73 Phil 607

Torts and Damages Civil Liability from Quasi Delicts vs Civil Liability from Crimes

At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanillas taxi collided with a kalesa thereby killing the 16 year old Faustino Garcia. Faustinos
parents filed a criminal suit against Fontanilla and reserved their right to file a separate civil suit. Fontanilla was eventually convicted.
After the criminal suit, Garcia filed a civil suit against Barredo the owner of the taxi (employer of Fontanilla). The suit was based on
Article 1903 of the civil code (negligence of employers in the selection of their employees). Barredo assailed the suit arguing that his
liability is only subsidiary and that the separate civil suit should have been filed against Fontanilla primarily and not him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Barredo is just subsidiarily liable.
HELD: No. He is primarily liable under Article 1903 which is a separate civil action against negligent employers. Garcia is well within
his rights in suing Barredo. He reserved his right to file a separate civil action and this is more expeditious because by the time of the
SC judgment Fontanilla is already serving his sentence and has no property. It was also proven that Barredo is negligent in hiring his
employees because it was shown that Fontanilla had had multiple traffic infractions already before he hired him something he
failed to overcome during hearing. Had Garcia not reserved his right to file a separate civil action, Barredo would have only been
subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo is not being sued for damages arising from a criminal act (his drivers negligence) but rather for
his own negligence in selecting his employee (Article 1903).
AGAPITO FUELLAS, petitioner, vs. ELPIDIO CADANO, ET AL., respondents.G.R. No. L-14409 [October 31, 1961]
FACTS
Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas, son of defendant-appellant Agapito Fuellas, were both 13 years old and classmates at St. Marys
High School, Dansalan City. While Pepito was studying his lessons in the classroom, Rico took the pencil of one Ernesto Cabanok and
surreptitiously placed it inside the pocket of Pepito. When Ernesto asked Rico to return the pencil, it was Pepito who returned the
same, an act which angered Rico, who held the neck of Pepito and pushed him to the floor. Villamira, a teacher, separated Rico and
Pepito and told them to go home. Rico went ahead, with Pepito following. When Pepito had just gone down of the schoolhouse, he
was met by Rico, still in an angry mood. Angelito Aba, a classmate, told the two to shake hands. Pepito extended his hand to Rico,
but the latter instead held the former by the neck and with his leg, placed Pepito out of balance and pushed him to the ground.
Pepito fell on his right side with his right arm under his body, whereupon, Rico rode on his left side. While Rico was in such position,
Pepito suddenly cried out My arm is broken. Rico then got up and went away. Pepito was helped by others to go home. That same
evening Pepito was brought to the Lanao General Hospital for treatment and the results of the x-ray revealed that there was a
complete fracture of the radius and ulna of the right forearm which necessitated plaster casting. As a result, a civil case for damages
was filed against Agapito Fuellas, father of the minor Rico.
ISSUE
WON Agapito Fuellas may be held liable for damages for the deliberate criminal act of his minor son.
HELD:
YES. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. This civil liability of the father or the mother, as the case may be,
is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them and the only way by which they can relieve themselves
of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. Since children
and wards do not yet have the capacity to govern themselves, the law imposes upon the parents and guardians the duty of
exercising special vigilance over the acts of their children and wards in order that damages to third persons due to the ignorance,
lack of foresight or discernment of such children and wards may be avoided. If the parents and guardians fail to comply with this
duty, they should suffer the consequences of their abandonment or negligence by repairing the damage caused.

77 SCRA 100 May 26, 1977

Torts and Damages Civil Liability from Quasi Delicts vs Civil Liability from Crimes
Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano filed a criminal case against Reginald but Reginald was
acquitted for lack of intent coupled with mistake. Elcano then filed a civil action against Reginald and his dad (Marvin Hill) for
damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that the civil action is barred by his sons acquittal in the criminal case;
and that if ever, his civil liability as a parent has been extinguished by the fact that his son is already an emancipated minor by
reason of his marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under Article 2180.
HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar the filing of a separate civil action. A separate civil action lies
against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, if accused is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words,
the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed
by the accused. Briefly stated, culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397,
emancipation takes place by the marriage of the minor child, it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation
by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus Emancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate
parental authority over the childs person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he
cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue
and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian. Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill
the SC however ruled since at the time of the decision, Reginald is already of age, Marvins liability should be subsidiary only as a
matter of equity.
81 SCRA 472
Torts and Damages Double Recovery of Civil Liability
In September 1975, Borilla was driving a jeep when he hit Arsenio Virata thereby causing the latters death. The heirs of Virata sued
Borilla through an action for homicide through reckless imprudence in the CFI of Rizal. Viratas lawyer reserved their right to file a
separate civil action the he later withdrew said motion. But in June 1976, pending the criminal case, the Viratas again reserved their
right to file a separate civil action. Borilla was eventually acquitted as it was ruled that what happened was a mere accident. The
heirs of Virata then sued Borilla and Ochoa (the owner of the jeep and employer of Borilla) for damages based on quasi delict. Ochoa
assailed the civil suit alleging that Borilla was already acquitted and that the Viratas were merely trying to recover damages twice.
The lower court agreed with Ochoa and dismissed the civil suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of Virata may file a separate civil suit.
HELD: Yes. It is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved parties may choose between an action under the Revised Penal Code
or of quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. What is prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines is to recover twice for the same negligent act. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation
of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for
civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. But said article forestalls a
double recovery.

MARIA TERESA Y. CUADRA, minor represented by her father ULISES P. CUADRA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
ALFONSO MONFORT, defendant-appellant.

MAKALINTAL, J.:
This is an action for damages based on quasi-delict, decided by the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental favorably to the
plaintiffs and appealed by the defendant to the Court of Appeals, which certified the same to us since the facts are not in issue.
Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were classmates in Grade Six at the Mabini Elementary School in Bacolod
City. On July 9, 1962 their teacher assigned them, together with three other classmates, to weed the grass in the school premises.
While thus engaged Maria Teresa Monfort found a plastic headband, an ornamental object commonly worn by young girls over their
hair. Jokingly she said aloud that she had found an earthworm and, evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her. At
that precise moment the latter turned around to face her friend, and the object hit her right eye. Smarting from the pain, she
rubbed the injured part and treated it with some powder. The next day, July 10, the eye became swollen and it was then that the girl
related the incident to her parents, who thereupon took her to a doctor for treatment. She underwent surgical operation twice, first
on July 20 and again on August 4, 1962, and stayed in the hospital for a total of twenty-three days, for all of which the parents spent
the sum of P1,703.75. Despite the medical efforts, however, Maria Teresa Cuadra completely lost the sight of her right eye.
In the civil suit subsequently instituted by the parents in behalf of their minor daughter against Alfonso Monfort, Maria Teresa
Monfort's father, the defendant was ordered to pay P1,703.00 as actual damages; P20,000.00 as moral damages; and P2,000.00 as
attorney's fees, plus the costs of the suit.
The legal issue posed in this appeal is the liability of a parent for an act of his minor child which causes damage to another under the
specific facts related above and the applicable provisions of the Civil Code, particularly Articles 2176 and 2180 thereof, which read:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by provisions of this Chapter.
ART 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children
who live in their company.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Article 2176 is the fault or negligence accompanying the act or the omission, there
being no willfulness or intent to cause damage thereby. When the act or omission is that of one person for whom another is
responsible, the latter then becomes himself liable under Article 2180, in the different cases enumerated therein, such as that of the
father or the mother under the circumstances above quoted. The basis of this vicarious, although primary, liability is, as in Article
2176, fault or negligence, which is presumed from that which accompanied the causative act or omission. The presumption is
merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and logical inference that may be drawn from the last paragraph
of Article 2180, which states "that the responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage."
Since the fact thus required to be proven is a matter of defense, the burden of proof necessarily rests on the defendant. But what is
the exact degree of diligence contemplated, and how does a parent prove it in connection with a particular act or omission of a
minor child, especially when it takes place in his absence or outside his immediate company? Obviously there can be no meticulously
calibrated measure applicable; and when the law simply refers to "all the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent
damage," it implies a consideration of the attendant circumstances in every individual case, to determine whether or not by the
exercise of such diligence the damage could have been prevented.
In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the defendant could have prevented the damage by the
observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage,
or the act which caused it. On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had
the right to expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury was

concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent, however careful, would have any
special reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's
character which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her parents.
The victim, no doubt, deserves no little commiseration and sympathy for the tragedy that befell her. But if the defendant is at all
obligated to compensate her suffering, the obligation has no legal sanction enforceable in court, but only the moral compulsion of
good conscience.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint is dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Civil Law Torts and Damages Article 2180 Liability of Schools of Arts and Trades and Academic Schools Liability of Teachers
and Heads of School
In April 1972, while the high school students of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos were in the school auditorium, a certain Pablito Daffon
fired a gun. The stray bullet hit Alfredo Amadora. Alfredo died. Daffon was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
The parents of Alfredo sued the school for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code because of the schools negligence.
The trial court ruled in favor of Amadora. The trial court ruled that the principal, the dean of boys, as well as the teacher-in-charge
are all civilly liable. The school appealed as it averred that when the incident happened, the school year has already ended. Amadora
argued that even though the semester has already ended, his son was there in school to complete a school requirement in his
Physics subject. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the school. The CA ruled that under the last paragraph of Article 2180, only
schools of arts and trades (vocational schools) are liable not academic schools like Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos.
ISSUE: Whether or not Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, an academic school, is liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code for the
tortuous act of its students.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court made a re-examination of the provision on the last paragraph of Article 2180 which provides:
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and student s or
apprentices so long as they remain in their custody.
The Supreme Court said that it is time to update the interpretation of the above law due to the changing times where there is hardly
a distinction between schools of arts and trade and academic schools. That being said, the Supreme Court ruled that ALL schools,
academic or not, may be held liable under the said provision of Article 2180.
The Supreme Court however clarified that the school, whether academic or not, should not be held directly liable. Its liability is only
subsidiary.
For non-academic schools, it would be the principal or head of school who should be directly liable for the tortuous act of its
students. This is because historically, in non-academic schools, the head of school exercised a closer administration over their
students than heads of academic schools. In short, they are more hands on to their students.
For academic schools, it would be the teacher-in-charge who would be directly liable for the tortuous act of the students and not the
dean or the head of school.
The Supreme Court also ruled that such liability does not cease when the school year ends or when the semester ends. Liability
applies whenever the student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school
and within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended at the time of the happening of the incident.
As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of
a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate
student privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues. Indeed, even if the student should be doing
nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere
of the school, he is still within the custody and subject to the discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.

At any rate, the REMEDY of the teacher, to avoid direct liability, and for the school, to avoid subsidiary liability, is to show proof that
he, the teacher, exercised the necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of, and the school exercised the diligence of
a bonus pater familias.
In this case however, the Physics teacher in charge was not properly named, and there was no sufficient evidence presented to
make the said teacher-in-charge liable. Absent the direct liability of the teachers because of the foregoing reason, the school cannot
be held subsidiarily liable too.
CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
VICENTE VASQUEZ, JR. and LUISA SO VASQUEZ, and CEBU DOCTORS' HOSPITAL, INC., respondents
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
The pivotal issue in this petition is whether an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent
operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle.
The antecedents, as succinctly summarized by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
On 28 August 1988, at around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo So Vasquez, was driving a Honda motorcycle
around Fuente Osmea Rotunda. He was traveling counter-clockwise, (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but
without any protective helmet or goggles. He was also only carrying a Student's Permit to Drive at the time. Upon
the other hand, Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation, registered owner [of]
a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no. GBW-794. On the same date and time, Abad drove the said company car out
of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmea rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the
traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St. or to Belvic St.
In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries
to the former. Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the
Cebu Doctor's Hospital.
On September 5, 1988, Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctor's Hospital. It was there that Abad signed an
acknowledgment of Responsible Party (Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills, professional
fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur.
After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the accident, a Criminal Case was filed against Abad
but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute. So, the present action for damages was
commenced by Vicente Vasquez, Jr. and Luisa So Vasquez, parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez, against
Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation. In the same action, Cebu Doctor's Hospital intervened to
1
collect unpaid balance for the medical expense given to Romeo So Vasquez.
The trial court ruled in favor of private respondents Vicente and Luisa Vasquez and ordered Jose Benjamin Abad (hereafter ABAD)
and petitioner Castilex Industrial Corporation (hereafter CASTILEX) to pay jointly and solidarily (1) Spouses Vasquez, the amounts of
P8,000.00 for burial expenses; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and P778,752.00 for loss of earning
capacity; and (2) Cebu Doctor's Hospital, the sum of P50,927.83 for unpaid medical and hospital bills at 3% monthly interest from 27
2
July 1989 until fully paid, plus the costs of litigation.
CASTILEX and ABAD separately appealed the decision.
3

In its decision of 21 May 1997, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court holding ABAD and CASTILEX liable but held
that the liability of the latter is "only vicarious and not solidary" with the former. It reduced the award of damages representing loss
of earning capacity from P778,752.00 to P214,156.80; and the interest on the hospital and medical bills, from 3% per month to
12% per annum from 5 September 1988 until fully paid.
Upon CASTILEX's motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals modified its decision by (1) reducing the award of moral damages
from P50,000 to P30,000 in view of the deceased's contributory negligence; (b) deleting the award of attorney's fees for lack of
4
evidence; and (c) reducing the interest on hospital and medical bills to 6% per annum from 5 September 1988 until fully paid.

Hence, CASTILEX filed the instant petition contending that the Court of Appeals erred in (1) applying to the case the fifth paragraph
of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, instead of the fourth paragraph thereof; (2) that as a managerial employee, ABAD was deemed to
have been always acting within the scope of his assigned task even outside office hours because he was using a vehicle issued to him
by petitioner; and (3) ruling that petitioner had the burden to prove that the employee was not acting within the scope of his
assigned task.
Jose Benjamin ABAD merely adopted the statement of facts of petitioner which holds fast on the theory of negligence on the part of
the deceased.
On the other hand, respondents Spouses Vasquez argue that their son's death was caused by the negligence of petitioner's
employee who was driving a vehicle issued by petitioner and who was on his way home from overtime work for petitioner; and that
petitioner is thus liable for the resulting injury and subsequent death of their son on the basis of the fifth paragraph of Article 2180.
Even if the fourth paragraph of Article 2180 were applied, petitioner cannot escape liability therefor. They moreover argue that the
Court of Appeals erred in reducing the amount of compensatory damages when the award made by the trial court was borne both
by evidence adduced during the trial regarding deceased's wages and by jurisprudence on life expectancy. Moreover, they point out
that the petition is procedurally not acceptable on the following grounds: (1) lack of an explanation for serving the petition upon the
Court of Appeals by registered mail, as required under Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) lack of a statement
of the dates of the expiration of the original reglementary period and of the filing of the motion for extension of time to file a
petition for review.
For its part, respondent Cebu Doctor's Hospital maintains that petitioner CASTILEX is indeed vicariously liable for the injuries and
subsequent death of Romeo Vasquez caused by ABAD, who was on his way home from taking snacks after doing overtime work for
petitioner. Although the incident occurred when ABAD was not working anymore "the inescapable fact remains that said employee
would not have been situated at such time and place had he not been required by petitioner to do overtime work." Moreover, since
petitioner adopted the evidence adduced by ABAD, it cannot, as the latter's employer, inveigle itself from the ambit of liability, and
is thus estopped by the records of the case, which it failed to refute.
We shall first address the issue raised by the private respondents regarding some alleged procedural lapses in the petition.
Private respondent's contention of petitioner's violation of Section 11 of Rule 13 and Section 4 of Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure holds no water.
Sec. 11 of Rule 13 provides:
Sec. 11. Priorities in modes of services and filing. Whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and
other papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other
modes must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done personally. A
violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed.
The explanation why service of a copy of the petition upon the Court of Appeals was done by registered mail is found on Page 28 of
the petition. Thus, there has been compliance with the aforequoted provision.
As regards the allegation of violation of the material data rule under Section 4 of Rule 45, the same is unfounded. The material dates
required to be stated in the petition are the following: (1) the date of receipt of the judgment or final order or resolution subject of
the petition; (2) the date of filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any; and (3) the date of receipt of the notice of the
denial of the motion. Contrary to private respondent's claim, the petition need not indicate the dates of the expiration of the original
reglementary period and the filing of a motion for extension of time to file the petition. At any rate, aside from the material dates
required under Section 4 of Rule 45, petitioner CASTILEX also stated in the first page of the petition the date it filed the motion for
extension of time to file the petition.
Now on the merits of the case.
The negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance. Petitioner CASTILEX presumes said negligence but claims that it is not
vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death caused by ABAD.

Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances where the employer is
not engaged in business or industry. Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not
covered by said provision. Instead, the fourth paragraph should apply.
Petitioner's interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate. The phrase "even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry" found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be
engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned
5
task.
A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is applicable. Both provisions apply to employers: the
fourth paragraph, to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise; and the fifth paragraph, to employers in general,
whether or not engaged in any business or industry. The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in
the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions, while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees
acting within the scope of their assigned task. The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included.
Negligent acts of employees, whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry, are covered so long as they were
acting within the scope of their assigned task, even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of
their functions. For, admittedly, employees oftentimes wear different hats. They perform functions which are beyond their office,
title or designation but which, nevertheless, are still within the call of duty.
This court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer was engaged in a business or industry such as truck
6
7
operators and banks. The Court of Appeals cannot, therefore, be faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code to this case.
Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any business or industry, an employer is liable for the torts
committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks. But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship;
once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned
task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of
8
due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee.
It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence. As to whether he
was acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact, which the court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the
affirmative.
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect, and
even finality at times. This rule is, however, subject to exceptions such as when the conclusion is grounded on speculations,
9
surmises, or conjectures. Such exception obtain in the present case to warrant review by this Court of the finding of the Court of
Appeals that since ABAD was driving petitioner's vehicle he was acting within the scope of his duties as a manager.
Before we pass upon the issue of whether ABAD was performing acts within the range of his employment, we shall first take up the
other reason invoked by the Court of Appeals in holding petitioner CASTILEX vicariously liable for ABAD's negligence, i.e., that the
petitioner did not present evidence that ABAD was not acting within the scope of his assigned tasks at the time of the motor vehicle
mishap. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, it was not incumbent upon the petitioner to prove the same. It was enough
for petitioner CASTILEX to deny that ABAD was acting within the scope of his duties; petitioner was not under obligation to prove
this negative averment. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (He who asserts, not he who denies, must prove). The Court has
consistently applied the ancient rule that if the plaintiff, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in
10
a satisfactory manner facts which he bases his claim, the defendant is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense.
Now on the issue of whether the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD was acting within the scope of his
assigned tasks.
ABAD, who was presented as a hostile witness, testified that at the time of the incident, he was driving a company-issued vehicle,
registered under the name of petitioner. He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his
friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner.
No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether at a given
moment, an employee is engaged in his employer's business in the operation of a motor vehicle, so as to fix liability upon the
11
employer because of the employee's action or inaction; but rather, the result varies with each state of facts.

12

In Filamer Christian Institute v. Intermediate Appellant Court, this Court had the occasion to hold that acts done within the scope
of the employee's assigned tasks includes "any act done by an employee in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the
account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damages."
The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within
the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances.
We do not agree. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to
charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within
the course or scope of his employment.
The following are principles in American Jurisprudence on the employer's liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an
employee in the use of an employer's motor vehicle:
I. Operation of Employer's Motor Vehicle in Going to
or from Meals
It has been held that an employee who uses his employer's vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in
returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special
business benefit to the employer. Evidence that by using the employer's vehicle to go to and from meals, an employee is enabled to
reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the finding that an employee is acting within
13
the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle.
II. Operation of Employer's Vehicle in Going to
or from Work
In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee, and not a part
of his services to his employer. Hence, in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of
the services available at the place where he is needed, the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though
14
he uses his employer's motor vehicle.
The employer may, however, be liable where he derives some special benefit from having the employee drive home in the
employer's vehicle as when the employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier and, presumably, spending more time
at his actual duties. Where the employee's duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or hours of work, or
to go to and from his home to various outside places of work, and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his work, the
courts have frequently applied what has been called the "special errand" or "roving commission" rule, under which it can be found
that the employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home. However, even if the employee be
deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from work in his employer's vehicle, the employer is not
liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident, the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is
pursuing a personal errand of his own.
III. Use of Employer's Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours
An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latter's personal use outside of regular working hours is generally
not liable for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use, even where the employer
contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes and
there is some incidental benefit to the employer. Even where the employee's personal purpose in using the vehicle has been
accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept, it has been held that he has not
resumed his employment, and the employer is not liable for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the return
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trip.
The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of respondent superior, not
on the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours. Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as
in American law or jurisprudence, or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as
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in ours, it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his employer's business or within the scope of his assigned task.

In the case at bar, it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime work at the petitioner's office, which was located in Cabangcalan,
Mandaue City. Thereafter, he went to Goldie's Restaurant in Fuente Osmea, Cebu City, which is about seven kilometers away from
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petitioner's place of business. A witness for the private respondents, a sidewalk vendor, testified that Fuente Osmea is a "lively
place" even at dawn because Goldie's Restaurant and Back Street were still open and people were drinking thereat. Moreover,
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prostitutes, pimps, and drug addicts littered the place.
At the Goldie's Restaurant, ABAD took some snacks and had a chat with friends. It was when ABAD was leaving the restaurant that
the incident in question occurred. That same witness for the private respondents testified that at the time of the vehicular accident,
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ABAD was with a woman in his car, who then shouted: "Daddy, Daddy!" This woman could not have been ABAD's daughter, for
ABAD was only 29 years old at the time.
To the mind of this Court, ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties
at the time he figured in a vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m. of 28 August 1988, way beyond the normal working hours.
ABAD's working day had ended; his overtime work had already been completed. His being at a place which, as petitioner put it, was
known as a "haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and addicts," had no connection to petitioner's business; neither had it
any relation to his duties as a manager. Rather, using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or
one of the perks attached to his position.
Since there is paucity of evidence that ABAD was acting within the scope of the functions entrusted to him, petitioner CASTILEX had
no duty to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in providing ABAD with a service vehicle. Thus, justice and
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equity require that petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the consequences of the negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the appealed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the
modification that petitioner Castilex Industrial Corporation be absolved of any liability for the damages caused by its employee, Jose
Benjamin Abad.