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Held: We find respondent Judge's order to release the truck owned and driven by
Mr. Dionisio Golpe legally justifiable, hence, he is not subject to any disciplinary
sanction.
Complainant is correct in pointing out that the DENR Secretary or his duly
authorized representative has the power to confiscate any illegally obtained or
gathered forest products and all conveyances used in the commission of the offense
and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws. However, as
complainant himself likewise pointed out, this power is in relation to the
administrative jurisdiction of the DENR, which is entirely different from the criminal
jurisdiction of the court that ordered the release of the truck as presided by
respondent Judge.
In addition, according to Article 45 of the RPC, Forfeiture of the proceeds of the
crime and the instrument or tools with which it was committed cannot be done if
the same be the property of a third person not liable for the offense. Since the
truck here is the property of a third party not charged in the criminal complaint, the
order of its release here is henceforth justifiable.
Provident Tree Farms Inc. vs Batario 231 SCRA 463
Facts: In the extrant case, PTFI seeks to set aside the 8 February 1990 order of
respondent court and prays for the continuation of the hearing in Civil Case No. 8948836. PTFI claims that what was brought before the trial court was a civil case for
injunction, i.e., "restraining the entry of safety matches into the country . . . for the
purpose of securing compliance with Sec. 36 (l) of the Forestry Code and for
damages, "to seek redress of its right which has been clearly violated by the
importation of safety matches . . . . (which) is a denial to the petitioner of the
protection and incentive granted it by Section 36 (l) of the Forestry Code . . . ."
Naturally, PTFI asserts the inapplicability of the procedures outlined in R.A. No.
1125 relative to incidents before the Court of Tax Appeals because the instant
action is not a protest case where the aggrieved party is not an importer. It then
argues that since it could not avail of the remedies afforded by the Tariff and
Customs Code, resort to the courts is warranted, citing Commissioner of Customs v.
Alikpala.
Petitioner asserts his complaint on a statutory privilege or incentive granted under
Sec. 36, par. (l), of the Revised Forestry Code. The only subject of this incentive is
a ban against importation of wood, wood products or wood-derivated products
which is to be enforced by the Bureau of Customs since it has, under the Tariff and
Customs Code, the exclusive original jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture cases
and, in fact, it is the duty of the Collector of Customs to exercise jurisdiction over
prohibited importations.
The enforcement of the importation ban under Sec. 36, par. (l), of the Revised
Forestry Code is within the exclusive realm of the Bureau of Customs, and direct
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Decree No. 705. The sawyers were acquitted due to reasonable doubt but
petitioner was sentenced as guilty hence he filed this appeal.
Issue: Is petitioner
Decree No. 705?
Aquinio
guilty
of
violating
Section
68
of
Presidential
Held: No, There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68
of PD 705, to wit 1. Cutting, gathering, collecting timber and other forest products
from any forest land 2. Possession of timber or any forest products without legal
documents.
The provision clearly punishes anyone who shall cut, gather, collect or
remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority. In
this case, petitioner was charged by CENRO to supervise the implementation of the
permit. He was not the one who cut, gathered, collected or removed the pine trees
within the contemplation of Section 68 of PD 705. He was not in possession of the
cut trees because the lumber was used by Teachers Camp for repairs. Petitioner
could not likewise be convicted of conspiracy to commit the offense because all his
co-accused were acquitted of the charges against them.
Lagua vs Cusi 160 SCRA 463
Facts : In a vigorous complaint, the petitioners, alleged, among others:
In Paragraph 5(a):
a) On 1 January 1976, Atty. Ernesto Nombrado, legal counsel for
defendants, issued a memorandum to the Chief Security Guard of
Defendant East coast directing the latter to prevent the passage of
Plaintiff Laguas' hauling trucks loaded with logs for the Japanese
vessel (there were no other trucks hauling logs at that time) on the
national highway loading towards where the vessel was berthed. In
compliance with this directive, the security force of Defendant
Eastcoast closed the road to the use by plaintiffs trucks and other
equipments and effectively prevented their passage thereof while the
vehicles and trucks
The private respondents filed a motion to dismiss on two grounds, namely: (1) lack
of jurisdiction, and (2) lack of cause of action.
The private respondents extended that as the acts complained of by the petitioners
arose out of the legitimate exercise of respondent Eastcoast Development
Enterprises, Inc., rights as a timber licensee, more particularly in the use of its
logging roads, therefore, the resolution of this question is properly and legally
within the Bureau of Forest Development, citing as authority Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 705. The private respondents also argued that petitioner Daylinda
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Laguas has no capacity to sue as her name was not registered as an "agent" or
"dealer" of logs in the Bureau of Forestry.
Issue: Whether or not the petition for mandamus may be entertained by the trial
court.
Held: Yes. The petition for mandamus will be treated as a petition for certiorari in
the interest of justice.
The petitioners maintain that since their action is for damages, the regular courts
have jurisdiction over the same. According to them, the respondent court had no
basis for holding that the Bureau of Forestry Development must first determine that
the closure of a logging road is illegal before an action for damages can be
instituted.
P.D. No. 705 upon which the respondent court based its order does not vest any
power in the Bureau of Forest Development to determine whether or not the
closure of a logging road is legal or illegal and to make such determination a prerequisite before an action for damages may be maintained.
Moreover, the complaint instituted by the petitioners is clearly for damages based
on the alleged illegal closure of the logging road. Whether or not such closure was
illegal is a matter to be established on the part of the petitioners and a matter to be
disproved by the private respondents. This should appropriately be threshed out in
a judicial proceeding. It is beyond the power and authority of the Bureau of Forest
Development to determine the unlawful closure of a passage way, much less award
or deny the payment of damages based on such closure. Not every activity inside a
forest area is subject to the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development.
Anent the legal capacity to sue of the petitioners, spouses Laguas, we affirm the
trial court's ruling that since they were mere agents of petitioners Achanzar and
Donga and were suing in their own behalf, they did not have the capacity to sue for
damages. They are not the real parties in interest. However, the complaint can still
be maintained. It cannot be dismissed because the real parties in interest, Achanzar
and Donga were also plaintiffs. Thus, the trial court should have ordered only the
dropping of the names of the spouses Laguas pursuant to Section 11, Rule 3 of the
Revised Rules of Court but not the dismissal of the complaint.
Mustang Lumber vs Court of Appeals 257 SCRA 430
Facts: The authorities got wind of a suspicious stockpile of narra flitches, shorts,
and slabs that were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela,
Metro Manila. Readily, the said organized a team of foresters and policemen and
sent it to conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard.
During the sting operation, the team members saw coming out from the
lumberyard the petitioner's truck, with Plate No. CCK-322, loaded with lauan and
almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not
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produce the required invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck
together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR compound at Visayas
Avenue, Quezon City. The team was not able to gain entry into the premises
because of the refusal of the owner.
On 23 April 1990, Secretary Factoran issued an order suspending immediately the
petitioner's lumber-dealer's permit No. NRD-4-092590-0469 and directing the
petitioner to explain in writing within fifteen days why its lumber-dealer's permit
should not be cancelled.
On the same date, counsel for the petitioner sent another letter to Robles informing
the latter that the petitioner had already secured the required documents and was
ready to submit them. None, however, was submitted.[
In resolving the said case, the trial court held that the warrantless search and
seizure on 1 April 1990 of the petitioner's truck, which was moving out from the
petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, loaded with large volumes of
lumber without covering document showing the legitimacy of its source or origin did
not offend the constitutional mandate that search and seizure must be supported
by a valid warrant. The situation fell under one of the settled and accepted
exceptions where warrantless search and seizure is justified, viz., a search of a
moving vehicle
The trial court, however, set aside Secretary Factoran's order of 3 May 1990
ordering the confiscation of the seized articles in favor of the Government for the
reason that since the articles were seized pursuant to the search warrant issued by
Executive Judge Osorio they should have been returned to him in compliance with
the directive in the warrant.
On 7 July 1991, accused Ri Chuy Po filed in the CRIMINAL CASE a Motion to Quash
and/or to Suspend Proceedings based on the following grounds:
(a) the
information does not charge an offense, for possession of lumber, as opposed to
timber, is not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even
granting arguendo that lumber falls within the purview of the said section, the same
may not be used in evidence against him for they were taken by virtue of an illegal
seizure; and (b) Civil Case No. 90-53648 of Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila, the
FIRST CIVIL CASE, then pending before the Court of Appeals, which involves the
legality of the seizure, raises a prejudicial question
Issue: Whether the complaint charges an offense
Held: No. The petitioner proposed to quash the information in Criminal Case No.
324-V-91 on the ground that it does not charge an offense. Respondent Judge
granted the motion reasoning that the subject matter of the information in the
CRIMINAL CASE is LUMBER, which is neither "timber" nor "other forest product"
under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and hence, possession thereof
without the required legal documents is not prohibited and penalized under the said
section.
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Under paragraph (a), Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, an information may
be quashed on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an
offense. It has been said that "the test for the correctness of this ground is the
sufficiency of the averments in the information, that is, whether the facts alleged, if
hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of the offense, and matters aliunde
will not be considered." Anent the sufficiency of the information, Section 6, Rule
110 of the Rules of Court requires, inter alia, that the information state the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense.
Tan vs People of the Philippines 290 SCRA 117
Facts: On October 26, 1989, about 6:30 p.m., in the town proper of Cajidiocan,
Sibuyan Island, Romblon, Forest Guards Joseph Panadero and Eduardo Rabino
intercepted a dump truck loaded with narra and white lauan lumber. The truck was
driven by Petitioner Fred Moreno, an employee of A & E Construction. Again, about
8:00 p.m. on October 30, 1989, this time in Barangay Cambajao, Forest Guards
Panadero and Rabino apprehended another dump truck with Plate No. DEK-646
loaded with tanguile lumber. Said truck was driven by Crispin Cabudol, also an
employee of A & E Construction. Both motor vehicles, as well as the construction
firm, were owned by Petitioner Alejandro Tan. In both instances, no documents
showing legal possession of the lumber were, upon demand, presented to the forest
guards;
thus,
the
pieces
of
lumber
were
confiscated.
Tan and Moreno, together with Ismael Ramilo, caretaker and timekeeper of A & E
Construction, were charged by First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Felix R. Rocero
with violation of Section 68,[6] PD No. 705, as amended by EO No. 277. The
accused were all convicted for failure to comply with the Forestry Reform Code. The
CA found no cogent reason for the reversal or modification of the decision.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Section 68 of EO 277 is unconstitutional.
2. Whether or not "lumber" is to be construed as "timber" and/or forest product
within the contemplation of PD 705.
Held: Section 68 deals with penalizing the "cutting, gathering and/or collecting
timber or other forest products without license." One of the essential requisites for
a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law is the existence of an
actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial
determination. As Respondent Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, petitioners
were not charged with the [unlawful] possession of firewood, bark, honey,
beeswax, and even grass, shrub, the associated water or fish; thus, the inclusion
of any of these enumerated items in EO 277 is absolutely of no concern to
petitioners. They are not asserting a legal right for which they are entitled to a
judicial determination at this time. Besides, they did not present any convincing
evidence of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution that would justify
the nullification of said provision.
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the instant case, Edma did not resort to, or avail of, any administrative remedy. He
went straight to court and filed a complaint for replevin and damages.
Second, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of
cases pending before administrative agencies of special competence.
Third, the forest products are already in custodia legis and thus cannot be the
subject of replevin.
Factoran vs Court of Appeals 320 SCRA 530
Facts: On August 9, 1988, two (2) police officers of the Marikina Police Station,
Sub-Station III, intercepted a six-wheeler truck, with Plate No. NJT-881, carrying
4,000 board feet of narra lumber as it was cruising along the Marcos Highway.
They apprehended the truck driver, private respondent Jesus Sy, and brought the
truck and its cargo to the Personnel Investigation Committee/Special Actions and
Investigation Division (PIC/SAID) of the DENR Office in Quezon City. There,
petitioner Atty. Vicente Robles of the PIC/SAID investigated them, and discovered
the following discrepancies in the documentation of the narra lumber which are in
violation of Bureau of Forestry Development (BFD) Circular No. 10. The said BFD
Circular requires possession or transportation of lumber to be supported by the
following documents: (1) Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) which shall be issued
only by the District Forester, or in his absence, the Assistant District Forester; (2)
Sales Invoice; (3) Delivery Receipt; and (4) Tally Sheets.
Such omission is punishable under Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705
otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.[5] Thus, petitioner Atty. Robles
issued a temporary seizure order and seizure receipt for the narra lumber and the
six-wheeler truck.
On March 30, 1989, the Court of Appeals granted petitioners temporary relief in the
form of a temporary restraining order (TRO).
On September 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals converted the TRO into a writ of
preliminary injunction upon filing by petitioners of a bond in the amount of
P180,000.00.
Issue: W/N the court injuction on the DENR lies, considering that exhaustion of
administrative remedies were not followed
Held: No. All actions and decisions of the Director are subject to review, motu
propio or upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head
whose decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of thirty (30) days from
receipt by the aggrieved party of said decision unless appealed to the President x
x x. The decision of the Department Head may not be reviewed by the courts
except through a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition.
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Baggayan. The Court issued a writ ordering the return of the truck to private
respondents. Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan filed a motion to
dismiss with the trial court contending that private respondents had no cause of
action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners aver
that the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truck
was under administrative seizure proceedings pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705,
as amended by E.O. 277.
Private respondents resisted to avoid the operation of this principle asserting that
the instant case falls within the exception of the doctrine upon the justification that
(1) due process was violated because they were not given the chance to be heard,
and (2) the seizure and forfeiture was unlawful on the grounds: (a) that the
Secretary of DENR and his representatives have no authority to confiscate and
forfeit conveyances utilized in transporting illegal forest products, and (b) that the
truck as admitted by petitioners was not used in the commission of the crime.
ISSUE: W/N Replevin lies in a case where the Doctrine of Administrative Exhaustion
was not followed
HELD: No. A crime was committed and the tools of the crime are under custodia
legis. With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D.
705, the act of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest
products without authority constitutes a distinct offense independent now from the
crime of theft under Articles 309
From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that a suit for replevin cannot be
sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them
for administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Section 68-A of the P. D.
705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of
the private respondents failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have
been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction
over the case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck.
Exhaustion of the remedies in the administrative forum, being a condition
precedent prior to ones recourse to the courts and more importantly, being an
element of private respondents right of action, is too significant to be waylaid by
the lower court.
Alvarez vs PICOP 508 SCRA 498
Facts: PICOP filed with the DENR an application to have its Timber License
Agreement (TLA) No. 43converted into an IFMA.PICOP filed before the (RTC) City a
Petition for Mandamus against then DENR Sec Alvarez for unlawfully refusing
and/or neglecting to sign and execute the IFMA contract of PICOP even as thelatter
has complied with all the legal requirements for the automatic conversion of TLA
No. 43, asamended, into an IFMA.The cause of action of PICOP Resources, Inc.
(PICOP) in its Petition for Mandamus with the trialcourt is clear: the government is
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While the MPSA were pending, Banahaw Mining, on December 18, 1996, decided to
sell/assign its rights and interests over thirty-seven mining claims in favor of
private respondent Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation (Base Metals for
brevity). The transfer included mining claims held by Banahaw Mining in its own
right as claim owner, as well as those covered by its mining operating agreement
with CMMCI.
Upon being informed of the development, CMMCI, as claim owner, immediately
approved the assignment made by Banahaw Mining in favor of private respondent
Base Metals, thereby recognizing private respondent Base Metals as the new
operator of its claims
On November 18, 1997, petitioner PICOP filed with the Mines Geo-Sciences Bureau
(MGB), Caraga Regional Office No. XIII an Adverse Claim and/or Opposition to
private respondent Base Metals' application on the following grounds:
I. THE APPROVAL OF THE APPLICATION AND ISSUANCE OF THE MPSA OF BASE
METALS WILL VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE AGAINST IMPAIRMENT OF
OBLIGATION IN A CONTRACT
The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the MAB, ruling that the Presidential
Warranty of September 25, 1968 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
merely confirmed the timber license granted to PICOP and warranted the latter's
peaceful and adequate possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. It was
only given upon the request of the Board of Investments to establish the
boundaries of PICOP's timber license agreement. The Presidential Warranty did not
convert PICOP's timber license into a contract because it did not create any
obligation on the part of the government in favor of PICOP. Thus, the nonimpairment clause finds no application.
Neither did the Presidential Warranty grant PICOP the exclusive possession,
occupation and exploration of the concession areas covered. If that were so, the
government would have effectively surrendered its police power to control and
supervise the exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural
resources.
ISSUE: W/N the impairment of contracts apply?
Held: No. The guaranty is merely a collateral inducement.
An examination of the Presidential Warranty at once reveals that it simply reassures
PICOP of the government's commitment to uphold the terms and conditions of its
timber license and guarantees PICOP's peaceful and adequate possession and
enjoyment of the areas which are the basic sources of raw materials for its wood
processing complex. The warranty covers only the right to cut, collect, and remove
timber in its concession area, and does not extend to the utilization of other
resources, such as mineral resources, occurring within the concession.
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Held: Yes. In several cases on mining disputes, the Court recognized a distinction
between (1) the primary powers granted by pertinent provisions of law to the then
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (and the bureau directors) of an
executive or administrative nature, such as granting of license, permits, lease and
contracts, or approving, rejecting, reinstating or canceling applications, or deciding
conflicting applications, and (2) controversies or disagreements of civil or
contractual nature between litigants which are questions of a judicial nature that
may be adjudicated only by the courts of justice.The allegations in Tuasons
complaint do not make out a case for a mining dispute or controversy within the
jurisdiction of the DENR. While the Agreement to Operate Mining Claims is a
mining contract, the ground upon which the contract is sought to be annulled is not
due to Asaphils refusal to abide by the terms and conditions of the agreement, but
due to Induplexs alleged violation of the condition imposed by the BOI in its Joint
Venture Agreement with Grefco, Inc.. Also, Tuason sought the nullity of the
Contract for Sale and Purchase of Perlite Ore, based on the same alleged violation.
Obviously, this raises a judicial question, which is proper for determination by the
regular courts.
The DENR is not called upon to exercise its technical knowledge or expertise over
any mining operations or dispute; rather, it is being asked to determine the validity
of the agreements based on circumstances beyond the respective rights of the
parties under the two contracts. Thus, the DENR Regional Executive Director was
correct in dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over Tuasons complaint;
consequently, the MAB committed an error in taking cognizance of the appeal, and
in ruling upon the validity of the contracts.
Dipidio Earth-Savers Multi-Purpose Association vs Gozun 485 SCRA 586
Facts: After the EDSA Revolution, Cory swiftly rolled out EO 279 w/c empowered
DENR to stipulate with foreign companies when it comes to either technical or
financial large scale exploration or mining.
Nine years later, Ramos signed into law RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act. In
1994, Ramos already signed an FTAA with Arimco Mining Co, an Australian
company. The FTAA authorized AMC (later CAMC) to explore 37,000 ha of land in
Quirino and N. Vizcaya including Brgy Didipio. After the passage of the law, DENR
rolled out its implementing RRs. Didipio petitioned to have the law and the RR to be
annulled as it is unconstitutional and it constitutes unlawful taking of property.
In seeking to nullify Rep. Act No. 7942 and its implementing rules DAO 96-40 as
unconstitutional, petitioners set their sight on Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and
Section 107 of DAO 96-40 which they claim allow the unlawful and unjust taking
of private property for private purpose in contradiction with Section 9, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution mandating that private property shall not be taken except for
public use and the corresponding payment of just compensation. They assert that
public respondent DENR, through the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations, cannot, on its own, permit entry into a private property and allow
taking of land without payment of just compensation.
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(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as
to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the
property.
In the case at bar, Didipio failed to show that the law is invalid. There is taking
involved but it is not w/o just compensation. Sec 76 of RA 7942 provides for just
compensation as well as section 107 of the DENR RR. To wit,
Section 76. xxx Provided, that any damage to the property of the surface owner,
occupant, or concessionaire as a consequence of such operations shall be properly
compensated as may be provided for in the implementing rules and regulations.
Section 107. Compensation of the Surface Owner and Occupant- Any damage done
to the property of the surface owners, occupant, or concessionaire thereof as a
consequence of the mining operations or as a result of the construction or
installation of the infrastructure mentioned in 104 above shall be properly and
justly compensated.
Further, mining is a public policy and the government can invoke eminent domain
to exercise entry, acquisition and use of private lands.
Republic vs Rosemoor 426 SCRA 517
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Issues:
1. Whether or not Petitioners have standing.
2. Whether or Not EO 279 is an invalid law having been issued two days before
President Aquinos legislative powers expired with the convening of Regular
Congress and having thus took effect after which.
3. Whether or Not
RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 are unconstitutional and
consequently the FTAA entered pursuant to aboves tated laws is invalid
Held:
Preliminary Issue:
Petitioners have standing since they are residents of the land covered by the FTAA.
Sincethe petition if for mandamus and prohibition and the issue is of
constitutionality of a statute, the Supreme is no longer concerned whether or not
petitioners are real parties of interest to the contract/agreement.
EO 279 is valid and whether or not the laws effectivity date lies beyond the
expiration of the Presidents legislative power is irrelevant since it was still enacted
when the president held such power. It does not runcounter to EO 200 requiring
laws to have 15 days after publication requirement before its effectivity since
EO200 also provides unless it is otherwise provided, EO 279 having stated its own
effectivity as shall take effectimmediately. In addition, the 15-day postpublication requirement was for the information of the public anddoes not in any
way affect the date of enactment and is not a ground for invalidation. EO 279
nonetheless waspublished on the Official Gazette on 3 August 1987.
The 1987 Constitution provides The President may enter into agreements with
foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for
large-scale exploration, development, or utilization of minerals, petroleum, and
other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions providedby law,
based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the
country. In suchagreements, the State shall promote the development and use of
local scientific and technical resources
Some interesting notes:
1) State may directly undertake such activities
(2) State may enter into co-production, joint-venture or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens or qualified corporations (60% Filipino owned
(3) Congress may allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino
citizens
(4) For the large-scale exploration, development, or utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils,the President may enter into agreements with
foreign-owned corporation for technical or financial assistance. The framers of this
Constitution expressly omitted the phrase service contracts that was provided for
in the1973 Constitution which allowed foreign companies to manage and operate
mining activities and replaced itwith technical or financial assistance only. RA
7942, DAO 96-40, and the FTAA between the government and WMCP allows for the
management andoperation of the foreign-owned corporation for the large-scale
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Issue: Whether or not the Court has a role in the exercise of the power of control
over the EDU of our natural resources?
Held: Most certainly not. The Chief Executive is the official constitutionally
mandated to enter into agreements with foreign owned corporations. On the
other hand, Congress may review the action of the President once it is notified of
every contract entered into in accordance with this [constitutional] provision within
thirty days from its execution. In contrast to this express mandate of the President
and Congress in the exploration, development and utilization (EDU) of natural
resources, Article XII of the Constitution is silent on the role of the judiciary.
However, should the President and/or Congress gravely abuse their discretion in
this regard, the courts may -- in a proper case -- exercise their residual duty under
Article VIII. Clearly then, the judiciary should not inordinately interfere in the
exercise of this presidential power of control over the EDU of our natural resources.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers and due respect for co-equal and
coordinate branches of government, the Court must restrain itself from intruding
into policy matters and must allow the President and Congress maximum discretion
in using the resources of our country and in securing the assistance of foreign
groups to eradicate the grinding poverty of our people and answer their cry for
viable employment opportunities in the country. The judiciary is loath to interfere
with the due exercise by coequal branches of government of their official functions.
As aptly spelled out seven decades ago by Justice George Malcolm, Just as the
Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction
usurpations by any other department of government, so should it as strictly confine
its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it
by the Organic Act. Let the development of the mining industry be the
responsibility of the political branches of government. And let not the Court
interfere inordinately and unnecessarily. The Constitution of the Philippines is the
supreme law of the land. It is the repository of all the aspirations and hopes of all
the people.
Lepanto vs WMC 507 SCRA 315
Facts: Lepanto Consolidated and Tampakan Companies dispute ownership of shares
of stock at WMCP, Tampakan Companies bought such shares of stock through their
right of first refusal under an agreement denominated as tampakan option
agreement. Lepanto, getting wind of the Sale and Purchase Agreement between
WMC and Tampakan Companies, wrote, by letter to the DENR Secretary about the
invalidity of said agreement and reiterated its request for the approval of its
acquisition of the disputed shares. The Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) of
the DENR accordingly informed the Tampakan Companies of Lepantos position on
the matter and required the submission of a comment thereto. WMCP and WMC by
letters to the MGB, proffered their side. Several other letters or position papers
were filed by the parties with the MGB of the DENR. In addition thereafter, Lepanto
filed before the Makati RTC a complaint against herein respondents WMC, WMCP,
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civil action for certiorari when POA ruled that it has jurisdiction over the dispute. To
redo the proceedings fully participated in by the parties after the lapse of seven
years from date of institution of the original action with the POA would be
anathema to the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
(2) The cancellation of the RAWOP was supported by evidence.
(3) There is no unjust enrichment in the instant case. There is no unjust enrichment
when the person who will benefit has a valid claim to such benefit.
The principle of unjust enrichment under Article 22 requires two conditions: (1)
that a person is benefited without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that such
benefit is derived at another's expense or damage.
Clearly, there is no unjust enrichment in the instant case as the cancellation of the
RAWOP, which left Benguet without any legal right to participate in further
developing the mining claims, was brought about by its violation of the RAWOP.
Hence, Benguet has no one to blame but itself for its predicament.
Metro Iloilo Water District vs Court of Appeals 454 SCRA 249
Facts: Petitioner is a water district organized under the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 198. It was granted by the Local Water Utilities Administration
Conditional Certificate of Conformance No. 71. Its service areas encompass the
entire territorial areas of Iloilo City etc.
Sometime between April and May of 1993, petitioner filed nine (9) individual yet
identical petitions for injunction with prayer for preliminary injunction and / or
temporary restraining order against herein private respondents the pertinent
portions of which read:
Private respondents invoked the lack of jurisdiction of the trial court, contending
that the cases were within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the National
Water Resources Council (Water Council) under Presidential Decree No. 1067,
otherwise known as the Water Code of the Philippines (Water Code). In addition,
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private respondents Emma Nava and Rebecca Berlin denied having extracted or
withdrawn water from the ground, much less sold the same
Additionally, he alleged the petitioners rules and regulations were not published in
the Official Gazette and hence petitioner had no cause of action. Meanwhile, private
respondent Gerry Luzuriaga claimed that he was not the real party in interest, but
Shoemart, Inc. which has the control and possession of the property where the
alleged withdrawal of ground water was taking place.
The trial court dismissed the petitions, ruling that the controversy was within the
original jurisdiction of the Water Council, involving, as it did, the appropriation,
exploitation, and utilization of water, and factual issues which were within the
Water Councils competence. In addition, the trial court held that petitioner failed to
exhaust administrative remedies under the doctrine of primary administrative
jurisdiction.
MR denied shortly thereafter.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court may entertain the positions
Held: Petitioner anchors its claim on Section 31 (now 32) of PD 198, as amended,
which reads:
Sec. 32. Protection of waters and Facilities of District. A district shall
have the right to :
(a)
Commence, maintain, intervene in, defend and compromise
actions or proceedings to prevent interference with or deterioration of
water quality or the natural flow of any surface, stream or ground
water supply which may be used or useful for any purpose of the
district or be a common benefit to the lands or its inhabitants. The
ground water within a district is necessary to the performance of the
districts powers and such districts hereby authorized to adopt rules
and regulations subject to the approval of the National Water
Resources Council governing the drilling, maintenance and operation of
wells within its boundaries for purposes other than a singled family
domestic use on overlying land. Any well operated on violation of such
regulations shall be deemed in interference with the waters of the
district.
In asserting the jurisdiction of the regular courts over its petitions and
the propriety of its filing of the petitions before the trial court,
petitioner invokes the ruling of the Court inAmistoso v. Ong,[28] as
reiterated in Santos v. Court of Appeals,[29] that where the issue
involved is not the settlement of a water rights dispute, but the
enjoyment of a right to water use for which a permit was already
granted, the regular court has jurisdiction and not the Water Council.
A judicial question is raised when the determination of the questions involves the
exercise of a judicial function, i.e., the question involves the determination of what
the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are with respect to the matter in
controversy. As opposed to a moot question or one properly decided by the
executive or legislative branch, a judicial question is properly addressed to the
courts.
The instant case certainly calls for the application and interpretation of pertinent
laws and jurisprudence in order to determine whether private respondents actions
violate petitioners rights as a water district and justify an injunction. This issue
does not so much provide occasion to invoke the special knowledge and expertise
of the Water Council as it necessitates judicial intervention. While initially it may
appear that there is a dimension to the petitions which pertains to the sphere of the
Water Council, i.e., the appropriation of water which the Water Code defines as the
acquisition of rights over the use of waters or the taking or diverting of waters
from a natural source in the manner and for any purpose allowed by law, in reality
the matter is at most merely collateral to the main thrust of the petitions.
The petitions having raised a judicial question, it follows that the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, on the basis of which the petitions were
dismissed by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, does not even come to play.
The petition is remanded to the trial court.
Amistoso vs Ong 130 SCRA 228
Facts: On 1981 petitioner as plaintiff, filed before the then Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur, a complaint for Recognition of Basement with Preliminary
Injunction and Damages. The complaint alleged, that plaintiff (now petitioner) and
defendant Epifania Neri, (one of the herein private respondents) are the owners of
adjoining parcels of agricultural land ; that an irrigation canal traverses the land of
defendant Neri through which irrigation water from the Silmod River passes and
flows to the land of the petitioner for the latter's beneficial use and that respondent
Neri, owner of the land on which said irrigatrion canal exists and Senecio Ong, the
cultivator of the said property, despite repeated demands refused to recognize the
rights and title of the petitioner to the beneficial use of the water passing through
the aforesaid irrigation canal and to have petitioner's rights and/or claims
annotated on the Certificate of Title of respondent Neri . . . . Hence, the filing of
the said complaint.
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In their Answer, private respondents denied the existence of any right on the part
of the petitioner to the use of the canal mentioned in the complaint nor any
contract, much less any deed or encumbrance on their property and assert that
they have not performed any act prejudicial to the petitioner that will warrant the
filing of the complaint against them. By way of affirmative and special defenses,
private respondents alleged that petitioner's complaint states no cause of action
and that the Court has no jurisdiction over the same.
Failing to obtain a favorable reconsideration of the Order of dismissal, petitioner
now comes before SC through the instant petition contending:
That the case at bar is not to settle any water dispute between the parties but a
complaint which calls purely for a determination of the right of the plaintiff to have
an established right amounting to an easement annotated on the certificate of title
of the defendant, hence the question is judicial which may be taken cognizance of
by the respondent court;
Acting on private respondent's motion, respondent Judge dismissed petitioner's
complaint for lack of jurisdiction in an Order dated January 14, 1981. The pertinent
portion of that Order reads as follows:
... The basis of the motion to dismiss are the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
424 and the Water Code known as Presidential Decree No. 1067. In opposing the
motion to dismiss, plaintiff contends that the present action does not involve water
dispute and that since the present action was filed before the court prior to the
effectivity of the Presidential Decree No. 424, it is the old law on the matter that
should be applied. These contentions of the plaintiff are without merit.
Failing to obtain a favorable reconsideration of the Order of dismissal, petitioner
now comes before SC through the instant petition contending:
(1)
That the case at bar is not to settle any water dispute between the parties
but a complaint which calls purely for a determination of the right of the plaintiff to
have an established right amounting to an easement annotated on the certificate of
title of the defendant, hence the question is judicial which may be taken cognizance
of by the respondent court;
Issue: Whether or not the Court had jurisdiction.
Held:Private respondents' insistence that what is involved in the instant case is the
right to use, exploit and convey water is controverted by the "STIPULATION OF
FACTS" entered into between them and the petitioner in the court below which was
approved in an Order dated February 20, 1975, the pertinent portion of which reads
as follows:
From the foregoing stipulations, private respondents admit that petitioner, then
plaintiff, has an approved Water Rights Grant issued by the Department of Public
Works, Transportation and Communications. Private respondents, however, contend
that the said grant does not pertain to the beneficial use of irrigation water from
Silmod River. The records, however, do not show any other irrigation water going
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to petitioner's property passing thru respondents' lot aside from that coming from
the Silmod River. Respondents' controversion of petitioner's right to irrigation water
specifically from Silmod River is undoubtedly a lame denial.
The grant contradicts the erroneous findings of the respondent Judge, and
incontrovertibly entitles petitioner to the beneficial use of water from Silmod River.
That right is now a vested one and may no longer be litigated as to bring
petitioner's case within the jurisdiction of the National Water Resources Council. To
resurrect that issue right to the use of invistigation water from Silmod River
will be violative of the rule on res judicata which also applies with equal vigor and
effect to quasi judicial decisions.
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2. Whether or not Br. 94s ruling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, contravenes
People v. Relova.
Held: The redundancy of charges simply means a single complaint or information
charges more than one offense, as Sec. 13 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure. As early as the start of the last century, the court ruled that a
single act or incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and
unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more
than one offense and the only limit is the Constitutional prohibition that no person
shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishing for the same offense.
In People vs.Doriquez, the court held that two or more offenses arising form the
same act are not the same. And so, double jeopardy is not an issue because not all
its elements are present.
On petitioners claim that the charges for violation of Art. 365 of the RPC absorbs
the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984 and RA 7942, suffice it to say that a
mala in sefelony (such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Damage in Property)
cannot absorb malaprohibita crimes (such as those violating PD 1067, PD 984 and
RA 7942).
What makes the former felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa) and
what makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting them.Petitioners
reiterate their contention in that their prosecution contravenes ruling inPeople vs.
Relova.
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Issues:
1. Whether or not Sections 17 and 20 of PD under the headings, Upgrading of
Water Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they
limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents.
2. Can petitioners be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the
Manila Bay?
Held:
1. For one thing, said Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government
agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and
cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec.
17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long
as water quality has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect
its best usage. This section, to stress, commands concerned government agencies,
when appropriate, to take such measures as may be necessary to meet the
prescribed water quality standards. In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade the
quality of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident.
For another, a perusal of Sec. 20 of the Environment Code, as couched, indicates
that it is properly applicable to a specific situation in which the pollution is caused
by polluters who fail to clean up the mess they left behind. In such instance, the
concerned government agencies shall undertake the cleanup work for the polluters
account. Petitioners assertion, that they have to perform cleanup operations in the
Manila Bay only when there is a water pollution incident and the erring polluters do
not undertake the containment, removal, and cleanup operations, is quite off mark.
As earlier discussed, the complementary Sec. 17 of the Environment Code comes
into play and the specific duties of the agencies to clean up come in even if there
are no pollution incidents staring at them. Petitioners, thus, cannot plausibly invoke
and hide behind Sec. 20 of PD 1152 or Sec. 16 of RA 9275 on the pretext that their
cleanup mandate depends on the happening of a specific pollution incident. In this
regard, what the CA said with respect to the impasse over Secs. 17 and 20 of PD
1152 is at once valid as it is practical. The appellate court wrote: PD 1152 aims to
introduce a comprehensive program of environmental protection and management.
This is better served by making Secs. 17 & 20 of general application rather than
limiting them to specific pollution incidents.
2. Whether or not the court of appeals erred when it took cognizance of the petition
of sm prime.
Held:
1. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is
allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself
or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her.15
Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made
by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a
matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be
exhausted first before the courts judicial power can be sought.16 The premature
invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to ones cause of action.17 The
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal
reasons.18 The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and
provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of
justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until
the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as
to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error
and dispose of the case.19 While the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is subject to several exceptions, the Court finds that the instant case does
not fall under any of them.
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Issues:
1. Does the respondent LLDA have the implied power to impose fines as set forth in
PD 984?
2. Does the grant of implied power to LLDA to impose penalties violate the rule on
non-delegation of legislative powers?
Held:
1. Presidential Decree No. 984 (PD 984)[19] created and established the NPCC
under the Office of the President. EO 192, which reorganized the DENR, created the
Pollution Adjudication Board under the Office of the DENR Secretary which assumed
the powers and functions of the NPCC with respect to adjudication of pollution
cases.
On the other hand, LLDA is a special agency created under Republic Act No. 4850
(RA 4850)[20] to manage and develop the Laguna Lake region, comprising of the
provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon
and Caloocan. RA 4850, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 813 (PD 813),[21]
mandates LLDA to carry out the development of the Laguna Lake region, with due
regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and control,
preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the
prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution.
Under Executive Order No. 927 (EO 927),[23] LLDA is granted additional powers
and functions to effectively perform its role and to enlarge its prerogatives of
monitoring, licensing and enforcement.
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A comparison of the powers and functions of the Pollution Adjudication Board and
the LLDA reveals substantial similarity. Both the Pollution Adjudication Board and
the LLDA are empowered, among others, to: (1) make, alter or modify orders
requiring the discontinuance of pollution; (2) issue, renew, or deny permits for the
prevention and abatement of pollution, for the discharge of sewage, industrial
waste, or for the installation or operation of sewage works and industrial disposal
system; and (3) exercise such powers and perform such other functions necessary
to carry out their duties and responsibilities. The difference is that while Section 19
of EO 192 vested the Pollution Adjudication Board with the specific power to
adjudicate pollution cases in general,[24] the scope of authority of LLDA to
adjudicate pollution cases is limited to the Laguna Lake region as defined by RA
4850, as amended.
In this case, the DENRs Environmental Management Bureau endorsed to LLDA the
pollution complaint against petitioner. Under Section 16 of EO 192, the
Environmental Management Bureau assumed the powers and functions of the NPCC
except with respect to adjudication of pollution cases.
The Environmental Management Bureau also serves as the Secretariat of the
Pollution Adjudication Board, and its Director is one of the members of the Pollution
Adjudication Board. Clearly, by endorsing to LLDA the pollution complaint against
petitioner, the Environmental Management Bureau deferred to LLDAs jurisdiction
over the pollution complaint against petitioner.
2. Contrary to petitioners contention, LLDAs power to impose fines is not
unrestricted. In this case, LLDA investigated the pollution complaint against
petitioner and conducted wastewater sampling of petitioners effluent. It was only
after the investigation result showing petitioners failure to meet the established
water and effluent quality standards that LLDA imposed a fine against petitioner.
LLDA then imposed upon petitioner a penalty ofP1,000 per day of discharging
pollutive wastewater. The P1,000 penalty per day is in accordance with the amount
of penalty prescribed under PD 984
Alexandria Condo vs LLDA 599 SCRA 452
Facts: On 2 September 1987, the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission
issued a Development Permit to Phil Realty to develop Cluster A of the project. In
the Development Permit, PhilRealty was required to submit its condominium plans
to the Building Official of Pasig City. A building permit was issued
Shortly after Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) advised TACC that its
wastewater did not meet government effluent standards provided in Sections 68
and 69 of the 1978 National Pollution Control Commission Rules and Regulations
(NPCC) as amended by Department of Energy and Natural Resources (DENR)
Administrative Order No. 34. LLDA informed TACC that it must put up its own
Sewage Treatment Plant (STP) for its effluent discharge to meet government
standards.
In a Notice of Violation dated 6 May 1999, LLDA directed TACC to submit corrective
measures to abate or control its water effluents discharged into the Laguna de Bay.
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LLDA likewise imposed upon TACC a daily fine of P1,000 from 26 March 1999 until
full cessation of pollutive wastewater discharge.
TACC filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals with a prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order.
The Court of Appeals sustained LLDAs contention that the petition for certiorari was
prematurely filed. The Court of Appeals ruled that the proper remedy should have
been to resort to an administrative remedy before the DENR Secretary prior to
judicial action.
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permit has been filed with Laguna Lake Development Authority as of March 31,
1993 are hereby declared outrightly as illegal.
One month, thereafter, the Authority sent notices to the concerned owners of the
illegally constructed fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising
them to dismantle the irrespective structures within 10 days from receipt thereof,
otherwise, demolition shall be effected. The fishpen owners filed injunction cases
against the LLDA. The LLDA filed motions to dismiss thecases against it on
jurisdictional grounds. The motions to dismiss were denied. Meanwhile, TRO/writs
of preliminary mandatory injunction were issued enjoining the LLDA from
demolishing the fishpens andsimilar structures in question. Hence, the present
petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction. The CA dismissed the LLDAs
consolidated petitions.
It ruled that (A) LLDA is not among those quasi-judicial agencies of government
appealable only to the Court of Appeals; (B) the LLDA charter does vest LLDA with
quasi-judicial functions insofar as fishpens are concerned; (C) the provisions of the
LLDA charter insofar asfishing privileges in Laguna de Bay are concerned had been
repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991; (D) in view of the aforesaid
repeal, the power to grant permits devolved to respective localgovernment units
concerned.
Issue: Which agency of the Government - the LLDA or the towns and municipalities
comprising the region- should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its
environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned?
Held: LLDA. Section 4 (k) of RA 4850, the provisions of PD 813, and Section 2 of
EO 927, specifically provide that the LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue
permits for the use or all surface water for any projectsor activities in or affecting
the said region, including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish
enclosures, fish corrals and the like.
On the other hand, RA 7160 has granted to the municipalities theexclusive
authority to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters. The Sangguniang Bayan
may grant f ishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic
beds or bangus fry area within adefinite zone of the municipal waters.
The provisions of RA7160 do not necessarily repeal the laws creating the LLDA and
granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region.
The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any express provision which
categoricallyexpressly repeal the charter of the Authority.
It has to be conceded that there was no intent on the part of the legislature to
repeal Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments. The repeal of laws should be
made clear and expressed.It has to be conceded that the charter of the LLDA
constitutes a special law. RA 7160 is a general law.
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Tano vs Socrates
Facts:On December 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City
enacted Ordinance No. 15-92 which took effect on January 1, 1993 entitled: AN
ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE
PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND
PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF
To implement said city ordinance, then Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero issued
Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993 dated January 22, 1993 which reads as follows:
In the interest of public service and for purposes of City Ordinance No. PD426-1474, otherwise known as AN ORDINANCE REQUIRING ANY PERSON ENGAGED OR
INTENDING TO ENGAGE IN ANY BUSINESS, TRADE, OCCUPATION, CALLING OR
PROFESSION OR HAVING IN HIS POSSESSION ANY OF THE ARTICLES FOR WHICH
A PERMIT IS REQUIRED TO BE HAD, TO OBTAIN FIRST A MAYORS PERMIT and
City Ordinance No. 15-92, AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE
FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO
JANUARY 1, 1998, you are hereby authorized and directed to check or conduct
necessary inspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out
from the Puerto Princesa Airport, Puerto Princesa Wharf or at any port within the
jurisdiction of the City to any point of destinations [sic] either via aircraft or
seacraft.
The purpose of the inspection is to ascertain whether the shipper possessed the
required Mayors Permit issued by this Office and the shipment is covered by
invoice or clearance issued by the local office of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources and as to compliance with all other existing rules and regulations on the
matter.
In their comment public respondents Governor Socrates and Members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan defended the validity of Ordinance No.2,
Series of 1993, as a valid exercise of the Provincial Governments power under the
general welfare clause They claimed that in the exercise of such powers, the
Province of Palawan had the right and responsibilty to insure that the remaining
coral reefs, where fish dwells [sic], within its territory remain healthy for the future
generation. The Ordinance, they further asserted, covered only live marine coral
dwelling aquatic organisms which were enumerated in the ordinance.
Aforementioned respondents likewise maintained that there was no violation of due
process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. As to the former, public
hearings were conducted before the enactment of the Ordinance which,
undoubtedly, had a lawful purpose and employed reasonable means; while as to
the latter, a substantial distinction existed between a fisherman who catches live
fish with the intention of selling it live, and a fisherman who catches live fish with
no intention at all of selling it live, i.e., the former uses sodium cyanide while the
latter does not. Further, the Ordinance applied equally to all those belonging to
one class.
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Held:
1. Emilio Linde sought to corroborate the claim of appellant that it was another
unidentified group of fishermen who threw the bottle of explosives at a school of
"bolinao" fish. It was obvious, however, said the trial court, that the statement of
this defense witness was incredulous since he apparently had not at all been on
board the fishing boat in the company of the accused at the time of the incident.
Even the rather lengthy counter-affidavit of the four accused completely missed to
mention Linde. The court a quo went on to observe that the demeanor of the
accused at the witness stand and the substance of his testimony failed to elicit
belief.
Trial courts are tasked to initially rule on the credibility of witnesses for both the
prosecution and the defense. Appellate courts seldom would subordinate, with their
own, the findings of trial courts which concededly have good vantage points in
assessing the credibility of those who take the witness stand. Nevertheless, it is not
all too uncommon for this Court, in particular, to peruse through the transcript of
proceedings in order to satisfy itself that the records of a case do support the
conclusions of trial courts.
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2. Nestor Aldas, an Agricultural Technologist and Fish Examiner working with the
Department of Agriculture, Palo, Leyte, who examined the fish samples taken from
the accused, testified that he was with the team patrolling, on 04 July 1992, the
waters of San Pedro Bay, Baras, Palo, Leyte, when he, like the other members of
his team, witnessed the use of explosives by the accused. Fish samples from the
catch showed ruptured capillaries, ruptured and blooded abdominal portion, and
crushed internal organs indicating that explosives were indeed used.
The Court is convinced that the trial court has acted correctly in finding accusedappellant guilty of the offense charged.
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raised in the petition for the guidance of the herein respondents, and pursuant to
our symbolic function to educate the bench and bar.
The law and the facts indicate that a mere MOA does not guarantee the dumpsites
permanent closure.
The rally and barricade staged by the people of Antipolo on 28 January 1999, with
the full support of all the mayors of Rizal Province caused the MMDA to agree that it
would abandon the dumpsite after six months. In return, the municipal mayors
allowed the use of the dumpsite until 20 July 1999.
Were it not for the TRO, then President Estradas instructions would have been
lawfully carried out, for as we observed in Oposa v. Factoran, the freedom of
contract is not absolute.
Unlike No. 1,[26] Par. 1, Section 1, Article VII of the same DENR DAO, which
expressly allows ancestral domain claimants to reside peacefully within the domain,
nothing in Section 2 grants ancestral land claimants a similar right, much less the
right to build permanent structures on ancestral lands an act of ownership that
pertains to one (1) who has a recognized right by virtue of a Certificate of Ancestral
Land Title.
On this score alone, respondents action for injunction must fail. Even if
respondents had established ownership of the land, they cannot simply put up
fences or build structures thereon without complying with applicable laws, rules and
regulations
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest
or of transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-inintervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with
the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo.
That the subject of the information sought in the present cases is a matter of public
concern faces no serious challenge. In fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD is
indeed of public concern. In previous cases, the Court found that the regularity of
real estate transactions entered in the Register of Deeds, the need for adequate
notice to the public of the various laws, the civil service eligibility of a public
employee, the proper management of GSIS funds allegedly used to grant loans to
public officials, the recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth, and the
identity of party-list nominees, among others, are matters of public concern.
Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern,
involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which
directly affects the lives of the public at large.
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of
discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as
mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The
furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to
and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious,
oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of
positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only
its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the
associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are
unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state
and implies that the same is on its way to independence.
The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF
Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to law and the
Constitution.
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On 28 August 1997, before filing their answers, respondents moved to dismiss the
complaint. These respondents claimed that petitioners failed to exhaust
administrative remedies, rendering the complaint without cause of action. They also
asserted that the Manila RTC has no jurisdiction to enjoin theconstruction of the
mooring facility in Oriental Mindoro, which lies outside the Manila RTCs territorial
jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether or not the writ of preliminary injunction is proper
Held: The jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts to issue injunctive writs is limited to
acts committed or about to be committed within their judicial region. Moreover,
Presidential Decree No. 1818 (PD No.1818) prohibited courts from issuing
injunctive writs against government infrastructure projects like the mooring facility
in the present case. Republic Act No. 8975 (RA No. 8975), which took effect on
26 November 2000, superseded PD No. 1818 and delineates more clearly the
coverage of the prohibition, reserves the power to issue such writs exclusively with
this Court, and provides penalties for its violation.
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