The issue is if California (CA) state court has personal jursidiction (PJ) over Dr. Villa (Dr. V).

There are three kids of PJ: in perosnum, in rem, where defendant owns property in the
state and quasi in rem, where defendant owns property in the state but it is not in dispute
(Pennoyer). If in rem and quasi in rem, PJ is satisfied. Here, in rem and quasi in rem are not
at play, so the court will need to find in perosnum jurisdiction (jdx) over Dr. Villa. Whetehre
there is PJ over Dr. V is a two-step analysis: 1)is there a long arm statute conferring jdx, and
2) is it within the constitutional bounds, not abridging Dr. Vs right to Due Process.
Most states allow PJ in a variety of contexts, such as PJ over Defendants who: 1) are serve
dwith process in the state, 2) are domiciled in the state, 3) commit tortuous acts, enter
contracts, or conduct business in the state, or 4) otherwise consent. Under FRCP
4(k)(1)(A), the court can use CAs long arm statute which allows jdx over non-residents to
the extent permitted by the US Constitution.
The next question is whether its within the constitutional bounds, satisfying Due Process
Caluse to assert jdx over Dr. V. Courts answer this by using a minimum contacts test of
International Shoe, which states Due process requires only that in order to subject
defendant to judgment in perosnum, if he not be present within the territory of the forum,
he have certain minimum contacts with the forum, such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. If Dr. V did not
purposefully avail himself of the laws and benefits of the forum state, here CA, there is no
PJ. Regardless, we still aks if Dr. V had such minimum contacts with the forum so that the
exercise of jdx satisfies Due Process (Intl Shoe).
This two-step analysis includes: 1) a sovereignty prong, and 2) a fairness prong. Where the
contacts are continuous and systematic and give rise to the cause of action (COA), PJ is
typically found. Where contacts are sporadic and casual and do not give rise to the COA, PJ
is not found. Where contacts are continuous and systematic, but do not give rise to the COA,
which is general jurisdiction, opposed to specific jdx, the hurdle of continuous and
systematic contacts increased greatly, as the contacts not must also be substantial
contacts. These quadrant-base tests determine the first porng and is based on the nature of
the cause of action. Courts ultimately ask, does the COA arise out or significantly relate to
contacts with the state? Here, Sues (S) COA does not arise out of Dr. Vs contacts with CA,
as the breached contract was discussed and formed in New Jersey (NJ), rather than Dr. V
treating S and forming a K in CA. Dr. Vs contacts with CA are sporadic and casual, as Dr. V
only goes to CA for two weeks each year to attend a medical conference and for vacation.
Dr. V, a nationwide known doctor writes various medical articles that are in journals
distributed ot doctors nationwide, rather than solely CA. Though Dr. Vs contacts with CA
are sporadic and casual, we must still ask if his contacts regarding his website and contract
with S would be substantial to satisfy specific jdx.
We now ask if the contact resulting from Dr. Vs actions purposefully avail him the
privileges of conducting activities within CA, thus evoking benefits and protections of CAs
laws (Hanson). Contacts are also based on foreseeability, where a defendant oculd
reasonably anticipate being haled to court in forum. Purposeful availment has been treated
differently for different cases. In this case, we have an issue of PJ regarding Dr. Vs website

contacts and the contract made between Dr. V and S. Contact through internet and websites
is based on whom initiates the contacts. Here, S searches the interent for Dr. V and comes
across his personal website. Clearly, S is the one whom initiated the contacts. Using the
Zippo analysis, courts require intentional, forum specific targeting or express aiming at
the forum and or interactions via website with residents of the forum. These interactions
are analyzed using a sliding scale: 1) PJ exists when there is an active site where
defendant clearly has business contracts with foreing residents, 2) Gray area when there is
an interactive site where defendant exchanges information with hose computerts, base
don the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange and 3) No PJ when
there is a passive website where defendant has simple posts of information and is
accessible to those interested. Based on the facts, Dr. Vs website is in the passive category
as if shares basic information about his medical background (medical training), list of
medical journal articles that describe cases he has been involved in and the name of the
hospital in NJ where he works. There is no contact information on the website. Therefore,
the website is passive and would not constitute substantial contacts to indicate minimum
contacts with CA and thus there is no PJ based solely on the website.
However, we must still analyze the contract between the parties. Based on the Burger Kind
contracts case, purposeful availment through contracts is satisfied when there are: 1) prior
negotiations, 2) contemplated future consequences, 3) actual course of dealing and 4)
terms and choice of law provisions. While these are factors, not all are needed nor weigh
more heavily than others. Here, there was prior negotiations about Dr. Vs services when S
emailed Dr. V. After the initial contact, Dr. V was not interested. However, after Ss second
email contact, Dr. V became interested and emailed S back. Clearly there are prior
negotiations made. Dr. V then calls S back to say he can treat her at his hospital in NJ. There
are not contemplated future consequences regarding the service Dr. V provided, nor the
contract itself, but Dr. V promises to prescribe S with medication that she can pick up in CA,
and also promises to check in with her. Clearly, this is not exact contemplation of future
consequences, but seems like a course of dealing. When S returns to CA, her condition
worsens and she calls Dr. V tell him she is feeling worse. Dr. V discusses her condition
further and tells her not to worry. Clearly an oral contract was formed, thus satisfying the
first prong. Dr. V must now provide a compelling argument that it is unreasonable for the
case to be heard in CA
Assuming the appropriate sovereignty prong has been satisfied, courts next look at
fairness, which includes: 1) actual burden on defendant, 2) interests of the forum state in
the case, 3) Ps interest in getting relief, 4) convenience and 5) public policy. Based on these
facts, S would argue there is not a significant burden on Dr. Villa to come to CA as he is
comes to CA and for medical conferences and vacation two weeks out of every year. Dr. V
would argue that he only comes to CA for two weeks out of the year to attend a specific
conference and otherwise remains in NJ at his sole place of work. S would argue CA has an
interest in the case because it involves a CA student, though not a resident, is still benefiting
from the laws and benefits of CA. Dr. V would argue that CAs interests in the case are
minimal, that S is only a student, is A NJ resident and the procedure occurred in a NJ
hospital, proving that a NJ court has a much more significant interest in the case. Regarding
convenience, S would argue that a CA court would be more convenient, as she is disabled

and incapacitated in a CA hospital and unable to go to court in NJ. Dr. V would argue, it is
more convenient for the case to be heard in NJ because S will likely be home with her
parents in NJ. However, there is not significant inconvenience for Dr. V to travel to CA for
the case. Pubic policy issues
All factors considered, the CA state court is likely to have PJ over Dr.V.
If he was served in CA while speaking at a medical conference, there is likely PJ.
Part C
For Sue (S) to file suit in US District Court, the court must have subject matter jurisdiction
(SMJ) which includes: 1)diversity jdx (28 USC 1332) and 2) federal question (28 USC 1331).
A district court shall have original jdx over all civil actions where the amount in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75 K, exclusive of interests and costs and is
between: 1) citizens of different states, or 2) citizens of a state and citizens or subjects of a
foreign state. When referring to citizen sof different states, citizenship is defined as:
domicile- a perons place or true, fixed and permanent home and principal establishment
and to which he or she has intention of returning whenever absent therefrom. Mere
residence in a state is not sufficient. Evidence of citizenship includes: current residence,
location of person or real property or place of employment. Here, S is a student in CA, but
has live din New Jersey (NJ) her whole life prior. There are no fact indicating Ss change
citizenship which would include: 1) taking up residence in a different domicile with 2)
intention to remain there. Though she moved from NJ to CA, she was there for college and
had no intent, or intent indicated, showing she wanted to change domicile from NJ to CA.
Thus, she is a resident of NJ. Dr. V is a life-long resident of NJ and there is no indication he
intends to move or change is citizenship. Thus, both parties are from the same domicile, NJ,
and diversity of citizenship is not satisfied.
While there is no diversity of citizenship, the existence of the minimum amount in
controversy bears further inquiry. Mentioned above, the amount in controversy must
exceed the sum or value of $75K. When determining the amount in controversy, Ps
allegations of the amount must be made in good faith that cannot be determined as a
matter of legal certainty that it is not more than $75K. Here, Ss federal claim amounts to
$10K, alone not satisfying the amount in controversy. However, aggregation factors apply
when one Plaintiff aggregates claims against one defendant to meet the amount in
controversy, even if those claims are unrelated to one another. Here the claims can be
aggregated. The state claim, of $5 million aggregated with the federal claim of $10K
satisfies the minimum amount in controversy requirement. Thus, the amount in
controversy is satisfied. Though the court has jdx regarding the amount in controversy,
there is no diversity of citizenship and thus no diversity jdx.
Still, federal question jdx (FQJ) should be addressed. Federal courts have MSJ over all cases
arising under the Constitution, Laws or Treaties of the US (28 USC 1331). When addressing
FQJ, is is not affected by the amount in controversy, though satisfied. FQJ must be evident

from Ss statement of the cause of action (COA) in a well-pleaded complaint, not as an

anticipated defense by defendant, defendants answer or counter claim (Mottley). Base don
these facts, the FQ is in a well-pleaded complaint as S claim is a violation of the US Drug
Misuse Act (DMA), a federally created law, allowing a patient to sue a doctor is the patient
is injured by a drug that the doctor prescribed and the drug was not approved by the Food
and Druge Administration (FDA). S clearly claims the medication prescribed by Dr. V was
not approved. FQJ might not exist, despite a federally created COA, when resolution of the
underlying claim depends larelgy, if not wholly on questions of non-federal law (Shoshone).
Under Grable, for a question raised to be considered an essential federal element, it must
be raised, actually disputed and substantial, without disturbing congressionally approved
balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities. Here, there is an essential federal
ingredient embedded in the COA, as it is a violation of a federal act. The federal ingredient
is actually disputed in the context of this case since S asks for $10,000 in damages for this
claim, which is the maximum recovery allowed under the DMA. Third, we ask if there is a
federal interest in the claim, and there is as S claims the medication prescribed was not yet
approved by the FDA, thus requiring an investigation into this federal issue. Fourth,
treating this claim would not upset congressionally mandated allocation of jdx between
state and federal court as the FDA is a nationwide, federal administration, thus affecting all
products under the FDA in all states. Here, Ss first claim is clearly a federal question and
thus the court has FQJ over the first claim.
Supplemental jurisdiction (SJ) is invoked when a case has multiple claims, some involving
FQ and some not. The modern rule is that district courts shall have SJ over all claims that
are so related in action, within such original jdx that they form aprt of the same case, that
being claims arising from a common nucleus of operative fact (Gibbs) such that plaintiff
would ordinarily be expected to try both claims in one single proceeding. Here, the second
claim is a state negligence claim and the federal claim is a violation of a federal act. The
state negligence claim satisfies SJ because it is an issue regarding the drug prescribed to
Sue. The claims above derive from a common nulues of operative fact,a s interpreted by
Gibbs because the state claim is transactioanlly related (same drug prescribed) to the
anchor claim (federal violation of DMA).
However, the federal court may refuse to exercise SJ under 28 USC 1367(c) factors. Here,
the negligence claim, though has a significant amount in controversy, is neither complex or
novel as a state negligence claim is easily litigated, proving Dr. Vs failure to monitior her
condition and prescribing her an unapproved drug. The state claim does not predominate
over the federal claim and the court must first hear and try the federal claim to even prove
is Dr. V negligently violated the FDA. The federal claim will not likely be dismissed from
federal court, as it is a significant federal administrative issue. There are no exceptional
circumstances in this case. Therefore, there is likely SJ of both claims and the US district
court will be able to here both claims was they relate to a federal question, thus giving the
court SMJ over the claims.