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Christopher Hooks

Losing Ground
After getting crushed in November, Battleground Texas is fighting for survival and relevance
against other Democrats.
by Christopher Hooks Published on Tuesday, December 30, 2014, at 10:48 CST

Jen Reel
Among the many questions Texas Democrats are asking each other in the aftermath of 2014s electoral slaughter, few
are more pointed than this one: Whats going to happen to Battleground Texas?

The group blew into Texas in February 2013 on a wave of hype and hope. Some who pined for a
Democratic revival in the state saw in the group a kind of deus ex machina, a savior whod spirit
progressives to victory after years in the wilderness.
Battlegrounds founder, Jeremy Bird, a high-level veteran of Barack Obamas two presidential campaigns,
fed those dreams. He pledged to do what the Texas Democratic Party couldnt and earnestly begin the
project of turning Texas blue. Armed with technology and tactics derived from the Obama campaign,

Battleground promised to succeed where others had faltered. But doubts about Battlegrounds approach
and its intentions began immediately as well. Could an operation run largely by folks from outside Texas
understand the states complicated electoral landscape? Did it make sense to build a sort of shadow party
alongside the traditional Democratic apparatus?
When Battleground joined its efforts to Wendy Davis campaign last year, the group suddenly had a
chance to put its theories to a very public test. If the group helped Davis win, or at least get close,
Battlegroundand perhaps Texas Democratswould have a bright future. Instead, Davis lost to Greg
Abbott so badly that the high-stakes bid backfired. The lossalong with the fact that Texas had, yet
again, the lowest voter participation rate in the nationhas left some Democrats calling Battlegrounds
future into question.
Like a plane crash or an industrial accident, many things small and large had to go wrong to produce the
dismal results on Nov. 4. The Davis campaigns effort was bungled from the get-go, and it was certainly a
bad year for Democrats nationally. But neither of these fully explain the scale of 2014s loss. The most
serious failing of the Democratic coalition this year was its inability to mobilize and turn out voters, a
responsibility that fell largely to Battleground.
As dozens of conversations with individuals associated with the party, local Democratic groups,
campaigns and other progressive organizations make clear, Battleground Texas had a major part
though definitely not the only onein contributing to Democrats terrible showing in November. The
group, they argue, made critical and avoidable mistakes that cost candidates up and down the ticket. It
was doomed from the very beginning. It was a machine that could never have succeeded, and cannot, I
think, succeed going forward.
Many were reluctant to talk on the record, for fear of poisoning relationships and discouraging the
Democratic base. Some are still hopeful that Battleground can find a way to contribute to the coalitions
efforts in 2016 and 2018.
The picture the sources paint is more or less the same: Apart from a few counties and local races, rancor
and dysfunction overtook relationships among organizations that should have been working together.
Battleground was opaque in its dealings, shied from making firm commitments, negotiated with a heavy
hand and was coy about its long-term goals.
One word crops up in conversations over and over: arrogance. A senior Texas Democrat, characterizing
Battlegrounds ability to manage relationships with organizations inside the Democratic coalition, put it
more forcefully: The Obama guys were never any good at politics.
Local organizers offer diverse and specific critiques of the groups strategy on the ground: In big cities like
Dallas and Houston, Battleground used turnout models that were far too optimistic about the number of
Democratic voters that would come to the polls with little prodding. In South Texas, they say, an
unfamiliarity with Hispanic communities frequently tripped up the groups organizers. In other large cities
and counties, Battleground often ended up competing with well-established local parties for control of
resources, such as money and volunteers.
In public statements, the Battlegrounds leaders talk about the 2014 election as a speed bumpan
opportunity to learn lessons before they move forward with the long-term mission. In private, the
organizations representatives have been in an apologetic mode. Time to reset, they say. But many
Democrats are not swayed by conciliatory talk. Even though both sides publicly sing a song of unity, in
private Battleground finds itself in a power struggle with other Democrats, many of whom want to see the
party strengthened internally and fear the influence and leverage of outside groups.
Some observers wonder if Battlegrounds days are numbered.
It was doomed from the very beginning, says one senior Democratic consultant. It was a machine that
could never have succeeded, and cannot, I think, succeed going forward.
Others think Battleground is preparing to attach itself to Hillary Clintons 2016 presidential campaign
apparatus. The bad blood and differing opinions have set off a behind-the-scenes competition for the
three things that make modern campaigns tick: volunteers, money and data.
When Battleground landed in Texas, and before it really had a chance to prove itself, there was loud
and immediate grumbling from some corners of the party. Why in the hell did these out-of-staters think
they know better than we do? Some of that cantankerousness sounded hollow coming from Democratic
figures whod not seen much success over many electionsbut Battlegrounds swagger did alienate a lot
of Texans.

The groups ethos descends from Organizing for America, the Obama campaigns organizing engine.
OFA was a powerful national organization, attached to a juggernaut presidential campaign and was able
to more or less dictate terms to the locals. Some of that attitude made it to Texas, and it went over about
as well as youd expect.
Battleground seemed to disregard institutional knowledge about the states political landscape, arguably
to the detriment of the Democratic ticket. For example, the combined Battleground/Davis campaign effort
tapped BlueLabs, a Washington D.C.-based consulting firm run by yet more Obama whiz kids, to conduct
an analysis of the Texas electorate and figure out where to find votes. BlueLabs, the firms site says,
specializes in persuasion modelingtargeting crossover and moderate voters.
The models developed for the Davis campaign by BlueLabs and implemented by Battleground contained
assumptions that seemed shaky, according to party staffers and local organizers familiar with the effort.
BlueLabs assumed that much less work would be required to get Democratic voters to the polls than what
the Texans on the Davis campaign said would be needed. (Getting Democrats to vote in midterm years
has been a long-term problem.) We have to be honest about why we failed. We cant keep sugar-coating
everything and saying, Well, it was a bad national year. Thats unacceptable. Unless were going to be
honest and do an actual post-mortem, and see where the mistakes were made, where things couldve
been done better, were doomed to repeat the same failures again.
The models, the party staffers say, seemed to treat Bill Whites performance in 2010 as a floor, beyond
which Davis could improvefailing to recognize that it had taken a lot of money and effort to reach
Whites level.
So in some parts of the state, Battleground volunteers spent time combing white suburban neighborhoods
for crossover voterssoft Republicans and independentswhile neighborhoods rich with potential
Democratic votes went underworked.
Although most of Battlegrounds missteps were made in private, others were unforced errors made in full
public view. Perhaps the best example came when the groups founder, Bird, whose D.C. consulting firm
received some $382,000 from Battleground over the course of the election, released a memo under his
byline several days before the election.
The abysmal early voting turnout numbers the media had been scrutinizing were dead wrong, he claimed.
Battleground had helped perform miracles: Turnout was actually good, the right voters were coming out,
and Democrats were on track for a respectable performance. But it was Bird who was wrong. He had
compared 2014 turnout to a set of incomplete data from 2010. That the groups highly paid chief data
maven would make such a critical error right before an election remains perplexing.
More than a few Texas Democrats speculate that Battleground leaders were less than forthcoming about
their plans and goals with allied organizations because they believed their strategy would be vindicated
on election night. After Democrats won a good loss, the idea goes, Battleground would have proof of its
core concept, and a lot of the bickering would quiet down. If that was the plan, it failed spectacularly.
Battleground had a peculiarly fraught relationship with many county parties around the state. A huge
number of Democratic voters live in the states 15 largest counties, so local parties are major footsoldiers
of the Democratic effort, representing the permanent party infrastructure in Texas largest cities. Forging
close cooperative relationships with them should have been a no-brainer, but Battleground wanted to
dictate the terms of the relationship.
Battleground tried to get county parties to sign formal working agreements, according to four individuals
familiar with the negotiations, which included policies regarding data and sharing of volunteer resources.
The common perception was that Battleground asked for far too much, and didnt offer enough in return.
The Travis County Democratic Party signed a contract, which worked more or less acceptably, according
to both sides. Its unknown how many others did. The fact that Travis County had signed such an
agreement with Battleground was well known in other parts of the state, according to three local party
officials, but Battleground refused to share details of the agreement with other county parties
presumably under the belief that it would weaken their negotiating position. One county party leader
describes it as a divide-and-conquer approach: another, as an attempt to annex local party groups.
Another point of contention: Battleground accumulated an enormous amount of information on the states
voters, but that information was shared unequally with allied organizations. According to the sources
familiar with the negotiations, groups that cooperated closely with Battleground got more information
and groups that didnt got less.

In largely Hispanic Nueces County, home to Corpus Christi, Republicans swept every contested race in
an area that should be fertile ground for Democrats. One of the problems, local organizers say, was that
the coalition didnt spend enough time mobilizing Democratic base voters early on.
The Nueces County Democratic Party struggled to build a relationship with Battleground, which didnt
know how to talk to Hispanic voters and was reluctant to use volunteers to support Democratic lieutenant
governor nominee Leticia Van de Putte, says former Corpus Christi state Rep. Solomon Solly Ortiz Jr.
When Battleground and the state party tried to compensate late in the game by running their own voter
canvasses, they ended up unnecessarily duplicating each others efforts. It was just a clusterfuck, man,
Ortiz says.
Nueces County Democratic Party Chairman Joseph Ramirez heaps praises on the volunteers who came
from across the state and put in hard work and long hours. But, he says, Battlegrounds leadership in
Fort Worth misstepped, especially when it came to data sharing. Battleground volunteersmaking calls
and walking blockswere collecting information on the states voters that in the past might have been
collected by a campaign or local party group. Several county party leaders say they werent getting all of
the information they needed to effectively turn out voters.
The partitioning of voter data had never been a problem before, Ramirez says, and it shouldnt be a
problem now. Not having complete, up-to-date information about contacts that had been made with area
voters meant the county partys own voter contact efforts were hobbled. We still did what we could. But
there needs to be more openness and willingness to share data.
J.D. Gins, the executive director of the Travis County Democratic Party, agrees with Ramirez. Not
prioritizing the sharing of data directly with all campaigns and county parties is a fundamental mistake,
he says. The division of winners and losers before Election Day creates a serious level of resentment. In
the end, when we are not all coordinating and working together, we all lose.
In reply to questions about the organizations data policy, Battlegrounds spokesperson Erica Sackin says
that arrangements for how it would all work were made well before the election and were making sure
the work we did in this election will benefit Democrats across the state. Like all our allies who are
participating, were happy to be a part of this smart, strategic collaboration.
Texas Democratic Party Executive Director Will Hailer, who stepped down from his post in December,
says that a big chunk of Battlegrounds voter information would be coming over to the state party after
the New Year, as had been previously agreed. Weve had several productive discussions with
Battleground, Hailer says.
Another ongoing dispute involves what may be Battlegrounds greatest asset: the 34,000 Texans
who have volunteered for the group since its inception. Even critics acknowledge that the scale of
Battlegrounds volunteer operation was impressive, and could prove helpful to future Democratic
campaigns. Many who critique the group emphasize their appreciation and respect for the volunteers.
But some Texas Democrats were operating under the belief that the list of volunteers would be shared
with the party after the election. Their thinking is that the volunteer base should be a sort of communal
property. Volunteers are the lifeblood of campaigns: Money can make campaigns viable, and data can
inform strategy, but its volunteers who go out to walk blocks, make calls and keep people excited.
Senior staffers with Battleground say that was never in the cards, that it would be virtually unprecedented
to give away that kind of asset. The volunteers help give Battleground continued influence in the state
they are the groups future.
A growing number of Texas Democrats are worried that Battleground is getting ready to use its Texas
volunteer base to help Hillary Clintons campaign nationally. Top Texas Democrats say Jenn Brown,
Battlegrounds executive director, has privately admitted that she sees Texas as an export state in
2016meaning that the states money and volunteers would be best put to work elsewhere. Attempts to
contact Brown through the group were unsuccessful. Sackin, Battlegrounds spokesperson, told the
Observer that Battleground Texas was created specifically to keep resources in Texasso that people
didnt feel like they have to leave Texas to volunteer or donate to make a difference. Weve been saying
that since we were founded, thats why we were founded, and that hasnt changed.
Bird, the groups founder, and wealthy Houston attorney Steve Mostyn, the groups most important
financial backer, are prominent members of the leadership team of the Ready for Hillary Super PAC. If
Battleground involves itself in a contested Democratic presidential primary, it could arouse indignation
here, where not everyone has jumped on the Clinton bandwagon.

Photo courtesy Jeremy Bird

Jeremy Bird

But if Battleground Texas uses its volunteers to support Clintons campaign in other states during the
general election, a lot of Texas Democrats would be downright furious. Exporting Texas money and
volunteers isnt a new phenomenon, of course. Texas Democrats have long complained that the national
party uses Texas as a piggy bank. In 2012, Texas volunteers made 400,000 calls on behalf of Obamas
campaign in Florida. Bird told The American Prospect last year that his interest in Texas began with those
phone banks.
But in 2012, it was Obamas Organizing for America group that was responsible for getting Texas
volunteers to help the campaign win Florida. Texas Democrats may not have been thrilled about it, but
there was a clarity about the transaction. Battleground Texas, unlike OFA, has a stated aim of organizing
in Texas. Plus, Texas Democrats tend to make gains in the Legislature in presidential election years, and
many would like to see that effort stay front-and-center as planning starts for 2016.
In 2013, Bird told Politico that Battleground would make Texas a battleground state by treating it like
one, a proclamation that would seem to be at odds with the groups possible new focus on national
priorities.
At a late November meeting of the State Democratic Executive Committee, Battleground Texas Political
Director Cliff Walker appeared as the groups sole representative before a sometimes irate crowd,
according to a number of Democrats present. Asked directly if he would rule out using Battlegrounds
resources to support Clinton in other states, Walker offered a non-committal answer. It would be up to
Battlegrounds volunteers, he said, what they wanted to do.
The next day, Hailer, the partys executive director, appeared at a conference convened by the Texas
chapter of the youth civic group Junior State of America and told several hundred high school students,
many of whom had been volunteers in the Democratic effort, that Democrats had to make sure volunteers
and money stayed in Texas.
Manny Garcia, then the Texas Democratic Party spokesman, echoed the sentiment, without explicitly
naming Battleground. Its important for the development of the Texas Democratic infrastructure that
Texans work in Texas, he told the Observer at the time.
In effect, Battleground aims to become a sort of shadow party. The Texas Democratic Party has
precinct chairs; Battleground has neighborhood team leaders.As happened in Corpus Christi, the group
and the state party sometimes found themselves duplicating each others efforts this cycle, while
competing for some of the same volunteers and donors. But where the party elects its leaders,
Battleground is essentially a for-profit organization. Chris Young, the political director of the Harris County
Democratic Party, told the Houston Chronicle after the election that Battlegrounds approach represented
a privatization of the political system.
Many people associated with the Texas Democratic Party want to build up the partys capabilities, not
create a whole new one. If we want to get serious about party building, infrastructure investment belongs
in the party itself, says Gins.
Gins led one of the few Democratic groups to have a relatively successful working relationship with
Battleground this cycle, but still argues that strengthening the party should be the coalitions first goal. If
we want Democratic candidates to be viable in the long term, then the Democratic Party needs to be
strong and responsible for building the base. If Battleground involves itself in a contested Democratic

presidential primary, it could arouse indignation here, where not everyone has jumped on the Clinton
bandwagon.
But Battlegrounds backers say campaign finance laws make it impossible for the party to do the kind of
infrastructure building that needs to be done. The Democratic coalition here is stuck with organizations
outside the party, they say, because only groups like Battleground are unrestrained in their ability to land
big checks from many different kinds of donors.
In the end, whether the group stays or folds comes down to one factor: money. Battlegrounds operation,
when in full gear, is extraordinarily expensive to run. The groups most important financial backer is Steve
Mostyn, the Houston lawyer. He has, according to those who know him, a great antipathy toward the
Democratic Party itself. After the election, he pledged that hed stick with Battleground.
Im the guy whos got the most money in it and Im the one writing the checks, Mostyn told the Houston
Chronicle, and Im telling you I think its working. But with little to show to other donors, most think the
groups ability to sustain itself over the long term has diminished.
Battleground may be able to regroup and find a future for itself in Texas. But the post-election reckoning
is bound to continue for a while. After decades of losses, some Democrats are eager to fix problems
nowbefore the next election rolls around and the party faithful decide to circle the wagons.
We have to be honest about why we failed. We cant keep sugar-coating everything and saying, Well, it
was a bad national year. Thats unacceptable, says Ortiz, the former Corpus Christi state representative.
Unless were going to be honest and do an actual post-mortem, and see where the mistakes were made,
where things couldve been done better, were doomed to repeat the same failures again.
Tags: 2014 election, Battleground Texas, Steve Mostyn, Texas Democratic Party, Texas Democrats, Wendy Davis
Christopher Hooks joined the Observer in 2014. Previously, he was a freelance journalist in Austin, where he grew up. His work has
appeared in Politico Magazine, Slate, and Texas Monthly, among others. He graduated from The New School in 2012 with a
bachelor's degree in history.