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Citizenship and Exclusion: Radical Democracy, Community, and Justice.

Or, What is Wrong


with Communitarianism?
Author(s): Veit Bader
Source: Political Theory, Vol. 23, No. 2 (May, 1995), pp. 211-246
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
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CITIZENSHIPANDEXCLUSION
RadicalDemocracy,Community,and Justice.
Or,WhatIs Wrongwith Communitarianism?

VEITBADER
Universityof Amsterdam

OFSOVEREIGN7Y
1. PARADOXES
ANDCITIZENSHIP
Thedevelopment
Oursis a timefullof paradoxes.
of themodemstatewas
andunification
characterized
of powers.Howby a specificmonopolization
dramatized
as it wasin thejuridico-political
ever,thisdevelopment,
mythof
seemsto be over.I see
absolute,unitary,andindivisiblestatesovereignty,'
of statesovereignty
in anepochmarkedsimultaneously
fourmainparadoxes
andcontradictorily
of "nationby a processof erosionandstrengthening
states":(1) in a worldof fastandthorougheconomic,ecological,political,
we areconfrontedwith"ethnicrevivals,"
andinformational
globalization,
"newtribalism,"
"ethniccleansings,"
theimplosionof states,andthelike.(2)
Themythandpracticesof indivisiblesovereignty
of nation-states
contradict
thedevelopments
of internaldelegation("devolution
of statesovereignty"
to
states,provinces,regions,communities)andexternaldelegation("reconstructionof statesovereignty")
to suprastate
levelsandinternational
organizationsthatare simultaneously
going on. (3) The mythandpracticesof
focusedin thenation-state
unitarysovereignty,
andclaiminga monopolyin
legislation,jurisdiction,currency,taxation,andlegal enforcement,
contradictsthesimultaneous
anddelegationof thosepowers(e.g.,
disentanglement
Europeancurrency,
European
courts).(4) Themythandpracticesof unlimof thenation-state
ited,absolutesovereignty
contradicts
thegrowingfactual,
thatcomplement
moral,2andlegalexternallimitations
thewell-knowninternal limitations(liberal-democratic
constitutions).Limitationsby internationallaw,international
covenants,andcourts,howeverprecarious
theymay
be, areincreasingly
followedby proclamations
andpoliciesof intervention
AUTHOR'S NOTE: For corrections of the English text, I would like to thank T Dekker,
P Pekelharing,and T Strong.
POLITICALTHEORY,Vol. 23 No. 2, May 1995 211-246
? 1995 Sage Publications,Inc.
211

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212

POLITICAL
THEORY/May1995

humanrightsareseriouslyandblatantly
in casesin whichthemostelementary
protectionof "civilrights"versusstatesovereignty
violated:international
affairs(e.g.,Helsinki
inthe"internal"
andtheoldprincipleof nonintervention
Ex-Jugoslavia);
Iraq/Kurdistan,
Cambodja,
conferenceonpeaceandsecurity,
(e.g.,Haiti).
democratic
"politicalrights"versusnonintervention
of citizenshipcoincidewith
paradoxes
As I see them,themostimportant
asfollows:(1) withinstates,the
andcanbe summarized
thesedevelopments
tendencytowarduniversalistinclusionis relativelyadvanced(legal and
politicalequalityamongcitizens).However,this equalityof inclusionhas
interwovenwithsystematicexclusion
alwaysbeen,andstillis, intrinsically
(legalandpoliticalinequalitybetweencitizensandnoncitizens(foreigners,
getrights
metics,denizens,etc.).3(2) Noncitizensanddenizensincreasingly
havebeenreservedto citizens,and,by this, citizenship
that,traditionally,
does lose much of its traditionallegal, political,and social importance.
to
thataddsadditional
momentum
Moreover,it is exactlythisdevelopment
is developingin two waysintoa
thetendencyof exclusion.(3) Citizenship
by
concept:politicalcitizenshipis complemented
multipleandmultilayered
of
and
social
citizenship),
citizenship(manyspheres
economic,industrial,
and politicalcitizenshipis gainingimportanceon different,increasingly
suprastatelevels of politicalintegration(manylevels of politicalcitizenself-determination
and
ship).4However,theideaandpracticeof democratic
linkedand limitedto state
democraticcitizenshipis still predominantly
(4) As a consequenceof migrationand
membershipand "nationhood."
societiesand European
processesof Europeanunification(multicultural
citizenship),one findsa strongculturalandpoliticalpressureeven in soof ethnicity,culture,andnatowarda disentanglement
callednation-states
tionhoodfromcitizenship.Yetatthesametime,in a reactivemove,onefinds
of ethnic,"racial,"
cultural,
andamalgamation
the traditional
superposition
andnationalidentityandcitizenshipbecomingevenstronger.
In practicalpolicies,thoseparadoxesrequirea flexibleresponse.Theorethinking.
It is urgent,from
retically,theyaskforquickandthoroughgoing
bothadescriptive
andanexplanatory
aswellasfromanormative
perspective,
asa "bundle"
ofpowersthatcanbedivided,
sovereignty
one,toconceptualize
limited,delegated.Citizenshiphas to be thoughtof as a multipleand
legal and politicaltheoryas well as
multilayeredconcept.'Predominant
politicalphilosophyseemto havemuchtroubleevenstartingsucha process.
and(neo)connotonlyreactionary
Theyare-as always-in therearguard:
and(neo)republican
servativetheorybutalso mostliberal,communitarian,
theoriesof democracy.6
I shallconsidertheexemplary
difficultiesMichael
By wayof illustration,
Walzerhas, as a radicalsocial democrat,in tacklingthese paradoxesof

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ANDEXCLUSION 213
Bader/ CITIZENSHIP

citizenship.Walzeris, for two reasons,one of the moreinterestingauthorsin


this regard:his pluralistdemocracyis opposedto strongparticularismand to
all conservativeversionsof communitarianism
anddoes accept"reiteratively
universalist"claims of justice and morality; he breaks the "eardeafening
silence"or nearlycompleteneglectof problemsof membershipandexclusion
in predominantliberaltheoriesofjustice (e.g., Rawls, Dworkin).(Indeed,he
was one of the first in recentpoliticalphilosophyto highlightthis perplexing
problem.)Nevertheless,for ethical-politicalreasons,he opts, with regardto
the first paradox, for policies of fairly closed borders.With regard to the
second paradox, Walzer attacks, for democratic reasons, all versions of
"secondclass citizenship"for extendedperiods. He thereforeis in favor of
strongfirstadmissionselection.Withregardto thethirdparadox,Walzerthinks
that"admissionandexclusionareatthecoreof communalindependence.They
suggest the deepest meaning of self-determination"(1983, 62). He states
that to give up the state "is to give up any effective self-determination"
(p. 44). The hardcore of his ethical-politicalargumentsagainstopen borders
shows thatWalzer,with regardto the fourthparadox,clings to the superposition of ethnic,cultural,andnationalidentitiesandcitizenship:(i) closureis
thoughtto be necessaryandlegitimateto defendthe sharedmeanings,values,
and ways of life of specific (ethnic,cultural,religious, linguistic,historical)
political communitiesor states; (ii) closure is necessary and legitimate for
the reproductionanddevelopmentof collective political identityand attachment;(iii) closureis necessaryandlegitimatefor the developmentof socially
or culturallyembedded,rich personalities.
In this essay I first summarizerecentdiscussionsin moraltheoryon "free
movement"and show thattherearestrongmoralreasonsin favorof policies
of "fairlyopen borders."Next, I presenta shortsociological critiqueof the
fourprincipalargumentsby whichWalzertriesto show thatthe (nation-)state
is the adequateunitof politicalintegrationanddemocraticself-determination.
Finally,I will tryto develop a multilayeredconceptof citizenshipthatallows
one, at least in principle,to combine the moralrequirementsof universalist
justice with the requirementsof (differentversionsof) radicaldemocracyand
particularforms of life.

2. CITIZENSHIP
AND EXCLUSION:MORAL,
PRUDENTIAL,REALISTAND ETHICALARGUMENTS
In internationalrelationsof exploitation,oppression,and discrimination,
citizenshiphas always been andstill is the single most importantcriterionof

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214

POLITICAL
THEORY/May1995

inclusionandexclusion(see Brubaker1992).Notwithstanding
the strong
universalist
rhetoricin the
languageof humanrightsandtheinternationalist
liberal tradition("free movementof capital"),the socialist tradition
andthe anarchisttradition,those ex("proletarianinternationalism"),
havebeenwidelyignoredin thedominant
theories
clusionaryconsequences
of justice.7
Most recentmoraltheoryhas as its commoncore some versionof a
universalistegalitarianism
(see Kymlicka1990, 5; Goodin1992, 7). The
with this "egalitarian
exclusionaryeffectsof citizenshipareincompatible
plateau."Theegalitarianprincipleof equallibertiesservesas a criterionof
radicalcritiqueof all ascriptiveprivileges.Citizenshiplaws combine,in
differentways,criteriaof birthor descent(jussanguinis)andterritory(jus
soli). Theseascriptivecriteriaaremorallyno moredefensiblethanall the
other,like kinship,sex, age, region,residence,language,habits,culture,
socialclass,membership
inchurches,
lifestyles,gender,religion,nationhood,
inWestern
liberaldemocracies
is themodern
parties,andso on."Citizenship
of feudalprivilege-aninherited
statusthatgreatlyenhancesone's
equivalent
life chances.Likefeudalbirthright
privileges,restrictivecitizenshipis hard
to justify when one thinksaboutit closely"(Carens1987, 252; see also
Carens1992;Dummet1992, 171;Brubaker1992,31f; Walzer1983, 55,
1992,96f; SchuckandSmith1985,2). Theuniversalism
of themoralpoint
of view,evenin its thoughtful
and"weak"versions,whichI favor,8doesnot
allowmoralprivilegeto themembersof particular
communities.
fromjustice,ratherthanarguments
Followingarguments
forfreemobility
as ahumanright,9I thinkonecanplausiblyshowthattheexistinginequalities
withinandbetweenstatescannotbe morallydefended.Carens,Weithman,
andPoggi havereconstructed
Rawls's(1971) argumentto show thatone
shouldunderstand
the originalpositionglobally:the differenceprinciple,
then,requiresfar-reaching
international
redistribution
of resourcesandrewards.Wereone to introducevouchersfor the choiceof citizenshipin a
stateintoDworkin'sideaof anambition-sensitive
particular
andendowmentinsensitiveauctionso as to obtain,initially,a fairdistribution
of resources,
one could,most probably,get similarresults.10
The construction
of such
modelsis intendedto showwhatajustdistribution
in anideal,globalworld
would look like. They wouldmost likely demonstrate
an enormousgap
betweenthoseidealdistributions
andthe existinginternational
relationsof
exploitation,oppression,and exclusion.A just distributionof resources
withinstateswouldimplyredistribution
of controloverresourcesradically
incompatiblewiththeusualaccommodation
withcapitalistmarketeconomies. The international
consequenceswould be, obviously,even more
radical.

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ANDEXCLUSION 215
Bader/ CITIZENSHIP

of idealworldsareintendedto show whatjustice


Moralconstructions
requires;
theydonottellusdirectlywhatto do in nonidealworlds.Mysketch
doesnotissuein anydirectandunconditional
of anargument
"presumption
forfreemigration"
(Carens1992,25).Itshows,rather,
(i) directly,asthefirst
of radicalinternational
redistriandpreferred
option,theurgentrequirement
butionof resources(theformsof whichI cannoteventouchonhere).'1Italso
shows(ii) indirectly,
as a secondbestoption,themoralrequirement
of fairly
forpoliciesof international
openborders,opento thedegreeto compensate
ordonothaveanysuccessand
arenotintended,implemented,
redistribution,
significantimpact.12Justice,notcharityor mutualaid,asksfor fairlyopen
borders.
Moralargumentsare not the only practicalarguments.The worldof
haveto
practicalreasonandjudgmentis a complexone. Moralarguments
withrealistarguments,
andwithethicalcompetewithprudential
arguments,
politicalones.13As we are confrontedwith manyserioustheoreticaland
practicaltensionsbetweenthem,it is usefulto distinguishthesearguments
In all thosehardcases,one needsnotonlyprudencebutsome
analytically.
kindof priorityrules.
Prudentialarguments
canbe in favorof openbordersin all conditionsin
whichopenbordersarein thewell-informed,
long-termrationalinterestof
theparticular
statein question.Butprudential
arealwayscondiarguments
tional.In thepresentglobalsituation,I thinkit is unproblematic
to statethat
argumentsaboutinterestare mainlyused by defendersof fairlyclosed
borders:collectivewelfarechauvinism.
Thestatusof politicalrealismas a distinctnormative
theoryis questionable,andrealismdoes not,in itself,haveanyintrinsicdirection.However,
realistarguments
atleastremindusof twopoints:(i) "oughtimpliescan"and
(ii)moralarguments
shouldtakeintoaccountthemostprobableandexpected
of justaction:ethicsof responsibility
consequences
versus"justicebe done,
thoughtheheavensfall."Fromnumerous
politicalandtheoretical
statements,
we knowtherealistarguments
againstopenbordersalltoowell:overwhelming numbersof migrantsand refugees("flood");publicorderproblems;
andethnicsegmentation
unemployment
of labormarkets;stressor breakdownof thesocialsecuritysystems;seriousoverloadof publicsocialservices
(education,housing,health,transportation,
etc.); seriouspoliticaleffects
(welfarebacklash,xenophobia,racism,and immigrantfundamentalism);
culturalUberfremdung
InthisarticleI cannotdiscussthe"real(alienation).
ity"of thesewell-knownscenariosfordisaster.Forthesakeof argument,
I
acceptthattheyarenotjust blackprophecyplayingon fearandprejudice.
AndI takeit forgrantedthattheopeningof bordersis notanadequate
policy
againstinternational
inequalities.

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216

THEORY/May1995
POLITICAL

if appliedagainstopenborders,leadto two concluRealistarguments,


thatradicalinternational
redistribution
is thefirstand
sions:(i) it is apparent
mostimportant
optionin thestruggleagainststructural
povertyandinequalTothedegreethatthispolicydoesnotsucceed,oneofthemostimportant
ity.14
causesof forcedmigrationcannotbe removedand the legitimacyof all
possible othernormativeargumentsin favor of closed borderswill be
as a consequence.(ii) If one defendsthe openingof
severelyundermined
best
onehasto tackletheapparent
tensions
bordersas "asecond
stop-gap,"
of prudence.
ofjusticeandrealistrequirements
betweenmoralrequirements
intoaccount.
Defensiblepoliciesof openbordersshouldtakeconsequences
NeitherCarensnorGoodin,therefore,opt for an immediateandcomplete
I haveusedthephrase"fairlyopen"borders.Butif it
openingof all borders;
comestopracticalimmigration,
refugee,andnaturalization
policies,doesnot
betweenpositionsinnormative
thatmeanthattheseeminglyhugedifferences
Doesnot"fairlyopen"actuallymeanexactly
philosophybecomeirrelevant?
the sameas "fairlyclosed?"I do not thinkso. Firstof all, thesepositions
influencethe way in whichconsequencesare conceived,discussed,and
"takenintoaccount";
second,thedirectionof thosepoliciesdiffersconsiderably:froma moralpointof view,one asks,looksintenselyfor,andtries
out "more,muchmore"(Carens).Realistarguments(in theirtraditional
andethical-political
mixturewithprudential
meanless,
arguments)
currently
muchless immigration,
asylum,andnaturalization.
forclosedbordersareusuallymixedup
Prudential
andrealistarguments
with differentversionsof ethical-political
arguments(see the Walzerian
in section1). One can speculatethat,in an
versionof communitarianism
of moralityandSittlichkeitwould
imaginedideal world,the requirements
In ourworld,andparticularly
in the
complementeachotherharmoniously.
of
borders
and
their
tensions
are
case
citizenship,
sharpandvisible.Walzer,
in hischaracteristic
clarity,clearlymentionsthesetensions'5
(see 1983,280.
On the otherhand,he recognizes,witha disarmingopenness,the limitsof
hiscommunitarian
"Ican'tmovebeyond.Todothatwouldrequire
approach:
a differenttheorywhichwouldtakeas its subjectnotthecommonlife of the
citizen"(p. 30). If communitarianism,
for all its versions,pretendsto be an
identifiable
thenit mustmeanthatin allhard
positioninpractical
philosophy,
casestheparticularist
requirements
of community
musttrumptheuniversalist ones of justice.This priorityrule clearlycontradicts
the strongmoral
intuitionsthat are elaboratedin modemuniversalistmoraltheoriesand
international
andconstitutional
law:universalist
principlesandrightsshould
notonly trumpprudentialist
utilitybutalsotheethicsof particular
communities.Otherwise,
moralitywouldbe nomorethana thinideologicalmaskof
ethicalor utilitarian
welfarechauvinism.

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Bader/ CITIZENSHIP
ANDEXCLUSION 217

3. SOCIOLOGICAL
CRITIQUEOFA
COMMUNITARIAN
DEFENSEOF CLOSEDBORDERS
Walzerrepresentsone of the most liberal and pluralistversions of communitarianism.'6Therefore,he cannotbe criticizedfor the usual theoretical
andhistoricalmythsthatcharacterizethe conservativeor protectiveversions:
the basic conceptof communityremainsvague;the historicalrole of violence
and communityconstructionor buildingis ignoredin picturesof an organic
developmentof communities;internalhomogeneityof communitiesis postulatedand cross-cuttingcommunalallegiancesand collective identitiesare
forgotten;in a kind of retrospectivenostalgia,communitiesarethoughtto be
harmonious (traditional) Gemeinschaften and confronted with conflictridden and (modem) strategicGesellschaften;culturalcommunitiesare constructedwithoutany analysisof structuralantagonismandconflict,particularly
class antagonism and conflict;"7the idea of shared meaning, of shared
is verymuchoverstressed.18
cognitiveandnormativeframesandinterpretations
Nevertheless he does sharefour presuppositionswith all hard-corepolitical
communitarians.These are not very plausibleand can easily be refuted:
1. Superimpositionof linguistic, cultural,religious, ethnic, national,political communitiesandthe state.In sociology as well as in normativetheory,
broad container-conceptsof "ethnicity"preclude a detailed analysis of the
analyticallydifferentbut historicallyoverlappingcriteriaof exclusion and
possible communityformation.Elsewhere,I have triedto construct,from a
perspective of inequalities,a disaggregatedscheme of criteriaof exclusion
and correspondingpractices and legitimationsof exclusion."9From a perspective of identity,culture,and collective action, I also triedto show under
which circumstancesparticularcommunitiesdevelop/canbe constructed.20
Even in Walzerone can find the usual mix of ethnic, linguistic, territorial,
cultural,religious, and nationalcommunitiesand statescommon to communitarianlegitimationsof exclusion.It is obvious, however,thatsome of these
communitiesarenot only separatedanalyticallybuthistoricallyas well. They
do not always peacefullyoverlap.Usuallythey arenot coextensive, andthey
conflict with one another.
2. Walzer, of course, knows that states are not necessarily, or even
commonly,ethnic or culturalhomogeneousentities.2'Nevertheless,he does
speak of states as "nations"or "communities"all the time, even when this is
obviously false.22This is not just a conceptualweakness, it plays a crucial
role in the first (hermeneutic)of the four argumentsin favorof states as most
appropriateunities for argumentsabout distributivejustice. Without it he
would not be able to writethese normativelycrucialsentences:"thepolitical
community is probably the closest we can come to a world of common

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218

THEORY/May1995
POLITICAL

meanings.Language,history,andculturecometogether(comemoreclosely
togetherherethananywhereelse) to producea collectiveconsciousness"
(1983, 28).23Stateswouldonly be legitimate,in this regard,as worldsof
commonmeaning,sharedlanguages,andcommoncognitiveandnormative
weakandhistorically
morethandubious.
frames.Butthislinkis theoretically
It is obviousthathistoricalstatesdifferin degreeof linguisticandcultural
areveryimportant.
Forthreereasons,
andthatthesedifferences
homogeneity
mustberefuted:(i) it is obviouslywrongto assume,even
Walzer'sstatement
underpresentconditions,thata "statelessworld"wouldbe a "worldwithout
menand
deracinated
particular
meaning"(1983,34),inhabited
by"radically
women"(p. 39);(ii) his argument,
obviously,doesnotholdformulticultural
andbi- ormultilingual
states;(iii) therearemanyinter-"national"
linguisticculturalcommunities,old ones as well as new (religious,professional,
artistic,political),andWalzerhimselfknowsperfectlywellthatmanysmaller
"infra-state
units"showmuchstronger"worldsof commonmeaning"and
muchstrongeraffiliationandcommitments.
notonlycommunitarians24-conceive
3. Notallcommunitarians-and
of
the state as apolitical community. Walzerhalfheartedly,but no less mislead-

clubsandfamilies"
ingly,treatsthestatein analogywith"neighborhoods,
(pp. 35-42). Historicalstatesare not such warm,horizontalVergemeinbasedonconsent,butrather
schaftungenorfreeanddemocratic
associations,
basednotonfreeentrybutonenforcedmembership
coldverticalinstitutions,
andphysicalviolence.Strictlyspeaking,theyarenot "associations"
at all,
butinstitutions.
Ofcourse,therearedifferences
in thisregardbetweenstates,
andthesedifferencesareimportant.
Buteven"nation-states"
thatareculturally fairlyhomogeneousand ratherdemocratichave been statesin class
societies.Toevadetheconnotations
of coldness,verticalhierarchies,
bureaucracy,centralism,culturalnormalization,
and illegitimatedominationso
commonlyassociatedwithstates,Walzermisleadinglyprefersto speakof
"countries"
or"political
communities."
Hemaybeperfectly
rightinstatingthat
"thecommunity
is itselfa good-conceivablythemostimportant
good"(p.29),
butthis communitarian
convictionprobablytells less in favorthanagainst
the state,or moreprecisely,it couldbe mobilizedin its favoronlyif andto
thedegreein which,empirically,
statesweretoresemblethenormative
ideals
in the booksof democratic
If one recognizesthatstatesare
consent-theory.
notculturallyhomogeneous
ordemocratic
politicalcommunities,
themoral
andethicallegitimacy
of theirexclusionary
"righttocommunal
self-detenrnination"getsseverelyundermined.
4. Walzerthereforetriesto backup the ethicallegitimacyof statesby
ascribingto thema crucialrolein the defenseandreproduction
of cultural
diversity:

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Bader/ CITIZENSHIP
ANDEXCLUSION 219
canbe openonlyif countriesareatleastpotentially
Neighborhoods
closed.... Neighsomecohesiveculturefora generation
borhoodsmightmaintain
ortwo on a voluntary
basis,butpeoplewouldmovein, peoplewouldmoveout;soonthecohesionwouldbe
of culturesandgroupsdependsuponclosureand,withoutit,
gone.Thedistinctiveness
cannotbe conceivedas a stablefeatureof humanlife. If distinctiveness
is a value...
thenclosuremustbe permitted
somewhere.
(pp.38-9)

Toputit crudely,Walzerpredicts,as a necessaryresultof openborders,


some kind of culturalentropy(Walzer'sfamoussecondlaw of cultural
thermodynamics?).
This,in atleastthreerespects,is a curiousargument:
(i) Thatculturaldistinctiveness
dependson oneor otherformof closure
may,ina verygeneralsense,betrue.25
However,thephraseis muchtoovague
to be usefulin eitherempiricalornormative
arguments:
first,notall cultural
distinctionscan be defendedfroma liberal-democratic
perspective(e.g.,
classist,elitist,racist,sexist,etc.).Second,oneshouldspecifythetypeorform
of closure:closurebyfreeconsent(frominsidersandoutsiders)
differsradically
fromenforcedclosureby custom,socialconvention,andlaw (backedby
of physicalviolence).Walzersees clearlythatenforced
threator application
closure "replacescommitment with coercion. .

. So far as the coerced

membersareconcerned,thereis no longera communityworthdefending"


(p. 39). But his own argumentdependsupon a completelyunspecified
conceptionof enforcedclosureby thestate.If culturaldistinctiveness
would
thrivetotallyon state-enforced
of "difclosure,thepostmodernist
appraisal
ference"wouldhaveto bejudgedfroma differentangle.Third,oneshould
be sensitiveto thesocialcontextin whichclosuretakesplace:closureunder
conditionsof "rough"
equalitydiffersradicallyfromclosureunderconditions
of systematicexploitation,
andexclusion.26
oppression,
discrimination,
withmoderncapitalism,the statehas alwaysbeenthe
(ii) Historically,
strongestenemyof culturaldiversity.Internally,the modernnation-state
actedas a radicalculturalunifier,creating"thenation"by making"peasants
into Frenchmen,"
using outrightviolenceto crushculturaland national
minorities.It appliedwell-knowneducational,pedagogic,and civilizing
anddisciplinein orderto eraseotherlanguages
strategiesof normalization
and/ordialectsin creatingtheunifiedhighlanguage;
tocrushrivalpaganand
otherreligionsby creatingreligioushomogeneity;
to crushcompetingpeasant,popular,craftcultures,andframesof meaningandinterpretation.
The
creationof Walzer's"commonworldof meaning,"requiredan erasureof
rivalmemoriesandhistoriesso as to producethe dominant"historyof the
nation,"and so on.27 Externally,modernnation-stateshave acted,as a
byproductof theirdirecteconomicandpoliticalcolonizationandconquest
of theworld,andusuallyas itsmainideologicalmyth,as large-scalecultural
imperialists
(completeextinctionorradicalsubmissionandenforcedadapta-

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220

/ May1995
POLITICAL
THEORY

tionof all "native"


peoplesandcultures).Itis a strangeironyof historythen
thatWalzerentruststo thosevery statesthe heroicrole of championsand
defendersof culturaldiversity
(iii) It is onethingto recognizetheenormousroleof force,violence,and
of linguistic,religious,ethnic,cultural,and
powerin thehistoricalformation
It is quiteanotherto argueempirically
andnormatively
so on, homogeneity.
anddevelopforthe necessaryroleof enforcedclosurefor thepreservation
Walzer'spredictionof culturalenmentof culturaldiversity.Empirically,
tropyis not a verysoundone:contraryto the commonmythof purityand
of nationalcultures,mosthighculturesin historyhave
organicdevelopment
beenthe resultof hybridcrossings.Contrary
to conservativefearsof one
one finds even in the presentworld
unified"Coca-Cola"
world-culture,
a richvariety
contextof severeeconomic,cultural,andpoliticalinequalities
of newlycreatedcultures.Normatively,
conservationist
arguments
maybe
withrespectto nationalandculturalminoritiesthatwouldotherappropriate
wise becomeextinctby theoverwhelming
powerof imperialist
majorities.28
Butforme,it is strangeto seethosearguments
appliedwithrespectto exactly
thoseculturalmajorities,which,forthelast500 yearsor so, conqueredthe
worldculturallyas well as economicallyandpolitically.The"threat"
of the
shouldbe analyzedin thecontextof powerasymmetries
poorimmigrants
to
putit in context.Wheredoesthis"fear"forculturalencounter,
so typicalfor
conservatist
andneonationalistlracist
politics,comefromin Walzer'spolitical theory,whichotherwisestretchespluralismto its limits?
In Walzer'sSpheresof Justice(1983),thesefourcommunitarian
argumentsarebackedby the traditional
in favorof statesovereignty.
argument
to sovereignstatesasunitsofpoliticaldecisionmaking,Walzer
As alternative
allowsonlyfora choicebetween"twoformsof simpleequalitywithregard
to membership"
(p. 34) anddismissesbothof them.Thechoicewouldbe
betweena globalstate("worldstate"[p.48], "globalsocialism"[p.34])ora
worldwithoutstates,"globallibertarianism."
Tertium
nondatur.Theworldstateoptionwouldmeana "worldwithoutparticular
meaningsandwithout
politicalcommunities"
(p. 34), globallibertarianism
wouldalsobe a world
withoutpoliticalcommunities,
a worldin which"noonewasa member"
or,
moreprecisely,a worldof manysmallparochial
states:"ifstateseverbecame
it is likelythatneighborhoods
largeneighborhoods
will becomelittlestates"
(p. 38)."Toteardownthewallsof thestateis not. . . to createa worldwithout
walls,butratherto createa thousandpettyfortresses"
(p. 39). Evenif one
wereto acceptall this,one is stillnotforcedto accept,withoutalternatives,
theworldof thebigexclusionary
fortressesof theexistingstatesasthelesser
evil. Walzer,in his struggleagainstsimpleequality,fallspreyto the simple
conceptionof absolute,indivisiblesovereignty
thatI havealreadycriticized.

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Bader/ CITIZENSHIP
ANDEXCLUSION 221

In fact, we alreadylive in a worldwith limited,delegated,and divided


sovereigntyrights,a worldin whichunitsof politicaldecisionmakingvery
muchcross-cutandoverlapeachother(neighborhoods,
communities,
cities,
regions,states,federalrepublics,unions,unitednations).Andit is precisely
thatshouldbe arguedformorally.I do agreewith
thiskindof constellation
Walzerthataneffectivefightagainstparochialclosuredoes,indeed,require
some "kindof largeness"(p. 39). However,not just statesare able to
thistrend,butall inter-localandinter-national
counterbalance
units.29
The
of
ideal democratic
tellsus littleabouttheadepoliticalself-determination
quateterritorial
units,andif it doestellus something,it is thatit is in favor
of smallerunits.
So we mayconcludethatthe hermeneutic,
cultural,social,andpolitical
fortheethico-political
of therightof statesto closure
arguments
justification
Andwearenowinapositiontounderstand
donotstanduptocriticalscrutiny.
whyWalzeris forcedto talkso oftenin a crypto-normativist
way:he wants
statesto be whattheyhistorically
andactuallyneverhavebeen-linguistically
andculturallyhomogeneous
worldsof commonmeaning,freeassociations
basedon democraticconsent.Only in this way is he able to link state
sovereigntyto thedemocratic
or "communal
principleof self-determination
self-determination"
andcan he say,as alreadyquoted,that"togive up the
stateis to give up anyeffectiveself-determination"
(p.44).3?

4. HOW TO COMBINETHEREQUIREMENTS
OF
UNIVERSALIST
JUSTICEAND RADICALDEMOCRACY

Formsof democracystrongerthanthosepredominant
in developedcapitaliststatesshouldbefavouredforfourreasons:(i) politicaldemocracy
itself
is, intrinsically,
a formof goodlife;(ii) thereproduction
of thindemocracy
asksforstrongerformsof politicalallegiancethanit cancreateby itself;(iii)
ecologicaldisastersandthe destructionof naturecan be prevented,in a
democraticway,only by strongerformsof democracy;31
(iv) radicalredistributions,withinand betweenstates,can be realized,legitimatelyand
effectively,onlyin strongerdemocracies.
Yetall knownhistoricalformsof
strongerdemocracyandmosttheoretical
modelsof republican,
neorepublican,andcommunitarian
democracy
havebeenlinkedwithrigorouspolicies
of exclusion.Thedevelopment
of theoretical
modelsof "strong,"
"empowered"democracy,"pluralist
republicanism,"
"associational,"
"associative,"
or "liberal-socialist"
democracyhas,up till now,not sufficientlydealtwith
thisproblem.32

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222

POLITICAL
THEORY
/ May1995

of growingnumbers
of migrants
Recently,as a consequence
andrefugees,
"the contradictionbetween the universalistprinciples of rule of law and

claimsto integrityof given


democracyon one hand,andthe particularist
formsof life, on theotherhand"(Habennas1992,632f)hasbecomegreater.
betweenliberalism
Not each"ethos"is worthdefending.Theconfrontation
has
to
ask:Whichcomhas
shown
that
one
andcommunitarianism
always
munities?(see Kymlicka1988;Walzer1990b;Cunningham1991). The
andethical-political
discourseshould
tensionbetweenmoralrequirements
asI statedabove,froma qualifiedpriorityformorality.
be approached,
Many
have analyzedthe conseauthors,startingfrom similarconsiderations,
quencesfor the internalrelationswithincommunities.Conservativeor
is criticizedfor (i) a lackof individualautonprotectivecommunitarianism
omyandthefreedomto choose;(ii) notleavingany,orenough,roomwithin
communitiesor traditionsfor distance,criticism,rebellion,conflict,and
insidecommunities
change;(iii) ignoringall formsof structural
inequalities
(exploitation,
oppression,
discrimination,
exclusion);(iv)lackof civilrights
and civil culture;and (v) lack of democraticpoliticalrightsandculture.
a "third"
Normatively,
positionalongsideliberalismandcommunitarianism
communiemergesfromthiscriticism,somethinglike a liberal-democratic
liberalism.33
But even withinthis evolving
tarianismor a communitarian
no seriousattention
hasasyetbeenpaidto theproblematic
external
tradition,
relationsbetweencommunities:
closureand(ii) all formsof
(i) parochialist
betweencommunities,mostparticularly,
power-asymmetries
domination/
and
exclusion.34
oppression
andcommunity),
Bringingtogetherbothlinesof argument
(fordemocracy
andnormative-theoretical
a conceptual
clarification
of therelation
rethinking
to particularist
of democracy
(ethnic,cultural,national)identitiesorcommuanddemocracy,
nitiesandcitizenship
remainsurgent.Inotherwords,wehave
torethinktherelationsbetweentheethnicandcivicaspectsof modernnations
(A. D. Smith).
4.1 Disentanglement
of Citizenship
fromAscriptive"Characters"
andIdentities
Any morallydefensibleconceptof democratic
citizenshipoughtto start
fromuniversalism.
Withinstates,universalinclusionis required;between
states,all formsof morallyillegitimateclosureareto be criticized.As a first
fromascriptivecriteria
step,therefore,citizenshipoughtto be disentangled
andidentities(particularly
fromdescent,colour,sex,ethnicity,nationhood).
Thisis whatI havesuggestedabove.Itsconsequencesforconceptsof citizenship

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Bader/ CITIZENSHIPAND EXCLUSION

223

in politicalphilosophyandlegal theoryhavebeenworkedout by Carens,


andby Brubaker,
Kymlicka,andHabermas,
Heater,Meehan,andothers.
Carens(1993),followingHabermas,
distinguishes
sharplybetween"two
culturalcontexts:a groupculture,like the cultureof a religiousor ethnic
group,andthepublicpoliticalcultureof a liberaldemocratic
society"(25).
"betweenthoseaspectsof thepubliccultureof a particular
He distinguishes
democratic
societythatarerequired
by liberaldemocratic
principles... and
thoseaspectsof a society'sculturethatreflectitsparticular
history,traditions,
and forms of life but cannotbe construedas ways of instantiatingthe
of liberaldemocracy"
requirements
(p. 23). "Theconstitutional
principles
rootedin a politicalculture"arean expressionof moraluniversalism,
the
substantiveandconcrete,richer"ethical-cultural
formof life as a whole"
refersto theethical-political
discourse.
Themostpromisingapplication
of Habermas's
differentiated
discourse
theory(1992),up till now,canbe foundin his treatment
of citizenshipand
nationalidentity.Aftercriticizingneorepublican
andcommunitarian
conceptions of constitution,politics,andcitizenship,35
he arguesfor a complete
analyticalseparationof "Ethnos"and "Demos":an "unfastening
of the
semanticlinkbetweencitizenshipandnationalidentity"(p. 634)36 andeven
for a relativelyfargoinghistoricaldisconnection.
Withthe FrenchRevolution,he argues,ethniccementwasreplacedby a "democratic
communityof
consent"(p. 636). "Thenationof citizensfindsits identitynot in ethnicculturalcommonalities,"
butin democraticprocedures,
talk,anddecision
making.Historically
his case,he continues:"Heretherepuboverstretching
licancomponentof citizenshipdisengagesitselfcompletelyfromits affiliationto a pre-politicalcommunity(Gemeinschaft)
integratedby descent,
sharedtraditionandcommonlanguage"
(p. 636).37
Whereasin 1983,Walzerseemscompletelycommittedto theconceptual
andhistoricalconnectedness
of citizenshipwithethnicityandnation/state,
his laterpositionbecomesmuchmoresophisticated,
as in his in 199038 and
his 1992articleon civilsociety:"Thefourthanswerto thequestionaboutthe
good life" prefersthe settingof "thenation,withinwhichwe are loyal
members,boundto one anotherby ties of bloodandhistory"(p. 96); its
of membership
"understanding
is ascriptive;
it requiresno politicalchoices
and no activitybeyondritualaffirmation."
In a much more distancing
he sees that"intimeof trouble,it canreadilybe turnedagainst
treatment,
othernations,particularly
againstthe internalothers:minorities,aliens,
strangers.Democraticcitizenship,workersolidarity,free enterpriseand
consumerautonomy-alltheseareless exclusivethannationalism....The
natureof nationalistfervorsignalsthe inadequacy"
(p. 97). In his favorite

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224

POLITICALTHEORY/ May 1995

"pluralist
perspective"
(p.98),thecivilsocietyis a settingof settings,giving
as international
some hope to domesticatenationalism(101), particularly
civil society.
Inweakerversionsof thisdisentanglement,
commonlanguageandhistory
are still acceptedas legitimatecriteria,in strongerversionsthey are not
crucialanymorefor the conceptandpracticeof democraticcitizenship.39
someversionof thedisentanglement
fromascriptive
criteriaand
Historically,
identitieshasbecomea crucialelementin themythandhasbeen,to a lesser
andpracticesof French,American,andSwiss
degree,in the constitutions
republicanism.
As a second,muchmorecontested,step,democratic
citizenshipoughtto
asstatemembership.
bedisentangled
fromcitizenship
someversion
Historically,
is at the rootof all versionsof economic,
of this type of disentanglement
industrial,
orsocial(associational)
democracy
andof all formsof local,town
hall,provincialpoliticaldemocracyas well. In recentpoliticalphilosophy,
theconceptualdisentanglement
is perhapsmostclearlystatedbyHabermas.40
Politicalphilosophy,withtheusualtimelag,reflectspracticalprocesses, forcingus to disconnectdemocraticcitizenshipfromboth"ethnicity/
andfromstatemembership.4"
nationhood"
Thisis quiteobviousin thecase
of European"unification."
At the sametime,this case remindsus of the
enormouspracticaltensionsandcontradictions
thereformulation
of collective political,particularly
national,identitiesbringwiththemin an age of
democraticpluralism,multiculturalism,
andthe formationof
immigration,
inter-"national"
politicalunits.Onlyextremeright-wingneonationalist
and
conservativephilosophyandpoliticscan openlyavoidthis dilemma.The
hiddenneonationalist
ideologyof conservative
partiesandgovernments,
at
leastinEurope,is putundermuchstress,andliberal,democratic,
andsocialist
positionshaveto cometo termswiththesetensions.
4.2 Thickor ThinConceptsof Citizenship?
DifferentCitizenship
Statuses
Theuglyinternalconsequences
of republican
conceptsof citizenshipare
criticizedin anexcellentwaybyBenjamin
Barber(1984,chaps.8 and9) and,
moresuperficially,
by Walzer(1990a,217f;1992,91f, 105ff)andHabermas
(1992, 6580).Strongdemocraticcitizenship,however,does not, unfortunately,excludeillegitimateexternalexclusion,even if it is completely
fromall ethnicornationalcriteriaandidentities.Inthisrespect
disentangled
it is symptomatic
thatbothmodemstatesmentionedby Habermas(1992,
642f) to show the possibilityof this disconnection,
the UnitedStatesand

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Bader/ CITIZENSHIP
ANDEXCLUSION 225

haveexternalpoliciesmarkedbycollectiveegotismandcondiSwitzerland,
Toavoidthismorallyillegitimateexclusion
tionalinclusionor exclusion.42
and to defendstrongerversionsof democracy,one shoulddifferentiate
andpracticallybetweendifferent
levelsof citizenshipandargue
conceptually
for a "legal"and"lowthresholdconcept"of citizenship(Carens1993)with
law andpolicies.The
regardto immigration,
refugee,and naturalization
in Habermas43
indicationsfor such a strategyin Carensand,particularly,
remaintoo vaguein legalandpracticalterms.Theyshouldurgentlybe made
more specific.In a very shortoutlineof such a program,I proposeto
distinguishthefollowinglevelsof discourseandrelatedstatusesof citizenshipandduties:
Discourse

Moral

Citizenship Status
1. Passive status of person

Duties
moral duties

2. Negative status or status libertatis

legal duties

3. Positive status or status civitatis


(Staatsangeh6rgkeit)

status subjectionis

4. Active status or status activus civilis


(aktive Staatsburgerschaft)

legal duties

Political

5. Liberal, republican, or strong political


citizenship

moral and political duties

Ethical

6. Ethnic, cultural, national concepts


of citizenship

ethical duties

Legal

Figure 1.

Citizen-Status or Levels of Citizenship

Ad1. Themoralconceptof anautonomous


individual,
amoralpersonwith
freedomto chooseandresponsibility
forheractions,is thebasisof anylegal
conceptof a personas a bearerof rights,the precondition
of the general
conceptof rightandall specificsubjectiverights,privateorpublic.44
Rights
requirethemoralandlegalrecognition
of individuals
as persons;subjective
publicrightscannotbe separatedfromnaturalpersons(see Jellinek1905,
83f; 1928,418).Thepositionof theindividualwithrespectto thestateis the
basisof thelegalconceptof a "status,"
it is expressedin thisverygeneraland
abstractconcept of a statuspassivus.
Ad 2. The negative status, status libertatis or "Menschenrechtsstatus"

is a bridgebetweenmoralandlegalconcepts.Historically,
(Grawert),
it is the
resultof externalandinternallimitations
of statesovereignty.
Theprotection
of a sphereof individuality
by specificrightsof privacyanddueprocessis

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226

THEORY
/ May1995
POLITICAL

to allhumanbeingsenteringtheterritory
guaranteed
of a state;it is notlimited
to Staatsangehorige.Therefore,it is not called a status civilis but a human

rightsstatus.It applies,or better,shouldapply,equallyto aliens,strangers,


tourists,diplomats,legalor illegalresidents(capitalists,
businessmanagers,
migrantworkers,etc.)as to inbornor naturalized
citizens.
Ad 3. The positive status of citizenship, status civitatis or Staatsange-

horigkeit,usuallycontainstwothings:legalprotectionanddueprocessand
"claimson the administrative
activitiesof the statefor individualinterest"
(Jellinek1928,420) or claimsto publicgoodsandservices(likehousing,
education,healthcare,socialsecurity,andservices),whetheror not articulated constitutionally
as "socialrights."Jellinekhas conceptualized
this
positivestatusas a kindof compensation
forall thesacrificesthestateasks
fromits "subjects."
thesesacrificesformtheirstatussubjectionis:
Together,
theirlegal dutiesto performdirectlyor indirectlyfor the state(obey,pay
taxes,or performpublicwork)and/orto fulfillpublicservices(military,45
social,judicial).Concerning
ourproblem,I'dliketomentiononlytwopoints.
(i) Justlike claimsto legalprotection(includingrightsof privacyanddue
process),claimsto publicsocial insurancesand servicesincreasinglyno
longerdependon statemembership:
"statuspositivus"is not any longer
coextensivewith"statuscivitatis."
As I statedalreadyin section1,legalstate
loses importance
in this regard(see Grawert1984, 184).All
membership
legal residentscan legallyclaimprotectionand services(theypay taxes,
socialsecurity,andold age contributions),
andevenillegalresidentshave
bettermoralclaimsthelongertheystay.(ii)If oneacceptsthatsheerduration
of stay,andwithit growingsocialrelationsandexpectations-irrespective
of the character
(legalor illegal)of the firstentryintoa statewhateverits
or
criterion motivation-isa soundbasisforenhanced
moralandlegalclaims
to citizenship,the crucialissue becomesincreasinglythe legitimacyand
effectivenessof controlof firstentry(seeWalzer1983,34f).Furthermore,
if
oneacceptsthatalldifferent
statuses
of long-term
second-orthird-class
citizenship,"metics,"
"denizens,"
"Gastarbeiter"
aremorallyindefensible,
andthat,
allstatemembers
accordingly,
andatleastalllong-term
residentsshouldhave
activeandpassivedemocratic
politicalrights(see theexcellenttreatment
in
Walzer1993,53ff),thiscrucialrole,forallrestrictive
policies,offirstadmission
decisionsandeffectivebordercontrol,becomeseven moreevident.
Ad 4. The statusactivusincludesall activeandpassivepoliticalrights
(universal,free,equal,secret,directballot,andrightto getelectedin office)
and the freedomsof politicalcommunication.
In most liberal-democratic
theserightsarenotconnectedto a corresponding
constitutions,
legaldutyto

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Bader/ CITIZENSHIPAND EXCLUSION

227

vote, to candidatefor office,or to makeactiveuse of the possibilitiesfor


politicalparticipation,
legallyguaranteed
by thefreedomsof politicalcomIn my view,oneshoulddistinguishsharplybetweena "thin"or
munication.
low thresholdconceptof this legal statusactivuscivilisandthe different
normative
empiricalpracticesand"thicker"
conceptionsof politicalcitizenship(seeAd 5). Legalcitizenshipis nomore,butalsonoless,thanoneof the
it is not meantto guarantee
for activepoliticalparticipation:
prerequisites
andit cannotdo so.Itis a complexof moral,legal,and
politicalparticipation
politicalrights.These rightsare compatiblewith competingmoraland
politicaldutiesandconceptionsof politicsanddemocratic
citizenship,but
theydo not andshouldnotprescribelegalduties.Politicalrightsandfreesharedcivicanddemocratic
domscannotguarantee
a common
commitment,
culture,commonvirtues,and(moralandpolitical)duties.Thisasymmetry
betweenrightsanddutiesis typicalformodernlaw.46
Onepointneedsto be stressedhere.Ofcourse,we expectimmigrants
and
to obey the law andfulfill theirlegal duties
applicantsfor naturalization
entailedin the statussubjectionis.And,of course,we may hope that,in
addition,they morallyacceptandrespectthe law as we hope that"state
members"
do, althoughwe maynothavethemeansto enforceit. Butwe do
notaskfull "nativecitizens"to makeactiveuse of theirrightsto participate
norarewe legallyentitledto askthem.Wedonotandarenotentitledtojudge
whetherthey are "competent
citizens,"as so many"liberal"defendersof
privilegesof wealthandeducationundertheguiseof democracy
havedone.
we are not entitled,eitherlegally or morally,to ask from
Consequently,
immigrants
whatwe do notaskfrom"ourselves."
Ad 5. It is quiteobviousthatthislow thresholdconceptof legalstatus
activusdoes,andis meantto,allowfordifferentempirical
degreesof political
It is alsoobviousthata democratic
participation.
politicalsystemcannotbe
reproduced
orstrengthened
withoutatleastsomeminimum
of activepolitical
of somecitizens.Empirically,
participation
onecanjudgethedegreeof actual
democracyby studyinghow manypeopleparticipate
in publictalk and
decision/action
howoften,in howmanyspheres,andon howmanylevels.47
Thisdegreewill be quitelow in capitalist,sexist,racist,andelitistsocieties.
Normatively, the moral,ethical,and politicaldutiesto participatediffer
significantlyin accordancewith the competingconceptsof democratic
constitutions,politics,and citizenship.These can be grouped,following
Barber,intothreeidealtypes:"liberal,"
"unitary,"
and"strongdemocracy."
A lowthreshold
conceptof legalstatusactivusdoesallowforthecorresponding
andcompetingnormative
conceptions
of politicalcitizenship,
which,forour
purposes,canbe summarized
by reproducing
Barber'stable(1984,219).4"

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228

POLITICALTHEORY/ May 1995

TABLE 1

Forms of Citizenship
Representative
Democracy

Unitary
Democracy

Strong
Democracy

Citizens conceived

legal persons

brothers

neighbors

Bound together by

contract

blood

common participatory activity

Related to
govemment as

sovereign but
also subject

corporate body

active participant

By ties that are

vertical (citizen
to government)

horizontal (citizen
to citizen)

dialectical ("levels"
vanish)

Political style

distrusfful,
passive

self-abnegating,
submissive

cooperative, active

Civic virtue

accountability
(reciprocal
control)

fratemrity
(reciprocal love
and fear)

civility (reciprocal
empathy and
respect)

Status of citizenship
(vis A vis other
social identities

discretionary
(one among
many)

omnicompetent
(the only
permissible one)

sovereign (the first


among equals)

Ideal ground
(actural ground
is territory)

common contract
(generic
consensus)

common beliefs,
valuec, ends,
identity
(substantive
consensus)

common talk,
decision, work
(creative
consensus)

SOURCE:FromBenjaminBarbers StrongDemocracy:Participatory
Politicsfora New
Age. (1984, Figure3, p. 219). Reprnted by pernission fromthe UniversityofCalifomiaPress.

I sharemostof Barber'sarguments
against"thin"49
and"unitary"
democand
in
of
racy
favor theinstitutions,
cultures,virtues,andpracticesof stronger
democracy.
However,it seemsnecessaryto stresstwopoints,bothsignaling
thatmostrecentneorepublican
theorieshavetroubleavoiding"strongdemocracy"to fall backinto "unitarydemocracy."
Theytherebycross,in a
thoughtlessbutsystematicway,thelinebetweenlegitimatemoral,political
duties and legal duties. (i) Internally,this line should function as a legal

safeguardagainstbothtotalitarianism
andtheethicalmonismof republican
versionsof a good life, whichare incompatible
with ethicalpluralismin
modernsocieties.It is truethatsome ingredientsof strongerdemocratic
culture,virtues,habits,andpracticesarerequiredfor the reproduction
of
"thin"democracyandthat,therefore,completestateneutralityis wrong.50
Thestateandotherpublicagentssimplyhaveto optforandrealizepolicies
thatsocialize,educate,andtraininbornandimmigrant
citizensin theneces-

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Bader/ CITIZENSHIP
ANDEXCLUSION 229

saryhabits,customs,andvirtuesof a "minimal
publicorpoliticalmorality."
of liberal-democratic
Withoutsuch,thereproduction
andpublic
institutions
politicalculturewouldbe seriouslyundermined,
andwithit thesafeguards
of preciselythatethicalpluralism.
Defendinga minimalthreshold
conceptof
statusactivusthusdoesnotpreventonefromdefendingandarguingformuch
"thicker"
education.
conceptionsof politicalcitizenshipandof democratic
It
onlypreventsonefromdoingso in anilliberalway.
(ii) Externally,thickrepublicanconceptionsof citizenshipnecessarily
workand are meantto workin favorof highlyrestrictiveimmigration,
asylum,andnaturalization
policieswheneverthelineis crossedthatseparates
theethical,moral,andpoliticalduties,anddemocratic
virtuesthatarepraised
in all citizensfromlegaldutiesandcriteriaof entry.5"
Ad6. Inmost(neo)republican
theories,strong-democratic
politicalconceptionsof citizenship
areintimately
tiedup withethico-political
for
arguments
ethnic,cultural,or nationalconceptions
of citizenship
andthe corresponding
ethicaldutiesandvirtues.Most"civil"religionsareinfactethnicist,
denominaornationalist.
tionalist,
culturalistic,
This,again,demonstrates
howdifficultit is
to distinguishbetweendifferentversionsof democratic
politicalcultureand
virtuesthatare,inprinciple,
universalist
andparticularist
ethicalconceptions.52
hereI canonlystatethattheseconceptual
Unfortunately,
distinctions
open
up a promisingandnew strategyin normativetheorizing,allowingone to
combinetheadvantages
of minimal,neutral,orso-calledliberalconceptions
of politicsand citizenship(usingtheircriticalpoweragainstillegitimate
exclusion)with thoseof conceptionsandtheoriesof strongerdemocratic
politicsand citizenship,necessaryfor the continuityandreproduction
of
"liberal"
democracy.
Suchan argument
is confronted
by two serioustheoretical
andpractical
Howis itpossibletodistinguish
problems:
thehardcoreof universalist
liberal
anddemocraticpoliticalculturefromparticularist
ethnic-cultural
formsin
whichit is inevitablyembedded?
Howis oneto overcomethe"impotence
of
the ethical,"the weak motivationalforce of universalistmoraltalk and
minimalthresholdconceptsof politicsandcitizenship?Thesearethehard
questions"communitarian"
criticismposestouniversalist
"liberal"
defenders
of humanrights,democracy,
andtheruleof law.
4.3 WhatIs the Hard Core of LiberalDemocratic Culture?

Even analyticallyandtheoretically,
the proposeddistinctionbetweena
liberal, democraticpublic or political cultureand "ethical-culturalforms of

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230

POLITICALTHEORY/ May 1995

life" is not withoutproblems.A complexnormativetheoryof democracy


shoulddistinguishand discuss the interrelations
betweenthe following
levels:democratic
anddemoprinciples,
institutions,
cultures-habits-virtues,
craticjudgmentandaction(see Bader1990).Now it is an old republican
wisdomthatdemocratic
cannotbe maintained
principlesandinstitutions
or
withoutdemocratic
cultureandthatthereexistsa "dialectic"
strengthened
betweencultureandhabitsas well as betweenvirtuesandjudgment."3
Is it
possibleto spelloutthehard,universalist
coreof this"civic"culture,which,
canonly be foundembeddedin rivalingandchangingparticuhistorically,
laristformsof ethnic,religious,nationalcultures?Or,to statetheproblem
moregenerallyandsystematically:
(how)canone identifythe hardcoreof
liberalanddemocratic
principles,institutions,
cultures,habits,virtues,and
practicesif one recognizes(i) thatthey all aredevelopedin particularist,
historically,and sociallysituatedcultures;(ii) thatthey themselveshave
andcontinuetodoso;and(iii)thattheirarticulation
changedhistorically
and
is alwayscontested.I mustconfinemyselfto threeremarks
interpretation
usingdemocracyas anexample.
1.Democratic
principles(autonomy,
politicallibertyandequality,participation)do notfallfromheaven,noraretheyinscribedin natureorlanguage.
They are articulatedin specific(e.g., western,modern,capitalist,racist,
sexist)societies,periods,andpoliticalunits.Theirarticulation
haschanged
considerablyduringthe last threecenturies(e.g., throughthe strugglesfor a
truly universal understandingand codification of the right to vote). Their

interpretation
hasalwaysbeen,andstillis, contested:a shortlook in books
in politicalphilosophymakesthisevident.Thereis notevenconsensuson
whatthe basicprinciplesare,whetherthereis one or many.If many,how
many? How do they relateto each other?This means, however, at best that

theyshouldnotbe identifiedwithspecificinterpretations
andrecentcodifications.Theprocessof theirunderstanding
andarticulation
is open-ended,
butsuchthatitshowsacleardirectiontowarduniversalist
inclusion.Itmeans,
second,thatthey can alwaysbe challenged.A fundamental
disagreement
even on principlesis possible andis protectedby somethinglike a metanorm

of "consensusto dissent,""agreement
to disagree."Third,it meansthatthe
processof theirchangingarticulations
cannotbe steeredcompletelyby
propositionally
articulated
principles.
Itassumessomethinglikea metalegal,
metaconstitutionalbasic commitmentor democratichabitbeyond construc-

tivistrationalism.
Thismustbe embeddedin the evolutionof culture54
and
cannotbecontrolled
byReasonwithacapitalR.Finally,forallthishistorical,
social, cultural, or hermeneuticboundedness, there still is no cause for

historicismor socialandculturalrelativism.Manycommunitarian
andhermeneuticphilosophers
orculturalanthropologists
thinkit is thefinalblowto

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Bader/ CITIZENSHIP
ANDEXCLUSION 231

It isn't.It is onlythestartingpointof all


anykindof universalist
argument.
interestingdiscussions.Weareableto translate,
to learn,to compare,andto
detectdirectionin thesechanges,to engagein "reiterative"
or "relational"
universalist
projects.55
of principlesare
2. It is quite easy to show that our interpretations
ourcultures,and
informed,sometimesevendetermined
by ourinstitutions,
ourpractices.Andthisis thebasicargument
discourses
in normative
against
theorythatrestrictthemselvesto thislevel of principles(see Unger1983,
institutions
wonbyanalytical
99-102).Thecriticaldistancetowardparticular
abstraction
alsoworksin theotherdirection.It opensways
andcomparative
to thinkaboutalternative
institutional
translations
of democratic
principles
andallowsfor a thoroughgoing
of a
critiqueof the common"deduction"
presentconstitutional
design(e.g.,representative
politicalparty-democracy)
in a particular
historicaltradition.
Democratic
principlesallowfordifferent
institutional
in differentcontexts.56
designs(e.g.,directvs. representative)
3. The morespecificandmorecontext-dependent
the level, the more
difficultis theprocessof abstraction
in searchforthecommoncoreof liberal
democracy.Yetit shouldbe possibleto spell out whatliberaldemocratic
culture,habits,andvirtues,apartfromallparticularist
variations,
minimally
mean.Whatdo we referto whenwe speakof a liberalanddemocratic
public
orpoliticalculture?
Whataredemocratic
cultures,whatarerepublican
virtues
of citizenshipapartfromtheirFrench,American,Genevancoinage?These
againarehardquestions.57I confinemyselfto two verygeneralremarks.
(i) Evenif one stressesthatradicaldemocracyis anopen-ended
project,
directedmainlytowardpresentandfuturepublictalkandactionratherthan
towardsomeimaginedor realpast, it stillmustbe rootedin somecommon
democratic
andliberalpracticesof thepastto forma tradition
atall, to show
relativelystablehabits,to developrecognizable
virtues.Cultures,
habits,and
virtuesneedtimeto growanddevelop(see Bader1991a,98ff).Democracy
andtolerationmustbe learnedandpracticedthroughlongerperiodsof time
to strikerootsin thecharacter
of persons,theirjudgments,andactions.Even
Habermas-whootherwiseseriouslyunderestimates,
bothempiricallyand
"tradition"
in modernity-putshis trustin andbuildsupona
theoretically,
populace(Bevdlkerung)
habituated
to politicalfreedom,accustomedto the
We-perspectiveof thepracticeof self-determination
(1992,642). Herewe
are confronted,theoreticallyand practically,with anotherhardparadox.
Universalistprinciplesand institutionsof democracyask for democratic
cultures,habits,andvirtuesthatcannotbe thoughtwithouttheirownhistory
andtradition;
yet, atthesametime,thisreferenceto particular
historiescan
be used,andis used,as a criterionof exclusion.Thisparadoxmaywell be
thebestandmostlegitimateargument,
froma democratic
pointof view,in a

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232

POLITICAL
THEORY
/ May1995

defenseof politicsof fairlyclosedborders.It lies at theheartof thetension


betweendemocracyandjustice,evenin theoriesthattryto interpret
democas possible.Of courseno easysolutionmaybe
racyin termsas universalist
expected,butall democratsshouldthinkveryhardto showpracticalways
outof thisdilemma.58
of thosetraditions:
(ii) Everything
depends,therefore,on a specification
which traditions?They must,of course,be liberaland democraticto a
considerabledegree.Even if it turnedout to be quitedifficult,it is not
impossibleto disentangledemocratic
politicalcultureandcitizenshipfrom
too narrowlinks with particularethnic,nationalhistories.The familiar
distinctionbetweenpraiseworthy
patriotismandnastynationalismtriesto
articulate
a soft versionof thisdisentanglement."9
4.4 "Weaknessof Morality"?

Thedefenseof low thresholdconceptsof citizenshipandof the disconnectionof democraticpoliticalcitizenshipfrom all ascriptivetraditions,


loyalties,allegiances,commitments,
collectiveidentities,andparticularly
fromnationalcultures,is confronted
withatleastfourseriousproblems.
1. Is it possibleto havestrongcommitments
basedon universalist
princiBarberandmanyothershaveconvincingly
ples?Benjamin
demonstrated
that
the reproduction
of "thin"democracyitselfrequiresat leastsomestronger
democraticpoliticalcommitments.6'
Is it possibleempiricallyto develop
these strongercommitments
in a universalistmannerwithoutthe familiar
connotations
of nationalism,
chauvinism,
jingoism;to havea "constitutional
withoutall traditional
patriotism"
connotationsof "patria"?
How far can
liberal-democratic
conceptsof constitution,
legal andpoliticalcitizenship,
politicalcommunityandidentity,withouta considerable
loss in motivating
force,betornaway,abstracted,
cleanedfrom-realorimagineddisentangled,
commondescent,heredity,history,religion,ethnicity,andnationhood,
and
be basedonlyon language?Is it evenpossibleto do withoutone dominant
commonlanguage?
Canwe notonlyimaginebutrealizeapolitical"community"withouta particularist
historyandculture?6'
Is it possibleto break
with the superposition
fundamentally
of culture-nation-state-citizenship?
all knownformsof "liberal-democratic"
Historically,
or "republican
universalism"uptill nowarebadlydisguisedversionsof chauvinism.
Thereis still
a longwayto go in thehistoricalprocessof universalization,
nowunderway
formorethanthreecenturies,butwhichmightultimatelylead-in a future
hopefullynot too distant-from universalistdeclarationsand claims to
universalist
practices.If thiswereto bepossible,asI believeit is, wouldsuch

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Bader/ CITIZENSHIPAND EXCLUSION

233

a politicalidentityhaveenoughpractical,motivatingforceto combatand
overcomethe "strong"identificationsalong ethnic,cultural,nationalist,
statistlines?Orto be moreprecise:wouldit be strongenoughto tackleall
versionsof conservative
premodern
as well as thereaccommunitarianism,
tionaryappealto ethnic,racist,nationalist"communities,"
so successful
intheformerSovietUnion,butalsoinmany"respecttodayinex-Jugoslavia,
able"statesin WesternEurope?Andwouldit be strongenoughto copewith
and"democratic-communitarian"
theneorepublican
appealforfairlyclosed
borders?
2. How may one deal with the "impotenceof morality"in normative
theory?Intermsof recentnormative
themost
theory,thisproblemis probably
problematicconsequenceof the analyticalseparationfrom moralityand
Sittlichkeit.
Habermas,
again,clearlyrecognizesthisproblem.Themotivationaldeficitof procedural,
communicative
reasonis a resultof thefactthat
thisreasoncanonlypresentthe"weakforceof rationalmotivation."
"Anyway,it cannotguarantee
the transmission
of insightsin motivatedaction"
(1992, 19). This is the core problemthatHabermasshareswith Kant's
autonomous
moralwill (seeHabermas
1992,145,202),withRawls'stheory
of justice,whichlooksfor"themotivational
thrustof a convivial(entgegenkommend)politicalculture"(86), and with Dworkin'sattemptto embed
principlesof law intoa liberalethics(p. 87).
The action-relevanceof such a moralitythat has been absorbedback into the cultural
system remainslatentas long as it is not actualizedby motivatedactorsthemselves.They
must be in a disposition to act conscientiously.RationalMoralitythus depends upon
convivial socializing processes. These should producecorrespondinginstancesof conscientiality, that is to say correspondingformationsof the superego. Although the
motivatingforces of the good reasons of such a moralityare weak it becomes stronger
only to the degree thatmoralprinciplesare intemalizedand anchoredin the personality
system. (Habermas1992, 145f)

Thisskepticismwithregardtothemotivational
forceof universal,"moralpoint-of-view"
arguments
wasoneof themainreasonsforthestrongparticularist bias in Walzer'sSpheres.Interestinglyenough,Walzerhimselfis
immediately
confronted
withthesameproblemas soonas he triesto tackle
the nastyinternalandexternalconsequences
of "thenation,"whichaskfor
a domestication
by civil society.He feels somewhatuneasywiththe civil
societyargument:
It cannotbe said thatnothingis lost when we give up the singlemindednessof democratic
citizenship or socialist cooperationor individualautonomyor nationalidentity.There
was a kind of heroism in those projects-a concentrationof energy, a clear sense of

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234

THEORY
/ May1995
POLITICAL

of friendsandenemies.Tomakeoneof themone's
direction,anunblinldng
recognition
ownwasa seriouscommitment.
(1992,105)

loss of commitment
is particularly
seriousin comAndthisthreatening
identifications.
Both
parisonwith the very strongnationalist/ethnic/racist
positions,universalistdemocraticdiscoursetheoryandcivic pluralismin
asBrianBarrycalledit,havetotacklethesame
"national
populardiscourse,"
problem.Theydo so startingfromdifferentangles,but,as faras I cansee,
theydo notdiffermuchin topicsandpolicies.
Thetask
3. Howtodeveloployaltyto universalist
democracy
practically?
withcivility
is threefold:(i) to socializepeoplein a waythatthey"identify"
andculture;(ii) to educate
andliberal-democratic
principles,constitutions,
to
themeffectivelyin a democratic
manner;62
(iii) createinstitutional
opporanddemocracy
in allspheresof life,notonly
toleration
tunitiesforpracticing
All "liberal"
democratscan only hopethatthis is not only
in "politics."63
possible,buteffectivelydone,andwe should,as politicaltheorists,not be
thatit shouldbe donebutworkout moredetailed
contentwithreiterating
andpracticalproposals.
institutional
4. Whichpublicshouldone talk to? The preferreddiscoursesdiffer:
discourseversus"national-popular
universalistmoral-political
discourse."
But again,in the end,the differenceis not as greatas one mightexpect:(i)
Onemustwriteforor speakto a public.Buttherearenumerous
publicsand
arenasof publicity.Mostwriteforan(international)
academicpublicas well
as fora broader(mostlynational)publicof citizens.Walzerdoesit in a style
andrhetoricthatonlyslightlydiffersfromonegrouptotheother.Habermas's
style andrhetoricin his academictextsis verydifferentfromthosein his
broaderpublicinterventions.
He, rightly,thinksthatthereis a necessary
divisionof discoursesandworkandthattheoreticalandpoliticalprojects
botharecooperativeendeavors.
Walzerseemsto be reluctant
in thisregard,
showingat least someremnantsof the integratedtheoreticalandpolitical
"onemanshow,"so characteristic
of theforerunners
he admires,theHebraic
prophets.(ii)Bothmustkeepin touchwithspecificpublics;interestingly,
the
of
Walzer's
discourse
is
public
national-popular
increasingly
aninternational
stillmostlyacademic.If I understand
one,althoughunfortunately
his articles
from1989oncorrectly,
the"nation"
becomesa progressively
moreproblematicpublic.If therestill doesnotexista globalpublicof citizens,thisdoes
not meanthatone shouldnot contribute
to creatingone (as Chomskyand
otherswishto do). (iii) Whatto tell thepublic?Oneshouldavoidnotonly
the dangerof speakingto a globalpublicthatdoes notyet exist or cannot
understand
butalsothedangerof tellingthelocalpublicwhatit wantstohear.
In mostquestions,Walzer-againlikehis belovedprophets-clearlycount-

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ANDEXCLUSION 235
Bader/ CITIZENSHIP

ersthisdanger.Withregardto citizenshipasexclusion,histalkunfortunately
I believethatbothhopethatsomethinglike
is moredubious.Nevertheless,
civil societyis actuallydeveloping,withglobalor at least
an international
organizations
nongovernmental
arenas,publics,socialmovements,
interstate
organizations.
(NGOs),anda varietyof officialinternational
4.5 RadicalDemocraticCommunitarians
As NewConservatives?
andNeorepublicans
democracy-Isee myselfas one
Politicaltheoristsof radical,universalist
andpractroublefindingconvincingtheoretical
of them-have considerable
tical answersto the problemsthatI dealtwithin the precedingtwo parado havereallyhard
andneorepublicans
communitarians
graphs.Democratic
times in combiningjustice and democracywithoutmorallyillegitimate
exclusionaryconsequences.All "good"reasonsfor strongerversionsof
all reasonsfor solvingin a radicaldemocratic
way
democracy,
particularly
century,namely,the
the two mostparamount
problemsof the twenty-first
andmigrainequalities
ecologicalproblemandtheproblemof international
intojustas many"bad"reasonsforexclusion.This
tion,canbe transformed
will happenif it provesto be impossibleto elaborateconceptsandpractices
in sucha wayas to preventoratleastseverelyhinder
of strongerdemocracy
devices.Otherwise,boththeorieswouldjust add
theiruse as exclusionary
treeof exclusionary
ideology:besidesthe
anotherbranchto thefast-growing
ideologies,one is increasingly
all too familiarracistand neonationalist
andneorepublican
versionsof
confronted
withnewliberal,communitarian,
wouldturn
Radicalandprogressive
democrats
fundamentalism."'4
"cultural
intodefendersof morallyillegitimateprivilegesin a
out to be transformed
similarway as liberaldefendersof privilegesof wealthandeducationin the
againstthetrendtoward
nineteenth
centuryarguedandactedasconservatives
inclusion.
internallyuniversalist

Notes
1. See Bader and Benschop (1989, chap. 8, 4.4), for the cross-cutting and analogous
development of "absolute private property."Pogge's (1992) treatmentis much too vague,
analyticallyas well as historically.See the classical historicalstudiesof v. Gierke,Kern,Hintze,
Max Weber,Elias, Tilly,andmanyothers.See the shortandexcellenttreatmentin Ruggie (1993).
2. The increasingfactuallimitationis a consequenceof growing internationalinterdependencies in economic (capitalistworldeconomy,InternationalMonetaryFund[IMF],Worldbank,

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236

POLITICALTHEORY/ May 1995

etc.), political (alliances, etc.), ecological, and cultural perspective. The increasing moral
limitationis due to the impactof humanrightsdiscourses,internationalsocial movements,and
nongovernmentalorganizations(NGOs; like Amnesty International).See for the latteraspect:
Habermas(1992, 659f) andWalzer(1992a, 1993, 53).
3. See Walzer(1983) ("metics"),Heater(1990), Brubaker(1992), Tassin (1992), Meehan
(1993), Muus (1993) for excellent treatmentsof second-classcitizenship.See v. Dijk (1992) for
an excellent treatmentof the so-called Schengenparadox:free movementwithinthe EU. On the
other hand, states are requiredto lead policies to make "people stay where they are" and to
radicallyclose the EuropeanFortressexternally.
4. See the relation of "Citizenshipof the Union" and Danish citizenship in the Danish
Declarationin EdinboroughDecember 11-12, 1992 (quotedin Lange 1993).
5. See for sovereignty:Ruggie (1993). His treatmentis very similarto my protheoretical
strategyof disaggregation,elaboratedin Bader(1989, 1991). This strategyopens up promising
perspectivesfor normativetheoryandpolitical philosophyas well. See Kymlickaand Norman
(1994, 309f) andParekh(1990, 702).
6. It is a clear symptomthatthe exclusionaryeffects of citizenshipare completely lacking
in two recent readers:Gemeinschaftund Gerechtigkeit(Brumlikand Brunkhorst,eds., 1993;
exception:Wellmer)andAuf der Suchenach der gerechtenGesellschaft(Frankenberg1993) in
which many different"third"positionsaregatheredbetween"liberalism"and "communitarianism." In KymlickaandNorman(1994) they are,explicitlybut not surprisingly,excluded.In this
article, I exclude so-called differentialistor postmodernattemptsto deal with the problem
because they have still not overcome their fundamentalstrangenessto ethics and political
philosophy, particularlytheir really terriblelack of institutionalconcreteness (see the more
interesting versions of Connolly 1991; Young 1990; Benhabib 1993; in some respect also
Brunkhorst1994).
7. Only very recentlyone finds a growingamountof studies on these topics (Singer 1972;
Barry 1973, chap. 12; 1989, chap. 12 and 16; Beitz 1979;Beitz, Cohen,Scanlon, andSimmons
1985; Dowty 1987; Shue 1988; Veldhuis1990; Shklar1991; Barryand Goodin 1992). My own
sketch (for a more extendedversion, see Bader 1993b) is very much informedby the writings
of Joe Carensand Goodin.
8. See Waldron(1987); Bader(1990).
9. See Carens (1992) and Dummett(1992) along those lines. Both strategiesencounter
serious internalconsistency problemsand externalcriticism(see the commentariesby Woodward [1992] and Finnis and the illuminatingcomparisonof alternativeperspectivesby Terry
Nardin [1992]). Without being able to show this here, argumentsfrom justice seem more
promisingto me. FrankCunninghamhas rightly criticizedmy essay for not giving reasons in
this respect.
10. Suggestionmade by Robertv.d. Veen.
11. This is as seriousan omissionin the sketchof my argumentas the fact thatI have to leave
out the questionof how andby whomjustice will be democraticallyimplemented(bothMichael
Walzer and Frank Cunninghamdid remind me in their comments of the seriousness of this
omission).
12. See Goodin (1992, 8f) for the logic of this indirectmoralargument.
13. See Raz (1975), Habermas(1991, 1992). A note on terminologyseems urgenthere:the
distinctionbetween "morality"and "ethics"follows Habermas'sterminology."Ethics"refersto
Sittlichkeitandcouldperhapsbetterbe translatedwith "ethos."The Hegeliandistinctionbetween
"Moral"(Kant) and "Sittlichkeit"(Aristotle) shows analogies but is not identical with the
distinctionbetween the "right"andthe "good"in the Rawlsiantradition.

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Bader/ CITIZENSHIPAND EXCLUSION

237

14. Realist arguments,if applied against open borderpolicies, strengthenthe urgency of


internationalredistribution.If appliedagainstboth options (as usual), they are outrightconservative in theirconsequences.
15. "Only the world is a self-containeddistributiveworld" (Walzer 1983, 28), "the only
plausiblealternativeis humanityitself.... entireglobe" (p. 29): a Rawlsian"idealcontractualism" or Habermas's"undistortedcommunication"may be the only viable options. See Brumlik
and Brunkhorst(1993, 13).
liberals"like Selznick,Etzioni(1989), Unger,and,more
16. If one sets aside "communitarian
outspoken"liberal,"Gutmanand Kymlicka.
17. And thatis even truefor Kymlicka(1989b, 178, 199, 201f).
18. See for a critique:Bader(199la, chap.Artikulation),excellent:J. Scott(1985), Anderson
(1993, 104ff). Walzerhimself recognized ("second qualification"in a lecture in Amsterdam,
October26, 1993) thathe should have seriouslybetterqualifiedhis talk about"sharedvalues"
and "sharedmeaning"in "Spheres."
19. See Bader and Benschop (1989, 234). Unfortunately,"common history-Established/Outsiders-historistic ideologies"are not analyticallyisolatedand separatelydealt with.
They should thereforebe added(afterterritorialcharacteristics).
20. See Bader (1991a) chap. 3 on Collective Identity.See excellent historicalexamples in
Brubaker(1992); Anderson(1983).
21. See Walzer(1983, 28f, 52) ("nationalclub is differentfromthe state").See a bit clearer
in his "Comment"(Walzer1992c) on Taylor,wherehe distinguishes"liberalnationstates"like
Norway,France,and the Netherlandsfrom"immigrantsocieties like the UnitedStates"(p. 101).
But even this distinctiondoes, unwillingly,reproducetheideology of theethnicallyandculturally
homogeneous "nationstates"(ask the Bretons,the Occitantiens,the Fries). A really homogeneous "nation-state"is a theoreticalfiction,not a historicalreality,even afterso many centuries
of unifyinganddisciplinarystatepolicies. Empirically,the realinterestingquestionsconcern,as
always, the differentdegrees of homogeneityor heterogeneity.See for a critiqueof this "ideal
fit of states in culturaltraditions":Kymlicka (1989b); v.d. Berg (1993) "B Presumptionof
Nation-States."
22. See Walzer(1983, 42) "Perhapsthe borderof the political community[sic] was drawn
years ago so as to leave theirvillages andtowns on the wrongside";states "arealso the political
expression of a common life and (most often) of a national'family' "; (63) "If the community
[sic] is so radically divided that a single citizenshipis impossible, then its territorymust be
divided,too." If Walzerwouldtakethis crypto-normativist
maximseriously,it would mean that
most recent states shouldradicallybe brokenup into smaller"quasi-homogeneous"communities: see below (vs. global stateandstate-lessworld).If "thesharingtakesplace in smallerunits"
(p. 29), why not adjustthe "politicalunits"?That the "adjustmentmust itself be worked out
politically"and that one has to "appealto commonmeanings"is not only no argumentin favor
of the state as the appropriateunit, but it outrightcontradictsit.
23. See Walzer(1992b, 164f, 168) withmorestresson the social constructionof communities.
24. One can find that too, for instance,in texts of Kymlicka (1989b, 135, 178, 199, 201f)
andCarens.See for critique:Habermas(1992, 166);Bader,Berger,GanlBmann,
and Knesebeck
(1976, 356ff)
25. See Bourdieu(1979). But from the very general argumentof some necessary relation
between "identity,""group,""boundaries,"and "closure,"no specific argumentin favor of the
"state"can be drawn.Normativelyspeaking,it may be legitimatefor co-owners of apartment
houses andforworkercooperativesto applystronglyselectiveadmissionpolicies (bothexamples
fromWalzer'sreply to my critiquein Amsterdam,October1993) becausethe excludedcan find

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238

POLITICALTHEORY/ May 1995

their way somewhereelse, but even this example shows the limits: morallyillegitimatecriteria
of exclusion on one hand,exclusion withoutalternativeson the other.The analogywiththe state
is frivolous for two reasons:(i) so long as statemembershipis such an importantasset in many
respects (includinghousing, work, etc.), it should not be simply comparedto membershipin
"neighborhoodsand clubs";(ii) if all states apply the same exclusionarypolicy (see Carens's
critique of the legitimacy of the state system and the asymmetryof "exit" and "entry";see
Brubaker1992).
26. See Kymlicka(1990, chap.9) for consequencesin the normativedebateaboutpluralism
and state neutrality.See also Carens(1990); see analytically:Baderand Benschop (1989, IV, ?
4.6.3 "Selective association"vs. ? 4.6.4 "Patronage."
27. See E. Weber,Elias, Foucault,E. P. Thompson,AnthonySmith,B. Anderson,Brubaker,
Hobsbawm,and many others.
28. See Kymlicka(1989b) for nativeIndiansin Canadaand the UnitedStates.
29. See Ruggie(1993, 174);Pogge (1992) for a critiqueof this "idealfit of institutionswithin
territorialstates."This "presumptionof State of Spheres"(Berg 1993) and the corresponding
statementof statesovereigntyis muchqualifiedin laterwritingsof Walzer(see 1993, 54). Pogge
(1992, 61ff) discusses four main reasons for a vertical dispersalof sovereignty in his "multilayeredscheme":peace/security,reducingoppression,global economicjustice, and ecology.
30. This "voluntaristrhetoricof exclusion"is quite commonlanguagein right-wingparties
(see for France:Brubaker1992, 157).
31. Achterberg(1994).
32. See (Barber 1984; Unger 1987 II; Walzer 1989; Hirst 1994; Cohen and Rogers 1992;
Held 1992; Brunkhorst1994). For an excellent treatmentof the historicaltraditionsof the "two
conceptionsof citizenship"andthe respectivelegitimationsof exclusion, see Schuckand Smith
(1985).
33. See (Gutman1985;Greschner1989;Kymlicka1988, 1989, 1990;Selznick 1992;Etzioni
1988).
34. See Barber(1984) (very little on parochialism,nothingon exclusion);Greschner(1989,
140); (Hirst1994) is muchmoreawareof the problem.In his laterwritings,Walzermoreclearly
distinguishesbetween "nasty"and"noblenationalism"(1989, 1990) andtriesto discuss nations
in different historical contexts of dominance (1992a, 164, 166, 169f): historical forms of
nationalismandthe consequencesfor the "manyconceivablearrangementsbetweendominance
and detribalizationand dominanceand separation";see also his defense of moral minimalism
as a standardfor dealing with "tribalzealots." Of course there is some hope that internal
democraticorganizationat least helps to temperexternaloppression,exploitation,andexclusion
(see Cunningham1991, 317, who is more friendlyto the communitarianposition than I) for a
restatementof FriedrichEngels's hope in this respect, which has a hardtime with Athenian,
Venetian,Dutch,Americanimperialism,andSwiss xenophobia.See also Macedo's(1991, 279)
questionablestatementthat "no two liberalregimes have ever gone to war with one another."
Unfortunately,thereis, in my mind, more reasonfor skepticism.
35. See Habermas(1992, 333-48): Discourse theory "breakswith an ethical conceptionof
civic autonomy,"which "drawsits legitimatingpowerfromthe convergenceof familiarethical
convictions," and presupposesan ascriptivemembershipin an intersubjectivelife-form and
coherenceof tradition,a "commonlife," a "commonpast,"anda substantialconceptof a people
(Volksbegriff), which apprehendsthe constitutionas a "civic" or "nationalreligion," which
"understandsStaatsburgerschaftor citizenship not legally but ethically, and which favors
(austragt)a dominantethicalmeaningin politicsandpoliticaldiscourse."Accordinglythis does
not make sharpenough the "actualdifferencebetweenpolitics andethics"(p. 346).

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Bader/ CITIZENSHIPAND EXCLUSION

239

36. See Habermas(1992,637) "Conceptually,citizenshipand nationalidentitywere always


already independent."Historically,to the contrary,ethnic and civic aspects have always been
combined,in one way or the other,in nations(see Smith 1989, 348f).
37. See muchmorecritically:Brubaker(1992). See for some consequencesof the republican
French traditionof "citoyennete,"which-officially-does not pay any respect to ascriptive
criteria, for immigrationand naturalizationpolicies and traditions(political integration)in
comparisonwiththe British"race"-basedmodelof multiculturalismand"incorporation":
Verena
Stolcke (1993).
38. "I do not wantto suggest too stronga link betweennationand community.Communities
can take otherforms.... Reiterativeuniversalismoffers a way of understandingandjustifying
those boundaries.There is no sure way, given the circumstancesof nationallife, to get them
right.Nor is it any partof my argumentthatthese boundariesshouldalwaysbe stateboundaries"
(Walzer1990a, 554f).
39. With respect to language, Habermas'streatmentremains inconsistent:sometimes he
seems to accept linguistic bonds as essential: "Inthe last analysis, what brings togetherlegal
associates in a lawful communityis the tie of language, of people communicatingtogether"
(1992, 372, interestinglyenough with reference to Walzer's "FourMobilities" [1990, 13f]).
Whereasat other places, common languageis treatedas an ascriptivecriterion(see Habermas
1992, 636, 642), which is more in line with the realityof bi- or multilingualstateslike Canada,
Switzerland,and, more recently,South Africa. Carensis defendingthe claim thatin Quebec, in
a contextof powerasymmetries,languageis a legitimatecriterionin immigrationpolicies (1993,
10), but he carefullycriticizes "thick"theoriesof languageacquisition(33f) to preventfurthergoing claims of cultural adaptationto which Charles Taylor has drawn much attention.V.
Gunsteren(1988) unproblematicallyaccepts history as a relevantcriterion,whereas Choenni,
following Baubock,signalizesillegitimateexclusionaryeffects (1992,67,71,74) of conceptions
of citizenshipstartingfrom "predefinedpoliticalcommunityand assumesthatcitizenshipis the
cementof its cohesion."See below (section4.3) fora moresystematicstatementof this problem.
40. If one understandsdemocracypolitically,not "ethically,"and if one shifts the balancein
the democraticprinciplefromthe still,in some way,particularist
RechtsformtowardMoralprinzip,
the result is a universalistconceptionof democraticcitizenshipthat leaves completelyopen the
questionof politicallevels or units."However,thisunmistakableidentity[i.e., an associationbound
togetherby law with specific formsof life andtraditions- V.B.] does not identifyit as a political
communityof citizens.On the contrary,generalprinciplesofjustice holdsway overthe democratic
process, principles which are equally constitutivefor each polity (Burgerschaft)"(Habermas
1992, 372). In Habermas'sversion of the democraticprinciple,the universalistprinciple of
moralityis strongerthanthe lawful form (Rechtsform)of the particularlawful communitywith
which it is combined. State citizenship and world citizenship form a continuum,which can
already be recognized in its outlines (das sich immerhinschon im Umrissen abzeichnet).
Democratic citizenship (in the universal sense of Burgerschaftnot Staatsburger)showing a
tendency toward a global citizenship status, becomes historically disconnected from state
membership and linked with membershipin the "republicof republics"in the Kantian or
Habermasianversion: der Republikder Weltburger.The political discourse, consequently,is
supposedto show a significantshift from"ethical-political"toward"moral-politicaldiscourse."
41. Carens(1993, 37ff) for Quebec.
42. See forthe UnitedStates:Korver(1990, chap.5); see the shortreviewof U.S. immigration
law in historicalperspective:Elster(1992, 57-61). See for Switzerland:Anderson(1983, 123-7).
43. Following an old legal distinctionbetween different"statuses"of citizenship,Habermas
(1992, 638ff) distinguishesbetween "Staatsangehorigkeit"
and "Staatsburgerschaft,"
or, tradi-

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240

POLITICALTHEORY/ May 1995

tionally,between statuspositivus civilis and status activus. Unfortunately,the consequences of


this distinction for our problem are not elaboratedin detail. Habermasis content with two
remarks:(i) the conventionalascriptiveindices of residenceandbirth(ius soli and ius sanguinis)
establish no irrevocablesubmissionto the sovereignpower,they are much more only "adminof civil status.But he correctlyindicatesthat"thedecoupling
istrativecriteriafor the attribution"
of the normativemeaningof civil statusfrom the ascriptiveindices of descenthas certainlynot
been completely carried out." Normatively,he argues for a very "liberal"and permissive
immigrationpolicy withoutany furtherspecification(635f). (ii) He distinguishesbetween legal
political rights, which are includedin the status activus on the one hand, and more extensive
"republican"political or moral duties of a "civic praxis,to which no one can be compelledby
legal norms.""A legally enforcedobligationto observe democraticrightshas somethingof the
totalitarian.... For good reasons,modernobligatoryright(Zwangsrecht)is not concernedwith
motives and disposition."Republicanpracticesand virtues depend "properlyon uncompelled
motives andopinionsof a citizenryorientedto the commongood"(Habermas1992,641). Again,
the consequences for our problemremain very much implicit and would roughly mean that
republicandemocraticculture,virtues, and practicescannotbe used in any way as criteriaof
exclusion, because they cannot even legally be asked from state members. In my sketch, I
elaboratethe multilayeredconceptof citizenshipstatusesof GeorgJellinek(1905, 1928) without
statingthatthese differentstatusesshouldbe integratedin some harmonistic,holistic concept of
citizenship. I hope that it is unnecessaryto mentionthat I do not follow Jellinek's more than
dubioustheoryof democracy(see de Lange 1993).
44. Still excellent: Jellinek(1905, 83f) See, for one of the manyrecentversions of the same
argument,Dworkin(1977).
45. See Brubaker(1992) for the importancein republicanpolitical discourseon citizenship
law and naturalizationin France.
46. From Kant onward:foro internoversusforo externo;see Walzer(1990a, 216); status
activus and "whatlies beyond."
47. See Cunningham(1987) for those criteriaand the crucialquestionof degrees. Empirically, there can be found huge differencesbetween democraticpolitical systems (see v. Beyme
and many others). Normatively,the scale runs from defendersof restrictiveelite versions of
representativepolitical democracy(from Schumpeterto Huntington)to extensive versions of
participatorysocial and politicaldemocracy.
48. For similar,but much less developedtreatments,see Habermas(1992, 640-3); Walzer
(1983, 306-11, 1989, and particularly1992: comparison of the model of the good life in
republicandemocracy[? II], in the marketplace[? IV], and in "civil society" [? VI]).
49. See Bader (1992). See Kymlicka and Norman (1994, 357ff). Unfortunately,Barber
(1984) himself, in his regrettableand unnecessaryantiliberalrhetoric,usuallyequalizes "liberal
theories"with "liberalconstitutions,politics, and practices";low thresholdlegal citizenshipand
"representativedemocracy"with "thindemocracy."This does not help to clarify the relation
and
between legal statusactivusandstrongpoliticalcitizenshiporthatbetween"representative"
"strongdemocracy."In Figure3 of Barber(p. 219), it would,therefore,be muchbetterandmore
in line with the spiritof his argumentsto deal with "thindemocracy"insteadof "representative
democracy"(in strongdemocracy:citizens are also "legalpersons,"etc.).
50. See (Raz 1986; Gutman1987;Kymlicka1990,205-7,216-25, throughout).The minimal
nonneutralityof liberal-democraticstates can be, and is commonly, overstressed. In their
criticism of "The Left," "Civic republicanism,"and "Civil society theorists,"Kymlicka and
Normandistinguishbetween"citizenshipas legal status"and "citizenshipas desirableactivity"
(1994, 353), a distinctionthat is very close to what I have proposed. They point to urgent
dilemmasconfrontingliberaltheoriesof virtues.

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241

51. This is evidentlythe case in v. Gunsterensdiscussionof "admissionrequirements"(1988,


736-8). See, for similararguments,Oldfield (1990, 147). See as a kind of post mortemwarning
in constitutionaltheory and practice of "real
the perverse version of "communitarianism"
existing socialism"(see the shortreview in Grawert1984, 195f)
52. A symptomaticindicationof this difficultycan be foundin Carens'sambivalentattitude
toward stronger conceptions of culture and virtues: in his texts on distributivejustice and
problems of incentives he, rightly, insists on their relevance (1981, 1987); in his texts on
immigration,refugees and naturalization,he avoids it for fear of exclusionaryconsequences.
Now, I thinkthis fear is empiricallywell foundedbut conceptuallyunnecessary.And it forms a
bottleneck in normativetheory. One can and should defend a minimal thresholdconcept of
citizenship,butdoingthis does notpreventone fromarguingformuchthickerversionsof politics
and political citizenship.The importanceof a clear distinctionof "thick"politicalconceptions
from thick "ethnic"conceptions of citizenship is demonstratedexcellently by Brubaker(see
1992, 178ff for Germany).
53. See Bourdieu(1979); Bader(1991a, chaps.on Habitusand KollektiveIdentitat);Barber
(1984). This, in part,is recognizedby Habermas:"Legallyguaranteedconditionsof recognition
do not howeverreproducethemselvesautomatically.They need the cooperativeeffortof a civic
practice,somethingto which no one can be compelledby legal requirements.Thus the legally
constitutedcivic dependsupon a convival, consonantbackgroundof motives and opinions of a
citizenryreceptiveto the commongood whichcannotbe legallyordained"(1992, 641). Compare,
"Thecontextof a politicalcultureof freedom"(p. 642). See Wellmer(1993, 183ff), Brunkhorst,
and others.
54. This insight is not a privilege of "communitarians."
See, for differentversions, Dewey
(see Joas 1993); Rawls's "overlappingconsensus" (1993, 133ff); Habermas'sevolutionary
arguments.See Carens(1993), the "onlyjust politicalorder,at least undermodem conditions"
(p. 24), the "politicalcultureof a liberaldemocraticsociety" itself implies "a specific culture,
ethos, history,and way of life" (39f). Living in "modem"societies includes a minimal prize:
societal differentiation,one or otherversion of private-publicdistinction,secularized"public"
spheresthatare incompatibleand incommensurablewith all versionsof religious fundamentalism; the commitmentto pluralismis not withoutlimits of tolerationof culturaldifferences(see
26f on violence and on exit optionsfor dissenters).
55. See Walzer(1990a). Re-iterativeuniversalism"does not requirean externalstandpoint
or a universal perspective" (527); the "universalvalues" of moral minimalism "all have
particularistimplications";"thin morality" is always and necessarily embedded in "thick
morality"(see lectureAmsterdam,October26, 1993).
56. All this is excellentlyelaboratedby RobertoUnger(1983, 1987II;see also Bader199lb).
See the same idea in Habermas (1992, chap. 9), but with the usual lack of institutional
concreteness.
57. See the excellent treatmentof liberaltheories of virtue,which have been neglected for
so long, in Macedo (1991) andGalston(1991); see also Cunningham(1987, 144-50).
58. See Bader (199la, 421f) for individual and collective problems of reconciliationof
individuality,contingency,mortality,and history with universalistreason underconditions of
modernity.
59. See Riedel (for an excellent interpretationof Kant).Huizinga, Putte. Habermasis not
content with this proposal.It is for Habermasa historicalfact "thata political culturein which
the basic constitutionalprinciplescan put down roots may in no ways rest on a commonethnic,
linguistic and culturaldescent of all citizens" (Habermas1992, 642). My personal aversion
againstthe use of "nation-states"
may,in thisrespect,be verymuchinfluencedby the historically
understandablenegativeattitudeof most democraticandleftist Germanintellectualswith regard

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242

POLITICALTHEORY/ May 1995

to (mainstream)Germanhistory,"community,"and traditionof this "verspateteNation."But I


doubt that this would make much difference for the core of my theoreticalargument.Joas
highlightscorrectlythe completely differentcontext and historyof "community"discussions in
the United States, but even he completelyneglects, in his critiqueof the "generalizedsuspicion
against parochialism,regionaland nationalidentities"(1993, 60), all exclusionaryeffects.
60. Carens,to my mind, is too careful in this regard:democraticcommunitiescannot do
withoutmore than "some"commitmentto civil rights,rule of law, democraticrights(see 1993,
24f, note 27: "Howmany"citizenshave to be committed"howmuch"to securethe reproduction
of democratic culture and therewithof democraticinstitutionsand principles?Probablytoo
"weak,"liberalstate neutralitymay not be enough.
61. These questionscan easily be misunderstoodas if I would perpetuatethreewell-known
shortcomingsof most versionsof liberaltheory:(1) usually,the "benign"versions of state-neutralitywith regardto ethnicityareonly thinlydisguisedversionsof "chauvinistuniversalism"in
whichthe ethnicityof the predominantgroup/nationis ignoredand,thereby,presentedas neutral
and universal.(2) No complete "ethnic"neutralityof statesis possible if one takes into account
thatall stateshave one (or more)official languages,specific borders,anddistributionsof powers
between federal, regional, and local levels; that all states have to distributescarce resources
amongcompetingnations,ethnicgroups,and so on. (3) The normativeideal of ethnicneutrality
itself has to be reformulated:"relational"ethnic neutrality(in analogy to the reformulationof
"objectivity"in philosophy of science, cf. Bader 1988); the institutionaltranslationwould
certainlyincludethe recognitionof specific group-rights,proportionalrepresentation,and so on
(cf. Kymlicka 1994). I do not want to continue the symptomatic"black-box"of most liberal
theories that ignore the space between "individual"and state completelyor do recognize only
voluntaryassociations not allowing institutional,organizational,andjuridicalspace for ethnic
and othercollective communitiesapartfromthe so-called "politicalcommunity."
62. See alreadyKarlMannheimbeforethe second WorldWar;see Amy Gutman(1987).
63. Habermas'stheoryleaves room for more detailedproposalsin all threerespects,butits
most disappointingaspectis thathe does not makeany step in elaboratingwhatthatwould mean
(see Bader 1993a; also Unger 1987; Hirst 1994). Walzer'sSpheres (1983) nearly neglects the
problem of how to tame the ugly external consequences, but is, obviously, much richer in
institutionaldetail.
64. See Stolcke (1993), Bader(1985).

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246

POLITICALTHEORY/ May 1995

Young, I. 1990. Justice and the Politics of Difference.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.

VeitMichaelBaderis Professorof Philosophy


(SocialPhilosophy)
andof Sociologyat
He teachestheoretical
the University
of Amsterdam.
sociologyandtheoriesof society
andtheirhistory,
as wellas criticalandmarxist
theoriesofjustice.Hismain
philosophy;
researchareas are social inequalitiesand collectiveactionandprogrammatic
and
to thepoliticsof a libertarian,
democratic
strategicapproaches
socialism.

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