Challenges

and opportuni1es
Trends to address
New concepts for:

Oensive sea control

Sea-based AAW
Weapons development
Increasing oensive sea control capacity
Addressing defensive and constabulary missions

Capability and program implica1ons

Text

 In 2001, the Navy planned a new surface

warfare approach
New family of CG(X), DD(X), LCS
Employing Network-centric warfare
All three ships now cancelled/truncated

Navy has an opportunity to implement new

surface warfare concept
Final specicaHons for Flight III DDG-51
Concept and design of follow-on SSC and
modicaHons to LCS
Phased modernizaHon of remaining CGs
New weapons and sensors

This study proposes a plan focused on:

Large and small surface combatants
Results possible by mid-2020s

China the pacing challenge but not the only, or most likely, A2/AD threat
the surface forces will face

Iran shows less capable militaries can combine geography and re and
forget weapons to make an eecDve A2/AD network

Number of Ac1ve Conicts

40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
1950

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

Types of Ac1ve Conicts

100%

9%

13%

20%

80%
60%

53%

67%
16%
23%

0%
1946
Extrasystemic Conict

38%

57%

40%
20%

28%

67%

55%

23%
6%
1961
Interstate Conict

13%
1976
Internal Conict

5%

7%

1991
2006
InternaHonalized internal conict

Proxy, paramilitary, and indirect conicts on the rise

900,000

Millions of FY2015 $

800,000

Historical Budget Authori1es

Army

Navy

Air Force

Defense Wide

OIF/OEF DRAWDOWN

700,000

DoD-wide

COLD WAR DRAWDOWN

600,000
500,000
400,000

VIETNAM DRAWDOWN

KOREA DRAWDOWN

Air Force

300,000

Navy

200,000
100,000

Army

Percent of Budget by Category

100%
90%

Historical Budget Authori1es as Percent of Total DoN Budget Authority

Other Spending

80%
70%

R&D and Procurement

60%
50%
40%

Opera1ons and Maintenance

30%
20%
10%
0%

MILPERS
DoN Share of Healthcare

Budgets unlikely to rise; pressure conDnues on R&D and procurement

 Cold War Outer Air Bacle

Enabled carriers to approach within striking distance of Russia
Surface eets contribuHon was Up, Out and Down
Ships & aircrag able to engage Soviet bombers outside anH-ship missile range

Surface-Launched Missile Threat to U.S. Surface Combatants

Range:

50 nm

100 nm

150 nm

200 nm

250 nm

300 nm

200 nm

250 nm

300 nm

Variation in Y-values is for illustration only,

not intended to reflect relative altitude

SS-N-19
BrahMos

Tondar

Karus
Nasr
Kosar

C-801
C-701 C-704

Enemy
Combatant

Range:

Enemy
Combatant

50 nm

100 nm

150 nm

U.S. Surface
Combatant
Naval Strike Missile range from IHS Janes Navy International. All other ranges from IHS Janes Defence: Weapons database.
* RGM-84L, a Harpoon Block II variant, is the only variant in service with the U.S. Navy.
** Extended-range Harpoon Block I variant previously in U.S. and foreign service.

 Surface combatants will conduct bulk of sea control

Subs, carriers, amphibious ships conducHng power projecHon in future scenarios

Defeat enemy weapon launchers, not just enemy weapons

BAMS

SM-6

Future Anti-Ship Missile

Secure Data Link

DDG

Future Anti-Submarine
Weapon

TAGOS

Mission

Number

100

Long-range
SM-6
Defensive AAW

16

90

Mid-range
SM-2
Defensive AAW

32

80

ESSM

32 (8 cells)

BMD

SM-3

Strike

Tomahawk

24

SUW

Harpoon

8 non-VLS

ASW

VLA

10

70
Successful Engagements

Missile

60
50

S-L-S

SS-L-S

40
30
20
10
0
0.0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

Defending Missile Single Shot Pk

0.7

0.8

0.9

1.0

 Shig to a single, dense defensive AAW layer

Smaller interceptors; just as capable and more numerous as longer range
Acknowledges challenges against OTH targets
Enables integraHon of lasers, railgun and electronic warfare

Long-range interceptors used for oensive AAW

ASBM

EMRG

30 nm
Defensive AAW
5 nm

ASCM Salvo

Ship Self-Defense

Laser

RAM

LCS

ESSM

DDG
JHSV

CIWS

LCS

 Shig defensive AAW to ~30 nm range

Smaller ESSM-like interceptor
EW systems
Laser
ElectromagneHc railgun (EMRG)

Laser on some Flight III DDG-51

300-500 kW able to conduct air defense
Needed power and cooling (~1500kW)
too high for other ships

EM railgun on JHSV, DDG-1000

32 MJ able to conduct air defense, strike
Power requirement of 17MW
64 MJ EMRG on DDG-1000 for strike

Mission

Missile (replacement)

Number

Oensive AAW

SM-6

32

Defensive AAW

ESSM Blk II

96 (24 cells)

BMD

SM-3

Strike

Tomahawk (NGLAW)

24

SUW

Harpoon (LRASM)

8 non-VLS

ASW

VLA (None)

10

More capacity needed

from each VLS cell

Emphasize:
relevant capability
mulH-mission
applicability
smaller size; > 1 per cell

Planned soluHons are

large, single-
mission weapons

No ASW weapon able to
outrange sub-launched
anH-ship missiles
GeMng the most out of the ships main baOery the VLS magazine

Mission

Current Missile

Number

Future Missile

Number

Oensive AAW

SM-6

16

SM-6

42

Defensive AAW

SM-2

32

ESSM Blk II

96 (24 cells)

ESSM

32 (8 cells)

BMD

SM-3

SM-3

Strike

Tomahawk

24

LRASM

18

SUW

Harpoon

8 non-VLS

LRASM / SM

18/42

ASW

VLA

10

New ASW Missile

Mul1-mission LRASM

Long-range ASROC

SM-6 for oense

ESSM for defense

Ticonderoga (CG 47) Class Force Structure

30

25

Number Ship
of CCount
Gs

20

15

Phased Mod CGs

CG-47 Replacement
10

Operating CG 63-73
5

Operating CG 52-62

0
FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26 FY27 FY28 FY29 FY30 FY31 FY32 FY33 FY34 FY35 FY36 FY37 FY38 FY39 FY40 FY41 FY42 FY43
Fiscal YearYear
Fiscal

Cruiser phased modernizaDon needed for oensive sea control, air defense
commander capacity

Misawa Air Base

THAAD Batteries

Sasebo
Naval Base

Iwakuni Naval
Air Station

PAC-3 Batteries

Tokyo

Yokosuka Naval Base

Shore-based BMD systems should replace BMD ships in defense of xed

Cruiser phased modernizaDon needed for oensive sea control, air defense
locaDons overseas
commander

150 to 300 nm range engagement

Future An1-Ship Missile

Mutually-Supporting Air Defenses

Secure Data Link

Future An1-Submarine Weapon

Passive Listening

Variable Depth Sonar

Passive Towed Array

Enabling small surface combatants able to contribute to oensive sea

control with CGs and DDGs or on their own

160

Follow on SSC

SSC reqmt

LCS

140

120

PC
FFG

100

80

Large Surface Combatant reqmt

BMD sta1ons

DDG-1000
Future Large Surface
Combatant
DDG-51 Flight III

60

CSG escorts

DDG-51 Flight IIA

DDG-51 Flight II

40

DDG-51 Flight I
20

CG

FY14
FY15
FY16
FY17
FY18
FY19
FY20
FY21
FY22
FY23
FY24
FY25
FY26
FY27
FY28
FY29
FY30
FY31
FY32
FY33
FY34
FY35
FY36
FY37
FY38
FY39
FY40
FY41
FY42
FY43
FY44

Number of Surface Combatants

MCM

Growing SSC shorXall requires new approaches to escort, training and

security missions so CGs and DDGs can focus on oense

 Modify LCS to be the follow-on SSC

LCS Procurement
FY05

FY06

FY07

FY08

FY09

FY10

FY11

FY11

FY12

FY13

FY14

FY15

FY16

FY17

Follow-on SSC Procurement

FY19

FY20

FY21

FY22

FY23

FY24

FY25

Only one variant

Equip for defensive AAW, ASW and

SUW missions

VLS (24 cell)

3D radar (not SPY)
ASW mission package
Same gun

Upgrade selected LCS with VLS

 Evolve to dedicated LCS crews

Forward base 16 LCS

4 LCS

Upgrade selected LCS with VLS

Consider buying more JHSV
8 LCS

8 LCS

8 LCS
4 LCS

117
Days

117
Days

117
Days

117
Days

117
Days

117
Days

117
Days

LCS 1

Deployed

Homeport

LCS 3

Homeport

Deployed

Crew
101

LCS 1

O
Hull

LCS 3

Crew
102

O
Hull

LCS 3

LCS 1

Crew
103

LCS 3

LCS 1

O
Hull

LCS 1

LCS 1

117
Days

O
Hull

LCS 3

O
Hull

O
Hull

LCS 3

LCS 1

O
Hull

LCS 3

LCS 3

LCS 1

O
Hull

LCS 3

LCS 1

Deployed

Homeport

LCS forward

60-120 days

30 days

LCS CONUS

120-210 days

180 days

ShiZ LCS to dedicated crews; base some in todays overseas SSC ports

 Separate mission packages

from LCS program
Whole MCM mission package
Whole SUW mission package
Parts of ASW mission package

Add new mission packages

Electronic warfare
Humanitarian assistance
MariHme security

Consider expanding non-

combatant eet
Less expensive opHon for some
operaHons in low-threat
environments

 Challenges demand a new approach to surface warfare

Networked family of CG(X), DD(X), LCS no longer viable

Access threats increasing defensive demands on all surface combatants
Instability will increase demands for training, cooperaHon and security
Budgets will preclude new designed unHl 2030s

Navy has opportunity to implement a new surface eet concept

Flight III DDG-51

Follow-on SSC and modicaHons to LCS
Phased modernizaHon of CGs
New weapons and sensors (LRASM, AMDR variants, ESSM Block II, SEWIP)
PotenHal of the NaHonal Fleet

Surface eet must refocus on oensive sea control

CGs and DDGs equipped and available to defeat enemy plasorms

Restore ability of SSCs to do escort, training and constabulary missions

Restoring the surface eets ability to gain sea control, protect non-
combatant ships, train allies and partners, and secure sea lanes