On The Position of Maimona Philosophy

On the Position of Maimon's Philosophy
Author(s): Nathan Rotenstreich

Source: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Mar., 1968), pp. 534-545
Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20124632 .
Accessed: 22/12/2014 19:42
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Philosophy Education Society Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The
Review of Metaphysics.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 190.216.144.250 on Mon, 22 Dec 2014 19:42:37 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
EXPLORATION
ON THE POSITIONOFMAIMONA PHILOSOPHY

NATHAN RUTENSTREICH
in
Interwoven
the
complex
are
system
(1752-1800)
of his avowed
theories
texture
strands
creditors.
of
of
thought
Maim?n
Solomon
's
Maim?n
originating
is one of
in the
the
first
his debt to diverse philo

acknowledges
philosophers
trends
and
his major
traditions.
creditors,
Among
sophical
and Spinoza.1
includes Maimonides
The present analysis,
Maim?n
to an exploration
of his debt to Leibniz,
however, will be restricted
modern
who
and
Hume,
Kant.
In interweaving
from Leibniz
and Hume,
aspects of thought
from the earlier synthesis of their posi
takes his departure
Maim?n
But
tions, wrorked out by Kant in the Critique
of Pure Reason.
theories
of
Maim?n
the
critical
goes beyond Kant, by interlacing
the web Kant had woven
of strands from
itself, with
philosophy
to
Maim?n
link
What
the seemingly
Leibniz and Hume.
permitted
In the
and the sceptic?
systems of the rationalist
incompatible
to establish
first place, both thinkers
of the
the validity
sought
the two pillars of knowledge,
relation between
concepts and sense
to ac
that
the way
data.
both
believed
Secondly,
philosophers
was
one
to
aim
of
derive
their
knowledge
component
complish
the other.
from
According
to Leibniz,
derived from the conceptual;

while,
can be derived from "impressions."
factor can be
the empirical
to Hume,
"ideas"
according
in direction does not alter the fact that both

the two factors :
Leibniz and Hume posit a genetic relation between
are applicable
to sense-data
to both, concepts
because
according
one factor grows out of the other.
Hume maintains
that concepts
But
1
Solomon
the difference
On Maimon's
Maim?n
relation
(Jerusalem,
see S. H. Bergman,
to Spinoza
1967),
pp. 216 ff.
The
Philosophy

of
ON THE POSITIONOFMAIMON'S PHILOSOPHY
535
Leibniz maintains
they are copies of impressions;
a
it constitutes
factor can be explained hecause
that the empirical
a
in
the
monad.
context
Both
in
continuous
originating
stage
in opposite directions?a
Leibniz and Hume,
then, sought?albeit
are valid because
the heterogeneous
between
transition
continuous
component
fac
tors of human
Kant
knowledge.
rejects this method
of coping with the problem

of valid
the assumption
that there can be
and sense impressions,
concepts
from
Taking his departure
ity.
no continuous
transition between
the validity of concepts,

Kant sought another way of establishing
a different tnethod
to
or alternately,
their application
of justifying
to Kant, the relation between
the two fac
sense-data.
According
tors is not genetic
Unlike Leibniz and Hume, who

but functional.2
Kant
it.
Leibniz
and Hume
sustains
Whereas
duality,
as
crux
source
and
their
the
of
Kant
represent duality
problem,
as
it
the
his
framework
and
foundation
for
solution.
represents
abolish
to the
that the function of relating and ordering pertains
Arguing
nature
of
and
that
into
very
concepts,
only by being incorporated
a
a
determined
structure
does the datum occupy
log
conceptually
ical position.
Kant establishes
the interrelatedness
of the two fac
from the other.
that one can be derived
tors, without
assuming
relation in which
Leibniz, who posits a genetic
intelligible
a
find empirical
and unlike Hume, who posits
realization
sense
relation
which
in
find
their
genetic
impressions
conceptual
copies, Kant posits a relation based upon the synthetic nature of
a relation
between
i.e.,
knowledge,
subsisting
heterogeneous
Unlike
truths
factors.
Both
Leibniz
and Hume
measuring
hand, Maim?n
applies
senting the empirical

robs the former of
applies Hume's
can be neither
only
against
2
Hague,
See
my
furnish
with
Maim?n
criteria
to the problem of validity.

On
the Leibnizian
criterion which?by
solution
Kant's
factor
its
criterion
abolished
Kant,
as a realization
independence.
On
the
and
its
Leibniz
Systemalization,
repre
factor?
he
hand,
the empirical
factor
to which
according
nor reduced to another
but also against
Experience
of the rational
for
the one
other
factor.
It is not
that Maim?n
raises his
Studies
in Kant
1965).

(The
NATHAN ROTENSTR?ICH
536
For
objections.
translate
's objection
to
is this:
is
truths
empirical
impossible
residuum
of experience
established
by
of the factors is ultimate?so
's
Maim?n
truths
intelligible
to the irreducible
owing
Hume.
of Maim?n
the burden
into
If the heterogeneity
solution
Kant's
criticism
runs?then
as the foundation
for
sent duality
that the question
pretend
itself
is unsatisfactory.
one's
solution,
is an answer.
To repre
to
is merely
as a weapon
rather than as a target
to
Leibniz
the only
Maim?n,
According
provides
a
the
of
relation
between
solving
problem:
empirical
possibility
data and intelligible
concepts can be established
only by eliminating
that is to say, only by making
the empirical
factor
the former,
a
In
connection
be
intelligible.
thoroughly
assuming
synthetic
But Maim?n
uses Leibniz
for criticism.
tween
a new
to
the factors, Kant transfers
the problem
and its solution
a
But
the
of
the
factors
is
sphere.
problem
heterogeneity
as well.
Kant assumes
that he has overcome
by synthesis
posed
the acute
form of heterogeneity
which might
the possi
preclude
a
of
to
connection.
is analogous
This, however,
bility
synthetic
one
extreme
the assumption
that by bringing
in contact with
the
between
them.
Like Hume,
other, we cancel the polar opposition
to be, Maim?n
he purports
the ir
spokesman
emphasizes
the
datum.
But
of
whereas
Hume
maintains
the
reducibility
whose
its independence
vis-?-vis
primacy of the datum, Maim?n maintains
a Kantian
In this respect, Maim?n fights Kant with
the concept.
for it was Kant who taught that the empirical-perceptual
weapon;
than the conceptual
factor.
factor is no less independent
Accord
if the empirical
ing to Maim?n,
is
impossible.
synthesis
factor
is independent,
then
even
resembles
the one hand,
Kant's
then, Maimon's
position
and Hume's.
it lies midway
between
Leibniz's
On the
from Kant in using Kant's
Maim?n
other hand, however,
diverges
as
of solving
the
the problem
evidence
that
system
impossibility
of realizing
the solution
raised by Hume
implies the impossibility
another
he con
To
it
because
Leibniz.
way,
put
proposed
by
On
in that
he proposes
within
the limits of
confines
the solution
sciously
between
finite understanding,
Kant draws a distinction
archetypal
and ectypal
Maim?n
understanding.
understanding
apparently
agrees with
Kant
that the solution
is confined
within
the limits

of
ON THE POSITION OF MAIMON'S
537
PHILOSOPHY
But he goes beyond Kant in two respects.

understanding.
one thing, he stresses
the limits of finite understanding
by
more
the
problem
posed by Hume,
i.e., by
putting
pointedly
finite
For
out what makes

human understanding
finite.
For an
pointing
a
finite
with
furnishes
criterion
he
for
other,
understanding
own
its
it
finitude
with
the
infinite
measuring
by juxtaposing
From Hume, Maim?n
posited by Leibniz.
adopted
fact of sensation
and the conclusion Hume based upon
that the relations among concepts are purely psycholog
it, namely
the cognitive
ical. From Leibniz, Maim?n
ideal by con
adopted
trast with which
the nature of empirical knowledge
is illuminated.
can we draw from Maim?n's
What
of
conclusions
adaptation
understanding
the ultimate
Hume
and Kant?
First of all, because
Leibniz,
the background
Kant's
system constitutes
against which Maim?n
of Kant by
develops his theory, we can increase our appreciation
we
one
Maim?n.
that
may
expect
studying
Secondly,
problem
will be the nature of valid
with which Maim?n will be preoccupied
Finally, we may assume that the other problem with
knowledge.
from
elements
which
Maim?n
which
prevent
will
be preoccupied
will be the nature
the realization
of valid knowledge.3
of the factors
II
are the distinguishing
marks
of valid knowledge?
What
To
answer this question
to recall that in classical philos
it is necessary
the intelligible world on the
ophy a distinction was drawn between
one hand,
on the other.
and the empirical world
The first step
toward
cancelling
this
of knowledge.
within
the
realm
was
taken
by Kant.
By
sensation
for
and
and
world
understanding
intelligible
substituting
sensible world, Kant transformed
what liad hitherto
been a differ
ence in the structure
of the world,
into a difference within
the
limits
factors
intact.
3
Critical
The cognitive
See
to
(The Hague,
the
most
Speculative
distinction
But
the enclosure
of the diverse
despite
of knowledge,
remained
their duality
significance which Kant assigns to the differ
recent
study
comprehensive
The
Idealism:
Philosophy
Samuel
of
From
Atlas,
Solomon
Maim?n
1964).

NATHAN ROTENSTREICH
538
ence between
and sensation?as
from
understanding
distinguished
it
had
been
in
the ontological
classical
assigned
philosophy
validity
of Kant's
the logical condition
?can,
perhaps, be said to constitute
Maim?n goes beyond Kant by asking:
if under
idea of synthesis.
are
indeed
elements
sensation
of
and
then
standing
knowledge,
be maintained?
If understanding
their duality
and
why must
are
indeed
constituents
of
then
sensation
knowledge,
they ought to
a
as
of
rather than as two
be understood
elements
single system,
one of which
is based upon the other.
systems,
In abolishing
the ontological
and in substituting
difference,
a difference between
two sources of knowledge,
Kant took the first
second
toward
The
toward
rationalization.
rationaliza
step
step
between
the
is taken by Maim?n, who abolishes
the difference
a
sources
two
in
of knowledge
and substitutes
immanent
duality
a duality
in the process
of
immanent
the sphere of knowledge;
overcomes
which
the
and progressively
rationalization
perpetually
tion
irrational
factor,
of
i.e.,
irreducibility
rationalization,
which
would
Integration
substituted
for the fixed
process
into
the
into the
absorbed
By being
irrational
factor is robbed of its
a stable
status.
otherwise
arrogate
the datum.
the
continuous
status
of rationalization
process
of knowledge.
of the components
is
change undergone
by the datum entails a new view both
connected
them.
From
with
of concepts
and of the syntheses
are
intuitions
observation
that concepts without
Kant's well-known
are
intuitions
without
it
follows
that
and
blind,
concepts
empty,
The
contents
constitutes
are created
It is the content which

through
synthesis.
the encounter between
the different elements.
Abolish
between
ing the difference
the content into the concept
the elements
of
the absorption
as
endowed
into the concept
entails
itself, i.e.,
of
the power
with
As endowed
the power of explication.
no
content.
is
the
the
itself
longer
concept
Synthesis
explication,
to
and their application
of concepts
denotes
the self-transcendence
is implicit, to begin
intuitions.
The fullness furnished by intuition
is but the fullness of the con
and synthesis
in the concept;
with,
for
not
to
upon intuition
depending
begin with,
cept.
Being full
an
as
a
can
serve
for
the concept
its fullness,
starting
point
the problem
in which
i.e., for a genetic process
process,
explicative
be said that
It may
finds
its solution.
of validity
accordingly
with

ON THE POSITIONOFMAIMON'S PHILOSOPHY

Maim?n
goes beyond
tenet of each:
central
Maim?n
undertakes
from understanding
539
and Kant by developing

the
Leibniz, Hume,
with the help of Kant's concept of synthesis,
to demonstrate
the possibility
of a transition
was maintained
to experience,
which
by
But by so doing, he assigned a new

by Hume.
to Kant's conception
of synthesis;
whereas
Kant defined
as functions which
order the datum, Maim?n defines them
and denied
Leibniz
meaning
concepts
as the content
of the universe.
Ill
of synthesis
's new interpretation
leads him
of
of
the
universe.
the
rationality
conception
Rationality,
consists in the creation of the datum out of the
maintains,
not in the explanation
of the datum by means
of the
Maim?n
to a new
Maim?n
concept,
concept.
is realized
in the generation
of the datum.
Maim?n
Rationality
concrete
for this concept
in the
of rationality
sought
expression
:
facets
of
his
system
following
in
Conspicuous
is
the
noncognitive
sphere
In Kant's
thing-in-itself.4
(A)
its absence
factor
from
the
epistemological
the
posited
by Kant, namely
the thing-in-itself
fulfills the
system,
of (a) supplying knowledge
with the datum;
and
that the datum will not be eliminated
from
(b) guaranteeing
as it were,
Kant's
the ten
frustrates,
thing-in-itself
knowledge.
function
twofold
dency of the concept to produce the datum out of itself by way of a

transition.
continuous
the
If, however,
by "concept" we mean
room nor reason
element
of fullness,
then there is neither
for
limiting
in-itself;
function
a cognitive
to the thing
function
by assigning
a cognitive
there is neither room nor reason for allotting
to a factor which
subsists beyond
the sphere of knowl
its fullness
Hermann
Cohen
edge.
Anticipating
that
the
cannot
argues
thing-in-itself
an
based upon
analysis of the nature
and his
bear
Maim?n
followers,
the brunt of criticism
and constituent
elements
knowledge.
See Bergman,
op.
cit.,
pp.
7 ff.,
and
Atlas,
op.
cit.,
pp.
20

ff.
of
NATHAN ROTENSTREICH
540
Elimination
of
is entailed
the
by the
of concepts ; but no
concerning
assumption
of synthesis
is illuminated
positive characteristic
by its elimination.
The synthetic character of concepts finds positive
in the
expression
(B)
thing-in-itself
the synthetic character
the law of determinability

system,
apparent
pivot of Maimon's
der
How
is
it
Bestimmbarkeit).
(Satz
asks, to
possible, Maim?n
a
link a particular
with
Predication,
predicate
particular
subject?
a fundamental
of all knowledge,
is not an arbitrary act of
This function must necessarily
in
formal assertion.
be anchored
the meaning
and structure of the concepts
it combines;
it is not
of the assertion,
but also from the per
only from the perspective
a
a pred
term
of
must
that
constitute
content,
spective
particular
function
icate of a particular
be the measure
Or, as Maim?n
puts it, the content
subject.
of whether
the subject is determined
by the
and whether
the predicate
is the determination.
The
must
predicate,
combination
in the assertion
of the known
tion
in
tional
"This
"This
content;
assertion.
the
is accordingly
based upon the clarity
content guides the combina
and the known
the formal
facets of the proposi
Not
contents
to say
the known
permit us
but
structure,
is a right-angled
and
triangle,"
is a right-angled
truth."
Whereas,
prevent
us
from saying
to the realistic
according
is valid because
it copies the clear structure
solution,
knowledge
it is
of the world,
to Maim?n,
is valid when
according
knowledge
in
formulated
the
structure
Maim?n
function
assertions
which
a determinable
reflect
its
own
clear
structure,
i.e.,
its determinations.
subject
an ordering
is not merely
also maintains
that the concept
but also a fullness of content, because its very nature leads
us to bring
minations.
of
and
its implicit deter

from potentiality
into actuality
seems
two strands
of
to interweave
Here Maim?n
element
from
Aristotle's
the
of
emergence
potentiality
philosophy:
into actuality as a law of the universe,
and the element of related
forth
ness between
as the structure of propositions.

and predicate
from potentiality
into
the
Maim?n,
passage
represented
by
in
relation
is
the
between
and
subject
actuality
implicit
predicate;
is implicit in the structure of proposi
the structure of the universe
The encounter
between metaphysical
tions.
and logical structure
on the plane of the
nor on the plane of
occurs neither
universe,
con
formal logic, but on the plane of knowledge
saturated with
subject
As
ceptual
content.

541
PHILOSOPHY
The pivotal notion of Maim?n's

(C)
system is not exhausted
an
element of Aristotelian
that it combines
in the observation
logic
an element of Aristotelian
with
the subject-predicate
metaphysics,
structure
structure of propositions
with
the dynamic
of the uni
verse.
the element
For Maim?n
of
also adapts for his purposes
Maim?n
and accident.
substance
and accident
substance
between
the relation
represents
explicitly
a structure which has
as displaying
the determined
sphere : he correlates
to the logical
as being
substance
been
transferred
of its determination;
independent
as being
the determination
with
the accident
subject with
and he correlates
upon
dependent
the
determined
to
subject.
Maim?n
's transfer
of
the
categories
sphere
logical-conceptual
clearly
to abolish the duality of the spheres.
Also
tendency
related
reflected in this transfer is Maimon's
that
argument
closely
or
structure
cannot
of substances
be transparent
the
rational, unless
it is at the same time the structure of concepts.
ontological
reflects his
To understand
stance
and accident
to understand
transfers
the structure
of sub
why Maim?n
same
to the conceptual
at
the
is
time
sphere,
he criticizes
the notion
that the category
of
why
Were
constitutes
the supreme principle
of knowledge.
causality
we to represent as a central metaphysical
motif
the conflict between
the principle
of substance
and the principle
of causality, we would
to
the
include Maim?n
of the
have
among
leading proponents
former:
measuring
Maim?n
rationality,
effect
rather
the principle
that
argues
is not meaningful,
than explication?it
the related
terms.
The
as the
thinkers
represent
represented
by Maim?n
kind,
of causality
by his standard of
cause and
relation between
a
relation
of
because?being
implication
is not based upon the inner content of
assertion
and determination
which many
Maim?n
the
of the causality
strength
principle
as its weakness.
A connection
of
is external
and meaningless.
are
this
Maimon's
argues,
founda
ideal, then, is to find an immanent-meaningful
cognitive
even when
tion for the interconnectedness
of elements,
their con
occurs merely
in time.
nection
This ideal cannot be satisfied by
the merely
Maim?n
temporal relation of succession.
consequently
tries to correlate the principle of causality with a type of continuous
transition based upon the content of the phases which
follow one
another,
not upon
their position
in a temporal
sequence.

NATHAN ROTENSTREICH
542
The
(D)
rationalization
reflects the
by Maim?n
employed
in
his
teaching.
per
predominant
Particularly
in this respect,
is the term "differential,"
which Maim?n
tinent,
uses to denote
the process of creating
the datum out of the con
the
the conceptual
of
elements.
cept,
being
perceptions
integrals
As S. H. Bergman
has shown,3
the position
occupied
by the
very
concept
of differential
toward
rationalization.
terminology
in Maimon's
system is parallel to the position
of
in Kant's
the
schematism
Yet this
concept
by
occupied
system.
not
of
Maimon's
need
detain
since
it
to
us,
concept
aspect
pertains
of his system, rather than to its main
the technical machinery
trend
be worthwhile
light on that trend, it might
the relations between Formal Logic, which
to
pertains
the structure of judgments,
and Transcendental
which
per
Logic,
was among
tains to objects.
Maim?n
the first philosophers
to
take issue with Kant on this central matter.
Unlike Kant, Maim?n
of Transcendental
maintains
the primacy
and its inde
Logic
To throw
further
to examine
of Formal
In thus diverging
from Kant, Maim?n
Logic.
to
invest
content
of
with
all,
sought,
thought
and, secondly,
to make Formal Logic?which
and abstracts
disregards
deliberately
an abstraction
from content?merely
of the full, and consequently
Once we admit that the concept
is dynamic,
creative,
concept.
pendence
first
that it is the precondition

of rationalization
of
through generation
out of a concept,
then we are driven to regard content
as primary,
as secondary.6
saturated
and formal thought
thought
the datum
IV
If Maimon's
it is because the trend

system appears Janus-faced,
an
awareness
is
rationalization
that ration
accompanied
by
cannot be realized within
the limits of finite understanding.
toward
ality
Rationalization
is obstructed
by the factual difference

of knowledge,
i.e., by the dual
critical system.
factual
Maimon's
elements
component
scribed in Kant's
See Bergman,
op.
Rotenstreich,
14 ff.
pp.
6
Kant,
See
cit.,
pp.
Experience
65
ff.; Atlas,
and
its
op.
cit.,
pp.
Systematization,
between
the
structure
de
scepticism
109
is
ff.
Studies

in
543
PHILOSOPHY
on the one hand,

system:
and
of
standard
the
rationalization,
system by
measures
on
he
rationalization
other
the
finds it wanting;
hand,
Thus
be realized.
that it cannot
and finds
system,
by Kant's
even
de
seems to accept the Kantian
Maim?n
though
system
facto,
a solution
to the problem
it was
that it constitutes
he denies
uses
two different
based upon
he measures
of Kant's
Kant's
be described
to solve.
Maimon's
system may accordingly
designed
and factual scepticism.
rationalism
as a combination
of fundamental
factual scepticism?
other reason is there for Maimon's
What
an
in Kant's
of
is
element
that
recalled
there
will
be
It
ambiguity
of
connotes
the domain
"Experience"
sense
that Kant says
It is in this
data.
7
when he says
to experience."
to
Yet
has
left
be
else
"Everything
as grounded
and
both in perception
that he deals with experience
as a synthesis
and not
he refers to experience
in understanding,8
concept
sensuous
as
a mere
of
experience.
encounter with
case
In any
encounter.
Kant
does
not
an
offer
exhaustive
of expe
the two meanings
of the relation
explanation
more
seems to have been
in this matter;
rience.
Maim?n
precise
a particular
that
he
maintained
Kantian
terms,
sense-impres
using
the total system of knowledge
while
sion is an actual experience,
are
that concepts
This
implies
experience.
represents
possible
and
in
to
qua possible
experience,
general
knowledge
applicable
to actual experience
that they are not applicable
qua this or that
between
is no internal connection
There
particular
impression.
between
in its ultimate
factuality and the system
impression
of the system to the impres
Hence the applicability
The question
sion is not demonstrated
quid facti remains
by Kant.
the datum from
of
rationalization
unsolved;
through generation
this particular
of knowledge.
the concept
remains
within
unattainable
the limits
of finite
under
standing.
In the history
factual scepticism
of sceptical ideas, Maimon's
a
aware
is
His scepticism
of, and mea
special position
occupies
sures itself by, a criterion of knowledge
immune against scepticism.
on the
are
and
relativism
Both
challenged
scepticism
generally
7
Kritik
(London,
8
Peter
der
1950),
Prolegomena
and Lucas
reinen
p.
Vernunft,
B,
p.
218.
In
trans,
by
Kemp
Smith
208.
zu einer
(Manchester,
jeden
k?nftigen
1953).
Metaphysik,
etc.
S 20,

trans,
by
544 NATHAN ROTENSTREICH

that they presuppose what they negate.
More specifically,
grounds
it is objected,
first of all, that the sceptic assertion
"there is no
a
certain
itself
certain
is
it is
judgment"
judgment.
Secondly,
some
that
is
with
objected
scepticism
possible only by comparison
thing which
is beyond
to Maimon's
doubt.
Neither
of these
objections
seems
Maim?n
restricts
pertinent
scepticism.
explicitly
as he
doubt within
the limits of empirical
Doubt,
knowledge.
to
the existence
of thought
in
puts it, applies
concerning
objects
to the a priori conditions
of knowledge.
Such doubt
conformity
not
itself because
cancel
it applies
of
only to knowledge
not
to
structure
of
the
of
Further
knowledge
objects,
knowledge.
is explicitly
such scepticism
to a
formulated
more,
by reference
ideal.
Such
cognitive
definite,
crystallized,
scepticism
accordingly
or
of the ideal, not the self-contradiction
implies the nonrealization
of knowledge.
self-destruction
does
character of Maimon's
Janus-faced
system carries decisive
from
the
of
the
of philosophy.
We
weight
viewpoint
development
formulated
the program
of nine
may venture to say that Maim?n
aware
teenth century idealism,
not be
that
the
could
program
fully
as a
carried out.
Nineteenth
idealism
be
described
may
century
or
movement
which
to
undertake
endeavors,
dares,
philosophical
The
the execution
of Maimon's
Idealism tries to abolish the

program.
set
it
sceptical boundary
attempts to abolish the differ
by Maim?n;
ence between finite consciousness
and infinite-divine
consciousness.
It is not by chance that Hegel's
is
described
system
by Whitehead
as a philosophic
attitude of a God.9
design was to abolish
Hegel's
our minds
the inner opposition
between
and objects,
and to repre
sent objects or objectivity
as objectified mind.
we describe
do
Why
of Maimon's
this realization
as
Unlike
program
Maim?n,
daring?
not
as a limitation
finite mind
of infinite
represent
as
he represents
infinite mind
an immanent
of
explication
does
Hegel
mind;
9
1948),
"Analysis
p. 99.
of Meaning,"
in Essays
in Science
and
Philosophy

(London,
ON THE POSITIONOFMAIMON'S PHILOSOPHY545

This
finite mind.
system
justifies
not
only
is why
Hegel
to the Phenomenology
his daring venture.
that
Maimon's
a central
assigns
for
of Spirit;
Here he undertakes
program
can
be
in his
position
it is here that he
realized
to demonstrate
as
a matter
of
also that it is actually realized, and realized precisely

principle,
as incapable
of
mind which
Maim?n
finite
that
represented
by
as
Maim?n
What
rationalization.
frustrating
represents
realizing
as sustaining
it.
the trend toward realization, Hegel represents
but
The Hebrew
University
of Jerusalem.


On The Position of Maimona Philosophy

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Оригинальное название

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

On The Position of Maimona Philosophy

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

On the Position of Maimon's Philosophy

Author(s): Nathan Rotenstreich

This content downloaded from 190.216.144.250 on Mon, 22 Dec 2014 19:42:37 PM