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Ethnic nationalism, the Great powers and the question of Albanian independence,
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The copyright of this thesis rests with the
author or the university to which it was
submitted. No quotation from it, or
information derived from it may be
the prior written
published without
consent of the author or university, and
derived
from
it
be
information
should
any
acknowledged.
Nicola C. Guy
Ph. D.
Durham University
Department of History
2008
f
18 APR008
CONTENTS
Page
Volume I:
Contents
Abstract
Declarations
10
Acknowledgements
11
Abbreviations
12
Note on Spellings
13
Introduction
14
Historiographical
Overview
-
16
Source Material
21
23
international
ethnic nationalism and
relations
Ethnic Nationalism and Small States in
25
South-eastern Europe
Small States in the Great Power System
33
37
Chapter 1:
39
National Ambitions
and Linguistic
Nationalism:
the emergence
40
44
(1878-1908)
The Young Turk Revolution and Threats to Albanian
46
Identity (1908-12)
Balkan Wars (1912-13): the accelerator for independence
54
55
62
Great-Power Responses
67
Conclusions
72
Chapter 2:
75
76
77
88
91
Southern Boundary
95
98
100
Southern Commission
103
108
Conclusions
Chapter 3:
Experiments
international
111
with Self-government:
control commission
provisional
authorities,
the
Wilhelm
Wied
(1912-14)
Prince
of
and
112
116
In Search of a Prince
119
125
140
143
146
Chapter 4:
The Entente Powers and the Projected Partition of Albania:
the attempt to form a Balkan alliance (1914-15)
Preliminary Negotiations
148
Occupations of Albania
154
158
165
174
Conclusions
179
Chapter 5:
183
Anarchy, Occupations
185
191
191
195
204
207
211
Conclusions
218
Chapter 6:
221
224
226
226
235
239
243
248
257
263
265
Conclusions
Chapter 7:
267
268
268
272
280
small state
Albanian Initiatives and Responses
290
Conclusions
296
Chapter 8:
The Allied Occupations
300
and Nationalist Resurgence (1918-20)
301
313
Tirana Government
Great Power Withdrawals and the Extension of
321
Tirana's Control
327
Conclusions
Chapter 9:
330
Towards a Resolution?
The Ambassador's
Conference of Paris
342
346
356
361
Conclusions
The Independence and Frontiers of Albania
361
363
366
factors
to
national
opposed
(iv) Early twentieth-century criteria for statehood
370
in
language
the
shaping views about
role of
and
Albania's ethnic or `national' frontiers
Concluding Remarks: the role of ethnicity in national
372
frontier making
Glossary of Terms
377
381
Appendices
A:
402
The Ottoman Vilayets, including Kosovo, and the
402
403
C:
404
D:
406
409
F:
413
G:
416
417
Bibliography
417
Primary Sources
417
Unpublished
(i)
417
418
Private Papers
4"i y
Published
419
Secondary Sources
423
Books
423
446
Unpublished
461
ABSTRACT
Ethnic Nationalism, the Great Powers and
the Question of Albanian Independence,
1912-21
Nicola C. Guy
Based primarily on British policy and perceptions, this thesis aims to provide a
detailed analysis of the question of Albanian independence (1912-21) and the
delimitation of its frontiers (1912-26). It considers the Albanian question with
particular regard to perceptions of ethnicity and national identity prevailing
1912-21, and consideration of the position of small states in the international
system at the time. The first three chapters consider the period before the First
World War when the concept of an independent Albania first emerged. Chapter
One considers the rapid development of the Albanian nationalist movement in
1912. Chapter Two explores the Albanian question during the Ambassadorial
Conference in London and boundary commissions (1912-14). Chapter Three
considers some of the practical issues involved in establishing a new state.
Chapters Four and Five focus on the First World War, when the experiment of
independent
Albanian
Chapter
Four considers offers of
an
state was undone.
Albanian territory by the Entente powers to neutral states as inducements to
domestic
developments,
Chapter
Five
Albanian
the
enter
war.
explores
including the revival of an Albanian nationalist movement by 1918. The last four
Albanians
the
the
struggled once more
post-war period, when
chapters explore
to have Albania recognised as an independent and sovereign state. Chapters
Six and Seven examine the Albanian problem during the Paris Peace
Conference (1919-20) - when issues of central importance to the thesis (geoforefront
to
the
interests
came
of
versus ethnic self-determination)
political
international diplomacy. Chapter Eight details developments inside Albania, in
Chapter
forces.
Nine
foreign
initiatives
to
Albanian
remove
particular
investigates the Albanian question within the League of Nations and
Ambassadorial Conference in Paris. The thesis will show the importance of both
`national' and `international' forces in the recognition of Albania as an
independent state by 1921, and that neither theories of nationalism, nor
international relations offer adequate explanations.
DECLARATIONS
"The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be
published in any format, including electronic and the Internet, without the
author's prior written consent. All information derived from this thesis must be
acknowledged appropriately. "
Some preliminary ideas for material in Chapters One and Two can be found in
my BA dissertation `The Concert of Europe and the Creation of Albania:
National Ambition and Great Power Rivalry in the Balkans 1911-1914'
(University of Durham, 2002).
10
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
A great many people have given me help and assistance over the
past four
years. There are too many to thank properly and my apologies to anyone whom
I have forgotten. The help has come in a variety of forms. Firstly, there have
been all the librarians, archivists and other staff at the many libraries,
archives
and depositories that I have visited in Bloomington (Indiana), Cambridge,
College Park (Maryland), Durham, Leeds, London, Shifnal (Shropshire),
Stockton-on-Tees, Taunton, Tirana and Washington DC. You were
all so
helpful, cheerful and provided for many of my more `unusual' requests.
My many and varied financial contributors have ensured that I have been able
to concentrate more on my studies than on financial concerns. Without your
assistance I am certain that I would not have gone to many of the exciting
places I did or have been able to complete within four years. They were the
British Association of Health Services in Higher Education, British Association of
Slavonic and East European Studies, British Federation of Women Graduates'
Charitable Foundation, County Alderman Worsley JP Scholarship Trust Fund,
Durham University Department of History, Gilchrist Educational Trust, Kathleen
and Margery Elliott Scholarship Trust, Newby Trust, Ropner Trust, Royal
Historical Society, Shropshire LEA, Sidney Perry Foundation, Sir Richard
Stapley Educational Trust, Snowdon Award Scheme, Society for Promoting the
Training of Women, Teesside Educational Trust, United States Department of
State and Yorkshire Ladies' Council of Education.
My four supervisors have all helped in varied and invaluable ways. Dr Oliver
Zimmer introduced me to theories of nationalism and its curiosities when
applied to small states. Dr Sarah Davies offered me immense help, advice and
encouragement at all stages. Professor David Moon challenged me to think in
so many new ways and guided me through the tricky last two years. Dr David
Sweet first introduced me to the question of Albanian independence when I was
an undergraduate student and has continued to offer more advice and support
than I could have ever of dreamed of. A number of other individuals (Professor
Philip Williamson, Dr Alistair Thompson, John Donaldson, Dr Alison Williams,
Professor Victor Friedman, Professor Nicholas Pano, and the anonymous
referees of my journal article submissions) have read individual chapters and
improve
invaluable
to
the text.
offered
comments
A number of people have contributed in other ways. Four stand out particularly.
Bejtullah Destani has provided me with considerable amounts of useful and
illuminating primary material and introduced me to the delights of the Aubrey
Herbert papers. Jakup Azemi has translated many documents from Albanian
into English and been a valuable friend. My parents have also been an especial
drafts
help.
My
Dad
has
throughout
all
and
re-read
read
and
source of support
four years, so he must know much more about the Albanian question than he
large
the
My
Mum
has
to.
have
of
retyped
sections
valiantly
wished
could ever
text following my computer failure. Both went far beyond anything I could have
finally,
huge
Albanian
their
And
thank
to
the
and
a
people
you
ever expected.
I
hope
inspired
thesis
that
have
my
can go
me
so
much.
countries who
immense
faith
have
in
the
the
fulfilling
to
support
you
all
put
me
and
someway
Any
have
me.
errors which remain are completely my own.
all given
your
NCG, 7 Mar. 08
11
ABBREVIATIONS
DBFP
DDF
DDI
DMI
DOS
Department of State
EDW
FRUS
KA
FO
Foreign Office
MOEI
NACP
PID
PRO
RG
Record Group
SAC
TNA
12
A NOTE ON SPELLINGS
There are alternative and sometimes historical, national and political differences
and other considerations in the spellings of Balkan and Albanian names. I have
followed those most generally used by officials in the British Foreign Office at
the time of my study (1912-21), except where common usage dictates
something else, for example Serbia has been used instead of Servia.
Alternative forms of the most commonly used place names can be found in a
`Glossary of Terms' (pp. 377-80). Alternative forms of people's names can be
found in the `A Selective Who's Who' (pp. 381-401), together with a short
biography of them.
A special exception to this is my use of both `Kosovo' and `Kosova' in the text.
Kosovo will be used to refer to the former Ottoman vilayet of Kosovo, being
how the term was understood at the start of the twentieth century, despite
having only being created as recently as 1877. Kosova will be used to refer to
the present day self-proclaimed and quasi-independent statelet of Kosova,
from
1999,
1945
United
Nations
controlled
and created after
as the
which was
former Yugoslav autonomous province known as Kosovo and Metohija or
Kosmet. As Appendix A illustrates today's Kosova is only about one quarter of
'
the size of the Kosovo that existed under Ottoman rule.
districts
and
Ottoman
1 Before 1877 `Kosovo' vilayet was divided among several
administrative
Kosovan
(the
Polje
Kosovo
Serbian
on
(of
term
centred
origin),
as
a
geographical
only used
Kosove
Kosova,
Kosovo,
term
the
of
different
For
discussion
meanings and uses
a
of the
plain).
3-4.
xlix,
1998),
and
(London,
xxii
History
N.
Malcolm,
Kosovo:
Short
pp.
A
etc. see
13
INTRODUCTION
`Right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in
powers,
while the strong do what they can the weak suffer what they must. '2
In March 2007, the UN mediator, Martti Ahtisaari, recommended that the United
Nations-controlled
14
determining those frontiers; and, not least, the implications of such decisions for
the longer-term stability of the region. This thesis addresses these issues in the
formative
establishment of the `new Europe' at the end of the Peace Conference of Paris,
after the First World War.
Tiovo Raun has shown that, since the 1990s and the emergence of new ethnic
states in eastern Europe, there has been a resurgence of interest in what
determined the creation of new nation states there. 6 Since 1999, there has been
much debate within the international community on what the future status of the
autonomous province of Kosova should be. However, there seems to have
been little consideration as to why Kosovo (the Ottoman vilayet) and the other
majority Albanian-speaking
Montenegro,
Macedonia
(parts
western
areas
of
independent
Greece)
did
become
in
Chameria,
or part
not
either
north-west
and
Tom
decisions.
despite
legacy
these
Albanian
the
independent
of
state,
of an
Winnifrith observed the need for a scholarly and impartial account of the
formation of independent Albania in 2002, whilst Basil Kondis earlier noted that
there
was
no
recent,
and
comprehensive,
English
study
of Albanian
15
of `Albania', whose cause had yet to attract support in Britain; and it remains
largely applicable today. This thesis aims to meet the need for thorough
a
and
systematic analysis of the processes of Albanian independence, with particular
regard to contemporary considerations of ethnicity and national identity. At the
same time, it seeks to place the question of Albanian independence within the
context of power-political relationships, and the framework of the great-power
system, within which it would have to be achieved, if it was to be achieved at all.
Historiographical
There
have
Overview
been
a number
of studies
of the question
of Albanian
countries,
16
This thesis identifies three distinct but inter-related phases in the process of the
before
first
in
In
the
the
Albanian
independence.
the
period
phase,
question of
11 Examples include: P. Pipinelis, Europe and the Albanian Question (Chicago, 2nd ed. 1963)
(pro-Greek); A. B. Sula, Albania's Struggle for Independence (New York, 1967) (pro-Zog and
Albania:
The
History
Hole,
G.
(trans.
)),
C.
(Wiseman,
A.
Puto,
S.
Polio
of
and
and
pro-Albanian);
from its Origins to the Present Day (London, Boston and Henley, 1981) (pro-socialist and proAlbanian); A. Puto, L'Independance Albanaise et la Diplomatic des Grande Puissances, 19121914 (Tirana, 1982) (pro-socialist and pro-Albanian); M. Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: a
History of Kosovo (New York, 1998) (pro-Albanian); M. Cami, Fundamental Aspects of the
Albanian National and Democratic Movement in the Years 1913-1920: National Conference
Dedicated to the 70t" Anniversary of the Proclamation of Independence November 19,1982
(Tirana, 1983) (pro-Albanian); State University of Tirana, Historia e Shgiperise 11: 1909-1919
SelfZog:
Tomes,
King
J.
(pro-Albanian);
1965)
(Tirana,
11:
1909-1919)
Albania
(The History of
Zogu).
Ahmet
(limited
to
2003)
(Stroud,
Albania
Monarch
of
study
of
made
12N. Malcolm, `Myths of Albanian National Identity: Some Key Elements, as Expressed in the
J.
B.
S.
Schwandner-Sievers
Century',
in
Early
Twentieth
Writers
in
the
and
Albanian
Works of
70-1.
70-90,
2002),
History
(London,
Myth
Identities:
Albanian
),
at
pp.
(eds.
pp.
Fischer
and
13 Indeed a number of Wilson's fourteen points can be viewed as diametrically opposed to
Albanian nationalism, above all Serbia's right to access to the Adriatic which primarily meant
territory in northern Albania (Appendix E).
17
For the first phase, there is a good and growing literature on the origins and
formation of an Albanian identity, and on the Albanian national movement up to
1912.15 The main focus of this thesis is therefore on the period from 1912
onwards. There is also a good literature on the Balkan wars (1912-13) and
London conferences (1912-13), although most studies concentrate on other
Balkan states or their relevance to the First World War, rather than the Albanian
16
Richard Crampton's excellent book, The Hollow Detente (1979),
question.
14For similar ideas see Malcolm, `Myths of Albanian National Identity', pp. 70-1.
15 See for example: S. Skendi, The Albanian National Awakening, 1878-1912 (Princeton, New
Jersey, 1967); S. Skendi, `Albanian Political Thought and Revolutionary Activity, 1881-1912'
Sdost-Forschungen, 13 (1954), pp. 159-99; S. Skendi, `Beginnings of Albanian Nationalist and
Autonomous Trends: the Albanian League, 1878-1881', American Slavic and East European
Review, 12 (1953), pp. 219-32; G. W. Gawrych, The Crescent and the Eagle: Ottoman Rule,
Islam and the Albanians, 1874-1913 (London and New York, 2006); G. Fishta, (trans. R. Elsie
Epic
(London,
Malcis):
National
The
Highland
Lute
(Lahuta
The
Albanian
J.
Mathie-Heck),
e
and
2005); A. Doya, `Confraternal Religion: From Liberation Theology to Political Reversal', History
14
(2003),
349-81.
Anthropology,
pp.
and
18
During the First World War phase, there are two main areas for consideration:
international developments, and internal or domestic ones. Entente diplomacy
in the Balkans, including in particular a consideration of the Albanian question,
has received relatively little attention by scholars, in comparison with several
19
studies of its diplomacy elsewhere. There is a good literature on the reasons
for which the Italian government decided on co-belligerency with the Entente
had
it
the
to
pre-war alliances,
central powers, with whom
powers, as opposed
17 R. J. Crampton, The Hollow Detente: Anglo-German Relations in the Balkans, 1911-1914
cLondon, 1979)
8 D. Heaton-Armstrong (G. Belfield and B. Destani (eds. )), The Six Month Kingdom: Albania
1914 (London, 2005); Wilhelm Furst von Albanien, Prinz zu Wied, Denkschrift uber Albanien
in
his
time
this
Wilhelm
1917
In
of
1917):
(Berlin,
account
privately printed and published
book.
first
Armstrong's
the
Heaton
I
real
it
but
Albania
was not widely circulated so consider
19 In addition to more general works on the Paris Peace Conference that include sections on
War
World
First
in
diplomacy
the
Balkan
English
in
of
war entry, some examples of studies
States
Balkan
the
Policy
British
Setback:
Indecision
Muddle,
Curtwright,
and
include: L. H.
and
August 1914 to the inception of the Dardanelles Campaign (Thessaloniki, 1986); A. Dallin et al,
The
Politics
D.
Dutton,
York,
1963);
(New
1914-1917
Europe,
Eastern
Russian Diplomacy and
New
York,
War
(London
World
First
in
the
Balkans
in
France
the
and
Britain
and
of Diplomacy:
Canadian
1914-1916',
Balkans,
in
the
British
Diplomacy
Failure
'The
J.
Lowe,
1998); C.
of
Straits,
Russia
the
Britain,
W.
A.
Renzi,
'Great
(1969),
73-101;
4
and
Journal of History,
pp.
Robbins,
'British
G.
K.
1-20;
(1970),
Modern
History,
42
Journal
and,
pp.
1914-1915,
of
560(1971),
49
Review,
Slavonic
European
East
1914-1915,
pp.
Bulgaria,
and
Diplomacy and
85.
19
but these discussions explore the Albanian question only partially.20 The
literature on the domestic Albanian situation is very limited,
and the period is
considered only briefly in general surveys of Albanian history, or in studies on
21
other topics.
The period 1919-21 is the least well-researched phase of the Albanian question,
despite the prominence of many small state independence movements in the
international arena at the time, and the voluminous literature on the Paris Peace
Conference,
Michael
including
in the context
of wider developments
or of the theoretical
little
There
is
international
on
equally
relations.
contributions on nationalism and
discussions regarding the question of Albanian independence in the important
in
finally
determined,
the
1920-21,
particular on
and
question was
when
years
20 Useful accounts in English include: C. J. Lowe, `Britain and the Italian Intervention, 1914Office
Foreign
Russian
Renzi,
`The
W.
A.
533-48;
(1969),
12
Journal,
The
Historical
1915',
pp.
The
Historian,
Diplomacy',
Wartime
Study
in
A
War,
1914-15:
Great
into
the
and Italy's Entrance
A
ReWar:
Great
into
the
Entrance
Neutrality
'Italy's
A.
Renzi,
W.
and
28 (1966), pp. 648-68;
Allies
Quenoy,
'With
P.
du
1414-32;
(1968),
73
Review,
Historical
pp.
examination', American
War
I',
World
into
Entry
Italian
Problem
the
Russia
Enemies?:
of
Like These, Who Needs
and
from
War:
Great
the
Italy
Salandra,
A.
409-40;
(2003),
45
and
Canadian Slavonic Papers,
pp.
Peace
Paris
Italy
the
R.
Albrecht-Carrie,
1932);
(London,
at
Neutrality to intervention
Boundary
Italo-Yugoslav
'The
Petrovich,
B.
M.
1-34;
Conference (New York, 1938), pp.
W.
162-93;
Europe,
Eastern
and,
Diplomacy
Russian
pp.
and
Question, 1914-1915' in Dallin,
1957).
(London,
War
World
First
the
during
Diplomacy
in
Secret
W. Gottlieb, Studies
21See for example Pearson, Albania, I, pp. 78-117 passim and B. J. Fischer, King Zog and the
Struggle for Stability in Albania (Boulder, 1984), pp. 1-23.
22 M. L. Dockrill and J. D. Gould, Peace Without Promise: Britain and the Peace Conferences,
1919-23 (London, 1981).
23R. Woodall, 'The Albanian Problem during the Peacemaking, 1919-20' (PhD Thesis, Memphis
State University, 1978).
20
(17 December
international level, had been made by 1921, this date marks the end of this
study.
Source Material
As the main focus of the thesis is on British and also, from 1917 onwards,
American policy and perceptions, my main areas of research have been in the
primary and printed archives of these great powers. My archival sources include
principally those of the British Foreign Office, other government departments,
and personal papers located in the National Archives, Kew, and the House of
Lords' Records Office, both in London. The Foreign Office papers include the
(1912-13),
Albanian
London
the
the
of
official records of
conferences
and
boundary commissions (1913-14), which do not appear to have been utilised
State
Department
I
have
the
On
American
of
records,
used
policy,
elsewhere.
located in the National Archives College Park, Maryland. In addition, I have
Somerset
for
MP
Sir
Herbert,
Aubrey
the
the
papers of
collections of
explored
South and President of the Anglo-Albanian Society (1912-23), in the Somerset
Record Office. These include a large number of documents written by and to
by
the
been
has
of
This
study
Albanians.
supported
research
archival
prominent
French,
Italian
Russian,
English,
in
in
of
and
documents
print
available
some
24
documentary
Relevant
on
collections
there
are extensive collections.
which
24 The most commonly used collections include: G. P. Gooch, and H. Temperley (eds. ), British
[hereafter
1926-38)
(London
as
cited
1898-1914,11
War,
the
Origins
the
vols.
Documents on
of
London,
York
(New
3
World,
the
and
Diplomacy
vols.
and
BD]; B. de Siebert (ed. ), Entente
Foreign
the
to
Relating
Papers
(ed.
),
State
U.
S.
Department
EDWJ;
of
1921) [Hereafter cited as
13
Conference,
Peace
Paris
The
vols.
1919:
States
America
United
the
of
Relations of
Butler
R.
Woodward
L.
E.
PPC];
FRUS
and,
(Washington, D. C., 1942-47) [hereafter cited as
1947-78)
(London,
Vols.
1,21
Series
Policy
1919-1939,
British
Foreign
(eds. ), Documents on
),
(eds.
N.
Pokrovsky
M.
Maksakov,
V.
V.
V.
V.
Adoratsky,
DBFP];
and
[Hereafter cited as
P.
A.
KA];
[hereafter
1922-41)
(Moscow,
Arkhiv)
106
as
cited
vols.
KpacHbI Apxue (Krasnyi
21
and
provided
pertinent
examples
at particular
26
The
points.
secondary literature used is primarily that in English, but with the addition of
some literature in French, Italian, Russian, Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian
and
There is therefore, and intentionally, a clear English language and British focus
to the study: no Greek or Turkish language material has been considered, and
the study of other language sources, especially Albanian ones, is limited.
However, the amount of available `Albanian' material is less extensive than
might be supposed and I am sceptical that a more detailed examination would
have been very productive. There was no codified Albanian language until 1908
(with the Monastir Alphabet Congress), and much continued to be written in
English, French or Turkish. My preliminary investigations indicated that very
little documentation from this period survived in the Albanian archives, whereas
the Herbert papers, in particular, include a number of sources written by
Bol'shemennikov,
Mex3yHapoHb!
A.
S.
Erusalimskii,
e OmHOLUeHUA
6 3nOXy
A. A.
Mogilevich,
UMnepuanu3Ma:
,1
and
R. A.
OKyMeHmbl
Rotschein
U3 apxue
(eds. ),
gapcKoao
imperialism:
in
the
Affairs
(International
1878-1917
of
period
as
epeMeHHOeo npaeumenbcme
Series
2,21
Government),
Provisional
Tsar
vols. and
the
Archive
the
from
Documents
and
of
Esteri
Degli
Affari
Ministero
MOEI];
[hereafter
1931-1940)
(Moscow,
Series 3,10 vols.
cited as
Italiani,
Diplomatici
Documenti
/
diplomatici),
documenti
dei
la
(Commissione per
pubblicazione
1954(Roma,
5:
1914-1918,10
Series
1952-64),
(Roma,
vols.
Series 4: 1908-1914,12 vols.
(Roma,
1922-1935,10
Series
7:
1956),
(Roma,
vols.
and
56), Series 6: 1918-1922,2 vols.
3,
Series
1871-1914,
Frangais,
Diplomatiques
1953-1990) [hereafter cited as DDI]; Documents
1911-1914,11 vols. (Paris, 1929) [hereafter cited as DDF].
25 B. D. Destani (ed. ), Albania and Kosovo: Political and Ethnic Boundaries 1867-1946,2 vols.
Selected
Albanians:
the
Albania
Durham
),
Edith
(ed.
and
(London, 1999); B. D. Destani
Selected
Konitza:
Faik
(ed.
),
Destani
B.
D.
2001);
(London,
Articles and Letters, 1903-1944
Correspondence 1896-1942 (London, 2000).
26 For example in Albanian K. Nuro and N. Bato (eds.), Hasan Prishtina: permbledhje
1982)
(Tirana,
1908-1934)
documents,
Prishtina:
(Hasan
1934
published
dokumentesh, 1908 to
Relating
Documents
),
Austro-Hungarian
F.
Bridge
(ed.
German
R.
in
[trans. by J. Azemi], and
Guy].
A.
by
[trans.
1976)
1896-1912,
(Thessaloniki,
Struggle,
the Macedonian
22
Albanians, and these have been utilised wherever possible, especially as they
have not been used in any study of this type before.
Theoretical
and
international
relations
Comparative
Framework:
ethnic
nationalism
and
In their work on nationalisms in eastern Europe during and after the First World
War, No Banac and Katherine Verdery identified three key issues for any elite
deploy
independence
building
to
the newly
national
seeking
a
programme:
emergent
state; establishing
in the international
`collectivist'
defining
identity,
took
`nation's'
the
a
which usually
community; and
27
it
in
to
therefore
other national or ethnic groups.
placed
opposition
vision and
In all these three areas, the new state has the potential to have an impact on
the international system, and to be affected by the international system within
first
Barth
Fredrik
Moreover,
it
and
nationalism
showed,
as
operates.
which
identity formation
28
Of at least equal
is not purely about self-ascription.
traditionally
by
identity
is
which
the acceptance of such an
others,
importance
is
Such
time.
the
particularly
international
acceptance
the
at
community
means
for
boundaries,
and also
important in the validation of a nation's sovereignty and
the
is
territory
and
contested
in
where
regions,
mixed
ethnically
small states
to
protection
and
to
likely
is
endorsement
power
great
need
small state
frontiers.
its
then
maintain
establish and
in
great
a
literature
nationalism
theoretical
small-state
on
Nevertheless, the
the
the
of
that
start
at
international
operated
type
the
system
of
power system,
National
Character
National
)
and
(eds.
27 K. Verdery, `Introduction' to I. Banac and K. Verdery
1995),
Connecticut,
xiv.
Haven,
p.
(New
Europe
Eastern
Interwar
Ideology in
Difference
Cultural
Organization
Social
of
28 F. Barth (ed.), Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: the
11.
1969),
Illinois,
Heights,
p.
(Prospect
23
Notable
examples
include
Israel/Palestine
and
Kashmir
and,
by
diplomacy,
European
and were most cogently articulated
of
from
forces
international
interplay
vary
may
It appears that the
of nationalist and
In
the
to
simplest
opposing.
being reinforcing or supportive
contradictory or
international
the
impact
to
has
the
upon
upset or
ability
sense, nationalism
brings
it
terms,
balance-of-power
in
about
as
perceived
system, especially when
those
the
of
relative strength
the prospect of new states, and a shifting of
influence
a
international
the
can
In
system
in
reverse,
existence.
already
29E. Gellner, Encounters with Nationalism (Oxford, 1994); M. Glenny, The Balkans 1804-1999:
the
Nationalism
Hinsley,
H.
and
F.
1999);
Powers
(London,
Nationalism, War and the Great
to
his
it
leaves
Hinsley
conclusion
139-72:
until
International System (London, 1973), pp.
directly.
two
the
compare
24
principally
through
sponsorship
or endorsement
of a national
programme. In Kosova today, all these impacts can be clearly identified. The
clash between Serbian and `Kosovan' nationalism, and the feared impact on
international stability, prompted NATO's involvement in 1999. The delay in
settlement
international community's concern of the impact that `final status' would have on
the Balkan balance of power. Hence the refusal to allow Kosovan-Albanians to
join their co-ethnics in other parts of the Balkans, and the delay in advocating
Kosovan independence, for fear of inducing retaliation and instability within
Serbia by such an announcement.
Europe,
the
in
although
of small national and ethnic groups
that
Hroch
his
included
small
considers
Albanians are not
modelling.
within
A,
In
three
phase
through
awakening.
national
of
phrases
national groups go
language
its
develop
and
to
culture,
national
the said nationality attempts
the
increase
to
of
B,
amount
the
In
attempts
nationality
phase
ethnography.
30 E. C. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: programme, myth and reality
131.
Raun,
165,171;
'Estonian
p.
1992),
revisited',
nationalism
pp.
(Cambridge,
25
intends to consider.
international
historians
have
been
seeking
to
`internationalise'
Since
26
fabrication
deems
he
them
because
these
or
a
either
rejects
33A. D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism: a critical survey of recent theories of nations and
J.
Kertzer,
D.
J.
Hobsbawm
E.
42,120,122,132-3;
1998),
(London,
and
pp.
nationalism
`Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe Today', Anthropology Today, 8 (1992), pp. 3-8, at p. 3; B.
Arnold, `The Contested Past', Anthropology Today, 15 (1999), pp. 1-4, at p. 1; Hobsbawm,
1990),
(Cambridge,
Tradition
The
Invention
T.
Ranger,
p.
Hobsbawm
in
E.
`Introduction'
of
and
Nationalism
Ethnicity
Debates
Historiographical
in
History:
Nation
and
The
Smith,
about
1; A. D.
4
Nationalism,
Nations
Hobsbawrn,
32;
2000),
esp.
chps.
Hampshire,
New
and
(Hanover,
p.
the
the
Reflections
Communities:
of
Imagined
spread
and
Anderson,
origin
B.
on
6;
and
11-12.
1983),
(London,
pp.
nationalism
27
28
40Hastings, Construction of Nationhood, pp. 11,185-206; Smith, Nation in History, pp. 37-9.
41 See for example: Sula, Albania's Struggle for Independence; Pollo and Puto, History of
Albania: Qami, Fundamental Aspects. For Albanian accounts written before 1925 of Albanian
Illyrian origins see for example C. A. Chekrezi, Albania Past and Present (New York, 1919) and
C. A. Dako, Albania: The Master Key to the Near East (Boston, Massachusetts, 1919).
29
would not be very successful. Unlike the other Balkan `nations', no Albanian
state had existed before 1912, either in its own right or under a different
name.
More problematically, such a `historic nation' clashed
with the various other
Balkan `nations', and most obviously with Serbian claims to Kosovo.42
42 N. Malcolm, 'Myths of Albanian National Identity', p. 73; For a good study of Albanian ethnic
Times
the
to
from
Prehistoric
History
Ethnic
An
Albanians:
The
E.
Jacques,
E.
origins see
Present (Jefferson, North Carolina, 1995).
43See for example Gawrych, Crescent and Eagle, p. 21.
44 See for instance G. W. Gawrych, Tolerant Dimensions of Cultural Pluralism in the Ottoman
East
Studies,
15
Middle
Journal
International
1800-1912',
Community,
of
Empire: The Albanian
in
family
the
highland
tribal
B.
Fischer,
`Albanian
structure
and
519-36;
society
(1983), pp.
281-301.
(1999),
33
Quarterly,
European
East
pp.
transformation',
twentieth-century
process of
a5J. C. Hobhouse cited by Turkhan Pasha, Council of Ten minutes, 24 Feb 1919, FRUS PPC,
Elsie,
R.
1879)
Albania
(Paris,
les
La
I'Albania
P.
Vasa,
and
See
et
verite sur
also
IV, p. 114;
263-7.
2
(New
York,
1995),
Literature,
Albanian
pp.
vols.
History of
30
47 G. Duijzings, Religion and Politics in the Identity of Kosovo (London, 2000), pp. 7-8,27-8;
Malcolm, Kosovo, p. xxix.
48Smith, Nations and Nationalism, pp. 25-6; Hastings, Construction of Nationhood, pp. 165-6,
Tanzania
'unique'
the
Hastings
where nationalism was
of
However,
example
184-6:
also cites
it.
has
(Christianity-Islam)
divide
but
the
undermined
not
yet
based on language
religious
49 For a view which suggests a more extensive role for religion, especially Bektashism, see for
in
Religion
the
Politics
Doya,
`The
A.
Religion',
349-81
of
`Confraternal
Doya,
and
pp.
example
(2000),
20
Anthropology,
Critique
pp.
The
Albanian
Identities:
of
situation',
Reconstruction of
Revue
`Bektachisme
N.
Clayer,
albanais',
different
et nationalisme
perspective see
421-38; for a
des Etudes Islamiques, 60 (1992), pp. 271-300.
31
by
of
vanguard
small
a
very
pursued
actively
was
nationalism
Albania
from
faiths,
four
from
and
Albanian nationalists, although admittedly
all
it
It
from colonies abroad. was not a mass movement, and proved popular only
to
in times of crisis, such as protracted warfare, or when other options appeared
50Smith, Nations and Nationalism, p. 26; Tilly in Smith, Nation in History, p. 35.
Wars,
Balkan
the
during
Nationalism
Limits
51L. L. Farrar Jr., 'Aggression versus Apathy: The
of
Todorova
M.
259,262;
257-80,
Quarterly,
37
(2003),
European
at pp.
pp.
1912-1913', East
291.
2000),
Nation
Memory
(London,
Identities:
p.
and
(ed.), Balkan
32
Albania
often
depended
much
more
on
phil-Albanian
There are also problems regarding the definition of small states, but typically
they are deemed to include a number of common features: small in population,
in
located
in
weak
areas,
geographical
marginal
often
area,
geographical
small
hold
they
Typically,
therefore,
lacking
a
often
and
political
stability.
economically
52 See for example M. Rendell, `Defensive Realism and the Concert of Europe', Review of
32
(2006),
Studies,
pp. 523-40, at p. 525.
International
33
53 P. Salmon, Scandinavia and the great powers 1890-1940 (Cambridge, 1997), pp. xv, 8; D.
(Oxford,
Relations
International
in
Power
Small
the
Study
A
States:
Vital, The Inequality of
of
Great
Power
Power/
in
Small
Studies
States:
Small
Survival
The
1967), pp. 7-9; D. Vital,
of
Conflict (London, 1971), pp. 2-10
54See for example R. MacGinty, `War Cause and Peace Aim? Small States and the First World
`Historical
Schroeder,
P.
41;
41-56,
(1997),
27
at p.
pp.
War', European History Quarterly,
115-6,
108-48,
(1994),
19
Security,
esp.
pp.
International
pp.
Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory',
129-31,147-8.
55M. Handel, Weak States in the International System (London, 1981), p. 257; Also at Salmon,
Scandinavia, p. 4.
56 Handel, Weak States, pp. 257-8; R. L. Rothstein, Alliances and the Small States (New York,
183-4.
States,
Inequality
Vital,
14;
pp.
Scandinavia,
Salmon,
of
p.
1968), pp. 194-5;
5 For an extensive list of the factors that can influence the strength of small states during
(London,
11
War
World
in
Diplomacy
States:
Small
Fox,
The
Power
Baker
A.
of
wartime see
to
see
power
its
increase
great
a
On
how
relative
183-5;
strength
a small state can
1959), pp.
States,
Small
Survival
Vital,
p. 129.
of
for example,
34
Europe
were
(the Balkans,
international
confrontation'
in the twentieth
59
century.
However, for a newly aspiring state, its location could also be a drawback, as
for
to
a
strategic
position
retain or gain such
other stronger states might seek
themselves, or their allies. Other states also feared the potential of a new state
that might be unstable, or susceptible to outside influence from rival powers.
A third factor was the differing perspectives of a great power and a small state
in relation to the national question, as referred to in Sven Holtsmark's
58Vital, Inequality of States, pp. 3-4; Salmon, Scandinavia, pp. 12-4; Handel, Weak States, p. 3.
59Vital, Inequality of States, p. 5; Salmon, Scandinavia, esp. p. 2.
35
relationship usually means that the small state affords greater priority to the
negotiations,
relationship
whilst
60
If a small state can succeed in reducing such
and policy.
disparities and secure a more balanced relationship, the small state usually
proves more successful in merging or incorporating its own national interests
with that of the great power and, in turn, in harnessing great power support for
its national programme.
The fourth crucial component is the particular point in the international relations
cycle and the type of international system. The great-power system rested on
the balance of power between its leading members. When this balance was
found
it difficult to advance their national
relatively stable, small states generally
(1830-31)).
However,
Belgium
(with
notable exceptions such as
programme
during and following periods of crisis and conflict (such as 1853-56,1875-78,
to
Balkans),
1912-18
in
the
make considerable
were
able
small states
and
the
balance
As
the
in
their
system
which
upon
national programmes.
advances
in
the
being
balance
was
disrupted,
system
sought,
was
a
new
and
rested was
(and
could
the
states
from
flux
great)
small
aspiring
and
new
which
a state of
these
for
themselves
provoking
benefit. The small states were
often responsible
61
benefit.
their
balance
to
the
shift
to
deliberately
aiming
and
crisis points,
60Holtsmark cited in Salmon, Scandinavia, pp. 15-6; Vital, Survival of Small States, pp. 127-8.
61Rothstein, Alliances and Small States, pp. 191-212 passim; Salmon, Scandinavia, p. 15.
36
international
national question that does not readily fit such theories. The
62 See for example: P. Schroeder, `Historical Reality', pp. 108-48; G. Roberts, `History, theory
J.
Levy,
703-14;
(2006),
32
Studies,
International
in
IR',
Review
pp.
turn
of
the
narrative
and
International
System',
International
Schroeder's
W.
Paul
Foundations
of
`The Theoretical
History Review, 16 (1994), pp. 715-44, at pp. 715,742-3.
63For an indication of why the Kosovan and Bosnian questions should not be compared in this
Kosovo,
Malcolm,
for
pp.
xlviii-I.
example
see
way
37
(ii)
establish the reasons behind the decisions made about its frontiers;
(iii)
(iv)
38
CHAPTER 1:
National Ambitions and Linguistic Nationalism:
the emergence of an Albanian identity in 1912
Prizrend, Novi Bazar, Prishtina and Ipek, the kaza of Kalkadelen from the
vilayet of Kosovo, and the sanjaks of Koritza, Elbasan and Dibra from the
vilayet of Monastir (Appendix A). In the light of the impending defeat of the
Ottoman Empire by the Balkan League (a confederation of the Balkan states of
Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro), Albanian nationalists announced
their independence, because they no longer viewed Ottoman suzerainty as a
sufficient guarantee to protect their rights, customs and interests. This was the
opposite of what the League states had intended: one of the League's
motivations in the war had been to prevent the successful establishment of an
independent
Albanian state, which would have obstructed the
autonomous or
64
for
its
As
League's opportunities to intervene and claim this territory
members.
had
Albanian
Brailsford
had
H.
N.
that
1906,
nationalists
recorded
early as
do
intend
to
for
Albanians,
is
Albania
the
`Our
no
we
and
programme
claimed:
65
Slavs
'.
In
to
the
domination,
foreign
to
reality,
and certainly not
any
submit
1912,
the
November
late
that
illustrate
majority of
this chapter will
as
even as
Albanian
the
demanding,
within
autonomy
most,
at
nationalists were still
64 Barclay to Grey, 14 Aug. 1912, BD, IX.i, no. 614; Paget to Grey, 26 Aug. 1912, BD, IX.i, no.
659.
65Brailsford, Macedonia, p. 273.
39
Ottoman Empire. Only the prospect of Ottoman defeat prompted a small band
of nationalists to proclaim independence.
Activities
Nationalist
Albanian
of
(1878-1912)
to
an
1878,
the
establish
Berlin
agreed
powers
At the Congress of
great
of
to
Empire,
Ottoman
enlarge
the
agreed
Bulgaria
within
nominally
autonomous
Greece,
the
of
independent,
enlargement
Serbia
envisaged
as
and recognise
Montenegro.
independent
to
international
enlarged,
an
recognition
afforded
and
the
and
framework
relations
international
which
the
within
This established
for
the
be
next
Balkan
conducted
the
would
between
states
nascent
conflicts
thirty-five
Albanian
for
first
international
aspiring
The
any
problem
years.
from
the
powers,
great
to
therefore
recognition
secure
was
movement
national
40
and acceptance by its Balkan neighbours, that there was any separate Albanian
identity at all, distinct from that of the surrounding Slav, Greek
and Muslim
populations. Under the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano of March 1878, which
the Congress was summoned by the great powers to renegotiate, the Russians
had imposed the establishment of a large Russian-protected Bulgaria
on a
weakened Ottoman government: its frontiers were established according to
ostensibly ethnographic criteria, embracing practically the whole of Ottoman
`Macedonia', and were pushed so far to the west as to incorporate Monastir,
and extended even to the west of Lake Ochrida. Thus they included extensive
areas with undeniably Albanian-speaking
there
that
they
however,
In
the
ruled
event,
nationality.
or
nation
recognised
41
commissions of the Congress arrived to delimit the frontier, the Prizrend League
opposed by force the handing over of these territories and managed to retain
control of Plava, Gusinje, Hoti and Gruda. Montenegro was given the port of
Dulcigne as compensation, whilst the Greek frontier was instead fixed
at the
Arta River. When the commissions had finished their work, the League of
Prizrend was suppressed by the Ottoman authorities. 66
Thus, on the first occasion that the governments of the great powers had been
confronted with the question of a distinct Albanian ethnicity, and after they had
actively
according
promoted
to current
ethnographic
declined to
42
`ethnologically
the
tribal
differences,
given
stock',
really
single
and
a
religious
...
patron,
for
which
role the
least
unpromising
(though
scarcely
43
background)
was
eagle on a red
the
become
hundred
five
would
and
years,
nearly
after
ceremoniously unfurled
in
lived
had
Skanderbeg
or sought an
However,
flag.
never
Albanian national
69Skendi, Albanian National Awakening, pp. 300-405.
70Smith, Ethnic Origins, p. 199.
71 G. Maksutovici, `L' Albanie' in V. Moisuc and I. Calafeteanu (eds.), Assertion of Unitary,
1980),
(Bucharest,
(1821-1923)
Europe
Central
Southeast
in
and
Independent National States
170-1.
170-89,
pp.
at
pp.
44
linking of Albanian princes, but not of their territories. After Skanderbeg's death,
his descendants and followers soon emigrated to Italy, or once
more became
loyal Ottoman subjects. Moreover, literacy rates amongst Albanians
were very
low, and the book was read primarily by Albanians living abroad,
whilst many
initiatives in 1912 started within Albania. 72As Benedict Anderson has shown
of
elsewhere
in south-eastern
(including
schools,
Mirdita,
in
1914,
by
that,
a
and
individuals
three
`Albania',
in
Catholic
only
north-western
region
predominantly
74
the
When
the
in
'Albanian'.
to
newly created
of
cabinet
read
were able
their
1914,
they
September
March
between
conducted
Albanian state met
and
`Albanians'
because
the
one
another,
Turkish
in
understand
not
could
meetings
72 I. Blumi, `The Role of Education in the Formation of Albanian Identity and Myths', in
52.
49-59,
Identities,
Fischer,
Albanian
p.
at
pp.
Schwander-Sievers and
45
and some members did not even speak Albanian. 75 In the thirty-year
period
after the Congress of Berlin, there does not seem to have been
much
advancement of the Albanian national programme, except for a
small educated
intelligentsia, who tended to live outside Albania. Active
colonies included those
in Bucharest, Lausanne, Boston, Massachusetts,
and Constantinople. Many
divisions remained amongst the Albanian people,
and a national or autonomous
programme was of little interest to the bulk of the Albanian people, who were
relatively content with their life within the Ottoman Empire. The majority Muslims
did not want to jeopardise the important privileges they received
as Muslims.
The mountainous terrain in eastern and northern `Albania', especially,
and the
distance from Constantinople, meant that the Ottoman regime was very light,
especially in comparison to those Balkan regions nearer Constantinople. Even
Christian Albanians endured little interference with their local customs, traditions
and practices, and they saw no significant reason to upset the established
76
system. Nevertheless, the Albanian spoken language would soon become the
defining feature of identity and of the national movement.
1908,
In
by
Albanians.
the
a
centralisation, was received with much alarm
bey
Prishtina
Hasan
(such
Muslim
Albanians
and
as
number of prominent
75Heaton-Armstrong, Six Month Kingdom, p. 27.
76 I. Blumi, 'Thwarting the Ottoman Empire: Smuggling Through the Empire's New Frontiers in
Yemen and Albania, 1878-1920', International Journal of Turkish Studies, 9 (2003), pp. 251-70.
" For further details of the Young Turk revolution see Stavrianos, Balkans since 1453, pp. 52428
46
Nexhib Draga) from across the four vilayets, had been elected
as Young Turk
deputies. However, these men soon became distanced from the
centralising
policies of their party because of the impact on Albanian customs and practices.
Many would go on to become leading members of the Albanian
national
movement. From 1909 onwards, there were continual revolts in `Albania', some
led by these `politicians' for the protection of local rights, especially
regarding
local conscription and taxation privileges. However, the movements
remained
small-scale, unorganised and localised, with no central plan or co-ordination,
although gradually some of the groups started to work together to promote their
claims more effectively, including those representing different faiths. Perhaps
most importantly,
before.
had
having
despite
their
privileges
such
never
neighbours,
as
privileges
If
they
difficult
in
Government
Ottoman
the
position.
a
Such demands placed
47
48
49
in
the
`nationalise'
to
in
involved
uprisings
These two men were also
seeking
the
their
to
great
with
negotiations
Albania, in order to give greater weight
the
to
Ottoman
the
grant
authorities
to
on
pressure
put
also
powers, and
administrative
in
demanded
had
`Albanians'
that
in
begun
have
to
initiative
The
appears
significant
most
previous revolts.
Constantinople,
in
Albanians,
December 1911. At a meeting of prominent
facilitate
to
devised
they
Prishtina,
plans
Hasan
Kemal
Ismail
by
and
organised
Kosovo,
in
This
following
start
the
would
insurrection
year.
Albanian
a general
FO
1912,
May
27
Grey,
to
Lowther
80 Lowther to Grey, 29 Apr. 1912, FO 421/281, no. 26;
Awakening,
National
pp.
Albanian
Skendi,
50;
Hollow
Detente,
Crampton,
p.
421/281, no. 129;
438-44.
50
where Prishtina had considerable influence and supplies, and then spread to
the
Albanian-speaking
other
areas.
Prishtina
was
therefore
assigned
central plan, when the revolt broke out it was obvious that the problems
experienced in the 1911 uprisings still existed: there were no unifying ideas,
motives or leadership. Nevertheless, by 23 July 1912, the Ottoman government
had signed an armistice with the Albanians, in order to concentrate on the war
Albanians,
Sir
Edward
Grey,
Italy.
did
This
the
to
not satisfy
who, according
with
British Foreign Secretary, were finally of `one mind and they were quite
determined
He highlighted
in particular the
81
More
Christian
Albanians.
Muslim
significantly, a vision of
and
cooperation of
differed,
Other
definitely
had
Albania'
`ethnic
aims
emerged.
what constituted an
but the definition of `Albania' and its boundaries was the same in all the petitions
in
Committee
Central
Albanian
from
the
(for
Porte
to
the
example
submitted
29
Albanian
from
the
1912,
28
July
on
chiefs
Constantinople on
southern
and
the
(dissolution
Porte
by
the
of
July 1912). The one concession granted
The
itilfists.
the
hours)
rebel
Ottoman Empire within twenty-four
satisfied only
full
for
to
to
Albanian
call
and
resist,
from
continued
southern
central and
groups
four
for
the
of
vilayets
demands,
their
all
autonomy
implementation of
above
82
'Albania'.
have
to
leaders'
`nationalist
appear
1912,
the
August
of
majority
July
In
and
eventually
to
likely
more
prove
that
their
were
been persuaded
claims
Also
43-5;
II,
at
Shgiperise,
Historia
pp.
IX.
i,
591;
BD,
1912,
July
15
e
81 Grey to Paget,
no.
427.
Awakening,
National
p.
Albanian
Skendi,
82Skendi, Albanian National Awakening, pp. 433-4.
51
successful if they worked with each other, rather than independently, and that it
was therefore necessary to reduce the differences between them. They would
then be able to show a united front and appear stronger, which they
considered
would both apply greater pressure on the Ottoman authorities, and impress the
great-power
representatives.
`enlightened intellectuals', led by Hasan Prishtina and Nexhib Draga, who, like
Prishtina, was from an influential Albanian family and had served as a deputy in
the Ottoman parliament, developed a compromise arrangement, which is
usually referred to as the `Fourteen Points of Hasan Prishtina'. It was presented
on 9 August 1912.83 This agreement was crucial for the fledgling Albanian
nationalist movement, in a number of respects. Most significantly, it represented
an alliance between the two Albanian `nationalistic' groupings that were most
antagonistic towards one another, and had the greatest ideological differences.
It called for the recognition of local customs and the carrying of arms, to satisfy
the Hamidists, and for school rights and a national programme, in line with the
behalf
The
intellectuals.
the
on
also
presented
memorandum was
aspirations of
for
it
the
it
that
Albanians,
preservation of
was
not
aiming
made
clear
and
of all
the rights of a particularly locality, village or clan, but of those of all AlbanianOttoman
by
the
demands
The
the
were accepted
majority of
speaking people.
far
forces
had
Albanian
because
largely
as
east
as
advanced
government,
Uskub, but they were not implemented in full. The Porte granted some
for
demands
but
the
or
four
service
in
regional
laws
the
not
vilayets,
customary
the
to
it
that
autonomy
It
consider
form
unable
was
claimed
of autonomy.
any
limitations
defining
the
in
there
because
geographical
problems
were
question
in
defined
the
`Albania'
the
to
It
therefore
`Albania'.
reference
made
no
of
83 Marling to Grey, 27 July 1912, FO 421/282, no. 173; Marling to Grey, 8 Aug. 1912, FO
the
Crescent
Gawrych,
434-5;
and
National
Awakening,
Albanian
pp.
421/282, no. 203; Skendi,
Eagle, pp. 194-5,211.
52
petition or to any of the other versions that had been mooted. The Albanians
had not succeeded in securing an acceptance of the definition of `Albania' that
had first been proposed internationally in 1878. $4
Interestingly, it was the intellectuals who persuaded the Hamidists to accept the
Ottoman proposal, although the main intellectual goals had not been agreed to.
The intellectuals, especially Prishtina, appear to have been willing to accept this
more limited offer because they did not want to lose the valuable other
85
concessions it granted. These goals were at least as important, possibly more
important, than the `national' ambitions. Seeking autonomy within the Ottoman
Empire was only one means of achieving them. If they could be achieved and
Albanians
that
through
could
more ordinary
other means, and ones
secured
be
It
then
be
this
to,
then
not
even
would
acceptable.
would also
relate
Albanian
independent
An
to
state was an even
secure autonomy.
necessary
more remote possibility.
moderate
or conservative.
fairly
nationalists were
In
this
threat.
be
to
that
they
under
perceived
preservation of existing rights
The
defensive
ideas
fits
the
nationalism.
Albanian
of
with
nationalism
way,
promotion
Albanian
of an
identity
based
on their
oral ethno-linguistic
to
in
but
for
itself,
protect other older
an attempt
foundations materialised not
(supposedly)
That
they
spoke
all
rights.
and
and more established privileges
there
in
many
were
areas
key
other
the
Albanian was
unifier, although
that
the
define
to
basis
areas
on which
differences. Language thus provided a
the
fairly
it
with
neatly
be
coincided
and
deemed
granted autonomy,
they
should
IX.,
BD,
1912,
Aug.
21
no.
Marling,
84Marling to Grey, 13 Aug. 1912, BD, IX.i, no. 613; Grey to
437.
Awakening,
National
Albanian
p.
646; Skendi,
i,
IX.
BD,
1912,
Aug.
21
no.
Marling,
Grey
613;
to
85Marling to Grey, 13 Aug. 1912, BD, IX.i, no.
437.
Awakening,
National
Albanian
p.
646; Skendi,
53
86 For an indication of the importance of Albanians only aiming to secure territory within its
FO
1918),
(London,
Question
for
Albanian
M.
Konitza,
The
limits'
example,
see
`ethnographical
371/3570/454087Norman minute, 3 Sept. 1912, BD, IX.i, no. 658.
54
by
been
have
to
League
perturbed
states appear
of all the
to
their
be
detrimental
fear
this
that
for
Albanian claims
would
autonomy, out of
Albanians
the
that
in
the
historic
were now
area
irredentist ambitions and
claims
Albanians
Serbs
the
the
between
divisions
Nascent
and
`Albania'.
as
claiming
88 'Treaty of Friendship and Alliance Between the Kingdom of Bulgarian and the Kingdom of
Kingdom
the
between
of
Treaty
Friendship
the
Annex
to
'Secret
and
alliance
of
Serbia' and
1915),
(London,
League
Balkan
The
pp.
Serbia'
Gueshov,
I.
E.
in
Kingdom
the
of
Bulgaria and
19,112,115-6.
89See for example: Helmreich, Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars; Thaden, Russia and the Balkan
Wars.
Balkan
Hall,
Alliance;
55
appear to have been accentuated by the rise in Albanian national activities, and
by the Serbian response to secure their own national ambitions in these areas,
especially Kosovo. Meanwhile, as early as September 1911 (at least), officials
in Sofia articulated to the Russian government their concerns about the
significance of a future Albanian revolt. They feared that it would prove a major
block
to
Bulgarian
ambitions,
especially
if
it
resulted
in
autonomy
(independence was not considered) for those Albanians living in the Kosovo
and Monastir vilayets. Typically, the four Balkan League governments resented
any privileges being given to the majority Muslim population that were not
likewise afforded to the Christians. The Bulgarian Prime Minister, Ivan Gueshov,
was under particular pressure to ensure that any such advantages were also
90
But
League
Christian
the
to
the
governments were
populations.
accorded
for
by
Christian
Albanians
the
by
the
protection
appeals
even more concerned
the
this
If
these
their
would
negate
concessions were granted,
rights.
of
the
interfering
themselves,
these
great
of
persuading
or
states
possibility of
in
their
in
had
do
respective
to
advancements
previous
occurred
so, as
powers
to
by
disturbed
Serbs
The
references
were particularly
nationalist programmes.
Serbia'
`Old
to
their
directly
this
and a
claims
`ethnic Albania', because
opposed
the
that
Bulgarian
of
portions
Adriatic.
the
anxious
were
officials
on
coastline
Albania',
`autonomous
and
included
be
within an
Monastir vilayet should not
to
lead
`Albania'
in
for
demand
might
the
that
reform
anxious
even more
(the
term
there
to
the
`Macedonia',
in
people
disturbances
and
corresponding
for
themselves.
Macedonians not being used) claiming similar concessions
the
that
there
that
therefore
was every possibility
British officials
predicted
i,
IX.
BD,
1912,
Aug.
14
Grey,
to
90Nekliudov to Sazonov, 29 Sept. 1911, KA, VIII, no. 1; Barclay
1912,
June
27
Grey,
to
O'Beirne
35;
27
Dec.
1911,
FO
421/279,
Grey,
to
Salis
no.
De
614;
no.
Aug.
14
Grey,
to
Barclay
643;
i,
Grey,
BD,
IX.
21
Aug.
1912,
to
Buchanan
9;
no.
FO 421/282, no.
614.
i,
IX.
BD,
no.
1912,
56
Orthodox population, to intervene and secure the same rights for the Empire's
Christian populations as those being granted to the Christians and Muslims in
93
Albania, but this remained a double-edged sword. None of the Christian states
Christian
the
be
The
to
states
accelerated
made.
wanted such concessions
development of alliances between themselves, and resolved that they would act
their
than
Albanian
to
own ambitions.
relinquish
rather
gains,
prevent
swiftly
They were confident that they would be successful, because the Italo-Turkish
Ottoman
territory
longer
the
that
had
illustrated
considered
great powers no
war
integrity
the
territorial
to
accept an alteration of
as inviolable, and were prepared
in
the
balance
the
Ottoman
territory,
region.
of
power
and of
of
by
the
territory
in
the
had
also claimed
All four League states
ambitions
1912
in
Balkan
the
states
Albanians. As Farrar has shown, the ambitions of
IX.
i,
BD,
1912,
Aug.
14
Grey,
no.
to
Barclay
3;
KA,
VIII,
91 Hartwig to Sazonov, 1 Oct. 1911,
no.
i,
659.
1912,
BD,
IX.
Aug.
26
Grey,
to
no.
614; Paget
Aug.
12
Neratov,
Giers
to
i,
456;
Series
2,
XX.
Aug.
1912,
MOEI,
92Nekliudov to Neratov, 12
no.
18
the
division
staff,
Holmsen
i,
to
general
XX.
457;
2,
of
Series
master
quarter
no.
MOEI,
1912,
Alliance,
Balkan
the
p.
Russia
Thaden,
XX.
ii,
502:
Also
2,
Series
and
MOEI,
no.
at
Aug. 1912;
Documents,
Austro-Hungarian
no.
1912,
Berchtold,
3
Aug.
Athens
to
in
Minister
106; Austrian
450.
421.
EDW,
1912,
Paris
London,
18
Aug.
Embassies
no.
93Neratov to Russian
at
and
57
The Serbian claims were the most important for the Albanian question. The
Serbs sought to acquire that territory in northern Albania that they considered
ethnically and historically theirs, as part of `old Serbia'. On these grounds, they
claimed territory as far south as the Drin river, and including the sanjak of Novi
Bazar, the Kosovan plain and the vilayet of Scutari (all of which the Albanians
considered part of northern `Albania'), and northern and western Macedonia.
Economic motives were also crucial. Serbia sought to gain `Albanian territory' to
by
its
Adriatic
to
the
and
overcome
problems
caused
obtain an
coastline,
landlocked position, especially its economic dependency upon Austria-Hungary
for trade. Serbian aspirations therefore stretched as far south as the town of
Durazzo, which was considered the ideal location for a suitable Serbian port, or,
further
Alessio,
Medua
Giovanni
di
San
the
which were
or
ports of
alternatively,
Durazzo,
lengths
to
to
to
Serbian
secure
great
go
officials were prepared
north.
95
the
broke
When
the
`all
the
out,
been
termed
war
or nothing port'.
which has
94 Farrar, `Aggression versus Apathy', pp. 257-80, esp. pp 257,266; See also G. Young,
Near
in
East (Oxford, 1915), p. 151.
the
War
Nationalism and
95 Ed. Note, EDW, p. 226; Grey to Paget, 6 Nov. 1912, BD, IX.i, no. 142; Strandtman to
EDW,
415.
1912,
Aug.
20
no.
Sazonov,
58
Serbian King Peter therefore proclaimed it a `Holy War to free our brethren and
ensure a better future. '96
Greek claims to Epirus were next in importance for the Albanian question,
because they conflicted with Albanian claims in the Koritza and Monastir
vilayets. The Greeks also sought gains in eastern Thrace, especially Salonika,
and in southern
Macedonia.
97
important.
The `Albanian' areas
economic and strategic considerations were
claimed by the Greeks were home to the vast majority of Orthodox `Albanians'.
The Greeks claimed, in line with their view that religion was synonymous with
nationality, that, regardless of the language these people spoke, and even
admitting that many spoke only Albanian, their religion (Orthodoxy) and Hellenic
Serbian
Greek.
Greek
largely
them
made
claims
complemented
sentiment
Serbian
focused
`southern
Albania',
in
that
they
claims
whereas
on
ones,
to
It
thus
`northern
Albania'.
make a
unnecessary
considered
was
centred on
formal agreement. The Skumbi river, the traditional divide between the Gheg
between
the
division
Tosk
extent of
regions, provided a sufficiently accurate
and
Serbian
Greek
The
in
`Albania'.
two
the
and
the maximum claims of
states
to
their
to
in
claims
enhance
cooperation, worked actively
governments, often
to
determined
been
have
to
suppress an
this territory, and appear
equally
Serbs
The
their
to
used a
ambitions.
Albanian nationality, which was contrary
but
Albania,
in
also
northern
two-pronged approach, deploying guerrilla warfare
Albanian
notably
most
chieftains,
of
prominent
a
number
making alliances with
96 King Peter quoted in L. Freundlich, 'Albania's Golgotha: Indictment of the Exterminators of the
Keg
Powder
the
Heart
in
the
Kosovo
)
of
Albanian People' (Vienna, 1913), in R. Elsie (ed.
(Boulder, 1997), pp. 332-60, at p. 333.
Role
'The
Kondis,
B.
of
Albania
Greek
in
involvement
details
see
ambitions
further
and
on
For
(1984),
25
Studies,
Balkan
Greek-Bulgarian
1912',
Understanding
of
the Albanian Factor upon
pp. 377-87.
59
By contrast, the ambitions of both Serbia and Greece clashed with Bulgarian
ones, especially in `Macedonia', and Serbian ambitions also conflicted with
Montenegrin aspirations in `northern Albania'. These rivalries had seriously
hindered the development of the League, and they would continue to be
99
Montenegrin ambitions regarding Albanian territory were the third
significant.
most important. Montenegrin ambitions centred on the town of Scutari, which
had been the centre of the medieval Montenegrin kingdom, and also on the
sanjak of Novi Bazar, possession of which it desired to provide a coterminous
frontier with Serbia, and thus reduce its own isolation. The possibility of financial
four
As
League
the
the
smallest of
and military assistance was also attractive.
fewer
Albanians
less
than
the
secure relationship
and
a
numerically
with
states,
Montenegro
Slav
Russian
including
their
the
was
patron,
with
great powers,
Montenegrin
largest
Orthodox
The
than
the
problem
states.
other small
weaker
Serbia.
Although
its
those
incompatibility
because
the
of
claims with
of
of
arose
the Serbs and Montenegrins were religiously and linguistically similar, their
bitter
leaders
divisions,
their
had
were
historical separation
and
produced many
98A. Nicolson minute, 6 Apr. 1912 and Ed. Note, BD, IX. ii, Appendix II, pp. 1007,1018; Norman
45.
Wars,
Balkan
the
Diplomacy
p.
Helmreich,
BD,
IX.
i,
755;
1913,
and
no.
minute, 26 Mar.
99 For example on Greco-Bulgarian rivalries in Macedonia, the problems this had for the
territorial
include
to
it
therefore
a
League
Balkan
the
possible
formation of
was not
and why
(5
May
1912)
(29
Greco-Bulgarian
convention
the
military
or
agreement
within
settlement
Dec.
1
Grey,
Elliot
to
1;
KA,
XV,
Nekliudov
Neratov,
14
May
1912,
to
no.
October 1912) see
to
Nekliudov
405;
EDW,
1912,
Sazonov
May
Nekliudov,
30
1015-18;
to
ii,
no.
1913, BD, IX. pp.
translated
(compiled,
S.
Rubinchek
L.
EDW,
in
1912,
400;
Popov
June
20
no.
quoted
Sazonov,
Archive
Central
the
Journal
Digest
the
Krasnyi
Arkhiv.
A
Historical
A
of
of
'
annotated),
and
the
Russia
Thaden,
153;
S.
S.
R,
Vols.
U.
1-30
(Cleveland,
1947),
and
the
p.
Department of
Helmreich,
Diplomacy
76-7.
Wars,
101;
Balkan
the
Alliance,
pp.
of
p.
Balkan
60
10
Their animosity was so great
rivals for the leadership of the Serbian `race'.
that the Russian government
101
103
1912,
Oct.
10
Grey,
to
Bax-Ironside
100Potapov to General Staff, 16 Sept. 1912, KA, XV, no. 12;
Serbia,
Modern
History
A
Petrovich,
of
M.
B.
221;
Tangle,
Balkan
Durham,
p.
BD, IX.ii, p. 1018;
Balkan
the
Russia
Thaden,
596;
and
II,
1976),
London,
York
(New
p.
and
1804-1918,2 vols.
Alliance, pp. 106-7.
1914,
Apr.
7
Sazonov,
to
101Potapov to General Staff, 16 Sept. 1912, KA, XV, no. 12; Hartwig
League',
Balkan
the
Foundations
the
of
`Montenegro
C.
Helmreich,
E.
and
531;
EDW, no.
the
Diplomacy
of
Helmreich,
426-34;
(1937),
Review,
15
European
Eastern
pp.
Slavonic and
85,89.
Wars,
pp.
Balkan
377-87.
Factor',
Albanian
pp.
the
2,9;
Kondis,
`Role
102Gueshov, Balkan League, pp.
of
103Enclosures 1 and 2, Elliot to Grey, 1 Dec. 1913, BD, IX.ii, pp. 1015-18.
61
In the light of these rivalries and conflicting ambitions, the establishment of the
League was a remarkable achievement.
subsume
these animosities
temporarily,
104
106
95-7.
2,
Chapter
for
Greeks,
the
pp.
104For details of French support
see
105Grey to Goschen, 28 Oct. 1912, BD, IX.ii, no. 70.
84.
Albania,
Greece
p.
Also
Kondis,
352;
II,
and
106Historia e Shgiperise, p.
at
62
On the military side, the most significant initiative resulted from a meeting of a
number of leading nationalists in Uskub, on 14 October 1912. A policy of
neutrality seemed desirable, because the Albanians hoped that a `distinctive
policy' would establish their `racial individuality', but this `distinctive policy' was
not advocated or pursued. As Skendi has shown, the Albanians decided to
pursue a policy that was distinctive not in itself, but in its motivation. It was
decided that they would fight on the side of the Ottoman Empire, but would fight
for themselves, not for the Porte. They considered this the only way in which
they could successfully defend their territory and prevent the partition of `ethnic
Albania' (the four vilayets). In October 1912, the Albanians had the inherent
advantage of the possession of this territory, which they believed that they could
maintain only through war. Their declaration was presented to the Porte and the
impossible
16
October
1912.107
lt
had
to achieve a
still proven
great powers on
Kosovan
Albanians,
for
instance,
`Albanian'
many
under
policy:
single unified
Boletin, fought with the Serbs in Kosovo, whilst the Catholic Malissori
tribesmen, after assurances from King Nikita that he had no designs on
Albanian territory, and was solely determined to free his borders of Ottoman
108
to
by
trying
Porte
The
forces.
Montenegrin
fought
Turks,
responded
with
the
fanaticism
inciting
hope
in
the
amongst
religious
of
exploit this co-operation,
delegation
to
Uskub
the
In
a
Muslim populace.
meeting appointed
response,
but
Montenegrins,
from
the
Catholic
tribesmen
such action proved
detach the
had
than
quickly
like
felt
and
Malissori
allies,
The
rather
pawns
unnecessary.
Albanian
Most
homes.
their
to
the
mountain
returned
and
conflict
abandoned
Awakening,
National
Albanian
Skendi,
135,
107Brailsford, Macedonia, p. 279; Swire, Albania, p.
84.
Albania,
Greece
Kondis,
p.
Also
II,
353-4;
Shgiperise,
and
Historia
at
pp.
451-2;
e
Ppp.
Serbia
Albanians
'The
Mikich,
and
D.
8 Lamb to Lowther, 28 Dec. 1911, FO 421/279, no. 38;
Society
European
Central
East
),
(eds.
Djurdjevich
Kiraly
D.
in
B.
Wars'
Balkan
and
the
during
Wars,
Balkan
the
p.
Diplomacy
Helmreich,
1987),
165-96;
(Boulder,
of
Wars
Balkan
pp.
the
and
128,133.
Albania,
Swire,
pp.
45;
63
patriots pursuing other tactics soon arrived at similar conclusions regarding the
duplicity of the Greeks and Slavs, and agreed that the League
states were more
dangerous
to
Albanian
aspirations
than
their
Ottoman
predecessors.
109
Albanian fears regarding the first Balkan war were quickly realised
when the
League secured a series of sweeping victories. Despite ending the Italo-Turkish
in
war,
order to concentrate on fighting in the Balkans, the Porte had proven
unable to send troops from Tripoli, because of the Greek blockade. This
resulted in only 320,000 Ottoman troops facing a combined League force of
700,000.110 The Ottomans sued for peace, and at the beginning of December
1912 an armistice was signed. The League had fulfilled all its ambitions, and
surpassed many of them. The British Ambassador in Vienna, Sir Fairfax
Cartwright, wrote of the League's outstanding success:
At the beginning of the war Servia [Serbia] hoped to secure merely the
Vilayet of Kossovo [Kosovo]; after her first successes she claimed to
halving
Albania
Monastir;
Ueskueb
[Uskub]
talks
of
and
now she
retain
111
Herzegovina.
Bosnia
to
Greece;
tomorrow
annex
want
she will
with
When the armistice was signed, the League occupied all Ottoman territory in
Europe, except for the four cities of Constantinople, Adrianople, Scutari and
Janina. The last two were held by `Albanian' forces and were claimed by the
Albanians as part of Albania.
109Durham, Balkan Tangle, pp. 244-5; Skendi, Albanian National Awakening, p. 452; Historia e
Shgiperis6, II, p. 350; Also at Kondis, Greece and Albania, p. 84.
110A. F. Pribram, The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1920-1), I,
167; Jelavich, Establishment of Balkan National States, pp. 218-9.
" Cartwright to A. Nicolson, 8 Nov. 1912, BD, IX.ii, no. 165.
64
automatically
Albanian
ethnic
support
best
the
it,
had
Albanian
make
the
would
and
envisaged
patriots
as
nationalism
Milo's
Paskal
is
indicative
Such
of
Albanian
for
the
an
attitude
people.
choice
in
this
Albanian
the
period,
the
class
political
of
weaknesses
comments about
112Historia e Shgiperise, II, p. 357; Also at Kondis, Greece and Albania, p. 53.
65
113P. Milo, `Albania and the Balkan Entente', Association International d'etudes du Sud-Est
Europeen Bulletin, 30 (2001), pp. 39-66, esp. pp. 41-2.
114Cartwright to Grey, 10 Nov. 1912, BD, IX.ii, no. 173; Story, Memoirs of Ismail Kemal, p. 372;
Durham, Balkan Tangle, p. 231.
66
The delegates hoisted the flag of Skanderbeg, and designated it the `national'
flag.
' 15
Before
the first
Balkan war,
unnecessary, and at that time it was certainly desired by only a small minority of
nationalists, primarily those living abroad, who had experienced more liberal
democratic
and
and
predatory
neighbours
indefinitely.
Kemal
the
Ismail
to
factor
that
the
convince
enabled
crucial
recognition was
the
than
independence,
finally,
decide,
to
earlier,
rather
on
national convention
Empire.
Ottoman
the
albeit still recent, goal of autonomy within
Great-Power Responses
the
League
to
had
and
activities
Meanwhile, the great powers
also responded
October
8
On
increase in Albanian nationalist activity, albeit somewhat slowly.
the
Austria-Hungary,
Russia
Balkan
and
1912, the day that the first
war started,
in
the
interests
the
most extensive
two flanking Balkan powers, and those with
Treaty,
Berlin
the
League
the
that
overturn
not
must
issued
a statement
region,
Article
Reiterating
territorial
in
changes.
the
any
that
result
not
must
war
and
Turkeythe
of
Porte
administration
to
the
of
reform
undertake
Three, they urged
Memoirs
Story,
91;
Albania,
p.
115Historia e Shgiperis6, II, p. 360; Also at Kondis, Greece and
231.
Tangle,
Balkan
Durham,
372;
p.
Kemal,
p.
of Ismail
67
116 Swire,
68
played by Albanian representatives and those of the other small states would be
much reduced.
War,
World
the
Origins
of
121Nekliudov to Sazonov, 6 Nov. 1911, KA, IX, no. 45; S. B. Fay, The
430.
I,
1929),
York,
(New
p.
3
Causes
War
the
Underlying
vols.
Sarajevo:
of
Before
69
With
the
Albanian
for
the
decisive
be
to
interests
Austrian
question.
were
Balkan League besieging `Albanian' territory on all fronts, the Albanian
depended
Albanian
fate
the
upon
that
the
determined
question
of
nationalists
Albanian
from
the
1912,
November
representatives
the great powers. On 21
Albanians,
behalf
all
had
of
on
Constantinople
in
petition,
a
presented
colony
intervene
to
Powers
`Great
and preserve
Catholic,
to
the
Muslim, Orthodox and
the
it
far
of
position
Turkey-in-Europe
affected
as
as
the territorial status quo of
for
the
125
powers
great
the
excuse
This
necessary
Albania'.
eventually provided
23;
EDW,
Note,
Ed.
18;
p.
VIII,
KA,
no.
122Seefor example Neratov to Nekliudov, 15 Oct. 1911,
Sergei
Reminiscences
of
1909-1916:
Years,
Fateful
Duddington),
N.
A.
(trans
S. Sazonov
Tangle,
Balkan
Durham,
80;
1928),
York,
(New
p.
Affairs
for
Foreign
Minister
Russian
Sazonov
225.
Rome,
Vienna,
Berlin,
London,
Paris,
123See for example Sazonov to Russian Ministers in
45;
XVI,
KA,
1912,
Oct.
no.
31
Bucharest,
Cettinje,
Athens
Belgrade,
Sofia,
and
Constantinople,
163-4.
Balkan
Wars,
the
Diplomacy
pp.
of
Heimreich,
404.
EDW,
Note,
Ed.
no.
124Barclay to Grey, 23 Sept. 1912, BD, IX.i, no. 737; See also
125Ed Note, BD, IX.ii, p. 183.
70
to intervene, although the indications were that such action would have been
taken anyway. The extensive gains by the Balkan League had
made it clear that
the great powers would be unable to maintain the status quo, but the impact
of
these acquisitions on great-power interests was too great to be ignored. Without
this intervention, an independent or even autonomous Albania
could not have
been created, for it would have been only a matter of time before the Albanian
forces succumbed to the League's onslaught. Thanks largely to Austrian
efforts,
based mainly on self-interest, the Albanian appeal to have the matter settled by
the European great-power concert was successful. Cartwright wrote that the
Albanians were determined to maintain their country. They would fight to
the bitter end rather than allow their country to be dismembered. If Servia
is allowed to absorb a large portion of Northern Albania it will be followed
by a continual state of unrest and insurrection until Austria and Italy are
forced to intervene. 126
The other great powers agreed to settle the Albanian question in concert
between themselves, in order to prevent Austrian military action, which would
Slav
its
its
in
Russian
involvement,
have
to
proteges
and
protect
also
resulted
for
in
thinking
interests.
The
Balkan
concern
great-power
was
prime mover
own
their respective great-power interests, and the desire to maintain the balance of
than
Adriatic,
Balkans
the
in
the
any recognition of or support
rather
and
power
for Albanian national sentiment. Nevertheless, Albanian representatives had
been influential in aligning the Albanian national question with these greatLeague
Balkan
the
defeating
the
aspirations of
power interests, and thereby
Albanians,
the
than
themselves,
were stronger
states, which, although small
especially when acting collectively.
71
in geographical
127
Conclusions
The success of the Albanians in their calls for autonomy had been a major
consideration in the formation of the Balkan League, especially the League's
decision to engage in war against the Ottoman Empire. The neighbouring
Balkan states feared that, if the Albanians were successful in achieving their
Ottoman
down
the
they
regime.
and
support
would settle
national programme,
This would help stabilise the balance of power in the region, the opposite of
their
Christian
to
the
own national aspirations.
secure
small states sought
what
More importantly, any Albanian success would prevent the Balkan League from
127Enclosures 1 and 2, BD, IX.ii, no. 583; Paget to Grey, 21 Dec. 1912, BD, IX.ii, no. 408; Elliot
Conduct
the
BD,
1913,
IX.
ii,
Causes
749;
Carnegie
March
Endowment,
23
of
Grey,
and
no.
to
Balkan Wars, p. 418; Petrovich, History of Serbia, II, p. 603.
72
intervening and claiming this territory for themselves. As Swire argues, the
League states therefore desired to act to prevent the settlement of the Albanian
problem, and to deny the possibility of concessions spreading to other parts of
the Empire, especially Macedonia. 128
In turn, the threat posed by the Balkan League, in the first Balkan war, to
Albanian national and local interests had finally managed to weld together the
disparate groupings. Ismail Kemal and Hasan Prishtina led the movement to
gain great-power support for the Albanian national cause, especially amongst
the Austrians. The war was the factor that finally pushed the Albanians to affirm
the need for independence, and also to work together, irrespective of their other
differences. Besides the external threats that advanced the national movement,
the other key unifier was the Albanian spoken language, which was the one
common bond between the various groups. That they spoke Albanian was what
in
Slavs,
Greeks,
Turks
the
different
them
to
the
groups
and other ethnic
made
base
the
basis
determined
to
they
the
this
upon which
was
region, and
independent state they proclaimed. To achieve this, they needed great-power
Christian
Orthodox
the
defeat
the
to
small states, who
ambitions of
support
held
an established,
already
international
in
the
low-level,
position
albeit
than
they
were.
had
a great-power patron and were much stronger
system,
to
League,
Balkan
the
the
that
an
and
Cartwright was convinced
activities of
did
to
before,
Turks
Young
the
those
more
important but lesser extent
of
thirty
the
than
of
years
Albanian
previous
the
national movement
advance
Balkan
first
the
to
the
war,
he
As
of
initiatives.
outbreak
up
maintained
cultural
the
towards
their
Turks
if
Young
the
policies
changed
he could still write that,
73
74
CHAPTER 2:
Great-Power Interests and Albanian Boundaries (1912-14)
Albanian
regarding
the
involved,
interests
the
It
boundary
examines
commissions.
subsequent
It
for
the
faced
the
settlements.
the
reasons
and
problems
arguments used,
130Grey to Cartwright, 8 Aug. 1913, BD, IX.ii, no. 1226; An earlier version of the material
Ethnography,
Frontiers:
the
`Fixing
Guy,
C.
N.
been
has
Chapter
in
this
as
published
presented
Ethnicity
in
Studies
and
1914',
1912
to
Albania,
delimitation
the
of
and
politics
power
boundary
the
commission
fuller
For
27-49;
of
(2005),
consideration
a
pp.
Nationalism, 5
Boundaries
`Linguistic
and
Guy,
C.
N.
decisions
impacts
the
made see
of
deliberations and the
Historical
Journal
1926',
of
1878
to
Commissions
Albanian
Boundary
the
Interests:
Geo-political
2008.
forthcoming
Geography,
75
contends that these decisions promoted the objectives of the six European
powers, as opposed to the ethnographic dimensions that they professed.
century,
representation
of
European
peoples
ethnographers
and
their
worked
codification,
for
according
systematic
to
their
interpretations of `race' and ethnicity. This began with the cartographic mapping
of ethnic and `racial' groups and characteristics, although maps showed huge
131
With the advance of nationalism in eastern Europe, there was a
variations.
need to trace such boundaries on the ground and on maps. Fredrik Barth and
Katherine
Verdery
have considered
the complex
relationships
between
132
formation
However, there are
ethnicity, nationalism, nation-state
and borders.
few
still
studies of the practicalities of defining ethnic boundaries in political
terms. Boundary delimitation in the era before the First World War was closely
linked to these contemporary concerns for `ethnic frontiers'. In 1913, the
133
The
define
how
`nation'
to
the
western powers
or
a
nationality.
problem was
tended to follow the western liberal/civic tradition, which did not distinguish
131For examples in south-eastern Europe see for example H. Wilkinson, Maps and Politics: A
Review of the Ethnographic Cartography of Macedonia (Liverpool, 1951), pp. 316-7.
132Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries; K. Verdery, 'Ethnicity, Nationalism and State-making',
in H. Vermeulen and C. Glovers (eds.), The Anthropology of Ethnicity: Beyond `Ethnic groups
(Amsterdam,
1994).
Boundaries'
and
133A. Sharp, `The genie that would not go back in the bottle: National self-determination and the
),
(eds.
G.
Fraser
in
S.
Dunn
World
War
Peace
Settlement',
First
the
the
and
legacy of
and
Europe and Ethnicity: the First World War and contemporary ethnic conflict (London, 1996), pp.
10-29, at p. 12.
76
134Sharp, `Genie', p. 13; A. Sharp, `Britain and the Minorities at the Paris Peace Conference', in
178.
170-88,
1978),
Minorities
in
History
(London,
),
(ed.
at
p.
pp.
A. C. Hepburn
135G. Schpflin, Nations, Identity, Power the new politics of Europe (London, 2000), pp. 121-2,
254; Barth, Ethnic Groups, p. 11.
77
One called for, especially because it would advantage Russia's Slav proteges.
Yet considering the scale of the League's victory, changes to the frontiers were
unavoidable. Therefore it was decided that the London ambassadors of the
great powers would meet to discuss questions of interest: Serbian access to the
Adriatic, Albanian independence, Albanian frontiers and the Aegean islands.
The prime position of a future Albanian state, situated on the eastern Adriatic
littoral, especially at Valona and the Otranto Straits (between Corfu and the
eastern
Adriatic
coast,
considered
equivalent
to
Gibraltar
for
the
Mediterranean), and less than sixty miles from the Italian coast, made Albania a
vested
Austro-Italian
interest.
a Russian satellite
entrenched on the eastern Adriatic, a view with which the British concurred. The
in
to
to
avoid a
conference
order
an ambassadorial
other great powers agreed
They
hoped
the
between
that
them.
meeting would speed up
probable war
formality,
by
discussions
misunderstandings and other
minimising
geopolitical
complications.
the
to
because
London
other capitals.
of
objections
was chosen
expertise.
in
the
Conference
close contact
Throughout the
representatives remained
all
deliberations.
directed
the
largely
foreign
ministries, which
with their respective
that
Europe',
`concert
the
to
decided
had
of
By so doing, the powers
resurrect
diplomacy
whereby representatives of
traditional nineteenth-century means of
disputes,
discuss
on
to
in
agreement
reach
and
one country
each power met
Concert
Congresses.
(Berlin)
1878
(Vienna)
1815
in
the
and
most notably
be
to
more
conducted
the
negotiations
had
diplomacy
advantage of enabling
delays
and
inevitable
misunderstandings
the
by
complications,
reducing
quickly,
78
Of all the great powers, Austria-Hungary had most interests at stake at the
Conference and in the Albanian question. This explains why the Ballhausplatz
had taken the most active interest during the first Balkan war, had been the first
power to realise that the status quo could not be maintained and had been so
instrumental in establishing the Conference in the first place. Austria was the
traditional
protector
huge
Empire,
Ottoman
like
the
Empire,
a
was
More significantly, the Habsburg
Austrian
different
least
nationalities.
eleven
at
encompassing
polyglot empire,
incite
its
territory,
to
fallout
and
Ottoman
the
feared
that
spread
would
officials
Dec.
5
Sazonov
to
Benckendorff
504;
EDW,
136Benckendorff to Sazonov 4 Dec. 1912,
no.
Crampton,
165;
ii,
IX.
BD,
1912,
Nov.
8
no.
1912, EDW, no. 507; Cartwright to A. Nicolson,
),
(ed.
H.
Hinsley
F.
in
1909-1914',
Balkans,
Crampton,
'The
R.
J.
67-76;
Detente,
Hollow
pp.
261.
256-70,
1977),
p.
(Cambridge,
at
Sir
Grey
Edward
pp.
British Foreign Policy under
137Brailsford, Macedonia, p. 282.
373/2/1,
FO
1920),
p.
17
(London,
No.
138Albania, Foreign Office Handbook, Historical Section
105.
79
the Serbs there to unite with `mother Serbia' to form `Greater Serbia'.
Consequently, Austrian policy attempted to control the reallocation of Balkan
territory, and to prevent the spread of Serbian or Slav nationalism into Austrian
territory. As long as Serbia remained landlocked, this task was all the easier,
Serbian access to the Adriatic, hence the formal annexation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina (1908-09), and its pre-occupation with opposing Serbian claims to
northern Albania. A Serbian Adriatic outlet would endanger not only Austria's
economic and commercial interests but also its strategic ones: the Adriatic was
Austria's only access to the Mediterranean. The Austrians already had to share
the Adriatic with Italy but they did not want to share it with a third power that,
through control of the Otranto Straits, would have the potential to close the
Adriatic to Austrian vessels, both commercial and military. This was particularly
Russian
base.
Serbian
became
in
the
that
naval
port
a
event
a
worrying
139
its
decision
to
the
took
Balihausplatz
1912,
the
objectives
At the end of
achieve
Austrians
The
for
This
several reasons.
through diplomacy and not war.
was
but
they
Italian
were
they
that
support,
secure
would
were not convinced
(This
French
very
Russians
the
assistance.
that
secure
would
convinced
Ballhausplatz
the
in
1914.
)
Even
July
worryingly,
more
materialised
situation
139Jelavich, Establishment of Balkan National States, p. 235; A. F. Pribram, Austrian Foreign
World
First
the
History
A
Diplomatic
Zeman,
1923),
38-9;
Z.
(London,
of
pp.
Policy, 1908-1918
War (London, 1971), p. 14.
80
other
Balkan
small
state
nationalisms,
especially
the
Slavs. The
Italy was the only other directly interested power. The Consulta, the Italian
Foreign Ministry, had for some years been attempting to expand into the
Balkans, particularly economically and culturally. The Italian Foreign Minister,
Marquis Antonio di San Giuliano, had first-hand knowledge of Albania, and had
141
book
After Austria, Italy was the principal importer and
written a
on the area.
exporter in Albania, and accounted for twenty-five percent of goods leaving
Scutari and thirty percent from southern Albania. The Servizi Maritime carried
Albanian mail, the Puglia Line served northern Albanian ports, there were Italian
financial
Commerciale d'Oriente ranked as the official bank. There was a large Albanian
diaspora in Italy, especially in Sicily, and a Chair of Albanian had been
established
Naples
at
University.
140A. F. Pribram (trans. F.D. Morrow), Austria-Hungary and Great Britain 1908-1914 (London,
1951), p. 164; Pribram, Austrian Foreign Policy, pp. 18,46-7.
141Crampton, Hollow Detente, p. 76.
81
communes
in mainland Italy
powers
incompatible.
which
aspire
to
its
possession
are
acute
and
144
For
the
two
the
for
Italy,
the
true
This was particularly
powers.
weaker of
between
two
held
dictum
true:
Italians, the old
conditions, alliance or war,
only
145
Italy
Consulta
the
At
this
chose alliance.
Italy and Austria were possible.
point
Tripoli,
in
Empire
Ottoman
the
difficult
had only just completed a
war against
in
soon
so
become
conflict
major
desire
to
another
did
embroiled
not
and
to
likely
Italians
the
more
Austria,
considered
whom
afterwards, especially with
Austria,
fought
Italy
in
Even
alongside
which
German
conflict
a
support.
gain
Albania
detriment.
Italy's
an
was
Austria's
be
to
and
likely
to
advantage
was
had
they
agreement
an
signed
Austria
Italy
agree:
could
and
area on which
into
it
incorporated
1912,
in
1909
in
it
1901,
in
and,
Albania
reaffirmed
regarding
82
the Triplice. 146 Through these agreements, the Consulta sought to prevent
another power acquiring control of the Albanian littoral on the eastern side of
the Adriatic, less than forty miles from the Italian coast at the narrowest point.
Perhaps, in the future the ultimate goal-Albanian
and Italian spheres-might
prepared and, indeed, willing to work with the Austrians for the creation of an
independent Albania that touched the Adriatic. This was a much better option
than it becoming Slav, Greek or Austrian. In 1912-13, the divergent interests of
Austria and Italy could be ignored in the short term in order to oppose the
Hellenic and Slav threat, which at that moment appeared more pressing. 147
The German government was prepared to follow the line taken by its alliance
it
further
to
that
then
the
need
with
complication
would
partners, although
resolve
any disagreements
between Austria
and
Italy. Throughout
the
the
Least
the
Italy,
Bosworth,
B.
of
J.
R.
FO
371/1513/47771;
147Rodd to Grey, 9 Nov. 1912,
253;
1979),
(Cambridge,
War
World
p.
First
Foreign
Policy
before
the
Great Powers: Italian
178.
Austria-Hungary,
11,
Treaties
Secret
p.
of
Pribram,
158,
I,
Treaties,
Secret
Pribram,
1912,
FO
pp.
9
Nov.
371/1513/47772;
148Goschen to Grey,
178.
83
Of the three Entente powers, Russian interests were the most directly affected
by the questions under discussion. Russian policy consistently had the objective
of protecting and promoting the interests of fellow Slav nations in the Balkans,
especially Serbia and, in so doing, furthering Russia's stature and interests and
150
The Bosnian annexation crisis had
diminishing that of its Austrian rival.
highlighted just how dangerous Austrian pretensions to hegemony in the
Balkans could be. Sazonov sought to use Russia's proteges to counter this,
hence Russia's
patronage
Ambassadors'
In
Balkan
League.
the
the
of
84
Alliance. With Britain, despite Triplice fears about the Entente growing closer
together, Sazonov considered Russia had `no tie of any kind', because the
Entente related solely to their empires and colonies, and made no mention of
Europe. Additionally, Russian policy underwent considerable revision during the
period of the Conference. The expansion of Russia's proteges, both in territory
and population, meant that they were not as insecure as they had been during
the
Bosnian
crisis,
and
not
so
dependent
upon
Russia
151
support.
French actions, despite there being no real threat to France, appeared even
further
there
Russia,
than
those
were no
why
of
and explain
more pro-Slav
Russian fears of French opposition. Grey had accurately surmised that the
French Ambassador to London, Paul Cambon, was not altogether happy with
Grey's conduct, and was fearful that it might lead to a loss of Russian prestige,
Grey
that
Entente,
Triple
the
impact
should
it
and
that
unfavourably on
might
153
lead
follow
the
to
French
The
have shown more partisanship.
were prepared
in
On
some questions, most specifically
taken by Russia in negotiations.
because
interests
of
Russian
and
great
Albania,
as
not
were
where
southern
French
The
lead.
the
French
took
attitude was
Greece,
the
in
French interest
Sazonov:
Hartwig
to
from
in
summed up a communication
71.
Years,
Fateful
Sazonov,
500;
p.
1912,
EDW,
151Benckendorff to Sazonov, 29 Nov.
no.
152Pribram, Austrian Foreign Policy, p. 42.
153Grey, Twenty-five Years, 1,p. 274.
85
Throughout
the
154
Ambassadorial
Conference,
and
afterwards,
Grey was
in Serbian
claims.
Grey asserted
that
Benckendorff, the Russian Ambassador, was satisfied with his policy as it was
intended to get fair terms and secure peace, was not indifferent to Russian
friendship and did not intend to enact a rapprochement with the central powers.
In reality, Grey's actions were designed to pursue four key British objectives.
Only on the surface did Grey appear to pursue a neutral line. Grey was
motivated, firstly, by the desire to ensure a European peace, and for Grey this
meant maintaining the balance of power. He wanted policies that Russia and
Austria could agree upon, regardless of the technicalities, or merits, of the
155
Equally important, although in some respects contradictory, was the
case.
direct
Entente.
Whitehall
had
the
to
no
maintain and preserve
necessity
interests in Albania. If able to pursue an independent policy, it would apparently
have favoured the establishment of an independent Albania, as long as good
Russian
because
This
be
and
was not possible
assured.
government could
French opinion had to be considered. Despite their appearance of being nonWar
Haldane,
the
Richard
Grey
and
committal and of pursuing a neutral policy,
86
a predominantly
did
France
the
not want
(1908-09) and
I,
Years,
Twenty-five
pp.
Grey,
100;
156Crowe and Grey minutes, 31 Dec. 1913, BD, X. i, no.
272-3.
first
the
Russia
Britain,
Note
and
Gwynne's
157Wilson, Empire and Continent, incl. `H. A.
on
145-7.
War',
Balkan
pp.
87
trouble over a Balkan dispute that was not its concern. Therefore Grey's role
of
mediator became consistent with maintenance of the Entente. Consequently,
when a concession was made, it was not used as a diplomatic `score' but as a
reason for urging the other side towards moderation and concession. Grey felt
that he had secured the confidence of all the ambassadors, and even secured a
strong personal relationship between himself and Sazonov, because the other
states did not feel that he was trying to increase the prestige of British
159
diplomacy.
In reality, Grey was not as disinterested as it first appeared, but
rather worked
consistently
to safeguard
preservation of the Entente, British naval power and the balance of power.
Ambassadors'
Conference of 1912-13
On 17 December 1912, with Grey in the chair, the first meeting of the
Ambassadorial
by
The
discussions.
informal
during
represented
other powers were
occurred
their ambassadors in London: Count Alexander Benckendorff for Russia, Paul
Cambon for France, Count Albert von Mensdorff for Austria, Prince Karl Marx
They
for
Italy.
Imperiali
Guglielmo
Count
met
for
Germany
Lichnowsky
and
The
1913.
August
11
final
the
meeting on
officially sixty-six times, with
just
they
Grey
later
As
commented,
Conference was never officially closed.
did
They
break.
for
not
the
having
summer
adjourned
stopped meeting,
together
them
brought
first
had
that
the
because
urgent necessities
reconvene
left
Many
things
unsettled,
European
were
threatening
longer
peace.
were no
those
deprived
been
had
of
but the relations between the great powers
1912.160
late
dominated
had
that
dangerous elements
so
88
to Albanian
independence,
its
diminishing
and
hoped
to
Russian
Montenegrin
Serbian
officials
claims,
and
championship of
protect their geo-political
Austro-Italian
by
cogreater
preventing
position
for
Serbian
to
instructed
Hartwig
enthusiasm
Therefore
reduce
was
operation.
163
Mensdorff
There
as
Albania.
in
was an acknowledgment,
northern
gains
is
to
that
"viable":
`autonomous
say
Albania
and
that
made
was
unless
argued,
its
to
it
would easily succumb
large enough to have a separate existence'
be
to
Albania
that
not
was
the
However,
agreed
ambassadors
neighbour states.
(still
to
fully independent but autonomous, under the sovereignty or suzerainty
to
themselves
a
the
commit
Sultan,
would
powers
be decided) of the
and
89
neutral guarantee. These decisions were later revised to make Albania a fully
independent state, with the Sultan being replaced by a separate
'64
prince.
Meanwhile, at the first meeting, it was also agreed that Serbia would be denied
access to Adriatic territory in northern Albania, despite this being one of
Belgrade's major motivations. Instead Serbia would have access via rail links to
a neutralised port, although the port was left unspecified, as the Austrians had
Grey's
out
ruled
suggestions of San Giovanni de Medua, or the decision being
left to a commission. 165 From Grey's perspective,
he had facilitated a
Albanian
the
northern
regarding
167
Nevertheless, this decision produced severe
boundary, Austria must yield.
delays in the ensuing conference proceedings, because it led the Russians
the
1913
from
in
onwards
other areas, whilst
persistently to reject compromises
denied
been
had
that
the
to
port
Serbs would make a number of efforts
secure
them.
ii,
IX.
BD,
June,
28
Cartwright,
Grey
to
164Grey to Cartwright, 17 Dec. 1912, BD, IX.ii, no. 391;
116-8.
3,
Chapter
pp.
these
details
for
see
changes
1091;
of
no.
Austria-Hungary
and
Pribram,
800/62;
FO
MSS,
165Grey to Goschen, 21 Dec. 1912, Grey
Britain, pp. 169-70.
166Grey to Cartwright, 17 Dec. 1912, BD, IX.ii, no. 391.
167Pribram, Austria-Hungary and Britain, p. 182.
90
by his Franco-Russian
he
to
demands.
For
Entente
the
to
seemed
most
part,
co-ordinate
requests
170
perform his allotted role as mediator.
91
173
Kosovan plain, the Visoki Decani Orthodox monastery (despite claiming it was
in a predominantly Muslim and Albanian speaking area), and a procession of
Prizrend,
Ipek,
Dibra,
the place where
towns,
and
northern
most notably
Albanian nationalism had first emerged in 1878 (Prizrend League), in exchange
for Scutari becoming Albanian. This was despite Berchtold's earlier assertions
that no town with an Albanian-speaking
be
excluded, and
would
majority
171A. Nicolson to Buchanan, 31 Dec. 1912, BD, IX.ii, no. 428; Pribram, Austria-Hungary and
Great Britain, p. 178.
12 A. Nicolson to Cartwright, 21 Jan. 1913, BD, !X. ii, no. 538.
173Pribram, Austria-Hungary and Great Britain, p. 184.
92
consistently
Berchtold
174Grey to Cartwright, 22 Jan. 1913, BD, IX.ii, no. 543; Grey to Cartwright, 13 Feb. 1913, BD,
I,
Twenty-five
Grey,
663;
ii,
IX.
BD,
p.
Feb.
1913,
26
years,
Mensdorff
613;
IX.ii, no.
no.
memo.,
85.
Detente,
Hollow
Crampton,
184-5;
Great
Britain,
p.
Austria-Hungary
268; Pribram,
pp.
and
17,5
Duijzings, Religion and Politics, pp. 13-9.
176Crampton, Hollow Detente, p. 84.
177Sazonov, Fateful Years, p. 74; Crampton, Hollow Detente, p. 88.
93
Problems materialised before the commission began its work. Berchtold refused
to allow the Austrian representative, Colonel Mietzl, to participate unless Scutari
Edith
This
inadvertently
had
Albania.
to
what
was unequivocally committed
Durham, travel writer and Secretary of the Anglo-Albanian Society, called the
`criminal effect' of giving the Serbs sufficient time to distort ethnography by
180
These
Slav
them
districts
Albanians
to
activities
majority.
a
give
of
clearing
Viennese
intervene.
to
Ballhausplatz
the
officials
sufficient excuse
also gave
disillusioned
the
increasingly
concert system, and sent an ultimatum
with
grew
94
measures'
to enforce
generated much hostility, but none of the other great powers dared support the
Serbs, believing that they would risk war with Vienna if they did. Lacking
any
potential support, Belgrade withdrew its troops from the disputed zone. 182
Southern Boundary
Meanwhile,
contentious
Albanian frontier
conference
discussions
regarding
the southern
determined once more their positions on the disputed points. As with the
allocation of the Kosovan plain to Serbia, it had been quickly decided that the
Greeks would gain southern Epirus, including the important town of Janina.
Discussions therefore centred on whether the Greeks would also gain what they
called northern Epirus, or whether this territory would instead become southern
Albania. According to the official statistics of the Greek Government (1913),
Koritza,
Starovo,
kazas
former
Turkish
Epirus
the
of
consisted of
northern
Kolonia, Argyrocastro,
183
Imperiali led the Triplice's support for Albanian claims, supposedly
Philiataes.
because of more extensive Italian cultural and economic relations in southern
Greek
in
Entente
the
led
Cambon
the
of
Albania.
support
representatives of
Ministry)
Foreign
(French
Quai
d'Orsay
by
instructed
the
interests. Cambon was
heritage.
its
Athens
links
financial
French
classical
and
to do so because of
with
95
to exploit the German ancestry of the Greek King Constantine for its
own
advantage. This in itself complicated the German position, because they did not
wish to offend Constantine.
184
96
road that passed through Koritza. The Greeks claimed Argyrocastro on the
basis of supposed ethnic reasons, considering the
area Helllenophile, but
strategic
factors
must
certainly
have
been the
principal determinants.
The Triplice ambassadors did not accept this. Mensdorff argued that cession to
Greece would place Austrian vessels in jeopardy because all the Austrian ports
188
in
Adriatic.
the
Imperiali and Mensdorff instead proposed drawing the
were
border twelve kilometers south of Santa Quaranta, at Cape Stylos in Phtelia
Bay.
This
would
have
included
Koritza,
Argyrocastro,
the
road from
Argyrocastro to Delvino and Santa Quaranta (the port that served Argyrocastro)
189
Although
within Albania.
Albanian cultural and literary movements in the nineteenth century, and had a
number of Albanian schools, neither ambassador cited ethnographic arguments
to any large extent. They insisted that the Corfu channel had to remain neutral
in
the
included
be
had
Koritza
to
Albania,
to
new
the
whilst
mainland going
with
This
Greece.
Serbia
frontier
between
limit
in
the
and
coterminous
state
order to
187Grey to Cartwright, 9 June 1913, BD, IX.ii, no. 1036; Grey to Bertie, 10 June 1913, BD, IX.ii,
35-6;
Albania,
Southern
Stickney,
pp.
1027;
ii,
IX.
4
June
1913,
BD,
Elliot,
Grey
to
1038;
no.
no.
Wilkinson, Maps and Politics, pp. 238-9.
188Pribram, Austria-Hungary and Great Britain, p. 198.
189Grey to Elliot, 4 June 1913, BD, IX.ii, no. 1027; Stickney, Southern Albania, pp. 35-6.
97
Grey, once again, found himself in the role of mediator. He proposed delimiting
southern Albania by a boundary commission, and compensating Greece for
Albanian gains there with acquisitions in the Aegean islands, which
were at that
point under Italian occupation, following the Italo-Turkish war. 191This provides
an obvious example of how Grey used the Ambassadors' Conference to protect
British interests: although he had little interest in the Albanian issue, Grey
sought to use it to remove Italian control of the Aegean islands. He feared that
the Italian-controlled islands threatened Britain's naval power in the eastern
Mediterranean, especially given their proximity to the Dardanelles and the Suez
Canal. Imperiali immediately rejected the Aegean part of the proposal, but
agreed to the establishment of a commission, albeit with certain provisions
designed to safeguard Triplice interests: Koritza, Cape Stylos, and the southern
192
Despite
Albania.
these
Ochrida
Lake
of
as
parts
were
confirmed
of
shore
far
to
had
the
produce an
scope
greater
commission
southern
provisions,
ethnographical
settlement
London.
in
been
had
disputed
pre-determined
areas
southern
precise
details
1913-14
Albanian
how
the
of
delegate.
its
Each
own
selected
power
vague.
remain
constituted and operated
both
The northern commission consisted exclusively of military officers, whilst
FO
1913,
July
3
Buchanan,
Grey
to
190Buchanan to Grey, 21 June 1913, FO 371/1801/28493;
371/1801/31232; Crampton, Hollow Detente, pp. 125-6.
191Enclosure in Grey to Carnegie and Buchanan, 3 July 1913, BD, IX.ii, no. 1104.
192Grey to Cartwright, 8 Aug. 1913, FO 371/1802/37169.
98
Both commissions also seem to have received fairly limited instructions by the
Conference. They were to proceed on an ethnographic basis (mother tongue),
and were instructed
193 Elliot to Grey, 8 Sept. 1913, FO 371/1802/41432: Grey minute, 9 Sept. 1913, FO
371/1802/41432.
194Grey to Cartwright, 8 Aug. 1913, BD, IX.ii, no. 1226.
195Attachment in Doughty-Wylie to Grey, 5 Oct. 1913, FO 421/287/46428.
99
more interested
representatives complained they had not received any instructions, apart from
the Conference protocols, and that they needed a decent
map. It was only after
repeated appeals from the commissioners that topographers were sent to aid
their work.
The commissioners
Northern Commission
The northern commission eventually started work at the end of October 1913 at
199
Problems soon emerged.
Lin, on the northwestern shore of Lake Ochrida.
The opinions of the commissioners largely mirrored those of their respective
ethnographic
in
London,
superseding
objectives
geo-political
with
ambassadors
French
his
Potapov,
de
General
and
`findings'. The Russian representative,
Triplice
the
Serbian
favour
representatives
in
while
claims,
of
colleague argued
196Doughty-Wylie to Grey, 6 Oct. 1913, FO 371/1803/45565; Granet to Grey, 23 Sept. 1913, FO
to
`It
me
371/1822/43551:
FO
seems
1913,
Sept.
Crowe
24
371/1822/43551;
minute,
have
neither
frontier
should
the
British
delegate
the
commission
that
on
extraordinary
description nor map of the frontier laid down.'
197Crowe minute, 6 Oct. 1913, FO 371/1822/45864.
198Granet to Grey, 23 Dec. 1913, FO 371/1823/57915.
199Granet to Grey, 1 Oct. 1913, FO 881/10492, no. 4.
100
opposed them. Granet, who Whitehall had believed would take a conciliatory
position, increasingly considered the Franco-Russian claims so extravagant that
they could not be taken as a serious basis for discussion. He subsequently
came
to
support
proposals
advocated
by the
Triplice
commissioners.
Meanwhile, the Serbian Ambassador in London complained that Granet had `no
his
will of
own' and always sided with the Triplice, counter to Entente
interests. 200At the town of Prizrend, ambiguities in remit intensified animosities.
The delegates were attempting to delimit the frontier between the `districts' of
Prizrend and Luma (the areas surrounding these main towns being named after
them), but disagreements emerged over the definition of a `district'. Was it to be
an ethnographic area, as the Italian and Austrian delegates argued, or was it an
administrative
201
former
{the
Ottoman
kaza),
Potapov
area
as
claimed?
Eventually, the Triplice representatives and Granet moved from their original
position and advocated a frontier based on current Serbian outposts that were
Although
this
Prizrend.
they
that
defend
to
the
town
would
admitted
of
able
leave a considerable number of Albanian speakers in Serbian territory, they
their
found
that
outweighed
strategic and geographic considerations
also
this,
far
in
for
Potapov
of
excess
a compromise
argued
ethnographic objections.
202
With the
though it has to be said that his precise proposal remains unclear.
1913
in
December
the
issue
`district'
commission adjourned
still not resolved,
before
to
the
roads
bad
because
return
need
the
and
weather
of
spring,
until
101'"
When the commission resumed its work in Scutari, in April 1914, the same
divisions persisted. These proved so severe that Granet communicated to
London his doubts as to whether they would ever arrive at a `definite and honest
204
Granet's inability to distance himself from the inter-personal
conclusion'.
issues within the commission appears to have been a considerable factor
constraining his influence on the proceedings. Perhaps the most damaging
decision the northern commission made, and one contrary to their original
directives, was to agree upon a policy of `compensations': an Albanian
(Austrian) gain to be offset by a Serbian (Russian) one. They had begun
decide
the
to
frontier,
in
disputed
the
in
turns,
on
order
sections of
visiting,
inability
to
the
discussions
lengthy
However,
the
and
merits of each section.
the
that
in
the
considered
acceptance of a scheme
reach agreement resulted
Scutari
Lake
Dibra
The
were
questions
and
simultaneously.
visited sections
205
discussions
The
on
but
in
this
reached.
was
agreement
no
way,
considered
Vermosh
Velepoja
and
Albanian-Montenegrin
in Gusinje, mountainous
disputed
in
the
regions
Triplice
but
the
Montenegro,
commissioners
to
that these had been promised
League
Balkan
the
(between
and
London
the
that
peace agreement
maintained
Albanianthe
to
belonging
territory
Turkey) had unequivocally stated that any
102
that
Granet
to
communicated
London
that
only a change
of
commissioners could break the deadlock and produce results. Whitehall did
not
support him, because it did not want to jeopardise more important objectives
elsewhere by proposing a course that would offend the other powers over
a
207
British
interest.
By August 1914 the commission had still
marginal
not
finished, but with five of the six great powers at war its
operations finally
ceased.
Southern Commission
Meanwhile, the southern commission began its work at Monastir, on 4 October
1913. Obstacles soon materialised: in fifty-eight days the commissioners visited
only six villages and interviewed fourteen people. Athens was repeatedly
accused of attempting to influence decision-making with the use of extensive
propaganda and subversive initiatives. The commission reported a so-called
`Sacred Legion' which cried `union or death' at every opportunity, and the
presence of irregular troops that were used to ensure that all doors of Christian
homes remained closed to conceal the Albanian speaking women inside, or so
it was
believed.
Lieutenant-Colonel
Charles
Doughty-Wylie,
the
British
in
houses
that
representative and commission chairman, reported
were painted
the Greek colours of blue and white, and that the church bells rang whenever
the commission arrived at a town or village. He believed that this was meant to
the
Greek
Christian
(Orthodox)
thus
the
of
nature
supposedly
and
reinforce
206Enclosure in Granet to Grey, 2 May 1914, FO 421/293 no. 78; Granet to Grey, 6 June 1914,
FO 421/293, no. 166; Granet to Grey, 10 June 1914, FO 421/293, no. 183; H. M. V. Temperley,
A History of the Peace Conference of Paris 6 vols. (London, 1921), pp. 337-9.
207Crowe to Granet, 2 June 1914, FO 421/293, no. 149.
103
town. He wrote that the commissioners were always greeted either by hostile
a
crowd, clamouring for union with Greece, or by school children speaking Greek
and waving
Greek flags. 208 The inference was that the `Greeks' were
orchestrating
104
Nevertheless,
November
13
on
commissioners that they had been authorised to proceed on the new basis of
`seulement la nationalite, mais encore la situation economique, strategique et
213
On this basis he proposed a frontier, roughly midway between
geographique'.
210Grey to Bertie, 7 Nov. 1913, BD, X. i, no. 75; Doughty-Wylie to Grey, 26 Oct. 1913, FO
421/287 no. 202; Doughty-Wylie to Grey, 1 Nov. 1913, FO 421/287, no. 245; Grey to DoughtyWylie, 6 November 1913, FO 421/287, no. 242.
2" Ed. Note, BD, X. i, p. 62; Stickney, Southern Albania, pp. 36-7.
212A. Nicolson to O'Beirne, 4 Nov. 1913, A. Nicolson MSS, FO 800/371; Grey to O'Beirne, 4
Nov. 1913, BD, X. i, no. 72; Grey to Dering, 4 Nov. 1913, BD, X. i, no. 73; O'Beirne to Grey, 10
Nov. 1913, BD, X. i, no. 77; O'Beirne to Grey, 4 Nov. 1913, FO 421/287 no. 210; Grey to Dering,
3 Nov. 1913, FO 421/ 287, no. 222; Grey to Dering, 4 November 1913, FO 421/287, no. 229.
213 'Proces-verbaux de la Commission Internationale pour la delimitation de la Frontiere
Meridionale Albanaise' [hereafter cited as SAC minutes], 13 Nov. 1913, FO 93/1/36; Also at FO
881/10355X, pp. 49-50.
105
the French and Italian proposals. It started at Cape Stylos in the west and
finished, although not definitely fixed, near the point where the Koritza district
met the Grammos Mountains. The proposal received a favourable response. 214
The commission made considerable progress during the next month, possibly
due to the death of Bilinski, who appears to have been very vocal in opposing
any concessions to the Greeks. The main stumbling block to any agreement
remained the allocation of the district of Argyrocastro. The junior Austrian
delegate who replaced
Bilinski, Vice-Consul
(Policani,
Skoriazes
and
Sopiki),
the Argyrocastro
valley was
in
frontier
draw
the
be
to
it
but
Albanian,
that
possible
would not
predominantly
Greek
the
the
include
to
aforementioned villages within
such a way as
mainland.
Goudim-Levkovitch
considered
The
three
for
loss
these
the
Greece
villages.
that
of
compensated
was
condition
finish
their
to
in
Italy
Florence
to
to
Italian delegates then proposed
move
the
the
directives,
of
Doughty-Wylie's
maps
using
deliberations on the basis of
Geographical Institute in Florence.
216
to
largely
frontier
Having surmised that the commission would advocate a
Minister,
Prime
Greek
protested
the
Venizelos,
Eleftherios
Albanian advantage,
214Bertie to Pichon, 19 Nov. 1913, DDF, VIII, no. 497.
106
219
218It was clear by this point that Greece would not gain northern Epirus but Grey also wanted to
keep Venizelos in power.
219A. Nicolson to Grey, 2 Oct. 1913, Grey MSS FO 800/94; Elliot to Grey, 12 Dec. 1913, BD,
BD,
1913,
Aug.
5
Cartwright,
Bertie,
12
Dec.
Grey
to
1913,
BD,
X.
91;
i,
Grey
to
Xi, no. 90;
no.
IX.ii, no. 1202.
107
Conclusions
According to the Carnegie Report investigating the Balkan wars, the new
Albanian state comprised 11,317 square miles. This included 3,922 square
miles from Janina vilayet, 3,529 from Monastir, 2,970 from Scutari and 896 from
Kosovo. 222 This was far short of the vision of an ethnographic Albania
envisaged by the Albanians, but it did represent a fairly even compromise
between the Russian and Austrian proposals of December 1912. As Grey wrote
to a friend in February 1913, `if a good settlement of Albania would mean war
between two or more great powers, and an inferior settlement would secure
Grey
In
latter
has
be
'223
between
to
them,
the
this
sentence,
peace
preferred.
he
in
discussions
illustrated
his
the
true
was to chair at
motivation
clearly
London. He later wrote that `the [Ambassadors'] Conference had not settled
it
had
but
boundaries,
Albanian
details
the
the
served a
of
anything, not even
220Lichnowsky memo., 31 Dec. 1913, BD, X. i, no. 103; Swire, Albania, p. 184; Stickney,
Southern Albania, pp. 38-9; Grey to Bertie, 26 Nov. 1913, FO 421/287, no. 373.
221Erskine to Grey, 23 June 1914, FO 421/293, no. 239; Erskine to Grey, 25 June 1914, FO
421/293, no. 263.
222Carnegie Endowment, Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, p. 418.
223Grey to Pease, 1 Feb. 1913, quoted in G. M. Trevelyan, Grey of Fallodon: Being the Life of
TwentyGrey,
233;
Afterwards
Viscount
1937),
Grey
Grey
Fallodon
(London,
Edward
Sir
p.
of
five Years, I, p. 271.
108
224
By this, he meant avoiding war between the powers,
useful purpose'.
preventing Russia from moving towards the Triplice and safeguarding British
sea power. Throughout the Conference and the resulting commissions, Grey's
apparent impartiality and pragmatic approach, combined with his sense of
ingenuity and inventiveness, had contrived to produce compromises on
which
he could convince Russia and Austria to agree. As a bi-product, the
new
independent state of Albania had been created. However, as Grey was fully
aware, the results of these compromises were far from perfect. 225British policy
was thus clearly in line with defensive realist rhetoric. British representatives
oscillated between the two coalitions trying to create a balance, both in the
Balkans and more widely. Britain believed that an enlarged Serbia with Adriatic
access,
coupled
fundamentally
with
the
benefits
for
Russia
of warm
ports, would
109
been often necessary to disregard ethnography for larger reasons; but there is
110
CHAPTER 3:
Experiments with Self-government:
international
control commission
(1912-14)
This chapter explores the period in Albania after independence and before the
First World War, including the provisional regimes, the international commission
of control established by the Ambassadors' Conference to prepare the state for
a permanent regime, and the first Albanian kingdom. The new state officially
came into existence on 7 March 1914, with the arrival of the Mpret (literally in
Albanian `king'). From its inception, the newest `nation' in Europe, and the
world's first predominantly Muslim one, faced insurmountable problems. Within
six months of his arrival, the Mpret fled the country, never to return. During this
period the Albanian nationalists failed to assert themselves, because they were
independent
Instead
Albania
to
on
any
vision
of
what
an
meant.
unable
agree
local traditions, interests and rivalries, especially religious and geographical
Meanwhile,
dominate.
the
to
great power solidarity, especially
ones, came
Austro-Italian, which in 1912-13 had been so crucial in the creation of an
independent Albania, unravelled as these powers returned to their previous
dismantle.
began
to
Albanian
In
turn,
the
state
policy of competition and rivalry.
This chapter argues that a variety of factors were responsible for the failure of
the
It
that
Albanian
independent
first
the
contends
the experiment of
state.
Instead,
to
the
be
and
these
prince.
new
attributed
cannot
reasons
majority of
intrigue,
Albanian
importance
the
rifts
and
of perpetual and new
acknowledging
(both
interested
from
great
that
parties
it argues
external pressures and enmity
111
powers and neighbouring states) were the prime determinants, and that these
had materialised well before the onset of the First World War.
may
be
unsuccessful.
When
the
initial goal
(for instance
has
threat
imminent
impending
the
has
been
independence)
or
achieved and
it
(on
fervour
that
whatever scale)
dissipated, the nationalist
went along with
Terror
by
the
(typified
graphically
most
diminish,
counter-revolution
a
and
may
following the French Revolution in 1789) may take place.
Presidency
the
of
1912),
under
At Valona (November
a provisional government,
had
the
the
powers
to
until
country
been
had
Kemal,
govern
Ismail
established
228
the
1913,
government
Throughout
future.
provisional
Albania's
decided on
independent
it
an
Most
established
impressive
significantly,
steps.
took some
1870-1914
France
Rural
227 E. Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of
London, 1977).
28Story, Memoirs of Ismail Kemal, p. 372; Swire, Albania, p. 137.
112
Throughout
Key
from
the
its
nationalists were not part of
start.
composition
problems with
the new regime. Mehmed bey Konitza and Philip Nogga, both Albanian
London
to
the
conferences, were still pre-occupied overseas,
representatives
from
had
Bib
Doda,
leaders,
national
influential
retired
especially
and other
Ismail
1913,
September
In
presented
members
committee
eighteen
politics.
the
detailing
faults
document
the
provisional
of
Kemal with a
and shortcomings
229Jacques, Albanians, pp. 343-44; Swire, Albania, pp. 180-1.
230Lamb to Grey, 22 Nov. 1913, FO 421/287, no. 375; Swire, Albania, p. 181.
113
government.
231
The provisional government had many rivals for its authority: these were
associated
with
the
tribal,
religious
and
geographical
divisions,
which
large
Greek
troops
irrelevant.
areas
had
controlled
independence
not rendered
force
international
In
was
the
Albania.
to
Epirus
an
north,
assigned
of northern
Many
Phillips.
Colonel
British
leadership
the
Scutari,
in
of
under
stationed
independence
to
the
project.
indifferent
whole
tribesmen
remained
northern
114
arrangement
could
Potentially the greatest internal challenge came from Essad Pasha's so-called
`Senate of Central Albania'. Essad was an influential bey who dominated much
he
had
Tirana,
the
from
base
Durazzo
Albania
his
where
around
and
of central
Muslim
bodyguard),
form
(a
his
tenants,
of
personal
redrifs
support of many of
the
from
Bosnia).
He
(Muslims
Bosniaks
critical
of
was exceedingly
clergy and
provisional government.
instead
a
established
the
and
authority
provisional government's
acknowledge
This
1913.
October
16
on
President,
occurred
himself
Senate,
on
as
with
rival
it
international
the
and
control commission,
the same day as the first meeting of
Essad's
its
to
authority either.
illustrated Essad's determination not to submit
Senate
consisted
of
his friends,
family
and
supporters.
It was
less
in
it
but
gaining
successful
was
the
than
provisional government,
representative
from
support
Albanian
people across
115
had
those
including
who
society,
government activities.
Establishment
of the International
Control Commission
With the provisional government stumbling, the powers dithered over what to do
with the new state. By March 1913, they had decided that, instead of placing
Albania under the sovereignty, or suzerainty, of the Sultan, and the inevitable
complications for the Balkans that might result from having a Muslim head of
237
European
Christian
Albania would therefore be
state, a
prince should rule.
independent rather than autonomous. An international control commission,
consisting of representatives of the six great powers and, unlike the two
boundary commissions, an Albanian representative, would govern Albania until
the arrival of the prince, facilitate the transfer to his authority and assist him in
1913,
for
By
July
ten
the
the
an even more
years.
end of
new state
running
detailed formula had been worked out, by which Albania was to be guaranteed
by the six powers, it was to have a civil administration that would be run by the
to
further
for
enable
months
preliminary six
six years, with a
control commission
the commissioners to determine the details, and Dutch officers to command the
gendarmerie.
Austrian
to
lest
they
or
from
Catholic officers
susceptible
prove
participating,
in
this
keep
Entente
resolution secret
Italian influence. Grey insisted that the
236 The Times, 3 July 1913; Swire, Albania, pp. 179-80; Essad was vilified because of his
it
Although
Scutari.
forces
was
Montenegrin
to
the
in
at
the
involved
capitulation
suspected
had
Scutari
that
the
leader
the
at
Pasha,
Essad
believed
garrison
that
it
of
as
was
never proven,
Montenegrin
had
first
Balkan
a
forces
in
the
accepted
Montenegrin
defied
the
war,
so valiantly
this
in
Albanian
affairs
April
Despite
1913.
playing a significant role
bribe to surrender the city in
than
illusions
rather
(money,
grandeur)
for
of
and
power
of
self-interest
reasons
was persistently
out of any nationalist sentiment.
116
238
acted outside the concert. The flag of Skanderbeg was recognised as the
official Albanian
amongst Albanians.
239
of
an Albanian
delegate
to the
commission.
Disagreement
delegate,
Italian
The
be
delegate
how
this
chosen.
should
materialized over
Alessandro
government.
the
Valona,
Albania'
where
`delegate
anywhere outside
of
recognised as the
Skumbi
the
river.
had
of
north
particularly
and
control,
provisional government
238'Proceedings of the Ambassadors' meeting held on 29 July 1913' in Bertie to Grey, 29 July
1913, BD, IX.ii, no. 1186.
239Grey to Cartwright, 8 Aug. 1913, BD, IX.ii, no. 1226.
240Lamb to Grey, 22 Oct. 1913, FO 421/287, no. 158.
117
Lamb favoured some form of election or popular selection, possibly by the four
or five major municipalities. If that was considered too difficult, he would accept
241
The Russian and French delegates
a selection by the commission itself.
argued for selection by the commission,
remained
satisfied
both sides-a
242
It
by
Ismail
Kemal.
is
by
the
provisional
government
or
controlled either
interesting that being the Albanian delegate on the control commission was
Albanian
that
influential
than
important
of
position
and
considered a more
Foreign Minister, presumably because Albania had still failed to establish
diplomatic relations with any other state. The decision was important because a
the
invited
to
had
been
concert,
of
part
as
sit
state
small
of
a
representative
his
influential
than
less
far
he
inevitably
but
greatlow
level,
proved
albeit at a
power colleagues.
118
In Search of a Prince
The major problem facing Albania at this point was uncertainty
about the state's
future, and above all the delay in having a new ruler appointed. There
was
much consensus on this point, but for different reasons, and with diverse ideas
about who would be a good choice. Ismail claimed that only the appointment of
Albania's monarch could stem the violence that was becoming endemic in the
country.
government's
and subsequent
submitting to rule by anyone else, and instead coveted the Albanian throne
himself. The British representatives in Albania (Lamb, Doughty-Wylie, Granet
and Phillips) all seemed particularly anxious. Lamb and Doughty-Wylie, for
instance, made repeated appeals to the British Foreign Office to hasten the
ruler's announcement and arrival. They were both convinced that this was the
most
effective
way
to
reduce
divisions
and
uncertainty
amongst the
244
Albanians.
In London, Aubrey Herbert and other members of the AngloAlbanian Society exerted political pressure continuously.
245
As early as May
1913 (while the Conference of Ambassadors was still in session), Herbert had
the
importance
Grey
the
to
right
with
someone
of selecting
stressing
written
to
if
the
Herbert,
to
According
Albanian
was
the
prince
prince.
qualities as
to
important
it
him,
behind
then
a
Albanians
select
in
the
was
uniting
succeed
243Lamb to Grey, 15 Oct. 1913, FO 421/287, no. 111; Lamb to Grey, 22 Oct. 1913, FO 421/287,
72;
FO
881/10492,
Also
72;
Grey,
14
Oct.
no.
1913,
FO
421/287,
at
no.
no. 158; Lamb to
FO
421/287,
193,
Oct.
30
Grey,
Lamb
Oct.
1913,
123;
to
FO
20
421/
287,
Grey,
Goschen to
no.
Ismail
Kemal,
378.
Memoirs
Story,
214;
of
p.
no.
244See for example: Lamb to Grey, 22 Oct. 1913, FO 421/287, no. 158; Doughty-Wylie, 23 Oct.
1913, FO 421/287, no. 146.
245Herbert to Grey, 18 Sept. 1913, Grey MSS, FO 800/108.
119
Protestant
246
respected a `tall man'.
246Herbert to Grey, 31 May 1913, Grey MSS, FO 800/108; Heaton-Armstrong, Six Month
Kingdom, p. 20: Heaton-Armstrong reiterated this view when he noted the good impression that
following
the
had
'on
Wilhelm
bearing'
Prince
`blonde'
hair
`soldierly
natives'
`height',
the
and
of
the Prince's arrival in Albania.
247Grey to Bertie, 3 Nov. 1913, BD, X. i, no. 71.
248Grey to Cartwright, 4 July 1913, BD, IX.ii, no. 1113.
249Swire, Albania, pp. 182-3; Durham, Balkan Tangle, p. 257.
120
power by using the European concert to contain the ambitions and strength of
their proteges, satellites and partners.250
253
to
designed
decisions,
safeguard
have
to
Wilhelm
Initially
made sensible
seems
Wilhelm
1913,
December
both his own future and the new regime. At the end of
273.
FO
421/287,
Also
no.
250Russell to Grey, 7 Nov. 1913, FO 881/10492, no. 273:
at
251Grey to Russell, 7 Nov. 1913, BD, X. i, no. 76.
Albania
in
Dutch
The
Goslinga,
A.
252For details of the Dutch experience in Albania see G. T.
Rome, 1972).
53Durham, Balkan Tangle, p. 259.
121
provisionally
but
throne
the
only on certain conditions, namely
accepted
guarantees for a great power loan, his Civil List and an assurance that Essad
Pasha recognised the `will of Europe'. The British Ambassador in Berlin
wrote
that other conditions
Wilhelm wisely refrained from taking up the throne until the internal situation
had improved. This may indicate that he was not as inept as some have
255
Problems and divisions within the country had escalated. The Young
claimed.
Turk government had resolved to restore Ottoman suzerainty over Albania. In
October 1913, the Porte sent Major Bekhir Grebeneja, together with several
followers, to Albania with the idea of propagating the idea of the Albaniandescended Izzet Pasha, the Ottoman Minister of War, as a Muslim prince.
256 At
the time, it appeared that an arrangement had been reached with Jsmail, and
257
Whitehall
One
Albania's
had
broken
official
President
that the
neutrality.
The
Africa.
in
Raid
Jameson
the
described the affair as reminiscent of
southern
to
had
Ismail
that
it
consented
intention seems to have been to make appear
Pasha
Izzet
to
Albania,
forces
to
as
and
the Turks bringing arms and military
FO
Jan.
1914,
3
Grey,
to
Goschen
in
254Enclosure 2, Wilhelm to Jagow, 31 Dec. 1913,
374.
FO
421/287,
1913,
Grey,
19
Nov.
to
no.
Lamb
421/292/480;
255Grey to Goschen, 18 Dec. 1913, BD, Xi, no. 95.
256Lamb to Grey, 2 Jan. 1914, FO 421/292, no. 24; Kondis, Greece and Albania, p. 121.
257Lamb to Grey, 19 Jan. 1914, FO 371/1890/2437; Lamb to Grey, 10 Jan. 1914, FO 421/292,
no. 57.
122
objected to being treated in the same manner as Ismail, who had been
dismissed for his involvement in the Bekhir affair. In response, the commission
stated that Essad Pasha would be removed, by force if necessary. Eventually,
on 3 February 1914, Essad did resign but, significantly, only on the proviso that
he would lead the delegation to Neuwied to welcome Wilhelm, and formally
offer him the crown, an accession that he had until then persistently opposed.
Lamb considered this condition far from satisfactory but saw no alternative, in
the light of Essad's
perceived
26
The
Albania.
in
support and strength
123
achievement
of successfully
impression that he was under the influence of Essad Pasha, and thereby
the
Essad's
to
provisional
authorities,
especially
other
prestige relative
promote
Wilhelm
had
Wilhelm
himself.
It
that
entered
was alleged
government, and even
into a secret arrangement with Essad to land at Durazzo, and that this had been
Essad's intention in leading the Neuwied expedition. However, no evidence has
262
disembarking
Wilhelm
favoured
Lamb
disprove
this.
at
to
confirm or
survived
Scutari, where he would be under the protection of the international forces, and
261Goschen to Grey, 8 Jan. 1914, FO 421/292, no. 25; Goschen to Grey, 10 Jan. 1914, FO
421/292, no. 40.
262F. Konitza to Herbert, 18 Nov. 1913, Faik Konitza, no. 29.
124
263
then embarking on a tour of the country.
Nevertheless, on 7 March 1914,
Wilhelm sailed from Trieste to Durazzo, which he declared as his capital, much
to the jealousy of both northern and southern Albanians, who preferred Scutari
and Valona, respectively. The majority of Albanians rejoiced at his arrival. Here
was their `Skanderbeg' to end all their problems, and they declared him Mpret
or king, although the great powers recognised him only as a hereditary prince.
However, he was not to bring the much-anticipated happiness and prosperity to
his new subjects.
264
in
its
him,
but
its
to
transferred
advisory capacity.
remained
powers
commission
On 10 April 1914, a scheme of organisation was drawn up and signed by
Albanian
representatives
and
control
commission
delegates.
Religious
Christian
hated
Muslims
immediately:
prince, and
a
complaints surfaced almost
Wilhelm
then
Orthodox.
Catholics
he
a
made
Lutheran
nor
neither
satisfied
as a
for
him
to
it
difficult
failed
the
to
tour
He
country, which made
number of errors.
He
diminished.
the
that
soon
his
optimism
early
ensured
and
authority,
exert
Appeal
Court
High
the
things
of
for
as
such
on
money
wasting
was criticised
inspectors
the
law
fledgling
of
school
appointment
there
courts,
only
were
when
to
other
the
ministers
few
of
maintenance
there
and
schools,
were
when
the
In
arguably
Albania.
left
gendarmerie,
contrast,
countries who never even
Albania's most urgent requirement, received only modest
265
funding.
125
Only two of its members had recently been resident in Albania, its
members
were considered
too steeped
in Ottoman government
although
the Albanian
spoken
cornerstone of the Albanian state. Turkhan bey Pasha, who had enjoyed an
illustrious career in the Ottoman diplomatic corps, was chosen
as Prime
Minister. He had not lived in Albania for many years, nor had he been involved
in the nationalist movement. He was suspected by some of having leanings
towards Russia, following his service there, by others of having Ottoman
sympathies, and by others of being an Italian agent. Even Hasan Prishtina was
criticised by Lamb as a `mere puppet in the hands of Essad', although the two
men usually took opposing positions. The most controversial appointment was
Wilhelm's choice of Essad Pasha, who, in a complete volte-face, had now come
around to `support' Wilhelm, as Interior and War Minister (and effective Prime
Minister). Many nationalists considered him a traitor, primarily because of his
role in the Scutari capitulation to Montenegro (April 1913), and few trusted him.
Durham, in one of her more accurate assessments, pointed out that Essad
believed that by ingratiating himself with Wilhelm he could become effective
lesser
it
the
Conversely,
Wilhelm
considered
ruler and perhaps usurp power.
his
he
in
hope
that
the
Essad
into
bring
the
to
contain
could
government,
evil
266
Minister
War
Interior
Essad's
was particularly
and
appointment as
activities.
forces
limited
those
him
it
because
munitions
and
of
control
gave
significant,
266Lamb to Grey, 1 Jan. 1914, FO 421/292, no. 39; Lamb to Grey, 17 Mar. 1914, FO 421/292,
26;
Durham,
Kingdom,
Month
Six
Heaton-Armstrong,
200-1;
p.
Albania,
Swire,
pp.
no. 225;
Batakovic,
'CpncKa
D.
26-7;
Kingdom,
Six
Month
Heaton-Armstrong,
261;
pp.
Balkan Tangle, p.
Mitrovid
in
A.
Toptani'),
Essad-Pasha
TonmaHU'
('Serbian
Ecad-Wawa
government and
u
enada
1991),
(Belgrade,
20th
in
the
Albanians
XX
(Serbs
century)
(ed.), Cp6u u An6aH14uy
and
eeKy
in
independence
Albanian
37,59:
Ismail
Kemal's
written
was
25-78,
of
proclamation
pp.
at
pp.
in
Albanian
literate
written
leaders
the
because
nationalist
Turkish
present were not sufficiently
in the Latin script adopted in 1908.
126
that the state did possess, and made the Prince even more dependent upon
him. Essad soon obtained the upper hand. He managed to keep Wilhelm
`prisoner' in Durazzo, and prevented him from touring the country as the
Albanians and the British representatives had urged.
balances.
127
in Athens,
in northern
Epirus.
On 22 February
270Elliot to Grey, 5 Mar. 1914, FO 421/292, no. 218; Lamb to Grey, 28 Feb. 1914, BD, X. i, no.
119; Also at FO 421/292, no. 206.
128
(1 March 1914), although they had left a number of troops in Koritza for
`treatment'.
271
Venizelos was under considerable pressure from the Epirotes, the Greek
public
and the political opposition to help the insurgents but, at this time, Greece was
in no position to enrage the great powers. Therefore, in an attempt to assuage
both sides, Venizelos appealed to the powers to ensure linguistic and religious
safeguards in northern Epirus, and did so again four weeks later. The powers
took two months to respond. This delay added to the uncertainty, confusion and
anxiety. In their reply, on 24 April 1914, the powers urged the Albanian
government to implement the guarantees and to include local elements in the
272
Meanwhile, on 6 April 1914, the Greek troops left in Koritza for
gendarmerie.
`treatment' had escaped and started a revolt, and were joined by Greek
fifty
`Epirote'
bands.
To
defend
town,
there
the
partisans and
were only
gendarmes and their Dutch officers. Within a few hours, the public buildings and
forces
Greek
Wilhelm
keen
lead
hands.
to
in
against
was
vantage points were
the Epirotes, although these `forces' amounted only to armed civilians and 2500
have
Such
Dutch
the
enhanced
officers.
an action would
gendarmes under
Wilhelm's prestige in Albanian eyes, but he was prevented from taking it by
Essad, the Italian forces in Durazzo and the majority of the control commission
delegates. Essad and the Consulta feared that Wilhelm's involvement would
jeopardise their plans, and, according to Lamb, the commission members
inexperienced
for
the
dreaded the potential outcome of any military action
271Lamb to Grey, 28 Feb. 1914, BD, X. i, no. 119; Also at FO 421/292, no. 206; Kondis, Greece
130-2.
Albania,
pp.
and
272Elliot to Grey, 23 May 1914, FO 421/292, no. 228, Elliot to Grey, 8 Mar. 1914, FO 421/ 292,
4
Benckendorff,
to
Sazonov
208;
Mar.
FO
421/292,
Bunsen,
5
1914,
de
to
Grey
no.
213;
no.
Greece
Kondis,
212;
and
Buchanan,
Mar.
FO
421/292,
6
1914,
Grey
to
in
no.
Mar. 1914
Albania, pp. 127-30.
129
and
provided
for the
recruitment
of local elements
into the
274Lambto Grey, 17 May 1914, FO 421/293, no. 108; Grey to Erskine, 17 June 1914, FO
421/293, no. 210; Kondis, Greece and Albania, pp. 130-2.
130
separate administration, but took the view that Albania was in no position to go
to war against Greece. Meanwhile, for the Greek side, the local
autonomy
option represented a considerable modification of their former position. This
option was pursued for two main reasons. Firstly, Greece needed the support of
the Orthodox Albanians and, contrary to Greek ambitions and their
religious
affinity, it was becoming apparent that the majority desired to be Albanian not
Greek. 275Secondly, union with Greece was not yet possible because it
would
have resulted in considerable opposition, if not intervention, by Austria or Italy.
Therefore, in opting for local autonomy, the Greeks, as opposed to `Epirotes',
managed to circumvent both the Albanian responses and great power interests,
and simultaneously secured Greek dominance and interests in the region. Lamb
was not blind to this trick. He wrote to Grey that the Greeks understood that the
arrangement `simply smoothes the way for a speedy annexation of northern
Epirus'. 276Elsewhere, the great powers had been primed to modify their former
plans for Albania because they were not prepared to go to war with Greece,
Germany
Britain
did
The
First
to
the
and
whom even
not wish
offend.
start of
World War meant that the great powers never formally agreed to these
resolutions.
Austro-Italian
The greatest threat to Albania came not from its Balkan neighbours but from the
great
powers.
Lamb
made
numerous
complaints
about
his
fellow
Albanian
for
the
decisions
he
state
He
that
made
only
carped
commissioners.
the
that
Albanian
interests
the
other
best
based on the
people, and
of
their
that
to
home'
`back
to
ensure
consult
more
were
concerned
commissioners
275Ed. Note, Austro-Hungarian Documents, pp. 33-4.
276Lamb to Grey, 3 June 1914, FO 421/293, no. 151.
131
further, alleging that only Germany and Britain had ever intended to
act
honestly. She considered Leon Krajewsky, the French
representative, one of
the worst, and accused him of being even more pro-Slav than the Russians. 278
conventions (1911). Eventually, and with help from Jagow, Grey ensured that
279
Elsewhere,
less
Bank
be
international.
Entente
the
the
no
would
powers were
They
duplicity
in
to
their
the
new state.
refused to
complicit
undermine
subscribe to the loan that was necessary to implement reforms, and to rebuild
the
to
footing.
All
the
Albania
send
refused
powers
a
secure
on
and establish
280
After the great power controversy
troops necessary for stability and security.
to
the
had
Balkan
larger
the
returned
governments
subsided, most of
crisis
over
longer-term
their
Albania,
to
the
towards
pursuit of
or
a policy of ambivalence
ambitions.
277Lamb to Grey, 11 July 1914, BD, X. i, no. 141; Swire, Albania, pp. 186-7.
278Durham, Balkan Tangle, pp. 258,269.
279Lamb to Grey, 29 Nov. 1913, FO 421/287/54708; Grey to Goschen, 18 Feb. 1914, BD, Xi,
Hollow
Detente,
156.
Crampton,
114;
p.
no.
280Grey to Rodd, 4 June 1914, BD, X. i, no. 134; Goschen to Grey, 5 June 1914, BD, Xi, no.
Wilhelm,
Prince
to
be
Office
Foreign
troops
necessary protect
conceded
might
137: The British
but such a pretext was never deemed to materialise.
132
and
Rodd's
observations,
Foreign Minister's
133
In May 1914, whilst the Corfu negotiations were still ongoing, a series of minor
disturbances in central Albania, especially in the Shiak region, a small rural
area between Durazzo and Tirana, proved impossible to contain. They had
begun as traditional Albanian grievances, but they soon escalated and had
profound implications for the national regime. Reports had emerged of armed
men concentrating near Shiak. There was nothing exceptional about these
intensified,
have
to
but
(potentially)
the
appears
volatile
situation
reports,
differences
in
the
did
because
of
personal
not,
although other similar ones
Durazzo administration. Amid accusations that he was conniving with the
insurgents and diverting military supplies in a plot to overthrow Wilhelm, Essad
Pasha was arrested on a charge of treason and imprisoned aboard an Austrian
have
to
Sluyss,
Johan
Major,
Dutch
the
The
Austrians
appear
and
cruiser.
in
Austrian
feared
he
because
they
plans
instigated his arrest
would obstruct
Leoni
temporary
the
and
of
took
absence
Albania. They therefore
advantage of
Durazzo.
from
Wilhelm,
to
Extraordinaire
Envoy
Italian
Baron Carlo Aliotti, the
Leoni,
their
who
to
own advantage.
But the Italians soon turned the situation
from
had
Aliotti,
returned
who
had returned from the Corfu negotiations, and
283Crackanthorpe to Grey, 21 Oct. 1913, FO 421/287, no. 171; Swire, Albania, pp. 194-6.
134
284Rodd to Grey, 21 May 1914, FO 421/293, no. 103; Lamb, Various Reports, FO 421/293, nos.
207.
Albania,
Swire,
46-150;
p.
Armstrong,
Six
Kingdom,
Month
pp.
95-170 passim; Heaton
2135
Heaton-Armstrong, Six Month Kingdom, pp. 66-7.
135
286
Chief
Sheik-ul-Islam
Mufti.
reappointment of the
It is significant that the
as
religious component was so prominent in this rebellion. In the independence
campaigns, and in opposition to the claims of their Balkan rivals, the Albanians
had persistently downplayed their religious differences in order to
appear united
and gain independence. In 1914, outside forces were soon able to exploit these
differences for their own goals. The insurgents soon surrounded Durazzo. To
oppose them, the Prince had only a small number of gendarmes, Dutch officers
and foreign volunteers, and Bib Doda's Mirdites. The latter refused to fight and
break the besa. The Prince's prestige depended primarily upon the support that
he had from the powers. In this case, they all refused to give him either material
287
or monetary aid.
On 23 May 1914, the actions of another Dutch Officer, Captain Saar, provoked
the final phase. Saar had been sent to meet the insurgents, but, seemingly
ignorant of Albanian customs, whereby most Albanians carried arms although a
fired
besa
he
had
his
them,
mistakenly
on a
man who
given
would not use
had
Albanians
Prince's
It
troops
that
the
Albanians.
to
many
appeared
group of
broken the besa. According to Lamb, it also confirmed rumours that Wilhelm
intended to massacre the population. This prompted even more people to side
288
did
trust
they
that
leaders
The
or
the
not
proclaimed
rebel
rebels.
with
insisted
Prince,
the
on meeting only great power representatives
and
recognise
little
but
times
They
three
delegates).
with
(in effect, the control commission
met
have
to
Wilhelm
received poor advice-perhaps
seems
success.
a reflection of
286Heaton-Armstrong, Six Month Kingdom, pp. 66-7; Swire, Albania, p. 210; Jacques, Albanians,
FO
1914,
May
Grey,
27
Lamb
to
129;
FO
421/293,
1914;
22
May
Grey,
to
Lamb
no.
357;
p.
Lamb
185:
FO
421/293,
1914,
Grey,
June
to
4
was more sceptical
Lamb
131;
no.
421/293, no.
'dubious
the
He
insurgents.
the
commented upon
than Heaton-Armstrong of the composition of
that
him,
to
'unknown'
even
he
some
that
and
the
many
were
met,
representatives
character' of
identity'.
`true
their
`conceal'
to
attempted
287Swire, Albania, pp. 208-9; Heaton-Armstrong, Six Month Kingdom, pp. 84-9.
288Jacques, Albanians, p. 357.
136
the other priorities that his great power advisers had. The commission
delegates
Wilhelm
to
leave
Durazzo, and he repeatedly
repeatedly urged
refused to do so. With shells bombarding the town, Wilhelm was persuaded to
escort his family to safety on an Italian ship stationed in the harbour. Wilhelm
had proclaimed his intention to return to the palace, but once he was on board
the Italians seem to have taken the matter into their own hands. The ship raised
289
Wilhelm
anchor and sailed out of port, with
aboard.
In these events, there were three determining factors: Essad Pasha; great
power actions, above all Austro-Italian; and Wilhelm. It was alleged that Essad
had been scheming with the rebels and Italians to provoke an incident and
290
Swire's
seize the throne for himself, but such allegations were never proven.
full
investigation,
for
fear
it
hold
Italians
that
the
to
a
of
allegation
were reluctant
but
be
likely
taken as selfItalian
duplicity,
is
cannot
most
correct
revealing
departure.
Essad's
following
is
the
The
true
of
accusations made
same
evident.
Despite persistent allegations that he was promoting the insurrection from
abroad (financially, materially and with propaganda), nothing was ever proven.
According to Heaton-Armstrong, whilst Essad was too clever to leave any
`incriminating documents' in his own possession, even those documents that
291
Essad.
to
returned
eventually
and
examined
never
were
were sequestered
have
to
Essad
Pasha),
Turkhan
(such
seems
Like other Albanian leaders
as
Italian
Had
the
lesser
officials wanted,
been a pawn of the great and
powers.
his
during
him,
and
arrest
have
whilst
they could most probably
restrained
to
Durham
357;
Albanians,
Jacques,
217;
p.
289Rodd to Grey, 15 June 1914, FO 421/293, no.
[hereafter
DD/HER/54
as
Office,
cited
Record
Somerset
MSS,
Herbert
d.,
Herbert, 28 July n.
DD], pp. 1-2,8-12.
Jacques,
207;
Albania,
Swire,
p.
126;
290 Lamb to Grey, 20 May 1914, FO 421/293, no.
Durham
also
MSS,
'DD/HER/54:
Herbert
d.,
July
28
Herbert,
Durham
to
356;
n.
Albanians, p.
dismissal.
Wilhelm's
for
Italians
the
Pasha
Turkhan
of colluding with
accused
291Heaton-Armstrong, Six Month Kingdom, pp. 66-9.
137
Austrian and Italian actions and rivalry were far more important. The Italians
and Austrians were split and working against one another, and against Prince
Wilhelm.
significant indication (on the surface at least) of the conflicting and divergent
objectives of the Triplice allies in Albania, and of the breakdown of Austro-Italian
solidarity. Accounts differ greatly, but it appears that the main controversy arose
because the Austrian representatives, anxious at their deteriorating influence in
Durazzo, had attempted to use the altercation, and the absence of the
commission delegates and Aliotti, to secure the dismissal of Essad and to
enhance their own position at the expense of their Italian rivals. Lamb wrote to
Grey that the Austrians were able to profit from the absence of the Italian
representatives
(Aliotti
and Leoni)
momentarily eluding the vigilance of the Italians. The Italian Charge d'Affaires
(Castoldi - who had previously been the junior representative on the southern
boundary commission) allowed himself to be duped into acquiescing in what
in
Leoni
immediately
Aliotti
On
be
done.
their
to
succeeded
return,
and
was
turning the incident to Italian advantage, by conniving for the release of Essad
into Italian custody, and thus again relegating Austrian influence and advantage
292
the
in
turn
Italians
faux
the
Saar's
Following
exploited
to second place.
pax,
Durazzo bombardment.
have
to
He
blow.
appeared
Prince's dwindling credibility as sovereign another
292Lamb to Grey, 31 May 1914, FO 421/293, no. 158; Rodd to Grey, 21 May 1914, FO 421/293,
no. 103.
138
293
even that not at his own behest. Nevertheless news of his departure
spread
quickly
throughout
Albania
and
Europe.
Wilhelm's role was the most interesting. There were times when he could have
acted more decisively. Heaton-Armstrong's forlorn comments about Wilhelm's
military failings, despite his training in the German army, and the decision to
296
However, Wilhelm seems to
send Essad into exile, are intuitive examples.
have received extremely poor information and conflicting advice. According to
Heaton-Armstrong, he was often left isolated and without support. This was in
in
he
found
himself
because
desperately
Wilhelm
needing counsel
spite of
that
Heaton-Armstrong
he
had
recorded
also
no experience.
situations of which
293Lamb to Grey, 24 May 1914, FO 421/293, no. 116.
294Rodd to Grey, 15 June 1914, FO 421/293, no. 217.
295Durham to Herbert, 28 July n.d., Herbert MSS, DD/HER/54, p. 7; Heaton-Armstrong, Six
Month Kingdom, pp. 90-5.
296Heaton-Armstrong, Six Month Kingdom, for example pp. 69,76.
139
140
300
to
to
the
Albanian
forced
to
powers were
arms
uphold
resort
regime. Faced
with these obstacles, the Prince's position became increasingly untenable.
By August 1914 and the start of the First World War, Wilhelm's position had
deteriorated
further.
One
by
one,
the
great
powers
withdrew
their
from
Albania. From a great-power perspective, they had more
representatives
important things to deal with than Albania. With the assassination of Archduke
Franz Ferdinand, even the Austrians, until then Wilhelm's most vehement
supporters, albeit for motives of self-interest, became uninterested in Albanian
The
international
squadrons in the Bay of Durazzo were the first to be
affairs.
Italy
(still
With
the
to
the outbreak of
neutral)
only
power
remain.
withdrawn.
was
from
Scutari.
A
Council
force
Phillips
his
international
and
were evacuated
war,
the
town
Consuls
Powers
left
the
to
the
of
administration
supervise
of
was
of
301
from
Durazzo.
This
Diplomatic
district.
representation was withdrawn
and
inevitably had consequences for the working of the commission. Grey ordered
the withdrawal of Lamb on 12 August 1914, the day on which Britain declared
had
Russian
German
the
By
then
already
Austria.
representatives
and
war on
departed,
Austrian
the
with
Italians
The
August.
7
left
repeatedly
Dutch
the
on
mission
respectively, and
the
that
Albania,
in
Lamb
whole
keep
Office
to
Foreign
arguing
the
urged
Albanians
the
that
left,
he
if
would
dissolve
and
control commission would
in
turn
This
by
the
would
Prince
the
desertion
powers.
great
this
of
a
as
regard
302
the
Meanwhile,
for
the
difficulties
powers.
remaining
of
create a new set
troops
international
stationed at
The
211:
300Crowe to Lamb, 17 June 1914, FO 421/293, no.
Scutari were not considered to conflict with these principles.
301Swire, Albania, p. 237.
FO
421/294,
1914,
Aug.
12
Rodd,
to
Grey
302Roddto Grey, 3 Aug. 1914, FO 421/294, no. 86;
FO
1914,
Aug.
31
Grey,
to
Rodd
91;
12
Aug.
FO
421/294,
1914,
Lamb,
no.
to
Grey
90;
no.
421/294, no. 93.
141
administration remained short of funds. The Consulta, who together with the
Ballhausplatz, was responsible for administering the promised loan,
refused to
authorise the commission delegates to pay the remaining sums. Instead, Aliotti
demanded
303
The Austrians refused to help Wilhelm for fear of
exchange for them.
offending the Italians, who had remained neutral in the war. Only at this late
stage, and when a greater emergency required it, did Austro-Italian cooperation re-emerge.
With the control commission went the last hopes for Prince Wilhelm's regime.
His supply of funds finally ran out on 13 August 1914, and the remaining
representatives of the commission urged him to leave. He refused to do so,
although he did send his children back to Germany on 22 August 1914, with
Heaton-Armstrong.
into
following
firing
finally
leave
the
He
to
shells
of
convinced
annoyance.
was
Durazzo. He departed, with his wife, on board the Austrian Misurata, on 3
September 1914. He never formally abdicated or renounced his rights to the
He
Albania.
be
his
thoughts
declared
that
he
throne, and
with
would always
entrusted
304
the
to
his
desire
to
He
Consul.
Italian
the
return
asserted
presidency of
throne with the conclusion of war, and the Austrians promoted his candidature.
departure
his
interpreted
have
to
as
The Albanians, almost all of whom appear
303Durham 'Albanian Letter', 14 Aug. 1914, The Near East, 28 Aug. 1914, in Edith Durham, pp.
62-3.
65;
Ibid,
in
1914,
Sept.
18
East,
p.
Near
304Durham `Notes from Albania', 3 Sept 1914, The
Swire, Albania, pp. 230-2
142
Conclusions:
a failed experiment?
factional
differences
(religious,
destabilise, the international system. With the advent of the First World War,
these pressures increased even further. The concert that had worked so hard
for Albania's
It
longer
the
broken.
ambitions and
on
no
a
check
was
question, was now
Albanian
Significantly,
it
the
Albania's
question,
was not
enemies.
rivalries of
but
diplomacy,
European
the
had
for
long
tested
concert
principles of
which
so
down
brought
the
Balkans
that
in
the
concert and
eventually
events elsewhere
longer
threatened
Albanian
When
the
European
the
no
question
war.
provoked
peace
between
the
powers
143
144
counter-national
forces
were
far more
influential
in the demise of an
310
31.
Konitza,
Faik
no.
1915,
Nov.
2
o
Delbrck,
31 F. Konitza to
145
CHAPTER 4:
The Entente Powers and the Projected Partition of Albania: the
form
Balkan
to
attempt
a
alliance (1914-15)
When she left Albania in 1914, Edith Durham noted what people had said to
her: `Now that the powers are busy fighting each other, they will leave us free to
manage our own affairs. '311The international forces left quickly, but Albania did
not cease to occupy the attention of the great powers. It was perceived as
having a key role to play in any future Balkan settlement. Both sides in the First
World War were ready to barter away Albanian territory in order to gain allies in
the Balkans. The instability in Albania gave the neighbouring Balkan states and
the interested great powers a situation that they could exploit in their own
interests, and so overturn the decisions so laboriously achieved during the
London conferences. Moreover, the situation created by the war was entirely
in
the
instrumental
had
been
Austria,
so
whose attitude and policies
new.
formation of Albania, was the enemy rather than the partner of the Entente
their
free
to
latter
The
own power-political and military
pursue
now
were
powers.
had
been
the
in
1913
Albania
independent
The
establishment of
objectives.
the
interests
and
the
powers,
great
that
of
competing
reconciled
compromise
into
the
that
With
the
existence
war,
their
concert
of
collapse
concert.
preserved
Britain
fledgling
this
expendable.
interests
were
the
state
small,
of
and
1839
the
of
in
to
1914
guarantee
the
uphold
order
war of
ostensibly entered
to
uphold
Belgian neutrality. But significantly, there was no parallel commitment
have
Chapter
in
this
311Durham, Balkan Tangle, p. 289; Other versions of material presented
Italian
the
Policy
British
in
and
Question
Albanian
Guy,
`The
N.
C.
been published as
N.
109-31
(2007),
18
and
Statecraft,
pp.
Diplomacy
1915',
1914-April
and
August
Intervention,
G.
in
1915'
December
1914
August
Epirus,
Northern
Offer
the
Greece
of
and
C. Guy, `Britain,
Century.
215'
for
the
Lessons
History:
European
(eds.
),
C.
Pappas
J.
N.
T. Papanikos and
335-44.
2006),
(Athens,
pp.
History
European
Conference
International
3rd
the
on
from
Essays
146
of
acquisitive
states
Austria,
the renewed
Balkan
neighbours.
From the start of the war, both sides entered into negotiations with the neutral
Balkan states of Greece, Bulgaria and Romania, in an attempt to recruit them,
or to at least secure their neutrality. Significantly, none of them negotiated with
Albania. In the Balkans, the Entente powers desperately needed to provide help
and support to Serbia, but Serbia's landlocked position made it difficult for them
to deliver this themselves. The British doubted whether they could supply
least
them
Serbs.
Even
if
they
to
the
provide
at
could
armaments or ammunition
Serbian
for
the
be
it
it
that
possible
would
was not clear
with money,
312
Balkan
Serbia
to
needed above all a
purchase anything useful.
government
had
Balkan
operated
better
the
as
alliance such
re-formation of a
still,
ally or,
by
be
Bulgaria,
this
In
the
achieved
during the Balkan wars.
could only
case of
Macedonia,
in
at
in
these
possible
only
territorial concessions, and
were
reality
313
Serbia
both
by
left
been
had
and
Bulgaria
embittered
the expense of Serbia.
likely
to
hardly
Serbia
but
Bucharest,
was
Greece following the 1913 Treaty of
formulated
Entente
the
Therefore,
a
Macedonian
its
spoils willingly.
give up
312Grey minute, 16 Aug. 1914, FO 371/2171/39796.
313Grey minute, 13 Aug. 1914, FO 371/1900/38875.
147
policy whereby they would offer Serbia territory in northern Albania, and in
particular the prized asset of an outlet on the Adriatic. This would recompense
Serbia for surrendering territory in Macedonia to Bulgaria. Since the creation of
Albania had originally been an Austrian idea to keep Serbia away from the
Adriatic, the fact that the Entente powers were now at war with Austria made
the abandonment of Albania easier to contemplate.
Preliminary
Negotiations
promising.
Greece
feared
that,
Venizelos
Entente.
unless
the
to
unconditional support
the
islands
to
Aegean
the
joined Serbia, the Entente powers might return
had
Entente
the
Although
Ottoman Empire, in exchange for Ottoman neutrality.
Greek
the
to
offer,
felt
accept
its
unable
initiated the conversations,
members
148
judgment', and may have prolonged the war by a whole two years. 315From then
It is doubtful whether Venizelos could have brought his offer to fruition. His
position was complicated by the attitude of the Greek King. Constantine,
influenced by his German ancestry and wife, and the views of the General Staff,
had a passionate belief in the superiority of German militarism, and was
convinced of an ultimate Germany victory. He had no sympathies for the
Entente, and no desire to help the Serbs in a conflict against Germany.
However, he did recognise Greece's obligations. The Entente foreign ministers
believed this would be useful in preparing public opinion for the confederation.
They consequently pledged help for Greece against Bulgaria, if Greece stayed
dominated
largely
Athens
in
Attitudes
the
joined
were
confederation.
neutral or
by fear of any retaliatory action by the Bulgarian government. William Erskine, a
British official in Athens, appears to have had a fairly accurate perception of
He
Whitehall.
in
his
to
superiors
Greek attitudes, especially in comparison
the
to
Albania
the
up
the
his
in
that,
whole of southern
offer of
view,
reported
be
Valona,
Greece
would
claimed), without
Skumbi river (north of the territory
insufficient to gain Greek entry.
316
1208-9.
II,
1938),
(London,
pp.
2
315D. Lloyd George, The Truth about the Peace Treaties, vols.
FO
1914,
Aug.
15
Grey,
to
Erskine
316Bax-Ironside to Grey, 15 Aug. 1914, FO 371/1900/39571;
371/1900/39564.
149
Italian attitudes and interests were also paramount in British thinking. Many
British diplomats considered that, as Italy was the only neutral power, its
preoccupation with Albania (in particular its strategic, economic and cultural
interests in southern Albania) could prove a key obstacle to the re-formation of
the Balkan states' confederation. Grey claimed that Italian intervention would be
`the turning point in the war', because of the perceived impact it would have on
317
The Greeks were concerned
the other neutral states, especially Romania.
lest the Italian attitude should prove a block to their aspirations, especially in
northern Epirus, as it had been in the 1913 London conferences. However, on
20 August 1914, Grey dismissed his colleagues' fears. He stated that, as far as
he could ascertain, Rome was showing no interest in Albania, made no mention
Valona.
He
did
Valona,
Albania,
claim
not even
and
except
of anything affecting
for
Valona,
`international
Italy
far
that
to
status'
might accept
as
suggest
went so
in the same manner as Tangiers, in which all the powers interested in the
Adriatic could participate. Grey urged Athens to uphold the Corfu agreement of
318
From
Chimara.
town
the
designs
of
May 1914, and warned against any
upon
independent
in
instrumental
been
had
establishing an
the outset Grey, who
so
British
interests
it
in
the
dismember
to
of
Albania,
was willing
of
and viable state
Italian
from
the
became
it
Yet
corresponding
clear
soon
wartime policy.
that
Saseno,
island
the
of
Italian
regarding
actions
negotiations, especially
Grey's initial view had been short-sighted.
Italians
the
closely
were
Entente
the
and
powers
The negotiations between
that,
as
Italian
The
asserted
Balkan
government
the
those
states.
to
with
related
Austro-Italian
the
invoke
to
Italy
Serbia,
obliged
not
had
was
Austria
attacked
296-7.
Fallodon,
Grey
pp.
of
31 Grey to Buchanan and Bertie, 22 Mar. 1915, in Trevelyan,
318Grey to Erskine, 20 Aug. 1914, FO 371/1900/42267.
150
wrote,
151
323
for
Valona
to
be
not
only
neutralised,
but
perhaps
even
internationalised, with all the Adriatic powers taking part in the administration.
Italian officials claimed that they would not object to the division of the rest of
Albania between Serbia and Greece, but on condition that the whole Adriatic
These
Boyana
Stylos
from
the
Mount
to
the
was neutralised.
mouth of
coast
initial proposals represented a complete change in Italian policy from the 1913
Ambassadors' Conference in London, but they supported longer-term policies
325
Adriatic.
that coveted expansion into the eastern
he
Grey
to
what
countenance
The negotiations were slow and uneven.
refused
the
Sazonov
from
despite
on
`hypothetical
pressure
negotiations',
considered
326
inopportune
it
that
insistence
his
Despite
an
was
Italian
entry.
necessity of
fully
Grey
their
aware,
was
to
Italians
the
neutrality,
to
abandon
press
moment
Entente
join
the
to
decided
had
and
Consulta
the
Rodd,
that
by
from reports
Gottlieb,
14-5;
Italy,
Albrecht-Carrie,
pp.
324Lowe, 'Britain and Italian Intervention', p. 534;
Studies in Secret Diplomacy, pp. 198-9.
325Albania, FO 373/2/1, pp. 91,93-4,105-6.
FO
1914,
Aug.
15
Grey,
to
326Grey to Rodd, 12 Aug. 1914, FO 371/2171/38844; Rodd
371/2171/39538.
152
was merely awaiting a decent pretext to take up arms against Austria. 327For the
time being, discussion amongst British policy makers centred on what might
furnish the necessary excuse. Most believed that a much greater threat to Italy
than the protection of its interests in Albania would be needed. Sir Eyre Crowe,
British Assistant
seeing Bosnia, Herzegovina and Dalmatia all `in a blaze' would induce the
Italians to help Serbia and Montenegro. 328 Others within Whitehall took a
different view, and considered that the Albanian position might win over the
Italians. This was particularly true since San Giuliano had hinted at the
importance of Albania when he had commented that the timetable would
depend upon `the march of events on the other side of the Adriatic'. 329As
George Clerk, then a Senior Clerk in the Foreign Office, remarked, it was hoped
that, although Albania might now have become a secondary issue in European
international affairs, it was definitely true that Valona may yet provide cause for
330
Entente
form
Evidence
Austria'.
between
Italy
that
some
of
suggests
and
war
action in the Adriatic
In
induced
Italian
intervention.
indeed
have
may
September 1914, Grey, Sir Rennell Rodd, British Ambassador in Rome, and Sir
Francis Bertie, British Ambassador in Paris, all proposed action in the Adriatic,
including
the destruction
Austrian
the
of
Franco-Russian
because
dropped
idea
The
involvement.
of
was eventually
opposition.
331
327 Rodd to Grey, 17 Aug. 1914, Clerk minute and Grey reply, 18 Aug. 1914, FO
19
Grey,
to
Buchanan
FO
371/2171/41000;
371/2171/40193; Bertie to Grey, 19 Aug. 1914,
Rodd
to
371/2008/38816;
FO
1913,
Aug.
13
Grey,
Aug. 1914, FO 371/2171/41123; Rodd to
Grey, 13 Aug. 1913, FO 371/2008/38817.
328 Crowe
minute,
371/2171/39796.
FO
1914,
16
Aug.
Grey,
to
Buchanan
1914,
16 Aug.
on
153
Occupations
Throughout
of Albania
September, discussions continued but they remained low key
dispersal of the small gendarmerie gave the interested parties (Italy, Greece,
Serbia and Montenegro)
advantage. The Greeks, still neutral, were the first to respond. By the beginning
of October 1914, the situation in northern Epirus was deteriorating partly, it was
believed, due to the complicity of the Epirote police. The British relief mission,
Muslims
in
forced
It
been
leave.
that
Mr
Duncan,
had
to
was reported
under
Argyrocastro were threatened with massacre, and that the Greek-speaking
(mainly Orthodox Christian) populations were convinced that Athens had
It
(Muslim)
`non-Greek'
elements. appeared
approved such an extermination of
that all respectable members of the Autonomous Northern Epirus government,
the
inevitably
This
Zographos,
Minister
gave
including Prime
were powerless.
Initially
the
intervene.
to
been
had
they
that
Greeks the `opportunity'
seeking
in
decisions
the
to
Greek
protect
Consulta objected to any
action, allegedly
designs
Greek
fear
regarding
but
London,
of any
undoubtedly out of
332
Valona.
the
statutes
the
of
The Italians claimed that, as
only great power signatory
creating
independent
an
Albania
their
it
in
the
involved
was
war,
not
MOEI,
1914,
Oct.
4
332Elliot to Grey, 12 Oct. 1914, FO 421/294, no. 94; Buchanan memo.
October
beginning
the
Grey
of
from
at
telegram
to
According
355:
i,
received
Vll.
a
3,
Series
no.
Greek
the
to
this
offset
been
action
had
Italians
the
contemplating
already
1914, however,
Epirus.
designs on northern
154
333
Venizelos
335 Rodd to Grey, 17 Oct. 1914, FO 421/294, no. 98; Grey to Rodd, 6 Oct. 1914, FO
5
Giuliano,
San
to
Bollati
FO
371/2009/57096;
371/2009/55875; Rodd to Grey, 7 Oct. 1914,
Oct. 1914, DDI, Series 5, I, no. 886.
336Rodd to Grey, 19 Oct. 1914, FO 421/294, no. 99; Rodd to Grey, 20 Oct. 1914, FO 421/294,
no. 101.
337Elliott to Grey, 20 Oct. 1914, FO 421/294, no. 102.
155
but, considering that the Italians had already gained agreement for intervention
from them, this was an easy promise to make. 338The Entente
also stated that
they were prepared for the Serbs to occupy northern Albania, but the Serbs
declared that they had no current interest in doing so,
unless attacked by
Albanian
339
Greek troops crossed the southern Albanian border in October 1914, officially
re-occupying all of southern Albania, apart from Valona, and establishing a
military administration by 27 October. Four days later, supposedly in response
to the Greek occupation and to Ottoman intrigues, and to uphold Albanian
neutrality, Italian troops as a `cautionary measure' occupied Saseno Island.
They established
inhabitants, especially the foreign nationals. The Consulta argued that Ottoman
intrigues would undermine Albania's future stability and were in the AustroGerman
November 1914). Therefore they proposed boarding and searching all vessels
338 Grey to Rodd, 6 Oct. 1914, FO 371/2009/55845; Rodd to Grey, 7 Oct. 1914, FO
371/2009/57096; Bollati to San Giuliano, 5 Oct. 1914, DDI, Series 5, I, no. 886; Bosworth, Italy,
to
According
he
lived.
had
have
Giuliano
San
is
hesitant
acted,
would
whether
p. 405: Bosworth
Bosworth, San Giuliano was mindful of a possible conflict with Greece and the usefulness of
San
for
See
Balkan
in
the
Germany
example
for
lingering support
governments.
many of
I,
Series
5,
DDI,
Oct.
1914,
3
Imperiali,
San
Giuliano
to
Sep.
1914
30
Giuliano to Imperiali,
and
the
Salandra
death
of
Giuliano's
San
occupation
Two
ordered
855,873.
weeks after
nos.
Saseno.
339Clerkand Crowe minutes, 8 Aug. 1914, FO 371/1896/36827; Lamb to Grey, 11 Aug. 1914,
FO
1914,
Sept.
16
Grey
Buchanan,
to
15
Sept.
1914,
Clerk
and
FO 421/294, no. 89;
minute,
Grey,
21
Salis
to
de
Grey,
FO
371/1903/66981;
Graz
18
Sept.
1914,
des
to
371/1903/49463;
247.
Albania,
Swire,
Sept.
22
1914,
FO
371/1903/51613;
Clerk
p.
minute,
Sept. 1914, and
156
flying Greek or Ottoman flags, to prevent the landing of arms and ammunition in
Albania. 340 Saseno was the closest Italian forces could get to the Albanian
mainland without occupying it. It was believed that it would provide an ideal
base from which to search any vessels. The move clearly illustrates the
importance of the Albanian littoral to Italian policy makers. Their actions placed
the Consulta in an ideal position, if events were to develop in a way that `forced'
them to intervene. This would also enable Italy to control the Otranto Straits,
and therefore access to the Adriatic. For this policy, the Consulta obtained
unanimous Entente support, although Petrograd was prepared to accept it only
as long as traditional French interests and operations in the Adriatic were not
341
The Saseno occupation was an incredible achievement and it
compromised.
in
play
significant
would
a
part
subsequent negotiations. Baron Sidney Sonnino,
soon to be Italian Foreign Minister, later claimed of the incident: `They [the
Entente] would swallow anything rather than risk pushing new forces into the
San
Giuliano
had
the
Moreover,
'342
their
earlier
predicted,
as
enemies.
arms of
It
from
bargaining
it
table.
the
Valona
would require
would remove
occupation of
both the Entente and Central Powers to make more substantial offers to secure
Italian intervention. Surprisingly, yet crucially, all the Entente representatives
doing
in
they
this,
have
failed
to
to
made a calamitous
and
so
realise
appear
343
intervention,
to
Italy
as
Instead
possible
a
receptive
more
making
of
error.
In
late
it.
to
have
to
Entente
secure
intended, the
offer more
would now
September
1914, Carlotti
to
in
London,
decisions
basis
the
and
(on
the
Valona
made
to
of
entitlement
157
protect it from aggressors) would grant the Italians `absolute mastery' of the
Adriatic. 344None of the Entente negotiators seem to have taken the hint.
objections,
the
Serbian
the
to
this
government.
Bulgarians, without notifying or communicating
348
to
Grey
Sazonov
countenance.
than
prepared
This was more
were
or
158
Securing
Bulgaria's
350
immediate
To
defeat.
from
Serbia
to
top
the
achieve
a crushing
protect
priority
considered
this, the Entente needed to guarantee Sofia the Enos-Midia line, and even the
Serbo1912
the
Macedonia
in
in
`contested
districts
the
promised under
zone'
Serbofor
to
They
Bulgarian convention.
a coterminous
allow
also needed
Greece
351
fact
that
to
the
importance
Sazonov
Greek frontier.
attached great
together
this,
that
He
frontier.
with
Serbia
argued
needed a common
and
the
be
expense of
at
only
Bulgarian territorial aspirations, could
achieved
that
recent
Albania's
creation, and argued
Albania. He had always opposed
detailed
Sazonov
independence
its
that
untenable.
was
had
confirmed
events
sasBertie to Grey, 7 Nov. 1914, FO 371/1902/68557.
Clerk
1914
Nov.
29
Grey,
and
to
350Bertie to Grey, 28 Nov. 1914, FO 371/1902/76590; Bertie
FO
1914,
Dec.
2
Grey,
Graz to
des
FO
371/1902/76686;
1914,
Nov.
30
minute,
371/1902/78118.
351Buchanan to Grey, 29 Nov. 1914, and Clerk minute, 30 Nov. 1914, FO 371/1902/76689.
159
the precise line that the Greco-Serbian frontier should take. It would start at
Pogradec, would pass by the watershed of the rivers Skumbi and Deval and go
south to the Adriatic at the mouth of the Skumbi, although Valona would be left
to Italy. By acquiring the fertile region of Durazzo, Shiak, Cavaya and Tirana,
Serbia would receive some material compensation for the loss of Macedonia,
whilst Greece would gain Albanian territory further north than that defined as
northern Epirus, including Berat and Elbasan. Even ethnic considerations were
invoked for this division, as the Skumbi represented the traditional division
between Ghegs and Tosks. Despite some French support, officials in Whitehall
did not give this scheme much credence. Their objections centred on their belief
that Venizelos would refuse the proposal, and not accept the allocation of
Monastir to Bulgaria. They also believed it would be violently opposed by the
Serbs and Albanians, especially the northern tribes, and that no definite
kept
if
Sazonov
be
by
Balkan
putting
achieved
a
state would
acceptance
for
leaders
Balkan
The
idea
forward one new
would merely wait
after another.
352
the next one to see how it differed, hoping for and expecting improvements.
that
He
Balkan
draw
to
argued
Sazonov
Nevertheless
schemes.
up
continued
Albania
Conference)
Ambassadors'
the
regarding
Austrian objections (during
feared
be
longer
Bulgaria
that
no
should
longer
enlarged
an
relevant,
were no
in
Russian
left
to
be
accordance
details
arbitration,
the
that
should
precise
and
1914,
November
By
the
of
end
Serbo-Bulgarian
1912
the
agreement.
with
the
Bulgarian
as
neutrality
Sazonov was prepared to accept a guarantee of
in
formulated
midthe
353
beyond
to
proposals
Grey
go
was not prepared
price.
Enosthe
to
up
Bulgaria
to
compensations
Although
offer
November.
prepared
FO
1914,
Nov.
28
Clerk
minutes,
352Buchanan to Grey, 27 Nov. 1914, and Olliphant and
371/1902/76211.
371/1902/76689.
FO
1914,
Nov.
30
Clerk
353Buchanan to Grey, 29 Nov. 1914, and
minute,
160
On 5 December 1914, the Entente offered Greece the whole of northern Epirus,
except Valona. Venizelos refused. He was insulted that Greece should be
offered so small a cession of territory, and stated that the whole of northern
Epirus meant less to him than the possession of Cavalla, whilst the Bulgarians
355
to
for
The internal
were
receive vast territories
nothing more than neutrality.
Greek situation had developed in a way that necessitated the maintenance of
Greek neutrality. Royalist circles were becoming increasingly pro-German;
Venizelos and his supporters were becoming more vehement in support of a
in
itself
Epirus
had
the
produced
of
northern
occupation
pro-Entente policy;
their
Greek
Members
the
attacking
were
public
parliament and
of
problems.
instead
Epirus
for
leaving
under a military administration,
northern
government
danger
There
it
into
the
of
incorporating
realistic
was a
ordinary civil regime.
of
further Greek manoeuvres, especially as Venizelos had sounded out the
in
town
Berat,
central
Consulta as to a possible advance on
a significant
161
Albania. 356Despite the Greek rejection, a further Entente offer was forwarded to
Sofia, but this too was rejected. The Bulgarians repeated their commitment to
remain neutral, but added that they might be convinced of the necessity of
participation on the Entente side, if a more definitive and substantial offer was
357
This
did
The Entente remained desirous of Greek
made.
not materialise.
support, fearful that without it the whole confederation scheme would collapse.
Before any further offers could be made, the position regarding Albania was
transformed by the Italian occupation of Valona, and its hinterland, on 26
December 1914. The Consulta reported that they had heard gunshots in the
port on Christmas
Durazzo,
government at
which presumably meant Essad, for them to occupy.
They claimed that the move was necessary to defend Albanian neutrality and to
Ottoman
Empire. The official explanation stated that
the
the
oppose
policy of
disorder, around Durazzo, had spread to the neighbourhood of Valona. Sonnino
Consulta
had
`provisional'
that
the
that
the
no
and
occupation was only
added
358
There is considerable evidence to dispute these
intentions of further action.
the
Porte
to
been
the
had
The
Consulta
recall
pressing
already
assertions.
Ottoman officers, whom it blamed for fomenting agitation in Albania. The
in
Austrian
to
direct
action
reports of expected
response
occupation was also a
It
is
Montenegrin
the
the
army.
the eastern Adriatic, because of
absence of
Vienna
to
Italian
that
a
reminder
to
as
serve
would
action
suppose
reasonable
it
to
that
in
Balkans
the
wished
general,
that Italy had interests in Albania, and
the
Conversely
if
force
by
do
to
necessary.
so
prepared
was
protect, and
162
protestations that Italian troops would not advance further than Valona, Italian
actions remained highly suspect. The Balkan states became more aggressive in
their pursuit of Albanian territory, keen to stake out their claims before Italian
forces were able to prevent them. Reports materialised of a Serbo-Greek
Serbs,
then
Albanian
the
Albania:
if
the
tribes
attacked
understanding regarding
the Greeks would create a `diversion' in the south.
361
in
Austrian
Serbia
agitation
likelihood of an Austrian offensive against
and
362
the
It
imperative.
for
Belgrade
help
prompted
Albania. This made
even more
Albanian
territory
importance
the
of
Entente to resume Balkan negotiations:
far
that,
Clerk
Greeks.
for
as
the
commented
declined,
them
particularly
within
for
in
the
hope
to
had
Athens
more
nothing
territory
Balkan
practically
went,
as
174.
War,
World
Italy
Page,
p.
107;
359Rodd to Grey, 26 Dec. 1914, FO 421/294, no.
and
Allies
'With
Quenoy,
du
Also
377;
360Sonnino to Aliotti, 22 Dec. 1914, DDI, Series 5, II, no.
at
Like These', p. 423.
163
war. Northern Epirus was already to 'all intents and purposes hers',
the
Consulta showed signs of preventing a further Greek
advance, for example
northwards to the town of Berat, and Sofia would eventually form
a barrier
between Greece and Serbia in Macedonia. The Bulgarians
would probably also
try to seize Cavalla, to which the Greeks were resolutely
opposed. In addition
no more offers of Albanian territory could be made. Theophile Delcasse, the
French Foreign Minister, refused to do anything that
might offend the Consulta.
Instead, the Entente sought to find payment for Greece
outside the Balkans,
and eventually settled upon Smyrna, because Ottoman possessions had
become bargaining tools, following the Ottoman entry in November 1914.363
These
Venizelos
resigning on 6 March
364
191 rj
passionate Greek advocate of the Entente cause, relations between the Entente
and Greece remained good. There were indications that the new Greek
government might agree to join them, although most likely this would not
include the restoration of a Balkan bloc. The final reply came at the beginning of
May 1915.365 By this point the situation had been completely transformed by
Italian entry into the war.
164
the highest bidder, has long been discounted. In reality, the Consulta had
quickly surmised that its irredentist ambitions could be secured only by entry on
the Entente side. Any alliance with Austria, or even neutrality,
was unlikely to
produce the desired results. The true tenor of Italian intentions became obvious
when the Consulta asked for concessions from the Entente in exchange for
intervention, although they had asked for the same concessions from the
Central Powers in exchange for mere neutrality. The Consulta simply
spun out
negotiations with the Austrian government until it was possible to extract the
366
from
Entente.
the
By the middle of February 1915,
necessary concessions
the Austrian negotiations had reached an impasse, and Rodd was able to report
that he believed the Consulta had definitely decided to join the Entente. 367The
position of the Balkans, if not Albania specifically, was crucial. Since the
beginning of the conflict, there had been reports of the impact that a Balkans
expedition might have on Italian thinking. As Clerk maintained, the Italians were
waiting for the Dardanelles campaign before acting. By the end of February
1915, and the start of the operation, Rodd too was urging that the time had
for
in
Rome,
decided,
to
but
it
`to
more,
wait
was
once
come
speak more plainly'
368
the Italians to make the first move.
366Renzi, 'Italy's Neutrality and Entrance into the Great War', p. 1426; Lowe, 'Britain and the
Italian Intervention', p. 539.
367Rodd to Grey, 16 Feb. 1915, Grey MSS, FO 800/65.
368Rodd to Grey, 28 Feb. 1915 and Clerk minute, 1 Mar. 1915, FO 371/2375/23560.
165
coastline,
should
Muslim state
stipulation probably arose from Italian treaty obligations with Essad Pasha. This
territory represented
British
worked
for
an agreeable
compromise,
in accordance with
166
Italy by defeating
Italian ambitions
Sazonov desired to
370Untitled memo., 2 Mar. 1915, MOEI, Series 3, Vll. i, no. 276; Sazonov to Benckendorff and
'Italo-Yugoslav
Petrovich,
Also
331;
Vll.
i,
3,
at
no.
Izvolskii, 7 Mar. 1915, MOEI, Series
Boundary', p. 179.
Like
Allies
'With
Quenoy,
du
39;
II,
371Carlotti to Sonnino, 8 Mar. 1915, DD1, Series 5,
no.
These', p. 426.
372Lowe, 'Britain and the Italian Intervention', p. 542.
1894Russia,
Policy
British
Tsar.,
and
373Untitled memo. cited in K. Neilson, Britain and the Last
358-9.
1996),
(Oxford,
pp.
1917
167
374
All these issues had an impact upon Serbia's
ports could be neutralised.
potential Adriatic access, and therefore on Russian use of any Adriatic ports,
375
expansion
376
Grey, on this issue, as on so many others, held a position halfway
morale.
between Rome, on the one hand, and Paris and Petrograd, on the other. Grey's
personal views were immaterial: he considered Italian intervention crucial. He
stated that, although he had no principled objections to the creation of an
independent Muslim state, he believed that there would be great difficulties in
37
in
the
Attempting to bring the sides closer together,
sustaining
state
practice.
Clerk proposed that the idea of the `state' was a matter of detail that should be
left for discussion. He added that, although the Italian claims were considerable,
it might
be worthwhile
to
378
Eventually, Delcasse was convinced by British arguments, as he
`opposition'.
too was desirous to avoid further delaying Italian entry. He agreed to accept the
Italian proposal, including `in principle' any British suggestions regarding
Albania. 379 Under immense diplomatic pressure, Sazonov too gradually, and
Italy's
He
the
his
lessened
recognition
of
conceded
objections.
grudgingly,
idea,
Muslim
Valona
the
albeit with certain
state
and
outright annexation of
modifications
and stipulations.
Muslim
the
be
the
to
Durazzo
that,
Sazonov maintained
capital of
was
whilst
Italian
be
to
territories
under
placed
the
need
would
generally
seaboard
state,
374Buchanan to Grey, 12 Mar. 1914, FO 371/2507/29374.
375du Quenoy, `With Allies Like These', p. 427.
376Delcasse to de Fleurian, 13 Mar. 1915, FO 371/2507/30052; Petrovich, 'Italo-Yugoslav
Boundary', pp. 181-2.
377Grey to Rodd, 16 Mar. 1915, FO 371/2507/30931.
378Clerk minute, 13 Mar. 1915, FO 371/2507/29374.
379Bertie to Grey, 18 Mar. 1915, FO 371/2507/31946.
168
381
strategic reasons.
380A Nicolson minute, 22 Mar. 1915, FO 371/2507/34055; Grey to Rodd, 25 Mar. 1915, FO
Sazonov
to
371/2507/34568;
FO
1915,
Mar.
25
Grey,
371/2507/35461; Buchanan to
FO
1915,
Mar.
19
Grey,
to
Buchanan
Benckendorff, 17 Mar. 1915, FO 371/2507/31554;
371/2507/32075.
FO
1915,
Mar.
Grey,
19
to
Buchanan
371/2507/32449;
FO
1915,
Mar.
25
Rodd,
Grey
to
381A. Nicolson minute, 22 Mar. 1915, FO 371/2507/34055;
Sazonov
to
371/2507/34568;
FO
1915,
Mar.
Grey,
25
371/2507/35461; Buchanan to
169
170
Rodd had informed him that, from `the military viewpoint England has interests
in common
This agreement had something for both sides. The Italian government would be
Muslim
foreign
in
the
for
Albanian
small
of
affairs
representation
responsible
hinterland
The
Entente
that
the
Albania.
of such a
ensured
state version of
`state' would be limited to the east, to provide a territorial connection between
385
From the British perspective, this
Greece and Serbia, west of Lake Ochrida.
balance
the
help
it
to
of
two
maintain
would
purposes:
arrangement served
the
dependent
be
Serbs
the
on
that
it
would not
would ensure
power, and
in
it
had
landlocked
Serbia's
a
placed
position
Adriatic for their maritime outlet.
help
Entente
the
supplies.
had
and
providing
prevented
and
precarious position,
383Sonnino to Imperiali, Tittoni and Carlotti, 21 Mar. 1915, DDI, Series 5, III, no. 121.
384Gottlieb, Studies in Secret Diplomacy, p. 343.
385Grey to Buchanan and Bertie, 14 Apr. 1915, FO 371/2508/44480.
171
Under the terms of the Pact, Clauses Five, Six and Seven
related to Albania.
Most significantly, Valona and Saseno were to go to Italy in full
sovereignty, the
coast was to be neutralised as far south as Cape Stylos, thus neutralising the
Corfu straits, and the Albania created in 1913 was to be tri-sected between
In the final stage of discussions, Sazonov and then Sonnino and Salandra
raised new objections. Grey, returning after his recuperation, finally brought his
full weight to bear on the proceedings. Together with Delcasse, he persuaded
Sazonov not to insist on Italian entry by 1 May 1915, and he persuaded the
Consulta, against its wishes, to delay signing until 2 September 1915.387
Although other areas of the settlement remained more important, the Albanian
question was particularly time-consuming because the Italians raised several
new objections. The Italians modified their position regarding Article Seven.
They suggested that the frontier question should be left open, and objected to
the definition of Lake Ochrida as the point from which the Serbo-Greek frontier
by
Grey
should start.
arguing that there were several points of
countered
drafting where the Entente had considered improving the text, but had dropped
these to save time. His main argument centred on a threat to a key Italian
in
territorial
definition
the
Consulta
the
If
the
connection
of
pressed
ambition.
definition
the
to
the
Entente
Albania,
the
of
raise
powers would need
eastern
Dalmatian hinterland already assigned to Italy. Grey argued strongly that the
Italians should not press for a weakening of Article Seven: such an action would
discuss
two
to
it
more
loss
time
double
lead to a
necessary
and make
of
386A. Nicolson memo., 15 Apr. 1915, FO 371/2508/45066.
387 Buchanan to Grey, 16 Apr. 1915 and Grey reply, 17 Apr. 1915, FO 371/2508/45196;
Buchanan to Grey, 20 Apr. 1915, FO 371/2508/46987.
172
changes. He also stressed the effect on morale of Italy entering the war at the
388
In response, Sonnino relented, stating that he
earliest opportunity.
now
accepted Grey's point of view, together with the points raised by Sazonov, and
hoped that signing could take place immediately. 389 The
projected gains in
Dalmatia had proved more attractive than those in Albania, and Sonnino dared
not jeopardise them. The Russians likewise waived raising any new points as to
the Albanian hinterland, and Sazonov stated that he was now content to leave
390
The final Pact of London was eventually
any necessary redrafting to Grey.
signed on 26 April 1915, and the signatories deliberately did not call it a treaty,
to avoid it requiring parliamentary approval.
173
years earlier, Grey and the same Italian, French and Russian Ambassadors, in
London, had represented four of the six great powers
who had created,
delimited and guaranteed an independent Albanian state. By the
end of April
1915, they had negotiated Albania's complete dismemberment. Italy formally
entered the war against Austria,
Interventions
Although the Pact was not published, there were strong suspicions that it
its
long-held
`Albania'.
The
that
scope
covered
agreement
revived
existed and
Belgrade
heightened
Italians
in
their mistrust
Athens,
the
and
and
suspicions of
Greeks
Dalmatia,
the
Italian
to
Serbs
Entente:
the
the
and
claims
regarding
of
394
Greek
Serbian
The
Asia
Minor.
gains elsewhere
and
possibility of
regarding
had diminished, and without the possibility of these as trade-offs, the everdwindling prospect of the confederation scheme may have been rendered
inoperable. In reality, although the Balkan states did not know this at the time,
the Italian agreement was very much in line with the confederation proposals.
Sazonov,
leaders,
Entente
the
especially
Throughout the Italian negotiations
392Salandra quoted in Renzi, `Italy's Neutrality and Entrance into the Great War', p. 1432. For
7.
6
Chapters
Italian
and
details of these revised
policies see
393See for instance Sazonov to Benckendorff, 20 Apr. 1915, MOEI, Series 3, VII. ii, no. 564.
394Percy memo., 9 July 1915, FO 371/2264/102672, pp. 41-2.
174
395
frontier
to
be as long as possible,
the
delicate
Serbian
political
situation.
Nevertheless,
on 3
September the Allies offered Bulgaria the Enos-Midia line and the `contested
Ottoman
Empire.
the
the
if
Bulgaria
in
Macedonia,
war against
entered
zone'
The Allies were prepared to disregard Serbian sensibilities in a desperate
395Buchanan to Grey, 12 Mar. 1915, FO 371/2507/29374; Grey to Buchanan and Bertie, 14
FO
371/2508/45066.
Apr.
1915,
15
A.
Nicolson
371/2508/44480;
FO
1915,
Apr.
minute,
39 Rodd to Grey, 9 Aug. 1915, FO 371/2265/109491; Rodd to Grey, 11 Aug. 1915, and Grey to
FO
371/2265/110393.
Aug.
1915,
10
DMO
FO
371/2265/111103;
1915,
Aug.
memo.,
Bertie, 12
397Grey to des Graz, 27 Aug. 1915, FO 371/2265/120224.
175
and the
resulting
compensation
398des Graz to Grey, 28 Aug. 1915, FO 371/2265/121477; des Graz to Grey, 1 Sept. 1915, FO
FO
Sept.
1915,
3
Clerk
1915,
Sept.
3
minute,
and
371/2265/123654; Grey to Bertie,
371/2265/124331.
399Stavrianos, Balkans since 1483, pp. 561-3.
400O'Beirne to Grey, 17 Sept. 1915, and Clerk minute, 18 Sept. 1915, FO 371/2269/133735;
France,
(Britain,
four
to
the
Italy,
the
text
powers
great
refers
Following the Pact with
where
Russia),
they
France
(Britain,
Powers
Entente
and
the
to
three
Russia and Italy), as opposed
Allied
Allies
Powers.
the
to
or
be
as
referred
will
176
401
benevolent neutrality.
The Greeks once more exploited the military situation to their advantage in
northern
Epirus.
The
Prime
Minister,
Stephanos
Skouloudis,
issued a
proclamation stating that the Greek return to northern Epirus was a success of
the highest importance (kiryx or first order), and implemented a series of
administrative
reuniting northern Epirus with the Kingdom of Greece. In the December 1915
Greek elections, the northern Epirotes, inhabitants of territory still officially part
of the state of Albania, were allowed to vote and to return deputies to the Greek
On
11
January 1916, the elected representatives took up their seats
parliament.
at the opening of the new Greek parliament. This last step proved too much for
the Allied representatives. In spite of the necessity of gaining Greek assistance,
the Allies, under Italian influence, and in view of the plight of the Serbs, were
They
demanded
Albanian
blatantly
to
an
sensibilities.
offend
not prepared
so
in
line
the
declared
from
Athens,
that
with
such moves were not
and
explanation
decisions of the great powers regarding Albania. The Greeks protested at the
Allied demands, claiming, in particular, that it was necessary to give the
the
Nevertheless,
levied
them.
taxes
upon
were
northern Epirotes a voice, as
Epirote
the
Allies
by
to
the
forced
northern
Greeks were eventually
exclude
Allies
402
Salonika,
the
much
were
troops
With their
at
deputies.
positioned
now
better placed to ensure that their demands were met.
FO
1915,
Nov.
9
Grey,
Elliot
to
401 Percy memo., 22 Oct. 1915, FO 371/2278/174823;
CAB]:
[hereafter
214
as
cited
42/2/31,
CAB
PRO
in
TNA:
par.
Zaimis
quoted
371/2278/167911;
41.
Greece,
Petsalis-Diomidis,
93;
p.
Also at Lowe, 'The Failure of British Diplomacy', p.
402Stickney, Southern Albania, pp. 61-3; Swire, Albania, p. 245.
177
Under attack from three sides, the Serbian position rapidly deteriorated.
Somewhat
Allies
the
and
amongst
403
Sazonov
the
Delcasse
from
Albania's
vetoed
and
neighbours.
opposition
for
the
favour
Italian
in
Sazonov
doing,
In
protectorate
of
an
argued
so
scheme.
whole of Albania-the
had
he
vehemently
very policy
in
the
opposed
discussions over Italian entry. He now considered this a lesser evil than an
404
by
the
tied
they
But,
independent Albania.
were
as one official pointed out,
Valona.
to
in
Pact,
London
the
`Gordian knot' of
relation
especially
405
British
Any
its
by
that
alliance partners.
of
thinking about Albania was determined
With
harsh
for
the
realpolitik.
discarded
wartime
of
reality
moral sentiment was
to
Entente
the
the
able
was
enemy,
Albania's chief proponent Austria now
Buchanan,
Grey
to
1915,
Nov.
22
403Buchanan to Grey, 21 Nov. 1915, Percy minute,
and reply
FO
371/2279/177332;
1915,
Nov.
21
Rodd,
Grey
to
23 Nov. 1915, FO 371/2279/175469;
Durham, Balkan Tangle, pp. 284-5.
1915
Nov.
22
Grey,
to
Buchanan
404Buchanan to Grey, 24 Nov. 1915, FO 371/2279/177902;
371/2279/17657.
FO
1915,
Nov.
23
and Percy minute,
1916,
9
Jan.
Admiralty,
to
Troubridge
405Memo., 10 Nov. 1916, Herbert MSS, DD/DRU/35/1;
For
ADM];
[hereafter
137/1141
as
ADM
cited
PRO
TNA:
Serbia',
in
Mission
'The British Naval
in
Serbia
Destruction
The
Fryer,
of
J
C.
E.
Albania
through
Serbian
see
retreat
details of the
Journal',
Serbian
pp.
Troubridge's
'Rear-Admiral
49-125,
and
1915 (New York, 1997), esp. pp.
136-238.
178
northern mountains,
admittedly towards the Adriatic, but not under the victorious circumstances
of
which they had dreamed for so long, and the future of an independent Albanian
state was once more in doubt.
Conclusions
The discussions surrounding entry into the First World War
are very illuminating
for the question of Albanian independence. From the start, `Albania' Albanian
or
territory was a significant feature of proposals to create a Balkan confederation.
It was to provide compensation
179
order to gain that help the Allies needed military success. This was
clearly far
from the predictions about small and neutral
states seeking to balance the
international system by siding with the weaker coalition. Instead it
clearly fits
408
back
to
it'.
success
The policies and actions of all the Allied great powers were clearly indicative
of
wider strategic trends. From the British perspective, the question of Albania was
related to concerns about Russian pre-eminence in eastern Europe. In Poland,
British negotiators favoured the creation of a semi-autonomous Poland as a
409
Russian
to
In Albania they preferred a small semicounterweight
ambitions.
autonomous and Italian-controlled Albania for much the same reasons in the
Adriatic, and as a means of protecting British sea power. For the Italians,
did
their
although
gains
not correspond to their maximum irredentist claims,
they secured much more than their initial demands. Their policy regarding
Albanian territory had protected their three core objectives in the war effort:
for
Adriatic
Russia,
the
Austria
and
potential
control of
and
protection against
expansion
and dominance
the
finally
had
been
had
Serbia
on
ports
gained
enlarged and
agreement,
have
Both
these
Greece.
boundary
should
Adriatic and an extended
of
with
407Schroeder, `Historical Reality', pp. 108-48, esp. pp. 117-23; For similar views on how small
Baker
be
the
judge
World
War
to
see
would
Second
victor
who
needed accurately
states in the
Fox, Power of Small States, esp. pp. 182-3,187.
408Trevelyan, Grey of Fallodon, p. 330.
409For further details see 'Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar, pp. 363-4.
180
central region where the conservative Muslim peasants had shown themselves
the least receptive to the nationalist programme. Whilst Russian and French
policies on the Albanian question remained largely constant, the war had
caused a revision of British and Italian interests in Albania and the Adriatic. The
policies pursued and decisions arrived at in London in 1913 were unable to
meet their geo-political interests in the region, or their wider war aims.
In
1915,
nobody
expected,
or even
for,
the
complete
called
181
an Anglo-French
balance.
For
if
Russian
to
the
a
new
at
arrive
attempt
in
the Balkans, particularly through the
its
increase
to
position
government was
acquisition
considered
of Constantinople
necessary
to
concessions
to
the
Italians
as
411
British
policy makers were not unaware of the deficiencies of
counterbalance.
their agreement, but wartime expediency overrode any moral objections. Of the
Pact more generally, Grey stated: `In war you will have secret treaties. Many
things regarded as criminal are regarded as inevitable in war. '412Clerk wrote, in
`the
dose
described
Lowe
has
Cedric
of
realpolitik,
as an unusual
aptly
what
the
is
that
be
has
to
if
principle of
strain
cannot
we
given,
one ever
answer,
in
the
the
to
war.
success
point of risking
nationalities
'413
182
CHAPTER 5:
Anarchy, Occupations
Renewed
Independence
and
For the first sixteen months of the war, great power concerns about Albania
related to any possible diplomatic lever or advantage. From January 1916,
fighting between the powers took place on Albanian territory. This territory in
turn took on a more immediate significance, as both sides sought to consolidate
and strengthen their possession and control of the areas they occupied, and to
extend their authority. In pursuing these policies, the powers would come into
conflict with both enemies and allies. The Italians would find opposition to their
policies in southern Albania, not only from the Greeks but also from the French.
Each of the great power armies used propaganda, incentives and bribes to win
over the Albanian nationalists and non-nationalists in the zones they controlled,
and to disrupt activities in those of their rivals. Great power political objectives
London,
Pact
1915
the
heart
be
the
to
of
of all policies, especially
at
continued
in spite of prior agreements, offers to Albanians of autonomy or independence,
favour
in
1917
1918
in
declarations
the
of self-determination and
and
and
wider
nationalism.
the
had
traditional
and
the
resurfaced,
In Albania at the start of
rivalries
war,
by
traditional
fragmented
into
a
had
separate zones, each controlled
country
183
ascendancy with religion a major motivation, in line with Hastings's views on the
conservatism of Islam, and its inability to be a force in favour of nationalism. 415
Only in the later stages, when other (non-national) courses and options had
failed or been discredited, did an Albanian nationalism re-appear, based largely
Orthodox
the
on
south and its enlightened diaspora, although many local
motives were also involved. All the powers, perhaps with the exception of
Austria, had already decided that the future of the fledgling independent state
should be revisited (either by great power negotiations or a subsequent peace
1913
London
in
that
the
conference), and
guarantees agreed at
were no longer
viable. By 1918, Albanians living in Albania or abroad were once more leading
the movement for an independent state of Albania, on the lines of President
Woodrow Wilson's principles.
It is possible to identify three distinct stages. During the first, the Albanians were
primarily
left
to
their
own
devices
and
counter-revolutionary
forces
territory
invaded
foreign
previously
In
the
armies
various
second,
predominated.
they
Albanians
the
impacts
differing
Albanian,
on
determined as
each with
independence,
Albanian
and
the
into
of
question
on
contact with and
came
In
third
the
Albanian
the
leadership
for
movement.
the
national
of
some vying
foreign
resolved
and
their
states,
tired
became
on
`Albanians'
reliance
of
period,
their
to
aspirations,
own
their
according
to
national ambitions
satisfy
once more
to
states.
weak
in
about
rhetoric
realist
opposition
and
184
Albanian Activities
(1914-15)
especially
those
who
programme, also left Albania: some returned to their former homes in places
such as Switzerland and the United States; many southerners went into
voluntary exile, as a result of the complications arising from the administration in
Autonomous
continued to exist and function, but their national programmes seem to have
been shelved temporarily. These `Albanians' tended to be loyal and patriotic to
their host government and its war efforts, and perhaps this is indicative of the
variable allegiances of many Albanians.
417
The response of those who remained in Albania was mixed. Local and regional
considerations dominated, as had also happened before 1912. One important
British report at the end of the war detailed the divisions as follows: in the north,
Scutari and its neighbourhood under a local commission of Muslims and
Christians; the Malissori under their local chieftains; 'Mirdita under Bib Doda; in
the centre, the region of Durazzo and its neighbourhood district under Essad
Pasha, although with various other opposition groupings; and the south, divided
between Valona and its neighbourhood under the control commission; and the
led
this
After
Greeks.
the
by
the
district
some
war,
occupied
southernmost
foreign observers to argue in favour of a system of administration similar to that
desirous
believed
that
of some
because
they
in Switzerland,
each region was
416For further details and the departure of Prince Wilhelm see Chapter 3, pp. 140-3.
417 For instance for details of Albanian activities in SwitzerNandsee Durham, `Notes from
Albania', 2 Oct. 1914, in Edith Durham, pp. 67-8, at p. 68.
185
418
form of federal or cantonal self-government.
It seems that, during much of the
war, national identity was of little significance and that Albanian divisions, of the
type that had proliferated under the Young Turks, were far more important.419
The division of `Albania' into smaller and smaller units, with few links between
the different areas, was nevertheless a step back from the former nationalist
movement. Local autonomy options were able to thrive because the differences
and rivalry between the various Albanian groups resurfaced, and disrupted the
The
forces
international
small number of
remaining were in a
uneasy coalition.
few select locations, such as Durazzo and Scutari. In any case, they did not
Many
influential
internal
Albanian
it
duty
deal
to
their
problems.
with
consider
Muslims beys and agas had signed up for the southern nationalistic package, in
1912, only because of the external threats, and as a means of protecting their
traditional privileges and customs. There was never any intention or desire for
Albania to become a modern, democratic, independent state of the type
it
that
The
intellectuals.
still
(some)
most
by
clear
made
war
southern
envisaged
looked east to Constantinople. This was to a large extent understandable
had
there,
been
had
many
and
educated
because, as rich Muslims, they
often
had
independence
the
In
at
Ottoman
attempt
in
the
addition,
court.
served
in
the
the
the
people
majority of
failed, or at least had not matched the needs of
ideal.
the
discredited
had
This
national
it
had
in
existed.
which
short period
had
it,
had
supported
not
individuals
opposed
who
Thus a range of groups and
been
had
or
for
purposes,
short-term
only
it, had used the nationalistic problem
their
further
to
own
by
the
war
the
to
created
it,
to
situation
use
sought
apathetic
factions
and
these
various
development
The
of
local or individual interests.
186
importance. The first three were primarily Muslim, the fourth Catholic.
in
developments
occurred
In the first months of the war, the most notable
(despite
Albania
Central
Senate
similar
a
the
involved
Albania
of
and
central
421
in
1913).
Essad
by
formed
from
that
distinct
initiative,
this
was a new
name,
it
but
remains
this
even
period,
Swire offers the most detailed account of
the
departure,
of
Wilhelm's
members
days
Three
after
muddled and confusing.
Durazzo
and
insurgency
Shiak
in
the
entered
involved
been
had
groups who
initial
many
this
objective,
had
they
When
achieved
hoisted the Ottoman flag.
('Albanians
1914-1918'
Cp6uju
420A. Mitrovic, `An6aH14uy nonumuuu Aycmpo-YzapcKe npeMa
Albanians,
Serbs
Mitrovic,
in
and
1914-1918'),
Serbia
towards
in the policy of Austria-Hungary
the
Italy,
Victory:
Mutilated
the
Legend
The
of
Burgwyn,
J.
H.
81-8,109-16;
79-136,
pp.
at
pp.
Connecticut,
Westport,
(London
and
1915-1919
Conference,
Peace
Paris
the
Great War, and
1993), pp. 55-64.
115-6.
3,
Chapter
pp.
421For details of the Senate of Central Albania see
187
involving Wilhelm. The major dispute centred on who should be offered the
Albanian throne. Numerous alternative candidates were proposed, even though
Wilhelm had not officially abdicated. Muslim Albanians continually looked for
Muslim alternatives, and the possibilities included Achmed Fouad, an Egyptian
Prince, who was supposedly very enthusiastic about the prospect. Some of the
foreign
371/1896/68866;
FO
1914,
Nov.
9
422Rodd to Grey, 27 Oct, 1914 and H. Nicolson minute,
Sept.
29
Grey,
to
Rodd
67-8;
Durham,
Edith
in
1914,
pp.
2
Oct.
Albania',
from
`Notes
Durham,
Swire,
371/1896/53190;
FO
1914,
Sept.
25
Nicolson
H.
371/1896/54150;
minute,
1914, FO
Albania, pp. 236-41.
188
recognised themselves
424
Meanwhile, the war gave Essad Pasha another opportunity to attempt to seize
power. He was prepared to make arrangements with anyone, including
Albania's staunchest enemies, as long as they promoted his personal position.
According to Swire and Dusan Batakovic, as early as September 1914, he met
Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pasic in Nish and was liberally supplied with
funds and equipment. 425In Dibra, Essad gained many additional recruits for his
`army', and many signed up in the belief that this would free Dibra from Serbian
Senate
the
had
Essadists
in
Durazzo
At
time,
the
the
persuaded
same
control.
to send men against the Epirotes. In their absence, Essad crossed the frontier
2
it
Durazzo,
towards
on
entering
with over 5,000 men and marched quickly
October 1914. Within three days, he had forced the Senate to make him
President, reportedly having threatened to shoot every member who opposed
in
involvement
French,
Italian,
him. It is distinctly likely that there was
and even
6341-3
TonmaHU',
and
425Swire, Albania, p. 237; Batakovic, `CpncKa enada u Ecad-nawa
pp.
5; des Graz to Grey, 19 Sept. 1914, FO 421/294, no. 53.
189
this successful coup. On the day when Essad was declared President,
and
almost a month before the official Italian occupation of Saseno, the Italian and
French representatives of the control commission returned to Durazzo
and
publicly embraced him. L'Independence
Albania,
an independent
426
had
five
francs
for
this
government
advanced
million
operation.
The third grouping, the `Union of Kruja', consisted largely of Essad Pasha's
former allies, who now opposed him. It was not particularly nationalistic, and
favoured union with the Ottoman Empire. On 20 December 1914, a meeting,
which became known as the `Union of Kruja', began at a farm near Kruja, with
delegates from all the districts opposed to Essad. They passed several
resolutions: to be reincorporated in the Ottoman Empire; to invite an Ottoman
drive
from
Essad
be
king;
their
to
to
the country; to elect an
prince
administrative council `under no single leader' to protect the rights of the people;
to initiate compulsory military service. They also resolved to prevent anyone
from the rival districts (especially Dibra and Mati) from passing into Union427
largely
Union's
Essad's
the
territory.
offset one
actions
and
controlled
the
Essad
Eventually,
Few
initiatives
obtained
of substance resulted.
another.
Montenegrin
Serbian
of
the
much
following
of
hand,
occupation
and
upper
by
This
1915.
in
June
more
Albania,
act was motivated
northern and central
Austrian
With
the
and
Albanian
of
than
arrival
fear of Italian intentions
rivals.
of
then
Italy
first
to
He
and
into
went
Bulgarian forces, Essad too retired
exile.
426 Page to Lansing, 1 May 1915,875.00/4 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M1211
1910-1944
Albania
Affairs
Internal
the
to
of
[hereafter M1211], roll 1 [hereafter r.]), Relating
State
Department
the
of
Records
of
[hereafter Internal Affairs], Political Affairs 1910-29,
Maryland,
Park,
College
Archives
National
at
[hereafter DOS], Record Group 59 [hereafter RG],
81-4;
I,
Albania,
Pearson,
pp.
237-8;
Albania,
Swire,
NACP];
pp.
[hereafter
USA
`CpncKa
u
Batakovic,
enada
359;
Albanians,
in
Jacques,
p.
L'lndependence Albanaise cited
Ecad-nawa TonmaHU', pp. 43 and 65.
190
The Albanian Committee, under Bib Doda's presidency, which presided over
Scutari, San Giovanni di Medua and Alessio, was the most nationalistic of the
four groupings, in spite of 'Bib Doda's circumspect allegiance before 1914. The
Albanian Committee had successfully managed to suppress the spread of
Essad's propaganda, despite his support by the Italians, and had forbidden him
from entering the towns under its control. It found it more difficult to control the
Union,
the
of
propaganda
especially as many Muslims agreed that only the
Porte could protect them. They consequently called for the Ottoman flag to be
flown over Scutari. Bib Doda managed to secure a compromise, by replacing
the national Albanian flag with one of red and black stripes. The most
Italian
May
1915,
the
in
Committee
initiative
the
when
occurred
of
nationalistic
Consul suggested that a National Government be formed. This never took place
429
because of Muslim opposition.
191
territory for themselves, in accordance with the rescinded treaty of San Stefano.
The Austrians aimed at (re-)establishing a viable autonomous Albania
under
Austrian control, although the extent of this autonomy varied from
proposal to
proposal. The Porte appears to have supported the Austrian position, whereas
officials in Berlin wanted to adopt a wait-and-see attitude, and persistently
opposed any unilateral Austrian action. Most disagreements occurred between
the two most directly interested states, Austria and Bulgaria. In particular, a
dispute raged about the right to occupy the two important Kosovan (Serbian)
towns of Prizrend and Prishtina, which both states claimed. 430As Austria was
the great power, and because its troops occupied far greater portions of the
disputed territory, the Ballhausplatz's
January 1916, the start of the Austrian occupation, the Austrians declared that
they had entered Albania only to expel the Serbs and Italians, and they called
Many
Albanians
(both
Christians
help
do
Muslims)
the
to
them
so.
and
upon
Albanians, including the important Mirdite leader Bib Doda, welcomed the
Austrians and invited their fellow Albanians to receive them as `liberators'. An
Albanian civil committee was established (29 April 1916) at Scutari, under
Austrian control. The initial enthusiasm for the Austrian arrival soon waned. A
Austrians
the
began
to
Albanians
with suspicion.
view
significant number of
down
the
bringing
in
had
Ballhausplatz
Many remembered the part the
played
Albanian
their
treated
troops
Austrian
the
that
It
Wied government. was reported
hosts poorly. They forcefully requisitioned all sorts of commodities and supplies
Ballhausplatz
the
1917,
January
23
On
low
prices, or on credit.
at very
to
Austria-Hungary
endeavouring
that
was
its
public proclamation
reiterated
in
the
of
pursuit
had
country
Albania,
entered
integrity
only
the
and
of
preserve
documents
German
[These
430TNA: PRO GFM 33/2201/5004, E285612-E285748
are copies of
Mitrovid,
];
Kew.
Archives,
National
The
in
deposited
War
World
First
the
during
and
obtained
116-8.
88-90
Aycmpo-YaapcKe',
and
pp.
`An6aHuy nonumuu
192
a common foe. This failed to reassure the Albanians. Very few joined
the
Austrian military or became its informal allies, despite
considerable financial
inducements and propaganda to do so. The most
notable group that did side
with the Austrians was a force under Ahmet bey Zogu, the future King Zog
and
nephew of Essad Pasha, who, despite being only 21 years old, had emerged for
the first time as a notable force in Albanian affairs. Swire
wrote that even those
Albanians who did join 'lacked a definite national cause'. He
added that they
`fought without the same ardour as in previous struggles
against the Turks'.
There were also concerns about what the Ballhausplatz planned for Albania
after the war. A delegation,
had
those
including
who
even
advocating,
also
were
abroad
and colonies
431War Trade Intelligence Department memo., 20 Oct. 1916, FO 371/2619/210652; Swire,
'An6aHqu
Mitrovid,
y nonumuqu
95-6,105;
Albania,
I,
Pearson,
Albania, pp. 259,265;
pp.
Aycmpo-YeapcKe', pp. 128-13; Fischer, King Zog, p. 12.
193
previously rebelled against him. Zogu wrote to Auguste Kral, formerly Austrian
representative
on the
international
control
commission,
areas.
This was far from the policy the Ballhausplatz officials intended for Albania.
They had no intention of the Albanians leading their autonomy or independence
movement themselves; rather it was to be strictly controlled. The Ballhausplatz
had probably not yet definitely decided its policy, or obtained agreement for
such a policy from its alliance partners. Under the pretext of a cholera epidemic,
Austrian troops occupied Elbasan and established a military cordon around the
town. The next day it was announced that assemblies for political purposes
far
Subject
to
imperial
by
the
in
districts
army.
occupied
were prohibited
14
On
decision.
this
to
to
Albanians
forces,
the
submit
were obliged
superior
February 1916, Akif Pasha resigned his position and declared that Albania
initial
Zogu's
Despite
by
Austria-Hungary.
cobe
temporarily
would
governed
he
the
for
the
interned
he
when
forces,
war
of
Austrian
rest
was
operation with
this
that
Swire
Emperor.
was
the
alleges
Vienna
to
to
new
congratulate
went
because Zogu was conspiring with the Bulgarians for the re-establishment of
Albanian administrative
the
1917,
March
10
independence. Eventually, on
Albanians,
the
to
under
immediate
autonomy
Austrian government granted
1918,
Mar.
14
Office,
War
to
432Spiers to War Office, 13 Mar. 1918, FO 371/3155/49228; Spiers
FO 371/3155/49231; Swire, Albania, pp. 260-2.
194
195
perturbed that the Italian intervention in northern Epirus had gone ahead
without
Surprisingly,
435Rodd to Grey, 12 Oct. 1916, FO 371/2623/204081; H. Nicolson minute and Clerk minutes, 2
there
that
impression
the
was
Clerk
Although
FO
371/2623/219594:
Nov. 1916,
was under
to
in
Epirus,
through
order
Italians
should advance
some sort of military understanding that the
link up with the Allied force at Salonika.
436Rodd to Grey, Rome, 12 Oct. 1916, FO 371/2623/204081.
437Serbian memo., 31 Jan. 1916, FO 371/2615/20162; Elliot to Grey, 28 Sept. 1916, FO
371/2615/203979.
438J. K. Tanenbaum, General Maurice Sarrail, 1856-1929: The French Army and Left Wing
Politics (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1974), pp. 163,165.
196
439
regime.
The great powers appeared far from uninterested. It has been suggested that
the French became a new force in Albania, and showed new interest in it
becoming an independent state. 440In reality, as H. James Burgwyn in particular
has shown, French activity was only at a local level, and for strategic as
opposed to moral or national reasons. Colonel Henri Descoins, the French
commander in Koritza, signed a proclamation stating that the regime was to be
under French military protection. It was suspected that Descoins was even the
General
For
document.
to
the
the
the
proclamation,
prior
week
author of
Maurice Sarrail, Commander of the Eastern Army, and Descoins were in
Sarrail
had
1916,
On
8
December
this
project.
repeated communication about
cabled that the Albanian
nationalists
Tanenbaum
be
supported.
should
Venizelist
from
Koritza
to
instigated
Sarrail
this
protect
action
contends that
By
Albanians.
by
expelling
forces, which had prompted guerrilla warfare
some
Sarrail
Allied
the
to
Albanian
cause,
the Greeks and converting the
nationalists
French
Koritza
under
hoped to protect the left flank. A peaceful and stable
the
discourage
French
troops
needed,
the
of
number
control would reduce
left
Army's
Eastern
the
Austrians from moving into southern Albania and enable
Stickney
69-70.
Albania,
pp.
439 Burgwyn, Mutilated Victory, pp. 77-9; Stickney, Southern
the
see
regime
For
of
the
successes
regime.
includes details of many of the achievements of
270-2.
Albania,
Swire,
pp.
also
440Pollo and Puto, History of Albania, p. 163.
197
government
to the
London conferences,
description
of the
442
Irrespective of its cause, this move generated much tension with the Italians.
Briand repeatedly assured Sonnino that the French had no designs on either
Albania or Koritza. It appears that, even by March 1917 (when he resigned as
Premier), Briand had not yet received full information. Sarrail's reports still
be
for
it
to
then
asked
insisted that the Albanians had proclaimed the republic,
the
had
Descoins
with
that
complied
French
merely
and
protection,
put under
let
the
`always
had
he
that
Sarrail
local
the
wrote
population.
wishes of
it
do
wanted; ...
what
population
Greek
in
the
to
behove
it does not
meddle
me
it
independent:
be
to
now
Koritza
internal
wanted
Balkan
question.
political
and
to
declaration
Koritza
continue
would
is, '443 However, the ramifications of the
198
444
beyond.
On 16 February 1918, Sarrail's
reverberate well into 1917 and
successor eventually abrogated the proclamation. The Quai d'Orsay was far
from keen to have the Albanian nationalist movement develop too far
under
French influence, in case it jeopardised their more important
goats regarding
Greece. Changes were only nominal: Greek schools re-opened and Essad
was
prevented from transferring his government to the town, as sops to the Italians
and Greeks, following the latter's eventual entry into the war. But, Koritza
retained essentially the same government, and the republic's flag continued to
fly over the town. Inter-religious co-operation was maintained, and both faiths
were thankful to the French for the opportunity of self-government without much
interference. The Albanians were also assured that this action did not threaten
445
independence.
their
the
Albania
independence
the
aegis
the
under
whole of
of
unity and
proclaimed
Italians
of
the
portion
Italy,
small
a
only
controlled
although
and protection of
446
the
By
terms
the
proclamation,
Allies
of
the
Albania, and
not much more.
free
including
in
internal
political
affairs,
Albanians were promised full liberty
the
foreign
In
state
affairs,
their
institutions, law courts, schools and
own army.
444See for example Clerk and Campbell minutes, 21 Aug. 1917, FO 371/2879/163402.
272:
Albania,
Swire,
111;
I,
p.
445Stickney, Southern Albania, p. 70; Pearson, Albania,
p.
fundamental
there
changes.
indicates
Swire
more
were
although
Pearson,
272;
Albania,
Swire,
p.
371/2878/63552;
FO
Mar.
1917,
25
Campbell,
to
Nabokoff
Albania, I, p. 106.
199
447
be
Although the Albanians enjoyed relatively little
was to
supervised by Italy.
autonomy in the Italian occupied zone and the Austrians in practice controlled
most of `Albania', there were noticeable improvements in the affected areas.
Swire wrote that the `Italians assumed in Albania the attitude
of a benevolent
although somewhat autocratic guardian'. Two hundred miles of good roads and
fifty miles of rail track were constructed, hospitals were
opened, schools
established, national newspapers circulated, model farms introduced and prices
regulated. The Italians paid high prices for the produce they requisitioned, and
this did much to improve the fortunes of the local populace. Relations between
the resident `Albanians' (no mention was made of the Greek- and Vlachspeaking populations)
These provisions
obviously
Pact,
1915
to
the
whereby an
ran counter
447Pearson, Albania, 1, pp. 106-7; Chekrezi, Albania, pp. 161-2; Dako, Albania, pp. 145-6;
Stickney, Southern Albania, p. 65.
4413Swire,
Albania, p. 276.
449Essad Pasha to Lansing, 5 June 1917,875.00/7 (M 1211, r. 1), Internal Affairs, DOS, RG 59;
Herbert's
Unfortunately,
papers
June
DD/DRU/47:
within
28
1917,
Herbert
Herbert,
to
Durham
there is no record of Herbert's own opinions on the subject.
200
to emphasise
the particular
the
Italian
to
of
acquisition
Otranto
require
the
continued
which
straits,
regarding
By
Albanian
independent
state.
town. It would not be part of a renewed
201
contrast, Woodall does not even mention the impact of the `Yugoslav' threat.
His discussion focuses solely on French and Greek antagonisms in southern
Albania. This view seems far less convincing, as it would not necessitate a
change in policy regarding northern Albania. Moreover, Italian complaints to
Britain regarding the French declaration at Koritza only emerged in the summer
1917
Italian
the
declaration at Argyrocastro had
and
after
questions
over
of
been raised. Woodall has also argued that the Italian action was a response to
Sonnino's fears that the Allies would renege on their promises in Asia Minor. He
Sonnino
decided
`tighten
that
therefore
Italy's grip' on the territory
to
contends
already in Italian control, including reserving the occupation of Albania for Italy
by
This
does
be
later
idea
to
substantiated
not seem
events; acquisitions
alone.
in Asia Minor, and elsewhere in the Adriatic, proved far more attractive to the
Consulta than those in Albania.
451
This last move, along with the supervision of Albanian foreign policy, clearly
less
been
have
to
His
intentions.
Sonnino's
colleagues appear
real
revealed
the
knowledge
had
Cabinet
fellow
his
of
prior
ministers
well informed: not even
forced
to
Sonnino
1917,
20
June
On
appear
was
Foreign Minister's plans.
His
his
Rome
to
in
statement
Deputies
actions.
before the Chamber of
explain
he
that,
declared
He
when
backtracked from the 3 June 1917 proclamation.
the
the
of
Albania
protection
independence
under
the
of
unity and
spoke of
a
Albania's
not
and
neighbours
Kingdom of Italy, this meant protection against
future
the
conference
that
He
peace
in
the
added
colonial sense.
protectorate
Albanian
the
boundaries
of
the
determining
precise
task
the
have
of
would
FO
1917,
Aug.
21
451Rodd to Balfour, 20 Aug. 1917, H. Nicolson, Cecil and Campbell minutes,
Woodall,
81-4;
Victory,
Mutilated
pp.
Burgwyn,
274-6;
Albania,
Swire,
pp.
371/2879/163402;
Adriatic,
the
see
Albania
and
Italian
on
details
For
18-20.
policies
Problem',
of
pp.
`Albanian
Chapters 6 and 7.
202
Italy's allied partners were just as anxious about Italian activities in southern
Albania, not least because of the impact on the Greek negotiations. Even before
the proclamation, the British Foreign Office had considered sending Harry Lamb
on a special mission to investigate
concerning, from a British perspective, was the extension of the Italian zone of
occupation into Greek territory: that is, south of the Florence line. Despite Italian
assurances that this was only temporary, to protect Valona and the Corfu
channel, Italian actions were treated with much suspicion. Whitehall and the
Quai d'Orsay received repeated appeals and protests from the Greeks.454The
Italian proclamation at Argyrocastro increased and confirmed these suspicions.
Whitehall viewed the move as an `implicit violation of the London declaration', in
that it referred to these changes, foreshadowing that which would materialise in
the
because
final
they
treaty,
sections of
and
contravened
peace
an eventual
the 1915 Pact relating to Greek and Serbian claims. The Italians had also acted
London
the
to
the
first
the
other signatory powers
consent of
gaining
without
because
Italians,
the
to
Only
declaration.
token protests were communicated
Quai
from
the
to
did
the Foreign Office
receive much support
not expect
452 Sonnino to Ferrero, 1 June 1917, DDI, Series V, VII, no. 174; Sonnino to Supreme
VII,
5,
Series
DDI,
1917,
June
5
de
Bosdari,
Sforza,
Command, Imperiali, Tittoni, Carlotti,
and
208;
VII,
5,
Series
DDI,
1917,
no.
10
June
Carlotti,
Tittoni,
Imperiali,
to
Sonnino
208;
and
no.
Albania,
Southern
Stickney,
p.
107;
I,
Albania,
Pearson,
80-1;
Victory,
p.
Mutilated
Burgwyn,
pp.
72; Swire, Albania, p. 273, Albrecht-Carrie, Italy, p. 239.
Mar.
25
Granville,
Balfour
454Rodd to Balfour, 8 June 1917, FO 371/2881/113449; Elliot to
and
Gennadius
371/2878/92555;
FO
1917,
April
1917, FO 371/2883/63110; Granville to Balfour, 9
H.
1917
May
23
Balfour,
and
to
Granville
371/2878/103707;
FO
1917,
May
23
commn.,
May
28
Balfour,
to
Elliot
Nicolson and Olliphant minutes, 24 May 1917, FO 371/2878/103957;
Rodd
to
371/2878/113747;
FO
1917,
June
6
Balfour,
Elliot
to
371/2878/113282;
FO
1917,
FO
1917,
June
9
Balfour,
to
Graham
371/2878/115250;
FO
1917,
June
9
Balfour,
Sonnino
Eventually
371/2878/117015:
FO
1917,
12
June
Balfour,
Rodd
to
371/2878/115251;
further
forces
Italian
forbid
south.
to
forced
any
moving
was
203
204
control that would deter Serbian, Greek, French and Essadist forces from
entering the Italian occupied area, the Quai d'Orsay raised no objections, in line
with their new policy of allowing Italy a `free hand' in Albania. Italian ambitions
soon resurfaced because, after the defeat of Bulgaria (30 September 1918), the
Austrians were forced to withdraw from their now exposed
positions. Ferrero,
however, informed Sonnino that, given the number of Italian troops
available, he
would be unable to occupy Durazzo or Elbasan before the French, Serb or
Essadist forces. 458On 7 October 1918, at a conference at the Quai d'Orsay,
Clemenceau, Lloyd George and Sonnino (but no American representative)
made a crucial decision
Clemenceau agreed that the two French divisions occupying Albania should be
withdrawn and be replaced by Italian ones. Sonnino interpreted this as meaning
that his European partners had agreed to reserve all of Albania for Italy, and for
the next eighteen months the Consulta justified the Italian occupation on the
basis of this decision. The French took a different view. Michel Pichon, the
Foreign Minister, insisted that although Italian troops had been allowed to
occupy Albania, this did not preclude Serbian troops from occupying northern
Albania, as stated in the Pact of London. He maintained that the agreement
North
Albania.
Mati
in
to
the
territory
river,
other words central
covered only
up
Franchet
Louis
General
French
jurisdiction
the
be
the
the
of
within
of
river would
d'Esperey. 459The Italians continued to object, and in effect attempted to argue
London
the
October
7
the
Albanian
that, on the
conference overrode
question,
205
Pact. Throughout these exchanges neither Whitehall nor Washington were kept
informed. In July 1919, the Foreign Office complained of having no knowledge
of any agreement relating to the occupation of Albania.
460
This tenuous great power agreement was further complicated when it became
forces
Serbian
that
would be the first to reach Scutari. None of the powers
clear
relished this situation, especially the Italians. As a result, Sonnino revised his
Albanian policy further. Discussions once more became bi-lateral between the
Italians and the French. Sonnino, who still considered Albania reserved for
Italian occupation, proposed that there should be no Serbian troops at Scutari,
first,
be
by
Serbs
if
there
they
the
that,
a mixed
should
replaced
arrived
and
detachment of British, French and Italian troops (similar to the international
Ferrero
Despite
World
War).
First
before
the
had
giving
operated
regime which
Italian
having
to
(Pichon
Drin
the
to
an
agreed
proceed past
orders not
before
that
Clemenceau
demanded
Sonnino
talks
to
this
with
point),
occupation
the
the
insisted
that
Clemenceau
of
decision was made permanent.
rights
London
the
Albania
in
agreements
to
on
rested
still
occupation
of
zones
powers
in
the
Greeks
the
to
south,
therefore
1915,
1913
rights
gave
also
and
and
of
into
Italian
having
Despite
occupation
in
Serbs
the
an
the
allowed
to
north.
and
did
due
to military necessity, and
the northern zone, he pointed out that this was
treaties.
the
the
earlier
of
to
principles
of
or abandonment
not reflect a change
the
What
negotiations,
not
mattered were
Sonnino did not mollify his position.
territory
troops
occupy
would soon
but actual possession of territory: the Italian
Serbia'.
`Greater
Serbia
by
of
part
as
that
Drin,
territory
claimed
the
was
of
north
Italy
to
their
attitude
French
conciliatory
the
continued
For wartime expediency,
206
their
de
facto
recognition
of
Essad,
informed
Essad
that he was not to attempt to return to
and
representatives
Albania. When Serbian troops entered Scutari, on 5 November 1918, they were
by
French
replaced
a
squadron under Colonel de Fourtou. This was later
soon
augmented
461
for
Sonnino's ideas
By the end of the war, the
an international regime.
Italians had enjoyed much success in their plans for Albania: Italian forces were
in possession of the bulk of Albanian territory; Sonnino had prevented the Serbs
from occupying northern Albania, especially the key centres; and French
conciliation
had encouraged
independent Albania, under Italian control. In the ensuing years, these were all
issues that would come up against considerable opposition. Sonnino found that
his plans for Albania were not as easy to implement as he had hoped.
Nevertheless the prospects for a revived, large, independent Albania looked
Pact
the
the
1915,
April
in
of
had
of
they
than
signing
with
more promising
London.
207
published
components had been suspected, but this was the first confirmation of its
It
had
provisions.
serious ramifications in all the Balkan states, especially
Albania. The Austrians translated the Pact into Albanian and proceeded to
distribute
it throughout
463
from
Albanian
These revelations made many
especially
nationalists abroad.
Albanian leaders and supporters realise that they could not depend on great
for
they
to
that
start reforming and organising ready
needed
power support, and
the end of the war. Nevertheless, many prominent Albanians believed that
Russian absence would be helpful in the longer term, especially at the
Frasheri,
Melida
One
commented
nationalist,
subsequent peace conference.
to
the
have
longer
French
Russia,
the
same excuse
that, without
would no
464
before
the
had
they
Serbia
Greece
war.
as
and
protect
States
United
1917
the
December
7
Thirdly, and perhaps most significantly, on
have
This
Power.
a
Associated
would
Allied
the
the
side, as an
war on
entered
had
States
United
the
never
though
for
Albania,
implications
even
number of
had
this
no
point
Albanian
at
and
independent
state,
previously recognised an
208
Albanian policy. 465The Americans were not a signatory to the London Pact,
and
they entered the war on the basis of the rights of national self-determination,
as
later clarified in President Wilson's legendary fourteen points (Appendix E). This
in
complete contradiction to the Pact of London, which had been based on
was
strategic necessity and political ambition: the dichotomy that is central to this
At
the upcoming peace conference, the differences between the terms of
study.
American and Italian entry were to prove a major complication. However, the
fourteen points were not entirely positive. No mention was made of Albania, in
contrast to some of the other Balkan nationalities, and some provisions were
Albanian
interests,
to
counter
above all those regarding Serbia, and perhaps
Italy. American policies also influenced the policies of its great power Allies.
This resulted in similar declarations and a revival of, for the British at least, their
466
helping
These `new' liberal
original objectives of
and protecting small states.
form
basis
Allied
Associated
the
the
and
nationalistic principles would
on which
Powers proclaimed they were now fighting the war. But the Albania question
differently
the
to
other national questions under
of
many
was viewed very
consideration.
Albania's
supporters
considered
the
Albanian
question
disagreed.
The
Belgian
the
to
great power statesmen
question.
equivalent
from
to
be
to
there
Slav
gain
Unlike the `new'
nothing
seemed
nationalisms,
aiding
the Albanian
nationalists,
or non-nationalists
Albanian
promoting
in
467
to
1918,
parliament,
February
On
18
questions
responding
nationalism.
Arthur Balfour, Foreign Secretary, replied that
59.
RG
DOS,
Affairs,
Internal
1),
465Lansing to Barnard, 5 Oct. 1914,875.00/2 (M1211, r.
466Stickney, Southern Albania, 70-1; Pearson, Albania, I, pp. 110-11,114.
Feb.
13
Grey,
to
Council
Army
467Durham to Herbert, 19 Mar. 1918, Herbert MSS, DD/DRU/47;
to
troops
British
idea
had
had
sending
Office
of
War
an
1916
In
the
371/2615/28547:
1916, FO
interfere
to
with
`their
spirit'
warlike
in
the
country and
Albania to play on the internal differences
fruition.
to
ideas
but
these
came
never
the central powers,
209
...
1918,
Mar.
19
Herbert,
to
Durham
468Lambert minute, 18 Jan. 1918, FO 371/3154/34264;
Herbert MSS, DD/DRU/47.
FO
1918,
Feb.
16
469 Lambert minute 18 Jan. 1918, FO 371/3154/34264; WED minute,
371/3154/34264.
470H. Nicolson minute, 22 July 1918, FO 371/3157/127525471MacGinty, 'Small States', pp. 45-8.
210
Albanian Nationalist
Revival (1916-18)
Albanian nationalist initiatives had started as early as April 1916, but there had
been many problems. Edith Durham alleged that the delays were the result of
differences among the leadership of the Albanian-Americans, who had become
important in the national revival because of their democratic inheritance and
financial assistance. She contended that they squabbled amongst themselves
Albanian)
from
factions
(both
in
two
that,
southern
originally
rival
particular,
and
The
Albanian-American
for
the
nationalist movement.
control of
were competing
the
thus
initiatives,
forward
in
repeating
any united
putting
result was a standstill
473
British
Turks.
Young
the
in
the
campaigns against
experienced
problems
Albanian
Foreign Office officials opposed any encouragement of an emerging
Czech
the
for
instance,
and
its
to
in
of,
support
contrast
national movement,
Polish movements, because of Mehmed Konitza's perceived anti-Italian views.
Albanian-Americans
to
1916,
April
in
meet
Mehmed's plans to visit Switzerland
consequently
were
support,
there and discuss ways of gaining great power
211
476
Vatra's first real impact was not felt until the summer of 1918, when a new
force
driving
the
head
the
main
President was elected to
organisation, although
the
Until
then,
Konitza.
Mehmed
tactics
behind the new policy and
was
been
had
Noli,
Fan
Bishop
influence
who
the
been
had
of
under
organisation
pro-Austrian.
been
had
Mehmed
Argyrocastro,
Since Italy's declaration at
He
Albania.
assured
independent
for
Italians
the
an
anxious to work with
25
Nicolson
A.
minutes,
474Elliot to Grey, 30 April 1916, Lamb minute, 24 May 1916, Clerk and
May 1916, FO 371/2619/94755-
Audrey
The
`Mademoiselle
475Durham to Amery, 23 Oct. 1917, Herbert MSS, DD/DRU/47:
to
of
members
her
in
correspondence
Durham
intriguing
alleged
interesting
one.
and
affair' is an
idea
the
to
French
by
the
promote
lady
French
was a ploy
the Anglo-Albanian Society that the
that,
not
but
the
of
prospect
Austrian
Italian
one,
to
or
an
French
rival
protectorate as a
of a
details
The
likely.
of
very
have
never
it
was
raised,
Italian
the
light
would
opposition
least in
of
from
far
however
clear.
are
how the affair ended
2003).
(eBook,
Masaryk
476See for example G. Lewis and A. M. Schlesinger Jr., Tomas
212
Sonnino
Sonnino subsequently
in
nationalists
exile, who called themselves the National Albanian Committee, to
Rome in early December 1918. Sonnino was keen to harness the support
of
the Albanian nationalists for Italy, but he was not prepared to go so far as a
formal declaration, for fear of the response it might produce from the Allies. In
mid-October 1918, Pichon warned the Consulta to stop fermenting Albanian
nationalism in the zones of Italian occupation, because the London Pact had
reserved southern Albania for Greece. In early November 1918, the British
Foreign Office and the American State Department, having heard reports that
the Italians were preparing to establish a puppet government in Albania to
present the peacemakers with a fait accompli, warned the Consulta against any
477
his
Albania.
Sonnino
insensitive
to
in
offend
so
as
was not
unilateral action
partner's
sensibilities
openly. Nevertheless,
213
block to Italian aspirations.478It was only after enduring the occupation that
479
to
his
other prominent nationalists came support
views. These were certainly
gains that the Italians, and probably also the Albanian representatives, knew
that the Consulta could not guarantee. Neither, as it turned out, nor as Sonnino
had hoped, could the Consulta control the Albanian nationalists.
The Italians also worked with Albanian leaders inside Albania. As they moved
northwards in 1918, Italian forces allowed the Albanians to continue with their
local
administrations,
but
simultaneously
helped
to
organise
meetings
Austrians
the
with
leaders
Many
the
discontent.
of
great
produced
which
replacement government,
Italian
and
idea
the
protectorate,
to
an
of
in Scutari thus came round
supporting
Albanian
to
desire
their
an
further
establish
the French insensitivity fostered
Dec.
28
Clerk,
to
Phillips
478Tourtoulis to Herbert, 12 Jan. 1919, Herbert MSS, DD/DRU/33/1;
371/3570/6937FO
1919,
Jan.
7
Balfour,
to
1918, FO 371/3570/9031; Rumbold
479See Chapters 7 and 8, esp. pp. 290-5,301-27 passim.
Nov.
20
Piacentini,
to
Sonnino
480Sonnino to Piacentini, 6 Nov. 1918, DDI, Series 6, I, no. 32;
Also
305;
I,
6,
Series
DDI,
no.
1918,
Nov.
23
Sonnino,
Sforza
243;
to
1918, DDI, Series 6, I, no.
284.
Albania,
Swire,
32-3;
p.
Problem',
`Albanian
pp.
Woodall,
at
214
provisional government
481
Italian
Sonnino was less than
protection.
under
optimistic about the project. He sent Colonel Ettore Lodi, considered an expert
in Albanian affairs, to Albania in the capacity of Political Liaison Officer to the
That was not the end of the matter. Throughout December 1918, Mehmed
Konitza, now the central figure in the Albanian nationalist movement, travelled
throughout Albania, with the object of organising a second meeting of Albanian
leaders, beys and agas. This finally took place at Durazzo on 25 December
1918. Here Lodi was unable to control the meeting as he had done at Alessio.
Over Lodi's objections,
the Albanians
National
themselves
a
proclaimed
481Sonnino to Imperiali, Bonin Longere and Miniscalchi, 8 Dec. 1918, DDI, Series 6, I, no. 492;
The
371/3148/206726:
FO
1918,
Dec.
17
Sonnino to Imperiali, n. d. Dec. 1918, and LC minute,
Albanian
(re-)establish
to
an
Consulta promoted the idea of French culpability in the movement
the
dismissing
their
did
views,
Whitehall
but
it
that
support
not
appears
provisional government
Italian
propaganda.
as
suggestion
215
483
They expressed their desire for a restoration of the independent
partition.
Albanian state of 1913-14, together with claims to their ethnic irredenta. Those
attending the meeting consisted of delegates from across Albania, but there
was no delegate from Koritza, which was still under French control, and Bib
Doda was the only representative of the northern clans. The Albanians
were
once more acting independently. In these activities, they were making their own
decisions and, for the first time, defying the great powers if their interests could
not be reconciled with Albanian nationalist ones, and against the traditional
realist rhetoric of the states system. Their abandonment of any hope of gaining
great power support was a last resort. Only when efforts in this direction had
been completely unsuccessful did the Albanians have the incentive to devise
their own independent policy, given that there were no other alternatives. As
late as October 1918, Mehmed was still advocating an Albanian regiment under
Aubrey Herbert, and Albanian commitment to Britain, and even to Italy, in return
for recognition of an independent Albania. 484
216
prevented from leaving Durazzo until they had explained their actions. Lodi
therefore told the delegates that they must abrogate their decision. Mehmed
went to Rome to explain why the government had been formed despite Italian
485
Mehmed was fully aware that this move had taken the Italians by
objections.
surprise, and had gone much further than they had anticipated, but he was
lose
to
Italian support. He ascribed the appointment of Turkhan
anxious not
Pasha as Prime Minister as an attempt to mollify Italian objections. 486
Meanwhile, Sonnino wanted to maintain Albanian support for Italy. Appreciating
that it was too late to undo this move, he merely insisted that all reports and
Albanian
the
Assembly would have to be reviewed by the Italian military
of
acts
authorities, and that the Italian government would not recognise the Albanian
government, pending the outcome of the peace conference. The French, British
American
likewise
it.
Lodi
to
governments
cleverly
refused
recognise
and
by
forced
Italy
decisions
had
been
their
Albanians
these
to
the
that
on
explained
Allies, but that, in reality, the Consulta fully supported the Albanian nationalists.
The Italians were attempting to play a double game: not to lose face with their
487
In reality, they
Allies, but also to maintain support of the Albanian nationalists.
had already lost control of the nationalists. Once more, the Albanians were
the
hands
the
future
rival
and
their
to
take
powers
great
of
of
out
attempting
future
their
the
in
determining
have
state.
to
of
role
a
and
neighbour states,
485Piacentini to Sonnino, 26 Dec. 1918, DDI, Series 6, I, no. 660; Piacentini to Sonnino, 26 Dec.
694;
6,1,
Series
DDI,
1918,
29
Dec.
no.
1918, DDI, Series 6, I, no. 661; Sonnino to Piacentini,
`Albanian
Woodall,
Also
732;
I,
6,
Series
at
no.
Piacentini to Sonnino, 1 Jan. 1919, DDI,
Problem', pp. 36-7.
RG
DOS,
Commission,
American
486Lybyer minute, 16 Feb. 1919,875.00/59 (M820, r. 556),
59.
Jan.
1
Sonnino,
to
Piacentini
694;
487 Sonnino to Piacentini, 29 Dec. 1918, DDI, Series 6, I, no.
30
France,
in
Embassy
American
to
France
in
Embassy
Italian
6,
I,
732;
Series
no.
1919, DDI,
37-8.
Problem',
pp.
'Albanian
Woodall,
II,
375;
Also
PPC,
FRUS
1918,
p.
at
Dec.
217
Conclusions
Throughout the First World War, all the powers changed their
positions and
attitudes regarding Albania, whilst the Balkan states remained largely constant,
but devised new methods and techniques for achieving their goals. As the
war
progressed, nationalism and nationalist interests played an increasing role.
Following on from Wilson's fourteen points, the Allies pledged to uphold the
interests of subject nationalities and small states. This was primarily for reasons
of self-interest and position in the wider war effort. For the British, particularly,
appeals to the Poles and Czechs were designed to upset Austrian war efforts.
In south-eastern Europe, a similar agenda was pursued, despite the lack of
direct British interests there. One War Cabinet memorandum stated that British
general-European interests were too deeply rooted in the Balkans for Britain to
be detached from Balkan politics. Although Britain had `no material interests in
south eastern Europe', it was `indirectly almost as much affect[ed] as [the] other
488
great powers' .
The Foreign Office considered the Albanian question as different to many of the
First
World
during
the
other small-state national questions under consideration
War. The Foreign Office denied that Britain had any commitments to Albania
because those signed before the war were `void', as all the signatories were
489
European
how
has
states
MacGinty
small
western
shown
now at war.
490
benefited from a `seminal structure of empowerment' produced by the war.
The
Europe.
in
war
eastern
Such ideas could also be applied to small states
Greeks,
the
table,
bargaining
especially,
the
improved their position at
and
218
By the end of 1918, the Albanians had once more achieved a nominal
administration over the whole country. In reality the French, Italians, Greeks and
Serbs still occupied and controlled the vast majority of territory the Albanians
would
claim
at the
peace
conference,
remained
unrecognised, shadowing its predicament in 1912. However, the counterrevolution had been defeated. As with Albanian initiatives during the Balkan
wars, it took greater external threats, and a realisation that they could not rely
on the support of others, to create this unity and resolve. Significantly, the
Albanian movement was again marked by an absence of religious differences,
been
have
discord
to
in
times
more
religious affiliations appear
of
whereas
The
prominent.
great powers' mistrust of, and concern about, each other meant
that they paid scant attention to Albanian actions or activities. In the last months
the
immediately
in
those
the
armistice, rapid progress was
after
of
conflict, and
the
to
This
Albanian
front.
of
the
experiences
similar
was
national
on
made
lack
the
because
different,
European
but
of
of
also
nationalities,
eastern
other
219
in
Albania.
Nevertheless, internationally,
for
these
great power support
activities
the Albanians viewed the situation at the end of the war with promise, as the
most interested states would no longer be involved. Melida Frasheri summed up
their position in a letter to Herbert. He wrote that
I think that the new situation of the three states-Russia,
Turkey-will
Austria and
Albanians
for
the
the politics of the powers and the little states
of
as
towards us.
He added that the three powers most interested in the Albanian issue before the
war, Italy not withstanding, would no longer be a political factor at the peace
conference. Therefore he considered that the Albanian question would be
for
less
by
disinterested
`friendly
powerconcern
and
powers'491with
resolved
Wilsonian
fairer
based
principles.
on
settlement,
politics, and would provide a
This view was naive: geo-political interests were at least as important after the
larger
because
if
prizes were at stake.
so,
more
war, not
220
CHAPTER 6:
The Peace Conference of Paris I:
the problem of southern Albania
`Is Albania to become the Poland of south-eastern Europe? '492
Chapters Six and Seven consider the interactions and the respective roles
of
nationalism,
especially
determination,
when
defined
as language
nationalism
or self-
and
commitments
with the
supposedly
new self-determination
493
diplomacy.
Wilson intended that the Conference would be based on his
fourteen points and national self-determination, but these `new' ideals faced
Pact
from
during
treaties
the
the
the
of
opposition
secret
signed
war, above all
London, in which great power interests remained protected. Despite the
for
limited
the
be
diplomacy',
`new
there
small
role
only
a
would
supposed
States
United
(now
including
the
the
states, and
great power representatives
Conference
Peace
the
By
time
decisions.
the
key
the
Japan)
and
would make
started,
(Czechoslovakia
the
be
the
it
Poland),
of
responsibility
would
and
and
221
494
Such arguments only applied to those states whose independence fitted in with
great power policy projections. Where independence was viewed as neither
beneficial nor necessary for great power interests, or for the balance of power, it
The
Albanians
despite
the
were a small
new
rhetoric,
not
supported.
was,
1919-20.
in
that
this
was viewed positively
was not something
grouping, and
Across central and eastern Europe, borders were unable to meet the Wilsonian
because
the
mixture of nationalities, outdated and unreliable
of
principles
to
for
the
due
the
tendency
to
figures
peacemakers
and also
population
to
factors
in
historical
ones,
ethnic
addition
strategic
and
consider economic,
495
Such
interests
an
their
stake.
at
not
were
strategic
own
even when
had
Conference
Ambassadors'
1913
The
already
new.
eventuality was not
definition
that
the
a narrow
effects
shown
interlaced
an
of nationality,
to
the
have
produce
attempt
on
could
population, and alternative priorities,
neither
new,
Not
not
frontiers.
self-determination
only was
ethnic or national
them
delimiting
on
and
states
the
establishing
problems associated with
were
this basis.
1919
Conference
Paris
The
of
494Sharp, `Genie', p. 25; Also at M. MacMillan, Peacemakers:
496.
2001),
War
(London,
End
the
to
p.
Attempt
Its
and
a95Dockrill and Goold, Peace without Promise, p. 91.
222
Colonel Edward House, Wilson's senior adviser, maintained that the Albanian
question differed significantly from the other European `national' questions, such
Poland,
Czechoslovakia,
Yugoslavia
and
as
which became independent, and
Ukraine and Armenia, which did not. He also projected that the Albanian
involved
if
`little
question
anything more than rectifications of frontier', and that, if
`nothing is done except in the matter of the Italian claim to Valona and in
providing for advice and guidance to Albania, she will be no worse off than she
496
In reality, the Albanian question proved to be both different and
has been,.
Albania
had
its
in
At
the
the
existed
of
war,
entirety and
more complicated.
start
had been independent. It was neutral in the war, and might possibly have been
Conference
The
Peace
into
force
Essad
Pasha's
taken
if
account.
was
an ally
did not resolve the Albanian question, and its territory did not form part of any of
the five peace treaties, or the Treaty of Rapallo (12 November 1920), which
disputes.
Italo-Yugoslav
settled
did
time
the
Although
issue.
the
Albania was thus a marginal
representatives at
Albanian
to
the
distinct
three
there
terms,
in
it
these
phases
think
were
of
not
first
The
Conference,
was
Peace
overlap.
during
the
some
with
albeit
question
the
focused
The
on
second
the peace preparations of all the relevant parties.
The
third
1919.
July
January
to
phase
from
Albanian
question,
southern
1920.
March
1919
to
March
from
Albanian
the
question,
northern
considered
At
the
third.
the
Seven
Chapter
Chapter Six considers the first two, and
into
and
sub-sections,
Albanian
small
the
question
Conference, the division of
223
Language Nationalism
Revisited
frontiers, what criteria would determine nationality? ' The western tradition
German
but
in
the
one
or
eastern
nationality,
emphasised choice
establishing
did not. Instead nationality was `determined not self-determined,
and the
and
498
Americans
For
the
geography.
favoured
be
the
to
language
1913,
London
in
in
criterion.
came
ambassadors
be
inadequate,
it
neatly
that
The evidence soon showed
and could not
was
49' Cobban, The National State, p. 63; Sharp, 'Genie', pp. 12-3; Sharp, 'Minorities', p. 178.
498Sharp, 'Genie', pp. 13-4 emphasis added.
224
501
This proved particularly problematic in eastern
its existence.
Europe, because of the competing national claims. It therefore led Allied experts
to believe in both ethnic (based on pseudo-linguistic foundations) and historical
bases for small states in the region.
Even more importantly, none of the great power representatives, not even
The
the
to
Wilson, was ever entirely committed
principle of self-determination.
into
to
newly
British Foreign Office wanted
see minority groups assimilated
to,
facto
de
to
If
the
granted
was
appeal
right
ones.
enlarged
created states or
in
it
to
difficult
be
it
refuse
for example, the Macedonian Bulgarians, then would
Irish,
the
for
southern
example
the case of other nationalist movements,
limited
therefore
ideals
These
were
Flemings, Catalans and French Canadians.
J.
Riga
L.
Also
and
170,178;
at
Sharp, `Minorities', pp.
499 Sharp, 'Genie', pp. 14,20,23;
Mitteleuropa
1919:
in
as
Europe
Central
East
Mapping
of
Kennedy, "'The Inquiry" and the
Study
for
the
of
Association
the
Middle America? ' (Unpublished conference paper given at
2006).
March
23-6
York,
New
University,
Columbia
Convention,
World
Nationalities
225
to eastern Europe. 502The fourteen points included many features that might be
considered contrary to self-determination, and they allowed for other priorities in
the drawing of frontiers, including international stability, historical development,
503
frontiers,
defensible
economics,
Above all, for
security and communication.
the Albanian question, Point 11 provided for Serbian access to the sea and
economic independence,
Romanian frontiers (Appendix E). The most likely location for Serbian access to
the sea was in northern Albania, especially before the dissolution of AustriaHungary. Albania was also not listed as one of the Balkan states to be restored
after the First World War. The Albanian question had a further complicating
factor, in that it was covered by the Pact of London (Appendix D). Despite the
supposedly new basis for negotiations, Georges Clemenceau and David Lloyd
George, the French and British Prime Ministers, and the Italians, still adhered to
this, at least when it suited their purposes to do so. As negotiations progressed,
it became clear that Italian claims far exceeded the terms of the 1915
be
Albanian
Thus
the
a combination of national
would
settlement
agreement.
self-determination
the
between
powers.
previous agreements
Preparations
There
were
no
representatives
from Austria
(previously the
five
Of
the
the
(formerly
Russia
opponent).
strongest
or
staunchest advocate)
502 League of Nations, The Complaints of Macedonia: memoranda, petitions, resolutions,
(Geneva,
1919-1939
Nations,
League
the
to
documents,
of
letters
addressed
and
minutes,
1979), pp. 20-1,36-7.
History
Temperley,
13;
of
503Sharp, `Protection of minorities', pp. 177-8; Sharp, `Genie', p.
Peace Conference, I, pp. 399,434.
226
great powers represented in Paris (the United States, British Empire, France,
Italy and Japan), Italy was the most directly interested in the Albanian
question.
504
Since Italy had entered the First World War, Italian policy had
claims in Trentino,
Sonnino,
still
Foreign
Minister,
longer
Albania's
sought
no
Greek
for
the
government,
as
504As the Japanese Delegation took no active part in European discussion their views will not
be considered.
227
grandiose gains elsewhere came to take precedence over less attractive ones
in Albania.
505
French policy was also similar to that in 1913 and, as then, did
not favour the
Albanians.
505Imperiali to Sonnino, 18 Dec. 1918, DDI, Series 6, I, no. 590; 1.J. Lederer, Yugoslavia at the
76;
1963),
London,
Haven
p.
and
Paris Peace Conference. A Study in Frontiermaking (New
135,313-7.
Victory,
Problem',
Mutilated
43-4;
Burgwyn,
`Albanian
pp.
Woodall,
pp.
228
506
final
report
(21 January
It
Albanian
the
question. considered that
recommendations on many aspects of
the problems involved were `so complicated in details, and the proposed
involved,
interests
form,
in
are
and so many
settlements are so experimental
both near and remote, that definite recommendations are felt to be unsafe at
1913
`highly
identified
the
Specific
artificial'
this time'.
with
problems were
boundaries, which cut off economic intercourses, national affiliations and tribal
A
Albanians.
bond
amongst
ties, the latter being considered the strongest
the
the
to
impracticable,
of
weakness
Albania
owing
considered
was
united
508For example Fiftieth Anniversary Book cited in G. Pano, `The Albanian-American Effort to
1
(1995),
Monitor
European
East
South
influence Wilson's policy toward Albania, 1918-1920',
5.
1-8,
P.
at
py.
229
national
affiliation of the
continue to exist; northern Albania, including Scutari, San Giovanni and Alessio
(9,800 square kilometres and 275,000 people) to the Yugoslavs
under a League
of Nations mandate; Valona to Italy (although not in full sovereignty but under
a
restricted League mandate); and in southern Albania, the two key towns,
Argyrocastro
230
The mandatory power was `left open': the authors opposed Italy for
a number of
reasons (past interference in Albania,
Yugoslavia and Greece being the main ones). However, neither Britain
nor the
United States, the only two powers who, according to the
report, would `be
willing to spend their efforts unselfishly', would accept the mandate. Therefore
the Italians should be allowed a temporary mandate limited to Valona, but
much
less than the Consulta wanted,
511
Unlike most Inquiry proposals, these recommendations did not become policy.
By the start of the Peace Conference, the American position had become more
sympathetic
remained
towards Albanian
was the
were
British
the
followed
discussion
that
the
with members of
change
explanations, of
512
The American records for the winter of 1918-19
delegation, seem adequate.
American
between
in
to
policy makers
such conversations
references
are scant
511
231
and junior British officials, who in any case often had their ideas vetoed, and
513
to strengthen
sovereign
states.
when
the
by the creation of
idea of a Balkan
confederation failed, Britain sought to balance Italy in the Adriatic and the
Balkans with a strong Greece and Yugoslavia. Whitehall wanted a strong
Greece, to replace the Ottoman Empire and protect British interests in the
eastern Mediterranean, including the India route and the Straits. Whatever the
higher rationale, the first steps to supporting the selected regional proxy
nationalisms were usually strategic. Greece was chosen for this role because
Venizelos was clearly seen as the key to long-term friendly Anglo-Greek
514
to
Albanians
By
the
maintaining
useful
as
were not viewed
relations.
contrast,
the British interests in the region, and were therefore not supported. Despite its
importance in Middle Eastern policy, religion (specifically the Muslim population)
does not seem to have influenced British policy on Albania and the Balkans.
515
232
Unlike the Inquiry, no central body co-ordinated British peace preparations, but
the
Political
Intelligence
Department
(PID)
soon
became
influential. 516
516Rothwell, British War Aims, pp. 221-8; Calder cited in A. Sharp, `Some Relevant Historians Journal
Australian
of
1918-1920',
Office,
Foreign
the
Department
Intelligence
of
the Political
Politics and History, 34 (1988), pp. 359-68, at p. 365.
Feb.
25
Nicolson,
A.
to
Nicolson
H.
517Memo. on Europe, PID paper 3, FO 371/4353/f23/pc55;
`Some
Sharp,
341;
Greece',
Greater
p.
1919, Peacemaking, pp. 270-1; Goldstein, `Britain and
Without
Peace
Goold,
Dockri'll
and
Relevant Historians', p. 363; Sharp, `Minorities', p. 177;
Promise, p. 93; McKercher, `Old Diplomacy and New, p. 90.
233
their ethnic irredenta 518 However, in Albanian policy, and as Chapters Six
and
.
Seven indicate, the PID does not seem to have been as influential as Goldstein
and others have maintained, primarily because of the Albanian question's interconnectedness with Italian ambitions. Senior colleagues were not prepared to
distance themselves from these plans, because issues that involved great
interests
power
were to be dealt with by the Supreme Council. Eventually, in
December 1919, Lloyd George assumed personal control of British policy. 519
The policy for Albania advocated by Allen Leeper and Harold Nicolson, the two
officials assigned to investigate the Albanian question, did not give such
prominence to self-determination. Leeper and Nico'Ison considered the 1913
settlement obsolete, and they emphasised that the northern commission had
fully
reported. Three ideas were proposed. Firstly, a tri-partite scheme
never
Greece,
London
(north
Yugoslavia,
to
Pact
to
the
to
that
and
south
under
similar
centre to Albania), which was contrary to self-determination and unacceptable
to the Italians. Secondly, leaving the frontiers as in 1913 but allowing the Serbs
Greece
to
Drin
to
the
Montenegrins
to
annex
allowing
river, whilst
advance
and
to
This
too
Voyussa
Drin
between
the
line
selfcontrary
was
rivers.
and
a
favoured
Nicolson
Leeper
Italians.
to
the
determination and unacceptable
and
the third suggestion, which, without allowing changes in the north, would cede
to
be
The
Epirus.
given
remainder would
to Greece a large portion of northern
it
Yugoslav
did
claims,
not satisfy
Italy under a mandate. Although this policy
internal
The
Greeks.
Italians
between
the
and
to
conflict
create
was unlikely
organisation
in
that
to
be
similar
Albania
system,
cantonal
a
would
of
Switzerland,
tribal
and
this
believed
outstanding
they
would reconcile
as
518PID, `South-eastern Europe and the Balkans' minute, Dec. 1918, FO 371/4355/f68/pc68,
Goldstein, `Britain Prepares', pp. 103,174-6,179.
519See Chapter 7, pp. 276-90.
234
and the Corfu channel. Albanian territory was considered a bargaining chip that
could be used to facilitate negotiations with the Italians in areas where British
interests were more directly involved. For this reason, the report concluded by
recommending co-operation between the South-eastern Europe and Middle
Eastern sections, in order to co-ordinate policy relating to Tripoli, Dodecanese,
Anatolia, Abyssinia and Albania. 520 Various other government departments
independently came up with similar proposals to the PID. For instance, the
Department of Military Intelligence (DMI) in the War Office, in September 1918,
under Major Harold Temperley, had proposed a similar scheme, except for a
521
few minor differences regarding the southern boundary.
British policy towards
Albania was therefore determined by a combination of motives: although it
employed
balance
the
be
determinants,
the
to
of
especially
prime
concerns continued
Greece.
power and position of
the
They
positive
appreciated
policy projections.
On
the
them.
hoped
to
Britain
France
on
both
capitalise
and
and
attitudes of
to
the
Italians
the
obstacle
that
main
were
other hand, they were acutely aware
their national ambitions. Woodall
235
concerned with Italy, particularly the danger of Italian influence in the Balkans.
Admittedly, as Woodall and Petsalis-Diomidis argue, Venizelos and the
other
Greek policy makers became fixated on becoming a Mediterranean
power, as
opposed to a Balkan one. They became fanatical with the Megali Idea (Great
Idea) of eastern Mediterranean acquisitions (eastern Thrace, the Dodecanese,
Asia Minor, even Constantinople), and were prepared to compromise over
Albania to achieve them. Greek officials were less concerned than the
Yugoslavs (Serbs especially) by the Italians being granted concessions in
Albania, but there were several calculated reasons for this. During the war, the
focus of Italian interests, except for Valona, had shifted further north, and had
thus become less incompatible with the gains sought by Greece. Venizelos
welcomed the prospect of an Albania under Italian influence, because he
considered that it posed fewer risks than an independent state. Venizelos was
it
be
issues
little
to
that
to
shrewd enough
realise
cost
magnanimous on
such as
hope
Greece
few
interests,
in
Albanian
in
had
the
of greater
an
mandate,
which
limited
the
Greek
to
therefore
provinces of
claims
were
gains elsewhere.
Argyrocastro,
for
Koritza,
primarily
and
be
They
that
these
believed
would
goals
economic and strategic reasons.
in
Italian
help
gains elsewhere
offset potential
attainable, and would also
Greece
522
Epirus,
in
its
In
Albania.
the pursuit of
northern
national ambitions
to
their
Albanians
the
than
southern
claims
and
position
a
stronger
occupied
Albania, because Venizelos had been able to align Greek ambitions more
the
the
great powers.
of
policies
closely with
344;
Greece',
Greater
p.
522Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, pp. 135,137-8; Goldstein, 'Britain and
Woodall, `Albanian Problem', pp. 42-3.
236
position
in the
international
system.
523
The
different
had
priorities.
The different linguistic groupings of the delegation
territorial
of
the
that
restoration
delegates
Montenegrin
Serbian and
maintained
'Jyaocnaeuja,
Mitrovid,
A.
40;
Problem',
523Lederer, Yugoslavia, p. 82; Woodall, 'Albanian
p.
1919Italy
Question
Albanian
and
the
('Yugoslavia,
1919-1939'
I4manuja
17umawe
An6aHCKO
u
1939'), in Mitrovic, Serbs and Albanians, pp. 231-73.
237
the medieval kingdoms, especially the Drin frontier and Scutari, should be the
main targets, and that concessions should be offered to Italy in the northern
Adriatic. The Croat and Slovene members argued that Fiume (an Istrian
port not
provided for by the London Pact, but now sought by the Italians), the Dalmatian
coast and islands, as the home to native Slav populations, should be the
primary focus, at the expense of claims in northern Albania, where ethnic
arguments and self-determination were more questionable. Initially the Serbian
section
held the
upper
hand,
but eventually
the Yugoslav
delegation
524Lederer, Yugoslavia, p. 96; Woodall, `Albanian Problem', p. 41; Swire, Albania, pp. 292-3;
due
to
illustrated
been
raiding
had
terms
frontier
defensible
1913
in
the
deficiencies
The
of
fighting.
perpetual
parties and
238
...
[the]
525
(stronger) great powers and small states to Italian ambitions. This did not bode
Albanian
to
for
Albanian
for
the
receptivity
question or
consideration of
well
have
to
do
delegations
Albanian
initially
the
not seem
various
claims, although
appreciated this.
`official
`Albania'
leaders
and
title
for
the
of
There were many rivals
of
Durazzo
by
the
be
that
constituted
delegation'. The most prominent proved to
Mehmed
(Sunni),
Pasha
Congress (December 1918), and led by Turkhan
239
of Autonomous
Northern
Epirus--a
Greek-inspired
venture
designed to enhance Greek claims. The Albanian community in Kosovo was not
Hasan
Conference,
the
he
to
Although
directly.
attend
was eager
represented
Prishtina was prevented from doing so by his inability to secure a passport.
Prishtina blamed this on the opposition of many Tosk Albanian southerners,
Kosovan
desired
to
Prishtina
Pasha,
Turkhan
restrain
claimed,
who,
above all
lack
the
bemoaned
increasingly
Hasan
official
an
of
pretensions and ambitions.
the
delegation,
Durazzo
the
as
Paris,
`Kosovan' delegate at
especially within
in
Albania
Kosovo
considered
not
to
were
with
reunite
claims
major reason why
527
Paris.
240
themselves what constituted Albania, how it should be run and by whom. As the
Conference progressed, there was a definite widening in the type and variety of
delegations,
disagreement
most
within
emerged
much
and
pursued,
policies
1919.530
in
April
delegation
Durazzo
in
the
in
the
split
clearly
Durazzo
the
the
This study concentrates primarily upon
role and policy of
to
Albanians
the
it
the
came
because
delegation,
closest
was
government
did
delegates
the
formation,
not
late
its
As
`official'
a result of
status.
gaining
drawn
had
they
Paris,
in
separately
before
their
although
together
arrival
meet
the
that
statesmen
believed
power
delegates
great
The
up several proposals.
29
Kola,
Sotir
to
Prishtina
58;
528Prishtina to Sotir Kolese, 11 Jan. 1919, Hasan Prishtina, no.
Kombetare
e
komitetit
i
<Mbojtja
themeltar
Jan. 1919, Hasan Prishtina, no. 59; Programi
Initial
(The
Kadriu
Hoxhe
etj.
Prishtina,
Hasan
i
Kosoves dhe Dibres>
nenshkruar nga
Hasan
by
Dibra',
Kosovo
signed
Defence
and
National
Committee
'The
of
of
programme of the
66.
Prishtina,
Hasan
1920,
),
Aug.
no.
Prishtina, Hoxhe Kadriu etc. 30
241
would act in accordance with Wilsonian principles, and thus support the re-
be respected by
242
533
ethnic rationale, these aspirations had little likelihood of success because they
were so distant from the plans of any of the great powers. Small states tend to
be less successful in their national programmes when they
present extravagant
claims and are disunited, because this makes them seem weaker and less
useful to the great powers. In 1919, the Albanian policies and actions suffered
in both of these ways.
interests.
discussions took place more informally and the presentation of small state
claims occurred through petitions and more low-level meetings, until eventually
the Italians made a bi-lateral agreement (outside the Peace Conference) with
the Greeks. The position of the small states, especially Albania, in this new
international system was therefore little stronger than it had been under the
War.
World
First
before
the
concert system
243
advantageous
geographical
position
made
it coveted
by its
faith,
in
Greek
Orthodox
their
the
clergy using
of
language.
Albanian
in
the
Ottomans,
to
the
collaboration with
prevent education
Turkhan admitted that small numbers of ethnic minorities would have to be
incorporated into any Albanian state, but he bemoaned the fact that a far larger
He
in
1913.
Albania
by
the
had
been
Albanians
created
excluded
number of
Venizelos'
challenged
1914,
in
disturbances
Epirote
the
claims regarding
244
quoting French sources that stated that this was the work of Cretan bands and
Greek troops. Turkhan added that he believed the Greeks were claiming
northern Epirus only to intimidate the Albanians into renouncing their claims on
southern Epirus. Turkhan finished by appealing to the Conference's sentiments
for a `lasting peace', and argued that `in the Balkans, unless the rights of
nationalities are respected' this cannot be achieved. If the Conference, contrary
to these principles, confirmed the dismemberment of Albania as effected in
1878 and 1913, his country would never enjoy the peace necessary for
development,
economic
and there would be continual disturbances of the
frontiers of the Albanian state. Albanian claims before the Greek Committee
Turkhan
240,000
inhabitants,
in
that,
the
stated
of
a similar vein.
continued
212,000 were Albanian and only 16,500 Greek, again far in excess of even the
`was
there
to
claim
He
then
proceeded
most generous great power statistics.
Chameria,
in
Koritza,
that,
district
Greek'
in
town
the
and
of
or
not a single
54,000 out of 60,000 inhabitants were Albanians, despite this region not even
being part of the Committee's remit, as territory ceded to Greece in 1913.535
These interviews were important because they were two rare occasions on
the
to
their
and
to
powers,
great
Albanians
views
present
were allowed
which
the
but
the
of
position
in
the
weak
formal
system,
power
great
role
given a
the
Council
Supreme
In
the
prime ministers and
Albanians is clearly evident.
Albanian
Both
listen.
presentations
to
did
not even show up
presidents
helped
than
hindered
have
to
rather
they
seem
generated a poor reception, and
`hardly
Albanian
were
the
that
claims
Crowe
the nationalist cause.
minuted
fantastic
and
`claims
their
that
are
Nicolson
Harold
added
and
worth reading',
Committee
the
`Minutes
of
535Council of Ten minutes, 24 Feb. 1919, FRUS PPC, pp. 111-16;
608/37/92/l/4/3983
FO
1919,
Feb.
27
Greece',
to
Questions
Relating
Territorial
Study
for the
of
142-3.
Greece,
pp.
Petsa'lis-Diomidis,
Committee
Greek
to
minutes];
[hereafter referred as
245
even the Italians do not propose that Albania should annex what is now Greek
territory'. 536The French delegates objected to hearing the claims because there
were potentially `persons of enemy nationality' amongst the Albanian delegates,
it was questionable whether Turkhan could be considered to govern Albania
and there was no official delegation. The Greek Committee agreed to hear the
Durazzo delegation only on the condition that representatives of northern Epirus
537
heard.
However,
Turkhan's
introduction of the Durazzo delegation
also
were
to the Greek Committee as `a pure representation of the entire people of
Albania' was perhaps most damaging to Albanian national claims, to the
prospect of great power backing and to the potential position of Albania in the
great power system. This statement far exceeded the delegation's authority and
differed significantly from the perceptions of the great power representatives in
538
the room.
These experiences were very different from that of the Greek representatives.
Venizelos had been heard by the Supreme Council three weeks before the
Albanians (3 and 4 February 1919), when the Greek Committee was first
Council,
Supreme
before
the
Turkhan
day
On
the
appeared
when
established.
Committee.
Greek
Epirus
the
to
his
Venizelos presented
claims on northern
Somewhat
ironically,
Nicolson wrote
Venizelos
that
that
speech
of
`is
As
the
lights
His
room.
up
frank,
charm
subtle.
and
genial
overwhelmingly
536H. Nicolson and Crowe minutes, 18 Feb. 1919, FO 608/29/1/2193; Also at Petsalis-Diomidis,
Greece, p. 143.
537Greek Committee minutes, 12 Feb. 1919, FO 371/3593/27947; Greek Committee minutes,
26 Feb. 1919, CAB 29/8/WCP192.
figures
Italian
instance,
For
538Greek Committee minutes, 12 Feb. 1919, FO 371/3593/27947:
Orthodox
61,000
and
inhabitants,
107,000
Albanians
the
favourable
to
were
most
which were
Peacemaking,
pp.
Nicolson,
Greek;
30,000
46,000 Muslim, whilst 77,000 spoke Albanian and
268,273.
246
always he has the triumph of his personality, but no real ice has been cut.'539
More generally Venizelos and the Greeks were better received. Venizelos, the
astute and charismatic politician, was able to charm the Allied leaders in a way
that others could not, and in a way that it seems most Albanians could not
even
envisage. Venizelos
orchestrated
compliments
Venizelos was all too aware of his good reception'541 but personality and
charisma could only get him so far, in accordance with IR theory and the
weakness of small states. This was especially so because Greek ambitions
conflicted with great power interests in many areas. The Greeks divided their
territorial claims into four categories: northern Epirus, the Dodecanese, Thrace
line
Epirus
through
The
Asia
Minor.
to
passing
northern
was
a
claim
and
Chimara, north of Tepelena, west of Voskopoja, to Lake Prespa, to join the
Greek frontier. Venizelos based his claim on the majority of the population being
Greek (120,000 to 80,000 Albanians). He admitted that not all the `Greeks'
boundary
1913
hence
the
Albanian,
Many
Greek.
and
spoke only
spoke
language
basis
the
its
as
had
of
on
solely
census
conducted
commission, which
He
Albanian.
families
Albanian-speaking
the
as
all
proof of nationality, recorded
the
be
taken
language,
as
`neither
that
nor skull' could
race, nor
maintained
539Nicolson, Peacemaking, p. 268; Council of Ten minutes, 3 Feb. 1919, FRUS PPC, III, pp.
859-61.
540Nicolson, Peacemaking, pp. 255-6; Council of Ten minutes, 3 Feb. 1919, FRUS PPC, III, pp.
875.
Iil,
PPC,
FRUS
Ten
Feb.
4
1919,
Council
p.
minutes,
859-61;
of
541See for example Venizelos to Repoulis, 4 Feb. 1919, cited in Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, pp.
137-8.
247
of Autonomous
Committee. They also contested the Albanian claims and reinforced the Greek
ones.
544
542Council of Ten minutes, 3 Feb. 1919, FRUS PPC, III, pp. 859-61.
543Venizelos to Repoulis, 4 Feb. 1919, cited in Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, pp. 137-8.
544Carapanos memo., 29 Jan. 1919, FO 371/3585/33955.
545Council of Ten minutes, 4 Feb. 1919, FRUS PPC, III, p. 875.
248
The Committee met from 12 February until 6 March 1919, and once gain in
November 1919.549 Each of the four powers had two representatives, with
(de
Italian
The
technical experts also attending on occasion.
representatives
the
towards
hostile
Italy's
indicative
Castoldi)
Martino and
attitude
of
were
French
Albania.
in
Italian
importance
Committee, and the
gains
of retaining
the
technical
their
was
expert
`disinterestedness' was also questionable, as
controversial
the
French
the
of
Cambon,
chairman
Leon Krajewsky. Jules
find
`the
to
Committee
the
was
Greek Committee, declared that the purpose of
1944),
(London,
Procedure
546F. S. Marston, The Peace Conference of 1919: Organisation and
138.
Greece,
Petsalis-Diomidis,
Also
p.
at
nn. 111,117;
' Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece, pp. 138-9.
548See Chapter 7, pp. 268-71.
FO
371/3593
FO
and
549For a record of these meetings in the official English translation see
incomplete).
being
latter
CAB
29/8,9
11
(the
set
and
608/37, and also
249
delegations. All three delegations accepted the Greek proposal that the frontier
should start about twenty-five kilometres north of Chimara, at Gramala Bay.
They agreed that territory south of the Voyussa should become Greek, because
the area was essentially Greek in character and because the river was an
important defensive line. The main differences regarded territory north of the
Voyussa. The Americans considered it impossible to divide the region into
in
links
the
Albanian
Greek
to
purely
and
ensure communication
zones and also
to
They
Greeks).
for
(Valona
for
Albanians,
Janina
the
the
prepared
were
region
Premeti,
but
Quaranta
Santa
Argyrocastro,
Delvino
Chimara,
not
and
cede
Leskoviki, Ersek or Koritza. They thus denied Greece about two-thirds of the
250
553
British
it
to
Contrary
area
and French views, and also to Inquiry
claimed.
reports, Clive Day, one of the American representatives, argued that economic
and trade patterns tied Koritza with Valona not Santa Quaranta, and that
strategic considerations were not relevant as another road linking Greece and
Yugoslavia could be buiIt.
554
The British and French proposals ran only a few kilometres north of the
American line until it reached the Voyussa. North of the river, the French
proposed a line running east along the Lengaritsa river, south of Premeti to the
River Osum, and then northeast to join the frontier proposed by Venizelos to the
1913 boundary at Lake Ochrida, which represented about two-thirds of the
territory they claimed but, more importantly, Argyrocastro and Koritza.555The
British did not specify their proposal north of the Voyussa, but they argued that
their line best reflected a compromise between the Greek and Albanian
556
Venizelos'
to
Goldstein
that
As
were
aims
argued, considering
positions.
degree
`received
they
the
of
remarkable
a
maximum possible gains,
achieve
Epirus
true
This
FO'.
from
the
where
northern
of
was especially
support
within
557
British
in
factor
important
The
they were accepted on strategic grounds.
In
the
Anglo-Greek
long-term
be
the
relations.
thinking continued to
position of
to
tangible
Greece
maintain
that
gains
this
term,
achieved
meant ensuring
short
the
`I
that
Venizelos in power. Harold Nicolson noted
need not elaborate
553Appendices A,
Petsalis-Diomidis,
northern section,
speaking Albanian
s5peakers.
371/3593/34810;
FO
1919,
Feb.
18
Committee
C,
Greek
B and
minutes,
in
the
language
deficiencies
statistics
of
Greece, p. 140: Admitting the
115,000
to
inhabitants
Greek-speaking
the Americans estimated 5,000
Albanian50,000
to
Greek-speakers
35,000
in
the
section
southern
and
251
Greece
itself
and
general
Entente
interests
in
the
eastern
Mediterranean'.558
The Italians proposed a very different frontier that was largely based
on the
1913 Florence protocol (and contrary to the 1915 Pact of London). De Martino
and Castoldi argued that their proposal represented the `best approach' to a just
division between the two nationalities, based on both ethnical and other
considerations. Using statistics very different from those provided by Venizelos,
de Martino criticised the significance of both the religious and language tests.
He argued that, because of the lack of Albanian schools, many people had to
learn Greek and this was not indicative of nationality, whilst the massacring of
the Muslim population before and during the First World War meant that religion
far
from
was also
satisfactory. Castoldi cited economic factors in support of the
Italian scheme. He argued that the regions north and south of the Voyussa
Quaranta
their
Santa
be
both
dependent
as
upon
could not
were
separated, as
559
the
He
that
line
question
considered
of communication.
natural sea outlet and
Adriatic,
in
interests
the
from
Italian
inseparable
Albania
and
was
of southern
560
Corfu
the
the
straits.
neutralisation of
above all the necessity of maintaining
The Italian representatives compromised little in the ensuing debates, and this
Adriatic
Consulta's
in
the
Albania
general
clearly showed the importance of
the
southern
Italians
of
point
the
In
starting
any
opposed
policy.
particular,
further
kilometres
south
boundary north of Cape Stylos (approximately sixty
by
the
ambassadors
being
the
than the other three proposed and
point agreed
558H. Nicolson to Crowe, 15 Mar. 1919, FO 608/37/92/1/1/4392.
559'Italian Proposal', Greek Committee minutes, 18 Feb. 1919, FO 371/3593/34810.
in
1919,
Feb.
18
cited
560Fuller minute, 20 Feb. 1919, FO 608/29/1657; Laroche memo.,
the
accept
Greeks
probably
the
would
believed
Laroche
Greece,
141:
Petsatis-Diomidis,
p.
base.
Corfu
the
Greek
of
favoured
control
Admiralty
but
British
the
the
coastline
neutralisation of
252
economic factors. They argued that geography (sea, mountains, and Prespa
and Ochrida lakes) favoured the 1913 frontier, whereas to its north there was no
natural obstacle, which would make the rest of Albania (Italian-controlled)
vulnerable to Greek assaults. Castoldi maintained that the fertile territory of
southern
Albania,
particularly
the
561
253
of
...
'563
The Albanian question next came up for discussion on 24,26 and 27 February
1919, when the committee heard the Greek, Albanian and northern Epirote
in
been
how
It
has
the
already
great power audience
representatives.
shown
the Greek committee seemed biased towards the Greek representatives, and
that Venizelos was much more adept at currying favour with the great power
Greek
hostility
to
Italian
by
Venizelos
But
claims,
was concerned
statesmen.
the
being
Chimara
the
of
his
inability
part
to
considered
coast
prevent
and
Adriatic
question.
He therefore
1300
by
Greek
square
claims
reduced
the
195,000
made
kilometres
kilometres to 5138 square
people, which
and
that
hoped
He
French
from
the
Greek claims only marginally different
proposal.
`Albanians'
28,516
and
in
only
`generous'
reality affected
offer, which
such a
by
Italian
help
opposition,
offset
1,157 `Greeks', would show Greek goodwill and
254
Before the Greek Committee next discussed the Albanian question (4 March),
Nicolson worked with Krajewsky and Laroche from the French delegation to
prepare a joint Franco-British proposal. The major problem remained Koritza.
Nicolson remained unconvinced by French arguments of its necessity as a road
connection, but Laroche refused to allow it to become Albanian. He argued that
the establishment of Italy as the mandatory power in Albania, and therefore
across the only line of communication between Monastir and Santa Quaranta,
from
is
his
Serbia
Greece.
It
drive
between
clear
would
a permanent wedge
and
diary that
Nicolson
was torn
between
`Albanianness' of Koritza, the strategic necessities of maintaining GrecoSerbian communication, and British mistrust of Italian intentions. Nicolson wrote
`it is terribly bad luck on Albania, who has Italy imposed upon her as a
because
down
frontiers
her
of
none
then
merely
cut
gets
mandatory power, and
255
565
As
in
1913,
trust
Italy
Balkans'.
in
the
us
great power rivalry and interests
decisive.
In the end, Harold Nicolson's
persistently predominated and were
moral concerns were overruled by Crowe's desire to bolster Greece with a
settlement
When they met on 4 March 1919, the positions of the American, French and
British delegations had changed and all to Greek advantage, with opposition to
Italy the major motivation, but they still lacked consensus. The Americans were
further
frontier,
but
The
Greece
Voyussa
to
the
north.
nothing
grant
prepared
British now proposed a line that closely resembled the French suggestion. The
French also advocated further Greek gains, above all the town of Premeti
because it connected Santa Quaranta and Janina. The discussion again failed
the
two
There
definite
one
on
decide
votes:
to
were
recommendation.
upon a
it,
in
the
that
the
effect
Voyussa'
of
`up to the
north
second on
proposal, and
by
three
first
The
Franco-British
accepted
was
American and the
proposals.
two-two
The
a
Italians
the
produced
second
to
objecting.
with
one,
votes
No
Italians.
the
was
progress
time
deadlock, with the Americans this
with
siding
made,
and
so
recommendations:
the
final
report
(8
March
1919)
contained
three
the
American
variant over
the
Franco-British,
with
the
to
to
separate
a
Crowe
relegate
Italian,
managed
Koritza and the
which
to
it
was
567
Committee,
responsibility
Territorial
Central
whose
The
annex.
256
collate the reports of the various territorial committees, also failed to agree
and
so confined itself to reiterating the views of their respective representatives
on
the Greek Committee. 568During the Greek Committee, geo-politics
superseded
self-determination with the result that there was little movement from the original
great-power positions.
French
in
the
differences
and
the
interesting
includes
Petsalis-Diomidis
146-7:
of
account
an
pp.
did
Italian
the
proposal
Committee's
English versions of the Greek
recommendations and why
final
in
the
version.
appear
not
568Central Committee on Territorial Questions minutes, 17 March 1919, FO 371/3593/4244;
29/13/WCP630;
CAB
d.,
Greece',
Committee
`Central
n.
Also at CAB 29/10/WCP370;
report on
C.
P.
608/92/1/4/5868;
FO
1919,
22
Apr.
Central Committee report, 31 Mar. 1919 and
Conference
Peace
the
Empire
Ottoman
Sevres:
The
the
Paris
to
at
Helmreich, From
partition of
Ohio,
1974),
86-7.
(Columbus,
1919-20
pp.
of
257
their proposals neither realistic nor practical, given the changing international
climate.
569
than
I
even
am myself',
made a number of naive
suggestions based on ethnic principles, but not ones that either his superiors or
the other powers' representatives would accept. It appears that Barnes held the
misguided conception that the Conference `seriously desired to constitute an
Albania capable of surviving as an independent self-respecting State '.570For
instance, on 25 April he proposed that Valona be given to Italy under a twentyone year mandate, and that the rest of Albania be given as a personal mandate
to the Italian Duke of Abruzzi, under the League of Nations, with Abruzzi as
High Commissioner and the title mpret! Barnes contended that this arrangement
satisfied the competing geographical, economic, cultural and ethnographic
interests. It would maintain a non-partitioned Albania, including Koritza and
eventually Valona, which the Americans would support, it would preserve Italian
interests by means of the prince, and also benefit Greece and Serbia because
571
Italian
there would be no outright
mandate.
Nicolson was more mindful of the wider British interests at stake. He proposed,
however, a number of curious schemes designed to fulfil different priorities. In
Corfu
1914
based
the
devised
he
protocol:
March),
(27
on
agreement
an
one
the disputed
areas would
258
far
the
from
that
He
scheme
was
mandatory power.
perfect, as there
admitted
was the prospect of the Greeks obtaining the upper hand and voting for union
with Greece, but at least it maintained Greek strategic control of Koritza, and
572
Another, equally implausible
partially offset Italian objections to annexation.
scheme (28 May 1919), but for different reasons, involved a tri-partitioned
Albania:
northern
Albania
would
become
an autonomous
state
under
574
delegation
British
because
the
little
remained
ideas
All these
success
met with
that
it
obvious
its
was
divided over
priorities and commitments, although
Hardinge)
Crowe
Balfour,
(especially
were
and
Nicolson and Barnes' superiors
less
sympathetic
to Albanian
nationalist
claims
and
an un-partitioned
factor
been
had
Koritza
that
a significant
independent state. It was appreciated
for
`strategic
security'
but
it
necessary
in Albanian nationalism,
was considered
his
ideas,
575
himself
about
Nicolson
concerned
Greece.
to
was
it
for
to go
territorial
connection
have
a
May,
28
provided
those
would
which
of
especially
Also
608/37/4392;
FO
1919,
Mar.
572Nicolson minute, `Settlement on South Eastern Europe', 27
88;
Sevres,
to
Paris
p.
Helmreich,
290,314;
Peacemaking,
Nicolson,
pp.
at FO 608/46/8/5605;
347-8.
Greece',
Greater
pp.
`Britain
Goldstein,
and
62-3;
Problem',
`Albanian
pp.
Woodall,
1919,
May
28
and
`Albania',
Nicolson
H.
memo.
573 Nicolson, Peacemaking, pp. 348-50;
608/29/1/11124.
FO
1919,
May
29
Balfour,
Hardinge
Crowe,
by
and
minutes
574Goldstein, 'Britain and Greater Greece', pp. 348-9.
575See for example Temperley minute, 28 Apr. 1919, FO 608/29/1/8333
259
between the Italian zone and the `Bulgarian' (Macedonian) part of Serbia. 576
Generally,
the
British
delegation
persisted
in
supporting
ethnic
self-
base
to
their policies but an anti-Italian stance was
on what
Anglo-American
these
Conference
the
Developments within
complicated
wider
in
Clemenceau
George,
Lloyd
particular,
and,
initiatives further, by making
6
April
24
to
From
Albania.
Wilson more hostile to Italian ambitions, including
260
May 1919, the Italian Prime and Foreign Ministers left Paris, protesting
at the
reluctance of the Conference to consider Italy's claims and Wilson's direct
appeal to the Italian people to accept his fourteen points as the basis of the
579
Wilson's mounting opposition to the Italians, especially Sonnino,
settlement.
he
held personally responsible for blocking resolution of the outstanding
whom
issues, had profound implications on his attitudes towards Albania, and above
all his doubts as to whether Italy should receive the mandate. In a meeting with
Cienenceau and Lloyd George on 6 May 1919, and in what constitutes one of
Wilson's few direct references to the Albanian question, Wilson remained
adamant that the Albanians should become independent and argued against
Lloyd George's concerns about their unity. 580
The rest of the American delegation was less convinced. According to Woodall,
Day expressed support for the Italian mandate plan to his American colleagues,
but, reiterated Wilson's refusal to partition Albania due to Wilsonian ideology
London
Pact,
in
to
the
imperialism,
the
Italian
to
as eulogised
and opposition
European delegations. He considered an Italian mandate within the 1913
frontiers as the most feasible plan to gain consensus from all the powers,
for
Greece
district
to
Argyrocastro
the
he
preferred giving
although personally
581
For Day and other American delegates, political questions
`national reasons,.
They
therefore
than
important
rationale.
about small states were generally more
Italian
facilitate
help
to
in
Albania,
designs
Italian
to
became more sympathetic
the
(the
Dalmatia
scheme
Trentino
of
Fiume,
opposite
and
concessions on
579P. Mantoux, `Introduction' to P. Mantoux (ed. ), (trans. A. S. Link), The Deliberations of the
Delegation
German
the
to
of
Delivery
the
Notes
28,1919):
24-June
of
Council of Four (March
2
Wilson,
Woodrow
Papers
vols.
to
the
Volume
of
Supplementary
Peace:
the Preliminaries of
370-87.
Italy,
Albrecht-Carrie,
pp.
1955),
jPrinceton,
esp. xxii-xxix;
Also
150;
Greece,
at
Petsalis-Diomidis,
p.
80 Council of Four minutes, FRUS PPC, V, p. 483;
Woodall, 'Albanian Problem', pp. 66-7
Commission,
American
414),
(M820,
3-13
581Day to Wilson, 22 May 1919,186.3411/18, pp.
r.
71-3.
`Albanian
Problem',
Woodall,
256;
RG
pp.
DOS,
261
582
by
In essence, in spite of Wilson's pledges to remove
Mezes).
envisaged
such trade bargaining from international politics, his own officials were equally
willing to play the bartering game that had been such a typical feature of old
diplomacy.
Although his advisers, including House and Johnson, emphasised the need to
be conciliatory on the Albanian question, because of the wider Adriatic and
Balkan concerns, Wilson remained adamant that Albania should not be used as
a pawn and that, possibly, even at this early stage, self-determination should be
applied. During his return voyage to the United States, he cabled Robert
Lansing, Secretary of State, who now headed the American delegation:
I meant before leaving to express to you and my other colleagues my
very profound interest in the fortunes of Albania. I am fearful lest midst
the multitude of other things that might seem more pressing and
important, due consideration of those rights should be overlooked. I beg
583
that you will be very watchful concerning them.
Woodall suggested that Wilson's concern came too late,
584
but it proved
Albanian
Conference,
the
half
the
in
the
Admittedly,
of
second
significant.
Adriatic
the
but
independently
wider
of
as part
question was not considered
question,
given
nevertheless
the
Wilson's
ascendancy
attitudes
of
political
and strategic
issues, but
Wilson
borders,
its
independence
Albanian
and
decision on the question of
inadvertently ensured that by the time that a sufficiently stable, organised and
RG
DOS,
Commission,
American
556),
582Day to Wilson, 22 May 1919,875.00/181 (M820, r.
Nicolson,
102;
Sevres,
to
Paris
p.
256; Woodall, `Albanian Problem', pp. 71-3, Helmreich,
424-7.
Italy,
Albrecht-Carrie,
284-5;
pp.
Peacemaking, pp.
DOS,
Commission,
American
556),
583Wilson to Lansing, 30 June 1919,875.00/209 (M820, r.
RG 256; Woodall, 'Albanian Problem', p. 73.
584Woodall, `Albanian Problem', pp. 73-4.
262
587
denationalisation.
585For further details on the Congress of Lushnje, see Chapter 8, esp. pp. 313-7.
Sevres,
to
Paris
Heimreich,
pp.
586H. Nicolson memo., 4 July 1919, FO 608/120/3112/17010;
the
known
have
to
of
delegations
appear
1919
the
August
1
power
By
great
other
164-5:
in
`bandwagonned'
support.
agreement and
Woodall,
134;
L'Albania,
Pastorelli,
10;
p.
Lamb to Clerk, 20 June 1919, DBFP, IV, no.
152.
Greece,
Petsalis-Diomidis,
135-7,
p.
Problem',
pp.
`Albanian
263
In this climate, Nitti was eager to come to a direct arrangement with the Greeks,
which could in turn be presented to the Allies as a fait accompli on southern
Albania. Such an idea had been mooted by Venizelos before the Conference
(December 1918), but Sonnino had ruled it out. In any event, Venizelos had
been encouraged to play a waiting game, because Phil-Hellenes persuaded him
that he would gain more of northern Epirus at the bargaining tables because of
British
and
French
588
By the
support.
agreement (19 July 1919), the Consulta agreed to support Greek claims, as
defined by the Franco-British line in the Greek committee, to northern Epirus
(Clause 2), including Argyrocastro and Koritza, and the Greek government
agreed to an Italian mandate over Albania, Italian sovereignty of Valona,
neutralisation of the Corfu straits, and demilitarisation of northern Epirus to
twenty-five
kilometres
basic
(Valona)
but
involve
the
to
the
of
most
abandonment
of
all
appeared
Italian interests in southern Albania. It was a pragmatic policy. By securing
interests
Italian
Corfu
the
were safeguarded
strategic
straits,
neutralisation of
but without the costs of occupation. In private, it was much easier to abandon
importantly,
More
favour
in
the new supposed ethnic rationale
of realpolitik.
Italy
but
Minor,
in
Asia
for
Italian
also
Greek
Tittoni gained
ambitions
support
there
Italian
if
Minor
Asia
in
not
were
freedom
full
ambitions
of action
secured
this
determine
free
to
left
was so
Consulta
or
not
fully satisfied, with the
whether
the
blunder,
diplomatic
of
Greek
none
although
(Clause 7). This was a major
It
it.
Venizelos,
undid
realised
Greek delegates, including the usually astute
Minor
Asia
in
designs
up
Italian
came
most of the settlement, especially as
Paris
to
Helmreich,
788;
6,
I,
Series
588Bonin Longere to Sonnino, 6 Jan. 1919, DDI,
no.
134-5.
Problem',
`Albanian
pp.
in
Woodall,
Sevres, pp. 42-3; Bianchiari and Sonnino cited
264
589
confident to be able to focus his attention on northern Albania and the northern
Adriatic, without the distraction of questions in southern Albania. It
also gave the
Consulta time to court the Albanians, and to work out
an agreement with their
Allies on northern Albania and the Adriatic, and possibly
even Asia Minor.
Tittoni soon reduced his support for Greek gains in northern Epirus, in
an
attempt to offset American objections to Italy gaining the port of Fiume. As early
as 3 September 1919, Tittoni would argue that the Greeks should not be
allowed to occupy Koritza following the French evacuation, because the
Albanians would not accept it, and that its status should be determined by
590
In the second half of 1919, the question of southern Albania was
plebiscite.
considered
only sporadically,
problem.
Conclusions
Realist theory predicts that small states will favour a weaker coalition to balance
the international system, but, as Chapter Five shows, this did not occur during
591
Meanwhile, the great powers during periods of conflict
the First World War.
favour the smaller states, but rarely the smallest, to tip the balance in their
favour. After the war, the new great power hegemon in the Adriatic (Italy)
its
its
favour
in
to
destabilising
the
to
strength
preserve
system
sought
continue
and stability
in comparison
(Greece
and
states
589 Wallace
Council of Heads of Delegations minutes, 3 Sept. 1919, FRUS PPC, VIII, p. 77; Italian
Diary,
20;
Miller,
XX,
400-1.
IV,
DBFP,
no.
pp.
memo.
591See for example Schroeder, `Historical reality', pp. 108-48.
265
266
CHAPTER 7:
The Peace Conference of Paris II:
the problem of northern Albania and the Adriatic
On 4 July 1919, Harold Nicolson wrote to the Foreign Secretary that Albanian
territory should no longer be used `as an item in the general give-and-take of an
Adriatic settlement'. 592 His wishes were not to be realised. As in 1913, the
northern Albanian question proved even more controversial than the southern
It
problem. has already been shown how the southern question impinged on the
Adriatic
wider
questions, especially in relation to Italian interests. This chapter
shows that all the great powers, even the Americans, considered the northern
Albanian problem as a subsidiary component of the larger Adriatic problem. The
problem of northern Albania was closely tied up with the balances of power in
the Balkans and the Adriatic, especially Italian ambitions and rivalry with the
Yugoslavs,
Conference
formal
inside
diplomacy
both
the
and outside
as
became much less Wilsonian and more realpolitik. In these discussions, two
distinct phases are evident. From March 1919 to January 1920, when the
Adriatic
the
Albania
of
was considered as a subsidiary part
question of northern
for
the
there
nationalism.
or
ethnic
small
states
place
no
was
and
question,
became
more
1920,
March
From January to
ethnic and national considerations
By
deliberations.
the
to
invited
to
important, and the Yugoslavs were
contribute
Albanian
the
the
removal of
March 1920, Wilson had managed to secure
Albanian-centred
one.
the
Adriatic
of
an
from
the
revival
question, and
problem
Albanian
to
the
In discussions on the northern Albanian problem, reference
indicative
sporadic,
and
superficial
was
self-determination
national question and
608/28/6/18300.
FO
d.,
Nicolson,
H.
to
592H. Nicolson to Balfour, 4 July 1919, and Balfour
n,
267
in
international
the
its
low
of
system. The Albanians
status and weak position
were neither consulted nor allowed to present their claims. Consideration of the
Adriatic question has been explored extensively. 593 For the purpose of this
study, it is necessary to focus on those aspects that had an impact upon the
Albanian question or questions.
jurisdiction
had
who
the
illustrate
they
because
illuminating
particular
these
are
exchanges
unfruitful,
being
In
Conference.
Peace
during
the
Albanian
the
small state
weakness of
to
deemed
been
had
Albania
equivalent
for
status
mandate
considered suitable
the
deliberations
These
reflect
also
state.
a colony or previously none existent
Italian
the
that
illustrate
They
Adriatic.
primary
in
the
balance
of power
changing
from
Austrian
former
zone)
interests in Albania had moved northwards (to the
Albania.
in
base
traditional
their
southern
Council
Supreme
the
to
their
delegation
claims
When the Yugoslav
presented
with
Italian
starting
objections,
(18 February 1919), this generated a series of
territorial
by
dealt
be
a
with
issues
not
that
could
Albania,
such
northern
Victory,
Mutilated
pp.
Burgwyn,
Yugoslavia;
593See for instance Albrecht-Carrie, Italy, Lederer,
243-312.
268
the territorial
594
recommendations, these matters had still not been resolved and the issue was
causing problems for the territorial committees. As some members of the
territorial committees appreciated, there was the possibility of a three way
paradox: the Greek Committee was to consider Greek claims to Albania, the
Romanian Committee Yugoslav ones and the Supreme Council Italian ones.
595
for
the
the
instead
under
Albania,
allowed
`independent'
small protectorate
of
London
He
1917.
in
`unauthorised'
larger
one proclaimed
Pact, or the
maintained
that
the enlargement
of Yugoslavia
Greece,
and the
and
it
longer
that
in
Macedonia,
frontier
no
was
meant
their
common
continuation of
These
Albania.
in
to
these
gains
for
make
states
necessary, or advisable,
Sir
delegates.
British
French
the
by
and
received
arguments were very poorly
Italians
the
that
indignantly
suggested
delegates,
British
the
Eyre Crowe, one of
Ten
18
Council
852-55;
minutes,
of
III,
PPC,
FRUS
pp.
1919,
Feb.
594Council of Ten minutes, 1
44-57.
IV,
PPC,
FRUS
pp.
Feb. 1919,
3
Mar.
1919,
Romania
to
minutes,
Relating
Questions
Territorial
595Committee for the Study of
74-5.
Albania,
Southern
pp.
Stickney,
264;
p.
Peacemaking,
Nicolson,
CAB 29/9/WCP225;
269
only used the Pact when it suited their purposes but otherwise ignored it. He
went further proposing, that in light of these `changed circumstances', there
should be a thorough re-evaluation of the whole of the 1915 Pact of London,
which he knew the Italians could not accept, for fear of losing their other
596
The
Supreme
Council's decision on this matter was a
promised acquisitions.
strange one: questions that were explicitly vital to Italy were reserved to the
Supreme Council, including consideration of the northern Albanian boundary
and whether Albania should become independent; the southern boundary did
fall
into
for
this
not
category and was suitable
consideration by the Greek
597
The decisions regarding Albanian independence and the northern
committee.
boundary issue had been deferred, but they were considered inextricably linked
to the wider Adriatic problem.
Between March and July 1919, a number of proposals were put forward which
598
One of the most significant was
incorporated the problem of northern Albania.
It
its
May
1919),
(28
Plan
known as the Tardieu
author. was one of
named after
Council
before
the
be
to
Albanian
of
the
put
the few schemes covering
question
Fiume,
including
State'
`Free
the
Four. its central feature was
creation of a
Albanian
The
Yugoslavia.
Italy
between
buffer
and
a
as
act
which would
be
been:
had
would
mandate
than
a
ones
previous
clauses were more specific
to
frontier
southern
a
from
the
northern
Italy,
present
stretching
given to
be
to
constructed
Conference;
was
by
the
railroad
a
determined
boundary to be
Yugoslav,
forty
Italian
percent
forty
capital,
(with
Albania
percent
in northern
6
Committee
Greek
minutes,
596Greek Committee minutes, 4 Mar. 1919, CAB 29/9/WCP263;
Petsalis608/38/13/3967;
FO
1919,
Mar.
6
Crowe
minute,
Mar. 1919, CAB 29/9/WCP244;
Diomidis, Greece, pp. 145-6.
11
Ten
Council
minutes,
of
29/91WCP244;
CAB
1919,
597Greek Committee minutes, 6 Mar.
326.
IV,
PPC,
FRUS
p.
1919,
Mar.
Lederer,
162-4,172-4,510-4;
Italy,
pp.
Albrecht-Carrie,
in
598Johnson memo., 8 May 1919,
66-8.
Problem',
pp.
`Albanian
Woodall,
208-10;
Yugoslavia, pp.
270
and twenty percent from other sources) for use by the Yugoslavs. Interestingly,
there was no mention of Valona going to Italy in full sovereignty, indicating that
it was believed Italian interests there would be sufficiently served by possession
of the mandate.
As with
other
599
proposals,
American
objections
American delegation, Wilson especially, seem to have been concerned that the
Albanians were not ready for self-government. However, the State Department
were also concerned about the alternative idea of a mandate scheme. Wilson
Italian
intentions
was suspicious of
regarding Albania, but saw no practical
alternative because none of the other three great powers desired the mandate
themselves. It was also unlikely that the Consulta would agree to another great
for
Wilson
time
do,
Unsure
to
having
the
and
played
what
mandate.
power
600
Appreciating that American
declined to comment on the Albanian clauses.
Adriatic
in
for
delay
the
the
the
question,
settling
prime reason
objections were
Frank Polk, the Under Secretary of State and Head of the American Delegation
following Wilson and Lansing's departure, advocated a more flexible position on
Italian
to
be
Americans
the
more sympathetic
Albania. He proposed that
should
Wilson-601
by
his
compromised
Nevertheless
persistently
was
stance
claims.
half
in
the
of
second
These difficulties would become even more pronounced
Albanian
for
the
important
question.
be
They
Conference.
particularly
the
would
Italy,
Albrecht-Carrie,
pp.
78-82;
VI,
PPC,
FRUS
599Council of Four minutes, 28 May 1919,
pp.
68-90.
Italy,
Albrecht-Carrie,
pp.
y,
78-82;
VI,
PPC,
FRUS
pp.
1919,
May
28
Four
minutes,
of
188-90.
RG
DOS,
Termination,
US
425),
(M367,
r.
601Polk to Lansing, 14 Aug. 1919,763.72119/6176
256.
271
question,
Tittoni
proposed
three
different
schemes,
604
The second plan (15 September) was introduced as
would be reconstituted.
an alternative,
272
Italians feared might not support their claims. Two changes affected Albania.
There was no mention of Greek claims to southern Albania,
and Yugoslavia
605
be
to
denied
both
territory
The third plan (8 October),
was
and railway rights.
presented by Vittorio Scialoga, then Tittoni's deputy but soon to become his
replacement, included the Fiume Free State, but in return demanded three
further concessions:
protectorate over Zara (a port which like Fiume was situated in a predominantly
ethnically Slav area, but with many Italians in the town); and an island near
Fiume.
606
These three proposals were indicative of the changing priorities of the Italian
government, its domestic problems, the opposition of the other great powers
and, in part, the resistance to an Italian occupation in Albania and other
607
difficulties
The
largest
places.
Italian
from
the
of
stemmed
activities
Fiume
had
led
Gabriel
D'Annunzio,
on
a successful raid on
who
nationalist poet
12 September 1919, and now governed the town. Designed to help Italian
became
in
Italian
the
very vocal
who
press,
nationalist claims and well received
in its demands that the Italian government must keep the town, it complicated
days
three
took
As
the
the position of the Italian negotiators.
place only
coup
Italian
the
that
it
Adriatic
the
appeared
plan,
second
of
presentation
after
in
their
been
had
earlier
the
genuine
not
and
move
government supported
conciliatory
608
The
overtures.
impact
on the American
delegation was
Heads
Council
49;
of
248,
of
Italy,
605Council minutes, 15 Sept. 1919, Albrecht-Carrie,
no.
p.
1919,
Aug.
29
Italian
224-5;
VIII,
memo.,
pp.
Delegations minutes, 15 Sept. 1919, FRUS PPC,
DBFP, IV, no. 20; Miller, Diary, XX, pp. 400-1.
Problem',
'Albanian
Woodall,
in
Polk
606Crowe to Curzon, 11 Oct. 1919, DBFP, IV, no. 78;
cited
DBFP,
1919,
June
20
Clerk,
to
Lamb
6154-5.
07On Albanian resistance to the Italians see for example
311-18.
8,
Chapter
details,
pp.
further
esp.
see
IV, no. 10. For
RG
DOS,
Termination,
US
608Polk to Lansing, 31 Aug. 1919,763.72119/6458 (M367, r. 429),
224-5;
VIII,
PPC,
FRUS,
pp.
1919,
Sept.
15
Delegations
Heads
minutes,
of
256; Council of
273
American delegation and other great powers to get his support for their ideas
to
settle the Adriatic question on this basis. Admittedly, however, Wilson's major
concession of the Italian mandate for Albania was conditional upon Italian
acceptance of the Fiume Free State, which the Consulta could not accept,
609
following
September.
12
As a result of the great-power interests in
especially
these interrelated questions, settlement of the Albanian question on these
grounds was not possible, despite Wilson finally, albeit reluctantly, accepting
the idea of an Italian mandate for Albania. As with Albanian nationalist initiatives
Italian ones could also be detrimental to the nationalist cause.
Most of the American delegation, including for the first time Douglas Johnson,
although still not Wilson, seem to have agreed that the Albanians were not
for
ready
self-government, but that they were a distinct nationality who were
worthy of it at some point in the future. In order to foster that eventually, a single
Albania was preferable to a partitioned one, and Italy was the only power
Therefore,
implication
by
the
the
to
take
responsibility.
mandate, and
prepared
the
to
influence
tighten
Americans
to
their
it,
the
than
use
ought
rather
oppose
RG
256;
DOS,
Termination,
US
436),
(M367,
r.
Wilson to Polk, 21 Sept. 1919,763.72119/6865
147.
Italy,
Albrecht-Carrie,
145-53;
p.
Problem',
pp.
Miller, Diary, XX, p. 403; Woodall, `Albanian
609Phillips to Polk, 14 Sept. 1919,186.3411/808 (M820, r. 436), American Commission, DOS,
US
Termination,
433),
(M367,
1919,763.72119/6833a
r.
RG 256; Wilson to Polk, 14 Sept.
Termination,
US
436),
(M367,
1919,763.72119/6865
r.
DOS, RG 256; Wilson to Polk, 21 Sept.
Polk
224-5;
VIII,
PPC,
FRUS
cited
pp.
Delegations
Heads
Council
minutes,
DOS, RG 256;
of
of
in Woodall, `Albanian Problem', pp. 148,151-3.
274
Whilst Wilson's
reservations
611
later
date.
The British and French representatives therefore
considered at a
attempted to facilitate
a compromise
positions. The idea that was most favoured by the European great powers
seems to have been a scheme whereby Italy would gain Valona in full
sovereignty and the Albanian mandate. The southern frontier would be as
proposed by the American Delegate on the Greek Committee (Argyrocastro to
Greece, Koritza to Albania), which incidentally went against new Italian policy in
the Tittoni-Venizelos agreement. Yugoslavia would not be given any territory,
Valley-a
Drin
build
in
the
the
to
only
and operate a railroad
right
concession to
both Yugoslavia and France. After consultation with Johnson, the European
Fiume
that
the
to
city should go
suggestions
eliminate
proposal was modified
latter
The
Greece.
to
Epirus
Italy,
that
to
should go
northern
and
unequivocally
Tittonithe
it
Italians,
though
by
to
the
contradicted
even
clause was agreed
612
The Italian representatives were willing to renege on
Venizelos agreement.
610Crowe to Curzon, 13 Oct. 1919, DBFP, IV, no. 80; Polk to Lansing, 10 Sept. 1919,
1919,
14
Aug.
Lansing,
to
Polk
256;
763.72119/6669 (M367, r. 430), US Termination, DOS, RG
238.
Yugoslavia,
Lederer,
256;
p.
RG
DOS,
763.72119/6176 (M367, r. 425), US Termination,
RG
DOS,
Termination,
US
611Polk to Lansing, 31 Aug. 1919,763.72119/6458 (M367, r. 429),
145.
Problem',
`Albanian
p.
Woodall,
256; Miller Diary, )(X, p. 403; Polk cited in
612Crowe to Curzon, 13 Oct. 1919, DBFP, IV, no. 80
275
their pledge to the small state, in pursuit of its wider interests; having
the
support of at least two great powers made this all the easier.
British
the
Head
Balfour
had
of
as
The position of Crowe, who
succeeded
Office
Foreign
the
differing
Delegation, was also complicated by the
views of
to
614
a
the
achieve
George,
Lloyd
was
For
Minister.
strategy
Prime
crucial
and
long
as
the
as
As
settlement,
of
areas
other
with
possible.
as
quickly
as
solution
Woodall,
169-70;
L'Albania,
pp.
613Crowe to Curzon, 11 Oct. 1919, DBFP, IV, no. 78; Pastorelli,
'Albanian Problem', pp. 154-5.
DBFP,
1919,
Nov.
12
Crowe,
Curzon
to
614Crowe to Curzon, 10 Nov. 1919, DBFP, IV, no. 119;
121.
IV,
DBFP,
1919,
Nov.
13
no.
Curzon,
IV, no. 120; Crowe to
276
British interests were not affected, he did not concern himself with the details
or
the (in)justice of the case. For the Prime Minister, the Albanian
problem was
part of the much larger dispute over the division of Ottoman territory. He was
by
desire
to gain Italian goodwill over British policy in the Adriatic, in
motivated
a
order to gain what he considered much-needed Italian support for British
interests in Asia Minor. Thus the marginal issue of Albania, and other issues in
the Adriatic, where British interests were minimal (other than naval and
Mediterranean ones), were expendable in order to foster goodwill on issues
British
interests were greater. The Foreign Office pursued a different
where
agenda. It persisted in seeking a permanent peace based on the balance of
power. Allen Leeper was therefore instructed to work for an arrangement with
the Americans on this basis. He determined that Wilson was prepared to accept
the Italian mandate over Albania, but that only a very small area around Valona
for
the
Italy
directly,
the
be
to
to
needs
of
economic
able
go
sufficient
would
town and its security.
615
277
15'),
41
privileges of
and
arbitrarily as north of parallel
transport. The right to control the development of the Boyana River was to be
Yugoslavia
it
to
delegate
to
Nations,
in
League
the
either
with power
of
vested
617
or Italy.
Clemenceau,
George
Lloyd
leaders,
who
French
and
However, the British and
the
departure
the
of
had both taken personal control of the negotiations, used
November
the
following
middeteriorating
Americans and Wilson's
position,
to
They
further.
satisfy
sought
these
to
arrangements
terms, to attempt
modify
Yugoslav
Albanian
ones,
and
the
Greek
of
expense
both Italian and
claims at
IV,
DBFP,
1919,
Nov.
18
616United States Peace Delegation memo., 17 Nov. 1919, and memo.,
Nov.
23
Curzon,
to
Buchanan
147;
IV,
DBFP,
1919,
Nov.
27
no.
Curzon,
to
Buchanan
129;
no.
1919, DBFP, IV, no. 140.
DBFP,
1919,
Nov.
29
Curzon,
to
Crowe
141;
617Curzon to Crowe, 24 Nov. 1919, DBFP, IV, no.
DBFP,
1919,
Dec.
2
Curzon,
to
Crowe
151;
IV,
DBFP,
2
Dec.,
Curzon,
no.
IV, no. 150; Crowe to
1919,
Dec.
5
Crowe,
to
Curzon
154;
IV,
DBFP,
1919,
3
Dec.
no.
Curzon,
IV, no. 152; Crowe to
Curzon
to
229-30;
161,
IV,
pp.
DBFP,
1919,
no.
Dec.
6
Curzon,
Crowe
to
DBFP, IV, no. 160;
169.
IV,
DBFP,
1919,
no.
Dec.
9
Curzon,
to
Crowe
165;
IV,
no.
Buchanan, 8 Dec. 1919, DBFP,
278
with
Franco-British
assistance,
and formalised
by a
dramatic shift in the Adriatic question. The British and French governments
Adriatic,
the
for
directly
to
particularly
last
of
a
settlement
work
prepared
were at
the
Italy
territorial
corpus
the
with
debated
of
heavily
the
continuity
point of
the
joint
In
Belgrade.
out
it
in
pointing
after
note,
to
a
champion
separatum, and
they
to
being
Yugoslavs
make,
the
asked
were
magnitude of concessions
prompt
`for
the
and
being
amicable
an
of
sake
they
asked
were
concluded that
279
for
unsuccessful,
resolution
of the
Adriatic
question
system.
in
the
This
1913.622
that
a
change
prompted
of
must remain
Supreme
the
to
first
time
their
For
the
representations
since
negotiations.
Council and territorial committees, the interested small states (in practice only
Albanians
the
By
their
invited
to
contrast,
the Yugoslavs) were
case.
present
Before
the
Albania.
to
great
their
invited
to
northern
claims
present
were never
Yugoslav
the
leader
former
Minister
Foreign
of
Croat
the
and
powers,
Italy,
Albrecht-Carrie,
11-14;
pp.
Question,
620Franco-British memo., 9 Jan. 1920, Adriatic
pp.
268-70.
238,
Italy,
Albrecht-Carrie,
38;
pp.
621Nitti to Lloyd George, 6 Jan. 1920, Adriatic Question, p.
270.
Heads
Council
63;
of
II,
DBFP,
of
1920,
622Council of Heads of Delegations minutes, 9 Jan.
no.
64.
II,
Jan.
DBFP,
10
1920,
no.
Delegations minutes,
280
Committee, Ante Trumbic, argued that the Yugoslavs were convinced that the
best solution was
to trace the Albania state as it was when created [in 1913],
with an
autonomous administration
623
Scutari.
Both alternatives
and
Trumbid's ideas were not popular with any of the great powers and therefore
be
they
thought
Yugoslavs
but
the
more
be
would
to
successful,
were unlikely
directly
themselves.
territory
this
than
the
claiming
great powers
acceptable to
Leeper
his
by
`flanked
George,
and armed
Lloyd
expert
According to Lederer,
with maps',
kept interrupting
the
Trumbic with pointed questions about
incapable
624
Albania
that
insisted
was
The Italians
Slovenes, Zara and Albania.
If
Pact
London
its
claims.
Yugoslavia
up
that
give
should
of independence, and
then
Albania,
Italy first received the city of Fiume and a mandate over central
Heads
Council
66;
of
II,
of
DBFP,
no.
623'Meeting in Pichon's office' minutes, 10 Jan. 1920,
264.
Yugoslavia,
p.
Lederer,
67;
II,
Jan.
1920,
DBFP,
12
no.
Delegations minutes,
624
Lederer, Yugoslavia, p. 264.
281
625Council of Heads of Delegations minutes, 10 Jan. 1920, DBFP, II, no. 64; Council of Heads
Delegations
Heads
Council
68;
II,
of
12
Jan.
DBFP,
1920,
of
no.
Delegations
minutes,
of
DBFP,
II,
70.
1920,
Jan.
13
no.
minutes,
282
frontier'.
627
History
Temperley,
70;
II,
DBFP,
1920,
626Council of Heads of Delegations minutes, 13 Jan.
no.
delegates,
Yugoslav
the
to
document
the
Before
343:
IV,
Conferences,
presenting
p.
of Peace
it.
had
the
approved
proposal and
Venizelos had been invited to examine
627Trumbic cited in Lederer, Yugoslavia, p. 264.
Heads
Council
70;
II,
of
DBFP,
no.
628Council of Heads of Delegations minutes, 13 Jan. 1920,
265-7;
Yugoslavia,
Lederer,
pp.
72;
II,
DBFP,
1920,
Jan.
14
no.
Delegations
minutes,
of
Albrecht-Carrie, Italy, p. 272.
283
sought to use their regular contact to obtain American support to defy the
ultimatum.
629
American support for the Yugoslav position came swiftly, but it was not yet
decisive. Wallace devised a scheme that gave a prominent position to Albanian
interests.
Rather than Italy, Yugoslavia and Greece gaining Albanian
national
territory outright, this should be awarded as mandates, except for Argyrocastro,
which would go to Greece in full sovereignty. The Foreign Office was also
toying once more with the idea of a triple mandate. 630Although most of the
State Department agreed that the new European plan was unacceptable, they
placed a far higher priority on a satisfactory strategic settlement of YugoslavItalian interests and boundaries. They had therefore distanced themselves from
for
instance,
Polk,
Albanian
interests.
to
proposed
ethnic arguments pertaining
two alternatives: withdraw from discussion of the Adriatic question after one
final effort to settle upon the principles of 9 December; or insist that the Italians
American
hinting
that
December,
9
lines
the
aid would
whilst
of
accept on
in
longer
State
Department
the
that
He
was no
warned
otherwise be withdrawn.
because
Italy
bear
to
bring
against
effective economic pressure
a position to
American
interruption
was
shipments
loan
coal
of
there was no
an
pending,
have
likely
blockade
full
most
would
be
to
economic
a
and
effective
unlikely
unfortunate
Robert
from
631
The
came
assistance
valuable
most
results,
`Italian
the
dismay
his
way
at
Lansing, the Secretary of State, who expressed
questions'
were
proceeding,
including
whether
the
DOS,
Termination,
US
457),
(M367,
629Wallace to Lansing, 16 Jan. 1920,763.72119/8703
r.
216.
Problem',
'Albanian
Woodall,
p.
256;
RG
DOS,
Termination,
US
458),
630Wallace to Lansing, 22 Jan. 1920,763.72119/8773 (M367, r.
101.
XI
I,
DBFP,
1920,
Feb.
13
no.
RG 256; A. Leeper memo.,
RG
DOS,
Termination,
US
456),
631Lansing to Wilson, 22 Jan. 1920,763.72119/8681 (M367, r.
RG
DOS,
Termination,
US
457),
(M367,
r.
1920,763.72119/8703
Jan.
256; Polk to Wilson, 24
256.
284
stressed that the scheme had not lost sight of the American viewpoint,
and that
the only changes to Wilson's `last word' were the
partition of Albania and
632
Free
the
State.
Even this was not sufficient to guarantee the
substitution of
Yugoslavs the much-needed American support, because President Wilson
had
still
not
commented
and
therefore
no
objections
could
be
officially
communicated. On 27 January 1920, Edith Wilson, the First Lady, replied that
there would be no further changes to her husband's position
regarding the
Adriatic. A week later, Polk was directed to follow his second
course of `moral
persuasion' and the Yugoslavs were advised to accept no Franco-British
633
The small Yugoslav
compromises.
European great power counterparts by using another great power to block their
designs.
Wilson's long awaited reply was eventually received on 9 February 1920. Using
ethnic arguments, he brutally attacked the 14 January proposal. His main
objection
determination
Albanian people against their vehement protests, among three alien powers'. In
comparison, he maintained that his `last word' memorandum prevented these
injustices and maintained a degree of unity amongst the Albanian people. This
intervention is highly significant, and can probably be considered Wilson's
Clemenceau
independence.
Albanian
for
and
nationalism and
strongest support
632Draft reply to Lansing's memo., 21 Jan. 1920, DBFP, II, no. 80.
633 Edith Bolling Wilson to Lansing, 27 Jan. 1920,763.72119/8833 (M367, r. 463), US
(M367,
1920,763.72119/9974
Feb.
3
Lansing,
Bolling
Wilson
RG
256;
to
DOS,
E.
Termination,
DOS,
RG
256.
Termination,
US
483),
r.
285
Lloyd George may have been bluffing about their threat to invoke the London
Pact, but Wilson had a far more powerful threat to use. As Woodall
so
accurately put it, `instead of threatening Italy with economic sanctions, Wilson
634
his
France
bolt
England'.
The manifesto closed with the
aimed
at
and
...
warning that if the Adriatic Settlement was not settled in accordance with the
principles of 9 December
the
President
consideration
desires
to say that
the withdrawal
agreement between the United States and France of 28th June, 1919,
[the military guarantee treaty] which are now before the Senate.635
Wilson's reply transcended much more than the Albanian or Adriatic questions.
The Senate failed to ratify either treaty, but to the British and French
in
the
the
threat
their
the
time
objectives
core
endangered
at
representatives
Peace Conference. It is remarkable that Wilson was prepared to go to such
636
lengths, over such a small issue as self-determination in Istria and Albania.
He used geo-political interests against the British and French representatives,
to
best
interests
direct
an
their
secure
in
marginal,
at
were
where
area
an
and
to
According
Albanian
the
for
basis
the
question.
national
of
settlement
ethnic
February
On
7
Johnson.
by
Woodall this harsh response was suggested
the
`approves
President
the
that
Lansing received a memorandum which stated
the
threatening
the
including
Johnson,
paragraph
telegram prepared by Dr.
286
withdrawal of the Treaties in the event that the American view is not
accepted. '637It has not proven possible to verify these assertions.
best
to
it
thought
they
Therefore,
the
central plains).
meant
did
They
Italy
Yugoslavia
respectively.
between
and
the
administration
separate
the
brought
be
mandatory
under
Albania
the
should
that
of
whole
concede
Albanian
the
the
of
aspirations
to
it
satisfy
eventually
system to make possible
287
638
This tri-partite mandate was
people for unity and self-government
late
a
.
attempt to overcome Wilson's scruples on Albanian nationalism.
Wilson was not so easily convinced. He objected to the idea that the
proposals
were being made in Yugoslav interests and that the tri-partite mandate would
help Albanian aspirations for unity and independence. 639Although he
was more
conciliatory in other areas of the settlement, Wilson reinforced his objections
regarding Albania. Above all, he
would of course make no objection to a settlement mutually agreeable to
Italy and Yugoslavia regarding their common frontier in the Fiume region,
provided
640
the
compensation elsewhere at
expense of nationals of a third power.
His willingness to accept such a scheme was on the basis that the proposed
joint ltalo-Yugoslav agreement affected only the nationals involved. This third
`power' was obviously Albania. Although Wilson understood that a three-fold
division of Albania might be acceptable to the Yugoslav government, the
American government was `just as vigorously opposed to injuring the Albanian
Jugo-Slav
it
injuring
the
is
to
for
benefit
Yugoslavia
the
opposed
as
of
people
between
the
differences
Wilson
insisted
the
Italy'.
that
for
benefit
the
of
people
Christian and Muslim populations would be increased by putting the two
language,
and
the
government
of
unlike
of
nationals
control
sections under
in
(Italy)
if
was represented
economic strength, especially one mandatory power
638Lloyd George memo., 16 Feb. 1920, Lloyd George MSS, House of Lords Record Office,
1920,186.3411/1070
Feb.
17
Also
LG];
[hereafter
at memo.,
London, LG/F/60/1/24
cited as
(M820, r. 437), American Commission, DOS, RG 256.
39Wilson minutes, 17 Feb. 1920,186.3411/1070 (M820, r. 437), American Commission, DOS,
RG 256.
640Memo., 25 Feb. 1920, Lloyd George MSS, LG/F/60/1/25.
288
the Council of the League of Nations and the other (Yugoslavia) was not."
Therefore he considered that to withdraw the mandate/s at some future point
would be `well nigh impossible'. Although he was willing to accept a joint ItaloYugoslav proposal, as long as that proposal only had an impact on their
interests and was compatible with self-determination, but Albanian questions
642
the
bi-lateral
talks.
were outside
scope of such
The European great powers failed to move Wilson from this position. 643Wilson
insisted that the 9 December memorandum must be the basis for future
negotiations on Fiume, but that the Albanian question was extraneous to the
issue as his `last word' made adequate provisions for a Yugoslav economic
644
To
in
Albania.
northern
outlet
ensure that the Allied leaders did not attempt to
circumvent his proposals, Wilson published a series of documents, in what has
been termed
`open diplomacy',
Albanian
the
holding
for
Wilson's
out on
It is difficult to understand
reasons
been
had
the
Europe
principle
issue, when in so many other areas of eastern
to
(pledge
date
to
All
disregarded in favour of other priorities.
explanations
desire
to
one
on
deliberations;
stand
a
make
tiredness
Albanian cause;
with
issue of self-determination)
the
his
Whatever
motives,
unsatisfactory.
seem
2 Presumably this objection applied to the Greek mandate too but this was not mentioned.
1920,
Feb.
24
Wallace,
to
Lansing
Memo., 25 Feb. 1920, Lloyd George MSS, LG/F/60/1/25;
81-2.
Italy,
Albrecht-Carrie,
31-4;
pp.
Question,
Adriatic
pp.
282-3.
Italy,
Albrecht-Carrie,
pp.
35-7;
643Davis to Polk, 26 Feb. 1920, Adriatic Question, pp.
rA4Polk to Davis, 4 Mar. 1920, Adriatic Question, pp. 47-9.
diplomacy'
`open
see
Machiavellian
this
645The Times, 9 Mar. 1920; For a fuller discussion of
Woodall, `Albanian Problem', p. 224, n. 26.
289
result ended the idea of Albanian partition or the Albanian problem being
considered a part of the Adriatic question. Direct Italo-Yugoslav relations finally
culminated in the Treaty of Rapallo, but Albania was specified outside its
646
According to Woodall, Lloyd George blamed Wilson's
remit.
support for
Albanian nationalism as the main reason why the peacemakers failed to
solve
the Adriatic question at the beginning of 1920:
Had Serbia [Yugoslavia] accepted our terms in Paris the whole
question
would
have
been settled,
now
647
The deliberations during the Peace Conference of Paris had therefore not
resolved the Albanian question, but Wilson's insistence on an ethnic settlement
had ensured that it had been removed from the power bargaining over the wider
Adriatic problems. The question of Albanian independence had been revived
it
level
that,
there
once
more,
of great power understanding
and
was some
holistically,
be
not as part of several other questions.
would
considered
290
status, the great powers did not initially deem the Albanian question to be a
national question at all, but instead equivalent to a colonial problem, in areas
not yet ready for independence.
Conference
deliberations
The Durazzo delegation, and many of the others, was initially anxious to work
Consulta
to
the
Italians,
the
the
coincide with
seemed
policies
of
as
with
Albanian national aspirations, and it was believed that such a policy would
therefore be beneficial. But opposition to such a policy soon mounted, as a
in
Albania,
Italian
in
Paris,
Italian
actions
and of
policies pursued
result of the
became
It
interests.
Albanian
also
national
which were not compatible with
had
limited
Italians
the
leaders
that
Albanian
the
increasingly obvious to
This
the
small states.
influence with the other three powers, and even with
delegation
the
for
asking
been
of
have
members
many
to
responsible
seems
Greek
Yugoslav
be
aggression
Italy
and
against
how effective a protector
would
Konitza
Mehmed
but
Italy,
and
loyal
to
Pasha
Turkhan
intrigue.
remained
and
by
reports
These
reinforced
were
views
Tourtoulis sought a non-Italian option.
Italian
an
what
of
Albania,
realisation
from
a
and
Italian
within
activities
of
Pasha
Essad
the
of
`revolt'
for
this
arrival
was
The
trigger
mandate might mean.
291
by
the
American
delegation,
than
many
other
Albanian
649
had
been.
Their united front was illustrated most obviously in
representatives
the presentation of identical memorandums by several
of the delegations (4 and
7 April 1919), in which the Albanians resolved to
prevent partition, re-take
control of their national movement on the international front and to prevent
themselves being subject to domination or interference by outside forces (a less
than veiled reference to the Italian, Serbian, Greek and also French and British
troops in Albania). The first petition was signed by the Albanian government,
and the second by Vatra, the Albanian delegation from Constantinople and the
Albanian colony in Romania. They also informed the Supreme Council (14 April
1919) that they no longer accepted the Italian mandate, and cited five reasons
for this: the London Pact; fears of Italian aspirations; the harshness of the
occupation, especially relative to that in Koritza; the work by Italian forces to
divide the Christian and 'Muslims populations; and Italian designs on Valona,
which they considered jeopardised long-term security in the Balkans. They
650
requested an independent Albania under an American or British mandate.
This represented the complete failure of Sonnino's Albanian policy.
649S. Bonsai, Suitors and Supplicants: The Little Nations at Versailles (New York, 1946), p. 67;
Woodall, `Albanian Problem', pp. 128-31.
650Albanian Delegations to Clemenceau, 4 Apr. 1919,186.3411/138 (M820, r. 415), American
Commission, DOS, RG 256; Albanian Delegations to Clemenceau, 4 Apr. 1919,186.3411/139
(M820, r. 415), American Commission, DOS, RG 256; M. Konitza to Admission in Paris, 14 Apr.
1919,186.3411/144 (M820, r. 415), American Commission, DOS, RG 256; Albanian Delegation
in Paris to Clemenceau, 16 Apr. 1919,186.3411/148 (M820, r. 415), American Commission,
FO
Apr.
1919,
16
Nicolson
M.
Konitza
Balfour,
H.
256;
to
16
Apr.
1919
RG
DOS,
minute,
and
608/76/2/5/7451.
292
This
revised Albanian
small states
with
various
groups,
including
those
with
irreconcilable
and
did
he
Wilson,
if
indeed
However,
make such a promise,
contradictory claims.
that
the
failed
to
have
such a positive
aspirations
raising of
understand
cannot
latter
Until
the
especially
negotiations,
of
stages
entail.
avowal of support would
In
indication
is
of such support.
those associated with his `final word', there
no
Italy
that
had
Wilson
could
the preliminary discussions,
even commented
`probably have Valona',
652
651MacGinty, `Small States', esp. pp. 50-2; Page cited in Handel, Weak States, pp. 5,180.
652Pano, 'Albanian-Americans Effort', p. 6; Albrecht-Carrie, Italy, p. 18.
293
`Captain Spencer
influence,
655
in the American
294
upon the already turbulent domestic Albanian situation, and the restless Italian
troops there. 656His successors were even more receptive to Albanian initiatives
and responses.
on great
power
policy became
self-evident
as the Conference
progressed. For instance, in October 1919, having received news of the leaked
Tittoni-Venizelos arrangements, the Albanians called daily upon the American
and British negotiators with protests, but they were merely advised to accept the
Italian mandate scheme. 657When the Yugoslavs were invited to participate in
the northern Albanian problem, no great power representative, not even Wilson,
thought such an opportunity should likewise be afforded to the Albanian
differences
irreconcilable
Finally,
the
changed policy generated
representatives.
between the leading Albanians. Turkhan Pasha never signed any petition
Durazzo
the
leading
three
the
members of
other
against Italy, and as a result
Pasha
Turkhan
him.
to
form
not
was
implemented
delegation
oust
coup
of
a
656Sonnino cited in Woodall, `Albanian Problem', p. 124.
657Tourtoulis, M. Konitza and M. Frasheri to Clemenceau, 17 June 1919, and Haul Pasha,
Colony
in
Albanian
Delegation
Colony
in
Evangjeli,
Albanian
Turkey,
Pandeli
of
Delegation of
1919,
June
19
States
United
National
in
Albanian
the
Delegation
Party
memo.,
Romania and
of
FO 608/28/2/f207-215; Tourtoulis to Balfour, 11 Sept. 1919, FO 371/3593/128639.
295
officially replaced until January 1920, but he left Paris and Mehmed became the
nominal leader, but with no greater success. Albanian initiatives and activities
were mostly low-key and unsuccessful. Neither their support for an Italian
mandate, nor, from April 1919, their ambition of an American mandate were
much of a counterweight to the ambitions of other states. This lack of influence
and resistance to an Italian-dominated and controlled `independence' meant
that the Albanians were unable to gain a great power supporter; or, more
correctly, they were unable to obtain one that they wanted, once Italian
intentions had become clear to them. As such, neither dependency on a great
power, by aligning policy with that of the great power, or the `going-it-alone'
approach produced anything significant, because the great power interests at
658
in
issues
being
determined
too
the
stake
were
significant.
Conclusions
Perceptions of nationalism in Britain, the United States and France in 1919-20
Europe,
in
but
based
the
eastern
problems materialised
civic model,
on
were
where this model was not practicable.
the main determination
bithe
irrespective
of
problems
of
of nationality,
In
identity.
lingualism of some people, or of other affiliations or markers of
be
and
which
it
sovereign,
Europe,
would
groups
of
which
matter
a
was
eastern
MacMillan
As
Margaret
dominant
wrote,
the
form
group.
part of
would not
"self-determination"
choosing
among
in
help
this
but
a
not
the
was
watchword
was
(often
many)
competing
nationalisms.
The
If
hungry.
feed
the
had
to
they
had
to
and
act as policemen
peacemakers
that
make
international
would
had
to
order
they
they could,
create an
116-23
Albania,
passim;
Southern
pp.
658Pearson, Albania, I, pp. 132-42 passim; Stickney,
Swire, Albania, pp. 303-11 passim.
296
659
However, she failed to point out that the powers also had their
own interests at
stake. They were not disinterested policemen, but rather like loan sharks: the
beneficiaries of their own decisions and actions. As Lansing later
maintained,
the self-determination principle was `loaded with dynamite, raising hopes
which
660
be
The answer turned out to lie in those groups that
can never
realised'.
organised themselves and had established their position before the start of the
Conference, such as the Poles, the Czechs and the Yugoslavs. 661 Despite
expectations to the contrary, the small or weak states, especially the smallest
and weakest, remained just as weak as before under the new diplomacy. The
great powers did not feel able to undo some pre-conference decisions, such as
Yugoslav or Czechoslovak
overrule the similar Albanian resolution in 1918, and the great-power one in
1913. The Albanians were even weaker than their rivals. In 1919, their influence
different
delegations,
had
formed
limited
because
they
each with
several
was
them,
this
Their
against
use
rivals could
contradictory objectives and agenda.
the
Thus,
less
it
take
them
the
selfwhenever
seriously.
great powers
and made
determination principle conflicted with great power interests, self-determination
In
terms,
Americans.
by
the
ignored
practical
or marginalised, even
was usually
the powers were not prepared to make any great efforts to ensure that the new
their
impact
there
be
own
on
boundaries would
was an
respected, unless
interests or on the balance of power.
659MacMillan, Peacemakers, pp. 5-6; Sharp, `Minorities', p. 178; Cobban, Nation State and
National Self Determination, pp. 57-76.
660R. Lansing, The Peace Negotiations (Boston, Massachusetts and London, 1921), pp. 97-8.
661Sharp, `Minorities', p. 178.
297
`the
essential aim and
were
663
it
Toynbee's
in
The
one
was
and
their
argument,
gap
cause'.
expression of
662H. Wilson, 9 Apr. 1920, FO 371/4387/pid876/f876; Also at Sharp, `Minorities', p. 184.
663Toynbee quoted in Goldstein, `British Peace Aims', p. 422.
298
common to most British and other great power officials, was the assumption
that the mandatory power the local peoples themselves would choose
would be
the correct one and in line with their own great power policy projections. None
of the great powers wanted the Albanian mandate, except Italy, and the
Durazzo delegation eventually resolved that it did not want the Italians. The
support and protection of a great power was considered indispensable for the
9new' states. British Cabinet discussions regarding Mesopotamia (that would
become Iraq) recommended that, should the inhabitants of the region express a
desire for Britain to act as mandatory power, then this should be taken up.664
The Albanian desire for an American or British mandate, as the only two powers
they trusted to act in Albanian interests, was refused. The powers had a very
strange interpretation of self-determination, especially for south-eastern Europe,
interested
in
it
is
the
really
or
powers were
questionable whether any of
where
Plebiscites
to
the
were used only
principle of self-determination.
committed
the
in
Balkans
in
the
chose
wrong
case people
not at all,
sparingly, and
nationality!
Instead,
as
Sir
James
Headlam-Morley
maintained,
`self-
determination is quite demode. Leeper and Nicolson determine for them what
665
they ought to wish, but they do it very well'.
299
CHAPTER 8:
The Allied Occupations and Nationalist Resurgence (1918-20)
`The Albanian people
to submit to being sold like cattle in the
are
not
minded
...
European markets as the spoils of Italy, Serbia and Greece. 666
eventually
prove
more
important
to
the
question
of Albanian
300
there
were
clear
problems.
To the
nationalists,
international
recognition was more important than domestic concerns. The policy of the
provisional government was therefore to await the decisions from Paris. This left
a vacuum. The most influential, able and well-known leaders in the government,
including both the prime and foreign minister, were at the Peace Conference in
Paris. Those ministers left in Albania worked to preserve the status quo, and
considered it their responsibility not to make any changes until Albania's future
had been settled. Additionally, none of the great powers (including Italy), or any
had
other state,
recognised the new Albanian government. Although the
Durazzo government had claimed jurisdiction over the whole of Albania as
in
it
had
in
1913-14,
practice
authority over about one-fifth of the
constituted
pre-war state, and much of this only with Italian endorsement or co-operation.
The other four-fifths of pre-war Albanian territory was occupied by the French
(Koritza and Pogradec), the Serbs (northern and eastern Albania down to the
D'Esperey line), and the rest by the Italians. There was also the inter-Allied
Albania
Allied
The
Italian).
French
(British,
Scutari
in
of
occupation
and
regime
Albanian
independent
formation
to
the
of a genuinely
proved a major obstacle
Allied
much
It
producing
another,
with
one
relations
also
affected
government.
667 Phillips to DMI, 24 Jan. 1919 FO 371/3570/3815; Phillips to DMI, 26 June 1919, FO
that
Bato
Nuro
By
1,
Hasan
103.
Ed.
Prishtina,
contend
and
contrast
608/30/1/16235;
note
p.
line
In
Congress
by
`Italian
the
with socialist rhetoric
Durazzo
organised
occupiers'.
the
was
Italian's
legalizing
the
involved
`feudal
traitors...
those
who aimed at
as
they condemn
imperialism plans in Albania. '
301
The first half of 1919 was stable in southern Albania, especially in the French
zone.
In
the
disenchantment,
Italian
zone,
British
reports
described
some
Albanian
Grecophile
this
to
the
although much of
was attributed
Conference
in
Paris,
decisions
from
Peace
Still
the
the
awaiting
elements.
force
in
the
Greeks
be
to
Italians
the
the
seen
using
wished
nor
neither
669
Scutari,
in
Albania,
in
By
and around
especially
northern
contrast,
region.
there was much animosity, although these disagreements rarely turned violent.
With negotiations still proceeding in Paris, neither side wanted to be accused of
being aggressive or of breaking the peace. The Italians had agreed to an
The
Scutari
town.
from
Serbs
the
to
international regime only
occupying
prevent
force
in
international
led
the
Fourtou,
de
General)
French Colonel (later
who
Major
Commander,
Italian
the
Scutari, found himself frequently clashing with
As
town.
the
territory
surrounding
Perricone, who controlled the Italian-occupied
the
to
inability
his
with
Fourtou
work
de
1919,
1
January
of
wrote
early as
two
the
incompatibility
the
of
Italians, and Phillips, now a Brigadier-General, of
141/669/10;
FO
1925,
Mar.
2
668'History of question of independence of Albania' memo.,
Woodall, `Albanian Problem', pp. 169-95 passim.
Phillips
608/30/12/12241;
FO
669Phillips to DMI, 19 May 1919, and Eden minute, 11 May 1919,
FO
371/3570/13815.
1918,
Dec.
31
memo.,
302
670
In particular, there proved to be disagreement
men.
over the jurisdiction and
the nature of the regime. This escalated to
such an extent that D'Esperey was
forced to spend two days in Scutari inspecting the
situation and speaking to
Piacentini directly. This initiative failed,
and the French, with British support,
responded by requesting that the Italians withdraw to beyond
a zone ten
kilometres around Scutari. 671This was just
one of many incidents indicative of
the deteriorating
Franco-Italian
complicated because the French at Scutari did not follow exactly the
same
policy as their representatives in Paris. Military leaders appeared eager to
support Serbian aims, regardless of the impact on Franco-Italian relations.
According to Woodall, Pichon repeatedly refused to
agree to their requests to
withdraw troops from Scutari. He explained that their presence was symbolic
rather than effective because of the pivotal role of Scutari in the larger Adriatic
question. He sought to use Scutari as a possible trade-off in the Adriatic
dispute, and even observed that there was a `southern Adriatic question',
672
Scutari.
There were also numerous Franco-Italian complaints
centred on
about Phillips, including his phil-Albanian tendencies. Nevertheless, Whitehall
resolved to keep him in post, to maintain the international character of the
673
Relations between the Italians and
regime and to restrain their Allies.
Yugoslavs were particularly tense. It appeared that the Italians were using their
base in northern Albania to attempt to destabilise the new Yugoslav regime.674
The Serbs sought to take advantage of the Italians' loss of support in Paris in
670Phillips to Clerk, 28 Dec. 1918, FO 371/3570/9031; d'Esperey cited in Woodall, `Albanian
Problem', pp. 75-6.
303
675
304
minorities. This in turn produced an influx of Kosovan refugees into Albania. 677
One observer went so far as to claim that the Yugoslavs
were deliberately
expelling Albanians in order to change the ethnic character
of the region, and to
prevent the Durazzo government from claiming the region
as part of `ethnic
Albania,. 678This flood of refugees added to the tensions because
neither the
French nor the Italians wanted them: the French because
they could not be fed
and because they spread disease; the Italians because they formed the base
of
a large Albanian nationalist movement, the Committee for the National Defence
of Kosovo. The Committee claimed to represent 15,000 Albanians, and it called
for the return of Kosovo and other Albanian-inhabited
areas. Most importantly, it
was a movement the Italian authorities had no control over. Italian reluctance to
help this group contributed greatly to their unpopularity amongst the Albanians.
Although the British forwarded repeated reports of Yugoslav-Albanian fighting to
their Allies, there was no action to prevent the hostilities, because the French
and the Americans
refused to participate
Belgrade. 679
305
because movement
306
683
Italian officials, forces and actions proved unpopular for several reasons. The
Italian administration persistently tried to undermine, overrule or circumvent
Albanian intentions, or else it attempted to control Albanian nationalism by
asserting that all decisions of the Durazzo government must be ratified by the
Italian High Commissioner. The provisional government did not want a small,
central, Muslim-dominated Albania as described in the London Pact. This was
shown most obviously in the protests of 3 June 1919, the second anniversary of
the Italian proclamation. Admittedly, this was something that the Consulta too
had decided
it no longer wanted.
intended.
Above
they
had
to
that
the
all,
continued
effect
opposite
consistently
to offend the Albanians. One such incident, which provoked immense uproar,
involved taking down all Albanian flags on 28 November 1919, which had been
Albanians
the
the
to
proclaiming
seventh anniversary of
celebrate
put up
independence. Italy's opponents (the Essadists, Serbs and Greeks) all used this
684
in
French
By
the
southern
to their advantage.
zone of occupation
contrast,
tact
the
tranquillity,
by
of
a
result
as
Albania was marked
comparative order and
Piacentini
that
Pastorelli
persistently
French
the
contends
officers.
and ability of
their
their
Albanians
the
failed to understand
ambitions, and underestimated
or
683Durham to Herbert, 3 Aug. 1919, Herbert MSS, DD/DRU/47.
684Dodge to Lansing, 13 Sept. 1919,763.72119/7183 (M367, r. 439), US Termination, DOS,
130,133.
!,
286-8;
Albania,
Albania,
Pearson,
Swire,
256;
pp.
pp.
RG
307
the
escalating
dissatisfaction.
By
contrast,
other
great
power
685
its
to
position
Consulta
consolidate
the
term,
sought
Nevertheless, in the short
Sonnino
1919,
June
attempted
In
forces.
Serbian
in northern Albania vis-a-vis
DOS,
Termination,
US
439),
685Dodge to Lansing, 13 Sept. 1919,763.72119/7183 (M367, r.
318-22.
L'Albania,
Pastorelli,
pp.
RG 256;
308
to secure British and American support for the removal of Serbian troops from
central Albania, after failing to secure French support, on the basis of the
November 1918 agreement. Although it was not a party to that
agreement,
Whitehall decided that the Italians, rather than the Serbs,
could best preserve
peace in Albania. With the larger Adriatic settlement still unresolved, British
officials thought that their support on this issue might placate the Italians. The
Foreign Office sent an official warning to the Yugoslav government, but Serbian
activities continued and even intensified. The Yugoslav government proclaimed
that Serbian troops were under the control of the Interior Department, not the
War Department, as the area represented territory occupied by Serbia before
August 1914, and was thus not subject to the control of D'Esperey. They
declared that the boundary of northern Albania was the Drin, and accused the
Italians of violating it.686This move was too much for even the Quai d'Orsay, but
the great powers were unable to prevent the advance of Serbian and Essadist
forces in northern Albania. Once more, Italian ambitions were detrimentally
affected. This demonstrated to the Albanians the inability of the Italians,
`Albanian'
borders.
the
to
powers
more
protect
especially, and
great
generally,
This in turn convinced many that independence, free from the interference of all
future
for
Albania's
best
the
forces,
option
even great power ones, was
outside
further
Paris,
in
Scutari
in
those
Events
integrity.
and
echoed
stability and
illustrated Italian weakness relative to the other powers, and even the small
Yugoslav state. The most damaging event was French success in defeating
309
nationalists and the Italians feared greatly. It appeared that the Allies were
colluding against the Albanians. Despite Italian efforts to prevent this move,
especially the Greek occupation of Koritza, in contravention of the TittoniVenizelos
agreement,
the
The Albanian resolve to determine their own future was mounting. By August
1919, Phillips had concluded that the Albanians were resolutely opposed to the
idea of an Italian protectorate, and were talking of proclaiming a besa against all
foreigners. These initiatives escalated in the ensuing months. Following Nitti's
for
including
the
Adriatic
Tittoni's
proposal
partition
plans,
of
proclamation
public
became
Albanians
1919),
the
September
(27
all
Italian
in
Albania
the
parliament
689
fears
These
designs.
were reconfirmed
too acutely aware of great-power
Phillips
but
leaked
continued
Tittoni-Venizelos
out,
the
agreement
when news of
for
the
best
the
Italian
option
mandate as
to advocate a strictly limited
US
437),
(M820,
1919,186.3411/975
r.
Nov.
687Colby to American Delegation in Paris, 9
Commission, Other Questions, DOS RG 256.
Sept.
5
FO,
to
Delegation
Albanian
688Grieve to Balfour, 1 July 1919, FO 608/108/1/2/16920;
FRUS
1919,
Sept.
3
Delegations
Council
Heads
minutes,
608/76/2/6/18644;
FO
of
of
1919,
'Albanian
Woodall,
288;
Albania,
Swire,
132;
p.
PPC, VIII, pp. 77,306; Pearson, Albania, I, p.
Problem', pp. 190-4.
689For details of Tittoni's Adriatic plans, see Chapter 7, pp. 272-4.
310
policy which was never likely to get much support. This increased
his prestige amongst the Albanians, but his promotion of these ideas did much
to distance Phillips from the Serbs, Italians and French, the very people he was
supposed to be working with and encouraging to compromise. His position was
further weakened when five of the northern Albanian tribes proclaimed a besa
and resolved to prevent Serbian seizure of Albanian territory. De Fourtou
alleged that Phillips had helped orchestrate this. In response, Crowe ordered
Phillips not to support the besa, for it was quite likely that Britain might sponsor
the partition of Albania and give northern Albania to the Serbs. As one official
is
the
Albania
the
think
`General
Phillips
to
of
universe',
centre
seems
wrote,
to
Crowe's
instructions,
to
independent
his
work
continued
actions, contrary
and
directives,
Whitehall
despite
Until
his
British
recall, and
official policy.
against
691
Phillips proved to be a strong promoter of Albanian nationalism.
FO
1919,
Aug.
12
DMI,
to
Phillips
690Phillipsto DMI, 5 Aug. 1919, FO 371/3571/118658;
371/3571/121232.
1919,
Sept.
29
Buckler,
to
Phillips
691Adams minute, 24 Sept. 1919, FO 371/3571/132899;
FO
1919,
Oct.
1
DMI,
to
Phillips
256;
RG
DOS,
US
Commission,
557),
(M820,
r.
875.00/251
Nov.
14
DMi,
Phillips
to
FO
371/3571/133792;
Oct.
1919,
DMI,
24
to
Phillips
371/3571/143125;
174-6,182-3.
Problem',
Also
Woodall,
`Albanian
pp.
at
1919, FO 371/3571/143125;
311
this
point Nitti had decided to partition Albania. Thus the military rule continued but it
did little to support the provisional government. 692 Nevertheless, by October
1919, Morton Eden, Phillips' secretary, was writing that the popularity of the
693
for
depended
being
Support
it
the
provisional government
upon
anti-Italian.
regime had already been dwindling because of its lack of progress, and its
inability to achieve recognition or to secure Albania's objectives in Paris. The
the
in
1919,
November
turning
of
proposed
when
news
point came
real
including
the
Durazzo
Italy
the
between
emerged,
government
and
agreement
throughout
Protests
Commissioner.
High
Italian
the
sprang
up
acceptance of
Albania, demanding an explanation as to why their government had agreed to
694
Italy,
for
in
As
example
states,
other
governments
with
outrage.
such an
integrity,
for
and
little
left
compromise on national ambitions
room
public opinion
This
these
in
much
added
goals.
demanded
achieving
quick success
and
the
that
other
for
of
fought
representatives
goals
pressure as negotiators
(stronger) states were opposed to granting.
1919,
Oct.
24
DMI,
to
Phillips
692 Crowe to Curzon, 3 Nov. 1919, DBFP, IV, p. 155;
L'Albania,
Pastorelli,
371/3571/166766;
FO
1919,
Nov.
14
DMI,
to
Phillips
F0371/3571/153949;
199.
Problem',
'Albanian
Woodall,
p.
303-7,
nn.
94-3
FO
371/3571/180772.
1920,
Feb.
20
DMI,
to
Eden
FO
1919,
Nov.
16
DMI,
to
Phillips
694 Eden to DMI, 14 Nov. 1919, FO 371/3571/166766;
5
to
Prishtina
unknown,
371/3571/180772;
FO
1919,
20
Feb.
DMI,
Eden
to
371/3571/162839;
60.
Prishtina,
Hasan
no.
1919,
Sept.
312
hand
in hand. Fears about the future of the
went
popularity
country seemed justified when it became known that Bumci and the Italian
delegation in Paris had worked out a further compromise
agreement, whereby
Albanian integrity and independence were preserved, but
under Italian control.
In protest, a meeting of all `true nationalists' in the country was
called, and it
eventually turned into a National Congress held at Lushnje from 28-31 January
1920.695By then, it included not only opponents of the Durazzo regime but also
defectors from it. The Congress would prove to be one of the most important
developments in the whole saga of Albanian independence. Its root causes lay
in the delay in settling the Albanian question in Paris to Albanian satisfaction,
deteriorating
the
influence of the great powers, especially Italy. Albanian
and
nationalists
were exasperated
occupation, and felt betrayed by the news that it appeared that the London Pact
would be enacted. The Albanian delegation in Paris was isolated, and the
Durazzo government had lost popular support due to its ineffectiveness and its
inability to obtain recognition. Throughout December 1919, Albanians from
Albania,
from
districts
in
but
the
elected
central
especially
country,
across
696
During these preparations the
delegates to represent them at the congress.
Italians did not hinder the Albanians. By contrast, members of the Durazzo
Durazzo
1920,
January
the
On
13
far
more concerned.
government were
313
government ordered their prefect in Lushnje to prevent the meeting, but the two
697
Fifty-six delegates from across the country met, including representatives from
Valona, Koritza and Pogradec, and even from some regions outside the 1913
state. The meeting began by expressing the dismay of those assembled at the
prospect of Valona being given to Italy. The delegates considered that they had
been misled, by the great powers, into believing that the principles of justice and
self-determination would be applied to Albania. They argued that to trust the
great powers was to believe in a `broken reed', and that the Albanians must rely
on themselves alone to secure their complete independence and territorial
integrity. They determined that a `Sacred Union' must be formed to reject the
great-power plans for the partition of Albania. To accomplish this, they resolved
to replace the provisional government, which was criticised as nothing more
than a `puppet Italian regime', with a new administration `composed of honest
hold
to
to
by
the
trusted
elect a national
a
general
election
and
people',
men
legislative assembly, which would draw up a new constitution. They also agreed
be
be
in
Paris
delegation
that the peace
reconstituted, and would
would
Albania
independence
the
of
the
complete
of
requesting
mission
with
charged
within its ethnographical
frontiers.
the
Pasha,
Turkhan
but
Delegation,
Peace
the
whom
remained as members of
Congress was `especially disappointed
replaced
Tourtoulis
Bumgi
were
and
with',
698
The
Erickson.
Telford
Charles
Dr
by Pandeli Evangjeli and
Italian
the
to
delegates in Lushnje drafted an emotive protest, addressed
Eden
FO
371/3571/180096;
1920,
Feb.
8
697Phillips to !DMI, 31 Jan. 1920, and Phillips to DMI,
FO
1920,
Feb.
24
DMI,
to
Phillips
371/3571/180772;
FO
1920,
Feb.
20
DMI,
to
371/3571/185677.
698'The Assembly of Lusnia', Herbert MSS, DD/DRU; Pearson, Albania, I, p. 137.
314
The Congress also addressed the issue of what type of state Albania should be.
It reaffirmed the Organic Constitution of 1914, which had created the monarchy
It
that
been
had
Wilhelm,
resolved
abrogated or suspended.
never
and
under
formally
had
Wilhelm
As
these
had
never
the war
conditions.
not altered
699Pearson, Albania, I, pp. 138-40; Polio and Puto, History of Albania, p. 177; Logoreci,
208-9;
Handbook,
Geographic
Albania,
Marmullaku,
Albania,
33;
pp.
51-2;
Albanians, pp.
p.
Albania,
Southern
Stickney,
Swire,
308-11;
Question,
39;
Albania,
pp.
Albanian
Pipinelis,
pp.
p.
120-3; Pastorelli, L'Albania, pp. 322-4; Woodall, `Albanian Problem', pp. 203-4
315
The
delegation
in
Albania
being,
For the time
appeared relatively stable.
events
in
Albania,
the
in
new government
in Paris continued its efforts unsuccessfully;
for
direct
leadership,
Zogu's
Tirana, under Ahmet
was making preparations
the
Zogu
Wilhelm,
most
of
Pasha
control
Essad
gained
Like
under
action.
for
be
carrying out
responsible
important office in the government, which would
the
he
allthrough
control
would
which
many much-needed reforms, and
Albanian
the
Commander-in-Chief
army,
of
He
became
forces.
important armed
to
tribal
because
continued
affiliations
his
included
men
own
the core of which
Logoreci,
139;
I,
Albania,
Pearson,
p.
DD/DRU;
700'TheAssembly of Lusnia', Herbert MSS,
177;
Albania,
History
Puto,
p.
Pollo
of
268,311-3;
and
Albania,
Swire,
pp.
Albanians, pp. 51-2;
208-9.
Handbook,
Geographic
pp.
Marmullaku, Albania, p. 33; Albania,
I,
Albania,
Pearson,
326-8;
p.
L'Albania,
Pastorelli,
pp.
701Woodall, `Albanian Problem', p. 205;
312-3.
Albania,
Swire,
pp.
140-1;
316
Allied actions provided the impetus for the next developments. On 11 March
1920, the inter-allied occupation of Scutari ended, although the Italians under
Perricone were authorised to remain. With Wilson's prevention of the Albanian
problem being included in the general Adriatic question (February-March
703
1920),
the main reason for British and French involvement in Albania was
removed. More generally, there was increasing public pressure to reduce costs
and bring the troops home. The justification given in parliament was that the
War Office had decided that political missions could no longer be financed from
army funds. If British involvement was needed for political purposes, then the
Foreign Office would need to finance it, but it had decided that this was
704
buffer
between
Franco-British
the
The
the
withdrawal removed
unnecessary.
Serbs and Italians. When de Fourtou and his troops evacuated the city, they
handed
Serbs.
They
the
by
be
taken
the
to
their
over
place
apparently expected
defence of Mount Tarabosh and the Boyana line to them, and gave them
to
Tirana
However,
the
secure
managed
government
ammunition.
and
weapons
Scutari
to
the
Fourtou
handed
de
that
Phillips
over
town.
the
wrote
control of
the
two
to
in
turn
new
Scutari,
of
members
control
passed
which
municipality of
government
Zogu's
that
Pearson
Effendi).
Hodj
Kadri
alleges
(Zogu and
Zogu
Serbian
Anticipating
response,
a
involvement had begun much earlier.
702'TheAssembly of Lusnia', Herbert MSS, DD/DRU; Pearson, Albania, I, p. 139.
703These issues are discussed in Chapter 7, pp. 280-90.
704Lamington to Crawford, 28 Apr. 1920, FO 371/3572/194951.
317
had managed to forestall them by secretly occupying Scutari with a force of Mati
705
left.
Despite Serbian annoyance, and plans for
clansman, before the French
an immediate assault, Phillips argued in March 1920 that there was no real
advantage to be gained from such an initiative, especially with the San Remo
(April 1920) talks opening, and Perricone's detachment still stationed there.
Zogu was appointed governor of Scutari by the Albanian government, which
had been impressed by his initiative and speedy action. Meantime, Phillips was
recalled to Britain, as the Foreign Office became increasingly receptive to the
Consulta's requests. This would ultimately complicate Britain's policy towards
Albania. Although Phillips was undoubtedly sympathetic to the Albanian cause,
from this point on Britain no longer retained any personnel in Albania, and had
706
to rely on Italian information about what was happening.
As the primary task of the Tirana government was the expulsion of all foreign
forces from Albanian soil, the events at Scutari were exceedingly popular,
Durazzo
feebleness
the
hesitancy
the
in
to
of
and apparent
contrast
especially
from
forces
French
by
the
This
impression
withdrawal of
was reinforced
regime.
Albanian
the
to
handing
French
the
1920,
over control
Koritza on 21 June
with
the
between
1920)
May
(15
Kapishtica
Protocol
Committee there. By the
of
it
between
first
(the
Greece
and another
agreement
Tirana government and
Greek
than
Albanian
that
to
rather
Albanians
ensure
the
managed
government),
Both
French
agreed
the
following
sides
Koritza
withdrawal.
forces would occupy
The
had
Conference
Peace
concluded.
the
the
to observe
status quo until
Greek
to
the
right
Greek
guaranteed
and
to
nationals
Albanians agreed
protect
16
Times,
The
289;
Albania,
Swire,
p.
705Pearson,Albania, I, p. 142; Fischer, King Zog, p. 20;
371/3572/195649.
FO
1920,
Mar.
25
Office,
War
March 1920; Phillips to
67;
FO
421/298,
Also
no.
at
706Phillips to War Office, 25 Mar. 1920, FO 371/3572/195649;
Swire,
289,320-1;
Albania,
Swire,
20;
pp.
Zog,
King
Fischer,
142;
I,
p.
p.
Pearson, Albania,
229-30.
Problem',
'Albanian
59;
pp.
Zog's Albania, p.
318
schools, churches and language, and allowed Greek troops to occupy twentysix villages in Albania, southeast of Koritza and north of the Florence line.707
The Albanian achievement regarding Koritza should not be undervalued. It
enhanced the prestige of the Albanian government both at home and abroad,
The
unresolved.
role of outside forces was once more
significant. Lloyd George had ensured that the French withdrawal did not take
San
Conference
he
hoped
Remo
because
to use
the
place until completion of
Albania as a bargaining tool. As Woodall maintains, once more the great power
leaders'
overestimated
in Greek thinking. In
709
highly
Koritza
Asia
Minor,
in
to
prized.
was not
potential gains
comparison
Moreover, the main objections to an Albanian occupation of Koritza had been
ipso
Albanian
believed
that
had
Whitehall
would
control
previously
removed.
facto mean Italian control-either
did
Italy
that
Whitehall's
not
Tirana
conviction
new
with
combined
regime,
new
that
Koritza,
in
Albania
to
25,000)
meant
(less
than
occupy
have enough troops
These
Italian
arguments also
be
puppets.
the Albanians could not
viewed as
had
that
the
that
Crowe
Venizelos.
problems
have
maintained
to
satisfied
seem
67;
FO
421/298,
Also
no.
at
707Phillips to War Office, 25 Mar. 1920, FO 371/3572/195649;
Stickney, Southern Albania, pp. 126,128.
Zog,
King
Fischer,
144-5;
I,
Albania,
708Stickney, Southern Albania, pp. 126,128; Pearson,
pp.
F6920.
126.
Albania,
Southern
Stickney,
237;
p.
Problem',
p.
Woodall, `Albanian
319
The new government also made progress in central Albania. When Essadist
forces attempted to seize control, the Tirana regime acted swiftly and decisively.
They issued a manifesto to the population, warning against armed participation
in the propaganda meetings being held by Essadist agents, and they sent
delegates to Paris to attempt to negotiate directly with Essad. There was little
anticipation of success, but Zogu thought that the initiative would gain the
Tirana government valuable time. It did. An agreement was signed with some of
the rebels, and by mid-April 1920 Zogu's forces had managed to defeat those
711
With Essad's threat removed, the Albanian government was
that remained.
key
force
further
to
take
to
south and
a number of
able
send an armed
Essad
On
13
June
1920,
1920.
by
24
April
including
Argyrocastro,
settlements,
Albanian
Rystemi,
Avni
by
in
Paris
revolutionary student and
an
was murdered
712
Kosovo Committee member.
By contrast, the Tirana government had not proven very successful in securing
Greek
the
and
a
but
agreement,
Italian
good
with
were
prospects
withdrawal
an
The
Italian
benefits
need
the
to
in
Rome
occupation.
in
an
of
as
attitude
change
been
the
had
this
lack
the
because
main
of
for action against Italy was crucial,
it
lost
also
had
was
and
support,
Durazzo
popular
the
government
reason why
Crowe minute, 27 May 1920, FO
became
he
Albania
a
to
Rystemi
712Pearson,Albania, I, pp. 144,147: When
returned
Essad's
time
the
but
of
Zogu,
to
Club
in
at
(Union)
Bashkimi
the
opposition
member of
be
in
together.
believed
to
they
cahoots
were
assassination
320
321
and without
The Tirana
322
Giovanni
Giolitti,
declared
in the
Italian
parliament
that the
policy.
This
attitude
was completely
irreconcilable
323
the Albanians that the Italians would be removed only through force,
and that
diplomacy was futile. 720
numerous
petitions
which his
government received very evasive replies. The spur for the revolt came from the
inhabitants of the town. At a meeting of the Committee of National Defence (29
May 1920), the men involved pledged to drive the Italians out of Valona. An
ultimatum sent to Piacentini demanded the withdrawal of Italian troops from
Valona and the handing over of Valona, Telepena and Chimara within twentyfour hours. 721Instead of replying to the Albanian ultimatum, Piacentini replied
with gunfire.
immediate withdrawal of Italian troops (16 June 1920). Giolitti would have liked
to maintain control of Valona but he saw the situation as pointless, for, as Swire
feared
Giolitti
that sending
but
to
`no
there
withdraw'.
was
alternative
argued,
demonstrations
Italian
troops
and
popular
general
strikes
might provoke
more
that would gravely injure the solidarity of the army. The sordid conditions of the
Italian army in Albania had become notorious (disease, especially malaria,
death, demoralisation, possible conflict with Greeks, Serbs and Albanians) and
lacked any attraction for soldiers. The Italian troops declined to take orders, and
720Stickney, Southern Albania, p. 124; Pastorelli, L'Albania, pp. 335-6; Swire, Albania, pp. 310,
317-8.
721Delvina report, 10 June 1920, Herbert MSS, DD/DRU/33/3; Buchanan to Curzon, 12 June
371/3572/201447;
FO
1920,
May
Duncan
28
Buchanan,
to
371/3572/204247;
FO
1920,
79.
421/298,
1920,
FO
24
May
FO
371/3572/201447;
Also
Curzon,
no.
to
at
Buchanan
324
some units had refused to embark on ships stationed at Bari and Brindisi and
destined for Albania. 722
325
of one of its `lungs' in the port of Valona. He concluded that Albania should
enter the Italian sphere of influence, but not as the result of some international
agreement to which the Albanian people were opposed, for that would be
costly
724
and probably unsustainable.
Straits
Otranto
the
and the
of
Adriatic. By holding the island, they would also be well positioned should an
in
influence
try
to
to
gain
power, or another state
unfriendly regime come
Albania. The major drawback for the Consulta was the nature of the withdrawal.
724Sforza, Makers of Modern Europe, pp. 161,170; Albrecht-Carrie, Italy, p. 297; Swire,
Albania, p. 322; Also at Pearson, Albania, I, pp. 149-50.
326
Conclusions
By August 1920, the prospect of an independent Albania had
considerably
improved: only the Serbs remained as foreign occupiers in any large
numbers.
The work and initiatives of the Tirana government towards this purpose
was
impressive, especially its ability to remove the Italian great power through a
combination
diplomacy
of
and force. In these experiences, the Albanian
example contradicts traditional theories about weak states in the great power
system at the time, a system still largely based on multi-polarity and the balance
726
Handel's arguments that weak states are not always `helpless', or
of power.
mere pawns of the great powers, rests on the contention that the small state is
727
help
from
to
The
able
gain external
other weak states or other great powers.
Poles, Czechs and Greeks were all able to foster French support and increase
their relative post-conflict strength, but this was clearly not the case for the
Albanians. Rothstein's interpretation, meanwhile, gives more weight to Albanian
initiatives: he contends that a small power can `affect its chances of survival,
725The Times, 2 and 5 Aug. 1920; Skendi, Albania, pp. 12-3; Fischer, King Zog, pp. 22-3;
Pearson, Albania, I, pp. 150-1; Swire, Albania, pp. 322-3.
726See for example Handel, Weak States, pp. 175-87.
727Handel, Weak States, pp. 257-9; Baker Fox, Power of Small States, p. 180; Vital, Inequality
5,187.
States,
pp.
of
327
primarily by altering the expectations which the Great Powers held about its
position
728
to
its
likely
response
and
external pressures,.
As such, the
previously
dominated-in
the
Balkans,
Russia
Austria-were
and
728Rothstein, Alliances and the Small States, pp. 194-5; Also at Salmon, Scandinavia, p. 14
729Holtsmark cited in Salmon, Scandinavia, pp. 15-6.
730Page cited in Handel, Weak States, pp. 5,180; See also Baker Fox, Power of Small States,
p. 187.
328
been
had
to
by
this
late
Albania,
1920.
in
the
able
neither
secure
and on
ground
In the interim, this increased the strength of the Balkan nationalists, including
the Albanians. When British, French and American pressure was withdrawn and
Italy under Benito Mussolini regained its strength, this position could not endure.
In the 1930s, Zogu became increasingly dependent upon the Italians, and the
73'
Germans began to penetrate economically in the Balkans more widely.
100-239.
Zog,
King
pp.
Tombs,
285-500
I,
Albania,
Pearson,
or
pp.
731On Zogu see for example
329
CHAPTER 9:
Towards a Resolution? The Ambassadors'
Conference of Paris
On 5 May 1920, Mehmed Konitza wrote to President Wilson to thank him for his
efforts, the previous year, to prevent Albania from being dismembered by the
neighbouring states and Italy. He also called attention to Wilson's suggestion
that Albania be recognised as an independent state by the newly formed
League of Nations. He added that
the Albanian nation, leaders and people alike, have no confidence in the
declaration of Italy's Premier that `She is ready to aid Albania in its
national insurrections,
733
330
importance.
independence
the
Barros
James
As
frontiers.
commented
and
331
Admittance
736
Its reasoning used both ethnic and strategic arguments. Considering Serb,
Greek and Italian claims to Albanian territory to be unjust, it outlined the
privileges and concessions that it was prepared to grant the ethnic and religious
Orthodox
Christians
in
in
to
the
the
an
south,
attempt
minorities, especially
Albanian.
It
becoming
to
this
its
territory
neighbours' objections
overcome
the
Austria
disappearance
the
that
removed
great
power
as a
of
considered
The
London
Pact.
in
the
Italy
the
to
concessions outlined
offer
main reason
throughout,
fairly
the
and not
moderate
new government appeared
position of
737
It also sought the support of pro-Albanian
too different from its predecessor.
their
States,
to
United
the
Britain
both
on
respective
in
pressure
put
and
parties
British
MPs
by
twenty
May
1920,
In
over
signed
memorandum
a
governments.
736Albanian Delegation to unnamed, n.d. 1920, Herbert MSS, DD/DRU/35; League of Nations,
Complaints of Macedonia, p. 179.
737Albanian Delegation to unnamed, n.d. 1920, Herbert MSS, DD/DRU/35; League of Nations,
Complaints of Macedonia, p. 179.
332
favour
in
British
the
influential
of
argued
and other
government's
persons
recognition
Albanian
the
question. There were also numerous
satisfactory means of settling
parliamentary questions, especially by Aubrey Herbert and other members of
the Anglo-Albanian Society. As late as November 1920, Herbert was sending
Foreign
Office,
to
the
memoranda
although he did not expect any action to be
taken. He hoped that this situation might change if Albania was recognised by
the League of Nations, but was worried that, `if it is refused admission into the
League, its only chance of life is through fighting' because, he added, Albania is
738
from
As
in
defenceless
to
`small,
aggression
all
sides.
state'
open
a
weak,
1919, these activities did little to influence British policy.
The changes in Italian policy during 1920 have already been detailed. It was not
the policy that the Albanians
government
but,
Albania,
in
its
interests
Tirana
the
government and securing
with
agreement
been
(having
formal
unable
the
time,
occupation
the
a
of
costs
saving
same
at
Ambassadors'
the
to
It
diplomacy).
force
use
sought
to secure this through
or
been
had
Conference,
Peace
the
Conference, which, as the successor of
The
Albanian
the
question.
invested with the task of the final determination of
did
but
they
Albania
a
seek
independent
not
Italian government advocated an
Italy
Albania,
in
allow
interests'
would
`special
which
be
but
to
granted
mandate,
1920,
Nov.
10
Grey,
to
Herbert
738Memo. by British MPs, 26 Jun. 1920, FO 371/4885/C9;
2
Aug.
George,
Lloyd
to
Guinness
Herbert
DD/DRU/33/3;
MSS,
and
Herbert
Herbert MSS,
Herbert
to
FO
371/4885/C2930;
1920,
2
Aug.
Harmsworth,
Myers
to
1920, FO 421/4885/C2931;
37114885/C10317.
FO
1920,
Nov.
2
Harmsworth,
333
that `need' would be determined by the great powers, not the Albanians.739
progress on the Albanian question in its first six months. Only following the
Tirana agreement (2 August 1920) between Italy and the Tirana government did
conversations appear to resume, focusing on what could be done to secure a
740
Yugoslav
forces.
Debate settled on two traditional questions:
withdrawal of
the futures of Scutari and northern Epirus. These issues had become directly
related to one another, because the Yugoslavs had expressed their intention to
press their Scutari claim if Greece made gains in northern Epirus.
complicated
741
This
739Eyres to Curzon, 15 Mar. 1922, FO 421/302, no. 82; Barros, Corfu Incident, pp. 16,309:
the
Conference
Ambassadors'
of
that
the
consideration
has
Barros, meanwhile,
argued
Peace
by
it
the
to
directed
directly
`usurpation
of power' not
Albanian question was a
fields
its
`overstep
its
to
based
of endeavour'.
allotted
Conference and
ability
on
740Curzon to Imperiali, 6 Sept. 1920, FO 421/299 no. 57.
741Curzon to Russell, 24 Sept. 1920, FO 421/299, no. 72.
334
guarantee its integrity under the sanctity of the League, were thus attempting to
determine its own future and also to take it out of control of the great powers
and the Ambassadors' Conference specifically. However, as members in both
the League's Council and Assembly, great power policy would still be of
paramount importance. The petition was in accordance with Article One of the
League's Covenant which allowed for a `fully self-governing State, Dominion or
Colony not named in the Annex' to become a member if agreed to by two-thirds
of the Assembly and providing that the applicant gave effective guarantees to
observe its international obligations, and accepted any regulations prescribed
by the League regarding its military, naval and air forces and armaments. The
Albanian government maintained that Albania's independence was based upon
the constitution of the Albanian state, as drawn up by the Ambassadors'
Conference (1913) and Florence Protocol (17 December 1913 and ratified
1914). They maintained that Albania's international status was recognised by
the six European powers, plus Romania, Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria, who had
diplomatic
accredited
Durazzo.
in
1914
its
to
government
representation
Information was also given regarding the gendarmerie and the present and
742
future armed forces.
British
the
being
for
been
a puppet of
Drummond has often
merely
criticised
His
demagogy
Whitehall.
to
League
the
may
for
subordinating
government, and
743
the
drew
he
In
the
on
up
memorandum
have hidden his complicity.
application,
because
the
interests
British
it is clear that
were protected,
to
those
than
far
applied
Albania
extensive
to
more
were
conditions applied
the
to
Albania
that
meet
appeared
Drummond
maintained
other applications.
Nations',
League
the
to
for
Admission
of
by
Albania
742Secretary-General memo., `Application
25 Nov. 1920, FO 371/4886/C12126.
743See for example League of Nations, Complaints of Macedonia, pp. 13,17
335
`necessary conditions'
Conference and
several serious internal disturbances in the course of the war, and, since its
conclusion, the position of Albania had been rendered precarious by the
difficulties that had arisen during the Adriatic question discussions. In particular,
he drew attention to the 1915 Pact of London that, whilst not denying Albanian
national claims, decreed that the international status of the country was a matter
to be decided after the war. He concluded that
The main question which falls to be decided by the Assembly would
seem, therefore, to be whether in 1913-14 Albania in fact acquired the
political organisation and the character of a State in so definitive a
manner that she cannot be considered to have lost such character by
reason of events which have since occurred, or whether, on the contrary,
the international status of the country is at present doubtful. Should the
former view be taken, it remains to be considered whether Albania is also
by
Article
1
in
the
to
give
guarantees required
of the
a position
actually
744
Covenant.
17 December
1920, exactly
eight years
of the
336
Ambassadorial Conference in London, and seven years after the signing of the
The results of this achievement were profound. By being admitted into the
League, the Albanian state was finally recognised de jure as a sovereign and
Greece
Yugoslavia
frontiers
its
still
and
independent state, albeit with
with
true
748
the
be
1920
December
17
Thus,
considered
such,
as
should,
undefined.
Albania
its
Following
independence.
admission,
date when Albania achieved
Greece,
including
the
diplomatic
powers,
channels with all
established normal
Yugoslavia and Italy; but, significantly, its government was still not recognised.
I,
Albania,
Pearson,
130;
Albania,
Stickney,
Southern
in
748League of Nations minutes cited
p.
pp. 157-8.
337
and conferred
specific
international
obligations,
including full
It
is
doubtful
been
had
Albania
the
However,
expected.
not
admittance of
determination
the
have
been
and
Albania
without
admitted
would
whether
President
Fisher,
the
A.
L.
Herbert
British
Delegate,
the
Cecil,
of
or
actions of
fifth
The
British
Education,
committee,
policy.
the Board of
who went against
including
to
been
applications,
had
admission
consider
established
which
749Pearson, Albania, I, p. 158.
750The Times, 18 Dec. 1920; Also at FO 371/48861C13685.
338
versus the representatives of the great powers and smaller, interested states
who opposed it, but not because of any balancing tendencies on the part of the
smaller states. Those in favour of admission argued that Albania constituted a
nation by virtue of the unanimous desire of its inhabitants. The country
possessed frontiers that had been fixed by an international convention, and
neither the London Pact nor the occupation of Albanian territory had been able
to deprive it of its position as an independent state. The main opposition was
led by the French delegate, Rene Vivani. Rather than opposing the admission
of Albania directly, he maintained that, as the chief Allied Powers had not yet
decided on the status of Albania, the League Assembly would risk running
counter to the will of the great powers if they came to a quick decision. It was
also argued that Albania could not constitute a state due to its large Muslim
population. On 6 December 1920, the committee voted by 13 votes to 8 in
favour of Vivani's proposal to adjourn until Albania's international status and
frontiers had been established by the Ambassadors' Conference in Paris.751It
appeared that the French and British delegates had succeeded in keeping
Conference,
Ambassadors'
that
Albanian
the
the
and
question within
control of
the Albanian attempt to remove its settlement from the control of the great
powers had failed.
In the Assembly, this arrangement was upset by Cecil and Fisher, rather than
the Albanians or other small states. Cecil has been described as, amongst other
`the
founder
League
this
the
`most
point,
principal
and, at
of
things, the
sincere'
339
those
associated
with
the
Anglo-Albanian
Society,
and
he
encouraged them to keep up their pressure and activities. It is not clear how this
753
developed
Cecil had not expected much success: he had
relationship
or why.
proceeded in the hope of securing some kind of pledge that the issue would
eventually be settled.
754
340
succeed if population size was taken into account. Curzon was particularly
opposed to admitting Albania and Ukraine because of their political instabiIity.755
341
representatives claimed that the past fortnight had seen a `great consolidation'
in Albania's
British Revisionism
The British government continued to refuse to recognise Albania for nearly a
year. It maintained that admission to the League did not imply the recognition of
Albania by all its members, and that the Ambassadors' Conference must
establish
an agreement
on Albanian
frontiers
before according
formal
Although
it appointed a representative (Consul without exequatus),
recognition.
Harry Eyres, it stipulated that this implied no endorsement of the Tirana
760
Albania.
The
British
determined
the
of
attitude
was
still
state
government or
largely by that of the Italians and Yugoslavs. The Italians had, by the Tirana
Tirana
facto
de
the
form
of
government,
recognition
of
protocol, conceded some
759The Times, London, 18 Dec. 1920; Also at FO 371/4886/C13685; Schroeder, 'Historical
Reality', pp. 117-23.
760 Rumbold to Curzon, 27 Dec. 1920, and Crowe to Rumbold, 31 Dec. 1920, FO
371/48861C14978; Curzon to Eyres, 17 May 1921, FO 421/300, no. 84; Curzon to de Martino,
20 Apr. 1921, FO 421/300, no. 62: The irony of this view appears to have been missed or
ignored: if Albanian frontiers were not fixed the southern frontier of Yugoslavia and the northboundary
Greek
not
either.
were
western
342
Additionally, Britain was still officially bound by the London Pact. There
were
also some vague references to a settlement based on the old chestnut of the
`merits of the case', which presumably meant `ethnic' or `national' frontiers. 761
This non-recognition of Albania was common across the European
powers and
neighbouring states. Although diplomatic representation was sent to Albania, it
remained unrecognised, as did the Tirana government. This put the Albanians
in an unusual, even dangerous, position in the great power system: on the one
hand their independence in some form had been assured by admittance to the
League, but as yet no government had officially approved that independence or
the government, despite votes in the League to the contrary. With no fixed
borders, the state was particularly vulnerable to assault.
343
Petroleum), following the discovery of oil in Albania, during the war, by Italian
and Austrian geologists. On 25 March 1921, Eyres signed an agreement
(14 November
Albania
Office
had
hoped
it
Foreign
balance
the
to
the
would
of power, as
contributing
do in 1913.
frontiers.
1913
had
the
the
the
settlement of
put
throughout
war
subsequent negotiations:
763Eyres to Curzon, 6 Apr. 1921, FO 421/300, no. 71; W. Bland and I. Price, A Tangled Web: a
13:
However,
1986),
(London,
(1912-1955)
Albania
p.
history of Anglo-American relations with
Tirana
the
had
British
that
the
with
colluded
government
Bland and Price's other allegation
for
Albania's
in
in
to
securing
exchange
government a year earlier, order secure oil concessions
in
have
Price
Bland
is
Nations,
less
League
references
no
the
and
to
plausible.
of
admittance
Office
Foreign
and
the
collusion
book,
of
such
evidence
no
their
reveal
records
this part of
it.
do
to
1920
in
seem
not
support
British activities
764Goldstein, `Britain and Greece', pp. 355-6.
344
Albanian frontiers once more into the `melting pot'; but the Pact of London, in
turn, `went to pieces under the pressure of events'. The powers were therefore
responsible for substituting territorial arrangements acceptable to all parties
concerned.
frontier'
was
needed,
to
correct
the
local economic
and
345
766For example on fighting in Koritza see Eyres to Curzon, 10 May 1921, FO 421/300, no. 88;
Pearson, Albania, I, p. 160.
767For example Herbert to Harmsworth, 2 Nov. 1920, FO 371/48851C10317.
768Granville to Curzon, 1 June 1921, FO 421/300, no. 99.
769For example Evangjeli to US Government, 17 May 1921, Herbert MSS, DD/DRU/45; Vrioni
to League, 29 March 1921, Albania and Kosovo, I, no. 130: Pearson, Albania, I, p. 160, Swire,
Albania, p. 343.
770League of Nations minutes cited in Stickney, Southern Albania, p. 131; Pearson, Albania, I,
Albania,
183.
History
Puto,
Pollo
163-5;
of
p.
and
pp.
346
leaders. On 21 June 1921, the Albanians renewed their appeal to the League.
The new Albanian Prime Minister, Iljas bey Vrioni, described in detail the
`abnormal' conditions of Albania. He appealed for the evacuation of Yugoslav
and Greek forces from those parts of Albania's
Yugoslavia and Greek occupation, under Article 2 of the Covenant (which dealt
"'
by
with acts of aggression or war
member states).
most clearly the precarious nature of the Albanian position, and the necessity of
resolving the boundary issue. Despite much success in its other initiatives, as a
small weak state Albania still needed the international system to guarantee its
security.
Italians
the
initiative
timely
the
recognition),
regarding
(as
of
of
a result
question
to
Conference
Ambassadorial
the
that
come
the League merely recommended
771 M. Frasheri to Herbert, 6 June 1921, Herbert MSS, DD/DRU/33/1; Stickney, Southern
164-5.
I,
Albania,
Pearson,
pp.
132-3;
Albania, pp.
772For further details see Stickney, Southern Albania, pp. 132-9.
347
773
decision
Various
Albanian nationalist and diaspora
a
as soon as possible.
groups had also petitioned the League, considering it the only `competent
tribunal to pass judgment' upon their case. They continued to petition the
greatpower governments, and urged Herbert and other supporters to apply pressure
774
their
These appeals do not seem to have
on
respective governments.
generated
any
noticeable
results,
once
again
illustrating
the
limited
Within a few days of the League hearing, Vrioni declared that Albania did not
recognise
the competence
of the Ambassadors'
Conference to re-open
348
the
flexibility
to
shift
their
allegiances
in response to changing
International
Recognition
important
developments
on
the
Albanian
question
within
the
Ambassadors' Conference in Paris. Throughout 1920 and the first part of 1921,
75 H. Nicolson minute, 13 Nov. 1920, FO 371/4885, C10317; Pearson, Albania, I, pp. 169-72;
League of Nations minutes cited in Stickney, Southern Albania, pp. 139,141-4; Stavrianos,
Balkans since 1453, pp. 714-15: The resolution regarding establishment of a commission of
to
impartial
three
It
were
visit
persons
who
of
inquiry was adopted unanimously.
consisted
disturbances
disputes
decisions,
the
the
and
near
Albania and report on
powers'
execution of
the
to
to
had
the
The
supervise
frontier.
appoint
observers
power
the Albanian
commission
in
1922
Albania.
When
it
to
from
territories
the
foreign
troops
reported
allotted
evacuation of all
Stavrianos
totally
gave a more prominent position
upheld.
Albanian
almost
the
complaints were
(12
May
1922)
'birth
the
the
inquiry
report
commission's
considering
to the commission of
fulfilled
have
to
the
does
but
the
Albania'
all
not
appear
the
commission
new
certificate of
it.
to
Stavrianos
attributes
functions
349
Albania was rarely discussed within the Conference, despite French and British
representatives arguing in the League for the importance of the Conference as
the mechanism for settling the Albanian question. The Albanian question had
meanwhile been designated outside the Rapallo agreement. The other powers
did not want to endanger that settlement by considering the Albanian one
simultaneously. As Leeper wrote, it `was clever of the Italians to have adopted a
conciliatory attitude to the Yugoslavs on this point [Albanian question] and to put
the onus of refusing Scutari on the British and French governments'. "'
In June
Curzon
had
be
interests
in
retained.
would
investments and,
particular, strategic
"' Young to Curzon, 25 Nov. 1920, FO 371/4886/C12253; A. Leeper minute, 26 Nov. 1920, FO
371/4886/Cl 2253.
778Curzon to de Martino, 20 Apr. 1921, FO 421/300, no. 62; Memo. on Albanian frontiers in
Curzon,
20
de
Martino
127;
to
I,
Kosovo,
1921,
Albania
June
14
no.
and
Curzon to Hardinge,
I,
164.
Albania,
116;
Pearson,
421/300,
p.
FO
no.
June 1921,
79 de Martino to Curzon, 20 June 1921, FO 421/300, no. 116,
350
agreed in advance to the first two points but was far less inclined to accept the
third. He persistently refrained from answering the notes he received. 780
Chimara and Argyrocastro be allocated to Albania, but the British delegate still
The
British
delegate
Greece.
to
that
these
also remained
should go
argued
hostile to Italian claims to Saseno, which resulted in a committee being
783
1921,
September
the
29
Eventually,
its
future.
investigate
to
on
established
Conference of Ambassadors agreed to maintain the political independence and
territorial
integrity of Albania,
`special
Italy's
to
so-called
recognise
and
784
it
day
1921,
the
November
9
backdated
to
but
November,
On
16
interests'.
(British
Conference
in
the
involved
then
the
great powers
was formally agreed,
783Crowe minute, 1 Sept. 1921, FO 421/301 no. 61; Curzon to de Martino, 17 Sept. 1921, FO
FO
Sept.
1921,
893/13/2.
28
Ambassadors
Conference
minutes,
of
421/301, no. 75;
3C
Empire, France, Italy and Japan, but not the United States) formally
recognised
of Albanian
352
would
reconsider
786
Nothing to this effect was specifically
the question.
mentioned, but the inference was that, if the powers thought it necessary, such
a task would be entrusted to Italy. This was potentially the most important part
of the agreement. It undermined the sanctity of the League, as the new arbiter
of international disputes, and it meant that the Italians had finally managed to
secure international recognition of their Albanian interests by the other great
powers, and a legal means of protecting them. The opportunity for intrigue to
facilitate this was obvious, for the agreement gave great scope for possible
Italian intervention, based on either territorial or economic threats to Albanian
integrity and independence. It therefore could be described as representing at
best a `conditional independence', similar to that which was suggested for
Kosova more recently. Italy's claim to be the protector attained reality by the
November
Zogu,
Treaty
Tirana
(27
the
two
treaties
especially
of
signing of
with
787
1926).
The declaration
decided
had
to
that
the
great powers
also announced
The
in
1913-14.
frontiers
traced
Albanian
the
southern
as
essentially reconfirm
boundary was to be delimited on the basis of the lines of the Florence Protocol,
Chimara,
together
Argyrocastro
Koritza,
all
important
towns
with
the
and
of
with
Greeks
the
that
This
Albanian.
becoming
were
territory,
meant
surrounding
The
1918.
had
they
that
twenty-six
since
the
occupied
to
villages
return
obliged
be
1914
to
in
(provisionally)
line
boundary
was
agreed
northern and eastern
the
to
Yugoslavs
the
the
to
three
one
and
four
of
in
advantage
sectors,
rectified
786Curzon to de Martino, 17 Sept. 1921, FO 421/301, no. 75; Milo, `Albania and the Balkan
between
Relationship
E.
Manta,
'Reciprocal
175-6;
I,
Albania,
pp.
Entente', p. 41; Pearson,
37
(1996),
Studies,
Balkan
Tirana',
Treaty
1926
the
Renewal
The
of
of
Politics and Economics:
309-30, at p. 311.
3
Chamberlain,
Graham
88;
to
FO
421/311,
Dec.
1926,
d.
Graham,
no.
to
n.
Chamberlain
90.
421/311,
FO
no.
Dec. 1926,
353
The declaration also acknowledged that the 1913-14 northern commission had
been interrupted by the war and had not completed its operations. It therefore
further
boundary
in
determine
boundary
to
those
the
established a
commission
for
loco.
This
lasted
investigated,
delimit
boundary
in
to
the
and
areas not yet
four years (1922-26). As with all First World War boundary commissions (and in
detailed
instructions
it
Albania
before
in
the
to
those
received
war),
contrast
789
delimitation
The
commission,
regarding protocol, procedure and membership.
in
its
began
European
the
three
work
powers,
great
consisting of members of
March 1922, the decision having been taken to delay its start until the
it
had
1913-14
Like
the
Albanian
the
an
commissions,
winter.
conclusion of
its
All
interests
but
protected.
again
were
power
great
remit,
national
or
ethnic
for
their
Allied)
(Principal
to
the
be
to
powers
great
submitted
protocols were
354
to
consider
requests
from
the
Albanian,
Greek
and
Yugoslav
790
governments.
and
French
delegates
would
supervise
the
northern
one with
791
Yugoslavia.
With the Italians having secured an agreement about the
northern Adriatic with the Yugoslavs, their interest turned again to focusing
upon southern Albania. This was clearly to protect Italian interests in southern
Albania, but, in light of the far tighter directives and the different nature of the
commission, this in itself should not have produced many problems. The
representatives considering the northern sections of the frontier proceeded
slowly and cautiously. They encountered no real problems because most
Yugoslav troops had grudgingly retreated from their advanced positions. By
faced
by
the
difficulties
the
the
considering
southern
representatives
contrast,
boundary were greater then those faced by either of the two pre-war
Tellini
them
felt
Greeks
that
The
and
against
was
prejudiced
commissions.
four
Tellini
A
Albanian
to
the
and
when
crisis was provoked
viewpoint.
partial
border
town
Italian
the
at
murdered
a
were
commission
other members of
Corfu
fleet
by
The
Italian
Greek
territory.
in
responded
occupying
situated
island. As Barros has shown, this episode illustrated the inherent weakness of
790Pearson, Albania, I, pp. 175-6; Swire, Albania, p. 364.
791Vannutelli to Mussolini, 30 Aug. 1923, DDI, Series 7, II, no. 205: Also at Barros, Corfu
Incident, pp. 140-1.
355
the League. Despite pressure from the smaller powers, the French sought to
find a diplomatic solution in the Conference of Ambassadors (which
continued
792
1931),
Although it delayed the workings of the
until
and outside the League.
commission and made the Italians, especially, hostile to the Greeks, this
incident does not appear to have altered the final settlement. 793
Conclusions
This chapter has illustrated a further tactic deployed by the Albanian nationalists
in their activities within the great power system. It illustrated how they used an
international organisation (the League of Nations) in their attempt to elude or
defeat the policies of the great power states when the policies of the latter ran
contrary to the national ambitions of the smaller `state'. In so doing, the
Albanians used one of the most effective techniques available to small states:
they appealed to the rights of justice and international law. The Albanians also
improved the chances of the survival of their state by pursuing a moderate and
non-provocative policy. To secure acceptance of Albania as an independent
its
It
Tirana
the
resolved
government modified
objectives.
and sovereign state,
to compromise on the ethnic ideal of a majority Albanian-speaking population
defined state, in order to secure others goals, namely internal stability,
defensive or strategic frontiers and international recognition. Rather than hold
they
the
but
for
the
made
realistic
goal,
unachievable
ethnic,
ultimate,
out
decision to opt for a more limited but possible version of the Albanian state,
In
in
they
international
the
the
so
operated.
which
system
constraints of
within
doing, and, as Rothstein argues regarding other questions, they were able to
They
to
appeared
represent a coherent
appear stronger and more unified.
792Barros, Corfu Incident, pp. 304,307.
793For a fuller consideration of the 1922-26 boundary commission please see Albania and
Kosovo, I, nos. 136-60.
356
national state without substantial dissident minorities, and they were attempting
to secure
non-irredentist
794
They
were also pursuing more
neighbours.
However, the Albanians still placed too much faith in the importance of the
League of Nations in international affairs, as they had likewise placed too much
trust in the intentions of great power statesmen. In practice, the `new diplomacy'
of the League operated only marginally differently to the `old diplomacy' of the
concert. Such a view was typical of many small states. Throughout the Paris
peace
negotiations,
the
underlying
assumption
was that
states would
796
be
to
The
applied
going
never
was
of
self-determination
principle
making.
fairly to the Albanian question, because the territory the Albanians claimed was
had
British
the
to
importance
and
states,
of
victorious
variety
a
of strategic
794Rothstein, Alliances and Small States, pp. 194-5; Also at Salmon, Scandinavia, p. 14; Vital,
Inequality of States, p. 189.
795Sharp, 'Minorities', p. 184.
796Barros, Corfu Incident, pp. 301-2,304.
357
promised this territory to them in the Pact of London. Likewise, selfdetermination was completely disregarded for the defeated Bulgarians. As
one
commentator
British policy-makers, `on the international plain and vis--vis small states all
British diplomats were hawks'. 797
This chapter has also showed that, in the course of 1921, British policy towards
the Albanian question became more sympathetic. This decision was the product
of a reassessment of British strategic interests in the Adriatic and the Balkans.
Albanian activities, such as their anti-Italian stance, which made a `large
independent Albania' less threatening to British naval interests, the increased
inside
Albania and the revised boundary claims, all contributed
political stability
to this. But events extraneous to Albanian activities were more important, most
from
Greece.
It
domestic
developments
in
changes
notably
resulting
now
helped British policy, and also Italian, to bolster the fledgling Albanian state.
Admittedly the great powers pursued a two-pronged approach: by the secret
1921
the
9
November
they
to
the
curtailed
somewhat
memorandum,
annex
independence and sovereignty of the new state that the memorandum had
In
doing,
that
they
geo-political,
ensured
so
publicly.
supposedly endorsed
the
in
that
the
Albania
in
interests
Italian,
event
protected
were
above all
Albanian state proved too weak and fragile for existence, or susceptible to
foreign (Greek or Yugoslav) hostility, aggression or intrigue.
in
the
had
1921
the
by
re-establishment of
Therefore,
acquiesced
great powers
1913,
borders
thereby
the
Albania
excluding
many
independent
of
within
an
358
Albanian speakers, but the Albanian problem had not been solved. With the
exception of a period during the Second World War (1939-1944), Albania has
remained independent ever since and its boundaries, except in that same
period, have remained unchanged. On the other hand, Albania has remained
one of the weakest and most isolated states in the European international
system. In the short term, it was already possible to identify problems. Albania
in 1926 was very different from the Albania of 1921, when its boundary
commission was formed. There had been numerous changes of government.
The Regency had been replaced and Ahmet Zogu had instituted a successful
coup d''etat, with himself proclaimed first President (1925) and later King Zog
(1928)-Albania's,
and Europe's, first and only Muslim king. The great power
359
during the period of peace that followed. When the Italians, under Mussolini,
finally invaded Albania, on 7 April 1939, no assistance was offered to it by the
British or French governments, despite the guarantees made in 1921. In the
end these guarantees, like those to Czechoslovakia, were practically worthless.
360
CONCLUSIONS
A house divided against itself cannot stand. A dismembered
'799
it
fight
for
nation cannot live, must
unification or die.
The Independence
361
success.
The thesis has also identified two main theatres in which independence had to
be achieved: the national or domestic area, and the international or external
one. The relative importance of these two depended to a large extent upon the
developments
these
in
the
the
of
great
power
system
at
which
point
cycle
interests
the
the
As
the
and
priorities
of
great powers
changed,
cycle
occurred.
importance
in
the
turn
the
this
strength
relative
and
of
altered
and
shifted,
by
Albanian
the
the
of
small-state
actors
national process.
made
contribution
Thus, following points of crisis at which the power-relativities of the international
362
system were shifting, the Albanians, like the other small states, although not
always able to play off one power against another, were able to make
considerable advances in their national programme. By contrast, when the
international system was relatively stable, and the great powers could use the
Albanian question for their own purposes, then home-grown Albanian factors
were less productive, and international ones were more significant.
In the international arena, which has been the primary focus of this study, five
supplementary processes were identified, four of which were diplomatic, and
the fifth military. On the diplomatic side, there was the `old' or closed diplomacy
of the Conference of Ambassadors of 1912-13; the secret diplomacy that
resulted in the Pact of London; the Paris Peace Conference and the subsequent
Conference of Ambassadors in Paris, supposedly the `new diplomacy' of the
Wilsonian era, but with a marked tendency to the continuation of old-diplomacy
tendencies; and the activities within the League of Nations, which were closer to
the ideals of the new diplomacy. These international processes were of course
influenced by national considerations, such as the decision to convene the
Ambassadors' Conference in London; they also had an impact upon national
forces, such as the resurgence of Albanian nationalism that led up to the
Congress of Lushnje. There was, as we have seen, a complicated interaction
forces.
these
between
interplay
various
and
363
the peace and warfare of nations than any other factor, political or economic'.800
The decisions made regarding the delimitation of Albanian boundaries in 191214, and again in 1919-21, and applied by 1926, were supposed to be based
on
ethnic principles: it was, in short, deemed that those areas where Albanian was
the majority spoken language should become part of the newly independent
Albanian state. This was in line with the contemporary view that equated
nationality with ethnicity, and ethnicity with language. In practice, however, the
great powers, the small Christian Balkan states, and, by 1920, even the Tirana
government itself, had alternative priorities and interests (strategic, geographic,
economic
and even
settlement. For all the great powers, even those supposedly disinterested, geopolitical interests overrode sentiments about nationality or the rhetoric of
Albanian
for
morality.
claims
a truly `ethnic' or `national' settlement proved far
too radical and ambitious for the great power representatives, especially in the
light of their own interests, the rival claims of other small Balkan states and the
potential instability within the international system that such a change would
have produced.
For the great power representatives, in particular the British, the boundaries
between
considerations of nationality,
compromise
represented a reasonable
Kosovo
In
the
and
geography, economic expediency and strategic security.
Monastir vilayets, the boundaries undoubtedly fell far short of nationalistic
hopes on both sides, but in practice this does not seem to have been a
in
to
factors
The
introduction
liability.
addition
of a wider set of
particular
factors
determining
larger
the
(such
nationality,
consideration
of
a
as
ethnicity
364
nationality
principle.
The
Albania
thus
created
was
much
more
the
new Albanian
`nation' could
have solidified,
unified
and
functioning
fully
into
developed
itself,
small
a modern and
and
strengthened
Hylland
Thomas
This
international
in
the
conclusion supports
system.
state
Eriksen's finding that the introduction of other factors (a wider consideration of
interests),
features,
which
economic
strategic concerns,
nationality, geographic
first
to
compromise
sight
at
seem
Admittedly, these
the
international
thoughts
from
at
far
the
statesmen
ideas
of
theoretical
were
is
there
that
do
here
much
suggest
time, but the practical outcomes studied
802
theorizing.
Eriksen's
Hylland
to
plausibility
801See Appendix G, p. 416 for an indication of the extent of the Albanian-speakers left outside
41-3
Frontiers',
the
Guy,
'Fixing
details
For
further
and
pp.
Albanian
see
state.
the independent
forthcoming.
Geo-political
Interests',
Boundaries
and
Guy, `Linguistic
161-2.
Nationalism,
Ethnicity
Eriksen,
pp.
and
Hylland
365
Albanians
the
At
particular points,
was not a mere supplicant.
the
the
to
decisive
of
settlement
themselves made significant and
contributions
the
to
They
of
unusual
use
make
Albanian question.
were able successfully
destabilised
Europe)
that
in
Balkans,
in
the
(1912
post-1918
political climates
803For details of the difficulties the mountains caused to the Serbian retreat see for example
involved
for
indication
the
49-125;
Serbia,
problems
practical
of
an
esp. pp.
Fryer, Destruction of
373-4.
Conclusion,
boundaries
Albanian
pp.
see
in determining
366
the respective balances of power and strengthened the position of small states,
including themselves, relative to other more powerful states. After the First
World War, it took the Albanians longer than some other small
states to
capitalise on this opportunity, because they were weaker and smaller than
those other small states with which they were in competition, and were
themselves as yet far from united. Nevertheless, it is important to note that,
although a small state may be more effective in the great power system than its
size and position would initially suggest, in the Albanian case this happy
situation was usually of limited duration, and came about only because it was in
the interest of one or other of the great powers to exploit it. The initiatives of the
Tirana government in 1920 only proved so successful because of the Italian
pre-occupation with Yugoslav questions, which the Consulta had determined as
being, for the moment, strategically more important. It is also important to note
that, at certain points, such as the radicalism of their presentations at the Paris
Peace Conference, Albanian national efforts could actually be detrimental to the
national cause, the success of which would depend on the attitude of the greatfor
further
This
to
the
need
power representatives.
consideration also points
in
the
influences
interplay
the
the
of small states
of
various roles and
study of
great-power system.
Sir Edward Grey asserted that, in the settlement of the Albanian question in
804
His
1913, `the primary thing was to preserve agreement between the powers'.
First
during
the
discussions
be
to
the
after
and
applied
comment could equally
World War. Although the Albanian nationalists and others made important and
based
for
there
on ethnic
a settlement
timely contributions, and
was some room
367
policies may also have indirectly served the interest of the small state, but this
Great
in
determining
their
their
course.
power
chosen
primary
was not
concern
They
to
idealistic.
determined
policy
according
representatives were realistic not
their own interests,
and anticipated
advantages
fit
to
Albanian
British
the
For
well
question seems
policy on
example,
sentiment.
805
The British intended to maintain what they
the theory of defensive realism.
British
to
in
Europe,
balance
the
naval
maintain
and
of power
saw as
Balkans
in
the
Adriatic
location
the
Albania's
was,
and
on
strategic
supremacy.
805 For further discussion of the reasons for, and implications of, offensive and defensive
Schroeder's
W.
`Paul
for
H.
M.
Scott,
in
the
example
great power system see
realistic practices
663(1994),
from
Vienna',
Review,
16
View
International
History
The
System:
pp.
International
523-40.
Europe',
'Defensive
Realism
Concert
Rendell,
the
666-8
pp.
and
of
80, esp. pp.
and
368
although perhaps only of indirect interest to Britain, still a matter for concern,
because it had the potential to impact on these important direct interests. British
policy thus set out to ensure that the declining Ottoman and Hapsburg empires
would not be replaced by a dominant Russia, and, after 1918, by a dominant
Italy, in the Balkans, the Adriatic and the eastern Mediterranean. British policymakers thus sought to bolster those states, whether great powers or small
states, that they viewed as the best instruments for achieving these objectives
at any particular point. To achieve these goals, they were prepared to work with
other states and compromise other lesser objectives. When an independent
Albania would help achieve these goals, as in 1912-13 and again in 1921,
British policy was generally supportive; whereas when an independent Albania
was perceived as compromising these goals, as in 1919, it was opposed. In
1919, Foreign Office support shifted to the Yugoslav and Greek small-state
nationalisms, as it was then considered that these states would provide a better
counterbalance to the 'Italians. By comparison, the Italians persistently, and
in
London
Pact, pursued offensive-realist practices in pursuit
the
most notably
of their goals. At the 1912-13 conferences, they were prepared to work with the
Austrians and other powers, but this soon gave way to more aggressive
tendencies. They returned to a theoretically less aggressive stance only in
1919, when the high degree of opposition to their ambitions from stronger great
Italian
Consulta,
For
the
became
policy goals were naturally
manifest.
powers
be
1921,
to
by
had
They
although
clearly resurfaced
always paramount.
for
to
they
by
different
approval
secure
managed
means, when
accomplished
Albanian
thereby
fully
idea
the
to
and
state,
their plan
of a
sovereign
circumvent
interests.
their
safeguard
369
The Balkan small states, as R. W. Seton-Watson and Farrar have pointed out
(although it is obvious enough), also operated within a Balkan small-states
system, which functioned in a similar manner to the larger European greatpower system. Their ambitions, rivalries and actions were not so much about
national or ethnic goals, as about their strength and security in their relations
806
Again, realist tendencies
with one another, and also with the great powers.
can be seen to have predominated throughout-most
decisions about entry into the First World War. By 1920, the Tirana government
appears to have been acting in a similar manner to these other small states, in
seeking to secure its position in the Balkan states system.
(iv) Early twentieth-century criteria for statehood and the role of language in
Albania's
`national'
frontiers
about
ethnic
shaping views
or
For great-power policy makers in early twentieth century Europe, nationality
has
It
language
been
have
to
and ethnicity.
synonymous with
would appear
in
the
ideas
their
these
been
that
period
pinnacle
were
at
supposed
generally
President
by
War,
World
First
the
and were most cogently articulated
after
Wilson. In reality, as this study has demonstrated, European great-power
in
Wilsonian-style
1919
had
self-determination
already adopted
representatives
`mother`ethnographic'
the
discussions
and
their
establishment of an
regarding
but
differed
have
The
1914.
before
tongue' Albanian state well
phraseology may
in
live
to
for
Albanian
being
idea
the
speakers
all
the rhetoric was very similar:
the
the
that
Thus
of
Albanian
consideration
independent
see
we
state.
an
in
developments
War
World
First
before
the
produced major
Albanian question
in
in
having
thought
effect,
was,
what
how great powers
about small states, and
806See for example R. W. Seton-Watson, A History of Roumania from Roman Times to the
Apathy',
Also
Farrar,
`Aggression
1934),
438;
(Cambridge,
p.
Unity
versus
at
p.
Completion of
269.
370
the German `primordial' model applied to such nationalisms. During the First
World War, these ideas were canvassed more widely (though
of course not
applied in practice to Albania), and the Paris Peace Conference accepted
language as the major indicator of nationality. However, in the
case of Albania,
and for the reasons already given, in the initial discussions of 1919, the
connection was not made with those earlier considerations of the Albanian
question, which had been based on similar principles of nationality, or with the
problems that had been posed by using a language-based definition of
nationality.
Briefly stated, the theory was that each linguistically-distinct group had the right
to self-determination
in
advocating an `ethnic'
policy makers persisted
language
This
based
boundaries,
the
principle.
on
settlement of statehood and
for
inadequate
this
having
been
its
in
criterion
recognised
as
an
of
spite
was
In
Albanian
the
during
addition,
of
and other questions.
consideration
purpose
807For similar ideas see Verdery, `Ethnicity', p. 40 and Sharp, `Genie', p. 23.
371
interests to do so.
Meanwhile, policy makers in small states and interested great powers took
a
more diverse approach to the ethnic basis of states. Some of the Albanian ideas
appear similar to the theories articulated by great power statesmen and officials,
especially their insistence on oral as opposed to written language. The policy
makers in other small states took an alternative view that was largely dependent
upon their own interests. For the Greeks, for instance, religion remained the
prime indicator of nationality. At Paris in 1919, they refused to consider the
language test, and instead pointed to the large number of prominent Greeks
808
`Albanian'
by
`descent',
but
In
who were
regarded as `Greek' by `religion'.
short, there remained much confusion and inconsistency over the criteria for
determining nationality, and this left politicians in both great and small states
free to shape their attitudes according to what was most expedient.
Concluding
There has been considerable debate on what role ethnicity should play in
defining national boundaries (particularly where ethnicity is defined in narrow
linguistic terms), and how far the `primordial' model of national identity can be
for
instance,
have
been
Hylland
Eriksen,
Gellner
particularly critical
and
applied.
808Council of Ten minutes, 3 Feb. 1919, FRUS PPC, III, p. 860; Nicolson, Peacemaking, pp.
255-6.
372
in
809Hylland Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism, pp. 1-4,161-2; Gellner, Nations and Nationalism,
pp. 534.
0 0. Zimmer, `Boundary mechanisms and symbolic resources: towards a process-orientated
R.
Brubaker,
173-93;
(2003),
9
Nationalism,
Nations
identity',
pp.
to
and
national
approach
Ethnicity without Groups (Cambridge, Mass., 2004).
811Duijzings, Religion and Politics, pp. 13-9.
812R. Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New
47.
Verdery,
`Ethnicity',
204;
1996),
p.
(Cambridge,
p.
Europe
373
between
1912
1914,
the
boundary
particular
and
commissioners
often had only
rudimentary
ethnographic
knowledge
and expertise,
maps.
It was
therefore
difficult
in practice
to
refine the
broad
ethnographic
frontiers
elsewhere,
especially
using
boundary
in
that
to
those
arose
commissions, also came up against similar problems
Albania before and after the First World War. The idea that there were tidy
by
boundary
determined
be
frontiers
just
to
commissioners
waiting
ethnographic
from the great powers hardly survived these practical experiences on the
ground.
indeed
(strategic,
and
economic
political,
criteria
and
priorities
None
the
had
to
decision-makers
great-power
of
the
consider.
cultural) which all
that
the
to
objectives
national
or
ethnic
committed
entirely
were
representatives
their
into
these
own geowith
conflict
came
they proclaimed, especially when
813Wilkinson, Maps and Politics, pp. 316-7.
374
Russian
of short-term expediency.
Serbian
their
interests
the
in
1912-13,
client-state
of
support
not,
officials could
Russia
for
without
and
unprepared,
yet
was
as
which
a
war
without risking
France
its
especially
and
the
partners,
power-political
of
support
alienating
the
the
to
of
merits
Britain. These great-power calculations, wholly extraneous
initial
the
in
instrumental
largely
creation of an
securing
Albanian case, were
375
Paris, Sir Eyre Crowe responded to the suggestion that ethnic considerations
should always take precedence over strategic ones, and his comment will stand
He
fitting
for
this
stated that `in preparing the treaties, they
as a
study.
epitaph
had to make compromises on all points', and enquired: `Why maintain that in
this question
particularly
141.
It,
DBFP,
1919,
Nov.
1
Delegations
no.
Heads
815Crowe, Council of
minutes,
of
376
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
The places mentioned have various spellings, both in Balkan languages and
others. The spellings of place names used in the thesis are those most
commonly used by the British Foreign Office at the time, except where common
dictates
Listed
below
otherwise.
are the names, with some alternatives,
usage
of places that appear regularly in the text.
Used in Thesis
Towns
Alessio
Lezhe, Lezha
Argyrocastro
Cavaya
Cettinje
Cetinje, Cettigne
Chimara
Delvino
Delvine, Delvina
Dibra
Der,
Djakova
Durazzo
Fiume
Rijeka
Ipek
Janina
Kalkandelen
Kolonia
Kolonje, Kolonja
Koritza
Kruja
Debar, Debra
377
Used in Thesis
Leskoviki
Luma
Liouma, Ljuma
Monastir
Nish
Nis
Podgorica
Pogradec
Pola
Pula
Prishtina
Prizrend
Salonika
San Giovanni
di Medua
Shengjin
Santa Quaranta
Scutari
Spalato
Split
Tepelena
Tirana
Tirane
Uskub
Valona
Voskopoja
Zara
Zadar
378
Used in Thesis
(Some regions are named after one of the main towns. Where this is the case,
for example Monastir, please see list above. )
Boyana
Chameria
Decani
Drin
Drina, Drini
Gusinje
Kefalu
Kephali
Kosovo*
Novi Bazar
Ochrida
Plava
Plave
Saseno
Sazen, Sasseno
Skumbi
Stylos
Phtelia, Stilo
Vermosh
Vermoc, Vermoshi
Voyussa
Note
text,
in
Kosova
the
on
see
both
Kosovo
please
the
and
special use of
* For explanation of
Spellings, p. 13.
379
Used in Thesis
Albanie, Shgiperia
Albanians
Kosova*
Vlachs
Aroumanians, Kutzo-Vlachs
Note
text,
on
Kosova
in
the
see
Kosovo
both
please
the
and
special use of
* For explanation of
Spellings, p. 13.
380
381
Russian Ambassador
to Britain from
1903-1917, having
subject to much criticism for his anti-Greek views. His death in November
1913, whilst delaying the commission, eventually made a compromise on
the southern Albanian boundary easier to facilitate.
Isa bey Boletin (Boletini) (1864-1916)
Boletin was one of the great Kosovan freedom fighters. Although he
initially supported the Young Turks, he participated in various resistance
activities, often in collusion with the Serbs, during the first Balkan war. He
Ismail
Kemal's
his
troops
of
was a member
provisional government, and
defended Wilhelm of Wied until his departure from Albania in September
1914. He fought with the Serbs in the First World War and was later
interned in Podgorica, where he is said to have been killed in a shootout.
Bishop Luigj (Luigi) Bumci (1872 -1945)
He was the nephew of the Albanian writer Pashko Vasa and an important
He
in
1912.
Alessio
Bishop
became
leader,
Catholic
of
and
political and
in
Conference
Peace
Paris
to
the
Catholic
and
representative
was the
d'etat,
1921
December
in
the
He
Regency.
High
coup
the
participated
He
(1924).
then
by
Zogu's
from
himself
but was
coup
office
removed
life.
into
from
ecclesiastical
politics and retired
withdrew
382
war cabinet.
383
Clerk served as acting first secretary in the Ottoman Empire from 19101912, when he returned to the post of clerk in the Foreign Office,
and
became a senior clerk in 1913. In 1919 he became private
secretary to
Lord Curzon, when the later was acting Foreign Secretary. He
continued
to have an illustrious career, holding a variety of positions in the
Diplomatic service. He became an important diplomatic figure in the
building of the `New Europe', being involved in strengthening British ties
with Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Turkey.
Committee for the National Defence of Kosovo (Komiteti Mbrojta Kombetare
e
Kosoves)
The Committee was founded on 1 May 1918 with the aim of promoting
Kosovan interests in the eyes of the great powers. The Committee
considered that other Albanian representatives were not doing this. It
also sought to foster an uprising in Kosovo against Serbian rule under its
leaders, who included Hoxhe Kadriu, Hasan Prishtina, Bajram Curri and
Avni Rystemi. In November 1918, it moved its headquarters to Scutari to
help facilitate military and political action. On 6 March 1919, the
Committee called for a general uprising in Kosovo. This led to a largeDrenica,
10,000
but
involving
the uprising
rebels,
scale revolt at
some
by
Yugoslav
forces
brutally
to
as
an
example
other ethnic
crushed
was
minorities within the new state.
Sir Eyre Crowe (1864-1925)
Crowe was a career civil servant. He held a variety of positions in the
British Foreign Office, rising to Permanent Under-Secretary of State (in
November 1920). At the Paris Peace Conference, he was a Minister
384
Plenipotentiary and became the head of the British delegation after the
Committee.
Suleiman bey Delvina
Lushnje
following
the
Albanian
He was Prime Minister of the
government
lljaz
bey
by
he
1920,
November
was replaced
Congress until
when
385
Cross.
Victoria
the
was awarded
386
(1914).
Initially a supporter
of Slav nationalism,
her
sympathies turned towards the Albanians following her first visit there in
1909. In 1912 she founded the Anglo-Albanian Society with Aubrey
Herbert and became its secretary. Despite being unable to visit Albania
after 1921, for health reasons, she continued to campaign on Albanian
issues until her death. She is believed to have written over eight hundred
letters on Albanian issues.
Akif Pasha Elbasani
He came from a prominent Bektashi family and played an active role in
in
Minister
Interior
He
the
the
Albanian
of
was
nationalist activities.
many
Prince Wilhelm's government after Essad Pasha's exile, and never
1915,
In
he
left
Albania.
Wilhelm
had
the
was
post even after
resigned
387
influential
in establishing
the
National
Commission of Initiative.
Sir Francis Elliot (1857-1948)
from
November
1903
until the
dethronement
of
King
388
and Janina.
In 1882, he became
head of censorship in
was
commission
British delegate
(July-December
on the
Albanian
northern
boundary
1914). He had
British
Attache
been
Military
to
the
(1911-1914)
embassy at
previously
Rome, and the Legation at Berne. In March 1915, he was temporarily
raised to Brigadier-General.
Captain Duncan Heaton-Armstrong (1886-1969)
Heaton-Armstrong became Wilhelm of Wied's private secretary in 1913,
In
for
the
European-wide
in
position.
having taken part
competition
a
Neuwied
back
to
Wilhelm's
and
he
1914,
August
children
escorted
for
the
interned
He
of
rest
British
first
was
became the
of
war.
prisoner
the war.
389
be the
inspiration
for the
legendary
John
Buchan character
Greenmantle.
Count Guglielmo Imperiali (1858-1944)
Imperiali was Italian Ambassador in Constantinople from 1904 to 1910,
and then in London from 1910 to 1920. In London, he played a significant
role in bringing Italy into the First World War and negotiating the Pact of
London (1915).
Dr. Douglas Johnson
Dr. Johnson was the most influential American advisor to Wilson on
Albanian and Balkan questions at the Paris Peace Conference. After he
left the Conference (June 1919), to return to teaching at Columbia
University, the Americans had no experts on Albanian or Bulgarian
kept
informed
the
his
departure,
he
Even
of
well
was
after
questions.
diplomatic exchanges, and he continued to prepare memoranda for the
State Department.
Hoxhe Kadriu (1878-1925) (Also known as Kadri Lutfulla Prishtina)
Having spent some years in prison for political activities, Kadriu worked
Following
banker.
finally,
law
lawyer,
as a
and,
professor of
as a
Albanian independence, he moved to Scutari (1914), where he continued
390
391
governments. During the First World War, he was one of the Albanian
nationalists most active in bringing Albanian issues to the notice of the
great powers.
Leon Krajewsky
Krajewsky was of Polish descent, and persistently pro-Slav in his actions.
He was the French representative on the international commission of
control (1913-14), having been French Consul at Cettinje before the first
Balkan war. In the First World War, he became personal representative
to Essad Pasha, and he served as the French technical expert on the
Greek committee in 1919.
Auguste Kral
Kral was the Austrian
representative
appointed
British
representative
on the
international
control
from
October
Office
Foreign
the
He
in
Albania.
worked at
commission
1914 until November 1915, when he was placed in charge of the British
Adriatic Mission. In January 1920, he was appointed chief political officer
Constantinople,
in
Commissioner
High
British
soon
and
to
the
attached
became Assistant High Commissioner.
A. W. Allen Leeper (1887-1935)
the
to
1918
Office
in
Foreign
the
attached
and was
Leeper entered
draft
helped
he
PID,
the
policy
where
South-eastern European section of
392
Wilhelmstrasse for working too closely with his British colleagues and
for
Austria-Hungary.
advocating against support
Baron Giacomo de Martino
in
Wied
Wilhelm
to
Italian
of
De Martino was personal
representative
Paris
the
Committee
Greek
in
the
at
1914. He 'led the Italian negotiators
London,
to
Ambassador
Italian
became
1920
in
Peace Conference, and
Washington.
later
to
and
Count Albert von Mensdorff (1861-1945)
In
1886.
in
diplomatic
service
Mensdorff entered the Austro-Hungarian
he
1914
to
1904
from
served
1889 he was transferred to London, where
393
friendly
between
relationships
the
British
and Austrian
Affairs
(1910-16),
having
previously
seen
service
in
394
section of the PID, where he was one of the officials responsible for
drafting British policy regarding Greece, including Albania, and he
served
as technical expert on the Greek Committee. He later decided that
diplomatic life was not for him. Having left the service, he wrote a number
to the Albanian
Minister
Prime
of
and
395
as Prime
Thereafter,
1921).
Zogu
in
1933.
by
of
an
agent
assassinated
Sir Rennell Rodd, from 1933 Baron Rennell (1858-1941)
Rodd was British Ambassador in Rome from 1909-19, having previously
in
influential
He
Stockholm.
Oslo
Berlin,
in
Paris,
getting
was
and
served
diplomatic
left
He
1915.
the
in
London
Pact
the
to
Italians
the
of
sign
Egypt
to
British
but
in
1919
mission
nonetheless served on a
service
(1921-23).
Nations
League
to
the
Delegate
British
(1920) and as
of
396
(Skenderbeg,
Skenderbeu,
nationalists.
that
the
for
bribe),
(allegedly
Montenegrins
garrison
the
of
to
a
surrender,
397
398
399
400
went into exile, first in Egypt, then Britain, then the United States and
finally settled in France, where he eventually died.
401
APPENDIX A:
The Ottoman Vilayets, including Kosovo, and the Newly
Independent State of Kosova817
4RZwSOMA
.r
tie-
r*lr
do,
Oa t'"
-1 elaw+i
KOSOVA
tAir loll
DER
i-..
4
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r'
'Ct. 1a.
!. r rss
,r
Ti
I
'4
TI
A
...,
+.
-'
~r
7f
]b
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`f
1`
II
INE
J'
)_
a. 1
C.
i,
ice. -
r
Vfl"W
A!
. sit
1y'L'aCii
_e
1r,
r"
817 http: //en wikipedia ora/wiki/Image-, Albanian Vilayets of Ottoman Empire. ipg: The newly
the
the
is
lines)
(shown
by
dashed
Kosova
of
size
about one quarter
independent state of
former Ottoman vilayet (shaded and with solid lines).
402
APPENDIX B:
Austro-Italian and Russian Proposals,
Albanian Claims and the Agreed Boundaries818
19
20
cl
rvitza
eLCII,
."
ne
Piishtina
,
41l
pP-
,;
..
v%%Dpakf)
-.
u aril
ia"N
`.
.
Imo,
'
`
<<
r
"
v,
j
II!
,',
F'
.f+.
slflib
Sko 1yi!
",
42
or*
San
Gim,
-amii
",
1l
t"
U PI'C-dit
o
.:
PfflP p
llr
//
'
'
Elbas
y
Trt 'ti
ONA.STaR
"
,
41
f"
y,
LvPr "s
kf
erst
/,
te.
""
--`', f
ions
Knritza
o
dent 7a
oFlorina
+
"
It
Q+
-4
"
0'
Vanina.
%v.
.
"
Boundarie:
e...
".
" .
+"
_,,.,
e0*
r"""
Frontiersfired b} Ambassadors'
Conference
and Boundarl
1912-1914
Commissions
"
Scalein Miles
10
20
20_
4(l
818Based on Balkan Map 13, US Commission, DOS, RG 256; Similar versions can be found at
H. C. Woods, `Albania and the Albanians', The Geographical Review, 5 (1918), pp. 257-273, at
168.
Albania,
Dako,
259
p.
and
p.
403
APPENDIX C:
The Florence Protocol (17 December 1913)$19
Description of the frontier line:
The frontier starts from point C (on the Austrian map, hill 1738 north-east of
MANDRA NIKOLICA) where the southern frontier of kaza KORITZA joins the
summit of GRAMMOS. It goes towards the south following the summit of
GRAMMOS as far as MAVRI PETRA, from there it passes the hills 2536 and
2019 and reaches GOLO. From there, after following the river alongside hill
1740, it passes between the villages of RADATI and KURSAKA, it goes towards
the hill found to the north-east of KUKESI from where it goes downhill in order
to reach the SARANDAPOROS.
It follows the river until it reaches its mouth in the VOJUSSA from where it
TUMBA,
between
the villages of
to
the
top
of
continues
mount
passing
ZIPALICA and MESSARIA and over hills 956 and 2000.
From the top of mount TUMBA the frontier goes towards the west over hill 1621
ZIRMAZES.
the
to
of
north
passing
From there it follows the river to the hilltop which is found to the north-east of
information
to
the
(previously
EPISKOPI
on
the village of
annexed according
between
to
the
keeping
the
towards
it
from
ridge
there
the map)
south
goes
into
falls
Greece.
It
in
is
GAIDOHOR,
Albania,
which
RADATI, which is in
and
KAKAVIA,
hill
the
a
the
above
the ZRINOS valley, crosses
river and climbs
VALTISTA
leaving
follows
It
this
and
Albania.
in
is
river,
new
village which
Guy],
D.
by
French
from
[trans.
the
Session'
Fifteenth
819`Annex to the Official Report of the
78
F0881/10355X,
Also
F093/1/36:
p.
1913,
Dec.
17
at
SAC minutes,
404
From there it reaches STUGARA, and then VERTOP and hill 750, leaving
JANIARI and VERVA in Albania. It passes over hills 1014,675 and 839 and
leaving
KONISPOLI
in
Albania.
follows
the
It
towards
the
north-east,
goes
finally
STILO,
ORBA
hills
and
reaches hill 254 before turning south
summit of
and reaching PHTELIA bay.
405
APPENDIX D:
Selected Extracts from the Pact of London (26 April 1915)820
ARTICLE 1:
A military convention shall be immediately concluded between the General
Staffs of France, Great Britain, Italy and Russia. This convention shall settle the
forces
be
Russia
by
to
military
employed
number
of
against Austriaminimum
Hungary in order to prevent that Power from concentrating all its strength
in
Russia
deciding
direct
her
Italy,
the
to
event of
principal effort against
against
Germany.
ARTICLE 2:
On her part, Italy undertakes to use her entire resources for the purpose of
their
Russia
Britain
Great
France,
jointly
all
against
and
with
waging war
enemies.
ARTICLE 3:
The French and British fleets shall render active and permanent assistance to
Italy.
ARTICLE 4:
Tyrol
Cisalpine
Trentino,
the
with
Under the Treaty of Peace, Italy shall obtain
Gorizia
the
Trieste,
of
counties
its geographical and natural frontier, as well as
the
Volosca
including
and
Quarnero
far
the
Istria
and
Gradisca,
as
as
all
and
Plaknik,
islands
the
of
Lussin,
small
Cherso
as
well
as
islands
Istrian
and
of
2VII,
671,
Cmd.
1920),
Papers,
820Parliamentary Debates: House of Commons (Parliamentary
7.
406
ARTICLE 5:
Italy shall
also
be given
the
province
of Dalmatia within
its present
administrative boundaries.
ARTICLE 6:
Italy shall receive full sovereignty over Valona, the island of Saseno and
surrounding territory.
ARTICLE 7:
Should Italy obtain the Trentino and Istria in accordance with the provisions of
Article 4, together with Dalmatia and the Adriatic islands within the limits
specified in Article 5, and the Bay of Valona (Article 6), and if the central portion
of Albania is reserved for the establishment of a small autonomous neutralised
State, Italy shall not oppose the division of Northern and Southern Albania
between Montenegro, Serbia, and Greece.
ARTICLE 8:
Italy shall receive entire sovereignty over the Dodecanese Islands which she is
at present occupying.
407
ARTICLE 9:
Generally speaking, France, Great Britain and Russia recognise that... in the
event of total or partial partition of Turkey in Asia, she ought to obtain a just
share of the Mediterranean region adjacent to the province of Adalia.
ARTICLE 11:
Italy shall receive a share of any eventual war indemnity corresponding to their
efforts and her sacrifices.
ARTICLE 13:
In the event of France and Great Britain increasing their colonial territories in
Africa at the expense of Germany, these two Powers agree in principle that Italy
may claim some equitable compensation.
ARTICLE 14:
Great Britain undertakes to facilitate the immediate conclusion, under equitable
50,000,000
least
loan
pounds.
at
of
of
a
conditions,
ARTICLE 16:
The present arrangement shall be held secret.
Alliance
Triple
the
denounced
and
Italian
[On 3 May 1915 the
government
23
May
On
1915.
May
10
Entente
the
on
powers
with
agreement
a
naval
signed
Austria-Hungary
declared
war on
1915 Italy mobilised and
and severed
declare
did
but
1915),
May
(24
war on
Germany
not
diplomatic relations with
]
1916.
August
28
Germany until
408
APPENDIX E:
Wilson's Fourteen Points
(delivered in a Joint Session of Congress, 8 January 1918)
I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be
no
private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed
always frankly and in the public view.
II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike
in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by
international action for the enforcement of international covenants.
Ill. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the
establishment
for
its
to
the
themselves
consenting
peace and associating
maintenance.
IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national agreements will be
domestic
lowest
to
the
safety.
consistent
with
point
reduced
409
VI. The evacuation of all 'Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions
affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other
nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed
opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development
and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free
nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome,
assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The
treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be
the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as
distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish
sympathy.
VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored,
in
limit
the
to
sovereignty which she enjoys common with all
without any attempt
to
this
No
free
restore
serve
will
other single act will serve as
nations.
other
have
themselves
laws
they
in
the
the
set
and
which
nations
among
confidence
Without
this
their
for
the
another.
determined
relations with one
government of
forever
is
law
international
healing act the whole structure and validity of
impaired.
invaded
the
freed
and
be
restored,
portions
French
territory
and
VIII. All
should
Alsace-Lorraine,
in
1871
the
in
Prussia
by
of
matter
the wrong done to France
be
fifty
for
should
the
years,
nearly
the
world
has
of
peace
unsettled
which
interest
in
the
be
of
secure
made
that
more
in
once
peace may
order
righted,
all.
410
historically
established
lines
of
allegiance
and
nationality;
and
XII. The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a
but
the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule
secure sovereignty,
should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested
opportunity
of autonomous
free
passage to the ships and commerce of all
permanently opened as a
international
guarantees.
nations under
XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the
territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assure
the
to
and
free
economic
political
whose
sea,
and
access
secure
and
a
by
international
be
integrity
territorial
independence and
guaranteed
should
covenant.
411
formed
be
XIV. A general association of nations must
under specific covenants
for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and
territorial integrity to great and small states alike.
412
APPENDIX F:
Draft Mandate for Albania (9 December 1919)821
The United States, British and French Governments desire to recognise the
independence of the Albanian State. They consider that the State of Albania will
in
indicated
4
Article
to
the
22 of the Covenant of
extent
paragraph
of
require,
the League of Nations, `the administrative advice and assistance' of one of the
Great Powers. For this task Italy, by her geographical situation and economic
is
indicated.
primarily
capacity,
The United States, British and French Governments are anxious, therefore, to
implied
Albania
State
the
Mandate
the
Italy
to
conditions
under
of
over
a
entrust
in the Covenant of the League of Nations. They consider that these conditions
be
Mandate
this
Italy's
basis
form
the
and should
acceptance of
of
should
Government
Italian
between
the
be
Convention
to
in
and
concluded
a
embodied
headings
The
Powers.
Associated
Allied
Principal
the
Governments
the
and
of
following:
be
the
Convention
would
of such a
frontiers
the
State
independent
is
within
(1) Albania
recognised as an
in
these
Nothing
body
the
in
the
indicated
covering memorandum.
of
stipulations
negotiation
rectifications
shall,
with
however,
the
prevent
the Albanian
Serb-Croat-Slovene
State
State from
such
regional
local
in
and
be
ethnographic
with
accord
as may
economic requirements.
to
have
the
Government
construct
right
shall
Serb-Croat-Slovene
The
(2)
41
Albania
Northern
of
parallel
through
north
and operate railways
152.
IV,
DBFP,
Dec.,
2
Curzon,
no.
821Document 2, Crowe to
413
shall forthwith
be established
consisting of a
414
the
of
administration,
of
country
the
and
legislative
and
exercise of
efficient
administrative
bodies
Under
recommendation
this
heading
would
be
included
any
might make as to
Mandatory Power shall have the right for a period of two years
form the date on which the Mandate is conferred, and pending the
forces
the
to
maintain armed
organisation of
native gendarmerie,
in the country. After that period the State of Albania shall be
be
to
Power
demilitarised,
shall
allowed
and
no
permanently
the
in
the
forces
the
of
sanction
without
country
maintain regular
Council of the League of Nations.
415
APPENDIX G:
A Modest Interpretation
Albanian
the
Speakers
Excluded
of
G" p
" M ON TENE
oNiksh,ch
"^
"""
C ,
"""".
Gu0
sinje
eteika
Cattarb
QI"S
cc iije
ill
40
"x
"r"/
/
W*jshtina
ovo
"
pek
Risano
k
;rots,`
t^'
"
l"""
Andri ev
"i
`'" ~ 'bd
(J'akova
4"
Uroshev
' i
'-
!
is
60000
6z
"
Mke
Sru
',
.vL
1S UTA1
%TARA
o
Andvari
Prizreni
17
'Kalkandel
n"
*y
0
fro'.
Shen- I
Shkura
`,
Kukuch
fC
Kuma
Usku
GQ,
t. va
"
"" :
Koprulu
'bra
Prilip
Duraz
aTnina
r"
""
"
Kavlja
ShkumbI
ecin
1.
lake
il i"r
Ochrida
PoSradets
r', S
Struva
09hrida
",
onastir
akc
esra
"
,.F
oi
'
.
ra
Salo
BiQA
Berat
PASS
Eksisu
Gad
?"
:1
R`
SASO
Vona
"'
Il
I
'
r0
K/etsoure
W,
k1
Otranto
Va
"e.
i`
%'
C t"l
CORF
,;
Santi
Ouaranta
r, e1
fJanrna
.i
0 141
.h
.
Paramy4ia
REFERENCE
Eoundarirsbe{oe 13
---- -13
1
ter Bnunriares
i3 . -.
of
Boundary line proposed by
Provisional Albanian ovcrnmcnt
(19I3)followingethnographica!lines
..
ea
0*
+
cQ
1Q]
'E
Railways
. ----- ------ScaleWes s0
mctrc_ 50
10 2
------ - ----IR 70 30 40
30
40
eS
PrCVC7a
53
61 Y
e", es
822Temperley, History of the Peace Conference, IV, p. 338 [Kindly reproduced with permission
]
Affairs.
International
Institute
Royal
of
of the
416
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