify the d u ty to respect the personhood
and self-conception o f another. E liza b eth Spelm an gathers fam iliar
com plaints about failures to respect personhood: Y o u only p ay attention to m y b od y and its less fam ous counterpart, Y ou only p ay atten tion to m y m ind; T h in k a b ou t w ho I am , rather than how od I a m ,
from an elderly person; and the resentm ent o f a person identified on ly
as the w ife or husband o f another.283 These com plaints, P rofessor
Spelm an arges, m ake dem ands more strenuous than rights; the com plainant has dem anded to be treated as the person he or she is,284 even
though it m ay not be possible for a heeding agent to comply. B u t a
lesser d uty is possible. T h e agent m ust ackn ow led ge the separate life
plan o f the object. T h e agen t m ust regard the object as a sou rce
g r o u p s );
a s o c ia l f a c t t h a t c a u s e s t h e i d e n t it y o f th e h u m ilia t e d to c o lla p s e in p u b li c v ie w ) .
281 One student commentator fnds these indignities so intense that she deems sexual harass
ment a violation o f the Thirteenth Amendm ent, a badge of slavery. Jennifer L. Conn, N ote,
Sexual Harassment: A Thirteenth Amendment Response, 28 COLUM . J.L. & S o c . PROBS. 5 1 9 , 539
(
1995).
282 See S t e p h e n M
ib e r a l
aced o
, L
o n s t it u t io n a l is m
ib e r a l
ir t u e s
: C
it iz e n s h ip
, V
ir t u e
and
o m m u n it y
in
4 7 ( 1 9 9 1 ) ( a d d in g t h a t life p la n s m u s t c l a i m so m e o r ig in i n r a
t io n a l t h o u g h t in o r d e r to w a r r a n t r e s p e c t).
492
H ARVARD L A W R E V IE W
[V o l. n 1:445
1997]
493
a n d
. L. R
e v
. 10 0 9 , 1 0 1 7 ( 19 9 5 ).
292 See Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BN A) 37, 42 (D .D .C. 1980), revd, 753 F.2d
141 (D .C. Cir. 1985), affd sub nom. Meritor Sav. Bank, F S B v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
293 See Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 149-50 (D.C. Cir. 1985), a ffd sub nom. M eritor Sav.
Bank, F S B v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
294 See id. at 150.
295 Judge B o rk wrote a separate opinion dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc in Vin
son. See Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330, 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting).
494
H ARVARD L A W RE VIEW
[V o l. 111:445
1997]
495
496
H A RV A RD L A W R E V IE W
[V o l. 111:445
1997]
497
498
H ARVARD L A W R E V IE W
[V o l. 111:445
1 9 97 ]
499
T h e p h ra se d o e s n ot
m e a n o n e in c id e n t b u t r a t h e r i n d ic a t e s s o m e n u m b e r to o lo w to im p r e s s th e c o u r t : i n o t h e r
w o r d s , th e q u e s t io n o f p e r v a s iv e n e s s is a n s w e r e d
r a s s in g in c id e n ts .
Pr
a c t ic e
S ee A
lba
o n t
, Sexu
al
before th e c o u r t e n u m e r a t e s th e n u m b e r o f h a -
Harassm
ent
in
th e
o r kplace
: L
aw
and
4 9 n .1 6 6 (19 9 0 ) ( c it in g is o l a t e d in c id e n t s c a s e s in v o l v i n g 5 0 in c id e n ts o v e r 1 0 y e a r s ,
f i v e in c id e n t s o v e r t h r e e y e a r s , a n d th r e e is o l a t e d in c id e n t s o f h a r a s s m e n t o v e r [a ] t h r e e - y e a r
p e r i o d ( c it a t io n s o m itte d ) );
1 9 9 7 ) ( n o t in g t h a t t h e m a g i s t r a t e j u d g e d e e m e d th e h a r a s s m e n t to h a v e b e e n a n i s o l a t e d i n c i
d e n t , e v e n t h o u g h th e p l a i n t i f f h a d c o m p la in e d t o h e r e m p lo y e r s g e n e r a l c o u n s e l: H a s it a l w a y s
b e e n l ik e th is ? . . . [ T h e h a r a s s m e n t] t a k e s u p so m u c h t im e ( in te r n a l q u o t a t io n m a r k s o m it te d ) ) .
500
H ARVARD L A W RE VIEW
[V o l. 111:445
H ere a resp ectfu l person stan dard, tem pered b y the defense o f reaso n a b le avoid ability, con veys, w h a t is desirable abou t d octrin al atten
tio n to p erv asiv en ess that is, the chance to w eigh and to m easure
th e w ron gn ess o f w o rk p lace action w hile at the sam e tim e rescuing
w h a t is d esirab le abou t the idea o f reasonableness. It m a y be reason
a b le , for exam p le, for com pany m anagem ent to p a y less attention to a
fe w sexual h arassm en t com plaints in the m iddle o f its o w n hostile
ta k e o v e r crisis. A s the harassm ent becom es m ore en com passing
la s tin g longer, affectin g m ore people it becom es less reasonable for
m a n a ge m e n t to neglect these conditions o f disrespect, even if fu n d a
m en t is o f co m p a n y ow nership happ en to be in turm oil. A t this point,
on e m a y sa y th a t pervasiven ess has been achieved. T h e q u a lity to
lo o k for is not sim ply the breadth o f harassm ent, as atten tion to per
v a siv e n e ss in its curren t state suggests, bu t the ad d itio n al dim ensin
o f avoid ability.
Volenti non f i t in ju ria a them e sounded in the stu d ent note
w h o se title begins D id She A s k for It? 332 in flu en ced Justice
R e h n q u is ts opinion for the C o u rt in M eritor Savings B ank, F S B v.
V inson333 an d the M eritor-d erived rule that a p la in tiff m u st prove th at
sh e did not w elcom e the challenged conduct.334 A s m a n y com m entato rs arge, the rule a b ou t w elcom en ess is akin to the com m on law
b e lie f th a t rape claim s are often lies that are asserted to n u llify past
consent: a cco rd in g to the prejudice, a w om an w h o is n ow a p la in tiff or
a p rosecu trix w a s a w illin g p articip an t w hen the con d u ct occu rred .33S
TVial courts h a v e acqu iesced to this effort b y a llo w in g defend ants to
a rg e w elcom en ess w ith an array o f testim ony for instan ce, that the
p la in tiff used coarse lan gu age at w o rk, talked to colleagu es abou t her
se x u a l activities, or told risqu jo k es.336 L aw y ers w h o d efen d T itle V II
332 See A nn C . Juliano, Note, D id She Ask F or It?: The Unwelcome R equirem enl in Sexual
H arassm ent Cases, 77 C o r n e l l L. R e v . 1558 (1992).
333 477 U.S. 57, 68-69 (1986) (stating that the com plainants fantasies and sexually provocativ e speech or dress are obviously relevant to the issue o f voluntariness (citation omitted) (in
te rn a l quotation m arks omitted)).
334 See M ovan v. M aries County, 792 F.2d 746, 750 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that the plaintiff
m u st prove th at she w as subject to unwelcom e sexual harassment); M ary F. R adford, By Invitatio n Only: The P r o o f o f Welcomeness in Sexual Harassment Cases, 72 N .C . L . R e v . 499, 519
(1994) (noting that alm ost all federal circuits follow this rule); Childers, supra note 122, at 862 n.29
(read in g M eritor to state a presumption o f welcom eness that the plaintiff m ust rebut).
335 See Janine Benedet, H ostile Environm ent Sexual Harassment Claims and the Unwelcome
In flu en ce o f Rape Law , 3 M i c h . J. G e n d e r & L. 125, 132 (1995); Estrich, supra note 4, at 816;
Ju lian o , supra note 332, at 1573 - 7 5 336 See Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1991) (ruling against the p laintiff in part
b ecau se o f her history o f enjoying sexually suggestive jokes); Weiss v. Am oco O il C o., 142 F.R.D.
3 1 1 , 316 (S.D. Io w a 1992) (perm itting discovery, on the question o f welcom eness, regarding the
co m p lain a n ts practice o f sending and pinning up risqu cards); G an v. Kepro C irc u it Sys., 28 Fair
E m p l. Prac. C as. (B N A ) 639, 639 (E.D . Mo. 1982) (noting sexually explicit rem arks o f the plain
tiff). In W einsheim er v. Rockw ell International Corp., 754 F. Supp. 1559 (M .D. F ia. 1990), affd
w ith o u t opinion, 949 F.2d 1162 ( n t h Cir. 1991), the plaintiff made extensive allegations o f ha-
1997]
501
sexual harassm ent claim s have said that welcom eness is am ong their
b est w eap o n s o f defense.337
T h e rule about welcom eness shuttles uneasily betw een tw o truths.
O n e is th a t people are different: one person s m eat is a n oth ers poison.
A s Justice S ca lia has noted, once the courts are w illin g to hear com plaints o f sexual harassm ent w ithout proof of severe injury, the m ost
stra ig h tfo rw a rd w a y to ju d ge the m agnitude o f the harm is to ask
w h a t the cond uct m eant to the com plainant, and the su b jective them e
o f the w elcom eness requirem ent reaches tow ard an answ er.338 A lthough this reasoning m ight arge for retaining the w elcom eness rule,
it w o u ld also arge for its banishm ent it is equally true that a w e l
com eness in q u iry som etim es slurs the com plainant, overlaps at least
p a rtia lly w ith her burden to prove an ob jective w rong,339 and exposes
her to pretrial m aneuvers likely to prove hum iliating.340
A s w ith avoidability, the Feinberg-derived volenti criterion can
w o rk w ith a respectful person standard to encourage sim u ltaneou sly
the respectful treatm ent o f w orkers and attention to in d ivid u a l circu m stances th a t could support a defense. T h is approach w o u ld m a rk an
im portan t contrast. T h e opinion o f the C o u rt in M eritor asks: D id she
a sk for it? D id she d eserve it because of her clothes and conversation?
M erito r indulges trial ju d ges w ho w ant to evade their duties w ith a
stereotype. T h e respectful person standard, however, chooses another
query: D id the d efendant behave as a respectful person? T h a t is, did
the d efen d an t regard the com plainant as a person, self-propelled and
unique, w ith a range o f potential reactions to sex-based conduct in the
w o rk p la ce? T h is ran ge is intelligible to actors w illin g to render re
sp ectful attention; they m ay blunder, b u t their respect w ill be discerna ble. In d eed the concep t o f welcom eness, w hen used ap p ro p ria tely to
ev al a te the conduct o f an actor rather than the reaction o f a co m
p lainant, is a t its root a question whether respect w as rendered.
rassment, in cluding a claim that one defendant had pressed his penis into her hand while she was
looking elsewhere. See id. at 1561. The court found that although this incident was g ra p h ic,
the p laintiff had reported it to m anagement too casually and had generally failed to make a case
because o f her proven, active contribution to the sexually explicit environm ent. Id. at 1563-64.
337 See Jared H. Jossem, Investigating Sexual Harassment Complaints: G uidelines fo r E m ploy
ers, in L i t i g a t i n g t h f . S e x u a l H a r a s s m e n t C a s e , supra note 95, at 103, 113 (suggesting that,
as part o f trial preparation, law yers for employers should investgate the clothing and joke-tellin g
proclivities o f complainants).
338 See supra notes 25-29 and accom panying text (noting the sparseness o f the p lain tiffs prim a
facie case under current doctrine).
339 See Estrich, supra note 4, a t 830.
340 See Snchez v. Zabihi, 166 F.R.D. 500, 502 (D. N.M . 1996) (limiting the defen dan ts e ffo rt to
seek discovery on a sexual aggressor defense); Priest v. Rotary, 98 F.R.D. 755, 757 (N .D . Cal.
I 9^3) (quoting intrusive questions posed by defense counsel); Ellen E. Schultz & Ju n d a Woo,
P la in tijfs S ex Lives Are Being Laid Bare in Harassment Cases, W a l l S t . J., Sept. 19, 1994, at
A i.
502
H ARVARD L A W R E V IE W
[Vol. 111:445
1997]
50 3
erent for hostile en viron m ent sexual harassm ent claim s.348 T h e re
spectful person stan dard suggests a cautious interpretation o f hypersen sitivity that preserves the gains o f the objective standard b u t still
accom m odates the need for a standard that guides behavior in the
w orkforce.
O n this question, the respectful person standard would, fo llo w in g a
fram ew ork used in dign itary-tort law, function as follow s. O n ce the
p la in tiff produces evidence that the defendant did not conform to the
stan dard of a respectful person, the cou rt w ould perm it the d efen d an t
to arge that he did indeed conform to the standard, and th a t the
p la in tiffs feeling or experience of disrespect resulted from her hypersensitivity. L ia b ility w o u ld depend on w hether the p la in tiffs unu su al
sen sitivity w as k n ow n b y or kn ow ab le to the defendant.349 I f the de
fen d an t could not have k n o w n or predicted the reaction, then the de
fen d an t w ould not be liable. If, how ever, the defendant kn ew abou t
the hypersensitivity and acted deliberately to provoke a pained reac
tion, then the defendant w ou ld be liab le.350 A corporate em p loyer
w o u ld be liable if it knew o f and condoned its em ployees d eliberate
exploitation o f the p la in tiffs hypersensitivity.351
Parallels to current doctrine are evident. T h e question o f hypersen
sitiv ity is em bedded in the dialectic betw een objective and su b jective
assessments o f conduct.352 T h e respectful person standard, w h ich partakes of both ob jective and su b jective m easures o f behavior, va lid ates
both the (objective) principie o f reasonable know ledge and the (su b jec
tive) principie o f in d iv id u a l difference. A t the same time, h ow ever, the
348 See supra p. 4 7 7 . Consistent w ith this view, tort law generally discourages plaintiffs from
labeling themselves as extrem ely sensitive. See R e s t a t e m e n t ( S e c o n d ) o f T o r t s 4 6 cmt. j ,
313 cmt. c, 652D, cmt. c (1965).
349 F ran k Ravitch offers as an illustration a female worker whose boss thinks that wom en do
not belong in the workforce. In an effort to drive her out, the boss exploits what he kn o w s to be
her sensitivity to loud noise and sets up a noisy m achine near her office. The noisy m achine
w ould not bother the reasonable person. Under current analysis, a hostile environm ent sexual
harassment claim would fail, even though the supervisor deliberately imposed detrim ental working conditions based on the gender o f his subordnate. See Ravitch, supra note 345, at 257.
350 Longstanding tort rules are in accord. See C la rk v. Associated Retail Credit M en, 105 F.2d
62, 65-67 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (allow ing a remedy for the deliberate exploitation o f the p la in tiffs vulnerability to stress); Bundren v. Superior Court ex re. Los Robles R e g l Med. Ctr., 193 C a l. Rptr.
671, 676 (Cal. Ct. A pp. 1983) (reversing a grant of sum m ary judgm ent for the defendant in a case
in w hich the plaintiff sought recovery for the d efen d an ts rude questioning of p laintiff while
plaintiff w as recovering from surgery); G reat Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Roch, 153 A. 22, 23 (Md.
1931) (allowing similar recovery for defendant grocers packing a dead rat in a loaf o f bread);
R e s t a t e m e n t (S e c o n d ) o f T o r t s 46 cmt. f (1965) (noting that, in the case o f an acto r who
know s o f the plaintiffs peculiar susceptibility conduct m ay become heartless, flagrant, an d outrageous when the actor proceeds in the face o f such know ledge).
351 T h is sum mary is largely congruent w ith the recommendation of Ravitch, cited above in note
345, except that Ravitch is com m itted to the concept o f the objectively reasonable person. Id. at
271. It is also congruent w ith the burden-shifting argum ent proposed in Abrams, cited ab ove in
note 121, at 1214-15, and Childers, cited above in note 122, at 862 n.29.
352 See supra p p . 4 8 0 -8 2 .
HARVARD L A W RE V IE W
54
[V o l. 111:445
re sp e ctfu l person stan dard depart* from , and im proves on, current
d o c trin e b y p ro v id in g redress for deliberate, hostile con d u ct aim ed at
a n em p lo yee because o f her gender. A lth o u g h the ultrasensitive em
p lo y e e app ears to be m ore a creature o f w o rrie d im aginations than real
case s,3S3 sexual harassm en t doctrine ou ght to have a place for this in
d iv id u a l. In d ealin g w ith the possibility o f a claim b y such a litigant,
th e resp ectfu l person bu ild s on traditions o f both o b jectivity and indi
v id u a l attention.
3.
T he Law /Fact D iv id e . In asm uch as courts h a ve adm itted the
d iffic u lty o f their task o f d ivid in g the la w from the fa cts in sexual
h a ra ssm en t cases,354 one m a y w on d er h o w the respectful person stan
d a rd w o u ld function to preserve this distinction w ith its atten d an t
b e n e fits.3SS S upp orters o f the distinction can endorse the respectful
p erso n standard; in su p plan tin g references to reason in hostile e n v i
ro n m e n t sexual harassm en t claim s, the respectful person standard
w o u ld coexist w ith the curren t dich otom y betw een questions o f law
a n d q u estion s o f fact. S u m m ary ju d g m e n t and dism issals o f com
p la in ts w o u ld still be a vailab le to d efendants on m ost o f the same
g ro u n d s curren tly deem ed dispositive in fed eral courts. P rocedural
bases for dism issals an d su m m ary ju d gm en ts, such as the statute o f
lim ita tio n s356 and the failure to exh au st adm in istrative rem e
353 S e e E llison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (91 Cir. 1991) (referring to the rare hyper-sensitive
e m p lo yee); A ndrew s v. C ity o f Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1483 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that the
o b je ctiv e standard is necessary to protect em ployers from hypersensitive employees). Reported
case la w contains few decisions in which a court ruled against a plaintiff on the ground that the
p la in tiff w as hypersensitive. One such case m ay be Sand v. George P. Johnson Co., 33 Fair Em pl.
Prac. C a s. (B N A ) 716, 72c (E .D . M ich. 1982), although the San d rationale included other considerations. Instead the issue o f hypersensitivity emerges as a defense la w yers tactic, a labe! to pin
on a p lain tiff. See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 118 F.R.D. 525, 531 (M .D. Fia. 1988)
(d en yin g a defense motion for a com pelled psychiatric exam ination that w as intended to show
th a t the p lain tiff w as hypersensitive to pornography); Feldm an-Schorrig & M cD onald, supra note
1 1, at 28 (recom m ending this tactic).
354 S e e Scarfo v. C abletron Sys., Inc., 54 F.3d 931, 935-36 (ist Cir. 1995); cf. Sw anson v.
E lm h u rst C h rysler Plym outh, Inc., 882 F.2d 1235, 1238 (7th Cir. 1989) ( U nder Rule 52(a) w e are
o bliged to correct errors o f law including mixed findings o f law and fact, and any finding o f fact
p rem ised upon a rule o f law . (citations omitted)).
355 A distinction between law and fact offers the possibility o f consistency am ong like cases,
an d ap p rop riate reliance on the relative capabilities o f lay persons and legal experts. See Stephen
A . W e in e r , The C iv il Jury Trial and the Law-Fact D istin ctio n , 5 4 C a l . L . R e v . 1 8 6 7 , 1 9 2 2 - 2 5
( 1 9 6 6 ) . C r i t i c i s m o f th e d i s t i n c t i o n c o m e s f r o m v a r i e d q u a r t e r s . See, e.g., J a n i c e S c h u e t z , T h e
L o g ic
o f
W om en
on
T r ia l:
C ase
S tu d ie s
o f
P o p u la r
A m e ric a n
T r ia ls
144
( 19 9 4 )
(w[ B ] o t h l a w a n d f a c t a r e f r a m e d b y t h e c u l t u r e o f th e in t e r p r e t e r s w h o c r e a t e n a r r a t i v e s t o e x -
f e r i n g a d e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t c r it iq u e ) .
T h i s c r i t ic is m p r e c e d e s t h a t o f th e L e g a l R e a lis t s .
1997]
358 On this burden in sexual harassment cases, see Evans v. Technologies Applications & Serv
ice Co., 80 F.3d 954, 959 (41 Cir. 1996); and Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128
(4th Cir. 1987).
359 S ee Stahl v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 19 F.3d 533, 538 (io th Cir. 1994); VValk v. Rubberm aid,
Inc., 913 F. Supp. 1023, 1027 (N .D . Ohio 1994), a jfd w ithout opinion, 76 F.3d 380 (6th Cir. 1996).
Som e conduct m ay be based on sex and yet not be central to Title V I I s concern w ith discrim ination; thus, it too would fall outside the scope of the respectful person standard. S ee G olu szek v.
Sm ith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N .D . 111. 1988) (rejecting a claim based on heterosexual man-tom an harassment, in which plaintiff w as teased for having no wife or girlfriend and for liv in g with
his mother, and stating that this behavior, though rude and childish, did not fall w ithin Title V I I s
concern with discrimination against a discrete and vulnerable group).
360 F or current treatments o f pervasiveness, see Callanan v. Runyun, 75 F.3d 1293, 1296 (8th
-C ir. 1996), and Gross v. Burggraf Construction Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1537 (io th Cir. 1995). Present
doctrine treats severity and pervasiveness as mixed quesons of law and fact. See Jordn v.
C la rk , 847 F.2d 1368, 1375 n.7 (91 Cir. 1988); A nthony v. County o f Sacram ento, 898 F. Supp.
1435, 1447 (E.D. C al. 1995). T he respectful person standard would com port with this approach.
361 T h e Supreme C ourt has agreed to decide whether Title V II covers same-sex harassment.
See O ncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 117 S. Ct. 2430 (1997). T h is issue has d ivid ed the
circuits. Compare G arcia v. E lf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding
that same-sex sexual harassment claim s are not actionable under Title VII), with H opkins v. B a l
timore G as and Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 752 (41 Cir. 1996) (allowing the claim, but im posing extra
burden o f proof on the plaintiff to show that harassment was based on his gender), cert. d en ied ,
117 S. Ct. 70 (1996), and Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire, 887 F. Supp. 1133, 1136 (C .D . 111.
1995) (allow ing the claim).
HARVARD L A W R E V IE W
[V o l. 111:445
o f an o b je c tiv e standard, the* resp ectfu l person stan dard va lid ates a
su b set o f all sexu al harassm ent com p lain ts as grievances a b o u t be
h a v io r th at is w ron g, con trary to statu te, and am enable to un iversal
ju d g m e n t. T h e respectful person approach spares d efendants from
p ro tra cte d co u rt proceedings w h en no reasonable factfin d er co u ld conc lu d e th a t the p la in tiff w a s entitled to relief. M ore generally, the dich o to m o u s law /fa ct distinction is consonan t w ith the cen tral im porta n c e o f dich otom ies w ith in respect betw een in d ivid u al an d groupb a se d identities; betw een the o b ject as som ething other than the subje c t an d the o b je c t as c ritically like th e subject; betw een separation as
iso la tin g p un ishm en t and separation as affirm ation and thus in its
b a sic question s com ports w ith a resp ectfu l person standard.362 In barrin g som e accou n ts o f harassm ent, the respectful person stan dard does
n o t im p licitly slur them as a reaction contrary to reason, u n like the
p r e v a ilin g o b je c tiv e criterion for hostile environm ent case analysis. In
o th er aspects, the tw o standards are sim ilar for purposes o f pretrial
d ispo sition as a m atter o f law.
IV .
Som
V ir t u e s
of
th e
Respectfu
Person
363 924 F.2d 872, 884-85 (9th Cir. 1991) (Stephens, J., dissenting).
1997]
507
HARVARD L A W RE VIEW
[V ol. 111:4 4 5
374 See, e.g., N atio n al M uffler D ealers A s s n v. U nited States, 440 U .S. 472, 477 ( 1979) (establish in g criteria for reasonableness o f tax regulation).
375 See, e.g., A ssociated R an dall B an k v. G riffin, K ubik, Stephens & Thom pson, Inc., 3 F.3d
208, 213 (7th Cir. 1993) (discussing reasonable care standards as applied to broker-dealers);
T h e re se H. M ayn ard , The Affirmative Defense o f Reasonable Care Under Section 12(2) o f the Securities A ct o f j q j j , 69 N o t r e D a m e L. R e v . 57, 1 13 -1 5 (1993).
376 See, e.g., B ourqu e v. F D IC , 42 F.3d 704, 711 ( is t Cir. 1994) (using a reasonableness standard
to decide w h eth er a docum ent was probative); F e d . R. E v i d . 20i(b) (discussing reasonableness as
ap p lied to ju d ic ia l notice); F e d . R. E v i d . 7o6(b) (perm itting reasonable com pensation for courtap p oin ted expert witnesses).
377 S ee Stand ard O il Co. v. United States, 221 U .S. 1, 63-64 (1911) (setting forth the antitrust
rule o f reason).
378 S ee A ylett v. Secretary o f Hous. and U rban Dev., 54 F.3d 1560, 1567 (io th Cir. 1995) (dis
cu ssing the nature o f reason in reviewing the decisin o f an adm inistrative judge).
379 See M ich ael L. Perry, The Constitution, the Courts, and the Question o f M inim alism , 88'
N w . U . L. R e v . 8 4 , 119-20 (1993) (describing the role o f reasonableness within a minim alist parad igm o f constitutional interpretation); C arol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principies,
107 H a r v . L . R e v . 820, 824 n.21 (1994) (noting the interpretive difficulty posed by the w ord reaso n a b le in the Fourth Amendment).
380 O ne o f the handful o f doctrines that refer to the perspective o f those who receive action is
the tort o f offensive batterv that is, intentional contact that offends a reasonable sense o f per
sonal d ignity. R e s t a t e m e n t ( S e c o n d ) o f T o r t s 19 ( 19 6 5 ). T h is form ulation o f an objective
stan d ard addresses actors prim arily, w ith only secondary em phasis on the recipients o f action.
T h e ad jective reasonable serves to assert an o bjective standard and to define out hypersensitivities un kn ow n and unknow able to the actor. See J o s e p h W . G l a n n o n , T h e L a w o f T o r t s :
E
x am ples a n d
381 See F
L
ib e r t y
x p l a n a t io n s
e in b e r g
7 (19 9 5 ) .
9 6 - 1 0 9 (19 8 0 ).
382 S ee supra p p . 4 9 8 - 5 0 1 .
ber g
, R ig
h ts
, Ju
s t ic e
an d
th e
ound
of
1997]
59
H A RV A RD L A W RE VIEW
[Vol. 111:445
1997]
.399
HA R V A R D L A W R E V IE W
512
[Vol. 111:443
A m e rican law frequ ently en cou rages, and even requires, citizens to
ren d er respect o f the sort d escrib ed in this A rticle. T h is section sug
gests that analogies can be d ra w n b etw een the ideas o f respect that are
im p lic it in m an y o f the curren t le g a l doctrines and the respectful person stan dard proposed here. F r a n k ackn ow led gem ent o f respect as a
con stitu en t o f law, rath er than a p a r t o f a system o f m orality that is
r e d r ic k so n
n it e d
, B
Sta tes
la ck
an d
L
So
ib e r a t io n
uth
. A C
f r ic a
o m p a r a t iv e
is t o r y o f
lack
Id
e o l o g ie s in t h e
1 9 97 ]
408 d.
409 On the extensive secondary literature discussing moral rights, see the sources cited in G eri J.
Yonover, The Precarious Balance: Moral Rights, Parody, and Fair Use, 14 C a r d o z o A r t s &
E n t . L.J. 79, 81 n.6 (1996).
410 See H.R. Rep. N o. 101-514, at 5 (1990). T he word honor comes from the statutes predecessor, the Berne Convention.
411 E d w ard J. Damich, A Critique o f the Visual Artists Rights Act o f 1989, 14 N o v a L . R e v .
407, 408 (1990).
412 See N eil Netanel, A lienability Restrictions and the Enhancement o f Author Autonom y in
U nited States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 C a r d o z o A r t s & E n t . L.J. 1, 36-37 (1994).
413 See D a r r a b y , supra note 405, at 9-03[i].
414 I m ake an analogous argument concerning products liability. See A nita Bernstein, How
Can a Product Be Liable?, 45 DUKE L.J. 1, 43 (1995).
H ARVARD LA W RE VIEW
[Y o l. 111:445
tle m e n t to respect in the w tfrkplace sh ould not be dim inished b y rejo in d e rs th a t the p la in tiff chose the jo b and w as p aid to a ccep t w o rk
in g con d itio n s.415 B oth V A R A an d th e respectful person standard
r e le g a te reasonableness to a su p p ortin g role and, in particular, confne
it to excep tion s an d defenses. B o th V A R A and the respectful person
sta n d a r d gu ard again st incursions and b ou n d ary Crossing, rath er than
im p o se a ffirm a tiv e duties. T h e v isu al artist is entitled to in ju n ctive
r e lie f a ga in st inten tional or grossly negligent distortion, m odification,
o r d estru ction th a t w ou ld be p reju d icia l to the w ork;416 the w o rker is
e n title d to respectfu l distance.
2.
E n viron m en tal Law. A s the phrase hostile en viron m en t
su g g ests, en viron m en tal law can inform a respectful person approach
to sex u a l harassm en t in the w o rk p lace.
A s the ph ilosopher Paul
T h o m p so n w rites, a respectful person is a person w h o m easures his or
h e r a ctio n in term s o f its consisten cy w ith[,] and [effect] on[,] a netw ork
o r w e b o f relationsh ip s.417 W ith in this ecosystem the w orksite,418 a
la r g e r social com m unity,419 or the p h ysica l w orld the respectful perso n accep ts the m ediating effects o f external circum stances. T h o m p
son p o in ts out th a t both con sequ en tialist ethical ph ilosophy and K a n
tia n abso lu tism tend to understate the im pact the en viron m ent has on
e th ics. N o b le ch aracter traits m ay becom e vices w h en taken to ex
trem es, b ut the en viron m ent in w h ich a virtuous person lives w ill reinfo rce the ten d en cy o f virtu es to b alan ce one another.420 T h e en viron
m e n ta l constitu en t o f ethics, w h ich T hom p son calis the ecology of
v ir tu e , suggests th at en viron m en tal la w can inform and gu ide the de
v e lo p m e n t o f a leg al stan dard o f respect.
C on sider, for exam ple, th e p recau tion ary principie,421 an en viron
m e n ta l tenet endorsed in the 1992 R io D eclaration 422 and by A m erican
c o u rts.423 T h e precau tion ary principie asserts that society should an
tic p a te , rath er than sim ply attem p t to remedy, activities that h arm the
415 S e e supra pp. 469-70.
416 S e e 1 7 U .S.C . 1 0 6 A (aX3)(AH B) ( 19 9 4 ) .
417 E lectronic mail from Paul B. Thom pson, D irector o f the C en ter for Biotechnology Policy
a n d E th ics and Professor o f A gricultural Econom ics at Texas A & M University, to Carolyn Raffensperger, Director, Science and E nvironm ental H ealth N etw ork (M ay 12, 1997) (printout on file
w ith the Harvard Law Review).
418 S e e supra note 280 and accom panying text.
419 S e e supra p. 489.
420 S e e Thom pson, supra note 417.
421 T h e p recautionary principie, or vorsorgeprinzip, emerged in West G erm any in the 1970S.
S e e K o n ra d von M oltke, The Vorsorgeprinzip in West Germn Environm ental Policy, in R o y a l
C
o m m is s io n o n
n v ir o n m e n t a l
Po
l l u t io n
, T
w elfth
epo rt
: B
est
Pr
a c t ic a b l e
n v i-
app. 3 , at 58 (19 8 8 ).
422 S ee D avid A . Wirth, The R io Declaration on Environm ent and Development: Two Steps
F orw ard and One Back, or Vice Versa?, 29 G a . L . R e v . 599, 634 (1995). I elabrate on the precau
tio n a ry principie in A n ita Bernstein, Form ed by Thalidomide: Mass Torts as a False Cure fo r
T o xic Exposure, 97 C o l u m . L . R e v . (forthcom ing 1997).
423 S ee infra note 427.
R O N M E N T A L O P T IO N
1997]
SIS
en viron m ent.424 U rging policym akers to err on the side o f nonencroach m en t and distance, the precautionary principie expresses re
spect.425 T h is em phasis on avoiding harm rather than m axim izing
u tility has affronted econom ics-focused critics, w h o arge th at better
safe than sorry as a policy provides little gu idance abou t the optim al
m ix o f risks and contains a tacit prejudice in favor o f the status q u o.426
T h ese criticism s stem from a utilitarian prem ise that runs co n tra ry to
the concep t o f recognition respect. D espite this utilitarian criticism ,
h ow ever, the principie retains strong appeal for courts, ad m in istrative
agencies, and com m entators.427 L ik e the ethical d u ty to refrain,428 the
precau tion ary principie counsels hesitation; the respectful person understands the prudence of caution.
E lsew here, current environm ental law recognizes the tenet o f re
spect. A n im al rights, linked analytically to en viron m entalism ,429 are
en forced b y an array o f laws. A t the federal level, statutes protect
v u ln erab le species430 and provide for the hum ane transport o f anim als.431 A t the State level, anticruelty statutes declare the w ron gfu l-
H ARVARD L A W R E V IE W
[Vol. 111:445
ary
r a n c io n e
, A
n im a l s
, Pr
o pe r ty
and
th e
aw
1 2 1 - 2 2 ( 19 9 5 ) .
P r o fe s s o r
F r a n c i o n e , a n a n i m a l r ig h t s a c t i v i s t , n o t e s t h a t t h e s e l a w s a r e f a r fr o m s e lf - e n f o r c i n g a n d , in a n y
e v e n t , n e v e r c h a l le n g e t h e f la w e d h u m a n c e n t r i c p r e m is e t h a t a n i m a l s m a y , o r p e r h a p s m u s t,
s u f f e r w h e n s u c h s u f f e r i n g w o u l d b e n e f i t h u m a n b e in g s .
See id. a t 1 2 9 - 3 0 .
W h e th e r o r not
F r a n c i o n e is r i g h t to q u a r r e l w it h t h e s c o p e a n d e n f o r c e m e n t o f a n d c r u e l t y s t a t u t e s , t h e i r e x is t e n c e d e m o n s t r a t e s a d e g r e e o f r e c o g n it i o n r e s p e c t o f a n im a ls .
a n i m a l in o n e s
c h a r g e ) ; N . Y . A g r i c . & M k t s . L a w 3 5 3 ( M c K i n n e y 19 96 ) ( r e fe r r in g to th e f a il u r e t o p r o v id e
p r o p e r s u s t e n a n c e ).
434 I n a 19 8 5 s e q u e l t o h is c l a s s ic c l a i m t h a t t r e e s w a r r a n t r e s p e c t , C h r i s t o p h e r S t o n e g r o u p e d
t o g e t h e r e n t it ie s t h a t , t h o u g h n o t p e r s o n s a n d h e n e e n o t m o r a l a g e n ts , n e v e r t h e le s s c o m m a n d l e
Revisited: H ow Far
Will Law and Moris Reach? A Pluralist Perspective , 5 9 S . C a l . L . R e v . i , 1 2 - 1 3 (*9 8 5 ). T h e s e
g a l o r m o r a l a t t e n t i o n . C h r i s t o p h e r D . S t o n e , S h o u ld T Y e es H a v e S t a n d in g ?
e n t it ie s i n c l u d e e m b r y o s , a n i m a ls , c o r p s e s , l i v i n g o r g a n is m s , h a b it a t s , s p e c ie s , t r ib e s , n a t io n s ,
c o r p o r a d o n s , e v e n i n t a n g i b le s l ik e t h e q u a l i t y o f th e l ig h t in th e A r i z o n a d e s e r t a t s u n s e t .
2 1-2 2 .
S t o n e u s e s s p e c ia l l a n g u a g e
Id. a t
d i s in t e r e s t e d e n t it ie s , m o r a l o b l ig e e s , m o r a l p a tie n t[ s ]
t h a t e l u c i d a t e s t h e i n f r m i t ie s o f a r e a s o n - b a s e d s t a n d a r d f o r j u d g i n g o f f e n s iv e n e s s a n d h a r m to
S ee supra p p . 4 5 6 - 7 1 . T h e t e r m m o r a l p a t i e n t , f o r e x a m p le , w h i c h S t o n e b o r r o w s f r o m
see S t o n e , supra, a t 45 & n .1 2 5 ( c it in g T o m R e g a n , T h e C a s e f o r
d i g n it y .
t h e p h i lo s o p h e r T o m R e g a n ,
A n im a l R ig h t s
r im e te r .
1 5 1 - 5 6 (19 8 3 )), s u g g e s t s a t e r r a in o f r e s p e c t e x t e n d in g b e y o n d t h e K a n t i a n p e -
L i k e t h e r e s p e c t f u l p e r s o n s t a n d a r d , S t o n e s a r g u m e n t a b o u t m o r a l p l u r a li s m
t h a t m o r a l c l a i m s c a n b e o b je c t - g e n e r a t e d a s w e l l a s s u b je c t - g e n e r a t e d .
g u m e n t is t h a t d i s in t e r e s t e d e n t it ie s a r e f u n d a m e n t a l l y e n t l e d to r e c o g n it i o n r e s p e c t .
o g n it io n
v a r e s d e p e n d i n g o n th e e n t i t y
t h e e n t it le m e n t s o f e m b r y o s d i f f e r f r o m
a c c e p ts
A t it s c r u x , S t o n e s a r
S u ch rec
th o se o f
b u t th e c la im s o f a l l in c lu d e a t t e n d o n , fo -
S ee D i l
supra n o t e 4 3 , a t 1 0 8 - 1 0 . O n b e h a l f o f d i s in t e r e s t e d e n t it ie s , S t o n e a s s e r t s th e c la i m m a d e in
t h e r e s p e c t - f o r - p e r s o n s l it e r a t u r e th e p e r s o n s r ig h t to b e t r e a t e d a s th e p e r s o n h e o r s h e is . See
S p e lm a n , supra n o t e 2 6 1 , a t 1 5 2 - 5 3 .
435 S e e B e r n s t e in , supra n o t e 4 1 4 , a t 4 4 .
436 S ee C a l . P e n a l C o d e 6 4 0 .5 ( W e s t 19 9 6 ) ( c r im i n a liz i n g th e m a k i n g o f g r a f fit i) ; H a w .
c u s , a w a r e n e s s o f s e p a r a t io n , a n d c o m b i n a t i o n s o f u n iv e r s a l a n d p a r t ic u l a r i s t i c r e g a r d .
lo n ,
Re
. St
a t
.A
n n
. 2 9 8 -2 7 ( M i c h ie 19 9 6 ) ( a d d r e s s i n g v a n d a l is m o n p u b li c s c h o o l p r o p e r t y ) .
437 S o m e e a r l y j u d i c i a l w r it n g e x p r e s s e d r e s p e c t f o r c o r p s e s .
See E n g l a n d v. C e n t r a l P o c a h o n -
t a s C o a l C o . , 1 0 4 S .E . 4 6 , 4 7 (W . V a . 19 2 0 ) ( a l l o w i n g a c la im f o r u n a u t h o r iz e d d is in t e r m e n t) ; L a r s o n v. C h a s e , 5 0 N .W . 2 38 , 2 4 0 ( M in n . 1 8 9 1 ) ( a l lo w i n g a w i d o w s c la i m f o r u n a u t h o r iz e d d is s e c tio n );
eeto n
supra n o t e 3 8 7 , a t 362 ( r e fe r r in g to a s e r ie s o f c a s e s a l l o w i n g
r e c o v e r y f o r n e g l ig e n t e m b a lm in g , n e g l ig e n t s h i p m e n t , r u n n in g o v e r th e b o d y , a n d th e l i k e ).
1997]
517
H a t e S p e e c h ].
442 See Robin West, Toward a First Amendment Jurisprudence o f Respect: A Com m ent on
George Fletchers Constitutional Identity, 14 C a r d o z o L. R e v . 759, 762 (1993). A lth o u gh West
rejects the idea of privileging equality over liberty, her hybrid equality/liberty argum ent describes
m any o f the elements o f recognition respect. See id.
443 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. C ity o f St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392-94 (1992); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 4 11 -14 (1989). T h e Supreme C o urt sum marily affirm ed a Seventh C ircu it case th a t had
struck dow n an ordinance defining pornography-caused harms as civil rights violations an d creating a prvate right o f action to redress these injuries. See American Booksellers A s s n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 324, 325 (7th Cir. 1985), a ffd mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
444 See H enry Louis Gates Jr., Let Them Talk: Why Civil Liberties Pose No Threat to C ivil
Rights, N e w R e p BLIC, Sept. 20 & 27, 1993, at 37, 46-47 (addressing the harms o f racist speech).
445 See sources cited supra note 7 and accom panying text.
H ARVARD L A W RE VIEW
[V ol. 111:445
. . . .).
1997]
519
centrates pow er w ithou t necessarily prom oting the fittest and b est ob
je c tiv e truth.457 Just as notions o f transaction m isdescribe the o b jec
tiv e criterion of hostile environm ent sexual harassm ent claim s458 and
the nature o f visual artists rights,459 th ey do not build a satisfactory
ideal o f free speech. For purposes o f recognition respect, how ever,
m etaphors o f m arket and transaction retain valu in that they describe
the free discussion am ong persons w ho credit one another w ith free
dom and reason.460
T h e free speech debate in general explores the lim its o f recognition
respect, a quest that I describe in this A rticle bu t do not try to resolve
except w ith specific reference to the area o f sexual harassm ent law . A
respectful person standard, im plicit in the W est and H eym an visions o f
the right to free speech, m ay even tu ally enter First A m en d m en t d oc
trine. B u t rather than arge here in favor o f this m igration, I connect
respect and free speech only to contend that one cannot posit a rig h t o f
free speech w ithout considering a distinction betw een expression and
com m unication. T h e idea o f recognition respect sums up w h at m akes
free speech a valu able right, w h at lim its the right to free expression,
and w h a t is at stake in construing the F irst A m endm ent guarantee.
b.
R eligin. T h e Free Exercise and E stablishm ent C lau ses of
the F irst A m endm ent sim ilarly link recognition respect w ith civil liber
ties. One fam ous m etaphor envisions the boundaries that characterize
recognition respect461 b y perceiving constitutional religious protection
as shielding a garden from the encroachm ent o f w ilderness.462 T h e re
spectful person, as discussed above, m aintains a distance from others
and recognizes that individual w ill arises u n iq u ely in each hum an be
ing.463 P ointing occasionally in opposite directions, the Free E xercise
457
458
459
460
461
- 462
See
See
See
See
See
See
H e y m a n , supra n o te 4 5 0 , a t l ix - lx i.
supra p . 488.
supra p. 513-14H e y m a n , supra n o te 4 5 0 , a t lx ii.
supra p . 509 .
M a r k d e W o l f l H o w e , T h e G a r d e n a n d t h e W i l d e r n e s s ( 19 6 5 ) .
s o n , w h o s e v i e w o f th e R e lig i n C l a u s e s c o m m a n d s s t r o n g a ll e g ia n c e to d a y ,
J a m e s M a d i-
see LA U R EN CE H .
T r i b e , A m e r i c a n C o n s t i t u t i o n a l L a w 1 1 5 9 - 6 1 (2 d e d . 19 8 8 ), m a i n t a in e d t h a t in th e U n it e d
See L e t t e r f r o m J a m e s
reprinted in 5 T h e F o u n d e r s C o n s t i t u t i o n 10 7 , 1 0 7 - 0 8
S t a t e s r e lig io n s m u s t s t a y s e p a r a t e fro m o n e a n o t h e r a n d f r o m th e s ta te .
M a d i s o n to R e v . A d a m s (18 3 2 ),
( P h il ip B . K u r l a n d & R a lp h L e r n e r e d s ., 19 8 7 ) ( u r g in g t h a t th e g o v e r n m e n a b s t a in f r o m d e a l i n g
w ith
r e lig io u s e s t a b lis h m e n t s , e x c e p t to p r e s e r v e th e p u b li c o r d e r a n d to p r o t e c t e a c h s e c t
[ a g a i n s t ] t r e s p a s s e s o n its le g a l r ig h t s b y o th e r s ).
L a u r e n c e T r ib e id e n t ifi e s t h e m a in t h e m e s o f
c o n s t it u t io n a l r e lig io u s fre e d o m a s v o lu n t a r is m a n d s e p a r a t is m , b o th o f w h ic h a r e c e n t r a l to
r e c o g n it i o n r e s p e c t f o r p e r s o n s .
dom
See T
r ib e ,
supra , a t 1 1 6 0 - 6 1 ( d e f in in g v o lu n t a r is m a s t h e f r e e
fro m c o m p u l s i n in m a t t e r s o f b e l i e f a n d s e p a r a t is m
a s th e p r in c ip le t h a t r e l ig i n a n d
g o v e r n m e n t f u n c t io n b e s t i f e a c h r e m a in s in d e p e n d e n t o f th e o t h e r ).
520
HARVARD L A W R E V IE W
[Vol. 111:445
a n d E stablishm en t C lau ses fcxpress a com m on concern abou t autonom o u s hum an w ill and the d anger o f disrespectful encroachm ent.464
In recognition o f the v a lu o f com m itm ents to or principled
sta n ces again st religin, the A m e ric a n ju d icia ry has lent support to
conscien tious postures and p ractices, favorin g the perspective o f re
sp e c t for persons over altern ative buttresses for religin that other societies h ave chosen.46S A n d as w ith free speech, the Suprem e C o u rt
cases that strike dow n statu tory attem p ts to achieve recognition re
sp e c t for religious practices or institution s illum inate the w ays in
w h ic h A m erican law seeks to foster recognition respect. T h e E s ta b
lish m en t C lau se m ay be seen as a con strain t on statutes that ad van ce
recogn ition respect for religions, b u t w h en the C o u rt invalid ates such
statu tes, it renders respect to the religin in question w h ile insisting on
th e principie of separation b etw een ch u rch and state.466 T h e recent
in v a lid a tio n o f the Religious F reed o m R estoration A c t sim ilarly reveis
a solicitude for liberty o f conscience: in deem ing this statute unconstitu tio n a l, the Suprem e C o u rt based its decisin on congressional pow ers
u n d e r section 5 o f the F ourteenth A m end m en t, takin g care not to imp u g n religious freedom as a leg isla tiv e goal 467 Failed claim s for exem p tion likew ise reveal the C o u r t s respect for religious liberty: every
o n e o f the great free-exercise preced ents ruling against conscientious
p ractitio n ers o f religin contains a t least a bow, if not a paean, to spiritu a l freedom .468 T h e tangled c la im s o f religious liberty and religious
n eu tra lity continu to vex ju d g e s and scholars, w ho struggle over
w h ic h valu com es first. T h ese w riters h ave found com m on ground in
recogn ition respect.469
464 See M ichael W. M cConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. R e v . 115, 168
(1992) (T h e great evil against which the Religin Clauses are directed is governm ent-induced
hom ogeneity . . . . ).
465 Cf. Ugo M attei, Three Pattem s o f Law: Taxonomy and Change in the Worlds Legal System s,
45 Am. J. Com p. L. 5, 23 (1997) (noting th a t the W estern legal tradition, unlike other legal system s, relies on a separation o f law from religin); Sheldon H. Nahm od, The Public Square and the
Jew as Religious Other, 44 H a s t in g s L.J. 865, 867-68 (1993) (describing role played by antiSem itism in European nationalism leading up to the Holocaust); Richard Smith, Why the Taint to
R eligi n ? The Interplay o f Chance and R eason, 1993 B Y U L. R e v . 467, 468 (adverting to religion-state relations in Germany).
466 See, e.g., Board o f Educ. v. Grum et, 512 U .S. 687, 690 (1994) (observing that tenets o f Satm ar H asidic faith do not require a separate school district); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431
(1962) (noting that a unin o f church and state w o uld threaten to destroy governm ent and to d e
g ra d e religin).
467 See C ity o f Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. C t. 2157, 2172 (1997).
468 See, e.g., O Lone v. Estate o f Shebazz, 482 U .S. 342, 344, 352 (1987) (discussing efforts o f
p rison adm inistrators to cooperate with in m ates sincerely held Muslim beliefs); Bow en v. Roy,
476 U .S. 693, 700 (1986) (quoting with ap p roval congressional resolutions concerning Am erican
In d ian religious freedom); Reynolds v. U nited States, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 145, 166 (1878) (noting that
la w s cannot interfere with . . . religious belief and opinions).
469 S ee J e s s e H. C h o p e r , S e c u r i n g R e l i g i o u s L i b e r t y : P r i n c i p l e s f o r J u d i c i a l
I n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f T H E R e l i g i n C L A U S E S 31-32 (1995) (referring to indignation and of
fe n se); A bner S . Greene, The P olitica l Balance o f the Religin Clauses, 102 Y a l e L .J . 1611, 1643
1997]
521
c.
A ssociation. F irst Am endm ent doctrine connects personhood
and hum an dignity to build a freedom o f association:470 in the w ord s
o f L auren ce Tribe, virtu a lly every invasin o f personhood is also an
interference w ith association . . . 471 For C h arles Fried, the essence
o f p riv a c y another constitutional liberty linked w ith the F irst
A m en d m en t is the po w er o f an individual to share and w ith h o ld intim a cy based on in d ivid u al choice.472 Suprem e C ou rt case law on the
freedom o f association expounds on these vales, connecting associational rights w ith boundaries,473 self-definition,474 and protected sanctuaries.47S
L ik e the concept o f respect, freedom o f association rests on both
liberal and com m unitarian bases. F rom a liberal van tag e point, associational rights recognize that persons cannot flourish in isolation. A
com m unitarian perspective em phasizes that association in grou p s is
m ore than a right: com m unities are as central as individuis are to this
F irst Am endm ent-guaranteed liberty.476 H ere the contrast b etw een
reason and respect reappears. Successful claim s o f associational rights
h a ve com e from groups and com m unities united around variou s v a l es
an d characteristics religin, gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity,
fa m ily status all o f w hich, like sexual harassm ent, have little or
nothin g to do w ith reason. T h e im pulse to associate com es from a desire o f individuis to find their place in a com m unity. T h is place can
be identified, expressed, confirm ed, refined, m odified, and rejected
o n ly through the function o f respect.
V.
om m on
Sen se
and
R espect
H a vin g discussed respect as a m atter o f philosophy and socioc u ltu ral history as w ell as legal doctrine, w e m ay now explore respect
as a com m onsensical norm that lay persons understand and apply.
T h e proposed ju ry instruction below, interspersed w ith com m entary,
(1993) (concluding that political participation rights depend upon a recognition o f religious conscience as well as a stance against religious establishment); W illiam P. M arshall, The C oncept o f
Offensiveness in Establishment and Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 66 IND. L.J. 351, 373 (1991)
(noting, with disapproval, the theme o f offensiveness in Religin Clause case law).
470 See G risw old v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (noting that although the freedom of
association is not expressly included in the First Amendm ent its existence is necessary in m aking
the express guarantees fully m eaningful).
T r i b e , supra note 462, at 1400.
472 See C h a r l e s F r i e d , A n A n a t o m y o f V a l e s 142 (1970).
473 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483; see also Eu v. San Francisco County D em ocratic C en tu ry
C o m m n, 489 U .S. 214, 224 (1989) (identifying a right to determine the boundaries o f a political
association); Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 214 (1986) (applying an associational
right to political parties); Bates v. C ity of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960) (holding th a t an
associational right protects organizations from governm ent attack and interference).
474 See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984).
475 S ee Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-85.
476 See S o i f e r , supra note 138, at 51-52.
471
HARVARD LA W R E V IE W
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[V ol. 111:445
d escrib es the respectful prson standard in ord inary lan gu age. Follo w in g the pattern set elsew here in this A rticle, I h ave w ritten this
m od el ju r y instruction w ith T itle V II claim s in m ind, but one m ay
rea d ily alter this instruction to fit dign itary-tort actions.
X [th e p la in tiff] has alleged that she has been fo rced into a
h o stile work environm ent because o f sexual harassment. To establish a claim o f hostile environm ent sexual harassment, X
m ust prove by a preponderance o f the evidence that the w ork
p la ce was perm eated w ith discrim inatory intim idation, ridicule,
and in su lt that is related to sex, and that is sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the cond itions o f her employment and create
an abusive working environment. Exam ples o f such conduct are
sex u a l propositions, sexual innuendo, the display o f sexually exp lic it m aterials, and sexually derogatory language.
C om m ent: T h is sum m ary introduction w ou ld fo llo w a m ore general
op en in g, rea d ily a vailab le in the pattern books and not o f d irect con
cern here, th at w o u ld describe the nature o f a T itle V I I claim .477 T h e
a b o v e p a rag ra p h quotes alm ost verbatim an A B A -a u th o red m odel ju ry
in stru ctio n .478 Tellingly, the passage contains no reference to reason
an d reasonableness.479
U n d er the law, an employer must provide a working en v i
ronm ent in w hich men and women are treated equally, and that
is not hostile or abusive. You may need some guidance about
w hat it means to treat people equally and to provide an en v i
ronm ent that is not hostile or abusive. To help you in your deliberations, I ask you to ask yourselves: D id A B C [th e employer]
behave as a respectful person toward X ? I f A B C treated X as a
respectful person would, then A B C is not liable to X.
Comment'. F ollow in g the contention that the duties o f a respectful
person are prin cip ally n egative the respectful person refrains and
forbears, and stands b ack from boundaries480 this part o f the in
stru ction includes n egative locutions. E vid en ce suggests that although
m ltip le n egative statem ents can harm ju ro rs com prehension o f instru ction s,481 ju d g es can reduce or elim inate these harm ful effects by
ry
Pr
a c t ic e a n d
In
e v it t
, C
s t r c t io n s
: C
h arles
B. B
iv il a n d
& M i c h a e l A. W o l f f , F e d e r a l
104.01, at 10 12-13 (4th ed. 1987 &
lackm ar
r im in a l
Supp. 1996).
478 See Em p loym en t & Labo r Relations Comra., M odel Jury Instrctions: Employment Litiga
tion, 1994 A B A . S e c . L i t . 40.
479 T h ese term s appear in the A B A m odel ju ry charge. S ee id.
480 See supra pp. 486-92.
431
See R o b ert P. C h arrow & Veda R. Charrow , Making Legal Language Vnderstandable: A
Psycholin g uistic Study o f Jury Instrctions, 79 C o lu m . L. R e v . 1306, 1324-25 (1979) (finding
o nly sm all effects on com prehension when instrctions use single negatives, but identifying double
and triple negatives as p articularly incom prehensible to jurors).
1997]
523
524
H A RV A RD L A W R E V IE W
[Vol. 111:445
484 A vast array o f references to respect in the context o f harassment appear in the m edia. See,
e.g.y Sexua l Harassment and M isco n d u ct in the United States Army: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Arm ed Services, io s th C on g. (Feb. 4, 19 9 7 ) (statement of General Dennis J. Reimer,
C h ie f o f Staff, U nited States A rm y), available in L E X I S , Legis Library, C ngtst File; Women
Readers R ea ct, B a n g o r D a i l y N e w s , Jan. 28 , 1 9 9 7 , at A 8 (gathering comments from wom en
n ew spaper readers); Crossfire (C N N televisin broadcast, Feb. 16 , 1 9 9 7 ), available in L E X I S ,
N e w Library, Scrip t F ile (debating w h eth er opening combat positions to women w ould result in
greater respect for wom en soldiers and reduced sexual harassment).
485 T h om as H ead & M ickey Veich, Would You Say That in Front o f Your M other? Sexu a l
Harassment, S E C U R I T Y M g m t ., Feb. 1 9 9 4 , at 4 3 , available in 19 9 4 W L 2 8 2 3 11 4 .
1997]
525
practice o f harassm ent an d the accusation that one has com m itted this
violation o f em ploym ent law.
Sexual harassm ent la w needs to absorb the teachings o f com m on
sense and d aily experience. D octrine in this subject m ust be trued,
brought honestly into alignm ent w ith good sense. T h is process includes several discrete steps.
A s this A rticle has detailed at some length, the respectful person
m ust replace the reasonable person as the gauge by w hich cou rts d e
term ine w hether the alleged harasser has violated the law. R esp ect
and reason are neither m u tu a lly preclusive or oriented in con trary directions. H ow ever, centuries o f experience have connected reason w ith
various biases relatin g to gender and race in particular and caste
oppression in general th at obstruct the rem ediation o f sexual h a
rassment. E m phasis on reason also neglects the em otional and sex u a l
nature o f sexual harassm ent. Standards that dem and reasonableness,
in the sense o f shared understandings or centrist view s, have p ro v e d
problem atic in both theory and practice. Indispensable elsew here in
the law, the reasonable person m ust p lay a lesser role in sexual h a ra ss
m ent doctrine.
Another step is m ore theoretical and m ust be taken slowly. R eco gnizing respect as a legal concept com es cise to treading on the p rin c i
ple that the law ought to refrain from teaching or enforcing virtu e, ex
cept in the m inim al sense o f deterring citizens from endangering one
another. P hilosophical co n flict betw een those w ho favor the right and
those w ho em phasize the good has been underw ay for centuries, w ith
insufficient application to specifics.486 Sexual harassm ent law sh o u ld
enter this liberal-com m unitarian debate at a point near the edge o f lib
eral m inim alism .487 I h ave suggested that the respectful person fa lls
w ithin the b oundary o f w h a t the liberal State is com petent to u n dertake. T he path o f such a person m ay be stated in narrow and n eg a tiv e
terms: the respectful person has a legal duty to refrain from disrespect,
rather than a d uty to a ffirm or esteem another person. R espect in this
sense I have used the philosophical label recognition respect is
consistent w ith various relations now m andated by longstanding d o c
trine 488 E m bedded legal rules o f respect are taken for granted. A
stronger understanding o f the w a y in w hich the law dem ands respect486 Authors have explored the liberal-com m unitarian spectrum in specific areas o f law and p ol
icy. See, e.g., Troven A. Brennan, An E th ical Perspective on Health Care Insurance Reform , 19
Am. J.L. & M ed . 37, 47-5 (1993) (extrapolating from medical ethics to create an ethic o f access to
health care); Enrique R. Carrasco, Law, Hierarchy, and Vulnerable Groups in Latin America:
Towards a Communal M odel o f Development in a Neoliberal World, 30 S t a n . J. I n t l L. 221,
278-310 (1994) (rejecting the strict liberal/communitarian dichotomy to arge that vuln erable
groups are entitled to services necessary for the good life); Fox, supra note 246, at 171-7 8 (criticizing welfare reform).
487 See supra notes 41-42 and accom panying text.
488 See supra pp. 5 12-21.
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HARVARD L A W RE VIEW
[V o l.
111:445
fu l behavior w ill cla rify vales n ow obscured and shed light on liberal
p o litica l theory in A m erican law.
To com plem ent this theoretical advance, w orkin g law yers should
continu to introduce new extralegal understandings abou t sexual ha
rassm ent into the developm ent o f the law. O ne source o f input comes
from the jury, standing b y in both T itle V II and dign itary-tort actions.
Jurors grapple w ith respect in their d aily lives. T h e form ality o f a
courtroom , though a w o rk a d a y setting for law yers and ju d ges, causes
persons in the ju r y pool to think abou t w hat R obin D illon has called
institutional respect;489 although legal scholars and courtroom regulars
m a y find respect an alien concept in tort or antidiscrim ination law,
those persons assem bled to serve on a ju ry bring a heightened sense o f
the w ord into the court proceedings.490 O ther influences on the d evel
op m ent o f respect in sexual harassm ent proceedings m ay com e from
the w o rk experiences o f those fam iliar w ith other respect-focused dom ain s o f the law. E nviron m en tal law yers and intellectual property
specialists, for instance, m ight be w ell positioned to explain the legal
con cep t o f respect.
T reating sexual harassm ent w ith respect m ust begin w ith the ackn ow led gm en t th at sexual harassm ent is wrong. Such a statem ent, far
from im peding the progress o f w om en w orkers or m ixing tort im prope rly into c ivil rights law ,491 is essential to the prevention and rem ediation o f sexual harassm ent. O n ly after it is deem ed w rong can sexual
harassm ent be abju red and condem ned. Injurers and recipients o f
harassm ent w ill then be able to lcate their decisions and behavior in a
design th at is congruent w ith m orality.
T h e tw o legal dom ains that address sexual harassm ent tort and
antidiscrim ination law or, put m ore quaintly, law and eq u ity conjo in to dem and this m oral design. O nce it is agreed that sexual h a
rassm ent is a w ron g and henee w arran ts a claim at law, the principie
o f eq u ity behind the civil rights statutes lays the stress upon the d u ty
o f the defendant, and decrees that he do or refrain from doing a cer
tain thin g because he ought to act or forbear. It is because o f this emphasis upon the d efen d an ts d u ty th at equity is so m uch more ethical
than law .492 T h e obligations o f sexual harassm ent law derive from
489
1997]
527
L a w Employment D iscrim ination, 109 H a rv . L. R e v . 1568, 1573-74 n.26 (1996), pre-1991 Title
V II enforcem ent provided exclusively equitable remedies, see N ote, supra note 199, at 1464.