The Rationality of Renaissance Magic

The Rationality of Renaissance Magic
Gregory W. Dawes
Belief in magic is widespread both in history and in contemporary cultures. Can
such belief be regarded as rational? If so, in what way? An examination of the magic
of Renaissance Europe enables us to distinguish three ways in which a belief can be
rational. It can be (a) rationally defensible, given a particular set of background
beliefs, (b) formed by some reliable weans, or (c) the result of procedures that are
collectively rational. Distinguishing these differentforms of rationality not only
helps us to understand magical thought; it also assists in the controversial task of
distinguishing magicfrom science.
Magic has often been regarded as a non-rational practice. Self-styled modern

sceptics, of course, regard it as frankly irrational, and unworthy of further
consideration (except in order to debunk it). But psychologists and social
scientists are also inclined to define magic by reference to its irrationality. If
such beliefs are to be explained, they hold, it cannot be by reference to any
process of reasoning: they must arise from psychological and social factors.'
Some psychologists go so far as to hold that magical beliefs are pathological:
a sign that something has gone wrong with the functioning of our cognitive
powers. We find this idea in the American Psychiatric Association's widely
used Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders} DSM IV does not
classify belief in magic as itself a disorder, since it recognises that it 'may be

a part of normal child development' .^ But what it calls 'magical thinking' is
used in the diagnosis of real pathologies, such as schizophrenia and paranoid
personality disorder.""^
Given the prevalence of magic in human history and culture,
anthropologists and historians are less inclined to regard belief in magic as
' Barry Singer and Victor A. Benassi, 'Occult Beliefs: Media Distortions, Social Uncertainty,
and Deficiencies of Human Reasoning Seem to be at the Basis of Occult Beliefs',
American Scientist, 69 (1981), 49-55 (p. 49).
^ American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th
edn (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, 1994) (hereafter DSM IV), p.
768. A similar attitude is to be found in Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainbridge's
The Euture of Religion: Secularization, Revival, and Cult Eormation (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1985), p. 31. Stark and Bainbridge align themselves with Max Weber's
suggestion that it is only fallacious attributions of causality that should be described as
'magical'.
' DSM IV, p. 768.
+ DSM IV, pp. 278, 285, 637, 645.
Parergon 30.2 (2013)
34
Gregory W. Dawes
pathologiccJ. But they, too, have sometimes regarded it as in some sense

non-rational, an alternative to practices that we might think of as rationally
grounded. Stanley Tambiah, for instance, makes use of a famous distinction
from the work of Lucien Lvy-Bruhl (1857 1939). He argues that magic
represents a different kind of orientation to reality from that found in the
sciences, one that is 'participatory' rather than 'causal' .^ In her study of magic
in ecirly medieval Europe, Valerie Flint makes a similar claim, suggesting that
magic is a kind of'unreason' :
In their attempt to fnd a place for unreason deeper than, rather than this
side of, reason, the early Middle Ages in Europe display a good deal more
enlightenment about the emotional need for that magic which sustains
devotion and delight than does the post-ReFormation Western world.*
On this view, magic is a response to our emotional needs rather than a
response to rational enquiry.
Tambiah may be right about the existence of distinct ways of perceiving
the world, although it is not clear they can be as clearly distinguished as he
suggests.' Similarly, Flint may be correct that there exists an emotional need
for the kinds of services that are offered by magicians. We might even agree
with the modern sceptics that people today are acting irrationally if they
believe in magic. But if belief in magic is a form of 'unreason' in our own
time, it is not clear this was always the case. After all, as Richard Kieckhefer
has argued, 'the rational principles seen as explaining the operation of magic
... were widely shcired in medieval culture'." The same can be said of the
magical theories that became popular in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.
As we shall see, these, too, can be thought of as a (controversial) extension of
the best natural philosophy and theology of the day.
There is, however, a problem with these debates. It is that those who
engage in them rarely reflect on the differing senses in which a belief can
be described as rational. Historians have shown that magical beliefs can be
rational in the sense of being rationally defensible, given other beliefs that are
widely accepted in the culture in question. But the fact that behef in magic is
rational in this sense does not mean that it is rational in others. In particular,
we should not assume that magical beliefs were rational in the same way
^ Stanley JeyarajaTambiah, Magic, Religion, and the Scope of Rationality (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990), pp. 105-09.
^Valerie I. J. Flint, The Rise of Magic in Early Medieval Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1991), p. 4.
' Gregory W. Dawes, 'Participation and Causality: Lvy-Bruhl Revisited', Studies in Religion/
Sciences Religieuses (forthcoming).
"Richard Kieckhefer, 'The Specific Rationality of Medieval Magic', American Historical

Review, 99 (1994), 813-36 (p. 814).
35
as the theories of modern science or the taken-for-granted convictions of

everyday life. The aim of this article, therefore, is to set out three senses in
which a belief (or set of behefs) can be thought of as rational, with a view to
identifying the distinctive rationality of the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century
European magical tradition.
I. Defining Magic
Before embarking on this discussion, a few words about my subject would
seem in order. There have been many attempts to define magic and, in
particular, to distinguish it from rehgion and from science.' If one thing has
emerged from these discussions, it is the recognition that clear distinctions
are not always possible. Magic merges into both rehgion, on the one hand,
and science and technology, on the other. Take, for example, the collection
of ancient texts published in 1928 under the title The Greek Magical Papyri. '"
While many of these texts would surely count as magical, others seem to be
simple herbal remedies for common ailments. These could be classified as
a form of folk science. Even those who accepted the efficacy of magic have
not always been clear about such matters. Medieval thinkers, for example,
found it difficult to distinguish a magical potion from a simple poison."
Closer to our period, Giovanni Pico della Mirndola (14631494) defmes
magic as 'the practical part of natural science','^ whue the Magiae naturalis
(1558) of Giambatsta Della Porta (c. 1535 1615) combines references to
occult powers with practical instruction regarding animal breeding and plant
husbandry.
Similar remarks can be made about the porous boundary between religion
and magic. When Moses and Aaron had their competition with the magicians
of Pharaoh (Exodus 7-9), the actions of both sides would have appeared to
a bystander to be indistinguishable. The biblical writers distinguish the two
'^ For a dated but still useful overview, see Murray Wax and Rosalie Wax, 'The Notion of
Magic', Current Anthropology, 4 (1963), 495518. For a more recent discussion, see
Jesper Sorensen, A Cognitive Theory of Magic (Lanham, MD: AltaMira/Rowman &
Littlefield, 2007), pp, 9 - 3 0 ,
^'^ Papyri Graecae Magicae: Die Griechischen Zauberpapyri, ed. and trans. Karl Preisendanz, 2
vols (Leipzig: B, G,Teubner, 192831); English translation: The Greek Magical Papyri in
Translation, including the Demotic Spells, ed, Hans Dieter Betz (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1986).
Richard Kieckhefer, European Witch Trials: Their Foundations in Popular and Learned Culture,
1300-1500 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), pp. 4 9 - 5 0 ,
Pico della Mirndola, 'Conclusiones magicae numero XXVI secundum opinionem
propriam', in his Conclusionessive theses DCCCC (1486):'pars practica scientiae naturalis';
see S. A, Farmer, Syncretism in tbeWest: Pico's 900Theses (1486)-The Evolution ofTraditional
Religious and Philosophical Systems (Tempe, AZ: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and
Studies, 1998), p, 494,
Parergon 30.2 ( 2 0 1 3 )
36
Gregorjr W Dawes
groups by reference to the source of their power, rather than the nattire of
their deeds. '^ In a similar way, 'demonic magic' in medieval and early modern
Europe was regarded as a perversion of the true faith, punishable not merely
because it was socially dangerous, but as a form of heresy.'* Even today it
can be difficult to distinguish religion and magic. When modern Roman
Catholics carry St Christopher medals in their cars, should we regard this as
an expression of religious devotion or a magical act?
In response to these diffictilties, recent scholarship has shied away from
broad definitions of magic, favouring detailed case studies." But in order to
pick out the phenomena to be studied, we require some working definition
of magic, however provisional. Here is mine. Magic is the attetnpt to bring about
tangible effects by means oj actions invoking occult powers whose efficacy is thought to
depend upon theirJorm. When I say that magic invokes 'occult' powers, I mean
that such powers do not correspond to the intviitively accepted (and hence
obvious) mechanisms that we employ in tmderstanding everyday events. '* By
'actions whose efficacy is thought to depend on their form', I mean that such
actions are thought to operate by virtue of being signs.
This definition enables us to distinguish magic from both religion and
science. Magic can be distinguished from religion by reference to the tangible,
immediate, this-worldly effects that it seeks to bring about."The distinction
between magic and science is more difficult. It carmot be found in magic's
invoking of occult powers, for modern science also invokes powers that
remain occult (that is to say, 'hidden') even when they can be demonstrated
experimentally and described in precise, mathematical terms. But modern
science differs from magic in its understanding of the powers involved. In
particular, it rejects the idea that an occult power can be invoked by actions
'^ Jacob Neusner, 'Science and Magic, Miracle and Magic in Formative Judaism:The System
and tlie Difference', in Religion, Science, and Magic in Concert and in Conict, eds Jacob
Neusner, Ernest S. Frerichs, and Paul Virgil McCracken Flesher (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1989), pp. 61-81 (p. 74).
'* Michael D. Bailey, 'From Sorcery to Witchcraft: Clerical Conceptions of Magic in the
Uter Middle Ages', Speculum, 76 (2001), 960-90 (pp. 969-70).
"Michael D. Bailey, 'The Meanings of Magic', Magic, Ritual, and Witchcraft, 1 (2006), 123
(p. 5).
'^ Sorensen, A CognitiveTheory of Magic, p. 35.
" This way of making the distinction is clearest in the work of Bronistaw Malinowski. See,
for example, his 'Magic, Science and Religion', in Science, Religion and Reality, ed.
Joseph Needham (London: Sheldon Press, 1925), pp. 1984 (p. 38). A different way
of distinguishing magic from religion goes back to Emile Durkheim, who argued that
magic was practised by individuals rather than by a community. See Emile Durkheim,
The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912), trans. Joseph Ward Swain (London: George
Allen & Unwin, 1915), p. 44. Against the Durkheimian view, see Jack Goody, 'Religion
and Ritual: The Definitional Problem', British Journal of Sociology, 12 (1961), 142-64
(pp. 146-^7).
37
or objects merely by virtue of their form. Scientists may believe in occult

powers, but they do not manipulate them by means of ritual and symbols.'"
So much for an initial definition of magic. A second problem is that
there was more than one magical tradition in Renaissance and early modern
Europe. The first such tradition was that of popular magic. As in every age,
each town had its 'ctmning men' and 'wise women', offering remedies for
common human problems: ctires, forttme telling, the detection of treasure,
success in love, and the interpretation of dreams. The acceptability of popular
magic seems to have become more contested in the early modern period,
as Christian clergy made particular efforts to distance orthodox reUgion
from condemned magic."This distancing of orthodox religion from magic
may be connected with the burgeoning fears regarding witchcraft, which are
characteristic of this period. And of course witchcraft belief went hand-inhand with works on demonologv, since witches were thought to be in league
o.'
with the devil.^" To these traditions of popular magic and demonology we

might add that of alchemy, if we consider alchemy to be a magical practice.
Finally tbere existed a tradition of what is sometimes called 'intellectual
magic', practised by those who thought of themselves as philosophers.
While all these traditions are interesting, my focus will be on that of
intellectual magic. This is the magic that was written about and (one assumes)
practised by members of Europe's intellectual elite. Key figures here are
Marsilio Ficino (1433 1499), Cornelius Agrippa (1486-1535), and Phillip
Aureolus Theophrastus von Hohenheim, also known as Paracelsus (14931541). Ficino has been described as 'high magic's greatest Renaissance
theoretician',^' Agrippa wrote a popular compendium of magic, while
Paracelsus is best known for his medical writings. (Agrippa and Paracelsus
have also achieved fame in more recent times as characters on chocolate
frog cards in the Harry Potter novels.) Such learned authors may well have
been magicians, in the sense that they practised the rituals about which they
wrote. But what is important here is that they theorised about them, offering
us accounts of what magic was and why, in their view, it was effective. My
'* My definition of magic excludes judicial astrology the attempt to predict human affairs
by reference to the influence of the heavenly bodies insofar as astrology seeks merely
to predict and not to control. But it includes astral magic, understood as the attempt to
capture and channel heavenly influence.
" Keith Thomas, Religion and the Decline qf Magic (1971 ; Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985),
pp. 5889; Stuart Clark, 'Witchcraft and Magic in Early Modern Culture', in Witchcraft
and Magic in Europe: The Period of theWitch Trials, eds Bengt Ankarloo and Stuart Clark
(London: Athlone, 2002), pp. 97-169 (pp. 116-21).

^''Stuart Clark, Thinking with Demons: The Idea qf Witchcraft in Early Modern Europe (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1997), particularly chaps 14 and 15.

2' Clark, 'Witchcraft and Magic', p. 149.
38
Gregory W. Dawes
question wl be in what sense these theories of magic can be regarded as

rational.
II. Rational Belief
If the idea of a magical tradition reqtiires some clarification, so does that of
rationality. Some writers on magic employ unhelpfully broad conceptions of
rationahty.^^They may, for example, speak o practical rationality: the process
by which we choose particular means to achieve a desired goal.^^The practice
of magic can surely be rational in this sense. If people believe ritual actions
to be effective in bringing about a certain result, then if they want to achieve
that result it is reasonable for them to perform those actions.^""^ But what I am
interested in here is the rationality of holding such beliefs in the first place.
Similarly, sociologists can talk aboutûnctionai rationality, which refers to the
fact that a belief may function advantageously in a particular society, perhaps
by bringing about social cohesion or by relieving stress.^^ But this, too, bears
no relation to the question of whether individuals are acting rationally in
holding such a belief.
(a) Rational Acts of Believing
In discussing the rationality of belief in magic, we also need to clarify the
phrase 'rational belief, for it could be used to refer to either the content of the
belief or the act by which someone believes it. When I say, 'belief in magic is
rational', do I mean that the proposition 'magic is effective' is rational? Or do
I mean that a particular person is acting rationally in holding it? Is rationality a
property of propositions or of people?
Put in this way, the question practically answers itself. It is difficult to
make sense of the idea that a proposition is rational.^* One can make sense of
the idea that a proposition is justified, perhaps in the sense of being supported
by the available evidence. One might even think that people count as rational
agents only if their behefs are justified in this sense. Strictly speaking,
however, it is the act of forming or maintaining the behef that is rational, not
^^1. C. Jarvie and Joseph Agassi,'The Problem of the Rationality of Magic', British Journal cf
Sociology, 18 (1967), 55-74 (p. 55).
^' Micha! Buchowski, 'The Rationality of Magic', Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 18 (1988),
509-18 (p. 513).
^* E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1937), p. 148.
"Buchowski, p. 513.
^*J. Agassi and 1. C. Jarvie, 'Magic and Rationality Again', British Journal of Sociology, 24
(1973), 236-45 (p. 236).
39
the content of the behef itself. It follows that rationality is a characteristic

of persons (and perhaps institutions)," but not of propositions. For stylistic
reasons, I shall continue to speak about 'rational belief. But the phrase should
be understood as referring to rational acts of believing.
(b) Bounded Rationality
A further point needs to be made before launching into the historical
discussion. It is that human rationality is always bounded rationality.^* Human
beings are not omniscient beings, with unlimited time and resources. They
need to form behefs 'on the Hy', with limited knowledge and under the
pressure of having to make immediate decisions. They cannot, in practice,
ensure that all their beliefs form a coherent set, not merely in the sense of
not contradicting one another, but also in the sense of lending support to one
another. If this were our ideal of human rationality, then few, if any, agents
would count as rational. All we can hope to achieve is the greatest degree
of coherence we can achieve in the circumstances, even though that will
inevitably fall short of a certain philosophical ideal.
It follows that where people end up, when acting rationally, will be
partly a product of where they start. People will begin their reflection in
differing 'conceptual spaces', with differing inherited behefs and cognitive
resources." If we did have unlimited time and resources, these different
starting points would be unimportant. They would recede into insignificance
as rational agents presented with the same evidence converged on a common
view.'" But since we do not have unlimited resources, there is no guarantee
that such a convergence will occur. Equally rational agents presented with
the same evidence may fail to form the same beliefs or modify their existing
beliefs in the same way. If this is the case, then there is no answer to the general
question, 'Were Renaissance thinkers acting rationally in believing in magic?'
The most we can do is to identify the factors that would enable us to judge
the rationality of an individual's beliefs.
" i shall argue in Section III (c) that certain collective procedures can also be described as
rational, but my focus here is on the rationality of individual acts of believing.
^* Gerd Gigerenzer and Daniel G. Goldstein, 'Reasoning the Fast and Frugal Way: Models of
Bounded Rationality', Psychological Review, 103 (1996), 650-69 (pp. 650-51).
"John S. Wilkins, 'Are Creationists Rational?', Synthese, 178 (2011), 207-18 (pp. 211-13).
'"Proponents of Bayesian views of scientific reasoning make a similar claim about 'prior
probabilities', understood as initial degrees of confidence.These prior probabilities may
differ greatly among individuals, but are supposed to 'wash out' as those individuals
update their beliefs in the light of new evidence.
40
Gregory W Dawes
III. Varieties of Rational Believing
In this article, I shall identify three ways in which a belief can be thought
of as rational. A belief might be (a) rationally defensihle., given a particular
set of background beliefs, (h) formed on the basis of evidence or by some
other reliable cognitive mechanism, or (c) the product of procedures that are
collectively rational.
(a) Rationally Defensible Believing

The sense in which anthropologists and historians commonly regard magiccJ
beliefs as rational is arguably the weakest sense ofthe phrase. On this view, a
belief is rational if it is rationally defensihle: if there are intellectual resources
in the individual's culture that could be used to lend support to it. With
regard to magic, this requires nothing more than the existence of background
beliefs that could be used to construct an argument in defence of its efficacy.
Such background behefs could exist whether or not anyone in that culture
constructed such an argument and whether or not believers in magic relied
on arguments of this kind.
This may be a weak sense ofthe phrase 'rational belief, but it has some
important implications. Its significance wl become clear when I discuss the
second sense ofthe phrase 'rational belief, which has to do with iejormation
of beUefs. Whether individuals were acting rationally in forming a behef in
the efficacy of magic wl be largely dependent on the background beliefs
that were prevalent in their culture. Such background behefs could lend
credibility to both first-hand experiences and second-hand reports of magical
operations. The presence of such background beliefs also helps to explain
why belief in magic endured, even in the face of apparent failure. As we shall
see, scepticism about magic was possible, even in Renaissance Europe. But
there was little reason for scepticism in a society in which such background
beliefs were widespread.
What were the background beliefs that lent support to belief in magic
in Renaissance Europe? Of particular importance here were those beliefs
that pertain to the sources of magical power: the 'occult' mechanisms that
magicians invoked. There are five such mechanisms, the existence of which
was widely accepted and which could be used to defend belief in magic.
(i) Celestial Itifluence
The first and most important set of background beliefs relating to magic had
to do v\dth the influence of the heavenly bodies. The influence (inuentia or
inuxus) of the heavenly bodies was not the only source of magical power
to which Renaissance writers could appeal. But it was the dominant one.
Parergon 30,2 (2013)
41
Nattiral magic was in this sense largely astral magic, if we understand 'astral'
to denote all the heavenly bodies, not merely the stars.^'
It is true that Paracelsus, for instance, occasionally downplays the power
of the heavenly bodies, suggesting that they merely image what happens
on earth," or that they merely 'cook' rather than create the occult powers
into which the magician can tap." But even he speaks continually of astral
influence, which he regards as critical to the practice of his magical medicine.
He beheves, for instance, that wounds can be more or less severe depending on
the heavenly constellation under which they are received. ^ So his disparaging
remarks about astral influence do not indicate a rejection of this traditional
doctrine. What they may indicate is a rejection of astrological determinism,
for while Paracelsus believes in stellar influence, he also holds that 'the wise
man can dominate the stars and is not subject to them'.''
The causal mechanisms by which the heavenly bodies exerted their
influence were not always mysterious. Light and heat, for instance, were
obvious candidates, and most natural philosophers were agreed that light
produced heat, although how it did so was not immediately obvious.^*
Similarly, there was no agreement on the way in which the heavenly bodies,
particularly the sun, produced heat. But that they did so was clear. Since heat
was one of the four Aristotelian primary qualities," it could easily be thought
of as an important means of bringing about earthly change. Intuitively, too,
this made sense: we are all familiar with the way in which the heat of the stm
can make plants grow and help animals to flourish.
Yet alongside these familiar mechanisms, most natural philosophers
also accepted the existence of occult forces, forces that we are unable to
perceive. These occtilt forces constituted the mysterious influence (inuentia)
that heavenly bodies were thought to exercise, the inuxus that descended
" I say 'astral' rather than 'astrological', since the latter implies a kind of determinism that
not all writers on magic would accept.
^^ Walter Pagel, Paracelsus: A Introduction to Philosophical Medicine in the Era of the Renaissance
(Basel: Karger, 1958), pp. 68-69.
" Pagel, p. 54.
'PageUp. 71.
' ' Paracelsus, Die 9 Bcher de Natura rerum (1537), book 6; see also Theophrast von Flohenheim,
genannt Paracelsus, Smtliche Werke, ed. Karl Sudhoff (Munich/Berlin: R. Oldenbourg,
1922-33) (hereafter Smtliche Werke), 1 xi 378 (references to the standard edition of
the works of Paracelsus are provided to enable readers t o consult the full Latin text);
English translation from Paracelsus: Essential Readings, trans. Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke
(Berkeley, CA: North Atlantic, 1999) (hereafter Essential Readings), p. 185.
'' Edward Grant, Planets, Stars, and Orbs: The Medieval Cosmos 1200-1687
Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 610.
(Cambridge:
^^ See Aristotle, Degeneratione et corruptione, 11.2 (329B) and Meteorolgica, IV. 1 (378B).These
were heat and cold, dryness, and fluidity.
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42
Gregory W Dawes
from them and which could penetrate even dense and opaque bodies.'* As
we shall see, a few late medieval thinkers denied the existence of such occtt
powers, believing that motion and light were all the heavenly influences that
were required. ^'' But this scepticism does not seem to have been widespread.
There were too many puzzling phenomena such as the magnetic power
of the lodestone that were assumed to have some 'natural' cause, but for
which ordinary Aristotelian physics offered no explanation.''^*' There were
other phenomena such as the formation of minerals in the depths of the
earth for which appeals to light and heat seemed pointless, since they
occurred beyond the reach of such familiar forces.''^' Once one attributed the
formation of such minerals to an occult heavenly influentia, it was a small step
to associate particular metals with the influence of particular planets: tin with
Saturn, lead with Jupiter, iron with Mars, and so on."^^
(ii) Words and Rituals
A second set of background beliefs has to do v\dth the power of words and
rituals. Characteristic of Renaissance magic as of magic in all ages is
the belief that certain rituals, accompanied by key words, have causal power.
They can bring about tangible effects merely by being performed, in the
right context and with the right intention. The idea that certain rituals and
utterances can have effects is not, of course, limited to the world of magical
thought. The performative power of utterances their ability to bring about
new states of affairs was a major tbeme of twentieth-century linguistic
philosophy, inspired by J. L. Austin's 1962 work. How to Do Things with
Words. In the appropriate social setting, and when uttered by tbe appropriate
speaker, words can indeed bring about a new state of affairs, at least in the
social world.This is why one should be careful about what words are uttered
at an auction.There is, however, nothing mysterious about this kind of power,
which is simply a matter of social convention.
There is another kind of power attributed to words and rituals that is also
relatively uncontroversial. It is the psychological effect that rituals can have
on those who practise them. While apparently directed outwards, word and
rituals can work 'reflexively', as it were, working inwardly to alter the state
of mind of the agent. The psychological power of rituals was already noted
'Grant,
^ ^ t ,
t,
*' Grant,
^^Grant,
p. 611.
pp. 613-14.
p. 615.
pp. 611-12.
p. 612.
43
by Plato,"^^ and is discussed by Francis Bacon (15611626).''^ Renaissance

writers on magic were not unaware of the psychological power of rituals.
Marsiho Ficino, in particular, has a sophisticated understanding of the power
of the imagination (the vis imaginativa).^^
It would be wrong to assxune, however, that Renaissance thinkers
regarded an altered state of mind as the only effect of magical ritual. They
believed that magical rituals could have a physical effect, above and beyond
their psychological or social effects. Cornelius Agrippa, for instance, relates
a story about female sorcerers who can turn men into beasts of burden
for as long as they need to do their work.*^* Those who tell this story,
including Agrippa, did not regard these women's magical powers as merely
psychological." Similarly, Ficino speaks about the celestial power of various
stones. The agate-stone, he writes, can be used to draw down the power of
Mercury to improve vision, while the eagle-stone can draw down the power
of Luna and Venus in order to bring about speedy deHvery in childbirth.'^*
While Ficino may believe the effect of such stones to be partly mediated
by the power of the imagination, it remains an effect that is brought about
by celestial powers. The power of the heavenly bodies, Ficino assumes, can
operate in ways that are independent of human consciousness. Such powers
are an objective fact about the world, into which we can tap but which are
not dependent on us.
(Hi) The Doctrine of Signatures
A third set of wddely held doctrines that could be drawn upon in support
of magic are those regarding what we might call 'effective resemblances'.
This belief found its most influential historical expression in the doctrine of
signatures: the appearances of things can offer a key to their hidden (occtilt)
causal properties. As Paracelsus writes, 'there is nothing that nature has not
o, laws, 933A-B.
^ Bacon, The Advancement of Learning (1605), II. 11.3.
*' D. P. Walker, Spiritual and Demonic Magicfrom Ficino to Campanella (1958; University Park:
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), p. 76.

'^^ Agrippa, De occulta phiosophia, 1.41, 45; English translation: Henry Cornelius Agrippa,
Three Books of Occult Philosophy written hy Henry Cornelius Agrippa ofNettesheim, trans. J. F.
[probably John French], ed. DonaldTyson (1651; St Paul, MN: Llewellyn Publications,
1993) (hereafter Occult Philosophy), pp. 122, 135.
" Incidentally, while Agrippa cites St Augustine in support of this story, he fails to mention
that Augustine (De civitate dei, XVI11.18) does not believe it. Augustine argues that if
demons have any power, it is only that of making men appear to be beasts.
*" Ficino, De vita lihri tres (1489), 111.12; English translation is taken from Marsilio Ficino,
Three Books on Life, ed. and trans. Carol V. Kaske and John R. Clark (Binghamton, NY:
Center for Medieval and Early Renaissance Studies, 1998), p. 301.
4-4
Gregory W. Dawes
signed in such a way that man may discover its essence' .'^'^ And Nature here is,
ultimately, the Creator.
It is not God's will that all He has created for the benefit of man and
has given him as his own should remain hidden. ... And even if He did
o
conceal some things. He left nothing unmarked, but provided all things
with outward, visible marks, with special traits just as a man who has
buried a treasure marks the spot in order that he may find it again.^"
It is Paracelsus, too, who offers us a concise summary of this doctrine:
'everything that is within', he writes, 'can be known from what is without'.''
This is true of human beings as well as of other objects in the natural world.
Their inner character is revealed in their external appearance."
The doctrine of signatures is not unrelated to that of celestial influence,
for the stars and planets are often thought to be responsible for both hidden
power and external sign. We find this idea, although less clearly expressed, in
Agrippa's De occulta philosophia (1533):
All stars have their peculiar natures, properties, and conditions, the seals
and characters whereof they produce through their rays even in these
inferior things, viz. in elements, in stones, in plants, in animals, and in their
members, w^hence everything receives from an harmonious disposition,
and from its star shining upon it, some particular seal, or character stamped
upon it, which is the significator of that star, or harmony, containing in it
a particular virtue."
Thus, for instance, the 'bay-tree, the lote-tree, and the marigold are solary
plants',^* having a particular relation to the sun, and we know this because
they display the character of the sun in their roots. In this way, the doctrine
of signatures combines a belief in occult and mysterious powers with a claim
about how they are to be discovered. While the world's hidden powers
are hidden, they are also manifest, in the sense that they can be 'read off
the appearances of things by those with the skill to do so. But it does raise
an important question, which has to do with the theory of knowledge.
^' Paracelsus, Astronomia magna (1538), book 10; SamtlicheWerke, I xii 91; English translation
from Paracelsus, Four Treatises together with Selected Writings, eds and trans. George Rosen,
Henry E. Sigerist, C. Lilian Temkin, and Gregory Zilboorg (Birmingham, AL: Classics
of Medicine Library, 1988) (hereafter Four Treatises), u, 195.
'" Paracelsus, Die 9 Bcher de Natura rerum, book 6; SamtlicheWerke, 1 xi 393; translation from
Four Treatises, Ii, 194.
' ' Paracelsus, Von hirifallenden Siechtagen der Mutter (Hysterie) (\530); SamtlicheWerke,] \m 343;
translation from Four Treatises, ii, 194.
'^ Paracelsus, Astronomia magna, book 10; SamtlicheWerke, I xii 9193; translation from four
Treatises, II, 195-96.
^' Agrippa, De occulta philosophia, 1.23; translation from Occult Philosophy, p. 102.
^* Agrippa, De occulta philosophia, 1.33; translation from Occult Philosophy, p. 102.
45
Particularly when the letters of the book of nature are not easuy read, how
can the magician come to know of its occult powers?
(iv) Macrocosm and Microcosm
To answer that question, writers on magic could turn to another widely held
doctrine, that of macrocosm and microcosm. According to this doctrine
o
'
the human being represents the universe in miniature, both reflecting and
containing in his own person the properties of the cosmos at large. As
Agrippa writes, 'God .,. created man after his image; for as the world is the
image of God, so man is the image of the world; ... therefore he is called
the Microcosm, that is the Lesser World' ."The human being is a microcosm
because he is a composite being, having an astral nature as well as a terrestrial
nature.'* It follows, as Paracelsus writes, that
all heavenly orbits, terrestrial nature, watery properties and airy essence
inhere in him. The nature of all fruits of the earth and all mineral ores
of water, all the constellations, and the four winds of the world are in
him. What is there upon earth whose nature and power does not reside
within man?"
While the traditional, Aristotelian and Ptolemaic, cosmology made a sharp
distinction between the heavenly quintessence (fifth essence) and the four
earthly elements, this doctrine blurs that distinction by claiming that the
human being contains elements from both realms.'" It is because the human
being is a microcosm, containing in himself all the powers of the universe,
that he can both come to know and tap into those powers in order to bring
about tangible effects. The privileged position of human beings means they
can master the powers in question. If a person fails to master these external
powers (such as those of the stars) and allows himself [sic] to be dominated
by them, it is because he forgets that he 'has the whole firmament hidden
within himself .'**
(v) Daemons and Demons
A final potential source of magical power, frequently discussed by at least
the opponents of magic, was demonic or (more precisely) daemonic. It was
widely believed, by magicians and their opponents alike, that there existed
" Agrippa, De occulta philosophia, 111,36; Occult Philosophy, p. 579.
'^Pagel, Parace/sus, p. 65.
"Paracelsus, Opus paramirum (1531), book 4; Smtliche Werke, I ix 308; translation from
Essential Readings, p. 98.
'" Charles Webster, Paracelsus: Medicine, Magic, and Mission at the End of Time (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 2008), p. 42.
'^ Paracelsus, Die 9 Bcher de Natura rerum, book 6; SmtlicheWerke, 1 xi 378; translation from
Essential Readings, p, 186,
46
Gregory W. Dawes
spiritual beings having preternatural powers on whose assistance a magician

could call. This belief is not merely a product of Christianity; it is already
found among the practitioners of popular magic in antiquity. The Greek
magical papyri, for instance, include spells that are thought to work in an
apparently mechanical fashion. But they also contain spells that are supposed
to work by invoking intelligent spiritual beings, namely gods or daemons.
Most early modern writers on magic make a distinction between natural
and demonic magic. Moreover, the vast majority condemn demonic magic,
even if they defend natural magic. The problem for the defenders of magic is
that the botindary between the two was far from clear. It was widely believed
that angelic intelligences moved the planets, after all, and the medieval world
was full of spirits, some of whom were benign but others malevolent. Even
the very term 'demon' is here problematic, for in everyday usage it refers
only to a malevolent spirit. It is less misleading to use the term 'daemon',
the Latinised form of the Greek SaipfOV (daimn), for among Renaissance
thinkers, particularly the Neoplatonists, daemons were not always regarded
as harmful or malevolent.''" Such thinkers drew upon the ancient idea that
there existed daemons that were good spirits and sources of inspiration or
protection. Indeed, in Renaissance thought the ancient daemons are often
assimilated to the Christian angels. The problem was that although not all
daemons were evil, it was dangerous to invoke a daemon, since even if your
intentions were good, you might end up with an evil one. For this reason,
cautious religious thinkers condemned all magic, since it so often seemed to
rely on demonic power.
(b) Rationally Formed Beliefs
It follows that there were plenty of resources in Renaissance culture from
which one could construct a defence of magic. But a second and stronger
sense of the phrase 'rational belief' has to do with how beliefs are formed.
There are two possibilities here. Belief in magic may be formed as a result of
arguments, being the product of conscious inference from some body of data.
Such a belief wotild count as rational if the arguments are good ones, even
when the premises are false and the conclusion mistaken.*"' Alternatively,
* Brian P. Copenhaver, 'How to Do Magic, and Why: Philosophical Prescriptions', in

The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Philosophy, ed. James Hankins (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 137- 69 (p. 163).

^' It is a commonplace among philosophers that a person could be acting rationally in
forming a false belief. Isaac Newton was surely acting rationally in holding to his newly
developed physics, even though we now judge that (at least in certain respects) his
physics was false.
47
such a behef may be produced by some other mechanism, reliance on which

would normally count as rational.
(i) Inferential Beliefs
Let me start with the first of these: the situation in which a behef is formed
or maintained as a result of a conscious process of inference. Most commonly,
that inference will be of an explanatory kind: there wul be some puzzling fact
about the world of which the belief in question seems the best, or perhaps
the only plausible, explanation. In everyday life, for example, I might see a
broken vvdndow, note that the new television is missing, and form the beHef
that my house has been burgled. But similar inferences are found in science.
A physicist, for instance, might wdtness tracks in a cloud chamber and infer
that the best explanation of those tracks is the existence of a subatomic
particle.''^Those who value evidence and argument, particularly modern selfstyled sceptics, are inchned to regard this as the paradigmatic kind of rational
believing. Perhaps it is. But as we shall see in a moment, relatively few of our
beliefs, even our scientific behefs, are formed in this way.
Did Renaissance thinkers believe in magic as the restilt of some conscious
process of inference, one that we might judge to be rational? It is, of course,
difficult to say what gives rise to a person's belief as distinct from the reasons
he or she might offer in its defence. When defending magic, writers of this
period could point to the existence of occult powers, belief in which was
seen as warranted by puzzling phenomena, such as magnetism. But behef
in occult powers is not identical with belief in magic. One could accept the
existence of occult powers but deny our abity to tap into them. So even if
the existence of such powers was regarded as the best available explanation of
some phenomenon, it did not foflow that magic would be effective.
In fact, it seems that belief in the power of magic itself was rarely, if ever,
defended as the best available explanation of otherwise puzzling phenomena.
Perhaps the nearest we come to a rationahty of this kind is in the writings of
Paracelsus. Not only does Paracelsus compare his medical procedures vsdth
those of the traditional. Galenic medicine that he opposes. He also argues that
his remedies are better than those proposed by traditional medicine because
they are based on experience. As he writes,
every physician must be rich in knowledge, and not only of that which is
written in books; his patients should be his book, they will never mislead
him. ... But he who is content with mere letters is like a dead man; cind
Among philosophers of science, there is an ongoing debate about what is warranted by
inferences of this kind. Are we justified in helieving the theory in question or merely in
accepting it, in the sense (roughly speaking) of acting as if it were true? But this debate
need not detain us here.
48
Gregory W. Dawes
he is hke a dead physician. As a man and as a physician, he kills his patient.
Not even a dog killer can learn his trade from books, but only from
experience. And how much more true is this of the physician!*"'
One could regard this attitude as 'empirical',*^ if by this term one

means nothing more than a reliance on first-hand experience as opposed to
a priori argument or the authority of books. It may even stem from the same
'constructive scepticism' about the power of reason that led seventeenthcentury natural philosophers to turn to experiment.*"' But it is hardly empirical
in our modern sense.''*" With the work of Paracelsus, we are still a long way
from the later scientific ideal of quantifiable, controlled experiments that
could, in principle, be replicated by anyone. When Paracelsus referred to
experience, he was not talking about a knowledge of the world that stems
from cautious experimentation." He was talking about a kind of intuitive
knowledge: one that does not rely on conscious reasoning and which leads
one to grasp the inner essence of things.*'
Reasoning from empirical evidence is not, of course, the only way in
which to form beliefs by way of inference. One could also form a behef in
magic by way of reasoning from other behefs, such as the belief in demons,
angels, occult powers, or the doctrine of the microcosm. As we have seen,
the world of Renaissance and early modern thought contained plenty of
resources for arguments of this kind, which were freely used by defenders of
magic. Marsiho Ficino, in his famous defence, could even deploy theological
arguments. He noted, for example, that three magi were the first to adore
the Christ child and that Jesus's disciples themselves enjoyed knowledge of
occult powers.*"' But of course a person may produce arguments in defence
*^ Paracelsus, Das Buch Paragranum (1565); SamtlicheWerhe, 1 viii 70; English translation from
Paracelsus: SelectedWritings, ed. Jolande Jacobi, trans. Norbert Guterman, 2nd edn (New
York: Pantheon, 1958), p. 50.
*^ Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke, 'Introduction', in Essential Readings, pp. 1 337 (p. 24); Pagel,
Paracelsus, p. 53.
'"^ Pagel, Paracelsus, p. 51 ; on the 'constructive scepticism' of the age, see Richard H. Popkin,
The History of Scepticism from Savonarola to Bayle, rev. edn (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2003), pp. 112-27; and Keith Hutchison, 'What Happened to Occult Qualities
in the Scientific Revolution?', sis, 73 (1982), 233-53 (pp. 248-50).
*"*" Pagel, Paracelsus, p. 65; Harald Burger, 'Deutsche Sprachgeschichte und Geschichte der
Philosophie', in Sprachgeschichte: ein Handhuch zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache und ihrer
Erforschung, eds Werner Besch, Anne Betten, Oskar Reichmann, and Stefan Sonderegger,
2nd edn (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1998), pp. 181-92 (p. 185).
'''' Webster, Paracelsus, pp. 154, 156-57.
^^ Pagel, Paracelsus, pp. 60-61; Franz Hartman, The Lfe of Paracelsus and the Substance of His
Teachings (1887), cited in Matthew Wood, Vitalism:The History of Herhalism, Homeopathy,
and Flower Essences (Berkeley, CA: North Atlantic, 2000), p. 20.
^' 'Apologia', in Ficino, De vita lihri tres (1489); Ficino, Three Books on Life, p. 397.
49
of a position that is being held on other grounds. There is httle evidence that
Renaissance thinker s^r/ned their belief in magic as a result of such inferences.
These background behefs seem to have made more plausible a behef in magic
that was formed on other grounds.
o
(ii) Basic Beliefs

What were those other grounds? There are two other ways of forming beliefs
that are often regarded as rational. The first gives rise to what philosophers
call 'basic' or 'non-inferential' beliefs. These are formed spontaneously as a
result of being placed in a particular situation. The best-knovni instance is
that of a behef that we form as a result of sense perception. My belief that
there is a coffee cup on my desk, for instance, was not formed as a result of
evidence or argument. Undoubtedly, it does involve some sort of cognition,
perhaps matching the raw sensory stimuli with learned categories such as
'coffee cup'. But the cognition involved is generally unconscious: the belief in
question is not formed as a result of any reflective process of inference.'"The
same may be said of beliefs that arise from memory. These, too, are formed
spontaneously, not as a result of conscious inference and argument.
It is at least possible that behefs about magic might have been formed in
the same way, spontaneously, as a result of sense perception. This could occur
in situations in which the individuals in question had witnessed phenomena
that they perceived to be the result of magical operations. Benvenuto Cellini
(1500 1571), for example, the Florentine artist and goldsmith, relates a
story of such an occasion. Cellini had fallen in love with a Sician girl, whose
mother had (wisely, one suspects) tried to remove her from his influence. In
an effort to ensure they were reunited, Cellini calls upon an acquaintance, a
priest who was familiar with magical arts. They went to the Colosseum by
night, where by means of various elaborate ceremonies, the priest conjured
up a host of demons, the sight of which terrified everyone involved. It was
so impressive that the priest later invited Cellini to engage with him 'in
consecrating a book to the devil', with the aid of which they could become
rich through treasure hunting."
This whole account may, of course, be fictional, but even if it is, Cellini
clearly intended it to be a plausible fiction. It is, after all, included in his
autobiography. But if it is a reliable record, it shows an educated person of the
Renaissance relating experiences that he himself attributed to magical powers.
On the idea of unconscious cognition, see Rhianon Allen and Arthur S. Reber, ' Unconscious
Intelligence', in A Companion to Cognitive Science, eds William Bechtel and George
Graham (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), pp. 314-23.
" The Autobiography ofBenvenuto Cellini (1728), trans. George Bull (Harmondsworth: Penguin,
1956), pp. 120-24.
50
Gregory W. Dawes
What is important here is that there is no indication that Cellini engaged

in any conscious process of theorising, weighing up potential explanations
of the phenomena he was experiencing. Rather he perceived them, in some
immediate fashion, as magical. More precisely, he perceived them as the
workings of a powerful, demonic magic. If this is true, then Cellini's belief in
magic may have been a form of hasic or non-iriferential belief.
Of such a belief it makes little sense to ask if we are rational in forming
it. After all, we do not in any sense choose to form such a belief: we have
no choice, but do so spontaneously. But we can ask if a person is acting
rationally in continuing to hold a belief that is formed in this way. A common
view ctmong philosophers is that non-inferential beliefs arising from sense
perception enjoy a kind of prima Jade justification.'^ Acceptance of such
beliefs is, as it were, rational 'until further notice', that is to say, untu we
have reason to doubt them. There are times when we do have good reasons
o
to doubt them, to assume that our senses are deceived or are malfunctioning.
But we are entitled to accept the deliverances of our senses unless we have
such reasons. On this view, people who witness what appear to be magical
operations are acting rationally in taking what they see at face value, unless
they have reason to question it.
The question then becomes whether those who v\dtnessed what appeared
to be magical operations had reason to doubt the evidence of their senses.
There are two kinds of reasons that might cause a rational agent to entertain
such doubts. The first is based on a posteriori reasoning, and derives from the
observation that magiccil rituals repeatedly fail to bring about their claimed
effects. If this is the case, then it is unlikely that what I am witnessing is, in fact,
a magical operation. It is more likely to be the result of deception or illusion.
The second is based on a priori reasoning. If my background beliefs are such as
to make successful magic highly improbable, then a similar conclusion should
be drawn. In this situation, too, it seems more likely that the phenomena in
question have a non-magical cause.
Let me begin with the first of these: the a posteriori reasoning. On the
assumption that magical rituals are, in fact, ineffective, we might think that
Renaissance and early modern thinkers should have realised this. Notoriously,
however, practitioners of magic have ways of accounting for apparent failures,
which do not call into question the general efficacy of their rituals. Witch
doctors, for example, might explain the failure of their practices by arguing
that they were countered by further acts of witchcraft. But even setting this
idea seems to go back toThomas Reid (17101796) and has been most vigorously
defended in our time by William P, Alston, See, in particular, the latter's'Thomas Reid
on Epistemic Principles', History of Philosophy Quarterly, 2 (1985), 435-52 (p. 449).
The Rationality cxf Renaissance Magic
51
aside, the inefficacy of magic was by no means an easy thing to establish in a

world that lacked controlled experiments and clinical trials.
In any case, magic sometimes works: it brings about its desired effects.
It may do so, for instance, in ways that we would think of as psychologically
mediated and therefore natural.^^ As one anthropologist writes, 'people do
occasionally die of witchcraft ... and they are sometimes healed by faith' P^
Ftirthermore, magic rituals are often accompanied by medicinal or dietary
remedies, as in the work of Ficino. Even if the ritual remedies had no
psychological effect on their own, these other measures may have influenced
the outcome. Since no attempt was made to eliminate such 'confotmding
factors', as we would call them, it must have been no simple matter to decide
if magical rituals did or did not work.
What about the second kind of evidence for scepticism: that based on a
priori reasoning Irom background beliefs? Once again, the background beliefs
of this period offer little reason for scepticism. A rational agent of the twentyfirst century who witnesses what appears to be a successftil magical operation
surely has reasons for doubt.Those reasons have to do with a better knowledge
of the way in which the world operates, or (if one prefers) a different set of
background beliefs. But the thinkers of the Renaissance period occupied a
very different conceptual universe from our own.
These differences should not, however, be overstated. Even some who
shared these background beliefs were sceptical about magic. As we shall see
shortly, scepticism about magic was a Uve possibity in the societies in which
Ficino, Agrippa, and Paracelsus wrote. So while there were background
beliefs that lent support to belief in magic, there were other backgrotmd
beliefs that might lead one to be sceptical. It might be argued that those
who expressed such scepticism were acting more rationally than those who
did not.
(Hi) Belief on Testimony
I shall come back to the reasons for scepticism in a moment.There is, however,
another way of forming beliefs. In addition to behefs formed on the basis of
iriference and those formed spontaneously as the result of experience., there is a
third category, that of belief on the basis of testimony. It is important to note
how significant this category is. We may, for example, believe that science is
based on experimental evidence and careful reasoning. There will surely be
people for whom this is true, at least some of the time. But for non-scientists
(or for scientists themselves outside of their own field) beliefs about science
'^ A fact already noted by Francis Bacon (The Advancement of Learning, II. 11.3).
'^* Roy A. Rappaport, Ecology, Meaning, and Religion (Richmond, CA: North Atlantic, 1979),
p. 191.
'
52
Gregory W. Dawes
are much more likely to be based on testimony. I believe, for example, that
the equation e = mc^ represents the rate at which matter can be converted into
energy. But I do not believe this as a result of following the reasoning that
gave rise to it. I believe it on the testimony of those whom I judge to have the
requisite knowledge and skills. Such behef may fall short of a certain ideal
it would, perhaps, be better if I could follow the reasoning for myself but it
does not seem to be irrational.
As it happens, testimony seems to have been the most common basis
for belief in magic during the Renaissance. Brian Copenhaver, for example,
refers to what he calls the doxographic evidence for magic.'' This consisted
of documents that were wddely beheved to be ancient, dating back to
Hermes Trismegistus or Zoroaster or Moses, of which the Corpus Hermeticum
translated by Ficino was the best-known collection. Such documents were
thought to embody a ptisca or antiqua theologia, which gave the practice of
magic an ancient and venerable lineage.'''The appeal to doctunents of this
kind is particularly prominent in the work of Agrippa, which repeatedly cites
ancient authors and reports of magical operations.
Were Agrippa and his contemporaries acting rationally in accepting such
reports? As I noted a moment ago, there is nothing intrinsically irrational
about believing something on authority, partictilarly if we have reason to
regard the authority in question as rehable. But, as David Htime writes, 'a
wise man ... proportions his behef to the evidence','' and this may involve
taking a critical attitude to reports of extraordinary events. It would be clearly
anacbronistic to expect the thinkers of this period to have the critical attitude
of the modern historian. But was it possible for them to doubt the evidence
of the many documents that apparently witnessed to magical effects?
(iv) Scepticism about Magic
It seems that it was, for alongside the many Renaissance thinkers who
believed in magic, there also existed a number of sceptics. Wben faced wdth
reports of marvellous events {miiabilia), at least some Renaissance thinkers
were prepared to question them. Already in the fourteenth century, Nicolas
Oresme (c. 13201382) complained about the excessive credulity of many
'5 Brian P. Copenhaver,'Did Science Have a Renaissance?', fas, 83 (1992), 387-407 (p. 396);
Copenhaver, 'Natural Magic, Hermetism, and Occultism in Early Modern Science', in
Reappraisals of the Scientific Revolution, eds David C. Lindberg and Robert S. Westman
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 261-301 (p. 275).

'* See the preface to Eicino's Pimander, cited in Brian P. Copenhaver and Charles B. Schmitt,
Renaissance Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 147.
''David Hume, 'An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding', Section X, Part 1, 87,
in Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals
(1777), ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902), p. 110.
The Rationality <xf Renaissance Magic
53
of his contemporaries. Even many holy men and theologians, he writes, have
been too quick to believe reports of extraordinary events: 'If you ask how
they know [something to be true], they can give no better response than a
simple woman'.'"
Oresme was, perhaps, ahead of his time. But in the fifteenth century a
growing number of thinkers display a new sense of the past, which includes
a critical attitude towards reports of past events.''The most famous example
was Lorenzo Valla (1406-1457), who in 1440 exposed the so-called Donation
of Constantine as an eighth-century forgery by pointing to the 'various
contradictions, impossibilities, stupidities, barbarisms, and absurdities' that
document contains."" Writers on magic, too, can exhibit something of this
new sensibihty. In his Disputations Against Divinitary Astrology (1496), for
example, Pico della Mirndola criticises no less a figtire than Roger Bacon for
his tmcritical acceptance of authorities."'
This scepticism was not merely about the doctunents that spoke of magic.
There existed thinkers who were sceptical about the very possibity of magic.
Religious thinkers, of course, often condemned magic, on the grotmds that it
involved interaction with demons. But such scepticism did not necessarily cast
doubt on the efficacy of magic, for it was wddely believed that demons cotild
bring about effects that were 'praeter naturam' ('preternatural'), outside of
the ordinary operations of nature."^ But it is not the theological criticism of
magic that interests me here; it is scepticism about the very possibility of
magic. Luden Febvre famously argued that it was not possible to be an atheist
in the sixteenth century."^ But whatever the truth of Febvre's claims about
religion, it was certainly possible to be a sceptic about magic.
Noteworthy here are those thinkers who doubted the very existence
of the occult powers to which theorists of magic appealed. I have already
mentioned Oresme's criticism of the credtility of his contemporaries. But on
at least one occasion, Oresme denies that there is any need to posit occult
'" 'Si queras quomodo scitis hoc, ipsi non plus respondebunt quam simplex mulier', cited in
LynnThorndike, A History of Magic and Experimental Science, 8 vols (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1923-58), m (1934), 453.
' ' Peter Burke, The Renaissance Sense ofthe Past (London: Edward Arnold, 1949), pp. 7, 5076.
"" Lorenzo Valla, On the Donation of Constantine (1440), trans. G. W. Bowersock (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), pp. 8-9
"' Pico della Mirndola, Disputations, 1.6466, cited in Farmer, Syncretism in theWest, p. 144.
"Ânthony Ossa-Richardson, 'Pietro Pomponazzi and the Rle of Nature in Oracular
Divination', Intellectual History Review, 20 (2010), 435-55 (pp. 437-38).
"^ Lucien Febvre, The Problem of Unbelief in the Sixteenth Century.The Religion of Rabelais (1942),
trans. Beatrice Gottlieb (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), p. 460, et
passim.
54
Gregory W Dawes
heavenly influences, arguing that the effects of the heavens on the earth can all
be accounted for by reference to manifest qualities.*** As he writes,
in order to explain action or production in these inferior beings and their
diversity one ought not to posit any qualities or influence in the heavens
other than light and motion ... thus ... heaven brings about whatever
effects [it brings about] through its form or essence by means of its light
and motion and not through other unknown qualities, which are called
influences.*^
While this attitude is unusual, Oresme was not the only one to make such
suggestions. Writing at a later date, Alessandro Achillini (14631512)
attributed the formation of metals in the earth not to occult influence, but
to the power of heat."*" While the denial of occult astral influence did not
rule out the possibility of magic (which could appeal to other powers), it did
undercut a central pillar of Renaissance magical theory.
Other authors of the period expressed scepticism about demonic
magic. Whue not denvinp the existence of demons, Oresme cast doubt on
their abuity to bring about tangible effects."' He also calls into question the
efficacy of the spells that are thought to summon demons, citing as evidence
the diversity of the invocations that are employed in different places or by
different sects.** So while Oresme does not deny the possibility of magic, he
is inclined to reduce all magic to natural magic. In this respect, he anticipates
the more radical arguments of an author closer to our period, namely Pietro
Pomponazzi (1462-1525). Pomponazzi offered Aristotelian arguments that
called into question, not just the power of demons to bring about tangible
effects, but their very existence.*** It is difficult to know how widespread such
scepticism was, for the denial of the existence of demons was hazardous in a
world in which Church authorities frequently spoke about demonic power.
But such authors show that it was certainly possible to entertain doubts about
magic.
What is striking is that even those who wrote about magic were, at times,
capable of expressing scepticism about its power.The best-known example is,
once again, Cornelius Agrippa. The same Agrippa who wrote the De occulta
philosophia also authored the De inceititudine et vanitate scientiarum declamatio
^'^ Thorndike, Magic and Experimental Science, III, 414.

*' Nicole Oresme, Cûaestio contra divinatores horoscopios (1 370), cited in Grant, Planets, Stars,
and Orbs, p. 613, n. 177 (translation author's own).

"'' Achillini, ifeer de orbibus (1494), cited in Grant, p. 614.
*'Thorndike, in, 428.
S" Thorndike, in, 429.
*''Thorndike, v (1941), 94-110.
The Rationality cJRenaissance Magic
55
invectiva (15 27). In this work, he seems to renounce many of his earlier beliefs,
casts doubt upon many ancient authorities, and describes magic as nothing
but 'a mixture of Idolatry, Astrology, and superstitious Physick'.'^^ It is not
clear whether Agrippa's purpose in penning the De vanitate (as it came to be
known) was serious, playful, or perhaps prophylactic: a defence against the
charge of having written in support of magic. But there is no need to decide
this question here. What is important is that it constitutes fiirther evidence
that there existed reasons for doubting the efficacy of magic. It could be
argued that those who faued to take such reasons seriously failed to act as
rationally as those who did.
(c) Collective Rationality
Traditional definitions of rationality have assumed that it is an attribute of
individuals or of the decisions made by individuals. So far in this article I
have done the same. More recently, however, some philosophers have begun
working with a broader understanding. On this view, rationality involves
the employment of those procedures that reliably give rise to true belief. Note that
'reliably' here means 'for the most part' rather than 'always'. Outside of
simple deductive reasoning, no procedures of this kind will be Infallible. If
we adopt a broad definition of this kind, then it becomes clear that rational
belief-forming procedures can be social rather than merely individual.
(i) Science as Social Process
This is certainly true of the modern sciences, which are successful not
merely because they employ particularly reliable forms of reasoning or good
experimental methods. A key factor in their success is that their practitioners
are organised into particular kinds of communities, which have distinctive
procedures. David Hull, for example, highhghts two collective processes
that contribute to the success of science." The first is that of granting credit,
particularly to those who can claim priority in proposing an idea. Scientists
gain credit not only by pubhcation, but by the number of times their
^ Henry Cornelius Agrippa, The Vanity ofArts and Sciences, trans, James Cottrell (London: j .
C, for Samuel Speed, 1676), p, 127,
'" I have singled out the work of David Hull merely as an example. Other philosophers who
have contributed to this discussion are Helen E. Longino (Science as Social Knowledge:
Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry (Princeton, Nj: Princeton University Press,
1990)), Philip Kitcher (Tbe Advancement of Science: Science without Legend, Objectivity
without Illusions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993)), and Miriam Solomon
(Social Empiricism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001)), While these authors debate the
precise mechanisms involved and the manner in which they operate (see Solomon, pp,
5455), they share with Hull the conviction that a particular kind of social organisation
is essential to the success of science.
Parergon 30,2 (2013)
56
Gregory W. Dawes
publications are both cited and used by others. Gaining credit for priority
might encourage secrecy, but in fact credit can be gained only by making
public one's data and by citing the works of others (which in turn extends
their credit). The importance of gaining credit might also encourage fraud,
but scientific commtmities are generally severe on those who offer fraudulent
restilts. It follows that if scientific fraud is comparatively rare, it is not because
scientists are particularly virtuous, but because of the collective procedtires
of their communities.
The second major mechanism is that of collective checking, a process by
which others attempt to replicate and verify published results. This restilts in
a degree of objectivity. This objectivity arises, not merely from the fact that
scientific theories can be inter-subjectively tested,'^ but from the fact that
they have been through a communal process of testing. As Htill writes,
the objectivity that matters so much in science is not primarily a
characteristic of individual scientists, but of scientific communities.
Scientists rarely refute their own pet hypotheses, especially after they have
appeared in print, hut that is all right.Their fellow scientists will he happy
to expose these hypotheses to severe testing."
For the same reason, science 'does not require that scientists be tmbiased' ; it
requires only 'that different scientists have different biases'.*^
To Hull's two mechanisms, we may add a third. Scientific commtmities are
so constituted that they can engage in what computer scientists call 'parallel
processing' ."They can ptirsue independent and even mutually contradictory
lines of research, without needing to worry about their consistency. This
means that the norms of rationality within a collective project may be
different from those that wotild apply to an individual working alone. A
solitary individual might not be acting rationally in purstiing a hypothesis
that seems highly unlikely to produce results. But a scientist, who belongs to
a community of researchers, can feel free to pursue such a line of inquiry, in
the confident expectation that others will pursue more apparently promising
lines of inquiry.'''
'2 Karl R. Popper, The Logic ofSdentic Discovery (1935; London: Routledge, 2002), p. 22.
" David L. Hull, Science as a Process: An Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual
Development of Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 4.

'^ Hull, p. 22.
""William A. Kornfeld and Carl E. Hewitt, 'The Scientific Community Metaphor', IEEE
Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, SMC-11 (1981), 2433.
'^ Paul R.Thagard, Computational Philosophy of Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988),
p. 186.
57
(ii) Collective Rationalitj in the Renaissance

The birth of modern science is customarily dated to the seventeenth century,
for it was that century which saw the rise of the scientific institutions that
embodied such processes.'' One thinks, for instance, of the Accademia dei
Lincei, with w^hich Galileo was associated, which was founded in 1609, the
Royal Society in Britain, founded in 1660, and the Acadmie des Sciences in
France, founded in 1666. But at least some of these social processes preexisted the seventeenth century. When Galileo applied for the chair of
mathematics at Bologna in 1587, his propositions on centres of gravity were
sent for review to Giuseppe Moletti (1531-1588), the holder of a similar
chair at the University of Padova.'^ It seems, then, that in late medieval
universities there existed at least an informal and occasional process of peer
review.
If early modern nattiral philosophy benefited from tbis collective scrutiny,
what we might call 'the science of magic' seems to have lacked it. Many
theorists of magic thinkers such as Paracelsus or Giordano Bruno (1548
1600) spurned the establisbed institutions of learning. They were 'wayward
geniuses and intellectual vagabonds','' working and publishing outside of the
universities. It is true that other theorists of mapic did belong to institutions
o
of learning.'"^ But even when they did, the ctdture of magic (like that of
alchemy) valued secrecy rather than publicity. "'' Tbe preface to Agrippa's
De occulta philosophia includes a letter from his teacher Abbot Trithemius of
Sponheim (146 21516) advising him ' to communicate vulgar secrets to vtilgar
friends, but higher secrets to higher, and secret friends only'.'"^ This was, of
course, in one sense pretence, for these words are fotind in the preface of a
published book. But there were reasons why a magus might be cautious about
publication. Even among the intellectual elite, 'imprisormient and execution
were real demgers facing those interested in magical practices'.'"' It foflows
' " Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway, Merchants qf Doubt: How a Handful qf Scientists Obscured
the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming (New York: Bloomsbury, 2010),
pp. 268-69.
^^ W. R. Laird, 'Introduction', in The Unfinished Mechanics of Giuseppe Moletti: An Edition and
English Translation of his 'Dialogue on Mechanics' (1576), ed. and trans. Laird (Toronto:
University ofToronto Press, 2000), pp. 3-62 (p. 40).

''^ Thorndike, Magic and Experimental Science, V, 127.
Benedik Lang, Unlocked Books: Manuscripts of Learned Magic in the Medieval Libraries of Central
Europe (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008), pp. 26869.
'**' Peter J. Erench, yo/in Dee:The World of an Elizabethan Magus (London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1972), pp. 81-82.
'"^ 'John Trit|h]emius, abbot of Saint James of Herbipolis, formerly of Spanhemia, to his
Henry Cornelius Agrippa of Nettesheym, heath and love', in Occult Philosophy, p. Ivii.
"Lang, pp. 219-30.
58
Gregory W. Dawes
that the world within which magic was studied was not one that encouraged
an open debate about its theory or its efficacy. It lacked at least some of the
collective, critical scrutiny that is characteristic of modern science.
IV. Conclusion
I argued at the beginning of this analysis that no general judgement can be
passed on the rationality of those Renaissance thinkers who beheved in magic.
It is clear that the world they occupied contained many resources that could
lend support to such a belief. But it also contained resotirces that could lend
support to scepticism. We might think that the sceptics had better reasons on
their side, but this was by no means as obvious then as it is now. In any case,
the'science of magic' lacked the degree of collective, critical scrutiny that has
come to be characteristic of the modern sciences. Comparisons with modern
times are difficult, if not impossible. But if we focus on the rationality of
individuals, the mixture of credulity and scepticism found among Renaissance
writers on magic may differ very little from that found among the thinkers
of today.
The University ofOtago
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The Rationality of Renaissance Magic

Magic has often been regarded as a non-rational practice. Self-styled modern

classify belief in magic as itself a disorder, since it recognises that it 'may be

pathologiccJ. But they, too, have sometimes regarded it as in some sense

"Richard Kieckhefer, 'The Specific Rationality of Medieval Magic', American Historical