Timon is reported as telling us that in order to be happy, one must pay attentio

n to three connected questions: first, what are things like by nature? second, h
ow should we be disposed towards things (given our answer to the first question)
? and third, what will be the outcome for those who adopt the disposition recomm
ended in the answer to the second question? And the passage then gives us Pyrrho
's and Timon's answers to each of the three questions in order.
The answer to the question what are things like by nature? is given by a sequence
of three epithets; things are said to be adiaphora and astathmta and anepikrita.
Taken by themselves, these epithets can be understood in two importantly differe
nt ways: they may be taken as characterizing how things are (by nature) in thems
elves, or they may be taken as commenting on human beings' lack (by our nature)
of cognitive access to things. Adiaphora is normally translated indifferent . But t
his might be taken as referring either to an intrinsic characteristic of things na
mely that, in themselves and by nature, they possess no differentiating features
or to our natural inability to discern any such features. In the latter case und
ifferentiable might be a more perspicuous translation. (Beckwith (2011) plausibly
connects the focus on differentiating features, or the lack of them, with the A
ristotelian notion of differentiae; on either of the readings to be explored, Ar
istotle's picture of the world and of our ability to understand it would indeed
be a prime example of the kind of view from which Pyrrho is anxious to distance
himself.) Similarly, astathmta might mean unstable or unbalanced , describing an objec
tive property of things; or it might mean not subject to being placed on a balanc
e , and hence unmeasurable , which would again place the focus on our cognitive inabi
lities. And anepikrita might mean indeterminate , referring to an objective lack of
any definite features, or indeterminable , pointing to an inability on our part to
determine the features of things. The statement as a whole, then, is either ans
wering the question what are things like by nature? by stating that things are, in
their very nature, indefinite or indeterminate in various ways
the precise natu
re of the thesis would be a matter for further speculation or by stating that we h
uman beings are not in a position to pin down or determine the nature of things.
Let us call these the metaphysical and the epistemological interpretations resp
ectively.
It is clear that the metaphysical interpretation gives us a Pyrrho who is not in
any recognizable sense a sceptic. Pyrrho, on this interpretation, is issuing a
declaration about the nature of things in themselves precisely what the later Pyrr
honists who called themselves sceptics were careful to avoid. On the epistemolog
ical interpretation, on the other hand, Pyrrho is very much closer to the tradit
ion that took his name. There is still some distance between them. To say that w
e cannot determine the nature of things as opposed to saying that we have so far
failed to determine the natural features of things is already a departure from th
e sceptical suspension of judgement promoted by Sextus Empiricus. And to put it,
as on this reading Pyrrho does put it, by saying that things are indeterminable
, is a further departure, in that it does attribute at least one feature to thin
gs in themselves namely, being such that humans cannot determine them. Neverthel
ess, the epistemological interpretation clearly portrays Pyrrho as a forerunner a
naive and unsophisticated forerunner, perhaps
of later Pyrrhonist scepticism, wh
ereas the metaphysical interpretation puts him in a substantially different ligh
t.
The natural way to try to choose between these two interpretations is to see whi
ch of them fits best with the logic of the passage as a whole. But here we encou
nter a further complication. The text of the phrase that follows the words we ha
ve just been discussing is subject to dispute. According to the manuscripts this
phrase reads for this reason (dia touto) neither our sensations nor our opinions
tell the truth or lie . Now, if this reading is correct, the thought expressed se
ems to favor the metaphysical interpretation; the idea is that, since things are
in their real nature indeterminate, our sensations and opinions, which represen
t things as having certain determinate features, are neither true nor false. The

y are not true, since reality is not the way they present it as being; but they
are not false either, since that too would require that reality have certain det
erminate features, namely features that are the negations of the ones that our s
ensations and opinions portray it as having. By contrast, it is quite unclear ho
w the claim that the nature of things cannot be determined by us could be though
t to license the inference for this reason neither our sensations nor our opinion
s tell the truth or lie . That claim would seem at most to license the very differ
ent inference that we cannot tell whether they tell the truth or lie.
But some scholars have suggested that the manuscripts are in error at this point
, and that what the text should say is on account of the fact that (dia to) neith
er our sensations nor our opinions tell the truth or lie . The change is justified
on linguistic grounds; it is alleged that the text in the manuscripts as they s
tand is not acceptable Greek. The considerations for and against this proposal a
re technical, and debate has yielded no consensus on this question. However, it
is clear that if one does make this small alteration to the text, the direction
of the inference is reversed; the point about our sensations and opinions now be
comes a reason for the point about the nature of things, not an inference from i
t. And this, it has been argued, points towards the epistemological interpretati
on. The idea would then be that, since our sensations and opinions fail to be co
nsistent deliverers of true reports (or, for that matter, false reports) about t
he world around us, there is no prospect of our being able to determine the natu
re of things.
This is the crux on which the decision between the two main lines of interpretat
ion of Pyrrho's philosophy turns. The remainder of the Aristocles passage, and i
ndeed the remainder of the evidence on Pyrrho in general, can be read so as to f
it with either the metaphysical or the epistemological reading of his answer to
the question about the nature of things. The Aristocles passage continues with t
he answer to the second question, namely the question of the attitude we should
adopt given the answer to the first question. We are told, first, that we should
not trust our sensations and opinions, but should adopt an unopinionated attitu
de. On the epistemological reading, the significance of this is obvious. But on
the metaphysical reading, too, we have already been told that our sensations and
opinions are not true, which is presumably reason enough for us not to trust th
em; and the unopinionated attitude that is here recommended may be understood as
one in which one refrains from positing any definite characteristics as inheren
t in the nature of things given that their real nature is wholly indefinite. (To t
he objection that this thesis of indefiniteness is itself an opinion, it may be
replied that doxa, opinion , is regularly used in earlier Greek philosophy, especia
lly in Parmenides and Plato, to refer to those opinions misguided opinions, in the
view of these authors that take on trust a view of the world as conforming more o
r less to the way it appears in ordinary experience. In this usage, the claim th
at reality is indefinite would not be a (mere) opinion, but would be a statement
of the truth.)
The passage now introduces a certain form of speech that is supposed to reflect
this unopinionated attitude. We are supposed to say about each single thing that
it no more is than is not or both is and is not or neither is nor is not . There a
re a number of intricate questions about the exact relations between the various
parts of this complicated utterance, and especially about the role and signific
ance of the both and neither components. But it is clear that this too is susceptibl
e of being read along the lines of either of the two interpretations introduced
above. On the metaphysical interpretation, we are being asked to adopt a form of
words that reflects the utter indefiniteness of the way things are; we should n
ot say of anything that it is any particular way any more than that it is not th
at way (with is being understood, as commonly in Greek philosophy, as shorthand fo
r is F , where F stands for any arbitrary predicate). On the epistemological interp
retation, we are being asked to use a manner of speaking that expresses our susp
ension of judgement about how things are.

Finally, in answer to the third question, we are told that the result for those
who adopt the unopinionated attitude just recommended is first aphasia and then
ataraxia. Ataraxia, freedom from worry , is familiar to us from later Pyrrhonism; t
his is said by the later Pyrrhonists to be the result of the suspension of judge
ment that they claimed to be able to induce. The precise sense of aphasia is les
s clear. Beckwith (2011) actually argues that the transmitted text is erroneous,
and that we should instead read apatheia, "lack of passion". This is an attract
ive suggestion; apatheia is indeed a term used not infrequently of Pyrrho's untr
oubled attitude (see section 5), whereas a reference to aphasia would be unparal
leled in the other evidence on Pyrrho. However, the proposal is inevitably specu
lative, and aphasia is a term in use in later Pyrrhonism; it seems worth trying
to elucidate it on the assumption that the transmitted text is correct. It might
mean non-assertion , as in Sextus that is, a refusal to commit oneself to definite a
lternatives; or it might mean, more literally, speechlessness , which could in turn
be taken to be an initial reaction of stunned silence to the radical position w
ith which one has been presented (an uncomfortable reaction that is subsequently
replaced by ataraxia the passage does say that aphasia comes first and ataraxia c
omes later). But the decision between these two ways of understanding the term i
s independent of the broader interpretive issues bearing upon the passage as a w
hole. For some form of non-assertion is clearly licensed by either the metaphysica
l or the epistemological interpretation; and on either interpretation, the view
proposed might indeed render someone (initially) uncomfortable to the point of sp
eechlessness . The important point, though, is that ataraxia is the end result; an
d this links back to the introductory remark to the effect that the train of tho
ught to be summarized has the effect of making one happy.
We have, then, two major possibilities. On the one hand, Pyrrho can be read as a
dvancing a sweeping metaphysical thesis, that things are in their real nature in
definite or indeterminate, and encouraging us to embrace the consequences of tha
t thesis by refusing to attribute any definite features to things (at least, as
belonging to their real nature) and by refusing to accept at face value (again,
as revelatory of the real nature of things) those myriad aspects of our ordinary
experience that represent things as having certain definite features. Or, on th
e other hand, Pyrrho can be read as declaring that the nature of things is inacc
essible to us, and encouraging us to withdraw our trust (and to speak in such a
way as to express our withdrawal of trust) in ordinary experience as a guide to
the nature of things. As noted earlier, the second, epistemological interpretati
on makes Pyrrho's outlook a great deal closer to that of the later Pyrrhonists w
ho took him as an inspiration. But that is not in itself any reason for favoring
this interpretation over the other, metaphysical one. For on either interpretat
ion Pyrrho is said to promise ataraxia, the later Pyrrhonists' goal, and to prom
ise it as a result of a certain kind of withdrawal of trust in the veracity of o
ur everyday impressions of things; the connection between these two points align
s Pyrrho with the later Pyrrhonists, and sets him apart from every other Greek p
hilosophical movement that preceded later Pyrrhonism. The fact that this later s
ceptical tradition took Pyrrho as an inspiration is therefore readily understand
able whichever of the two interpretations is correct (or whichever they thought
was correct). It is also true that, on the metaphysical interpretation of the pa
ssage, the grounds on which Pyrrho advanced his metaphysical thesis of indetermi
nacy are never specified; this too, like the precise character of the thesis its
elf, must be a matter for speculative reconstruction. But Aristocles only purpor
ts to be giving the key points of Timon's summary; the lack of detail, though di
sappointing, would not be surprising.