CANON 1

A.M. No. 2385 March 8, 1989

JOSE TOLOSA, complainant,
vs.
ALFREDO CARGO, respondent.
RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:
On 7 April 1982, complainant Jose Tolosa filed with the Court an AffidavitComplaint dated 7 March 1982 seeking the disbarment of respondent District
Citizens' Attorney Alfredo Cargo for immorality. Complainant claimed that
respondent had been seeing his (complainant's) wife Priscilla M. Tolosa in his
house and elsewhere. Complainant further alleged that in June 1981, his
wife left his conjugal home and went to live with respondent at No. 45 Sisa
Street, Barrio Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila and that since then has
been living with respondent at that address.
Complying with an order of this Court, respondent filed a "Comment and/or
Answer" dated 13 May 1982 denying the allegations of complainant.
Respondent acknowledged that complainant's wife had been seeing him but
that she bad done so in the course of seeking advice from respondent (in
view of the continuous cruelty and unwarranted marital accusations of affiant
[complainant] against her), much as complainant's mother-in-law had also
frequently sought the advice of respondent and of his wife and mother as to
what to do about the" continuous quarrels between affiant and his wife and
the beatings and physical injuries (sometimes less serious) that the latter
sustained from the former." (Rollo, p. 8).
Complainant filed a Reply dated 16 June 1982 to respondent's "Comment
and/or Answer" and made a number of further allegations, to wit:
(a) That complainant's wife was not the only
mistress that respondent had taken;
(b) That respondent had paid for the hospital and
medical bills of complainant's wife last May 1981,
and visited her at the hospital everyday;

(c) That he had several times pressed his wife to

stop seeing respondent but that she had refused to
do so;
(d) That she had acquired new household and
electrical appliances where she was living although
she had no means of livelihood; and
(e) That respondent was paying for his wife's house
rent.
Respondent filed a Rejoinder on 19 July 1982, denying the further
allegations of complainant, and stating that he (respondent) had merely
given complainant's wife the amount of P35.00 by way of financial assistance
during her confinement in the hospital.
By a Resolution dated 29 July 1982, the Court referred this case to the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. The Solicitor
General's office held a number of hearings which took place from 21 October
1982 until 1986, at which hearings complainant and respondent presented
evidence both testimonial and documentary.
The Solicitor General summed up what complainant sought to establish in
the following terms:
1. That respondent had been courting his wife,
Priscilla (tsn, May 12, 1982, p. 9).
2. That he actually saw them together holding hands
in l980 in Cubao and Sto. Domingo, Quezon City
(tsn, pp. 13-15, May 12, 1983).
3. That sometime in June, 1982, his wife left their
conjugal house at No. 1 Lopez Jaena Street, Galas,
Quezon City, to live with respondent at No. 45 Sisa
Street, Barrio Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila (tsn,
pp. 16- 17, May 12, 1983).
4. That while Priscilla was staying there, she
acquired household appliances which she could not
afford to buy as she has no source of income (tsn,
pp. 10-11, Sept. 10, 1985, Exh. 'M', N' and 'Q').

5. That when Priscilla was hospitalized in May, 1982,

at the FEU Hospital, respondent paid for her
expenses and took care of her (tsn, pp. 18-20, June
15, 1983). In fact, an incident between respondent
and complainant took place in said hospital (tsn, pp.
5-8, Sept. 20, 1983, Exhibits 'C' and 'C-l').
6. That an incident which was subject of a complaint
took place involving respondent and complainant at
No. 45 Sisa Street, Barrio Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro
Manila (tsn, pp. 8- 10, July 29, 1983; Exh. 'B', 'B-l'
and 'K').
7. That again in Quezon City, incidents involving
respondent and complainant were brought to the
attention of the police (Exhibits 'F' and 'G').
8. That Complainant filed an administrative case for
immorality against respondent with the CLAO and
that respondent was suspended for one year
(Exhibits 'D' and 'E'). (Rollo, pp. 33-35).
Respondent's defenses were summarized by the Solicitor General in the
following manner:
a) That Priscilla used to see respondent for advice
regarding her difficult relationship with complainant;
that Priscilla left complainant because she suffered
maltreatment, physical injuries and public
humiliation inflicted or caused by complainant;
b) That respondent was not courting Priscilla, nor
lived with her at No. 45 Sisa St., Tenejeros, Malabon,
Metro Manila; that the owner of the house where
Priscilla lived in Malabon was a friend and former
client whom respondent visited now and then;
c) That respondent only gave P35.00 to Priscilla in
the FEU Hospital, as assistance in her medical
expenses; that he reprimanded complainant for lying
on the bed of Priscilla in the hospital which led to
their being investigated by the security guards of the
hospital;

d) That it is not true that he was with Priscilla

holding hands with her in Cubao or Sto. Domingo
Church in 1980;
e) That Priscilla bought all the appliances in her
apartment at 45 Sisa Street, Tenejeros, Malabon,
Metro Manila from her earnings;
f) That it is not true that he ran after complainant
and tried to stab him at No. 1 Galas St., Quezon
City; that said incident was between Priscilla's
brother and complainant;
g) That it is also not true that he is always in 45 Sisa
St., Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila and/or he had
a quarrel with complainant at 45 Sisa St., Malabon;
that the quarrel was between Priscilla's brother,
Edgardo Miclat, and complainant; that respondent
went there only to intervene upon request of
complainant's wife (see tsn, June 21, 1984). (Rollo,
pp. 35-37).
The Solicitor General then submitted the following
FINDINGS
1. That complainant and Priscilla are spouses
residing at No.1 Lopez Jaena St., Galas, Quezon City.
2. That respondent's wife was their 'ninang' at their
marriage, and they (complainant and Priscilla)
considered respondent also their 'ninong'.
3. That respondent and complainant are neighbors,
their residences being one house away from each
other.
4. That respondent admitted that Priscilla used to
see him for advice, because of her differences with
complainant.
5. That Priscilla, in fact, left their conjugal house and
lived at No. 45 Sisa St., Barrio Tenejeros, Malabon,
Metro Manila; that the owner of the house where

Priscilla lived in Malabon is a friend and former client

of respondent.
6. That Priscilla indeed acquired appliances while she
was staying in Malabon.
7. That incidents involving respondent and
complainant had indeed happened.
8. That Priscilla returned to her mother's house later
in 1983 at No. 1 Lopez Jaena St., Galas, Quezon
City; but complainant was staying two or three
houses away in his mother's house.
9. That complainant filed an administrative case for
immorality against respondent in CLAO, where
respondent was found guilty and suspended for one
year. (Rollo, pp. 37-39).
In effect, the Solicitor General found that complainant's charges of
immorality had not been sustained by sufficient evidence. At the same time,
however, the Solicitor General found that the respondent had not been able
to explain satisfactorily the following:
1. Respondent's failure to avoid seeing Priscilla, in
spite of complainant's suspicion and/or jealousy that
he was having an affair with his wife.
2. Priscilla's being able to rent an apartment in
Malabon whose owner is admittedly a friend and
former client of respondent.
3. Respondent's failure to avoid going to Malabon to
visit his friend, in spite of his differences with
complainant.
4. Respondent's failure to avoid getting involved
invarious incidents involving complainant and
Priscilla's brothers (Exhs. 'B', B-1', 'F', 'G', ['G-1']
and ['I'])
5. Respondent's interest in seeing Priscilla in the
evening when she was confined in the FEU Hospital,

in spite again of his differences with complainant.

(Rollo, pp. 39-40).
Thus, the Solicitor General concluded that respondent had failed "to properly
deport himself by avoiding any possible action or behavior which may be
misinterpreted by complainant, thereby causing possible trouble in the
complainant's family," which behavior was "unbecoming of a lawyer and an
officer of the court." (Rollo, p. 40). The Solicitor General recommended that
respondent Atty. Alfredo Cargo be suspended from the practice of law for
three (3) months and be severely reprimanded.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the record does not contain
sufficient evidence to show that respondent had indeed been cohabiting with
complainant's wife or was otherwise guilty of acts of immorality. For this very
reason, we do not believe that the penalty of suspension from the practice of
law may be properly imposed upon respondent.
At the same time, the Court agrees that respondent should be reprimanded
for failure to comply with the rigorous standards of conduct appropriately
required from the members of the Bar and officers of the court. As officers of
the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must
also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance
with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a
member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain
from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses 1 but must also so
behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that
he is flouting those moral standards.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to REPRIMAND respondent attorney for
conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar and an officer of the court, and to
WARN him that continuation of the same or similar conduct will be dealt with
more severely in the future.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

M. No. 1334 November 28, 1989

ROSARIO DELOS REYES, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOSE B. AZNAR, respondent.
Federico A. Blay for complainant.
Luciano Babiera for respondent.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed against respondent on the ground of
gross immorality.
Complainant, a second year medical student of the Southwestern University
(Cebu), alleged in her verified complaint that respondent Atty. Jose B. Aznar,
then chairman of said university, had carnal knowledge of her for several
times under threat that she would fail in her Pathology subject if she would
not submit to respondent's lustful desires. Complainant further alleged that
when she became pregnant, respondent, through a certain Dr. Gil Ramas,
had her undergo forced abortion.
In compliance with the Resolution of the Court dated July 9, 1974,
respondent filed his Answer denying any personal knowledge of complainant
as well as all the allegations contained in the complaint and by way of
special defense, averred that complainant is a woman of loose morality.
On September 2, 1974, the Court Resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation.
The findings of the Solicitor General is summarized as follows:
EVIDENCE FOR THE COMPLAINANT
Complainant Rosario delos Reyes testified that:
1) she was a second year medical student of the
Southwestern University, the Chairman of the Board
of which was respondent Jose B. Aznar (pp. 11, 15,
tsn, June 6, 1975);

2) she however failed in her Pathology subject which

prompted her to approach respondent in the latter's
house who assured her that she would pass the said
subject (pp. 15,16, 26, 33, tsn, June 6, 1975);
3) despite this assurance, however, she failed (p. 33,
tsn, June 6, 1975);
4) sometime in February, 1973, respondent told her
that she should go with him to Manila, otherwise,
she would flunk in all her subjects (pp. 42, 50, tsn,
June 6, 1975); ... ... ... ;
5) on February 12, 1973, both respondent and
complainant boarded the same plane (Exh. "A") for
Manila; from the Manila Domestic Airport, they
proceeded to Room 905, 9th Floor of the
Ambassador Hotel where they stayed for three days
(Exhs. "K", "K-1" to "K-6"; p. 55, tsn, June 6, 1
975);
6) after arriving at the Ambassador Hotel, they dined
at a Spanish restaurant at San Marcelino, Malate,
Manila for around three hours (pp 56-57, tsn, June
6, 1975);
7) they returned to the hotel at around twelve
o'clock midnight, where respondent had carnal
knowledge of her twice and then thrice the next
morning (p. 59, tsn, June 6, 1975; pp. 154, 155 &
157, tsn, July 18, 1975);
8) complainant consented to the sexual desires of
respondent because for her, she would sacrifice her
personal honor rather than fail in her subjects (p.6l,
tsn, June 6, 1975); ... ... ...;
9) sometime in March, 1973, complainant told
respondent that she was suspecting pregnancy
because she missed her menstruation (p. 76, tsn,
July 17, 1975); ... ... ...;
10) later, she was informed by Dr. Monsanto (an
instructor in the college of medicine) that respondent

wanted that an abortion be performed upon her

(p.82, tsn, July l7, 1975); ... ... ... ;
11) thereafter, Ruben Cruz, a confidant of
respondent, and Dr. Monsato fetched her at her
boarding house on the pretext that she would be
examined by Dr. Gil Ramas (pp. 87-88, tsn, July 17,
1975);
12) upon reaching the clinic of Dr. Ramas she was
given an injection and an inhalation mask was placed
on her mouth and nose (pp. 88-90, tsn, July 17, 1
975);
13) as a result, she lost consciousness and when she
woke up, an abortion had already been performed
upon her and she was weak, bleeding and felt pain
all over her body (pp. 90-91, tsn, July 17,
1975); ... ... ... (Rollo, pp. 38-40)
Monica Gutierrez Tan testified that she met complainant and a
man whom complainant introduced as Atty. Aznar in front of the
Ambassador Hotel (pp. 183-184, tsn, Sept. 10, 1975; Rollo, p.
41).
Dr. Rebecca Gucor and Dr. Artemio Ingco, witnesses for the complainant,
testified that abdominal examinations and x-ray examination of the lumbrosacral region of complainant showed no signs of abnormality (Rollo, p. 42).
The evidence for the respondent as reported by the Solicitor General is
summarized as follows:
Edilberto Caban testified that:
1. In December, 1972, respondent Atty. Aznar stayed
at Ambassador Hotel with his wife and children;
respondent never came to Manila except in
December, 1972; (pp. 8-9,. tsn, Nov. 24, 1977);
2. He usually slept with respondent everytime the
latter comes to Manila (p. 13, tsn, Nov. 24, 1977;
Rollo, pp. 42-43).

Oscar Salangsang, another witness for the respondent stated

that:
1. In February, 1973, he went to Ambassador Hotel
to meet respondent; the latter had male companions
at the hotel but he did not see any woman
companion of respondent Aznar;
2. He usually slept with respondent at the
Ambassador Hotel and ate with him outside the hotel
together with Caban (pp. 8-9, 13-15, tsn, Jan. 13,
1978; Rollo, p. 43).
The Court notes that throughout the period of the investigation conducted by
the Solicitor General, respondent Aznar was never presented to refute the
allegations made against him.
In his Answer, respondent Aznar alleges that he does not have any
knowledge of the allegations in the complaint. As special defense,
respondent further alleged that the charge levelled against him is in
furtherance of complainant's vow to wreck vengeance against respondent by
reason of the latter's approval of the recommendation of the Board of
Trustees barring complainant from enrollment for the school year 1973-1974
because she failed in most of her subjects. It is likewise contended that the
defense did not bother to present respondent in the investigation conducted
by the Solicitor General because nothing has been shown in the hearing to
prove that respondent had carnal knowledge of the complainant.
Contrary to respondent's averments, the Solicitor General made a
categorical finding to the effect that respondent had carnal knowledge of
complainant, to wit:
From the foregoing, it is clear that complainant was compelled to
go to Manila with respondent upon the threat of respondent that
if she failed to do so, she would flunk in all her subjects and she
would never become a medical intern (pp. 42, 50, tsn, June 6,
1975). As respondent was Chairman of the College of Medicine,
complainant had every reason to believe him.
It has been established also that complainant was brought by
respondent to Ambassador Hotel in Manila for three days where
he repeatedly had carnal knowledge of her upon the threat that
if she would not give in to his lustful desires, she would fail in

her Pathology subject (Exhs. "A", "K", "K-1" to "K-6" pp. 51, 52,
55-59, tsn, June 6, 1975);
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, respondent did not bother to appear during
the hearing. It is true that he presented Edilberto Caban and
Oscar Salangsang who testified that respondent usually slept
with them every time the latter came to Manila, but their
testimony (sic) is not much of help. None of them mentioned
during the hearing that they stayed and slept with respondent on
February 12 to February 14, 1973 at Ambassador Hotel. ... ... ...
Besides, Edilberto Caban testified that respondent stayed at
Ambassador Hotel with his wife and children in December, 1972.
The dates in question, however, are February 12 to 14, 1973,
inclusive. His (Caban's) testimony, therefore, is immaterial to the
present case" (Rollo, pp. 43-44).
In effect, the Solicitor General found that the charge of immorality against
respondent Aznar has been substantiated by sufficient evidence both
testimonial and documentary; while finding insufficient and uncorroborated
the accusation of intentional abortion. The Solicitor General then
recommends the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for a
period of not less than three (3) years.
On March 16, 1989, the Court Resolved to require the parties to Move in the
premises to determine whether any intervening event occurred which would
render the case moot and academic (Rollo, p. 69).
On April 12, 1989, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation and motion
praying that the case at bar be considered submitted for decision on the
bases of the report and recommendation previously submitted together with
the record of the case and the evidence adduced (Rollo, p. 75).
After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees with the finding of
the Solicitor General that respondent Aznar, under the facts as stated in the
Report of the investigation conducted in the case, is guilty of "grossly
immoral conduct" and may therefore be removed or suspended by the
Supreme Court for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar (Sec. 27, Rule
138, Rules of Court).
Respondent failed to adduce evidence sufficient to engender doubt as to his
culpability of the offense imputed upon him. With the exception of the selfserving testimonies of two witnesses presented on respondent's behalf, the

records are bereft of evidence to exonerate respondent of the act

complained of, much less contradict, on material points, the testimonies of
complainant herself.
While respondent denied having taken complainant to the Ambassador Hotel
and there had sexual intercourse with the latter, he did not present any
evidence to show where he was at that date. While this is not a criminal
proceeding, respondent would have done more than keep his silence if he
really felt unjustly traduced.
It is the duty of a lawyer, whenever his moral character is put in issue, to
satisfy this Court that he is a fit and proper person to enjoy continued
membership in the Bar. He cannot dispense with nor downgrade the high and
exacting moral standards of the law profession (Go v. Candoy, 21 SCRA 439
[1967]). As once pronounced by the Court:
When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough
that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue
and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and Judicial
Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still
maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which at
all times is expected of him. ... In the case of United States v.
Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court, said:
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to
the State. If he does not perform that duty, he may not always
expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the
obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the
easiest of easy things, he is hardy indeed if he demand and
expect that same full and wide consideration which the State
voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help
themselves. This is particularly so when he not only declines to
help himself but actively conceals from the State the very means
by which it may assist him (Quingwa SCRA 439 [1967]).
The Solicitor General recommends that since the complainant is partly to
blame for having gone with respondent to Manila knowing fully well that
respondent is a married man ,with children, respondent should merely be
suspended from the practice of law for not less than three (3) years (Rollo,
p. 47).
On the other hand, respondent in his manifestation and motion dated April
18, 1989 alleges that since a period of about ten (10) years had already
elapsed from the time the Solicitor General made his recommendation for a

three (3) years suspension and respondent is not practicing his profession as
a lawyer, the court may now consider the respondent as having been
suspended during the said period and the case dismissed for being moot and
academic.
We disagree.
Complainant filed the instant case for disbarment not because respondent
reneged on a promise to marry (Quingwa v. Puno, supra). More importantly.
complainant's knowledge of of respondent's marital status is not at issue in
the case at bar. Complainant submitted to respondent's solicitation for sexual
intercourse not because of a desire for sexual gratification but because of
respondent's moral ascendancy over her and fear that if she would not
accede, she would flunk in her subjects. As chairman of the college of
medicine where complainant was enrolled, the latter had every reason to
believe that respondent could make good his threats. Moreover, as counsel
for respondent would deem it "worthwhile to inform the the Court that the
respondent is a scion of a rich family and a very rich man in his own right
and in fact is not practicing his profession before the court" (Rollo, p. 70),
mere suspension for a limited period, per se, would therefore serve no
redeeming purpose. The fact that he is a rich man and does not practice his
profession as a lawyer, does not render respondent a person of good moral
character. Evidence of good moral character precedes admission to bar
(Sec.2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and such requirement is not dispensed
with upon admission thereto. Good moral character is a continuing
qualification necessary to entitle one to continue in the practice of law. The
ancient and learned profession of law exacts from its members the highest
standard of morality (Quingwa v. Puno, supra).
Under Section 27, Rule 138, "(a) member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, ... " In Arciga v. Maniwang (106 SCRA 591, [1981]), this Court
had occasion to define the concept of immoral conduct, as follows:
A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. A
member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to
professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible
standard as to what is grossly immoral conduct or to specify the

moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy

of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what
appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may
not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as 'that which is willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to
the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community' (7 C.J.S. 959).
Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a
child became pregnant by reason of intimacy with a married
lawyer who was the father of six children, disbarment of the
attorney on the ground of immoral conduct was justified (In re
Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896).
In the present case, it was highly immoral of respondent, a married man
with children, to have taken advantage of his position as chairman of the
college of medicine in asking complainant, a student in said college, to go
with him to Manila where he had carnal knowledge of her under the threat
that she would flunk in all her subjects in case she refused.
WHEREFORE, respondent Jose B. Aznar is hereby DISBARRED and his name
is ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. RTJ-93-1033 October 10, 1995

MARIBETH CORDOVA and CHRISTOPHER CORDOVA, complainants,
vs.
HON. EMMA C. LABAYEN, Presiding Judge, Branch 54, RTC, 6th
Judicial Region, Bacolod City; HON. BETHEL KATALBAS-MOSCARDON,
former Presiding Judge of Branch 54, RTC, 6th Judicial Region,
Bacolod City; GIA L. ARINDAY, Branch Clerk of Court, and MARIO P.
LAMERA, Court Sheriff, Branch 54, RTC, Bacolod City; ARMANDO N.
ESO, Court Sheriff, and EDGAR DEPAMAYLO, Subpoena Server,
Branch 50, RTC, Bacolod City, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:
For consideration by the Court is the matter of the order we issued on
November 23, 1994, 1 requiring Atty. Salvador T. Sabio, counsel for herein
complainants, to show cause and explain why he should not be
administratively dealt with for violation of Canon I, Rules 1.02 and 1.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Acting on the Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator and the
Compliance 2 filed by Atty. Sabio, the Court issued a Resolution on May 30,
1995, 3 further referring the matter to the Bar Confidant for evaluation,
report and recommendation. On July 7, 1995, the latter submitted a Report
and Recommendation 4 finding Atty. Sabio guilty of violating Rules 1.02 and
1.03 of Canon I, which the Court hereby approves with modifications.
The present incident is an offshoot of an administrative complaint 5 filed by
complainants Maribeth and Christopher Cordova, through their aforesaid
counsel, Atty. Sabio, against herein respondents for disbarment, dismissal
from office and disqualification to hold public office with forfeiture of
employment benefits for their involvement in Civil Case No. 7092 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Bacolod City. The administrative complaint,
however, was dismissed by this Court on the basis of a Memorandum
Report 6 dated October 17, 1994 submitted by Deputy Court Administrator
Bernardo P. Abesamis, who likewise recommended that Atty. Sabio be
required to explain why he should not be administratively dealt with for
violation of Canon I, Rules 1.02 and 1103 on the ground that:

Their charge that Atty. Salvador T. Sabio "clearly instigated" the

filing of this complaint is also not totally baseless.
In her comment, Judge Moscardon stated that ". . . the original
counsel on record unquestionably accepted the Decision of the
appellate RTC court (sic). On the other hand, the petitioners
now, as well as their present counsel who are not fully
conversant (with) the circumstances surrounding the matter,
now attempt to mislead the High Court . . . ." Also worth
mentioning were the allegations that (1) the respondent sheriffs
were criminally charged for robbery, grave threats and malicious
mischief; (2) that the plaintiffs re-occupied the premises after
being ejected therefrom; (3) Atty. Sabio had been charged for
crimes involving dishonesty.
The foregoing points to the possible violations of the Code of
Professional Ethics, particularly Canon I, Rule 1.02 (A lawyer
shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the
law . . .) and Rule 1.03 (A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt
motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay
any man's cause).
The main bulk of Atty. Sabio's contentions were premised on the issue of
whether the writs of execution were issued and implemented by herein
respondents in gross violation of Sections 8 and 10, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court, with manifest partiality and breach of judicial trust, and with grave
abuse of discretion in excess of jurisdiction. In his Compliance, Atty. Sabio
asserts that the writ of execution was issued pending appeal despite the
filing of a supersedeas bond and the payment of advance rentals. A review
of the complaint, comment and answer filed in this case will readily show
that the writs in question were issued strictly in accordance with Sections 8
and 10, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court which provide:
Sec. 8. Immediate Execution of judgment. How to stay same.
If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall
issue immediately, unless an appeal has been perfected and the
defendant to stay execution files a sufficient bond, approved by
the municipal or city court and executed to the plaintiff to enter
the action in the Court of First Instance and to pay the rents,
damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment
appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal,
he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from
time to time under the contract, if any, as found by the judgment
of the municipal or city court to exist. In the absence of a

contract, he shall deposit with the court the reasonable value of

the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month
or period at the rate determined by the judgment, on or before
the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The
supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the municipal or city
court, with the other papers, to the clerk of the Court of First
Instance to which the action is appealed.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 10. Stay of execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or
Supreme Court. Where defendant appeals from a judgment of
the Court of First Instance, execution of said judgment, with
respect to the restoration of possession, shall not be stayed
unless the appellant deposits the same amounts and within the
periods referred to in Section 8 of this rule to be disposed of in
the same manner as therein provided.
The records of this administrative matter show that in an action for
ejectment filed against the predecessor in interest of herein
complainants, 7 judgment was rendered on April 14, 1992 by the Municipal
Trial Court, Branch 6, Bacolod City, in Civil Case No. 18761, ordering
defendants to vacate the premises and to pay plaintiffs therein the sum of
P5,000.00 as attorney's fees plus P1,200.00 appearance fee, P18,000.00 for
rentals from May, 1991 to April, 1992, and costs of suit. On August 20,
1992, the Regional Trial Court affirmed said judgment after finding that there
was no cogent reason to reverse the lower court's decision.
A Motion for Writ of Execution Pending Appeal was filed by plaintiffs on
September 4, 1995, to which an Opposition and Motion for Reconsideration
was filed by defendants on September 10, 1992. The Regional Trial Court
granted the motion on September 28, 1992 and the writ of execution was
issued on September 30, 1992. However, in the afternoon of September 29,
1992, plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order of September
28, 1992 granting the motion for execution, on the ground that they could
not file the supersedeas bond because the court allegedly failed to apprise
them of the amount thereof and, at the same time, attaching to said motion
a bond in the amount of P18,000.00. The motion for reconsideration was
denied by the Regional Trial Court on October 1, 1992, as a consequence of
which the writ of execution previously issued was implemented on October
8, 1992 and plaintiffs were ordered restored to the possession of the subject
premises.

Therein defendant Luz Cordova went to the Court of Appeals on a petition

for certiorari with injunction but was rebuffed therein. In a decision
promulgated on March 31, 1993 in CA-G.R. SP No. 29102, said appellate
court affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court. As a result, the
lower court granted on April 21, 1993 the Motion for Alias Writ of Execution
filed by plaintiffs and ordered the release of the amounts of P12,000.00 and
P18,000.00 deposited by therein defendants. An alias writ of execution was
subsequently issued on April 26, 1993.
The administrative complaint now filed before us by herein complainants, as
heirs and successors in interest of the late Luz Cordova, revolves around the
validity of the writ of execution issued by Judge Moscardon and the aliaswrit
of execution issued by Judge Labayen.
1. The writ of execution issued on September 30, 1992 by Judge Moscardon
is being controverted on the ground that a supersedeas bond had been
validly filed in this case and periodic rentals had been paid, hence said
supposed compliance with the Rules of Court should have legally stayed
execution pending appeal.
Sections 8 and 10 of Rule 70 clearly provide that to stay the immediate
execution of judgment in ejectment proceedings, it is necessary that the
defendant-appellant must (a) perfect his appeal, (b) file a supersedeas bond,
and (c) periodically deposit the rentals falling due during the pendency of the
appeal.
The purpose of the supersedeas bond is to answer for the rents, damages
and costs accruing down to the judgment of the inferior court appealed from,
the amount of which is to be determined from the judgment of said court.
The postulation of complainants and their counsel that the execution sought
was effectively stayed by the filing of a supersedeas bond was sufficiently
refuted and justifiably rejected when we consider the circumstances then
obtaining.
First. The amount of the supersedeas bond to be posted is easily discernible
from the dispositive portion of the judgment of the municipal trial court.
Hence, it was erroneous, if not altogether a deliberate falsity, for Atty. Sabio
to claim that they could not file a supersedeas bond because that court failed
to determine the same.
Second. The bond should have been filed forthwith after the municipal trial
court had rendered judgment against complainants, which judgment was
immediately executory, without prejudice to the right of appeal. As the
records readily reveal, the purported bond was belatedly filed on September

29, 1992, more than five months later, and only after the aforementioned
Regional Trial Court had already issued an order granting the motion for
execution pending appeal. We cannot, therefore, elude the impression thus
created that the filing thereof came only as a dilatory afterthought on the
part of defendants and their counsel. In a vain attempt to remedy the
situation, Atty. Sabio filed a motion for reconsideration of the order granting
execution, but the same necessarily had to fail for being frivolous.
Third. It will be observed that no supersedeas bond was filed after the
rendition of the decision either in the court of origin or in the appellate court.
The requirement for the filing of a supersedeas bond is
mandatory. 8 Defendants in the ejectment case appealed to the latter court
without filing a supersedeas bond. Such failure is a ground for outright
execution of the judgment of the municipal trial court, the duty of the
appellate court to order the execution of the appealed decision being thereby
ministerial and imperative. 9
Fourth. The Court of Appeals stated that the amount of P18,000.00
deposited by defendants therein represented rental payments for the period
from May, 1991 to April, 1992, and that a writ of execution had by then
already been issued by the Regional Trial Court. Evidently, therefore, the
amount thus deposited could not qualify as or subserve the purpose of a
supersedeas bond. Thus:
Finally, anent the prayer for injunction, petitioner contends that
she had deposited with the public respondent court the amount
of P18,000.00 representing the money judgment, to stay
execution pending appeal. The court noted that the said amount
represented the rental payments only for the months from May
1991 to April 1992. It is for this reason that this Court, in its
Resolution dated October 9, 1992 (p. 60, Rollo), ordered
petitioner to present proof of subsequent payments made
pursuant to Sections 8 and 10 of Rule 70. It appears, however,
that a Writ of Execution was already issued and even
implemented (par. 5. Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order, pp. 98-99, Rollo; Delivery of Possession, p.
118, Rollo) that a preliminary injunction is thereby rendered
nugatory. . . . 10
While it is true, therefore, that defendants deposited an amount which
approximates the monetary judgment for unpaid rentals, since the same was
filed late, it could not qualify as a supersedeas bond. What is considered
material for purposes of staying execution pending appeal under Rule 70 is
not only the fact of payment but, more importantly, the timeliness of the

filing of the supersedeas bond. Hence, the amount of P18,000.00 was

correctly applied as mere rental payments from May, 1991 to April, 1992. On
this ground alone, Judge Moscardon was perfectly justified in issuing the writ
of execution and respondent sheriffs in implementing the same. Of these
legal considerations, Atty. Sabio could not have been unaware.
The records, furthermore, do not sustain Atty. Sabio's representations with
respect to the application of the P12,000.00 which complainants supposedly
deposited with the court a quo. Atty. Sabio insists that said amount was
intended to answer for monthly rentals falling due after the rendition of the
decision of the Municipal Trial Court. This, however, runs contrary to the
facts obtaining in this case. The decisions of the Municipal Trial Court and the
Court of Appeals are silent on this point except for a statement found in the
higher court's decision that "this Court, in its Resolution dated October 9,
1992, ordered petitioner to present proof of subsequent payments made."
Also, in the order of Judge Moscardon dated October 1, 1992, she stated
that "the record does not show that the defendants had likewise paid the
periodical rentals." Also, in the complaint filed in this administrative matter,
it is alleged that the defendant consigned the rentals from May, 1991 until
April, 1992 in the amount of P12,000.00.
In view of these conflicting statements of complainants, plus the fact that
there is not enough evidence on hand, we are prevented from making a
specific determination thereon. Nevertheless, whether or not periodic rental
payments were made during the pendency of the appeal no longer carries
any weight in view of our earlier finding that execution could not be legally
stayed by reason of the admittedly belated filing of the purported
supersedeas bond.
Complainants further contend that the Regional Trial Court had no
jurisdiction to issue the writ of execution allegedly because it should have
forwarded the records of the case to the court of origin for proper
implementation. The argument is specious. The Municipal Trial Court may
issue execution immediately after judgment if no action was taken therefrom
by defendants. But, after the perfection of the appeal, it is obvious that the
jurisdiction over the controversy had passed to the Regional Trial Court,
hence the properly filed in and granted by the latter court. 11
2. Anent the issue on the legality of the alias writ of execution issued by
Judge Labayen, Atty. Sabio avers that the same is void for the reason that
he was not furnished a copy of the order, dated April 21, 1993, which
granted the motion for alias writ of execution. He further insists that the
same was issued despite the fact that the decision of the Court of Appeals

had not yet become final and executory since it was still pending review
before the Supreme Court.
Under Section 10 of Rule 70, an appeal to the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court shall likewise not be stayed unless the appellants deposit the
amount of rent due from time to time. In the case at bar, no proof has been
presented to show that the monthly rentals which fell due after the rendition
of the trial court's decision had been duly paid. Assuming arguendo, as
claimed by Atty. Sabio, that the P12,000.00 deposited with the Regional Trial
Court should answer for said rentals, the same was not sufficient to cover
rentals due during the entire pendency of the case before the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court. At most, such amount could apply only to
rental payments from May, 1992 to December, 1992. Of these facts, again,
Atty. Sabio could not have been completely oblivious.
The Court of Appeals rendered its decision on March 31, 1993 and there is
absolutely nothing in the records to show that herein complainants made
further payments aside from the P12,000.00 and P18,000.00 deposited with
the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court, respectively. In
addition, Atty. Sabio does not refute, and in fact it is admitted in paragraph 6
of the complaint filed in this administrative matter, that complainants
reentered and remained in possession of the premises, and it appears that
they continued to do so despite the prior implementation of the original writ
of execution. Verily, this time for failure of complainants to make periodic
deposits during the pendency of the appeal and their continued occupancy of
the premises, the issuance of thealias writ of execution was a ministerial and
mandatory duty of respondent judges.
Atty. Sabio likewise claims that execution could not issue because he was not
served a copy of the order dated April 21, 1993 12 which granted the motion
for alias writ of execution. He rationalizes that:
. . . The fact is that, a copy of the Order dated April 21, 1993
was not furnished the defendant's counsel.
Truth to tell, this is exactly the ground why undersigned counsel
filed his Urgent Motion to Lift AliasWrit of Execution, . . . .
It is therefore clear that the Alias Writ of Execution dated April
26, 1993 issued by the defendant Clerk of Court, Gia L. Aranday,
was improperly issued, considering that the Order of the
court granting the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution dated
April 21, 1993 was
not furnished the undersigned counsel, and, it is only through

the resourcefulness of the undersigned of following-up this case

that he came to know of the said Order dated April 21, 1993.
Undersigned counsel found himself in an embarrassing situation,
when he was confronted by his clients that the Alias Writ of
Execution dated April 26, 1993 was issued without his knowledge
of the prior Court Order dated April 21, 1993.
It is in this respect, that undersigned honestly believed that he
has a well grounded complaint against respondents Clerk of
Court and process server for their negligent act. (Emphasis in
the original text.)13
That bad faith attended the filing of this administrative charge was
unwittingly disclosed by the aforequoted allegations of Atty. Sabio in his
compliance. No ratiocination was proffered by him nor did he invoke any
authority of law or jurisprudence, since decidedly there is none, to support
his theory that execution should not issue where the adverse party is not
served a copy of the order even where the grant thereof had become a
matter of right. The inescapable conclusion, therefore, is that the filing of the
present complaint was, at the very least, ill-conceived and malicious, and
was resorted to as a last-ditch effort and a face-saving recourse of counsel.
It is worth noting that the administrative complaint was filed against herein
respondents only after the Court of Appeals had rendered a decision in favor
of plaintiffs. This in itself is already a clear indication that the acts of
respondents are valid and legal. Yet, Atty. Sabio persisted in instituting these
baseless charges against respondents to their proven prejudice. 14 As
correctly observed by the Bar Confidant, under the given circumstances, it is
apparent that complainants decided to institute the present case only on the
advice and/or upon the urging of Atty. Sabio. It also bears stressing that
respondent Judge Labayen even waited for the Court of Appeals' decision
before acting on the motion for an alias writ of execution of plaintiffs, if only
to obviate any imputation of bias or partiality.
We are fully convinced that, despite the misleading assertions of Atty. Sabio,
the issuance of the writ of execution was done in the valid and judicious
exercise of the functions and duties of respondent judges. We have carefully
examined and analyzed the procedure adopted by respondents in the
issuance and enforcement of the questioned writs. It would be the height of
injustice were we to impose any sanction on them for complying faithfully
with the procedural mandate of the rules governing the matter.

The Court would like to call attention again to the reprehensible propensity
of disgruntled litigants, most especially their counsel, of filing totally
baseless and unfounded charges against judges and court personnel in a
vain attempt to escape the dire consequences of their own negligence or in
an effort to transgress the lawful orders of the court. Judges and court
personnel should be protected from unjust accusations of dissatisfied
litigants, abetted by counsel who seek thereby to camouflage their
shortcomings. Besides, it goes without saying that mere suspicion that a
judge is partial to one of the parties to the case is not enough. There should
be evidence to prove the charge, 15 which is obviously absent in the case at
bar.
As an officer of the court, a lawyer has the sworn duty to assist in, not to
impede or pervert, the administration of justice. The present administrative
charge seeks to cast doubt on the integrity of respondent judges, the judicial
personnel and the court which they represent, in flagrant abdication of the
bounden responsibility of a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due
to courts of justice. Atty. Sabio thus deserves to be punished for instigating
the filing of an administrative complaint by his clients, in the guise of
upholding their rights but actually to frustrate the enforcement of lawful
court orders and consequently obstruct the desirable norms and course of
justice.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Salvador T. Sabio is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS, effective upon his receipt of
a copy of this decision. He is warned that a more severe sanction shall be
imposed should he commit another administrative offense. Let copies hereof
be attached to his record and served on the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and on all courts of the land.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-22320

July 29, 1968

MERCEDES RUTH COBB-PEREZ and DAMASO P. PEREZ, petitioners,

vs.
HON. GREGORIO LANTIN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Manila,
RICARDO P. HERMOSO and the CITY SHERIFF OF
MANILA, respondents.
Crispin D. Baizas and Associates for petitioners.
Isidro T. Almeda for respondents.
CASTRO, J.:
This is a motion for partial reconsideration of this Court's decision of May 22,
1968, specifically directed against the following observation therein made:
We feel compelled to observe that during the protracted litigation
below, the petitioners resorted to a series of actions and petitions, at
some stages alternatingly, abetted by their counsel, for the sole
purpose of thwarting the execution of a simple money judgment which
has long become final and executory. Some of the actions were filed,
only to be abandoned or withdrawn. The petitioners and their counsel,
far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have
tried to use them to subvert the very ends of justice.
Corollarily, this Court assessed treble costs against the petitioners, to "be
paid by their counsel.".
The herein movants, Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A. N. Bolinas, counsels for
the petitioners, while submitting to the judgment on the merits, seek
reconsideration of the decision in so far as it reflects adversely upon their
"professional conduct" and condemns them to pay the treble costs adjudged
against their clients.
At first blush, the motion for reconsideration presents a semblance of merit.
After mature deliberation and patient reprobing into the records of the case,
however, we are of the firmer conviction that the protracted litigation,
alluded to in the above-quoted portion of our decision, was designed to
cause delay, and the active participation of the petitioners' counsels in this
adventure is patent.
After November 15, 1962 when the Court of Appeals rendered judgment
sustaining Damaso Perez' position with respect to the extent of the levy, the
subsequent proceedings interposed alternatingly by the petitioner spouses

were obviously quixotic maneuvers expected to be overthrown by the courts

but calculated to delay an execution long overdue.
Had the petitioners and their counsels seriously believed that the levied
shares of stock were conjugal property, why did they not adopt this position
from the very start, or, at the latest, in CA-G.R. 29962-R, wherein Damaso
Perez challenged the legality of the levy's coverage, in order to end the
litigation with reasonable dispatch? They chose, however, to attack the
execution in a piecemeal fashion, causing the postponement of the projected
execution sale six times. More than eight years after the finality of the
judgment have passed, and the same has yet to be satisfied.
In a determined effort to prolong the litigation, the Perez spouses, as
represented by their counsels, sought the issuance of preliminary injunctions
to restrain the execution of the final judgment in civil case 39407 from
courts which did not have jurisdiction and which would, as expected, initially
or ultimately deny their prayer. For instance, after Damaso Perez bowed out
temporarily from the scene following the rendition of the aforementioned
Court of Appeals decision, his wife, Mercedez, Ruth Cobb-Perez, intruded
into the controversy and asked for an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction
from the Court of First Instance of Rizal in connection with civil case 7532
which she filed with the said court, knowing fully well that the basic civil case
39407 was decided by the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VII
presided by the respondent Judge Lantin), which latter court was the proper
forum for any action relative to the execution. Judge Eulogio Mencias of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, looking to Acosta vs. Alvendia (L-14598,
October 31, 1960), which held that courts of first instance have no power to
restrain acts outside their territorial jurisdictions, lifted on October 4, 1963
the ex parte writ which he previously issued enjoining the respondent sheriff
from carrying out the execution sale. It is clear, however, that Mrs. Perez and
her counsels, the movants, knew or ought to have known beforehand that
the Court of First Instance of Rizal did not have jurisdiction to issue the writ
which Mrs. Perez herself sought, and, anticipating the recall of the writ
improvidently issued, on September 3, 1963, a month before the said writ
was actually lifted, filed in the basic civil case 39407 an urgent motion to lift
the writ of execution issued on August 15, 1961, alleging as justification the
conjugal nature of the levied shares of stock and the personal nature of
Damaso Perez' judgment debt, the very same reasons advanced in civil case
7532 which was then still pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
Incidentally, Mrs. Perez failed to adduce any evidence in support of her
aforesaid urgent motion, as in fact neither she nor her counsels appeared
during the scheduled hearing, prompting the respondent judge to issue the
following order:

When the urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution was called
this morning for hearing, counsel for the movant did not appear
despite the fact that he had been duly notified of the motion for
hearing. In view thereof the court assumes that he is waiving his right
to present evidence in support of his urgent motion to recall or lift writ
of execution. Said urgent motion is therefore deemed submitted for
resolution.
Despite the recall of the aforementioned writ of injunction by Judge Mencias
on a disclaimer of jurisdiction (since the execution sought to be enjoined was
ordered by another tribunal), Mrs. Perez, now assisted by her husband who
had staged a comeback, prayed for the issuance of another injunction, this
time from Branch XXII of the Court of First Instance of Manila (not the same
Branch which issued the controverted writ of execution), in connection with
civil case 7532, then still pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. As
most probably anticipated anew by the Perez spouses and their counsels,
Judge Alikpala, presiding judge of Branch XXII, on November 8, 1963 denied
the preliminary injunction sought, on the ground, among others, that he had
no power to interfere by injunction with the judgment or decree of a court of
concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. On the very day the injunction was
denied, Damaso Perez, as if expecting the reversal from Judge Alikpala, was
already prepared with another "remedy," as in fact on that day, November 8,
1963, he filed in the basic civil case 39407 an "Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration" of the order of October 19, 1963, which denied his wife's
above-mentioned motion to recall the controverted writ of execution.
The foregoing motion, far from seriously seeking the reconsideration of the
order of October 19, 1963, which in the first place Damaso Perez could not
legally do for he was not even a party to the denied "Urgent Motion to Recall
Writ of Execution" (filed by his wife alone), was merely an offer to replace
the levied stocks with supposed cash dividends due to the Perez spouses as
stockholders in the Republic Bank.1 As a matter of fact, when the motion was
set for hearing on December 21, 1963, the counsels for Damaso Perez
promised to produce the said cash dividends within five days, but the
promise was never fulfilled.2 Consequently, the respondent Judge on January
4, 1964, denied the said motion for reconsideration.
The above exposition of the circumstances relative to the protracted
litigation clearly negates the avowal of the movants that "in none of the
various incidents in the case at bar has any particular counsel of petitioners
acted with deliberate aforethought to delay the enforcement of the judgment
in Civil Case No. 39407." From the chronology of antecedent events, the fact
becomes inescapable that the Perez spouses, coached by their counsels, had
sallied forth on a strategem of "remedies" projected to foil the lawful

execution of a simple money judgment. It is equally obvious that they

foreshadowed their own reversals in the "remedies" they ventured to adopt,
such that even before, one remedy had been exhausted, they interposed
another until the case reached this Court for the second time. 3 Meanwhile,
justice was delayed, and more than one member of this Court are persuaded
that justice was practically waylaid.
The movants also contend that even this Court sanctions the aforesaid civil
cases 7532 and 55292 as the "proper remedy" when we said that.
In reality, what they attacked is not the writ of execution, the validity
and regularity of which are unchallenged, but the levy made by the
respondent Sheriff. In this regard, the remedy is not the recall of the
writ, but an independent action to enjoin the Sheriff from proceeding
with the projected sale, in which action the conjugal nature of the
levied stocks should be established as a basis for the subsequent
issuance of a permanent injunction, in the event of a successful claim.
Incidentally, in the course of the protracted litigation, the petitioners
had already availed of this remedy in civil cases 7532 and 55292, only
to abandon it as they incessantly sought other, and often
simultaneous, devices of thwarting satisfaction of the judgment debt.
(Emphasis supplied) .
And because of this statement, they now counter that the said cases could
not be branded as having been instituted for delay.
The reference we made to civil cases 7532 and 55292 in the above-quoted
statement must not be considered out of context. We said that the
petitioners incidentally had already availed of the suggested remedy only in
the sense that said civil cases 7532 and 55292 were apparently instituted to
prove the conjugal nature of the levied shares of stocks in question. We used
the word incidentally advisedly to show that in their incessant search for
devices to thwart the controverted execution, they accidentally stumbled on
the suggested remedy. But the said civil cases were definitely not the
"proper remedy" in so far as they sought the issuance of writs of preliminary
injunction from the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the Court of First
Instance of Manila (Branch XXII) where civil cases 7532 and 55292 were
filed respectively, for the said courts did not have jurisdiction to restrain the
enforcement of the writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of
Manila (Branch VII) under the settled doctrines that Courts are without
power to restrain acts outside of their territorial jurisdiction 4 or interfere
with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate
jurisdiction. 5 However, the recall and the denial of the writs of preliminary
injunction in civil cases 7532 and 55292 did not amount to the termination

or dismissal of the principal action in each case. Had the Perez spouses
desired in earnest to continue with the said cases they could have done so.
But the fact is that Mrs. Perez practically abandoned civil case 7532 when
she instituted the above mentioned urgent motion to recall writ of execution
in the basic civil case 39407, anchored on the same grounds which she
advanced in the former case, until the said civil case 7532 was dismissed on
November 9, 1963, upon her own motion. Anent civil case 55292, the Perez
spouses virtually deserted the same when they instituted the herein petition
for certiorari with urgent writ of preliminary injunction based on the same
grounds proffered in the said civil case until the latter was also dismissed
on March 20, 1964, with the consent of the parties because of the pendency
then of the aforesaid petition for certiorari.
The movants further contend that "If there was delay, it was because
petitioners' counsel happened to be more assertive ... a quality of the
lawyers (which) is not to be condemned."
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's
cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not and
cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his
client's position, as in the case at bar.
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the
intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case.
If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty
to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the
incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client,
and temper his client's propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the
cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is
indisputable.
The movants finally state that the "Petitioners have several counsel in this
case but the participation of each counsel was rather limited implying that
the decision of this Court ordering that "treble costs are assessed against the
petitioners, which shall be paid by their counsel" is not clear. The word
"counsel" may be either singular or plural in construction, so that when we
said "counsel" we meant the counsels on record of the petitioners who were
responsible for the inordinate delay in the execution of the final judgment in
the basic civil case 39407, after the Court of Appeals had rendered its
aforementioned decision of November 15, 1962. And it is on record that the
movants are such counsels. Atty. Bolinas, upon his own admission, "entered
his appearance in the case at bar about the time the Court of First Instance
of Manila dismissed the petitioners' Petition for Relief in Civil Case No.
39407," or about August 3, 1961 and even prior to the Court of Appeals

decision above-mentioned. Atty. Baizas claims that he "became petitioners'

counsel only in October, 1963 when he filed, with Atty. A.N. Bolinao, Jr. Civil
Case No. 55292 before the Court of First Instance of Manila presided by the
Hon. Judge Alikpala although it appears on record that the urgent motion to
recall writ of execution filed by Mrs. Perez in the basic civil case 39407 on
September 3, 1963, was over the signature of one Ruby Zaida of the law
firm of "Crispin Baizas & Associates" as counsel for Mrs. Perez. It is to be
recalled that the said urgent motion is the same motion discussed above,
which, curiously enough, antedated by at least one month the lifting of the
writ of preliminary injunction issued in civil case 7532.
ACCORDINGLY, the motion for partial reconsideration is denied. Our decision
of May 22, 1968 is hereby modified in the sense that Attys. Crispin D. Baizas
and A.N. Bolinao, Jr. shall pay jointly and severally the treble costs assessed
against the petitioners.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Angeles, JJ.,
concur.
Concepcion C.J., voted for denial of the motion for reconsideration.
Fernando, J., took no part.
Footnotes

OMAS P. TAN, JR.,

Complainant,

A.C.
No. 9000
Pres
ent:

- versus -

COR
ONA,C.J.,
Chairperso
n,
LEON
ARDO-DE
CASTRO,
BERS
AMIN,
DEL
CASTILLO,
and
VILLA
RAMA,
JR., JJ.

ATTY. HAIDE V.
GUMBA,
Respondent.

Prom
ulgated:
Octo
ber 5, 2011
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by
complainant Tomas P. Tan, Jr. against respondent Atty. Haide B. Vista-Gumba
for gross unethical conduct.
The facts are as follows.
Complainant, a self-made businessman with a tailoring shop
in Naga City, filed a verified Complaint[1] against respondent, also a resident

of Naga City, before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)-Camarines Sur
Chapter. Pursuant to Section 1, Paragraph 3, [2] Rule 139-B of the Revised
Rules of Court, as amended, the said Chapter forwarded the complaint to the
IBP Board of Governors for proper disposition.
Complainant narrated that sometime in August 2000, respondent
asked to be lent 350,000.00. Respondent assured him that she would pay
the principal plus 12% interest per annum after one year. She likewise
offered by way of security a 105-square-meter parcel of land located
in Naga City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 2055 [3] and
registered in her fathers name. Respondent showed complainant a Special
Power of Attorney[4] (SPA) executed by respondents parents, and verbally
assured complainant that she was authorized to sell or encumber the entire
property. Complainant consulted one Atty. Raquel Payte and was assured
that the documents provided by respondent were valid. Thus, complainant
agreed to lend money to respondent. With the help of Atty. Payte,
respondent executed in complainants favor an open Deed of Absolute Sale
over the said parcel of land, attaching thereto the SPA. Complainant was
made to believe that if respondent fails to pay the full amount of the loan
with interest on due date, the deed of sale may be registered. Accordingly,
he gave the amount of 350,000.00 to respondent.
Respondent, however, defaulted on her loan obligation and failed to
pay the same despite complainants repeated demands. Left with no
recourse, complainant went to the Register of Deeds to register the sale,
only to find out that respondent deceived him since the SPA did not give
respondent the power to sell the property but only empowered respondent
to mortgage the property solely to banks. Complainant manifested that he
had lent money before to other people albeit for insignificant amounts, but
this was the first time that he extended a loan to a lawyer and it bore
disastrous results. He submitted that respondent committed fraud and deceit
or conduct unbecoming of a lawyer.
Upon being ordered by the IBP to answer the above allegations,
respondent filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Responsive
Pleading[5] but no answer or comment was ever filed by her before the IBPCommission on Bar Discipline (CBD). Likewise, the IBP-CBD allowed
respondent to answer the Amended Complaint subsequently filed by
complainant but she did not file any answer thereto. [6] She also chose not to
attend the mandatory conference hearings set on July 18, 2006, June 13,
2007 and January 25, 2008 despite due notice. Thus, she was deemed to
have waived her right to participate in the proceedings.

On February 9, 2009, IBP Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr.

rendered his report[7] finding respondent guilty of violating Canon 1, [8] Rule
1.01[9] and Canon 7[10] of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
recommending that she be suspended from the practice of law for one year.
Commissioner De La Rama opined that while respondent appears to be a coowner of the property as evidenced by an annotation on the back of TCT No.
2055 showing that half of the property has been sold to her, it was evident
that she employed deceit and dishonest means to make complainant believe,
by virtue of the SPA, that she was duly authorized to sell the entire property.
On August 28, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the report and recommendation of Commissioner De La Rama, Jr.
in its Resolution No. XIX-2010-446:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner of the above entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding
the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents
violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and for her failure to submit verified
Answer and did not even participate in the mandatory
conference, Atty. Haide V. Gumba is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year. [11]
We agree with the findings and conclusion of the IBP, but find that a
reduction of the recommended penalty is called for, pursuant to the principle
that the appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of
sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts. [12]
Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that a lawyer may be
disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private
capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. [13] Verily, Canon 7 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all lawyers to uphold at all
times the dignity and integrity of the legal profession. Lawyers are similarly
required, under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the same Code, not to engage in any
unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.
Here, respondents actions clearly show that she deceived complainant
into lending money to her through the use of documents and false

representations and taking advantage of her education and complainants

ignorance in legal matters. As manifested by complainant, he would have
never granted the loan to respondent were it not for respondents
misrepresentation that she was authorized to sell the property and if
respondent had not led him to believe that he could register the open deed
of sale if she fails to pay the loan. [14] By her misdeed, respondent has
eroded not only complainants perception of the legal profession but the
publics perception as well. Her actions constitute gross misconduct for
which she may be disciplined, following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court, as amended, which provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as
an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
xxxx
We further note that after filing a Motion for Extension of Time to File a
Responsive Pleading, respondent wantonly disregarded the lawful orders of
the IBP-CBD to file her answer and to appear for the mandatory conferences
despite due notice. Respondent should bear in mind that she must
acknowledge the orders of the IBP-CBD in deference to its authority over her
as a member of the IBP.[15]
Complainant now asks that respondent be disbarred. We find, however,
that suspension from the practice of law is sufficient to discipline respondent.
It is worth stressing that the power to disbar must be exercised with great
caution. Disbarment will be imposed as a penalty only in a clear case of
misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Where any lesser
penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be decreed.
[16]
In this case, the Court finds the penalty of suspension more appropriate
but finds the recommended penalty of suspension for one year too severe.
Considering the circumstances of this case, the Court believes that a
suspension of six months is sufficient. After all, suspension is not primarily

intended as a punishment, but as a means to protect the public and the legal
profession.[17]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Haide B. Vista-Gumba is found
administratively liable for grave misconduct. She is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS, effective immediately, with a warning
that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Let notice of this Resolution be spread in respondents record as an
attorney in this Court, and notice thereof be served on the Integrated Bar of
thePhilippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to
all the courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.
CANON 2
Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993
MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from
issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A"
and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from
making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other
than those allowed by law."
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.

THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC,

INC. 8:30 am 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce
through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during
office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems,
Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa.
Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees.
Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US
Embassy CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041;
521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced
are champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and
destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the
members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is
ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought
in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of
said advertisement at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the
practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through
paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines.
Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are
legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed
supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of
Arizona, 2 reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7,
1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues
raised herein, we required the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2)
Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA),

(4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association
of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas
(FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on the controversy and,
thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily responded
and extended their valuable services and cooperation of which this Court
takes note with appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the
services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it
constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can
properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we
deem it proper and enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the
respective position papers adopted by the aforementioned bar associations
and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in this bar
matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent
endeavored to distinguish the two terms, i.e., "legal support
services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense would readily
dictate that the same are essentially without substantial
distinction. For who could deny that document search, evidence
gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic institutional
services from government or non-government agencies like
birth, marriage, property, or business registration, obtaining
documents like clearance, passports, local or foreign visas,
constitutes practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to
make issue with respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to state
that the IBP has made its position manifest, to wit, that it
strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the effect
that today it is alright to advertise one's legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition
to respondent's act of establishing a "legal clinic" and of

concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper

publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of
this Honorable Court to perpetually restrain respondent from
undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law practice
as aforedescribed. 4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the
impression that respondent corporation is being operated by
lawyers and that it renders legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal
services to the public, the advertisements in question give the
impression that respondent is offering legal services. The Petition
in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned,
apparently because this (is) the effect that the advertisements
have on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be
traced, first of all, to the very name being used by respondent
"The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully submitted
connotes the rendering of legal services for legal problems, just
like a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical
problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes
lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the
advertisements subject of the present case, appears with (the)
scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the impression
that it is being operated by members of the bar and that it offers
legal services. In addition, the advertisements in question
appear with a picture and name of a person being represented
as a lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes whatever
doubt may still remain as to the nature of the service or services
being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering
"legal support services" as claimed by it, or whether it offers
legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice
does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction between
"legal services" and "legal support services," as the respondent

would have it. The advertisements in question leave no room for

doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services are
being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the
performance of acts contrary to law, morals, public order and
public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the
advertisements in question are only meant to inform the general
public of the services being offered by it. Said advertisements,
however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law student ought
to know that under the Family Code, there is only one instance
when a foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a
marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent
union between a man and woman entered into
accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by
law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relation
during the marriage within the limits provided by this
Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious
that the message being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the
legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in accordance with
our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only
misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of
Philippine law. At the very least, this can be considered "the dark

side" of legal practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws

are exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright
malpractice.
Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or abet
activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that
advertisements such as that shown in Annex "A" of the Petition,
which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words "Just
Married" on its bumper and seems to address those planning a
"secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes
light of the "special contract of permanent union," the inviolable
social institution," which is how the Family Code describes
marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability.
Worse, this particular advertisement appears to encourage
marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral
publication of applications for a marriage license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can
readily be concluded that the above impressions one may gather
from the advertisements in question are accurate. The Sharon
Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the
advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts
are being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity
simply because the jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not
extend to the place where the crime is committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support
services" respondent offers do not constitute legal services as
commonly understood, the advertisements in question give the
impression that respondent corporation is being operated by
lawyers and that it offers legal services, as earlier discussed.
Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes of an
ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar themselves are
encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which are
contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good,
thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx

It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined

from causing the publication of the advertisements in question,
or any other advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted
that respondent should be prohibited from further performing or
offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very
least, from offering such services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal
research, electronic data gathering, storage and retrieval,
standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of evidence,
and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and
should not be stifled but instead encouraged. However, when the
conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar encroaches
upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit
such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can
be better performed by specialists in other fields, such as
computer experts, who by reason of their having devoted time
and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting
requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from
"encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the profession
of the great benefits and advantages of modern technology.
Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will be doing better than a
lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to
allow or tolerate the illegal practice of law in any form, not only
for the protection of members of the Bar but also, and more
importantly, for the protection of the public. Technological
development in the profession may be encouraged without
tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to
perform all of its services, but only if such services are made
available exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar.
Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not legal
services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully
distinguishing between which service may be offered to the
public in general and which should be made available exclusively
to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may
require further proceedings because of the factual considerations
involved.

It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's

services ought to be prohibited outright, such as acts which tend
to suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages which are
bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law.
While respondent may not be prohibited from simply
disseminating information regarding such matters, it must be
required to include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it
is not authorized to practice law, that certain course of action
may be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or
capable of rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be
consulted before deciding on which course of action to take, and
that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without
subjecting itself to possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be
directed exclusively at members of the Bar, with a clear and
unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law
or perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored.
But nobody should be allowed to represent himself as a
"paralegal" for profit, without such term being clearly defined by
rule or regulation, and without any adequate and effective
means of regulating his activities. Also, law practice in a
corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the legal
profession, but before allowance of such practice may be
considered, the corporation's Article of Incorporation and Bylaws must conform to each and every provision of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court. 5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law
but engaged in giving legal support services to lawyers and
laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment).
This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out
itself to the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.,"
and soliciting employment for its enumerated services fall within
the realm of a practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory
powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is
merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity.

Respondent's own commercial advertisement which announces a

certainAtty. Don Parkinson to be handling the fields of law belies
its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic,
Inc." is offering and rendering legal services through its reserve
of lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is not limited
to the conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds,
incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their
legal right and then take them to an attorney and ask the latter
to look after their case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial
Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the
practice of law, and such limitation cannot be evaded by
a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it.
Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent
"The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits
employment of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for
deception, especially so when the public cannot ventilate any
grievance for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely,
the limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly
admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised
Rules of Court) is to subject the members to the discipline of the
Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business name,
the persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court
discipline. The practice of law is not a profession open to all who
wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am.
Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons who have
qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not only
respondent but also all the persons who are acting for
respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law practice. 6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the
issues stated herein, are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but
also misleading and patently immoral; and

4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and

punish the Legal Clinic and its corporate officers for its
unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical, misleading and
immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It
claims that it merely renders "legal support services" to answers,
litigants and the general public as enunciated in the Primary
Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to
5 of Respondent's Comment). But its advertised services, as
enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show that it is
indeed engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on
Persons and Family Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign
divorces, annulment of marriages, secret marriages, absence
and adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related
problems, immigration problems; the Investments Law of the
Philippines and such other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of
the aforesaid law, the legal principles and procedures related
thereto, the legal advices based thereon and which activities call
for legal training, knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava
Case, the activities of respondent fall squarely and are embraced
in what lawyers and laymen equally term as "the practice of
law." 7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount
consideration should be given to the protection of the general
public from the danger of being exploited by unqualified persons
or entities who may be engaged in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous
four-year course of study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts
or sciences course and then to take and pass the bar
examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.

While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as

an aid to the administration of justice, there are in those
jurisdictions, courses of study and/or standards which would
qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as such.
While it may now be the opportune time to establish these
courses of study and/or standards, the fact remains that at
present, these do not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime,
this Honorable Court may decide to make measures to protect
the general public from being exploited by those who may be
dealing with the general public in the guise of being "paralegals"
without being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected
from the dangers which may be brought about by advertising of
legal services. While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under
the present Code of Professional Responsibility from advertising,
it appears in the instant case that legal services are being
advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by
"paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the
general public from falling prey to those who advertise legal
services without being qualified to offer such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent,
however, seems to give the impression that information
regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage,
immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence, adoption
and foreign investment, which are in essence, legal matters , will
be given to them if they avail of its services. The Respondent's
name The Legal Clinic, Inc. does not help matters. It gives
the impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal
problems brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as
claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the misleading
impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic,
Inc., as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only
"paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very
admissions of its President and majority stockholder, Atty.
Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main purpose
of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek"
article." 9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:

Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to

solicit cases for the purpose of gain which, as provided for under
the above cited law, (are) illegal and against the Code of
Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an
advertisement to solicit cases, but it is illegal in that in bold
letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work
out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is not only
illegal but immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one
has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is
certainly fooling the public for valid marriages in the Philippines
are solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under the
law. And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting
marriage is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other
countries the trend is towards allowing lawyers to advertise their
special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified
practitioners legal services for their particular needs can justify
the use of advertisements such as are the subject matter of the
petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever
merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended
so that such act could become justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to
project that secret marriages and divorce are possible in this
country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly
reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they
could go about having a secret marriage here, when it cannot
nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice on divorce,
where in this country there is none, except under the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good
morals and is deceitful because it falsely represents to the public
to be able to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by
our Code of Morals should not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court
held that solicitation for clients by an attorney by circulars of
advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses of this character
justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10

6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:

xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law,
such as management consultancy firms or travel agencies,
whether run by lawyers or not, perform the services rendered by
Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein,
however, the fact that the business of respondent (assuming it
can be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves
knowledge of the law does not necessarily make respondent
guilty of unlawful practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a
consultant can render effective service unless he is
familiar with such statutes and regulations. He must
be careful not to suggest a course of conduct which
the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the
consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his use of
that knowledge as a factor in determining what
measures he shall recommend, do not constitute the
practice of law . . . . It is not only presumed that all
men know the law, but it is a fact that most men
have considerable acquaintance with broad features
of the law . . . . Our knowledge of the law
accurate or inaccurate moulds our conduct not
only when we are acting for ourselves, but when we
are serving others. Bankers, liquor dealers and
laymen generally possess rather precise knowledge
of the laws touching their particular business or
profession. A good example is the architect, who
must be familiar with zoning, building and fire
prevention codes, factory and tenement house
statutes, and who draws plans and specification in
harmony with the law. This is not practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit
a fire tower, replies that it is required by the statute.
Or the industrial relations expert cites, in support of
some measure that he recommends, a decision of
the National Labor Relations Board. Are they
practicing law? In my opinion, they are not, provided
no separate fee is charged for the legal advice or

information, and the legal question is subordinate

and incidental to a major non-legal problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
If it were usual for one intending to erect a building
on his land to engage a lawyer to advise him and the
architect in respect to the building code and the like,
then an architect who performed this function would
probably be considered to be trespassing on territory
reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the
industrial relations field had been pre-empted by
lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at the
elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is not the
case. The most important body of the industrial
relations experts are the officers and business agents
of the labor unions and few of them are lawyers.
Among the larger corporate employers, it has been
the practice for some years to delegate special
responsibility in employee matters to a management
group chosen for their practical knowledge and skill
in such matter, and without regard to legal thinking
or lack of it. More recently, consultants like the
defendants have the same service that the larger
employers get from their own specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is growing into a
recognized profession for which appropriate courses
are offered by our leading universities. The court
should be very cautious about declaring [that] a
widespread, well-established method of conducting
business is unlawful, or that the considerable class of
men who customarily perform a certain function
have no right to do so, or that the technical
education given by our schools cannot be used by
the graduates in their business.
In determining whether a man is practicing law, we
should consider his work for any particular client or
customer, as a whole. I can imagine defendant being
engaged primarily to advise as to the law defining his
client's obligations to his employees, to guide his
client's obligations to his employees, to guide his
client along the path charted by law. This, of course,

would be the practice of the law. But such is not the

fact in the case before me. Defendant's primarily
efforts are along economic and psychological lines.
The law only provides the frame within which he
must work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of
building the limits the kind of building the architect
may plan. The incidental legal advice or information
defendant may give, does not transform his activities
into the practice of law. Let me add that if, even as a
minor feature of his work, he performed services
which are customarily reserved to members of the
bar, he would be practicing law. For instance, if as
part of a welfare program, he drew employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is the
representations of the employer in the adjustment of
grievances and in collective bargaining, with or
without a mediator. This is not per se the practice of
law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and
may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject
under discussion, and the person appointed is free to
accept the employment whether or not he is a
member of the bar. Here, however, there may be an
exception where the business turns on a question of
law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers
who are not lawyers. But if the value of the land
depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal
role of the negotiator is to assess the probable
outcome of the dispute and persuade the opposite
party to the same opinion, then it may be that only a
lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a
controversy between an employer and his men grows
from differing interpretations of a contract, or of a
statute, it is quite likely that defendant should not
handle it. But I need not reach a definite conclusion
here, since the situation is not presented by the
proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the employer
before administrative agencies of the federal
government, especially before trial examiners of the
National Labor Relations Board. An agency of the
federal government, acting by virtue of an authority
granted by the Congress, may regulate the

representation of parties before such agency. The

State of New Jersey is without power to interfere
with such determination or to forbid representation
before the agency by one whom the agency admits.
The rules of the National Labor Relations Board give
to a party the right to appear in person, or by
counsel, or by other representative. Rules and
Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31.
'Counsel' here means a licensed attorney, and ther
representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase of his
work, defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor
Board allows, even arguing questions purely legal.
(Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky,
Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a
lawful calling (which may involve knowledge of the law) is not
engaged in the practice of law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major
non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to
members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or
information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any
particular client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the
Code of Professional Responsibility succintly states the rule of
conduct:
Rule 15.08 A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or
occupation concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear
to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another
capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render
wedding services (See Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine,
straightforward marriages, like securing a marriage license, and

making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not

constitute practice of law. However, if the problem is as
complicated as that described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the
Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then
what may be involved is actually the practice of law. If a nonlawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services then it is
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on
divorce, absence, annulment of marriage and visas (See
Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving informational
materials may not constitute of law. The business is similar to
that of a bookstore where the customer buys materials on the
subject and determines on the subject and determines by
himself what courses of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely
giving information, the Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the
law to the particular problem of the client, and give legal advice.
Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal
text which publication of a legal text which purports
to say what the law is amount to legal practice. And
the mere fact that the principles or rules stated in
the text may be accepted by a particular reader as a
solution to his problem does not affect this. . . . .
Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of these
two, that is, the text and the forms, with advice as to
how the forms should be filled out, constitutes the
unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation with
many approved and accepted texts. Dacey's book is
sold to the public at large. There is no personal
contact or relationship with a particular individual.
Nor does there exist that relation of confidence and
trust so necessary to the status of attorney and
client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE
THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A
PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR
SITUATION. At most the book assumes to offer
general advice on common problems, and does not
purport to give personal advice on a specific problem
peculiar to a designated or readily identified person.
Similarly the defendant's publication does not

purport to give personal advice on a specific problem

peculiar to a designated or readily identified person
in a particular situation in their publication and
sale of the kits, such publication and sale did not
constitutes the unlawful practice of law . . . . There
being no legal impediment under the statute to the
sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the
injunction against defendant maintaining an office for
the purpose of selling to persons seeking a divorce,
separation, annulment or separation agreement any
printed material or writings relating to matrimonial
law or the prohibition in the memorandum of
modification of the judgment against defendant
having an interest in any publishing house publishing
his manuscript on divorce and against his having any
personal contact with any prospective purchaser. The
record does fully support, however, the finding that
for the change of $75 or $100 for the kit, the
defendant gave legal advice in the course of personal
contacts concerning particular problems which might
arise in the preparation and presentation of the
purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause of action or
pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in the
preparation of necessary documents (The injunction
therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the
practice of law, particularly with reference to the
giving of advice and counsel by the defendant
relating to specific problems of particular individuals
in connection with a divorce, separation, annulment
of separation agreement sought and should be
affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973],
cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly
non-diagnostic, non-advisory. "It is not controverted, however,
that if the services "involve giving legal advice or counselling,"
such would constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is
in this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be
necessary for the judicious disposition of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give
the impression (or perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a

secret marriage. With all the solemnities, formalities and other

requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no
Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The
second paragraph thereof (which is not necessarily related to the
first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal
services?" or "legal support services", and not legal services, are
available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law"
becomes exigent for the proper determination of the issues raised by the
petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause "practice of law" has
long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The courts
have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and
scope of the term, some of which we now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or
render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes
legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and
contract by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may
not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally
engages in three principal types of professional activity: legal advice and
instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations,
preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles
not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public
tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights of life,
liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in proper
interpretation and enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer,
he is in the practice of law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises them as
to their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the
latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice
for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the
conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who

renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives

pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in
several cases, we laid down the test to determine whether certain acts
constitute "practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the
application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest
of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in
court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but
embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident
to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all
legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title
Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A
person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of
advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their
right under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as
an advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective, before any
court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or
commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity,
performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise
stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the
business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or
while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or
outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of
law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W.
2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105
Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or
litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and

other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the

management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general,
all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a
judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters or estate
and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as
do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the
work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind
of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262,
263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part
of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate
relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the
giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an
extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs.
Although these transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal
skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity
for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These
customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an
intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts.
No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in
the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the
lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which
involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of
adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting
at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which
rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o
Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the
Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v.
Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of
court. Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with

the perceptive findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations

that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can
neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by
respondent's own description of the services it has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving ready
information by trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which
are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive
use of computers and modern information technology in the
gathering, processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of
information and communication, such as computerized legal
research; encoding and reproduction of documents and
pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search;
evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact
finding investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic
institutional services from government or non-government
agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business
registrations; educational or employment records or
certifications, obtaining documentation like clearances,
passports, local or foreign visas; giving information about laws of
other countries that they may find useful, like foreign divorce,
marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to
emigration to the foreign country, and other matters that do not
involve representation of clients in court; designing and installing
computer systems, programs, or software for the efficient
management of law offices, corporate legal departments, courts
and other entities engaged in dispensing or administering legal
services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely
involve mechanical and technical knowhow, such as the installation of
computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices,
or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice
to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal
information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is nonadvisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing
information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and
adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent
corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the
client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and

so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the

intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to
be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements
represent and for the which services it will consequently charge and be paid.
That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of
law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent
corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the
weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice, contract
drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in
the January 13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the
Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into the
structure, main purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given
by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The
Legal Clinic, with offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria
Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the
client's problem, and even if it is as complicated as the CunetaConcepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of
lawyers, who, like doctors are "specialists" in various fields can
take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation
and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation, and
family law. These specialist are backed up by a battery of
paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the
trend in the medical field toward specialization, it caters to
clients who cannot afford the services of the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they
come, we start by analyzing the problem. That's what doctors do
also. They ask you how you contracted what's bothering you,
they take your temperature, they observe you for the symptoms
and so on. That's how we operate, too. And once the problem
has been categorized, then it's referred to one of our specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery
or follow-up treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a
matter of minutes. "Things like preparing a simple deed of sale
or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff or, if this
were a hospital the residents or the interns. We can take care of
these matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa

hospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a

common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt
with accordingly. "If you had a rich relative who died and named
you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of
property, we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. There
would be real estate taxes and arrears which would need to be
put in order, and your relative is even taxed by the state for the
right to transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation
would be properly trained to deal with the problem. Now, if there
were other heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then you
would need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem
for presentation in court, and gather evidence to support the
case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is
not controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law
by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it
within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements
which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said
reported facts sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to
serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client
may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation
and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond
the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers
engaged in the practice of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by
private respondent which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by
paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter
admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court,
and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals
found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right
conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited privilege subject to
withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional
conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the
bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law
and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 24

The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom

respondent would wish to draw support for his thesis. The doctrines there
also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who meet the
requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes
or rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business
except for members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions
required by statute and the rules of court. Only those persons are allowed to
practice law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through
education and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing
profound knowledge of legal science entitling them to advise, counsel with,
protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of their clients, with respect
to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The
justification for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the
bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from competition, but in the
protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters
by incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial department
can exercise little control. 27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the
concept in the United States of paralegals as an occupation separate from
the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its
merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for
judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has
done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by
respondent, there are schools and universities there which offer studies and
degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in the Philippines. 28 As
the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United
States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public.
One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by the American
Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant
Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify
legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United
States with their own code of professional ethics, such as the National
Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal
Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance
of what may be considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA,
some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed
limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal services, but
such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or
regulations granting permission therefor. 30

Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the

absence of constitutional or statutory authority, a person who has not been
admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration of
justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized
and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue
to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and
remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to practice law
in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code
of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his
legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective
information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit the
use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, selflaudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of
the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal
business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility,
the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not
resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as
furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to
be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is
engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the
interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like
self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of
his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession.
advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising
his goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of legal services or
solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that
the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of
Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to
those of respondent which are involved in the present proceeding, 39 was
held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a
flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his
profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the
public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other
things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers,

constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to

advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares.
Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself
and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of
mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the
public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice
with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled
the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be
the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of
Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising
possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity
and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and
conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community
has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is
a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good
and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to
magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal byproduct of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The
canons of the profession enumerate exceptions to the rule against
advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they may be
undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those
which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from
the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a
manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of
brief biographical and informative data. "Such data must not be misleading
and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his
professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses;
branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar;
schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational
distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships;
legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and
committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the
fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of
references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly
represented." 42

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose;
it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal
or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that
reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and
informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society
program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the
conduct, management or contents of which are calculated or likely to
deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of
the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card
may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which
he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law
practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law
firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office
address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable.
He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under
a designation of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the
advertisements for which respondent is being taken to task, which even
includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent corporation for
services rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do not and
conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is
repeatedly invoked and constitutes the justification relied upon by
respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the
fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer,
as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to
publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability
upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be
charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly
or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the
present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary
rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein
are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such
authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general
rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if
and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise,
the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association
after the decision in Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after

viewing television commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped

significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and
judicial systems, to allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used
by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating
public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been
under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point in
time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair,
criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct
which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem
formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to
disciplinary action, to advertise his services except in allowable
instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of
law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime
incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a
member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that
a repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding
will be dealt with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality
of the purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be
passed upon and determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into
an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative
parameters of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in
nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter be promptly determined,
albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of
our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or engage
in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule
against unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some socalled paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the
concern and province of the Solicitor General who can institute the
corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual
background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate charter, in light
of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is

referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under
the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein
respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or
dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or
similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from
conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction
proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let
copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for
appropriate action in accordance herewith.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur

FIRST DIVISION
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN,
Complainant,

A.C. No. 6672

Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and
BERSAMIN, JJ.

- versus -

ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO,

Respondent.

Promulgated:
September 4, 2009

x-----------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment [1] filed by Pedro Linsangan of the

Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes
Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional
services.
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the
Marie Labiano, convinced his clients[2] to transfer
Respondent promised them financial assistance [3] and
on their claims.[4] To induce them to hire his services,
them and sent them text messages.

help of paralegal Fe
legal representation.
expeditious collection
he persistently called

To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn

affidavit[5] of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him
to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize respondents
services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000. Complainant also
attached respondents calling card:[6]
Front
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01

Tel: 362-

7820
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar
Grace Park, Caloocan City

Fax: (632) 362-7821

Cel.: (0926) 2701719

Back
SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS

ABROAD.
(emphasis supplied)
Hence, this complaint.
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing
the printing and circulation of the said calling card. [7]
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.[8]
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report
and recommendation,[9] found that respondent had encroached on the
professional practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.02 [10] and other
canons[11] of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he
contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain, personally or through
paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138[12] of the Rules of
Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded with
a stern warning that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty.
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of
respondent but we modify the recommended penalty.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by
respondent into complainants professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02
of the CPR. And the means employed by respondent in furtherance of the
said misconduct themselves constituted distinct violations of ethical rules.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to,
including the manner by which a lawyers services are to be made known.
Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:
CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES
SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND
OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is
a profession and not a business; lawyers should not advertise their talents
as merchants advertise their wares.[13] To allow a lawyer to advertise his

talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession

in the publics estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high
character of service to which every member of the bar is called. [14]
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE
ANY ACT DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers. [15] Such actuation
constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment.[16]
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR
which provides:
RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE
OR INTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR
DELAY ANY MANS CAUSE.

This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind
of legal business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to
gain employment)[17] as a measure to protect the community from barratry
and champerty.[18]
Complainant presented substantial evidence[19] (consisting of the sworn
statements of the very same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to
respondents office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited legal business
as well as profited from referrals suits.
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he
later admitted it during the mandatory hearing.
Through Labianos actions, respondents law practice was benefited.
Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of
Labianos word that respondent could produce a more favorable result.

Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment

violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is
the rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyers client nor induce the
latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced
fees for his services.[20]Again the Court notes that respondent never denied
having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from Labianos
referrals. Furthermore, he never denied Labianos connection to his office.
[21]
Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into anothers
legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as
borrowers, respondent violated Rule 16.04:
Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his
client unless the clients interests are fully protected by the
nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a
lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of
justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter
he is handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only
exception is, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary
expenses (such as filing fees, stenographers fees for transcript of
stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a
matter that he is handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so
that the free exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected. [22] It
seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as
his entire devotion and fidelity to the clients cause. If the lawyer lends
money to the client in connection with the clients case, the lawyer in effect
acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake
in its outcome.[23] Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to
consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a
settlement which may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice

of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the clients cause.
[24]

As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes

malpractice[25] which calls for the exercise of the Courts disciplinary powers.
Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for initiating
contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment.
[26]
Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public from
the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the
nobility of the legal profession.
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of
the prohibition on lending money to clients), the sanction recommended by
the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed
penalty is grossly incommensurate to its findings.
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by
petitioner. A lawyers best advertisement is a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and
conduct.[27] For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their
services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional
cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

lawyers name;
name of the law firm with which he is connected;
address;
telephone number and
special branch of law practiced.[28]

Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial

assistance. The phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who already had
representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their
legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from their original
lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and emotional
vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and
deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of

substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule
that respondent was personally and directly responsible for the printing and
distribution of Labianos calling cards.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating
Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one
year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be
dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office
of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator to be circulated to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

WE

CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

[1]
[2]

[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]

[10]

[11]

[12]

[13]
[14]

Complaint dated February 1, 2005. Rollo, pp. 1-7.

Overseas seafarers Cenen Magno, Henry Dy, James R. Gregorio
and Noel Geronimo. Id., pp. 2-3, 9-14.
Id., p. 9.
Involved benefits and disability collection cases. Id., pp. 2-3.
Complaint, Annex D. Id., pp. 12-14.
Complaint, Annex A. Id., p. 8.
Answer dated April 26, 2005. Id., pp. 20-23.
Resolution dated August 15, 2005. Id., p. 24.
Report and recommendation penned by Commissioner Lolita
Quisumbing dated March 2, 2006. Id., pp. 106-111.
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Rule 8.02 provides:
A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the
professional employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of
any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance
to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
Rule 1.01; Canon 2; Rule 2.03; Canon 3; Rule 3.01; Canon 7;
Rule 7.03; Canon 8; Rule 8.01; Canon 9; and Rule 9.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Rollo, p. 110.
RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Section 27 provides:
Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from
his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice
of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. (emphasis supplied)
In Re: Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37 (1933).
Agpalo, LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS, 7TH Edition (2002), p. 109.

[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]

Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. See supra note 12.
Supra note 13.
Agpalo. Supra note 14, p. 72.
McCloskey v. Tobin, 252 US 107, 64 L Ed 481, 40 S Ct 306

(1920).
Or evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion even if other equally reasonable minds might
opine otherwise (Portuguez v. GSIS Family Savings Bank, G.R. No.
169570, 2 March 2007, 517 SCRA 309; Bautista v. Sula, A.M. No. P04-1920, 17 August 2007, 530 SCRA 406; ePacific Global Contact
Center, Inc. v. Cabansay, G.R. No. 167345, 23 November 2007, 538
SCRA 498). Moreover, in In re: Improper Solicitation of Court
Employees Rolando H. Hernandez, Executive Assistant 1, Office of
the Court Administrator, A.M. No. 2008-12-SC, 24 April 2009, the
Court adopted the OCAs evaluation which relied on the sworn
statements to support its conclusion that illegal acts were committed
by respondents in this case.
[20]
Supra note 14, p. 101.
[21]
Rollo, pp. 96-97.
[22]
Agpalo, supra note 14, p. 240 citing comments of the IBP
Committee that drafted the CPR, p. 90.
[23]
Id.
[24]
Id.
[25]
Supra notes 10 and 12.
[26]
State Bar v. Kilpatrick, 874 SW2d 656 (1994, Tex). In this case,
the lawyer was disbarred.
[27]
Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc., B.M. No. 553, 17 June 1993, 223 SCRA
378.
[28]
Id., p. 408.
[19]

CANON 3
A.C. No. L-1117

March 20, 1944

THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant,

vs.
ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor Feria for
complainant.
Francisco Claravall for respondent.
OZAETA, J.:

The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for

having published an advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943,
which reads as follows:
Marriage
license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay
or publicity avoided if desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of
parties. Consultation on any matter free for the poor. Everything
confidential.
Legal assistance service
12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.
Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having published the
said advertisement; but subsequently, thru his attorney, he admitted having
caused its publication and prayed for "the indulgence and mercy" of the
Court, promising "not to repeat such professional misconduct in the future
and to abide himself to the strict ethical rules of the law profession." In
further mitigation he alleged that the said advertisement was published only
once in the Tribune and that he never had any case at law by reason thereof.
Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for decision.
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation
by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen
solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly
provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise
his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession
and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops
to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or
offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of
justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the
temple of Jehovah. "The most worth and effective advertisement possible,
even for a young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be
forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code
of Ethics.)

In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from the

practice of law for the period of one month for advertising his services and
soliciting work from the public by writing circular letters. That case, however,
was more serious than this because there the solicitations were repeatedly
made and were more elaborate and insistent.
Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the
misconduct, the Court is of the opinion and so decided that the respondent
should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded.
CANON 4 AND 5

[B.M. 850. October 2, 2001]

MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION

RESOLUTION
ADOPTING THE REVISED RULES ON THE CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUCATION FOR MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES
Considering the Rules on the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE) for members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
recommended by the IBP, endorsed by the Philippine Judicial Academy, and
reviewed and passed upon by the Supreme Court Committee on Legal
Education, the Court hereby resolves to approve, as it hereby approves, the
following Revised Rules for proper implementation:
Rule 1. PURPOSE

SECTION 1. Purpose of the MCLE. Continuing legal education is

required of members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) to ensure
that throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence,
maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of the
practice of law.
Rule 2. MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION

SECTION 1. Commencement of the MCLE. Within two (2) months from

the approval of these Rules by the Supreme Court En Banc, the MCLE
Committee shall be constituted and shall commence the implementation
of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) program in accordance
with these Rules.
SEC. 2. Requirements of completion of MCLE. Members of the IBP not
exempt under Rule 7 shall complete every three (3) years at least thirty-six
(36) hours of continuing legal education activities approved by the MCLE
Committee. Of the 36 hours:
(a) At least six (6) hours shall be devoted to legal ethics equivalent
to six (6) credit units.
(b) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to trial and pretrial
skills equivalent to four (4) credit units.
(c) At least five (5) hours shall be devoted to alternative dispute
resolution equivalent to five (5) credit units.
(d) At least nine (9) hours shall be devoted to updates on substantive
and procedural laws, and jurisprudence equivalent to nine (9)
credit units.
(e) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to legal writing and oral
advocacy equivalent to four (4) credit units.
(f) At least two (2) hours shall be devoted to international law and
international conventions equivalent to two (2) credit units.
(g) The remaining six (6) hours shall be devoted to such subjects as
may be prescribed by the MCLE Committee equivalent to six (6)
credit units.
Rule 3. COMPLIANCE PERIOD

SECTION 1. Initial compliance period. -- The initial compliance period

shall begin not later than three (3) months from the adoption of these Rules.
Except for the initial compliance period for members admitted or readmitted
after the establishment of the program, all compliance periods shall be for
thirty-six (36) months and shall begin the day after the end of the previous
compliance period.
SEC. 2. Compliance Groups. -- Members of the IBP not exempt from the
MCLE requirement shall be divided into three (3) compliance groups,
namely:

(a) Compliance group 1. -- Members in the National Capital Region

(NCR) or Metro Manila are assigned to Compliance Group 1.
(b) Compliance group 2. -- Members in Luzon outside NCR are
assigned to Compliance Group 2.
(c) Compliance group 3. -- Members in Visayas and Mindanao are
assigned to Compliance Group 3.
Nevertheless, members may participate in any legal education
activity wherever it may be available to earn credit unit toward
compliance with the MCLE requirement.
SEC. 3. Compliance period of members admitted or readmitted after
establishment of the program. Members admitted or readmitted to the
Bar after the establishment of the program shall be assigned to the
appropriate Compliance Group based on their Chapter membership on the
date of admission or readmission.
The initial compliance period after admission or readmission shall begin
on the first day of the month of admission or readmission and shall end on
the same day as that of all other members in the same Compliance Group.
(a) Where four (4) months or less remain of the initial compliance
period after admission or readmission, the member is not required
to comply with the program requirement for the initial compliance.
(b) Where more than four (4) months remain of the initial compliance
period after admission or readmission, the member shall be
required to complete a number of hours of approved continuing
legal education activities equal to the number of months remaining
in the compliance period in which the member is admitted or
readmitted. Such member shall be required to complete a number
of hours of education in legal ethics in proportion to the number of
months remaining in the compliance period. Fractions of hours
shall be rounded up to the next whole number.
Rule 4. COMPUTATION OF CREDIT UNITS(CU)

SECTION 1. Guidelines. - CREDIT UNITS ARE EQUIVALENT TO CREDIT

HOURS. CREDIT UNITS measure compliance with the MCLE
requirement under the Rules, based on the category of the lawyers
participation in the MCLE activity. The following are the guidelines
for computing credit units and the supporting documents required
therefor:

PROGRAMS/ACTIVITY
UNITS

CREDIT
SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

1. SEMINARS, CONVENTIONS, CONFERENCES, SYMPOSIA, IN-HOUSE

EDUCATION PROGRAMS, WORKSHOPS, DIALOGUES, ROUND TABLE
DISCUSSIONS BY APPROVED PROVIDERS UNDER RULE 7 AND OTHER
RELATED RULES
1.1 PARTICIPANT/
OF
CERTIFICATE OF
ATTENDEE
TTENDANCE WITH

1 CU PER HOUR
ATTENDANCE

NUMBER OF HOURS
1.2 LECTURER
THE
PHOTOCOPY OF
RESOURCE
PER
PLAQUE OR
SPEAKER
PERIOD
SPONSORS

FULL CU FOR
SUBJECT
COMPLIANCE
CERTIFICATION

1.3 PANELIST/REACTOR
1/2 OF CU FOR
THE
CERTIFICATION
COMMENTATOR/
SUBJECT
PER
FROM
MODERATOR/
COMPLIANCE
PERIOD
SPONSORING
COORDINATOR/
ORGANIZATION
FACILITATOR
2. AUTHORSHIP, EDITING AND REVIEW
2.1 LAW BOOK OF NOT
FULL CU FOR
THE
PUBLISHED BOOK
LESS THAN 100 PAGES
SUBJECT PER
COMPLIANCE PERIOD
2.2 BOOK EDITOR
1/2 OF THE CU
OF
PUBLISHED BOOK
AUTHORSHIP CATEGORY
WITH PROOF AS
EDITOR
2.3 RESEARCH PAPER

1/2 OF CU FOR THE

DULY

INNOVATIVE PROGRAM/
SUBJECT
PER
CERTIFIED/
CREATIVE PROJECT
COMPLIANCE
PERIOD
PUBLISHED
TECHNICAL
REPORT/PAPER
2.4 LEGAL ARTICLE OF AT
ARTICLE
LEAST TEN (10) PAGES

1/2 OF CU FOR THE

PUBLISHED

SUBJECT PER
COMPLIANCE

PERIOD
2.5 LEGAL NEWSLETTER/
1 CU PER
ISSUE
PUBLISHED
LAW JOURNAL
EDITOR
AL

NEWSLETTER/JOURN

2.6 PROFESSORIAL CHAIR/

FULL CU FOR
THE
CERTIFICATION OF
BAR REVIEW LECTURE
SUBJECT PER
DEAN OR
LAW TEACHING/
COMPLIANCE PERIOD
REVIEW
DIRECTOR

LAW
BAR

Rule 5. CATEGORIES OF CREDIT UNITS

SECTION 1. Classes of Credit units.

participatory or non-participatory.
SEC.
2. Claim
for
participatory
credit units may be claimed for:

-- Credit

credit units.

units are
--

either

Participatory

(a) Attending
approved
education
activities
like
seminars,
conferences, conventions, symposia, in-house education programs,
workshops, dialogues or round table discussion.
(b) Speaking or lecturing, or acting as assigned panelist, reactor,
commentator, resource speaker, moderator, coordinator or
facilitator in approved education activities.
(c) Teaching in a law school or lecturing in a bar review class.

SEC. 3. Claim for non-participatory credit units. Non-participatory

credit units may be claimed per compliance period for:
(a) Preparing, as an author or co-author, written materials published
or accepted for publication, e.g., in the form of an article, chapter,
book, or book review which contribute to the legal education of the
author member, which were not prepared in the ordinary course of
the members practice or employment.
(b) Editing a law book, law journal or legal newsletter.
Rule 6. COMPUTATION OF CREDIT HOURS (CH)

SECTION 1. Computation of credit hours. -- Credit hours are computed

based on actual time spent in an education activity in hours to the nearest
one-quarter hour reported in decimals.
Rule 7. EXEMPTIONS

SECTION 1. Parties exempted from the MCLE. -- The following members

of the Bar are exempt from the MCLE requirement:
(a) The President and the Vice President of the Philippines, and the
Secretaries and Undersecretaries of Executive Departments;
(b) Senators and Members of the House of Representatives;
(c) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court,
incumbent and retired members of the judiciary, incumbent
members of the Judicial and Bar Council and incumbent court
lawyers covered by the Philippine Judicial Academy program of
continuing judicial education;
(d) The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor and Assistant
Secretaries of the Department of Justice;
(e) The Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitors General;
(f) The Government Corporate Counsel,
Government Corporate Counsel;

Deputy

and

Assistant

(g) The Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions;

(h) The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, the Deputy
Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the
Ombudsman;

(i) Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions;

(j) Incumbent deans, bar reviewers and professors of law who have
teaching experience for at least ten (10) years in accredited law
schools;
(k) The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps of
Professors and Professorial Lecturers of the Philippine Judicial
Academy; and
(l) Governors and Mayors.
SEC. 2. Other parties exempted from the MCLE. The following
Members of the Bar are likewise exempt:
(a) Those who are not in law practice, private or public.
(b) Those who have retired from law practice with the approval of the
IBP Board of Governors.
SEC. 3. Good cause for exemption from or modification of requirement
A member may file a verified request setting forth good cause for exemption
(such as physical disability, illness, post graduate study abroad, proven
expertise in law, etc.) from compliance with or modification of any of the
requirements, including an extension of time for compliance, in accordance
with a procedure to be established by the MCLE Committee.
SEC. 4. Change of status. The compliance period shall begin on the
first day of the month in which a member ceases to be exempt under
Sections 1, 2, or 3 of this Rule and shall end on the same day as that of all
other members in the same Compliance Group.
SEC. 5. Proof of exemption. Applications for exemption from or
modification of the MCLE requirement shall be under oath and supported by
documents.
Rule 8. STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF
EDUCATION ACTIVITIES

SECTION 1. Approval of MCLE program. Subject to the implementing

regulations that may be adopted by the MCLE Committee, continuing legal
education program may be granted approval in either of two (2) ways: (1)
the provider of the activity is an accredited provider and certifies that the
activity meets the criteria of Section 2 of this Rule; and (2) the provider is
specifically mandated by law to provide continuing legal education.
SEC. 2. Standards for all education activities. All continuing legal
education activities must meet the following standards:

(a) The activity shall have significant current intellectual or practical

content.
(b) The activity shall constitute an organized program of learning
related to legal subjects and the legal profession, including cross
profession activities (e.g., accounting-tax or medical-legal) that
enhance legal skills or the ability to practice law, as well as
subjects in legal writing and oral advocacy.
(c) The activity shall be conducted by a provider with adequate
professional experience.
(d) Where the activity is more than one (1) hour in length,
substantive written materials must be distributed to all
participants. Such materials must be distributed at or before the
time the activity is offered.
(e) In-house education activities must be scheduled at a time and
location so as to be free from interruption like telephone calls and
other distractions.
Rule 9. ACCREDITATION OF PROVIDERS

SECTION 1. Accreditation of providers. -- Accreditation of providers

shall be done by the MCLE Committee.
SEC. 2. Requirements for accreditation of providers. Any person or
group may be accredited as a provider for a term of two (2) years, which
may be renewed, upon written application. All providers of continuing legal
education activities, including in-house providers, are eligible to be
accredited providers. Application for accreditation shall:
(a) Be submitted on a form provided by the MCLE Committee;
(b) Contain all information requested in the form;
(c) Be accompanied by the appropriate approval fee.
SEC.
3. Requirements
of
all
providers. -approved accredited providers shall agree to the following:
(a) An official record verifying the attendance at the activity shall be
maintained by the provider for at least four (4) years after the
completion date. The provider shall include the member on the
official record of attendance only if the members signature was
obtained at the time of attendance at the activity. The official
record of attendance shall contain the members name and number
in the Roll of Attorneys and shall identify the time, date, location,

All

subject matter, and length of the education activity. A copy of such

record shall be furnished the MCLE COMMITTEE.
(b) The provider shall certify that:
(1)
This activity has been approved BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE in the
amount of ________ hours of which ______ hours will apply in (legal ethics,
etc.), as appropriate to the content of the activity;
(2)
The activity conforms to the standards for approved education
activities prescribed by these Rules and such regulations as may be
prescribed by the MCLE COMMITTEE.
(c) The provider shall issue a record or certificate to all participants
identifying the time, date, location, subject matter and length of the
activity.
(d) The provider shall allow in-person observation of all approved
continuing legal education activity by THE MCLE COMMITTEE, members
of the IBP Board of Governors, or designees of the Committee and IBP
staff Board for purposes of monitoring compliance with these Rules.
(e) The provider shall indicate in promotional materials, the nature of the
activity, the time devoted to each topic and identity of the instructors.
The provider shall make available to each participant a copy of THE
MCLE COMMITTEE-approved Education Activity Evaluation Form.
(f) The provider shall maintain the completed Education Activity
Evaluation Forms for a period of not less than one (1) year after the
activity, copy furnished the MCLE COMMITTEE.
(g) Any person or group who conducts an unauthorized activity under
this program or issues a spurious certificate in violation of these Rules
shall be subject to appropriate sanctions.
SEC. 4. Renewal of provider accreditation. The accreditation of a
provider may be renewed every two (2) years. It may be denied if the
provider fails to comply with any of the requirements of these Rules or fails
to provide satisfactory education activities for the preceding period.
SEC. 5. Revocation of provider accreditation. -- the accreditation of
any provider referred to in Rule 9 may be revoked by a majority vote of the
MCLE Committee, after notice and hearing and for good cause.

Rule 10. FEE FOR APPROVAL OF ACTIVITY AND ACCREDITATION OF PROVIDER

SECTION 1. Payment of fees. Application for approval of an education

activity or accreditation as a provider requires payment of the appropriate
fee as provided in the Schedule of MCLE Fees.
Rule 11. GENERAL COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES

SECTION 1. Compliance card. -- Each member shall secure from the

MCLE Committee a Compliance Card before the end of his compliance
period. He shall complete the card by attesting under oath that he has
complied with the education requirement or that he is exempt, specifying the
nature of the exemption. Such Compliance Card must be returned to
the Committee not later than the day after the end of the members
compliance period.
SEC. 2. Member record keeping requirement. -- Each member shall
maintain sufficient record of compliance or exemption, copy furnished the
MCLE Committee. The record required to be provided to the members by the
provider pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 9 should be a sufficient record of
attendance at a participatory activity. A record of non-participatory activity
shall also be maintained by the member, as referred to in Section 3 of Rule
5.
Rule 12. NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES

SECTION 1. What constitutes non-compliance. The following shall

constitute non-compliance:
(a) Failure to complete
compliance period;

the

education

requirement

within

the

(b) Failure to provide attestation of compliance or exemption;

(c) Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of compliance (including
evidence of exempt status) within the prescribed period;
(d) Failure to satisfy the education requirement and furnish evidence
of such compliance within sixty (60) days from receipt of noncompliance notice;
(e) Failure to pay non-compliance fee within the prescribed period;

(f) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or

intended to circumvent or evade compliance with the MCLE
requirements.
SEC. 2. Non-compliance notice and 60-day period to attain compliance. Members failing to comply will receive a Non-Compliance Notice stating the
specific deficiency and will be given sixty (60) days from the date of
notification to file a response clarifying the deficiency or otherwise showing
compliance with the requirements. Such notice shall contain the following
language near the beginning of the notice in capital letters:
IF YOU FAIL TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE
MCLE REQUIREMENT BY (INSERT DATE 60 DAYS FROM DATE OF
NOTICE), YOU SHALL BE LISTED AS A DELINQUENT MEMBER AND SHALL
NOT BE PERMITTED TO PRACTICE LAW UNTIL SUCH TIME AS ADEQUATE
PROOF OF COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE.
Members given sixty (60) days to respond to a Non-Compliance Notice
may use this period to attain the adequate number of credit units for
compliance. Credit units earned during this period may only be counted
toward compliance with the prior compliance period requirement
unless units in excess of the requirement are earned, in which case the
excess may be counted toward meeting the current compliance period
requirement.
Rule 13. CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE

SECTION 1. Non-compliance fee. -- A member who, for whatever reason,

is in non-compliance at the end of the compliance period shall pay a noncompliance fee.
SEC. 2. Listing as delinquent member. -- A member who fails to comply
with the requirements after the sixty (60) day period for compliance has
expired, shall be listed as a delinquent member of the IBP upon the
recommendation of the MCLE Committee. The investigation of a member for
non-compliance shall be conducted by the IBPs Commission on Bar
Discipline as a fact-finding arm of the MCLE Committee.
SEC. 3. Accrual of membership fee. -- Membership fees shall continue to
accrue at the active rate against a member during the period he/she is listed
as a delinquent member.
Rule 14. REINSTATEMENT

SECTION 1. Process. -- The involuntary listing as a delinquent member

shall be terminated when the member provides proof of compliance with the
MCLE requirement, including payment of non-compliance fee. A member
may attain the necessary credit units to meet the requirement for the
period of non-compliance during the period the member is on inactive
status. These credit units may not be counted toward meeting the current
compliance period requirement. Credit units earned during the period of
non-compliance in excess of the number needed to satisfy the prior
compliance period requirement may be counted toward meeting the current
compliance period requirement.
SEC. 2. Termination of delinquent listing is an administrative process.
The termination of listing as a delinquent member is administrative in nature
AND it shall be made by the MCLE Committee.
Rule. 15. COMMITTEE ON MANDATORY CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUCATION

SECTION 1. Composition. The MCLE Committee shall be composed of

five (5) members, namely, a retired Justice of the Supreme Court as Chair,
and four (4) members respectively nominated by the IBP, the Philippine
Judicial Academy, a law center designated by the Supreme Court and
associations of law schools and/or law professors.
The members of the Committee shall be of proven probity and integrity.
They shall be appointed by the Supreme Court for a term of three (3) years
and shall receive such compensation as may be determined by the Court.
SEC. 2. Duty of committee. The MCLE Committee shall administer and
adopt such implementing rules as may be necessary subject to the approval
of the Supreme Court. It shall, in consultation with the IBP Board of
Governors, prescribe a schedule of MCLE fees with the approval of the
Supreme Court.
SEC. 3. Staff of the MCLE Committee. Subject to approval by the
Supreme Court, the MCLE Committee shall employ such staff as may be
necessary to perform the record-keeping, auditing, reporting, approval and
other necessary functions.
SEC. 4. Submission of annual budget. The MCLE Committee shall
submit to the Supreme Court for approval, an annual budget [for a
subsidy] to establish, operate and maintain the MCLE Program.

This resolution shall take effect on the fifteenth of September 2000,

following its publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines.
Adopted this 22nd day of August, 2000, as amended on 02 October
2001.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and SandovalGutierrez, JJ., concur.
Kapunan, J., on official leave.

CBD Case No. 176 January 20, 1995

SALLY D. BONGALONTA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO and ALFONSO M. MARTIJA, respondents.
RESOLUTION

MELO, J.:
In a sworn letter-complaint dated February 15, 1995, addressed to the
Commission on Bar Discipline, National Grievance Investigation Office,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, complainant Sally Bongalonta charged
Pablito M. Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija, members of the Philippine Bar,
with unjust and unethical conduct, to wit: representing conflicting interests
and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a
judgment which complainant might obtain.
The letter-complaint stated that complainant filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Criminal Case No. 7635-55, for estafa, against the Sps. Luisa
and Solomer Abuel. She also filed, a separate civil action Civil Case No.
56934, where she was able to obtain a writ of preliminary attachment and
by virtue thereof, a piece of real property situated in Pasig, Rizal and
registered in the name of the Sps. Abuel under TCT No. 38374 was attached.
Atty. Pablito Castillo was the counsel of the Sps. Abuel in the aforesaid
criminal and civil cases.

During the pendency of these cases, one Gregorio Lantin filed civil Case No.
58650 for collection of a sum of money based on a promissory note, also
with the Pasig Regional Trial Court, against the Sps. Abuel. In the said case
Gregorio Lantin was represented by Atty. Alfonso Martija. In this case, the
Sps. Abuel were declared in default for their failure to file the necessary
responsive pleading and evidence ex-parte was received against them
followed by a judgment by default rendered in favor of Gregorio Lantin. A
writ of execution was, in due time, issued and the same property previously
attached by complainant was levied upon.
It is further alleged that in all the pleadings filed in these three (3)
aforementioned cases, Atty. Pablito Castillo and Atty. Alfonso Martija placed
the same address, the same PTR and the same IBP receipt number to wit"
Permanent Light Center, No. 7, 21st Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, PTR No.
629411 dated 11-5-89 IBP No. 246722 dated 1-12-88.
Thus, complainant concluded that civil Case No. 58650 filed by Gregorio
Lantin was merely a part of the scheme of the Sps. Abuel to frustrate the
satisfaction of the money judgment which complainant might obtain in Civil
Case No. 56934.
After hearing, the IBP Board of Governors issued it Resolution with the
following findings and recommendations:
Among the several documentary exhibits submitted by
Bongalonta and attached to the records is a xerox copy of TCT
No. 38374, which Bongalonta and the respondents admitted to
be a faithful reproduction of the original. And it clearly appears
under the Memorandum of Encumbrances on aid TCT that the
Notice of Levy in favor of Bongalonta and her husband was
registered and annotated in said title of February 7, 1989,
whereas, that in favor of Gregorio Lantin, on October 18, 1989.
Needless to state, the notice of levy in favor of Bongalonta and
her husband is a superior lien on the said registered property of
the Abuel spouses over that of Gregorio Lantin.
Consequently, the charge against the two respondents (i.e.
representing conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to
frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which
Bongalonta and her husband might obtain against the Abuel
spouses) has no leg to stand on.
However, as to the fact that indeed the two respondents placed
in their appearances and in their pleadings the same IBP No.

"246722 dated
1-12-88", respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo deserves to be
SUSPENDED for using, apparently thru his negligence, the IBP
official receipt number of respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija.
According to the records of the IBP National Office, Atty. Castillo
paid P1,040.00 as his delinquent and current membership dues,
on February 20, 1990, under IBP O.R. No. 2900538, after
Bongalonta filed her complaint with the IBP Committee on Bar
Discipline.
The explanation of Atty. Castillo's Cashier-Secretary by the name
of Ester Fraginal who alleged in her affidavit dated March 4,
1993, that it was all her fault in placing the IBP official receipt
number pertaining to Atty. Alfonso M. Martija in the appearance
and pleadings Atty. Castillo and in failing to pay in due time the
IBP membership dues of her employer, deserves scant
consideration, for it is the bounded duty and obligation of every
lawyer to see to it that he pays his IBP membership dues on
time, especially when he practices before the courts, as required
by the Supreme Court.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Pablito M.
Castillo be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
six (6) months for using the IBP Official Receipt No. of his corespondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija.
The complaint against Atty. Martija is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of evidence. (pp. 2-4, Resolution)
The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and recommendations. It is
well to stress again that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege
bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue
to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such
privilege. One of these requirements is the observance of honesty and
candor. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from
the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other
hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. for this reason,
he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in court.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo guilty committing a
falsehood in violation of his lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND him from the practice of law
for a period of six (6) months, with a warning that commission of the same

or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe
penalty. A copy of the Resolution shall be spread on the personal record of
respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Vitug, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as
Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:p
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While
ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case
would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our
national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment,
at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and
must not have been candidates for any elective position in the
immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the
1973 Constitution which similarly provides:

There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a

Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of
age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including
the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what
constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the
application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest
of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in
court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but
embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident
to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all
legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An
attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office
where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead
describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal
matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending
litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by
his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title
Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken,129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person
is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising
person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights
under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any
court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or
commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity
performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise
stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the
business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or
while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or

outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of

law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W.
2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil.
173,176-177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general,
all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
mattersconnected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in
matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute
law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by
the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions.
(5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part
of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate
relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the
giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an
extensive field of business and trust relations and other
affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct
connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to
become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a
high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and
affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or
counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration
of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns
the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that
part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in
court and that part which involves advice and drafting of
instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the
public that these manifold customary functions be performed by
persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral

character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust

obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p.
665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E.
313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service
Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation
briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of
law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of
employment in the profession. If what he does exacts knowledge
of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the
active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or
more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney
at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155
NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice
or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it
has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I
make a manifestation which I forgot to do during our
review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit.
May I be allowed to make a very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the
members of the Commission on Audit. Among
others, the qualifications provided for by Section I is
that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar"
I am quoting from the provision "who have

been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten

years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding
members of the Bar who are now employed in the COA or
Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification
that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the
Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law
outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long
as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their
legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within
COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as
members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission
on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional
Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important to take it
up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available
whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards
members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for
at least ten years is taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one
question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the
COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of
a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the
Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of
COA, although it is auditing, will necessarily involve
legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore,
lawyers who are employed in COA now would have
the necessary qualifications in accordance with the
Provision on qualifications under our provisions on
the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer
is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this
is that this is equivalent to the practice of law.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others,
that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit
(COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten
years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways
synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not
engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are
private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM
Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as
commonly understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the
business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are
often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The
firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners.
Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members
called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the
experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more
inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law
practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as
that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West
Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as
the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to
be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145
Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne,
128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost
every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a
definition would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the
most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the
average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large
percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p.
593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating

lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self perception of
the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects
history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander
SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as
a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed
laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases
before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed
laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today,
substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the
courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and nonlitigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending
more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than
in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the
diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed]
that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal
medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan.
11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage
in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal
skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties.
Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually
perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within
a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal
task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as
representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p.
687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is
one of the relatively rare types a litigator who specializes in this work to
the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have
mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling,
advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers
find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for
many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that
is constrained in very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove
from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special
roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the
constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in
which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The

most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and government
legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted
are emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the
traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a
revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers
and other professional groups, in particular those members
participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are
finding that understanding the major emerging trends in
corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today
requires an accurate understanding of the nature and
implications of the corporate law research function accompanied
by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The
recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal policy
formulation, particularly "model-making" and "contingency
planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional
procedures in many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be
processed, the sorting and weighing of significant conditional
factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of
estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the
need for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger
have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information
flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and
electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an improved
decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the
policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional
context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected
alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing
therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged
in predicting and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of
corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and
formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate
legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to
legal research has become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by

those trained primarily in the law can be improved through an
early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the
various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers,
particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in
business administration or management, functioning at the legal
policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for
the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions
which are currently engaged in similar types of complex
decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance
problems would require the services of an astute attorney
because of the complex legal implications that arise from each
and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the
business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law,"
Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously
referred to as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time"
lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the
tycoons and magnates of business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people
could not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For
one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation
will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller
and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to
private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for
certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to
handle most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who
handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or
jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax
laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board
meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory
agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission),
and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the
law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities
other than the legal affairs of the business of the corporation he
is representing. These include such matters as determining

policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis

supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being
isolated from the action, or not understanding how one's work
actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be
frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work
first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this
fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the
business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be
engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs
provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate
lawyers to enter the international law field. After all,
international law is practiced in a relatively small number of
companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country
is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by
corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go
to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their
"international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star,
"Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the
realm of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer
Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot
problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties,
and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business
Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in
the arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional
law teaching method of confining the subject study to the
Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as
well into the intertwining modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with
three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into
current advances which are of particular significance to the
corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary
skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management
responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and
management of the legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting

circles, with a shared area linking them. Otherwise known as
"intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying
theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the
counsel's role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the
globalization process, including the resulting strategic
repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required
to make, and the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at
multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced
as firms deal both with global multinational entities and
simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms
increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with
each other often with those who are competitors in other
arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making
within the corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate
lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder in some cases
participating in the organization and operations of governance
through participation on boards and other decision-making roles.
Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal
institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize for global operations.
( Emphasis supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with
governmental policies toward the promotion and management of
technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting
specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require
approaches from industry that differ from older, more
adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to
influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be
learned from other countries. In
Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative
efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world
famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the
Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within the
managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness
of both long-term and temporary groups within organizations
has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the

group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising

their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with
outsiders, promoting team achievements within the organization.
In general, such external activities are better predictors of team
performance than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the
corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations
are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to
anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand
relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations.
(Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three
factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been
found an effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding
both planning and pressing immediate problems. An
understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels,
and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic
problems physical, economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming techniques now make the
system dynamics principles more accessible to managers
including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better
decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of
a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement
value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize
the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases.
(Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based
models can be used directly by parties and mediators in all lands
of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent
and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on
instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an
international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the
legal function, concern three pointed areas of consideration,
thus:

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills

that comprise a major part of the general counsel's
responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law.
Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of
legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities
at that time when transactional or similar facts are being
considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are
undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal
consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this
nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms
change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent
environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate
today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a
global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office.
The general counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of
the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate
counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic
issues, including structuring its global operations, managing
improved relationships with an increasingly diversified body of
employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new
and varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping
internally with more complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing
corporate law is not enough to make one a good general
corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal
system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate
lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on
corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a
working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able
to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the
modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel,"
April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to
have more than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting
each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of
vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a
dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit
ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding

and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan.

11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C.
Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by
the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991.
Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not
possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the
nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he
took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of
the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer,
filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said
confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the
bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues
paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in
1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for
more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the
bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in
the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer
for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting
acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and
coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning
to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as
chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business
conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies
as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former
Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL.
Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared
for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of
advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of
the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked
with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor
groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the

agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made
use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast
judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member
of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the
President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma for "innumerable
amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms
and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of
Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod
used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a
team, and which is adequately constituted to meet the various
contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top
officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer
(such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and
an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating
the contracts) who comprise the members of the team.
(Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for
Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank
of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's
Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan transaction
is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be
compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business
terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing;
(4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt
restructuring program. For aside from performing the tasks of
legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national
development policies as key factors in maintaining their
countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled
"Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations,"
submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the
United States Agency for International Development, during the
Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan
World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace
Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis
supplied)

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than

purely renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of
contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in
renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an
international business specialist or an economist in the
formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring
contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical
language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only
with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the
guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See
International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an
unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987,
p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract
construction is the set of terms and conditions which determines
the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more
elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only
define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the
recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge
an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a
devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine
qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of
law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said:
"They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they
are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet
genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role
of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the
Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth
Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law".
particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into
consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the
Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a
lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of
contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily
more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA
327, the Court said:

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be

performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his
best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should
possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the
appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are
others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a
political question involving considerations of wisdom which only
the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service
Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this
case, and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the
Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment
in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no
authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another
person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no
authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice.
To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested
upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially
within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested,
subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess
the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar,
consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the
Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its
certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment;
and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v.
Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p.
200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the
nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is
mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which
provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments
for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two
Members for five years, and the last Members for three years,

without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be

only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall
any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say
that his definition of the practice of law is the traditional or
stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the
modern concept of the practice of law, which modern
connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent
framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's
definition would require generally a habitual law practice,
perhaps practised two or three times a week and would
outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive
years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that
in my written opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really
means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what
people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but
only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of
law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous"
or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all
situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others
on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps,
but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a
member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten
years. This is different from the acts of persons practising law, without first
becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected
President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more
qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action
or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is
indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the
incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public
hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed
the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by

the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond

judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1
Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly
shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the
instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective
power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would
amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of
the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the
President, may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and
thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in
the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom
the Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in
the U.S. Congress) decides to confirma Presidential nominee, it
would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would
still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit
that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of
Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing
Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator
placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front
of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had
happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming
with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The
procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow

from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the
spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-12426

February 16, 1959

PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner,

vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines
Patent Office, respondent.
Arturo A. Alafriz for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de
Castro for respondent.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition
and injunction against Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the
Philippines Patent Office.
On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he
had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of
determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the
Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law and
jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to the
circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with
sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said
examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been
holding similar examinations.
It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one
who has passed the bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court
to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly
qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and that
consequently, the cat of the respondent Director requiring members of the
Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass an examination given by the
Patent Office as a condition precedent to their being allowed to practice
before said office, such as representing applicants in the preparation and
prosecution of applications for patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in
violation of the law.

In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains

that the prosecution of patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the
practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical
knowledge and training, so much so that, as a matter of actual practice, the
prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only by lawyers, but also
engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training
who pass the prescribed examinations as given by the Patent Office; . . .
that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasijudicial body from requiring further condition or qualification from those who
would wish to handle cases before the Patent Office which, as stated in the
preceding paragraph, requires more of an application of scientific and
technical knowledge than the mere application of provisions of law; . . . that
the action taken by the respondent is in accordance with Republic Act No.
165, otherwise known as the Patent Law of the Philippines, which similar to
the United States Patent Law, in accordance with which the United States
Patent Office has also prescribed a similar examination as that prescribed by
respondent. . . .
Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of the United States
of America authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to prescribe
examinations to determine as to who practice before the United States
Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly authorized to do so by our Patent
Law, Republic Act No. 165.
Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would
appear to have been holding tests or examinations the passing of which was
imposed as a required qualification to practice before the Patent Office, to
our knowledge, this is the first time that the right of the Director of Patents
to do so, specially as regards members of the bar, has been questioned
formally, or otherwise put in issue. And we have given it careful thought and
consideration.
The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect
to admission to the practice of law in the Philippines 1 and to any member of
the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law anywhere and before
any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the
Philippines. Naturally, the question arises as to whether or not appearance
before the patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent
applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in
court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers
incident to actions and social proceedings, the management of such
actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,

and in addition, conveying. In general, alladvice to clients, and all

action taken for them in matters connected with the law corporation
services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in
matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where
the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of
the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263).
(Emphasis supplied).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of
work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation
to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal
advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and
execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business
and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may
have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always
subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects
a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs,
and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations.
These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an
intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can
be drawn between that part which involves advice and drafting of
instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public
that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character,
and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients
which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the
Justices (Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs.
Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I. ) 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).
In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the
Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other
persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their
oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. In the
first place, although the transaction of business in the Patent Office involves
the use and application of technical and scientific knowledge and training,
still, all such business has to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law,
as well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by
the Patent Office in accordance with law. Not only this, but practice before

the Patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws
and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in
accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. For instance: Section 8
of our Patent Law provides that an invention shall not be patentable if it is
contrary to public order or morals, or to public health or welfare. Section 9
says that an invention shall not be considered new or patentable if it was
known or used by others in the Philippines before the invention thereof by
the inventor named in any printed publication in the Philippines or any
foreign country more than one year before the application for a patent
therefor, or if it had been in public use or on sale in the Philippines for more
than one year before the application for the patent therefor. Section 10
provides that the right to patent belongs to the true and actual inventor, his
heirs, legal representatives or assigns. Section 25 and 26 refer to connection
of any mistake in a patent. Section 28 enumerates the grounds for
cancellation of a patent; that although any person may apply for such
cancellation, under Section 29, the Solicitor General is authorized to petition
for the cancellation of a patent. Section 30 mentions the requirements of a
petition for cancellation. Section 31 and 32 provide for a notice of hearing of
the petition for cancellation of the patent by the Director of Patents in case
the said cancellation is warranted. Under Section 34, at any time after the
expiration of three years from the day the patent was granted, any person
patent on several grounds, such as, if the patented invention is not being
worked in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the
patented article in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand
for the patented article in the Philippines is not being met to an adequate
extent and reasonable terms, or if by reason of the patentee's refusal to
grant a license on reasonable terms or by reason of the condition attached
by him to the license, purchase or use of the patented article or working of
the patented process or machine of production, the establishment of a new
trade or industry in the Philippines is prevented; or if the patent or invention
relates to food or medicine or is necessary to public health or public safety.
All these things involve the applications of laws, legal principles, practice and
procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training and experience for which a
member of the bar has been prepared.
In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the act,
orders and decisions of the Patent Director involve questions of law or a
reasonable and correct evaluation of facts, the very Patent Law, Republic Act
No. 165, Section 61, provides that:
. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any
party to a proceeding to cancel a patent or to obtain a compulsory
license, and any party to any other proceeding in the Office may

appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the
director.
In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of
business in the Patent Office and the acts, orders and decisions of the Patent
Director involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge
and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or
judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men,
which is not the case.
Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of
the functions and acts of the Head of the Patent Office.
. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues,
interferences, and extensions, exercises quasi-judicial functions.
Patents are public records, and it is the duty of the Commissioner to
give authenticated copies to any person, on payment of the legal fees.
(40 Am. Jur. 537). (Emphasis supplied).
. . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction that
exists up to the granting and delivering of a patent, and it is his duty
to decide whether the patent is new and whether it is the proper
subject of a patent; and his action in awarding or refusing a patent is
a judicial function. In passing on an application the commissioner
should decide not only questions of law, but also questions of fact, as
whether there has been a prior public use or sale of the article
invented. . . . (60 C.J.S. 460). (Emphasis supplied).
The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial
functions, it is reasonable to hold that a member of the bar, because of his
legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to practice before the Patent
Office, without further examination or other qualification. Of course, the
Director of Patents, if he deems it advisable or necessary, may require that
members of the bar practising before him enlist the assistance of technical
men and scientist in the preparation of papers and documents, such as, the
drawing or technical description of an invention or machine sought to be
patented, in the same way that a lawyer filing an application for the
registration of a parcel of land on behalf of his clients, is required to submit a
plan and technical description of said land, prepared by a licensed surveyor.
But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to
require persons desiring to practice or to do business before him to submit
an examination, even if they are already members of the bar. He contends
that our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, is patterned after the United

States Patent Law; and of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases
prescribes an examination similar to that which he (respondent) has
prescribed and scheduled. He invites our attention to the following provisions
of said Rules of Practice:
Registration of attorneys and agents. A register of an attorneys and
a register agents are kept in the Patent Office on which are entered
the names of all persons recognized as entitled to represent applicants
before the Patent Office in the preparation and prosecution of
applicants for patent. Registration in the Patent Office under the
provisions of these rules shall only entitle the person registered to
practice before the Patent Office.
(a) Attorney at law. Any attorney at law in good standing admitted
to practice before any United States Court or the highest court of any
State or Territory of the United States who fulfills the requirements
and complied with the provisions of these rules may be admitted to
practice before the Patent Office and have his name entered on the
register of attorneys.
xxx

xxx

xxx

(c) Requirement for registration. No person will be admitted to

practice and register unless he shall apply to the Commissioner of
Patents in writing on a prescribed form supplied by the Commissioner
and furnish all requested information and material; and shall establish
to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is of good moral
character and of good repute and possessed of the legal and scientific
and technical qualifications necessary to enable him to render
applicants for patent valuable service, and is otherwise competent to
advise and assist him in the presentation and prosecution of their
application before the Patent Office. In order that the Commissioner
may determine whether a person seeking to have his name placed
upon either of the registers has the qualifications specified,
satisfactory proof of good moral character and repute, and of sufficient
basic training in scientific and technical matters must be submitted and
an examination which is held from time to time must be taken and
passed. The taking of an examination may be waived in the case of
any person who has served for three years in the examining corps of
the Patent Office.
Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the
United States Patent Office in Patent Cases is authorized by the United
States Patent Law itself, which reads as follows:

The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary

of Commerce may prescribe rules and regulations governing
the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing
applicants or other parties before his office, and may require of such
persons, agents, or attorneys, before being recognized as
representatives of applicants or other persons, that they shall show
they are of good moral character and in good repute, are possessed of
the necessary qualifications to enable them to render to applicants or
other persons valuable service, and are likewise to competent to
advise and assist applicants or other persons in the presentation or
prosecution of their applications or other business before the Office.
The Commissioner of Patents may, after notice and opportunity for a
hearing, suspend or exclude, either generally or in any particular case
from further practice before his office any person, agent or attorney
shown to be incompetent or disreputable, or guilty of gross
misconduct, or who refuses to comply with the said rules and
regulations, or who shall, with intent to defraud in any matter, deceive,
mislead, or threaten any applicant or prospective applicant, or other
person having immediate or prospective applicant, or other person
having immediate or prospective business before the office, by word,
circular, letter, or by advertising. The reasons for any such suspension
or exclusion shall be duly recorded. The action of the Commissioner
may be reviewed upon the petition of the person so refused
recognition or so suspended by the district court of the United States
for the District of Columbia under such conditions and upon such
proceedings as the said court may by its rules determine. (Emphasis
supplied)
Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being
similar to the provisions of law just reproduced, then he is authorized to
prescribe the rules and regulations requiring that persons desiring to practice
before him should submit to and pass an examination. We reproduce said
Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for purposes of comparison:
SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. The Director subject to the approval
of the Secretary of Justice, shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in
the Patent Office.
The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from
the provisions of the United States Patent Law as regards authority to hold
examinations to determine the qualifications of those allowed to practice
before the Patent Office. While the U.S. Patent Law authorizes the
Commissioner of Patents to require attorneys to show that they possess the

necessary qualifications and competence to render valuable service to and

advise and assist their clients in patent cases, which showing may take the
form of a test or examination to be held by the Commissioner, our Patent
Law, Section 78, is silent on this important point. Our attention has not been
called to any express provision of our Patent Law, giving such authority to
determine the qualifications of persons allowed to practice before the Patent
Office.
Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of
bureau to prescribe forms and make regulations or general orders not
inconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious and efficient administration
of his branch of the service and to carry into full effect the laws relating to
matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau. Section 608 of Republic Act
1937, known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, provides that
the Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to the approval of the
Department Head, makes all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the
provisions of said code. Section 338 of the National Internal Revenue Code,
Commonwealth Act No. 466 as amended, states that the Secretary of
Finance, upon recommendation of the Collector of Internal Revenue, shall
promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of
the provisions of the code. We understand that rules and regulations have
been promulgated not only for the Bureau of Customs and Internal Revenue,
but also for other bureaus of the Government, to govern the transaction of
business in and to enforce the law for said bureaus.
Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear
provision of law giving the necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit
to and pass on examination prescribed by it before they are allowed to
practice before said Patent Office, then there would be no reason why other
bureaus specially the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Customs, where the
business in the same area are more or less complicated, such as the
presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc., assessments
exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
and the classification of goods, imposition of customs duties, seizures,
confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of Customs, may not also require
that any lawyer practising before them or otherwise transacting business
with them on behalf of clients, shall first pass an examination to qualify.
In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine
Bar authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may
practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much
of the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of
the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as
well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of

the functions of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so

that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the
Supreme Court.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the
respondent Director is hereby prohibited from requiring members of the
Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or tests and pass the same
before being permitted to appear and practice before the Patent Office. No
costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and Endencia, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

SECOND DIVISION
EMILIA R. HERNANDEZ,
Complainant,

A.C. No. 9387

(Formerly CBD Case No. 051562)
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.

- versus -

ATTY. VENANCIO B. PADILLA,

Respondent.

Promulgated:
June 20, 2012

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --x
RESOLUTION

SERENO, J.:

This is a disbarment case filed by Emilia Hernandez (complainant)

against her lawyer, Atty. Venancio B. Padilla (respondent) of Padilla Padilla
Bautista Law Offices, for his alleged negligence in the handling of her case.
The records disclose that complainant and her husband were the
respondents in an ejectment case filed against them with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila (RTC).
In a Decision[1] dated 28 June 2002, penned by Judge Rosmari D.
Carandang (Judge Carandang), the RTC ordered that the Deed of Sale
executed in favor of complainant be cancelled; and that the latter pay the
complainant therein, Elisa Duigan (Duigan), attorneys fees and moral
damages.
Complainant and her husband filed their Notice of Appeal with the
RTC. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals (CA) ordered them to file their
Appellants Brief. They chose respondent to represent them in the case. On
their behalf, he filed a Memorandum on Appeal instead of an Appellants
Brief. Thus, Duigan filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal. The CA granted the
Motion in a Resolution[2] dated 16 December 2003.
No Motion for Reconsideration (MR) of the Resolution dismissing the
appeal was filed by the couple. Complainant claims that because respondent
ignored the Resolution, he acted with deceit, unfaithfulness amounting to
malpractice of law.[3] Complainant and her husband failed to file an appeal,
because respondent never informed them of the adverse decision.
Complainant further claims that she asked respondent several times about
the status of the appeal, but despite inquiries he deliberately withheld
response [sic], to the damage and prejudice of the spouses. [4]
The Resolution became final and executory on 8 January 2004.
Complainant was informed of the Resolution sometime in July 2005, when
the Sheriff of the RTC came to her house and informed her of the Resolution.
On 9 September 2005, complainant filed an Affidavit of
Complaint[5] with the Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP), seeking the disbarment of respondent on the following

grounds: deceit, malpractice, and grave misconduct. Complainant prays for

moral damages in the amount of 350,000.
Through an Order[6] dated 12 September 2005, Director of Bar
Discipline Rogelio A. Vinluan ordered respondent to submit an answer to the
Complaint. In his Counter-Affidavit/Answer,[7] respondent prayed for the
outright dismissal of the Complaint.
Respondent explained that he was not the lawyer of complainant. He
averred that prior to the mandatory conference set by the IBP on 13
December 2005, he had never met complainant, because it was her husband
who had personally transacted with him. According to respondent, the
husband despondently pleaded to me to prepare a Memorandum on Appeal
because according to him the period given by the CA was to lapse within two
or three days.[8] Thus, respondent claims that he filed a Memorandum on
Appeal because he honestly believed that it is this pleading which was
required.[9]
Before filing the Memorandum, respondent advised complainants
husband to settle the case. The latter allegedly gestured approval of the
advice.[10]
After the husband of complainant picked up the Memorandum for
filing, respondent never saw or heard from him again and thus assumed that
the husband heeded his advice and settled the case. When respondent
received an Order from the CA requiring him to file a comment on the Motion
to Dismiss filed by Duigan, he instructed his office staff to contact Mr.
Hernandez thru available means of communication, but to no avail.[11] Thus,
when complainants husband went to the office of respondent to tell the
latter that the Sheriff of the RTC had informed complainant of the CAs
Resolution dismissing the case, respondent was just as surprised. The lawyer
exclaimed, KALA KO BA NAKIPAG AREGLO NA KAYO.[12]
In his 5 January 2009 Report, [13] IBP Investigating Commissioner
Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. found that respondent violated Canons 5, 17, and 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (the Code). He recommended that
respondent be suspended from practicing law from 3 to 6 months.
The board of governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XIX-2010452 on 28 August 2010. Therein, they resolved to adopt and approve the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. Respondent
was suspended from the practice of law for six months.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration. [14] He prayed for the

relaxation of the application of the Canons of the Code. On 14 January 2012,
the IBP board of governors passed Resolution No. XX-2012-17 [15] partly
granting his Motion and reducing the penalty imposed to one-month
suspension from the practice of law.
Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, acting Director for Bar
Discipline Dennis A.B. Funa, through a letter [16] addressed to then Chief
Justice Renato C. Corona, transmitted the documents pertaining to the
disbarment Complaint against respondent.
We adopt the factual findings of the board of governors of the IBP.
This Court, however, disagrees with its Decision to reduce the penalty to
one-month suspension. We thus affirm the six-month suspension the Board
originally imposed in its 28 August 2010 Resolution.
Respondent insists that he had never met complainant prior to the
mandatory conference set for the disbarment Complaint she filed against
him. However, a perusal of the Memorandum of Appeal filed in the appellate
court revealed that he had signed as counsel for the defendant-appellants
therein, including complainant and her husband. [17] The pleading starts with
the following sentence: DEFENDANT[S]-APPELLANTS, by counsel, unto this
Honorable Court submit the Memorandum and further allege that: x x
x.[18] Nowhere does the document say that it was filed only on behalf of
complainants husband.
It is further claimed by respondent that the relation created between
him and complainants husband cannot be treated as a client-lawyer
relationship, viz:
It is no more than a client needing a legal document and had it
prepared by a lawyer for a fee. Under the factual milieu and
circumstances, it could not be said that a client entrusted to a
lawyer handling and prosecution of his case that calls for the
strict application of the Code; x x x[19]

As proof that none of them ever intended to enter into a lawyer-client

relationship, he also alleges that complainants husband never contacted him
after the filing of the Memorandum of Appeal. According to respondent, this
behavior was very unusual if he really believed that he engaged the
formers services.[20]

Complainant pointed out in her Reply [21] that respondent was her
lawyer, because he accepted her case and an acceptance fee in the amount
of 7,000.
According to respondent, however, [C]ontrary to the complainants
claim that he charged 7,000 as acceptance fee, the fee was only for the
preparation of the pleading which is even low for a Memorandum of Appeal:
x x x.[22]
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client
relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the clients cause. [23] Once
a lawyer agrees to handle a case, it is that lawyers duty to serve the client
with competence and diligence.[24] Respondent has failed to fulfill this duty.
According to respondent, he merely drafted the pleading that
complainants husband asked from him. Respondent also claims that he filed
a Memorandum of Appeal, because he honestly believed that this was the
pleading required, based on what complainants husband said.
The IBP Investigating Commissioners observation on this matter, in
the 5 January 2009 Report, is correct. Regardless of the particular pleading
his client may have believed to be necessary, it was respondents duty to
know the proper pleading to be filed in appeals from RTC decisions, viz:
Having seen the Decision dated 18 June 2002 of the trial court,
respondent should have known that the mode of appeal to the
Court of Appeals for said Decision is by ordinary appeal under
Section 2(a) Rule 41 of the1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
In all such cases, Rule 44 of the said Rules applies.[25]

When the RTC ruled against complainant and her husband, they filed
a Notice of Appeal. Consequently, what should apply is the rule on ordinary
appealed cases or Rule 44 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. Rule 44 requires
that the appellants brief be filed after the records of the case have been
elevated to the CA. Respondent, as a litigator, was expected to know this
procedure. Canon 5 of the Code reads:
CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments,
participate in continuing legal education programs, support
efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the

practical training of law students and assist in disseminating

information regarding the law and jurisprudence.

The obligations of lawyers as a consequence of their Canon 5 duty

have been expounded in Dulalia, Jr. v. Cruz,[26] to wit:
It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and
legal processes. They are expected to be in the forefront in the
observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries
with it the obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and
to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and
jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic
legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty,
they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently
their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may
become susceptible to committing mistakes.

In his MR, respondent begged for the consideration of the IBP,

claiming that the reason for his failure to file the proper pleading was that he
did not have enough time to acquaint himself thoroughly with the factual
milieu of the case. The IBP reconsidered and thereafter significantly reduced
the penalty originally imposed.
Respondents plea for leniency should not have been granted.
The supposed lack of time given to respondent to acquaint himself
with the facts of the case does not excuse his negligence.
Rule 18.02 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall not handle any
legal matter without adequate preparation. While it is true that respondent
was not complainants lawyer from the trial to the appellate court stage, this
fact did not excuse him from his duty to diligently study a case he had
agreed to handle. If he felt he did not have enough time to study the
pertinent matters involved, as he was approached by complainants husband
only two days before the expiration of the period for filing the Appellants
Brief, respondent should have filed a motion for extension of time to file the
proper pleading instead of whatever pleading he could come up with, just to
beat the deadline set by the Court of Appeals.[27]

Moreover, respondent does not deny that he was given notice of the
fact that he filed the wrong pleading. However, instead of explaining his side
by filing a comment, as ordered by the appellate court, he chose to ignore
the CAs Order. He claims that he was under the presumption that
complainant and her husband had already settled the case, because he had
not heard from the husband since the filing of the latters Memorandum of
Appeal.
This explanation does not excuse respondents actions.
First of all, there were several remedies that respondent could have
availed himself of, from the moment he received the Notice from the CA to
the moment he received the disbarment Complaint filed against him. But
because of his negligence, he chose to sit on the case and do nothing.
Second, respondent, as counsel, had the duty to inform his clients of
the status of their case. His failure to do so amounted to a violation of Rule
18.04 of the Code, which reads:
18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of
his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the
clients request for information.

If it were true that all attempts to contact his client proved futile, the
least respondent could have done was to inform the CA by filing a Notice of
Withdrawal of Appearance as counsel. He could have thus explained why he
was no longer the counsel of complainant and her husband in the case and
informed the court that he could no longer contact them. [28] His failure to
take this measure proves his negligence.
Lastly, the failure of respondent to file the proper pleading and a
comment on Duigans Motion to Dismiss is negligence on his part. Under
18.03 of the Code, a lawyer is liable for negligence in handling the clients
case, viz:
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted
to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable.

Lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them,

otherwise their negligence in fulfilling their duty would render them liable for
disciplinary action.[29]
Respondent has failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer. When a
lawyer violates his duties to his client, he engages in unethical and
unprofessional conduct for which he should be held accountable. [30]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Venancio Padilla is found guilty of
violating Rules 18.02, 18.03, 18.04, as well as Canon 5 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Hence, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for SIX (6) MONTHS and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the
same or a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered into the personal records of
respondent as a member of the bar and furnished to the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation
to all courts of the country for their information and guidance.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.
SPOUSES DAVID and
MARISA WILLIAMS,
Complainants,

A.C. No. 6353

Present:

- versus -

ATTY. RUDY T. ENRIQUEZ,

Respondent.

PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
Promulgated:
February 27, 2006

x----------------------------------- --------------x
RESOLUTION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Atty. Rudy T. Enriquez stands charged with unlawful, dishonest,
immoral and deceitful acts in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics, and with conduct
unbecoming an attorney. The charges are contained in the Joint ComplaintAffidavit for Disbarment[1] filed by the spouses David W. Williams and Marisa
B. Williams.
It appears that respondent is the counsel of record of the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 13443[2] pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
33,Dumaguete City where complainants are the defendants. According to the
complainant-spouses, Marisa Williams bought the lot subject of the
controversy. A Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was then issued in her
favor, stating that she is Filipino, married to David W. Williams, an American
citizen.[3] On January 8, 2004, respondent charged her with falsification of
public documents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dumaguete
City. The complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 2004-34.[4]
The spouses Williams further alleged, thus:
21. That, in malicious violation of the rules governing the
practice of law, Attorney Rudy T. Enriquez cited outdated
material in his complaint-affidavit (Annex A-1) and in his
comments to counter-affidavit (Annex A-2). He then knowingly
applied this stale law in a perverse fashion to argue that Marisa
Batacan Williams automatically lost her Filipino citizenship when
she married an American, and was thus prohibited to own land
in the Philippines, thereby making her guilty of falsification in
the Deed she executed to buy property in Negros Oriental.
2.2. That in paragraph #1 of her counter-affidavit (Annex
A-2) Marisa cites Article IV, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides that she would not lose her citizenship when she
married an American unless she renounced it in a specific act.

2.3 That, in reply, Attorney Enriquez, quotes more

outdated law, declaring that her act of marrying her husband
was equivalent to renouncing her citizenship. He also doggedly
attempts to show that the 1987 Constitution supports his
position, not Marisas (Annex A-4).[5]
Complainants pointed out that the respondent is a retired judge, who
knows that the false charge (that Marisa Williams is an American) will not
prevail in the end.[6]
In his Comments by Way of Motion to Dismiss,[7] respondent
enumerated matters which to his mind were evidence of the acts of
falsification of complainant Marisa Williams. He insisted that the complaint
for disbarment was a mere tactic to divert attention from the criminal
charges against the complainants, and that the charges against him were
bereft of any factual basis.
On December 1, 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
[8]
Forthwith, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline scheduled the case for
mandatory conference/hearing. However, only the respondent appeared. The
parties were then directed to submit their verified position papers.
In their Position Paper, complainants claimed that respondent had
maliciously and knowingly filed fabricated cases against them and that his
acts were forms of attempted extortion. They also adopted their joint
complaint-affidavit by way of incorporation, along with their other pleadings.
For his part, respondent maintained that complainant Marisa Williams
was no longer a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines as a result of her
marriage to David Williams.
In her Report and Recommendation dated June 10, 1995,
Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala ruled that respondent was guilty of
gross ignorance of the law and should be suspended for six (6) months. The
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline adopted the foregoing recommendation in
its Resolution No. XVII-2005-114 dated October 22, 2005, with the
modification that respondent be reprimanded, with a warning and advice to
study each and every opinion he may give to his clients.
The Court agrees that respondent is administratively liable for his
actuations. As found by the Investigating Commissioner:

There is no evidence shown by respondent that

complainant Marisa Bacatan-Williams has renounced her Filipino
citizenship except her Certificate of Marriage, which does not
show that she has automatically acquired her husbands
citizenship upon her marriage to him. The cases cited by
respondent are not applicable in this case as it is clear that they
refer to aliens acquiring lands in the Philippines.
The Bar has been integrated for the attainment of the
following objectives: (a) elevate the standards of the legal
profession, (b) improve the administration of justice, and (c) to
enable the bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively (In re: Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, 49
SCRA 22). In line with these objectives of the Integrated
Bar,lawyers must keep themselves abreast of legal
developments. To do this, the lawyer must walk with the
dynamic movements of the law and jurisprudence. He must
acquaint himself at least with the newly promulgated
laws, the recent decisions of the Supreme Court and of
the significant decisions of the Court of Appeals. There are
other executive orders, administrative circulars, regulations and
other rules promulgated by other competent authorities engaged
in the administration of justice. The lawyers life is one of
continuous and laborious study, otherwise, his skill and
knowledge of the law and related disciplines will lag behind and
become obscure due to obsoleteness (Canon 5, Code of
Professional Responsibility.)[9]
As pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, Canon 5 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility requires that a lawyer be updated in the
latest laws and jurisprudence.[10] Indeed, when the law is so elementary, not
to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of
the law.[11] As a retired judge, respondent should have known that it is his
duty to keep himself well-informed of the latest rulings of the Court on the
issues and legal problems confronting a client. [12] In this case, the law he
apparently misconstrued is no less than the Constitution, [13] the most basic
law of the land.[14] Implicit in a lawyers mandate to protect a clients
interest to the best of his/her ability and with utmost diligence is the duty to
keep abreast of the law and legal developments, and participate in
continuing legal education programs.[15] Thus, in championing the interest of
clients and defending cases, a lawyer must not only be guided by the strict
standards imposed by the lawyers oath, but should likewise espouse legally
sound arguments for clients, lest the latters cause be dismissed on a

technical ground.[16] Ignorance

procedural laws.[17]

encompasses

both

substantive

and

We find too harsh the recommended penalty of the Investigating

Commissioner. It must be stressed that the power to disbar or suspend must
be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and character of a lawyer as an officer of the
Court and member of the bar will disbarment or suspension be imposed as a
penalty.[18] Pursuant to the IBP Commission on Bar Disciplines Guidelines
for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions,[19]and considering further that this is
respondents first infraction, we find that the penalty of reprimand as
recommended by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, will suffice.
We likewise note that in their pleadings in this case, the parties
repeatedly invoked their arguments in their pending cases below. Thus, we
find it unnecessary to rule over such arguments, which have yet to be
determined on the merits in the courts a quo.
WHEREFORE, for gross ignorance of the law, Atty. Rudy T. Enriquez
is REPRIMANDED and ADVISED to carefully study the opinions he may
give to his clients. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar
act shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
CANON 6
DOROTEO IGOY, complainant, vs. ATTY. GILBERT SORIANO, Court
Attorney
VI,
Office
of
the
Clerk
of
Court,
First
Division, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
As an officer of the court, it is the duty of a lawyer to uphold the dignity
and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he
has taken. It is his foremost responsibility to observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.[1] Arrogating unto
oneself, as in this case, the mantle of a Justice of the Highest Court of the
land for the purpose of extorting money from a party-litigant is an ultimate
betrayal of this duty which can not and should never be countenanced,
because [i]t is this kind of gross and flaunting misconduct on the part of
those who are charged with the responsibility of administering the law and
rendering justice that so quickly and surely corrodes the respect for the law

and the courts without which government cannot continue and that tears
apart the very bonds of our polity.[2]
Complainant Doroteo A. Igoy is one of the petitioners in G.R. No.
141843, entitled Heirs of Gavino Igoy, et al, v. Mactan Shangrila Hotel.
[3]
In a letter-complaint dated October 8, 2000, [4]written in the Cebuano
dialect and addressed to the Chief Justice, complainant alleged that while
the aforesaid case was still pending before the Court of Appeals, he tried to
look for a person in the Supreme Court who may assist him in obtaining
justice. Sometime in July 1999, a friend introduced complainant to a certain
Justice of the Supreme Court. He narrated to the said Justice the history of
their case. In turn, the said Justice asked for and received from him the sum
of P20,000.00. However, the said Justice reminded complainant that he
could offer no help while the case was pending before the Court of Appeals.
In February 2000, they received an unfavorable decision from the Court
of Appeals. Thus, complainant immediately visited the said Justice at his
office in the Supreme Court to inform him of the decision of the Court of
Appeals. The Justice offered to prepare the petition for review to be filed
with the Supreme Court. Complainant subsequently met the said Justice at
the Maxs Restaurant, where the latter turned over the prepared petition for
review. In consideration therefor, the Justice asked for an additional
P20,000.00. Since complainant did not have that amount of money with him
at that time, he undertook to send the same by courier as soon as he arrives
in Cebu. Complainant asked for the said Justices complete name and
address, which he readily gave as: Atty. Gilbert Soriano, 22 Melon Street,
Gatchalian Subdivision, Phase 3-13, Las Pias City.
As promised, complainant sent the amount of P20,000.00 through the
Aboitiz Express on May 2, 2000. The parcel was received by a certain Alvin
Soriano, who turned out to be respondents son, on May 5, 2000.
Complainant was surprised to learn that on May 31, 2000, this Court
denied the Petition for Review. Accordingly, they filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which this Court denied with finality on July 31, 2000.
Together with his letter, complainant submitted the following documents:
1. Photocopy of the Petition for Review allegedly prepared by the
Justice;[5]
2. Shippers Copy of Prepaid Consignment Note No. E0993783C
dated May 2, 2000, addressed to one Atty. Gilbert Soriano of 22
Melon St., Gatchalian Subdivision, Phase 3-13, Las Pias City, with
telephone numbers 826-1018, containing cash in the amount of
P20,000.00,[6] and sent by one Doroteo Igoy of Mactan, Lapu-lapu
City, with telephone numbers 495-8-49;[7]

3. Letter dated May 5, 2000 of one Atty. Gilbert F. Soriano,

addressed to Aboitiz Express, authorizing his daughter, Christine
Soriano, or his son, Alvin A. Soriano, to receive Parcel No.
E0993783C on his behalf;[8]
4. Note dated May 5, 2000, evidencing receipt by one Alvin Soriano
of the package on that date at 11:30 oclock in the morning. [9]
In his comment dated November 6, 2000, [10] Atty. Gilbert Soriano denied
that he was the Justice alluded to. He alleged that his friend, Nic Taneo,
introduced complainant to him because the latter was seeking help regarding
a pending case involving his poor relatives; that complainant requested him
to go over their petition to be filed with the Supreme Court, to ensure that
the same would not be denied on technical grounds; he acceded to the
request, after which complainant told him that he will be sending him a
token of gratitude, but he did not know that it was money.
Respondent further narrated that on May 4, 2000, he received a
telephone call from Aboitiz Express, informing him that complainant had sent
him a parcel but the messenger was unable to locate his given address, and
asking him to execute a letter authorizing anyone in his house to receive the
parcel. He recalled complainants promise of a token of gratitude, so
respondent authorized his children to accept the parcel. He was surprised to
find inside the parcel cash in the amount of P20,000.00. After several days
of mulling over what to do with the money, respondent asked his friend to
contact Atty. Rodulfo Taneo, the counsel for petitioners in G.R. No. 141843.
Atty. Taneo told him to hold the money and wait until he arrives in Manila.
Respondent denied giving complainant any assistance other than
checking the formal requirements of the petition for review. He also denied
that he entertained complainant in his office in the First Division of this Court
which, according to him, barely accommodates the staff therein with very
little elbow room. Assuming that complainant was thus accommodated in
respondents office in the First Division, respondent could not have uttered
the irresponsible and degrading statements imputed on him by complainant.
Further, respondent denied having received the amount of P20,000.00 from
complainant, arguing that, as a practicing catholic and active church leader,
he can not in conscience deceive anyone and ask for money.
Respondent likewise denied having demanded for an additional
P20,000.00, countering that complainant merely promised him a token gift
for the little help that he extended, without mention of any amount. In fact,
he almost forgot about that promise, and he remembered it only when he
was notified by the courier service that he had a parcel from complainant.
That was almost two (2) months after the case petition for review was filed
with this Court.

In closing, respondent insinuated that if this Court should find that he

committed a misconduct despite his explanation, he shall offer to retire from
the service.
On November 16, 2000, complainant wrote another letter to the Chief
Justice, again written in the Cebuano dialect. [11] Complainant averred that
respondent was introduced to him by Engr. William Redoblado as one of the
Justices of the Supreme Court. He only learned that respondent was not a
Justice when they met at the Cebu Mactan International Airport on October
31, 2000. Respondent offered to return the P40,000.00, but be refused to
receive the same. Instead, he told respondent to just wait for the outcome
of the complaint he filed against him with the Office of the Chief Justice.
In the same letter, complainant provided the following questions and
answers, to wit:
1. What is the name of the Justice of the Supreme Court whom you
contacted?
Answer:

Atty. Gilbert Soriano.

2. Where did you meet/see him?

Answer:

Inside the premises of the Supreme Court.

3. Who was the person who introduced him as Justice?

Answer:
Engr. William Redoblado was the one who
introduced to me that Gilbert Soriano is a Justice. I never knew
that Gilbert Soriano is not a Justice.
4. Where did you specifically give to the Justice the first P20,000.00?
Answer:
At the ground floor of the Supreme Court beside
the canteen where the parking area is located.
5. Who were with you at the Maxs Restaurant when the petition was
given to you?
Answer:
Engr. William Redoblado, Leonardo Paquibot,
Atty. Rodolfo Taneo, Atty. Gilbert Soriano and myself (complainant
Igoy). Atty. Taneo returned the petition because it was lacking.
Respondent submitted his comment[12] to the second letter, wherein he
contended that when complainant allegedly gave him the sum of P20,000.00
on July 16, 1999, his case was still pending before the Court of Appeals;
hence, there was then no reason for complainant to approach respondent
and give him money. Moreover, it is unnatural for a person to give money to
someone whom he does not know well and whom he met only for the first
time. Respondent brands as unbelievable the version that complainant

handed the money to him at the parking area beside the Supreme Court
canteen, where many of the Courts employees and visitors frequently pass.
He claimed that it was not Engr. William Redoblado, but Mr. Taneo who
introduced him to complainant.
Respondent alleged that on October 30, 2000, he informed Atty. Taneo
that he was returning the money he received through Aboitiz Express. He
was told by Atty. Taneo to meet him in Cebu. On October 31, 2000,
respondent arrived in Cebu and met Atty. Taneo and complainant at an
eatery near the airport. Respondent offered to return the P20,000.00 to
complainant, but the latter refused to accept it. Complainant stated that he
will withdraw his complaint only after the Supreme Court decides their case
in their favor. Respondent, however, informed complainant that as a mere
employee of the court, he could not dictate the outcome of the case.
On
January
8,
2001,
Atty.
Soriano
filed
his
letter
of
resignation/retirement under R.A. 1616, without specifying its effectivity
date.[13]
The Office of Administrative Services, to which this case was referred for
evaluation, issued a Memorandum on May 30, 2001, recommending
respondents dismissal from the service effective immediately, with forfeiture
of all retirement benefits to which he may be entitled.
Respondents offer to resign was obviously an attempt to evade whatever
penalty may be imposed on him. However, the mere expedient of resigning
from the service will not extricate him from the consequences of his acts. As
this Court pointed out in Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos:[14]
. . . Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress
for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the
public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of
justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The
attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the
court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to
the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally
no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the
proper administration of justice.
Settled is the rule that in administrative cases of this nature, the Court
may proceed with its investigation and mete the appropriate penalty against
erring officers of the court.[15] Resignation should not be used either as an
escape or as an easy way out to evade administrative liability by court
personnel facing administrative sanction.[16]
In recommending the dismissal of respondent from service, the Office of
Administrative Services (OAS) reasoned that:

From the established facts, it is clear that complainant came to see

respondent to plead for help in preparing a Petition for Review. The
respondent, on the other hand, saw it as an opportunity to make the
complainant believe that he has the influence and connections in the court
and would be easy for him (respondent) to help the complainant.
True, as respondent claimed, he was not urged by ulterior motives in
preparing the Petition for Review or at least reviewing the same, but not
being his official duty to do so, his actuation led complainant to believe that
it should be for a fee. It would have been very easy for him to decline the
offer of P20,000.00 even if it was gratuitously given if his real intention was
merely to help. He knew for a fact that the petitioners have a counsel who,
presumably, knows the appropriate pleadings to be filed with this Court.
Sec. 7 (D) of R.A. 6713 (Code of Ethical Conduct and Standard for Public
Officials and Employees) specifically provides:
Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions
xxx

xxx

xxx

d.
Solicitations or acceptance of gifts Public officials and
employees shall not solicit or accept, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity,
favor, entertainment, loan or anything of monetary value from any person in
the course of their official duties or in connection with any operation being
regulated by, or any transactions which may be affected by the functions of
their office.
Respondent, who is himself a lawyer, should have avoided all the
circumstances in which he might be accused of using his office in the guise
of helping others, for this taints the integrity of the Court.
The denial of the respondent of the receipt of initial payment of P20,000.00
cannot simply overcome the positive assertions of the complainant. If no
such initial payment took place, Atty. Soriano would not have claimed the
subsequent payment through the Aboitiz Express.
The claim of Atty. Soriano that the amount was given gratuitously would not
excuse him from any liability. To tolerate such acts would open the
floodgates to fraud or graft and corruption to be committed by officials and
employees of the Court.
Likewise, the fact that respondent tried to return the amount to Mr. Igoy
after the Chief Justice required him to comment on the complaint only

strengthened the case against him. Even if the offer to return the money
was accepted by the complainant, it will never exculpate him of his
administrative liabilities. Respondent by his brazen conduct consummated an
act that by itself is a disservice to the administration of justice and an affront
of the image of the court before the public.
It is admitted that respondent offered to resign, however, resignation should
not be used as an easy way to escape administrative liability by a court
personnel facing administrative sanction. Respondent therefore cannot go
scot-free and be simply forgiven for the damage he caused to the institution
he was bound by his oath and The Canons of Legal Ethics to serve with
utmost integrity.
Respondent may have been in the service for 28 years, but he has
blemished his record irreparably and under the circumstances, this office
believes that dismissal as a penalty is warranted.
The Court adopts the foregoing findings and recommendation of the OAS.
Time and again, this Tribunal has emphasized that [t]he conduct or
behavior of all officials and employees of an agency involved in the
administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk,
should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.[17] Their
conduct must, at all times be characterized by, among others, strict
propriety and decorum in order to earn and maintain the respect of the
public for the judiciary.[18] Indeed, Canon 6, Rule 6.02, of the Code of
Professional Responsibility states in no uncertain terms that
Rule 6.02.

A lawyer in the government service shall not use

his public position to promote or advance his private
interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his
public duties.

The foregoing command acquires particular significance given the

prevailing facts of this case considering that respondent is a senior lawyer of
this Court. It bears stressing that government lawyers who are public
servants owe utmost fidelity to the public service, for public service is a
public trust. As such, government lawyers should be more sensitive to their
professional obligations as their disreputable conduct is more likely to be
magnified in the public eye.[19]
The Court could not help but express its great disappointment over the
conduct of respondent who, as a lawyer with twenty-eight (28) years of
government service behind him, should have been among the first to set an
example to his co-employees and fellow civil servants. Instead, he badly
tainted the image of this Tribunal as well as the judiciary. Only recently in In
Re: Derogatory News Items Charging Court of Appeals Associate Justice

Demetrio Demetria with Interference on Behalf of a Suspected Drug Queen,

[20]
this Court said that:
Men and women of the courts must conduct themselves with honor, probity,
fairness, prudence and discretion. Magistrates of justice must always be fair
and impartial. They should avoid not only acts of impropriety, but all
appearances of impropriety. Their influence in society must be consciously
and conscientiously exercised with utmost prudence and discretion. For
theirs is the assigned role of preserving the independence, impartiality and
integrity of the Judiciary.
Respondent should be reminded in this regard that the nature and
responsibilities of public officers enshrined in the Constitution, and oftrepeated in our case law, are not mere rhetorical words to be taken lightly
as idealistic sentiments but as working standards and attainable goals, that
should be matched with actual deeds.[21] Those involved in the administration
of justice must live up to the stricteststandards of honesty and integrity in
the public service,[22]
In sanctioning errant officers and employees
administration of justice, the Court has held:

involved

in

the

Since the administration of justice is a sacred task, the persons involved in it

ought to live up to the strictest standard of honesty, integrity and
uprightness. It bears stressing once again that public service requires
utmost integrity and the strictest discipline possible of every public servant.
A public office is a public trust that enjoins all public officers and employees,
particularly those serving in the judiciary to respond to the highest degree of
dedication often even beyond personal interest.[23]
All too often, this Court has declared that any act which falls short of the
exacting standards for public office, especially on the part of those expected
to preserve the image of the judiciary, shall not be countenanced. [24] To
reiterate, public office is a public trust. Public officers must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with the utmost degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.[25]
This Court has also ruled that:
Time and again, we have emphasized the heavy burden and responsibility
which court personnel are saddled with in view of their exalted positions as
keepers of the public faith. They must be constantly reminded that any
impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of
official functions must be avoided. As we have held in the case of Mendoza
v. Mabutas (223 SCRA 411 [1993], citing Sy v. Academia, 198 SCRA 705

[1991]), this Court condemns and would never countenance such conduct,
act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of
justice which would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or
even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary.[26]
Respondents acts seriously undermined the trust and confidence of the
public in the entire judicial system. What makes his infraction worse is the
fact that he is not a mere court employee, but a senior attorney employed in
the Highest Court of the Land. He has indelibly sullied his record of
government service spanning twenty-eight years, and in so doing he has
prejudiced the integrity of the Court as a whole. Once more, this Court is
called upon to apply disciplinary sanction on an errant member, and again it
will not shirk from its responsibility. Thus, this Court imposes on respondent
the only penalty that he deserves --- that of dismissal from the service.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Gilbert Soriano is hereby DISMISSED
from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and leave credits
and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government including government-owned or controlled corporations. This
dismissal shall be immediately executory.
Further, respondent Atty. Gilbert Soriano is DIRECTED to SHOW
CAUSE within ten (10) days from notice hereof why he should not,
be DISBARRED. In the meantime, respondent isSUSPENDED from the
practice of law.
Let copies of this Resolution be attached to the records of Atty. Gilbert
Soriano and furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all the courts
throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 4354

April 22, 2002

LOLITA ARTEZUELA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. RICARTE B. MADERAZO, respondent.
PUNO, J.:
For his failure to meet the exacting standards of professional ethics, the
Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) in its
Resolution of May 2, 2000 recommended the suspension from the practice of
law of respondent Atty. Ricarte B. Maderazo for the period of six (6) months,
with a stern warning that repetition of the same act will be dealt with more
severely. Respondent allegedly represented conflicting interests in violation

of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Ethics, and Canon 15 and Rule 15.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.1
By way of a Motion for Reconsideration,2 respondent now comes before this
Court to challenge the basis of the IBP's resolution, and prays for its
reversal.
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows: On or about 3:00 in the
early morning of December 24, 1992, Allan Echavia had a vehicular accident
at Caduman St., corner H. Abellana St., Mandaue City. At the time of the
accident, Echavia was driving a Ford Telstar car owned by a Japanese
national named Hirometsi Kiyami, but was registered in the name of his
brother-in-law, Jun Anthony Villapez. The car rammed into a
small carinderia owned by complainant Lolita Artezuela.3
The destruction of the complainant's carinderia caused the cessation of the
operation of her small business, resulting to her financial dislocation. She
incurred debts from her relatives and due to financial constraints, stopped
sending her two children to college.4
Complainant engaged the services of the respondent in filing a damage suit
against Echavia, Villapez and one Bernardo Sia.5 Docketed as Civil Case No.
13666, the case was assigned to Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu. An Amended Complaint was thereafter filed, impleading Echavia,
Kiyami and Villapez, and dropping Sia as a party-defendant. 6 For his
services, complainant paid the respondent the amount of Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000.00) as attorney's fees and Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00)
as filing fee.7 However, the case was dismissed on March 22, 1994, allegedly
upon the instance of the complainant and her husband. 8
Because of the dismissal of Civil Case No. 13666, complainant filed a civil
case for damages against the respondent. It was docketed as CEB-18552
and assigned to Branch 57, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. The case was
dismissed on June 12, 2001.9
On November 24, 1994, Artezuela filed before this Court a verified complaint
for disbarment against the respondent. She alleged that respondent grossly
neglected his duties as a lawyer and failed to represent her interests with
zeal and enthusiasm. According to her, when Civil Case No. 13666 was
scheduled for pre-trial conference on August 20, 1993, respondent asked for
its postponement although all the parties were present. Notwithstanding
complainant's persistent and repeated follow-up, respondent did not do
anything to keep the case moving. He withdrew as counsel without obtaining
complainant's consent.10

Complainant also claimed that respondent engaged in activities inimical to

her interests. While acting as her counsel, respondent prepared Echavia's
Answer to the Amended Complaint. The said document was even printed in
respondent's office. Complainant further averred that it was respondent who
sought the dismissal of the case, misleading the trial court into thinking that
the dismissal was with her consent.11
Respondent denied the complainant's allegations and averred that he
conscientiously did his part as the complainant's lawyer in Civil Case No.
13666. He withdrew as counsel because the complainant was uncooperative
and refused to confer with him. He also gave several notices to the
complainant and made known his intention before he filed his Manifestation
to withdraw as counsel. Because of the severed relationship, the lower court,
after holding a conference, decided to grant respondent's manifestation and
advised the complainant to secure the services of a new lawyer.
Complainant, however, refused and instead, sought the dismissal of the
case.12
Respondent alleged that he sought the postponement of the Pre-Trial
Conference scheduled on August 20, 1993 so that he could file the Amended
Complaint. He admitted that Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint
was printed in his office but denied having prepared the document and
having acted as counsel of Echavia. He claimed that complainant requested
him to prepare Echavia's Answer but he declined. Echavia, however, went
back to his office and asked respondent's secretary to print the document.
Respondent intimated that the complainant and Echavia have fabricated the
accusations against him to compel him to pay the amount of P500,000.00.13
This Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP). The IBP-Visayas Regional Committee on Bar Discipline formed an
Investigating Committee to hear the disbarment complaint.
On October 6, 1999, Commissioner Gabriel T. Ingles issued a Report finding
the respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests, in violation of
Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well
as, of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Ethics. He recommended that the
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year.14 Commissioner Ingles did not rule on the other issues.
As aforesaid, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
upheld the findings of the Committee with modification only as to the
penalty.

Seeking reconsideration of the IBP's resolution, respondent contends that

the Investigating Committee did not conduct trial; hence, he was not able to
confront and examine the witnesses against him. He argues that the
Investigating Committee's finding that he represented Echavia is contrary to
court records and the complainant's own testimony in CEB-18552. He also
casts doubt on the credibility of the Investigating Committee to render just
and fair recommendations considering that the Investigating Commissioner
and the respondent are counsel-adversaries in another case, Civil Case No.
R-33277. Finally, he questions the imposition of a six-month suspension,
which he claims to be harsh considering that his private practice is his only
source of income.15
After carefully examining the records, as well as the applicable laws and
jurisprudence on the matter, this Court is inclined to uphold the IBP's
resolution.1wphi1.nt
In administrative cases, the requirement of notice and hearing does not
connote full adversarial proceedings, as "actual adversarial proceedings
become necessary only for clarification or when there is a need to propound
searching questions to witnesses who give vague testimonies." 16 Due process
is fulfilled when the parties were given reasonable opportunity to be heard
and to submit evidence in support of their arguments. 17
In the case at bar, records show that respondent repeatedly sought the
postponement of the hearings, prompting the Investigating Commissioner to
receive complainant's evidence ex parte and to set the case for resolution
after the parties have submitted their respective memorandum. Hence:
"The records show that this is already the third postponement filed by
respondent namely December 12, 1996 (sic), January 3, 1996 and
April 1, 1996.
The Commission for the last time, will cancel today's hearing and can
no longer tolerate any further postponement. Notify respondent by
telegram for the hearing for (sic) April 22, 1996 at 2:00 P.M. Said
hearing is intransferable in character.
In the meantime, complainant affirmed her complaint and likewise her
witness, Allan Echavia, also affirmed the contents of his affidavit and
further stated that he had executed the same and understood the
contents thereof."18
It is by his own negligence that the respondent was deemed to have waived
his right to cross-examine the complainant and her witness. He cannot

belatedly ask this Court to grant new trial after he has squandered his
opportunity to exercise his right.
Respondent's contention that the finding of the Investigating Committee was
contrary to the records and the complainant's own admission in CEB-18552
is without merit. It is true that Atty. Aviola was Echavia's counsel-of-record
in Civil Case No. 13666 as evidenced by the certification from the clerk of
court,19 and as admitted by the complainant in CEB-18552, viz:
"ATTY. MADERAZO: (To witness- ON CROSS)
Q:
Madam witness, you mentioned that the defendant in this case
was the counsel of Allan Echavia as early as August 20, 1993, wherein
you learned for the first time of this fact when you say he is counsel of
Allan Echavia. (sic) You mean he is the counsel of record of Allan
Echavia in the Civil Case before Judge Dacudao? Is that what you
mean?
A:
What I learned was that Atty. Alviola was the counsel of Allan
Echavia in the case before Judge Dacudao but I heard Atty. Maderazo
telling Allan Echavia not to admit that Atty. Maderazo is appearing for
me because he will be the one to coordinate with Allan's case.
Q:
So it is clear that the defendant in this case is not the counsel
of record of Allan Echavia. It was Atty. Alviola stated by you now?
A:
Atty. Maderazo was not Allan Echavia's counsel but it was Atty.
Alviola who was the counsel of record of Allan Echavia." 20
Nevertheless, the issue in this case is not whether the respondent also acted
as the counsel-of-record of Echavia. Rather, it is whether or not he had a
direct hand in the preparation of Echavia's Answer to the Amended
Complaint.
To be guilty of representing conflicting interests, a counsel-of-record of one
party need not also be counsel-of-record of the adverse party. He does not
have to publicly hold himself as the counsel of the adverse party, nor make
his efforts to advance the adverse party's conflicting interests of record--although these circumstances are the most obvious and satisfactory proof of
the charge. It is enough that the counsel of one party had a hand in the
preparation of the pleading of the other party, claiming adverse and
conflicting interests with that of his original client. To require that he also be
counsel-of-record of the adverse party would punish only the most obvious
form of deceit and reward, with impunity, the highest form of disloyalty.

Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Ethics states:

"It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of the retainer to disclose to the
client the circumstances of his relations to the parties and any interest
in or in connection with the controversy, which might influence the
client in the selection of the counsel.
"It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by
express consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts. Within the meaning of this Canon, a lawyer represents
conflicting interests when in behalf of one of the clients, it is
his duty to contend for that which duty to another client
requires him to oppose." (emphasis supplied)
An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the highly
fiduciary nature of the attorney-client relationship, sound public policy
dictates that a lawyer be prohibited from representing conflicting interests or
discharging inconsistent duties. He may not, without being guilty of
professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts
with that of his present or former client. Indeed, good faith and honest
intention on the part of the erring lawyer does not make this rule
inoperative.21 The lawyer is an officer of the court and his actions are
governed by the uncompromising rules of professional ethics. Thus:
"The relations of attorney and client is founded on principles of public
policy, on good taste. The question is not necessarily one of the rights
of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper
professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves
attorneys, like Ceasar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and doubledealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets
to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice."22
The professional obligation of the lawyer to give his undivided attention and
zeal for his client's cause is likewise demanded in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Inherently disadvantageous to his client's cause,
representation by the lawyer of conflicting interests requires disclosure of all
facts and consent of all the parties involved. Thus:
"CANON 15- All lawyers shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all
his dealings and transactions with his clients.
xxx

Rule 15.03- A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by

written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts."
While the Resolution of the IBP is purely recommendatory, we find no reason
to reverse the same. In disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar,
only clear preponderance of evidence is required to establish liability. As long
as the evidence presented by complainant or that taken judicial notice of by
the Court is more convincing and worthy of belief than that which is offered
in opposition thereto, the imposition of disciplinary sanction is justified. 23
A perusal of Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint shows that it
indeed conflicts with the complainant's claims. It reads:
"1. The allegations (sic) in Paragraph One (1) of the Complaint is
admitted in so far as it pertains to the personal circumstance and
residence of the answering defendant. The rest of the allegations in
Paragraph One (1), and all the allegations in Paragraph Two (2) ,
THREE (3), FOUR (4), FIVE (5), SIX (6), ELEVEN (11), TWELVE (12),
and FOURTEEN (14), of the Complaint are DENIED for lack of
knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of such
allegations."24
By way of prayer, Echavia states:
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after hearing, judgment be
rendered dismissing plaintiff's complaint."25
Anent the authorship by the respondent of the document quoted above, the
Investigating Committee found the testimonies of the complainant and
Echavia credible as opposed to respondent's bare denial. As pointed out by
Echavia, he was approached by Atty. Maderazo, introduced himself as his
lawyer and after some sessions in the latter's office, asked him to return and
sign a document which he later identified as the Answer to the Amended
Complaint.
The Investigating Committee found respondent's defense weak. Respondent
did not bother to present his secretary as witness, nor obtain her affidavit to
prove his allegations. Instead, he offered a convenient excuse--- that he
cannot anymore locate his secretary.
Respondent argued that it was the complainant who asked him to prepare
Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint, after reaching an agreement
whereby Echavia would testify in favor of the complainant. After he declined

the request, he claimed that it was the complainant who prepared the
document and asked his secretary to print the same. But as shown,
Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint was in no way favorable to the
complainant.
With the dismissal of Civil Case No. 13666, Echavia is practically off the
hook. We cannot find any reason why Echavia would commit perjury and
entangle himself, once again, with the law. He does not stand to profit at all
by accusing the respondent falsely.
Furthermore, considering complainant's stature and lack of legal education,
we can not see how she could have prepared Echavia's Answer to the
Amended Complaint and device a legal maneuver as complicated as the
present case.
Respondent's attack on the credibility of Investigating Commissioner Ingles
to render an impartial decision, having been an adversary in Civil Case No.
R-33277, does not convince us to grant new trial. This is the first time that
respondent questions the membership of Commissioner Ingles in the
Investigating Committee. If respondent really believed in good faith that
Commissioner Ingles would be biased and prejudiced, he should have asked
for the latter's inhibition at the first instance. Moreover, we could not find
any hint of irregularity, bias or prejudice in the conduct of the investigation
that would lead us to set it aside.
Finally, we remind the respondent that the practice of law is not a property
right but a mere privilege, and as such, must bow to the inherent regulatory
power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities.26 The suspension of the respondent's privilege to practice
law may result to financial woes. But as the guardian of the legal profession,
we are constrained to balance this concern with the injury he caused to the
very same profession he vowed to uphold with honesty and
fairness.1wphi1.nt
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Resolution of the IBP finding the respondent guilty
of violating Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Ethics, and Canon 15 and
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is affirmed. Respondent
is suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months with a stern
warning that a similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

CANON 7
November 29, 1989

A.M. No. 3249 SALVACION DELIZO CORDOVA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. LAURENCE D. CORDOVA, respondent.

RESOLUTION

, J.:

In an unsworn letter-complaint dated 14 April 1988 addressed to then Mr.

Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, complainant Salvacion Delizo charged her
husband, Atty. Laurence D. Cordova, with immorality and acts unbecoming a
member of the Bar. The letter-complaint was forwarded by the Court to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline
("Commission"), for investigation, report and recommendation.

The Commission, before acting on the complaint, required complainant to

submit a verified complaint within ten (10) days from notice. Complainant
complied and submitted to the Commission on 27 September 1988 a revised
and verified version of her long and detailed complaint against her husband
charging him with immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar.

In an Order of the Commission dated 1 December 1988, respondent was

declared in default for failure to file an answer to the complaint within fifteen
(15) days from notice. The same Order required complainant to submit
before the Commission her evidence ex parte, on 16 December 1988. Upon
the telegraphic request of complainant for the resetting of the 16 December

1988 hearing, the Commission scheduled another hearing on 25 January

1989. The hearing scheduled for 25 January 1989 was rescheduled two (2)
more times-first, for 25 February 1989 and second, for 10 and 11 April
1989. The hearings never took place as complainant failed to appear.
Respondent Cordova never moved to set aside the order of default, even
though notices of the hearings scheduled were sent to him.

In a telegraphic message dated 6 April 1989, complainant informed the

Commission that she and her husband had already "reconciled". In an order
dated 17 April 1989, the Commission required the parties (respondent and
complainant) to appear before it for confirmation and explanation of the
telegraphic message and required them to file a formal motion to dismiss the
complaint within fifteen (15) days from notice. Neither party responded and
nothing was heard from either party since then.

Complainant having failed to submit her evidence ex parte before the

Commission, the IBP Board of Governors submitted to this Court its report
reprimanding respondent for his acts, admonishing him that any further acts
of immorality in the future will be dealt with more severely, and ordering him
to support his legitimate family as a responsible parent should.

The findings of the IBP Board of Governors may be summed up as follows:

Complainant and respondent Cordova were married on 6 June 1976 and out
of this marriage, two (2) children were born. In 1985, the couple lived
somewhere in Quirino Province. In that year, respondent Cordova left his
family as well as his job as Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court,
Cabarroguis, Quirino Province, and went to Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur
with one Fely G. Holgado. Fely G. Holgado was herself married and left her
own husband and children to stay with respondent. Respondent Cordova and
Fely G. Holgado lived together in Bislig as husband and wife, with
respondent Cordova introducing Fely to the public as his wife, and Fely
Holgado using the name Fely Cordova. Respondent Cordova gave Fely

Holgado funds with which to establish a sari-sari store in the public market
at Bislig, while at the same time failing to support his legitimate family.

On 6 April 1986, respondent Cordova and his complainant wife had an

apparent reconciliation. Respondent promised that he would separate from
Fely Holgado and brought his legitimate family to Bislig, Surigao del Sur.
Respondent would, however, frequently come home from beerhouses or
cabarets, drunk, and continued to neglect the support of his legitimate
family. In February 1987, complainant found, upon returning from a trip to
Manila necessitated by hospitalization of her daughter Loraine, that
respondent Cordova was no longer living with her (complainant's) children in
their conjugal home; that respondent Cordova was living with another
mistress, one Luisita Magallanes, and had taken his younger daughter
Melanie along with him. Respondent and his new mistress hid Melanie from
the complinant, compelling complainant to go to court and to take back her
daughter by habeas corpus. The Regional Trial Court, Bislig, gave her
custody of their children.

Notwithstanding respondent's promises to reform, he continued to live with

Luisita Magallanes as her husband and continued to fail to give support to
his legitimate family.

Finally the Commission received a telegram message apparently from

complainant, stating that complainant and respondent had been reconciled
with each other.

After a review of the record, we agree with the findings of fact of the IBP
Board. We also agree that the most recent reconciliation between
complainant and respondent, assuming the same to be real, does not excuse
and wipe away the misconduct and immoral behavior of the respondent
carried out in public, and necessarily adversely reflecting upon him as a
member of the Bar and upon the Philippine Bar itself. An applicant for
admission to membership in the bar is required to show that he is possessed
of good moral character. That requirement is not exhausted and dispensed

with upon admission to membership of the bar. On the contrary, that

requirement persists as a continuing condition for membership in the Bar in
good standing.

In Mortel v. Aspiras, 1 this Court, following the rule in the United States,
held that "the continued possession ... of a good moral character is a
requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of the law ...
and its loss requires suspension or disbarment, even though the statutes do
not specify that as a ground for disbarment. " 2 It is important to note that
the lack of moral character that we here refer to as essential is not limited to
good moral character relating to the discharge of the duties and
responsibilities of an attorney at law. The moral delinquency that affects the
fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that
outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct
for instance, which makes "a mockery of the inviolable social institution or
marriage." 3 In Mortel, the respondent being already married, wooed and
won the heart of a single, 21-year old teacher who subsequently cohabited
with him and bore him a son. Because respondent's conduct in Mortel was
particularly morally repulsive, involving the marrying of his mistress to his
own son and thereafter cohabiting with the wife of his own son after the
marriage he had himself arranged, respondent was disbarred.

In Royong v. Oblena, 4 the respondent was declared unfit to continue as a

member of the bar by reason of his immoral conduct and accordingly
disbarred. He was found to have engaged in sexual relations with the
complainant who consequently bore him a son; and to have maintained for a
number of years an adulterous relationship with another woman.

In the instant case, respondent Cordova maintained for about two (2) years
an adulterous relationship with a married woman not his wife, in full view of
the general public, to the humiliation and detriment of his legitimate family
which he, rubbing salt on the wound, failed or refused to support. After a
brief period of "reform" respondent took up again with another woman not
his wife, cohabiting with her and bringing along his young daughter to live
with them. Clearly, respondent flaunted his disregard of the fundamental

institution of marriage and its elementary obligations before his own

daughter and the community at large.

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice

of law indefinitely and until farther orders from this Court. The Court will
consider lifting his suspension when respondent Cordova submits proof
satisfactory to the Commission and this Court that he has and continues to
provide for the support of his legitimate family and that he has given up the
immoral course of conduct that he has clung to.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,

Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Gri
EN BANC
A.M. No. 491 October 6, 1989
IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.

PER CURIAM:
In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(hereafter "IBP") held on June 3, 1989 at the Philippine International
Convention Center (or PICC), the following were elected by the House of
Delegates (composed of 120 chapter presidents or their alternates) and
proclaimed as officers:
NAME

POSITION

Atty. Violeta Drilon

President

Atty. Bella Tiro

Executive Vice-President

Atty. Salvador Lao

Chairman, House of Delegates

Atty. Renato F.
Ronquillo

Secretary, House of Delegates

Atty. Teodoro Quicoy

Treasurer, House of Delegates

Atty. Oscar Badelles

Sergeant at Arms, House of Delegates

Atty. Justiniano
Cortes

Governor & Vice-President for Northern

Luzon

Atty. Ciriaco Atienza

Governor & Vice-President for Central

Luzon

Atty. Mario Jalandoni

Governor & Vice-President for Metro

Manila

Atty. Jose Aguilar

Grapilon

Governor & Vice-President for Southern

Luzon

Atty. Teodoro Almine

Governor & Vice-President for Bicolandia

Atty. Porfirio Siyangco

Governor & Vice-President for Eastern

Visayas

Atty. Ricardo Teruel

Governor & Vice-President for Western

Visayas

Atty. Gladys Tiongco

Governor & Vice-President for Eastern

Mindanao

Atty. Simeon
Datumanong

Governor & Vice-President for Western

Mindanao

The newly-elected officers were set to take the their oath of office on July
4,1989, before the Supreme Court en banc. However,disturbed by the
widespread reports received by some members of the Court from lawyers
who had witnessed or participated in the proceedings and the adverse
comments published in the columns of some newspapers about the intensive
electioneering and overspending by the candidates, led by the main
protagonists for the office of president of the association, namely, Attorneys
Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged use of
government planes, and the officious intervention of certain public officials to
influence the voting, all of which were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws
which prohibit such activities. The Supreme Courten banc, exercising its
power of supervision over the Integrated Bar, resolved to suspend the oathtaking of the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into the veracity of the reports.
It should be stated at the outset that the election process itself (i.e. the
voting and the canvassing of votes on June 3, 1989) which was conducted

by the "IBP Comelec," headed by Justice Reynato Puno of the Court of

Appeals, was unanimously adjudged by the participants and observers to be
above board. For Justice Puno took it upon himself to device safeguards to
prevent tampering with, and marking of, the ballots.
What the Court viewed with considerable concern was the reported
electioneering and extravagance that characterized the campaign conducted
by the three candidates for president of the IBP.
I. MEDIA ACCOUNT OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN.
Emil Jurado, in his column "IBP Group Questions Drilon Election" (Manila
Standard, Sunday, June 17, 1989), Luis Mauricio, in two successive columns:
"The Invertebrated Bar" (Malaya, June 10, 1989) and "The Disintegrating
Bar" (Malaya, June 20, 1989), and Teodoro Locsin Jr. in an article, entitled
"Pam-Pam" (The Philippines Free Press, July 8,1989), and the editorial,
entitled 'Wrong Forum" of the Daily Globe (June 8, 1989), were unanimously
critical of the "vote-buying and pressure tactics" allegedly employed in the
campaign by the three principal candidates: Attys. Violeta C. Drilon, Nereo
Paculdo and Ramon Nisce who reportedly "poured heart, soul, money and
influence to win over the 120 IBP delegates."
Mr. Jurado mentioned the resentment of Atty. Drilon's rivals who felt at a
disadvantage because Atty. Drilon allegedly used PNB helicopters to visit farflung IBP chapters on the pretext of distributing Bigay Puso donations, and
she had the added advantage of having regional directors and labor arbiters
of the Department of Labor and Employment (who had been granted leaves
of absence by her husband, the Labor Secretary) campaigning for her.
Jurado's informants alleged that there was rampant vote-buying by some
members of the U.P. Sigma Rho Fraternity (Secretary Drilon's fraternity), as
well as by some lawyers of ACCRA (Angara, Concepcion, Cruz, Regala and
Abello Law Office) where Mrs. Drilon is employed, and that government
positions were promised to others by the office of the Labor Secretary.
Mr. Mauricio in his column wrote about the same matters and, in addition,
mentioned "talk of personnel of the Department of Labor, especially
conciliators and employers, notably Chinese Filipinos, giving aid and comfort
to her (Atty. Drilon's) candidacy," the billeting of out-of-town delegates in
plush hotels where they were reportedly "wined and dined continuously,
womened and subjected to endless haggling over the price of their votes x x
x" which allegedly "ranged from Pl5,000 to P20,000, and, on the day of the
election, some twelve to twenty votes which were believed crucial,
appreciated to P50,000."

In his second column, Mr. Mauricio mentioned "how a top official of the
judiciary allegedly involved himself in IBP politics on election day by
closeting himself with campaigners as they plotted their election strategy in
a room of the PICC (the Philippine International Convention Center where
the convention/election were held) during a recess x x x."
Mr. Locsin in his column and editorial substantially re-echoed Mauricio's
reports with some embellishments.
II. THE COURT'S DECISION TO INVESTIGATE.
Responding to the critical reports, the Court, in its en banc resolution dated
June 15, 1989, directed the outgoing and incoming members of the IBP
Board of Governors, the principal officers and Chairman of the House of
Delegates to appear before it on Tuesday, June 20, 1989, at 2:00 o'clock
p.m., and there to inform the Court on the veracity of the aforementioned
reports and to recommend, for the consideration of the Court, appropriate
approaches to the problem of confirming and strengthening adherence to the
fundamental principles of the IBP.
In that resolution the Court "call[ed] to mind that a basic postulate of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), heavily stressed at the time of its
organization and commencement of existence, is that the IBP shall be nonpolitical in character and that there shall be no lobbying nor campaigning in
the choice of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of
Delegates, and of the IBP officers, national, or regional, or chapter. The
fundamental assumption was that officers, delegates and governors would
be chosen on the basis of professional merit and willingness and ability to
serve."
The resolution went on to say that the "Court is deeply disturbed to note
that in connection with the election of members of the Board of Governors
and of the House of Delegates, there is a widespread belief, based on reports
carried by media and transmitted as well by word of mouth, that there was
extensive and intensive campaigning by candidates for IBP positions as well
as expenditure of considerable sums of money by candidates, including votebuying, direct or indirect."
The venerable retired Supreme Court Justice and IBP President Emeritus,
Jose B.L. Reyes, attended the dialogue, upon invitation of the Court, to give
counsel and advice. The meeting between the Court en banc on the one
hand, and the outgoing and in coming IBP officers on the other, was an
informal one. Thereafter, the Court resolved to conduct a formal inquiry to
determine whether the prohibited acts and activities enumerated in the IBP

By-Laws were committed before and during the 1989 elections of IBP's
national officers.
The Court en banc formed a committee and designated Senior Associate
Justice Andres R. Narvasa, as Chairman, and Associate Justices Teodoro R.
Padilla, Emilio A. Gancayco, Abraham F. Sarmiento, and Carolina C. GrioAquino, as members, to conduct the inquiry. The Clerk of Court, Atty. Daniel
Martinez, acted as the committee's Recording Secretary.
A total of forty-nine (49) witnesses appeared and testified in response to
subpoenas issued by the Court to shed light on the conduct of the elections.
The managers of three five-star hotels the Philippine Plaza, the Hyatt, and
the Holiday Inn where the three protagonists (Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo)
allegedly set up their respective headquarters and where they billeted their
supporters were summoned. The officer of the Philippine National Bank and
the Air Transport Office were called to enlighten the Court on the charge that
an IBP presidential candidate and the members of her slate used PNB planes
to ferry them to distant places in their campaign to win the votes of
delegates. The Philippine Airlines officials were called to testify on the charge
that some candidates gave free air fares to delegates to the convention.
Officials of the Labor Department were also called to enable the Court to
ascertain the truth of the reports that labor officials openly campaigned or
worked for the election of Atty. Drilon.
The newspaper columnists, Messrs. Luis Mauricio, Jesus Bigornia and Emil
Jurado were subpoenaed to determine the nature of their sources of
information relative to the IBP elections. Their stories were based, they said,
on letters, phone calls and personal interviews with persons who claimed to
have knowledge of the facts, but whom they, invoking the Press Freedom
Law, refused to identify.
The Committee has since submitted its Report after receiving, and analyzing
and assessing evidence given by such persons as were perceived to have
direct and personal knowledge of the relevant facts; and the Court, after
deliberating thereon, has Resolved to accept and adopt the same.
III. PROHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES UNDER IBP BY-LAWS.
Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the "strictly non-political"
character of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, thus:
"SEC. 4. Non-political Bar. The Integrated Bar is strictly nonpolitical, and every activity tending to impair this basic feature is
strictly prohibited and shall be penalized accordingly. No lawyer

holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office

in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality
thereof shall be eligible for election or appointment to any
position in the Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof. A
Delegate, Governor, officer or employee of the Integrated Bar, or
an officer or employee of any Chapter thereof shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his position as of the
moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any elective
public office or accepts appointment to any judicial, quasijudicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof. "'
Section 14 of the same By-Laws enumerates the prohibited acts
relative to IBP elections:
SEC. 14. Prohibited acts and practices relative to elections.
The following acts and practices relative to election are
prohibited, whether committed by a candidate for any elective
office in the Integrated Bar or by any other member, directly or
indirectly, in any form or manner, by himself or through another
person:
(a) Distribution, except on election day, of election campaign
material;
(b) Distribution, on election day, of election campaign material
other than a statement of the biodata of a candidate on not
more than one page of a legal-size sheet of paper; or causing
distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than
those authorized by the officer presiding at the elections;
(c) Campaigning for or against any candidate, while holding an
elective, judicial, quasi-judicial or prosecutory office in the
Government or any political subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof;
(d) Formation of tickets, single slates, or combinations of
candidates, as well as the advertisement thereof;
(e) For the purpose of inducing or influencing a member to
withhold his vote, or to vote for or against a candidate, (1)
payment of the dues or other indebtedness of any member; (2)
giving of food, drink, entertainment, transportation or any article
of value, or any similar consideration to any person; or (3)

making a promise or causing an expenditure to be made, offered

or promised to any person."
Section 12(d) of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions for violations of the above
rules:
(d) Any violation of the rules governing elections or commission
of any of the prohibited acts and practices defined in Section 14
prohibited Acts and Practices relative to elections) of the by-laws
of the Integrated Bar shall be a ground for the disqualification of
a candidate or his removal from office if elected, without
prejudice to the imposition of sanctions upon any erring member
pursuant to the By-laws of the Integrated Bar.
At the formal investigation which was conducted by the investigating
committee, the following violations were established:
(1) Prohibited campaigning and solicitation of votes by the candidates for
president, executive vice-president, the officers of candidate the House of
Delegates and Board of Governors.
The three candidates for IBP President Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo began
travelling around the country to solicit the votes of delegates as early as
April 1989. Upon the invitation of IBP President, Leon Garcia, Jr. (t.s.n., July
13,1989, p. 4), they attended the Bench and Bar dialogues held in Cotabato
in April 1989 (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, p. 123), in Tagaytay City, Pampanga,
and in Baguio City (during the conference of chapter presidents of Northern
Luzon (t.s.n., July 3,1989, p. 113; t.s.n., July 10, p. 41; t.s.n., July 13, p.
47) where they announced their candidacies and met the chapter presidents.
Atty. Nisce admitted that he went around the country seeking the help of IBP
chapter officers, soliciting their votes, and securing their written
endorsements. He personally hand-carried nomination forms and requested
the chapter presidents and delegates to fill up and sign the forms to
formalize their commitment to his nomination for IBP President. He started
campaigning and distributing the nomination forms in March 1989 after the
chapter elections which determined the membership of the House of
Delegates composed of the 120 chapter presidents (t.s.n., June 29, 1989,
pp. 82-86). He obtained forty (40) commitments. He submitted photocopies
of his nomination forms which read:
"Nomination Form

I Join in Nominating
RAMON M. NISCE
as
National President of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines

______________ _______________
Chapter Signature"
Among those who signed the nomination forms were: Onofre P. Tejada,
Candido P. Balbin, Jr., Conizado V. Posadas, Quirico L. Quirico Ernesto S.
Salun-at, Gloria C. Agunos, Oscar B. Bernardo, Feliciano F. Wycoco, Amor L.
Ibarra, Jose M. Atienza, Jose N. Contreras, Romeo T. Mendoza, Leo C.
Medialdea, Jr., Paulino G. Clarin, Julius Z. Neil, Roem J. Arbolado Democrito
M. Perez, Abelardo Fermin, Diosdado B. Villarin, Jr., Daniel C. Macaraeg,
Confesor R. Sansano Dionisio E. Bala, Jr., Emesto A. Amores, Romeo V.
Pefianco, Augurio C. Pamintuan, Atlee T. Viray, Ceferino C. Cabanas, Jose S.
Buban, Diosdado Z. Reloj, Jr., Cesar C. Viola, Oscar C. Fernandez, Ricardo B.
Teruel Rodrigo R. Flores, Sixto Marella, Jr., Arsenio C. Villalon, Renato F.
Ronquillo, Antonio G. Nalapo Romualdo A. Din Jr., Jose P. Icaonapo Jr., and
Manuel S. Person.
Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms at the Hyatt Hotel based on the
commitments he had obtained (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, pp. 82-85).
Unfortunately, despite those formal commitments, he obtained only 14 votes
in the election (t.s.n., June 29, 1 989, p. 86). The reason, he said, is that.
some of those who had committed their votes to him were "manipulated,
intimidated, pressured, or remunerated" (t.s.n., June 29,1989, pp. 8695;
Exhibit "M-4-Nisce," t.s.n., July 4, 1989, pp. 100-1 04).
(2) Use of PNB plane in the campaign.
The records of the Philippine National Bank (Exhibit C-1-Crudo and Exhibit C2-Crudo) show that Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. of the Department of
Environment & Natural Resources (DENR) borrowed a plane from the
Philippine National Bank for his Bicol CORD (Cabinet Officers for Regional
Development) Assistant, Undersecretary Antonio Tria. The plane manifest

(Exh. C-2-Crudo) listed Atty. Violeta Drilon, Arturo Tusi (Tiu), Assistant
Secretary for Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Tony Tria, Atty.
Gladys Tiongco, and Amy Wong. Except for Tony Tria, the rest of the
passengers were IBP candidates.
Atty. Drilon admitted that she "hitched" a ride on a PNB plane. She said that
she was informed by Atty. Tiu about the availability of a PNB plane (t.s.n.,
July 3,1989, pp. 116-118).
Atty. Tiu, who ran for the position of IBP executive vice-president in the
Drilon ticket, testified that sometime in May 1989 he failed to obtain booking
from the Philippine Airlines for the projected trip of his group to Bicol. He
went to the DENR allegedly to follow up some papers for a client. While at
the DENR, he learned that Assistant Secretary Tria was going on an official
business in Bicol for Secretary Fulgencio Factoran and that he would be
taking a PNB plane. As Assistant Secretary Tria is his fraternity brother, he
asked if he, together with the Drilon group, could hitch a ride on the plane to
Bicol. His request was granted. Their purpose in going to Bicol was to assess
their chances in the IBP elections. The Drilon company talked with the IBP
chapter presidents in Daet, Naga, and Legaspi, and asked for their support
(t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 549).
Assistant Secretary Antonio S. Tria confirmed the use of a PNB plane by Atty.
Drilon and her group. He recalled that on May 23,1989, DENR Secretary
Factoran instructed him to go to Bicol to monitor certain regional
development projects there and to survey the effect of the typhoon that hit
the region in the middle of May. On the same day, Atty. Tiu, a fraternity
brother (meaning that Tiu belongs to the Sigma Rho fraternity) went to the
DENR office and requested the Secretary (Factoran) if he (Tiu) could be
allowed to hitch a ride on the plane. Assistant Secretary Tria, together with
the Drilon group which included Attorneys Drilon, Grapilon, Amy Wong,
Gladys Tiongco, and Tiu, took off at the Domestic Airport bound for Naga,
Daet and Legaspi. In Legaspi the Drilon group had lunch with Atty. Vicente
Real, Jr., an IBP chapter president (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 54-69).
(3) Formation of tickets and single slates.
The three candidates, Paculdo, Nisce and Drilon, admitted having formed
their own slates for the election of IBP national officers on June 3, 1989.
Atty. Paculdo's slate consisted of himself for President; Bella D. Tiro, for
Executive Vice-President; and for Governors: Justiniano P. Cortez (Northern
Luzon), Oscar C. Fernandez (Central Luzon), Mario C.V. Jalandoni (Greater
Manila), Petronilo A. de la Cruz (Southern Luzon), Teodorico C. Almine, Jr.

(Bicolandia), Ricardo B. Teruel (Western Visayas), Porfirio P. Siyangco

(Eastern Visayas), Jesus S. Anonat (Western Mindanao), Guerrero A. Adaza,
Jr. (Eastern Mindanao) (Exhibit M-Nisce).
The Drilon ticket consisted of. Violeta C. Drilon for President, Arturo Tiu for
Executive Vice President, Salvador Lao for Chairman of the House of
Delegates, and, for Governors: Basil Rupisan (Northern 'Luzon), Acong
Atienza (Central Luzon), Amy Wong (Metro Manila), Jose Grapilon (Southern
Tagalog), Teodoro Almine (Bicolandia), Baldomero Estenzo (Eastern
Visayas), Joelito Barrera (Western Visayas), Gladys Tiongco (Eastern
Mindanao), Simeon Datumanong (Western Mindanao) (Exhibit M-1-Nisce).
Atty. Ramon N. Nisce's line-up listed himself and Confessor B. Sansano
Benjamin B. Bernardino, Antonio L. Nalapo Renato F. Ronquillo, Gloria C.
Agunos, Mario Valderrama, Candido P. Balbin Jr., Oscar C. Fernandez, Cesar
G. Viola, Leo C. Medialdea, Jr., Vicente P. Tordilla, Jr., Jose S. Buban, Joel A.
Llosa, Jesus T. Albacite and Oscar V. Badelles.
(4) Giving free transportation to out-of-town delegates and alternates.
Atty. Nisce admitted having bought plane tickets for some delegates to the
convention. He mentioned Oscar Badelles to whom he gave four round-trip
tickets (worth about P10,000) from Iligan City to Manila and back. Badelles
was a voting delegate. Nisce, however, failed to get a written commitment
from him because Atty. Medialdea assured him (Nisce) "sigurado na 'yan,
h'wag mo nang papirmahin." Badelles won as sergeant-at-arms, not in
Nisce's ticket, but in that of Drilon.
Badelles admitted that Nisce sent him three airplane tickets, but he Badelles
said that he did not use them, because if he did, he would be committed to
Nisce, and he Badelles did not want to be committed (t.s.n., July 4,1989, pp.
77-79, 95-96).
Nisce also sent a plane ticket to Atty. Atilano, who was his candidate, and
another ticket to Mrs. Linda Lim of Zamboanga. Records of the Philippine
Airlines showed that Atty. Nisce paid for the plane tickets of Vicente Real, Jr.
(Exh. D-1-Calica), Romeo Fortes (Exh. D-1-Calica), Cesar Batica (Exh. D-2Calica), Jose Buban of Leyte (Exh. D-2-Calica), Delsanto Resuello (Exh. D-3Calica), and Ceferino Cabanas (Exh. D-3-Calica).
In spite of his efforts and expense, only one of Nisce's candidates won:
Renato Ronquillo of Manila 4, as Secretary of the House of Delegates (t.s.n.
July 3, p. 161).

(5) Giving free hotel accommodations, food, drinks, entertainment to

delegates.
(a) ATTY. NEREO PACULDO
Atty. Paculdo alleged that he booked 24 regular rooms and three suites at
the Holiday Inn, which served as his headquarters. The 24 rooms were to be
occupied by his staff (mostly ladies) and the IBP delegates. The three suites
were to be occupied by himself, the officers of the Capitol Bar Association,
and Atty. Mario Jalandoni. He paid P150,000 for the hotel bills of his
delegates at the Holiday Inn, where a room cost P990 per day with
breakfast.
Those listed as guests of Atty. Paculdo at the Holiday Inn were: Emesto C.
Perez, Tolomeo Ligutan Judge Alfonso Combong, Ricardo Caliwag, Antonio
Bisnar, Benedicto Balajadia, Jesus Castro, Restituto Villanueva, Serapio Cribe
Juanita Subia, Teodorico J. Almine, Rudy Gumban, Roem Arbolado, Ricardo
Teruel, Shirley Moises, Ramon Roco, Alberto Trinidad, Teodoro Quicoy Manito
Lucero, Fred Cledera Vicente Tordilla, Julian Ocampo, Francisco Felizmenio
Marvel Clavecilla, Amador Capiral, Eufronio Maristela, Porfirio Siyangco,
William Llanes, Jr., Marciano Neri, Guerrero Adaza, Diosdado Peralta, Luis C.
Formilleza, Jr., Democrito Perez, Bruno Flores, Dennis Rendon, Judge
Ceferino Chan, Mario Jalandoni, Kenneth Siruelo Bella Tiro, Antonio Santos,
Tiburcio Edano James Tan, Cesilo A. Adaza, Francisco Roxas, Angelita
Gacutan, Jesse Pimentel, Judge Jaime Hamoy, Jesus Anonat, Carlos Egay,
Judge Carlito Eisma, Judge Jesus Carbon, Joven Zach, and Benjamin Padon.
Noel de Guzman, Holiday Inn's credit manager, testified that Atty. Paculdo
booked 52 (not 24) rooms, including the presidential suite, which was used
as the Secretariat. The group bookings were made by Atty. Gloria Paculdo,
the wife of Nereo Paculdo (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 63-68). The total sum of
P227,114.89 was paid to Holiday Inn for the use of the rooms.
(b) ATTY. VIOLETA C. DRILON
The delegates and supporters of Atty. Drilon were billeted at the Philippine
Plaza Hotel where her campaign manager, Atty. Renato Callanta, booked 40
rooms, 5 of which were suites. According to Ms. Villanueva, Philippine Plaza
banquet and conventions manager, the contract that Atty. Callanta signed
with the Philippine Plaza was made in the name of the "IBP c/o Atty.
Callanta."
Mrs. Lourdes Juco, a sales manager of the Philippine Plaza, recalled that it
was Mr. Mariano Benedicto who first came to book rooms for the IBP

delegates. She suggested that he obtain a group (or discounted) rate. He

gave her the name of Atty. Callanta who would make the arrangements with
her. Mr. Benedicto turned out to be the Assistant Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
The total sum of P316,411.53 was paid by Atty. Callanta for the rooms, food,
and beverages consumed by the Drilon group, with an unpaid balance of
P302,197.30. Per Attorney Daniel Martinez's last telephone conversation with
Ms. Villanueva, Atty. Callanta still has an outstanding account of
P232,782.65 at Philippine Plaza.
Atty. Callanta admitted that he signed the contract for 40 rooms at the
Philippine Plaza. He made a downpayment of P123,000. His "working sheet'
showed that the following persons contributed for that down payment:
(a) Nilo Pena (Quasha Law Office)

P 25,000

(b) Antonio Carpio

20,000

(c) Toto Ferrer (Carpio Law Office)

10,000

(d) Jay Castro

10,000

(e) Danny Deen

20,000

(f) Angangco Tan (Angara Law Office)

10,000

(g) Alfonso Reyno

20,000

(h) Cosme Rossel

15,300

(t.s.n. July 4, 1 989, pp. 3-4)

Atty. Callanta explained that the above listed persons have been contributing
money every time the IBP embarks on a project. This time, they contributed
so that their partners or associates could attend the legal aid seminar and
the IBP convention too.
Atty. Drilon alleged that she did not know that Atty. Callanta had billeted her
delegates at the Philippine Plaza. She allegedly did not also know in whose
name the room she occupied was registered. But she did ask for a room
where she could rest during the convention. She admitted, however, that she
paid for her hotel room and meals to Atty. Callanta, through Atty. Loanzon
(t.s.n. July 3,1989).

The following were listed as having occupied the rooms reserved by Atty.
Callanta at the Philippine Plaza: Violeta Drilon, Victoria A. Verciles, Victoria
C. Loanzon, Leopoldo A. Consulto Ador Lao, Victoria Borra, Aimee Wong,
Callanta, Pena, Tiu, Gallardo, Acong Atienza, D. Bernardo, Amores, Silao
Caingat, Manuel Yuson, Simeon Datumanong, Manuel Pecson, Sixto Marella,
Joselito Barrera, Radon Macalalag, Oscar Badelles, Antonio Acyatan,
Ildefonso C. Puerto, Nestor Atienza, Gil Batula Array Corot, Dimakuta Corot
Romeo Fortes Irving Petilla, Teodoro Palma, Gil Palma, Danilo Deen,
Delsanto, Resuello, Araneta, Vicente Real, Sylvio Casuncad Espina, Guerrero,
Julius Neri, Linda Lim, Ben Lim, C. Batica, Luis Formilleza, Felix Macalag
Mariano Benedicto, Atilano, Araneta, Renato Callanta.
Atty. Nilo Pena admitted that the Quasha Law Office of which he is a senior
partner, gave P25,000 to Callanta for rooms at the Philippine Plaza so that
some members of his law firm could campaign for the Drilon group (t.s.n.
July 5,1989, pp. 7678) during the legal aid seminar and the IBP convention.
Most of the members of his law firm are fraternity brothers of Secretary
Drilon (meaning, members of the Sigma Rho Fraternity). He admitted being
sympathetic to the candidacy of Atty. Drilon and the members of her slate,
two of whom Jose Grapilon and Simeon Datumanong are Sigma Rhoans.
They consider Atty. Drilon as a "sigma rho sister," her husband being a
sigma rhoan.
Atty. Antonio Carpio, also a Sigma Rhoan, reserved a room for the members
of his own firm who attended the legal aid seminar and the convention. He
made the reservation through Atty. Callanta to whom he paid P20,000 (t.s.n.
July 6,1989, pp. 30-34).
Atty. Carpio assisted Atty. Drilon in her campaign during the convention, by
soliciting the votes of delegates he knew, like Atty. Albacite his former
teacher (but the latter was already committed to Nisce), and Atty. Romy
Fortes, a classmate of his in the U.P. College of Law (t. t.s.n. July 6, 1989,
pp. 22, 29, 39).
(c) ATTY. RAMON NISCE.
Atty. Nisce, through his brother-in-law, Ricardo Paras, entered into a
contract with the Hyatt Hotel for a total of 29 rooms plus one (1) seventhfloor room. He made a downpayment of P20,000 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p.
58) on April 20, 1989, and P37,632.45 on May 10, or a total of P57,632.45.
Ms. Cecile Flores, Ms. Milagros Ocampo, and Mr. Ramon Jacinto, the sales
department manager, credit manager, and reservation manager, respectively

of the Hyatt, testified that Atty. Nisce's bill amounted to P216,127.74 (t.s.n.
June 28, 1989, pp. 57-58; Exhibits E-Flores, F-Jacinto G-Ocampo).
As earlier mentioned, Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms for those
who committed themselves to his candidacy.
The hotel guests of Atty. Nisce were: Gloria Agunos Dennis Habanel B.
Batula, John E. Asuncion, Reynaldo Cortes, Lourdes Santos, Elmer Datuin,
Romualdo Din, Antonio Nalapo, Israel Damasco, Candido Balbin, Serrano
Balot, Ibarra, Joel Llosa, Eltanal, Ruperto, Asuncion, Q. Pilotin Reymundo P.
Guzman, Zoilo Aguinaldo, Clarin, R. Ronquillo, Dominador Carillo, Filomeno
Balinas, Ernesto Sabulan, Yusop Pangadapun, A. Viray, Icampo, Abelardo
Fermin, C. Quiaoit, Augurio Pamintuan, Daniel Macaraeg, Onofre Tejada.
(6) Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. Violeta Drilon
In violation of the prohibition against "campaigning for or against a
candidate while holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory
office in the Government' (Sec. 14[c], Art. I, IBP By-Laws), Mariano E.
Benedicto II, Assistant Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment,
testified that he took a leave of absence from his office to attend the IBP
convention. He stayed at the Philippine Plaza with the Drilon group
admittedly to give "some moral assistance" to Atty. Violeta Drilon. He did so
because he is a member of the Sigma Rho Fraternity. When asked about the
significance of Sigma Rho, Secretary Benedicto explained: "More than the
husband of Mrs. Drilon being my boss, the significance there is that the
husband is my brother in the Sigma Rho."
He cheered up Mrs., Drilon when her spirits were low. He talked to her
immediate circle which included Art Tiu, Tony Carpio, Nilo Pena, Amy Wong,
Atty. Grapilon, Victor Lazatin, and Boy Reyno. They assessed the progress of
the campaign, and measured the strengths and weaknesses of the other
groups The group had sessions as early as the later part of May.
Room 114, the suite listed in the name of Assistant Secretary Benedicto
toted up a bill of P23,110 during the 2-day IBP convention/election. A total
of 113 phone calls (amounting to Pl,356) were recorded as emanating from
his room.
Opposite Room 114, was Room 112, also a suite, listed in the names of Mrs.
Drilon, Gladys Tiongco (candidate for Governor, Eastern Mindanao) and Amy
Wong (candidate for Governor, Metro Manila). These two rooms served as
the "action center' or "war room" where campaign strategies were discussed
before and during the convention. It was in these rooms where the

supporters of the Drilon group, like Attys. Carpio, Callanta, Benedicto, the
Quasha and the ACCRA lawyers met to plot their moves.
(7) Paying the dues or other indebtedness of any number (Sec. 14[e], IBP
BY-Laws).
Atty. Teresita C. Sison, IBP Treasurer, testified that she has heard of
candidates paying the IBP dues of lawyers who promised to vote for or
support them, but she has no way of ascertaining whether it was a candidate
who paid the delinquent dues of another, because the receipts are issued in
the name of the member for whom payment is made (t.s.n. June 28, 1989,
pp. 24-28).
She has noticed, though, that there is an upsurge of payments in March,
April, May during any election year. This year, the collections increased by
P100,000 over that of last year (a non-election year from Pl,413,425 to
Pl,524,875 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 25).
(8) Distribution of materials other than bio-data of not more than one page
of legal size sheet of paper (Sec. 14[a], IBP By-Laws).
On the convention floor on the day of the election, Atty. Paculdo caused to
be distributed his bio-data and copies of a leaflet entitled "My Quest," as
wen as, the lists of his slate. Attys. Drilon and Nisce similarly distributed
their tickets and bio-data.
The campaign materials of Atty. Paculdo cost from P15,000 to P20,000. They
were printed by his own printing shop.
(9) Causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than
those authorized by the officer presiding at the election (Sec. 14[b], IBP ByLaws).
Atty. Paculdo employed uniformed girls to distribute his campaign materials
on the convention floor. Atty. Carpio noted that there were more campaign
materials distributed at the convention site this year than in previous years.
The election was more heated and expensive (t.s.n. July 6,1989, p. 39).
Atty. Benjamin Bernardino, the incumbent President of the IBP Rizal Chapter,
and a candidate for chairman of the House of Delegates on Nisce's ticket,
testified that campaign materials were distributed during the convention by
girls and by lawyers. He saw members of the ACCRA law firm campaigning
for Atty. Drilon (t.s.n. July 3,1989, pp. 142-145).

(10) Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to vote for or

against a candidate (Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws).
Atty. Bernardino disclosed that his cousin, Atty. Romeo Capulong, urged him
to withdraw his candidacy for chairman of the House of Delegates and to run
as vice-chairman in Violy Drilon's slate, but he declined (t.s.n. July 3,1989,
pp. 137, 149).
Atty. Gloria Agunos personnel director of the Hyatt Terraces Hotel in Baguio
and president of the Baguio-Benguet IBP Chapter, recalled that in the third
week of May 1989, after the Tripartite meet of the Department of Labor &
Employment at the Green Valley Country Club in Baguio City, she met Atty.
Drilon, together with two labor officers of Region 1, Attys. Filomeno Balbin
and Atty. Mansala Atty. Drilon solicited her (Atty. Agunos') vote and invited
her to stay at the Philippine Plaza where a room would be available for her.
Atty. Paculdo also tried to enlist her support during the chapter presidents'
meeting to choose their nominee for governor for the Northern Luzon region
(t.s.n. July 13,1989, pp. 43-54).
Atty. Nisce testified that a Manila Chapter 4 delegate, Marcial Magsino, who
had earlier committed his vote to Nisce changed his mind when he was
offered a judgeship (This statement, however, is admittedly hearsay). When
Nisce confronted Magsino about the alleged offer, the latter denied that there
was such an offer. Nisce's informant was Antonio G. Nalapo an IBP candidate
who also withdrew.
Another Nisce candidate, Cesar Viola, withdrew from the race and refused to
be nominated (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p. 104). Vicente P. Tordilla who was
Nisce's candidate for Governor became Paculdo's candidate instead (t.s.n.
June 29, 1989, p. 104).
Nisce recalled that during the Bench and Bar Dialogue in Cotabato City,
Court Administrator Tiro went around saying, "I am not campaigning, but my
wife is a candidate." Nisce said that the presidents of several IBP chapters
informed him that labor officials were campaigning for Mrs. Drilon (t.s.n.
June 29,1989, pp. 109-110). He mentioned Ciony de la Cerna, who allegedly
campaigned in La Union (t.s.n. June 29,1989,p.111)
Atty. Joel A. Llosa, Nisce's supporter and candidate for governor of the
Western Visayas, expressed his disappointment over the IBP elections
because some delegates flip-flopped from one camp to another. He testified
that when he arrived at the Manila Domestic Airport he was met by an
assistant regional director of the DOLE who offered to bring him to the
Philippine Plaza, but he declined the offer. During the legal aid seminar, Atty.

Drilon invited him to transfer to the Philippine Plaza where a room had been
reserved for him. He declined the invitation (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. 102106).
Atty. Llosa said that while he was still in Dumaguete City, he already knew
that the three candidates had their headquarters in separate hotels: Paculdo,
at the Holiday Inn; Drilon, at the Philippine Plaza; and Nisce, at the Hyatt.
He knew about this because a week before the elections, representatives of
Atty. Drilon went to Dumaguete City to campaign. He mentioned Atty. Rodil
Montebon of the ACCRA Law Office, accompanied by Atty. Julve the Assistant
Regional Director of the Department of Labor in Dumaguete City. These two,
he said, offered to give him two PAL tickets and accommodations at the
Philippine Plaza (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. 101-104). But he declined the offer
because he was already committed to Atty. Nisce.
Atty. Llosa also revealed that before he left for Manila on May 31, 1989, a
businessman, Henry Dy, approached him to convince him to vote for Atty.
Paculdo. But Llosa told Dy that he was already committed to Nisce.
He did not receive any plane tickets from Atty. Nisce because he and his two
companions (Atty. Eltanal and Atty. Ruperto) had earlier bought their own
tickets for Manila (t.s.n. July 4, 1989, p. 101).
SUMMARY OF CAMPAIGN EXPENSES INCURRED
BY THE CANDIDATES
Atty. Paculdo admitted having spent some P250,000 during his three weeks
of campaigning. Of this amount, the Capitol Bar Association (of which he was
the chapter president) contributed about P150,000. The Capitol Bar
Association is a voluntary bar association composed of Quezon City lawyers.
He spent about P100,000 to defray the expenses of his trips to the provinces
(Bicol provinces, Pampanga, Abra, Mountain Province and Bulacan) (t.s.n.
June 29,1989, pp. 9-14).
Atty. Nisce's hotel bills at the Hyatt amounted to P216,127.74. This does not
include the expenses for his campaign which began several months before
the June 3rd election, and his purchases of airplane tickets for some
delegates.
The records of the Philippine Plaza Hotel, headquarters of Atty. Drilon's
camp, showed that her campaign rang up over P600,000 in hotel bills. Atty.
Callanta paid P316,411.53 for the rooms, food, and beverage consumed by

Atty. Drilon's supporters, but still left an unpaid bill of P302,197.30 at

convention's end.
FINDINGS.
From all the foregoing, it is evident that the manner in which the principal
candidates for the national positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their
campaign preparatory to the elections on June 3, 1989, violated Section 14
of the IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of the idea of a "strictly nonpolitical" Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the By-Laws.
The setting up of campaign headquarters by the three principal candidates
(Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) in five-star hotels: The Philippine Plaza, the
Holiday Inn and The Hyatt the better for them to corral and entertain the
delegates billeted therein; the island hopping to solicit the votes of the
chapter presidents who comprise the 120-member House of Delegates that
elects the national officers and regional governors; the formation of tickets,
slates, or line-ups of candidates for the other elective positions aligned with,
or supporting, either Drilon, Paculdo or Nisce; the procurement of written
commitments and the distribution of nomination forms to be filled up by the
delegates; the reservation of rooms for delegates in three big hotels, at the
expense of the presidential candidates; the use of a PNB plane by Drilon and
some members of her ticket to enable them to "assess their chances" among
the chapter presidents in the Bicol provinces; the printing and distribution of
tickets and bio-data of the candidates which in the case of Paculdo
admittedly cost him some P15,000 to P20,000; the employment of
uniformed girls (by Paculdo) and lawyers (by Drilon) to distribute their
campaign materials on the convention floor on the day of the election; the
giving of assistance by the Undersecretary of Labor to Mrs. Drilon and her
group; the use of labor arbiters to meet delegates at the airport and escort
them to the Philippine Plaza Hotel; the giving of pre-paid plane tickets and
hotel accommodations to delegates (and some families who accompanied
them) in exchange for their support; the pirating of some candidates by
inducing them to "hop" or "flipflop" from one ticket to another for some
rumored consideration; all these practices made a political circus of the
proceedings and tainted the whole election process.
The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only
violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession
which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey and
uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect for law
and legal processes" and to abstain from 'activities aimed at defiance of the
law or at lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule 1.02, Canon 1,
Code of Professional Responsibility). Respect for law is gravely eroded when

lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be millions of the law, engage in

unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP
formulated for their observance.
The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the presidency of the
association detracted from the dignity of the legal profession. The spectacle
of lawyers bribing or being bribed to vote one way or another, certainly did
not uphold the honor of the profession nor elevate it in the public's esteem.
The Court notes with grave concern what appear to be the evasions, denials
and outright prevarications that tainted the statements of the witnesses,
including tome of the candidates, during the initial hearing conducted by it
before its fact-finding committee was created. The subsequent investigation
conducted by this Committee has revealed that those parties had been less
than candid with the Court and seem to have conspired among themselves
to deceive it or at least withhold vital information from it to conceal the
irregularities committed during the campaign.
CONCLUSIONS.
It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the provision in the 1987
Constitution (See. 8, Art. VIII) providing for a Judicial and Bar Council
composed of seven (7) members among whom is "a representative of the
Integrated Bar," tasked to participate in the selection of nominees for
appointment to vacant positions in the judiciary, may be the reason why the
position of IBP president has attracted so much interest among the lawyers.
The much coveted "power" erroneously perceived to be inherent in that
office might have caused the corruption of the IBP elections. To impress
upon the participants in that electoral exercise the seriousness of the
misconduct which attended it and the stern disapproval with which it is
viewed by this Court, and to restore the non-political character of the IBP
and reduce, if not entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering for the top
positions in the organization which, as the recently concluded elections
revealed, spawned unethical practices which seriously diminished the stature
of the IBP as an association of the practitioners of a noble and honored
profession, the Court hereby ORDERS:
1. The IBP elections held on June3,1989 should be as they are hereby
annulled.
2. The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct election by the House of
Delegates (approved by this Court in its resolution of July 9, 1985 in Bar
Matter No. 287) of the following national officers:

(a) the officers of the House of Delegates;

(b) the IBP president; and
(c) the executive vice-president,
be repealed, this Court being empowered to amend, modify or repeal the
By-Laws of the IBP under Section 77, Art. XI of said By-Laws.
3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive VicePresident elected by the Board of Governors (composed of the governors of
the nine [91 IBP regions) from among themselves (as provided in Sec. 47,
Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right of automatic
succession by the Executive Vice-President to the presidency upon the
expiration of their two-year term (which was abolished by this Court's
resolution dated July 9,1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby
restored.
4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President
shall automatically succeed to the office of president. The incoming board of
governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-President from among
themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated among
the nine (9) IBP regions. One who has served as president may not run for
election as Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election until after the
rotation of the presidency among the nine (9) regions shall have been
completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.
5. Section 47 of Article VII is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 47. National Officers. The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines shall have a President and Executive Vice-President to
be chosen by the Board of Governors from among nine (9)
regional governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis.
The governors shall be ex oficio Vice-President for their
respective regions. There shall also be a Secretary and Treasurer
of the Board of Governors to be appointed by the President with
the consent of the Board.
6. Section 33(b), Art. V, IBP By-Laws, is hereby amended as follows:
(b) The President and Executive Vice President of the IBP shall
be the Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the House
of Delegates. The Secretary, Treasurer, and Sergeant-at-Arms

shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the

House of Delegates.'
7. Section 33(g) of Article V providing for the positions of Chairman, ViceChairman, Secretary-Treasurer and Sergeant-at- Arms of the House of
Delegates is hereby repealed
8. Section 37, Article VI is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 37. Composition of the Board. The Integrated Bar of
the Philippines shall be governed by a Board of Governors
consisting of nine (9) Governors from the nine (9) regions as
delineated in Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the
representation basis of one (1) Governor for each region to be
elected by the members of the House of Delegates from that
region only. The position of Governor should be rotated among
the different Chapters in the region.
9. Section 39, Article V is hereby amended as follows:
Section 39. Nomination and election of the Governors at least
one (1) month before the national convention the delegates from
each region shall elect the governor for their region, the choice
of which shall as much as possible be rotated among the
chapters in the region.
10. Section33(a), Article V hereby is amended by addingthe following
provision as part of the first paragraph:
No convention of the House of Delegates nor of the general
membership shall be held prior to any election in an election
year.
11. Section 39, (a), (b), (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) of Article VI
should be as they are hereby deleted.
All other provisions of the By-Laws including its amendment by the
Resolution en banc of this Court of July 9, 1985 (Bar Matter No. 287) that
are inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified.
12. Special elections for the Board of Governors shall be held in the nine (9)
IBP regions within three (3) months, after the promulgation of the Court's
resolution in this case. Within thirty (30) days thereafter, the Board of
Governors shall meet at the IBP Central Office in Manila to elect from among

themselves the IBP national president and executive vice-president. In these

special elections, the candidates in the election of the national officers held
on June 3,1989, particularly identified in Sub-Head 3 of this Resolution
entitled "Formation of Tickets and Single Slates," as well as those identified
in this Resolution as connected with any of the irregularities attendant upon
that election, are ineligible and may not present themselves as candidate for
any position.
13. Pending such special elections, a caretaker board shall be appointed by
the Court to administer the affairs of the IBP. The Court makes clear that the
dispositions here made are without prejudice to its adoption in due time of
such further and other measures as are warranted in the premises.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla. Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J. and Medialdea, J., took no part.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.

CANON 8
STRELLA TIONGCO YARED (now deceased) substituted by one of her
heirs, CARMEN MATILDE M. TIONGCO petitioner, vs. HON.
RICARDO M. ILARDE, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo, Br. 26, JOSE B. TIONGCO and ANTONIO G. DORONILA,
JR., respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the Order
dated March 17, 1994[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 26,
which
reinstated
an
earlier
order
cancelling
the
notice
of lis pendens annotated on the back of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T92383 and T-5050, of the Registry of Deeds of Iloilo City covering Lots 3244
and 3246, respectively, located in Iloilo City.
The relevant facts are summarized as follows:

On October 17, 1990, petitioner Estrella Tiongco Yared filed an amended

complaint[2] before the Regional Trial Court, 6th Judicial Region, Branch
XXVI, against private respondents Jose B. Tiongco and Antonio Doronila,
Jr. Docketed as Civil Case No. 19408, the action was one for "annulment of
affidavit of adjudication, sales, transfer certificates of title, reconveyance and
damages.
In brief, the amended complaint alleged that respondent Tiongco, on the
basis of an affidavit of adjudication dated April 17, 1974 alleging that he is
the sole surviving heir of the previous owner, Maria Luis de Tiongco,
succeeded in having the subject properties registered in his name, to the
prejudice of the other surviving heir of the previous owner, petitioner among
them. Petitioner and respondent Tiongco's father were siblings, and both
were among several heirs of Maria Luis de Tiongco. The aforesaid affidavit
of adjudication was registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Iloilo City on May 10, 1974. Petitioner prayed that the properties be
reconveyed to the original registered owners, subject to partition among the
lawful heirs, and that respondent Tiongco be ordered to pay damages and
costs.
To protect her interest in the properties during the pendency of the case,
petitioner caused to be annotated on Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T52547, T-4666 and T-52546,[3] which covered Lot Nos. 3244, 3246 and
1404, respectively. TCT
Nos. T-92383 and T-5050
were
derived
or
transferred from TCT Nos. T-52547 and T-4666 respectively and registered in
the name of Tiongco.
After respondent Jose B. Tiongco filed his answer, trial ensued during
which, on three separate occasions, he filed motions seeking the cancellation
of the notices of lis pendens.[4] All these motions were denied.[5]
On
December
14,
1993, the
respondent
judge
issued
a
[6]
Decision dismissing petitioner's complaint and private respondent's
counterclaim. The trial court found that petitioner's cause of action had
already prescribed.
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal [7]on December 17, 1993. As before,
respondent Tiongco filed a motion for cancellation of the notices of lis
pendens[8] dated December 21, 1993; this was denied in an Order dated
January 10, 1994.[9] He filed a "Second Motion for Reconsideration" [10] which
was also denied in an Order dated January 26, 1994. [11] Displaying
remarkable tenacity, respondent Tiongco filed a "Third Motion for
Reconsideration."[12] This
time,
however,
his
arguments
proved
persuasive. In an Order[13]dated February 14, 1994, the respondent judge
ruled to wit:

In the light of the ruling laid down in Magdalena Homeowners Association

Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 184 SCRA 325; 330 (1990), cited in Vda. De
Kilayko vs. Tengco, 207 SCRA 600; 614-615 (1992), that "the continuance
or removal of a notice of lis pendens is not contingent on the existence of a
final judgment in the action and ordinarily has no effect on the merits
thereof so that the notices of lis pendens in the case at bar may, on proper
grounds, be cancelled notwithstanding the non-finality of the judgment of
this Court brought about by plaintiff's appeal and considering the finding of
this Court that plaintiff's action had already prescribed, which finding is
based on the admitted fact that the questioned deed of adjudication was
registered way back of May 10, 1974 so that the possibility of this finding
being reversed is quite remote if not totally nil and, considering further, the
circumstances obtaining in this case, among which are: (1) that the criminal
complaint for perjury filed by plaintiff against defendant Jose B. Tiongco
based on the same deed of adjudication had already been dismissed with
finality also on the ground of prescription; (2) that the occupants of the
property who were alleged as formerly paying rentals to herein plaintiff,
Estrella Tiongco Yared, had already recognized defendant's ownership and
had long stopped paying rentals to plaintiff without the latter intervening,
much less, contesting the decision in Civil Case No. 15421 where defendant
Jose B. Tiongco was declared with finality as the true and lawful owner of
Lots Nos. 3244 and 3246; and (3) that, if at all, the present claim of plaintiff
covers but a very small portion of subject lots consisting only a total of about
64 square meters hence, it would be unfair to the defendant who has torrens
title covering the parcels of lands solely in his name to have the same
subjected to the harsh effect of such a encumbrance; the Court, in view of
all the foregoing considerations and upon further review of the records,
hereby reconsiders its stand on the subject matter of lis pendens and so
holds that the continued annotation of subject notices of lis pendens is
intended to molest the defendant, Jose B. Tiongco, and is not necessary to
protect the rights of plaintiff as such rights, if any, are now foreclosed by
prescription.
This time, it was petitioner's turn to seek reconsideration. [14] On March 4,
1994, the public respondent issued an Order [15] reversing himself on the
ground that (1) it had already lost jurisdiction over the case due to the
expiration of the last day to appeal of both parties, (2) the notice of appeal
has been approved, and (3) the records had been ordered elevated to the
Court of Appeals.
Private
respondent
Tiongco
filed
another
motion
for
reconsideration[16] against the Order dated March 4, 1994. On March 17,
1994, the respondent judge issued the order, subject of this petition, which
is quoted hereunder:

Considering that under Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, although

appeal had already been perfected, the Court, prior to the transmittal of the
records to the appellate court, may issue orders for the protection and
preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter
litigated by the appeal and considering that in the case at bar, lis pendens is
not a matter litigated in the appeal and the records have not as yet been
transmitted to the appellate court so that this Court still has jurisdiction to
issue the Order of February 14, 1994 cancelling the notices of lis pendens
annotated on TCT No. T-92383 covering Lot 3244 and on TCT No. T-5050
covering lot 3246 and considering further, that the said Order does not direct
cancellation of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. T-89483 covering Lot no.
1404 which contains a total area of 1,587 square meters where the area of
64 square meters claimed by plaintiff can very well be taken; as prayed for
by the defendant Jose B. Tiongco, the Order of March 4, 1994 is hereby
reconsidered and set aside and the Order of February 14, 1994 is hereby
reconsidered and set aside and the Order of February 14, 1994 cancelling
the notices of lis pendens on TCT No. T-92383 covering lot 3244 and on TCT
No. T-5050 covering lot 3246 is hereby reinstated.
On April 5, 1994, the Register of Deeds cancelled the annotation of
notices of lis pendens.[17]
Feeling that a motion for reconsideration would be fruitless, petitioner
filed the instant special civil action for certiorari, alleging that:
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED CAPRICIOUSLY,
WHIMSICALLY AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ORDERING
THE CANCELLATION OF THE NOTICES OF LIS PENDENS ANNOTATED AT
THE BACK OF THE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE THAT ARE THE SUBJECT OF
THE CIVIL CASE NO. 19408, AS THESE ARE AMONG THE DOCUMENTS
THAT ARE SOUGHT TO BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID BY THE HEREIN
PETITIONER.
The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reasons of public policy and
necessity, the purpose of which is to make known to the whole world that
properties in litigation are still within the power of the court until the
litigation is terminated and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree
by subsequent alienation.[18] The notice of lis pendens is an announcement to
the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation, and serves as
a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at
his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said
property.[19]
Rule 13, Section 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure [20] and Section
76 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, [21] otherwise known as the Property

Registration Decree provide the statutory bases for notice of lis

pendens. From these provisions, it is clear that such a notice is proper only
in:
a) An action to recover possession of real estate;
b) An action to quiet title thereto;
c) An action to remove clouds thereon;
d) An action for partition; and
e) Any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting title
to the land or the use or occupation thereof or the building
thereon.[22]
Thus, all petitioner has to do is to assert a claim of possession or title
over the subject property to put the property under the coverage of the rule.
[23]
It is not necessary for her to prove ownership or interest over the
property sought to be affected by lis pendens.
Whether as a matter, of procedure [24] or substance,[25] the rule is that a
notice of lis pendens may be cancelled only on two (2) grounds, namely (1)
if the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse
party, or (2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the
party who caused it to be recorded.[26]
The petition should be dismissed, there being a clear violation of the
doctrine of judicial hierarchy that we have taken pains to emphasize in past
jurisprudence.
Thus, we ruled in Vergara v. Suelto[27] that:
[t]he Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if its is
to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by fundamental
charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened
with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original
jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised
only where absolutely necessary or where serious and important reasons
exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised
relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before
constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some
reason or another, are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where
the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the
Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts
that the specific action for the writ's procurement must be
presented. This is and should continue to be the policy in this regard, a
policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe.

We reaffirmed this policy in People v. Cuaresma,[28] thus:

xxx A last word. This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writ of
certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with
Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance), which may issue
the writ, enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is also
shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of
Appeals (formerly Intermediate Appellate Court), although prior to the
effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latter's
competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to those "in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction." This concurrence of jurisdiction is not,
however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an
absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which
application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of
courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and
should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial
hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed
with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court
of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are
special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in
the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to
prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which
are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and
to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket. Indeed, the
removal of the restriction on the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in
this regard, supra-resulting from the deletion of the qualifying phrase,
"in aid of its appellate jurisdiction"-was evidently intended precisely to
relieve this Court pro tanto of the burden of dealing with applications for
the extraordinary writs which, but for the expansion of the Appellate
Court's corresponding jurisdiction, would have had to be filed with it.
The Court feels the need to reaffirm that policy at this time, and to enjoin
strict adherence thereto in the light of what it perceives to be a growing
tendency on the part of litigants and lawyers to have their applications for
the so-called extraordinary writs, and sometimes even their appeals, passed
upon and adjudicated directly and, immediately by the highest tribunal of
the land. The proceeding at bar is a case in point. The application for the
writ of certiorari sought against a City Court was brought directly to this
Court although there is no discernible special and important reason for not
presenting it to the Regional Trial Court.

The Court therefore closes this decision with the declaration, for the
information and guidance of all concerned, that it will not only continue to
enforce the policy, but will require a more strict observance
thereof. (emphasis supplied)
Notwithstanding these pronouncements, parties persisted in disregarding
the judicial hierarchy. As we noted in Santiago v. Vasquez,[29]
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a
propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be
said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard
the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from
this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in
the exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated
by law to be sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not only
because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court but also
because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the
adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred to the
lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better
equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We,
therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct
resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate
courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstance justify availment of
a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.
This policy found further application in People v. Court of Appeals,
Aleria v. Velez, [31] and Tano v. Socrates.[32] Only the presence of
exceptional and compelling reasons justified a disregard of the rule. [33]
[30]

Petitioner has failed to advance a satisfactory explanation as to her

failure to comply with or non-observance of the principle of judicial
hierarchy. There is no reason why the instant petition could not have been
brought before the Court of Appeals, considering all the more that the
appeal of the main case was already before it. In Magdalena, Homeowners
Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[34] we ruled, to wit:
The notice of lis pendens-i.e., that real property is involved in an action-is
ordinarily recorded without the intervention of the court where the action is
pending. The notice is but an incident in an action, an extrajudicial one, to
be sure. It does not affect the merits thereof. It is intended merely to
constructively advise, or warn, all people who deal with the property that
they so deal with it at their own risk, and whatever rights they may acquire
in the property in any voluntary transaction are subject to the results of the
action, and may well be inferior and subordinate to those which may be
finally determined and laid down therein. The cancellation of such a

precautionary notice is therefore also a mere incident in the action, and may
be ordered by the Court having jurisdiction of it at any given time. And its
continuance or removal-like the continuance or removal or removal of a
preliminary attachment of injunction-is not contingent on the existence of a
final judgment in the action, and ordinarily has no effect on the merits
thereof.
In the case at bar, the case had properly come within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in virtue of the perfection of the plaintiff's
appeal. It therefore had power to deal with and resolve any incident in
connection with the action subject of the appeal, even before final
judgment. The rule that no questions may be raised for the first time on
appeal have reference only to those affecting the merits of the action, and
not to mere incidents thereof, e.g., cancellation of notices of lis pendens, or,
to repeat, the grant or dissolution of provisional remedies. [emphasis
supplied]
Had petitioner brought the instant petition before the Court of Appeals,
the same could, and would, have been consolidated with the appeal, thereby
bringing under the competence of the said court all matters relative to the
action, including the incidents thereof.
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, the disposition of the instant
case will be incomplete without a reference to the improper and unethical
language employed by respondent Jose B. Tiongco, who is also counsel for
private respondents, in his pleadings and motions filed both before us and
the court a quo. It is his belief that counsel for petitioner, Atty. Marciana
Deguma, "a rambunctious wrestler-type female of 52 who does not wear a
dress which is not red, and who stampedes into the courtroom like a mad
fury and who speaks slang English to conceal her faulty grammar," [35] is
impelled by less than less than noble reasons in serving as counsel for
petitioner. Her ulterior motive? "[T]o please and tenderize and sweeten
towards her own self the readily available Carmelo M. Tiongco," [36] a retired
police major described by respondent Tiongco as Atty. Deguma's "nio
bonito,"[37] an unmarried mestizo with curly hair who lives with plaintiff for
being houseless[38] who rents a place on the subject property sought to be
recovered by petitioner. Atty. Deguma, apparently are unmarried maiden of
a certain age, is variously described by respondent Tiongco as "a love-crazed
female Apache [who] is now ready to skin defendant alive for not being a
bastard,"[39] and a "horned spinster and man-hungry virago and female bull
of an Amazon who would stop at nothing to molest, harrass (sic) and injure
defendant - if only to please and attract police-major Carmelo Tiongco Junior
- the deeply desired object of her unreciprocated affections - who happens
not to miss every chance to laugh at her behind her back." [40] He claims that

Atty. Deguma, a lawyer with the Public Attorney's Office, is engaged in a

game of one-upmanship with a fellow employee, in that "she happens to be
ambitious enough to secretly (that what she thought) plot to put one over
her office-mate who simply netted a corporal (if not a private) by aiming at
no lest than an IMDC major - hoping to catch him by sheer brass and
audacity.[41] In so doing, Atty. Deguma is using the PAO as a "marriage
bureau for her own benefit.[42] Respondent Tiongco predicts that nothing
good will come out of opposing counsel's scheme since, quoting Voltaire,
"outside of virtue, ther's (sic) no happiness."[43]
Respondent Tiongco has achieved a remarkable feat of character
assassination. His verbal darts, albeit entertaining in a fleeting way, are cast
with little regard for truth. However, he does nothing more than to obscure
the issues, and his reliance on the fool's gold of gossip betrays only a
shocking absence of discernment. To this end, it will be wise to give him an
object lesson in the elementary rules of courtesy by which we expect
members of the bar to comport themselves. These provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility are pertinent:
CANON 8-A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY,
FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL
COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID HARASSING TACTICS
AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL.
Rule 8.01-A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use languages
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
xxx xxx

xxx

xxx

Rule 11.03-A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing

language before the courts.
In Romero v. Valle,[44] we stated that a lawyer's actuations, "[a]lthough
allowed some latitude of remarks or comment in the furtherance of the
cause he upholds, his arguments, both written or oral, should be gracious to
both court and opposing counsel and be of such words as may be properly
addressed by one gentleman to another." Otherwise, his use of intemperate
language invites the disciplinary authority of the court. [45] We are aghast at
the facility with which respondent Atty. Jose B. Tiongco concocts accusations
against the opposing party and her counsel, although it is of public record
that in Tiongco v. Deguma, et a1.,[46] we dismissed as totally unfounded his
charge of fraudulent conspiracy and public scandal against petitioner, Major
Tiongco, Atty. Deguma and even the latter's superior at the Public Attorney's
Office, Atty. Napoleon G. Pagtanac. His lexicon of insults, though
entertaining, do not find a ready audience in us, and he should be, as he is

hereby, warned accordingly: Homines qui gestant, quiqui auscultant

crimina, si meo arbitratu liceat, omnis pendeat, gestores linguis, auditores
auribus.[47]
WHEREFORE, the petition fir certiorari is hereby DISMISSED, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

CANON 9
[A.C. No. 2200. July 19, 1990.]
BASILIO C. GUTIERREZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. LEONARDO N.
ZULUETA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM.:
This case pertains to disciplinary proceedings initiated by the herein
complainant Basilio C. Gutierrez against the herein respondent Atty.
Leonardo N. Zulueta.
On October 13, 1980, the complainant filed with this Court a sworn lettercomplaint dated October 11, 1980 seeking the disbarment of the respondent
lawyer on the grounds of dishonesty and conduct unbecoming of a member
of the legal profession.
The complainant alleges that the respondent lawyer was his counsel in two
cases, namely, a workmens compensation case and a civil case filed with the
then Court of First Instance of Zamboanga Del Sur. The complaint concerns
the latter case. chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
The complainant filed the said civil case against his former employer, the
Singer Sewing Machine Company. The trial court ruled in his favor. On appeal
to the Court of Appeals, the said appellate court reversed the decision of the
trial court and ruled in favor of the company. It is categorically stated in the
said decision that the complainant did not file a brief. Thus, he maintains
that the case was resolved against him primarily because his lawyer, the

herein respondent, did not file the required brief with the appellate court and
such omission is attributable to the dishonesty of the respondent lawyer.
In support of his contention, the complainant alleges that sometime in
August 1976, the respondent lawyer, who was then in Manila, wired him to
send the amount of P400.00 to cover the expenses in relation to the
preparation and printing of the appellees brief, and upon receipt of the
message, he sent the said amount to the respondent lawyer through the
Philippine National Bank. He also alleges that he sent a telegram to the
respondent lawyer for the purpose of informing the latter that the P400.00
can be obtained at the Sampaloc, Manila branch office of the same bank.
It appears that sometime thereafter, the respondent lawyer assured the
complainant that the brief had already been filed in court and that a copy
thereof will be made available to the latter in due time.
It also appears that immediately after the complainant received a copy of
the decision of the Court of Appeals, he reported the matter to the provincial
governor inasmuch as the respondent lawyer is the provincial legal counsel.
An investigation ensued but the same failed to settle the problem.
As stated earlier, the complainant eventually brought the matter to the
attention of this Court. On April 20, 1981, the Court resolved to refer the
matter to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation.
In the investigation that ensued, the respondent lawyer testified that he
received the amount of P400.00 from the complainant for the purpose of
preparing the said brief and that he gave the said amount to his secretary to
cover the expenses to be incurred in such preparation. He also testified that
he had to leave for Pagadian City at that time and that he instructed his
secretary to attend to the filing of the brief. He likewise stated that
sometime thereafter, his secretary assured him that the brief had been filed
already. He also said that he could not furnish the complainant with a copy
of the brief inasmuch as his secretary, for undisclosed reasons, left the
office, taking with her his records and his typewriter. The respondent lawyer
admits that he received the additional amount of P100.00 from the
complainant for the purpose of securing a copy of the brief for the latter. 1
In due time, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its report recommending
therein that the respondent lawyer be found guilty of not having exercised
the due diligence required of a member of the legal profession in connection
with his duties to his clients and accordingly impose upon him the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for a period of one year. 2

The record of the case undoubtedly discloses that the respondent lawyer
failed to exercise due diligence in protecting and attending to the interest of
his client, the herein complainant. The failure of the respondent lawyer to
undertake the necessary measures to submit the required brief certainly
caused material prejudice to the complainant inasmuch as the appellate
court reversed the decision of the trial court which was in favor of the
latter. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The explanation given by the respondent lawyer to the effect that the failure
is attributable to the negligence of his secretary is devoid of merit. A
responsible lawyer is expected to supervise the work in his office with
respect to all the pleadings to be filed in court and he should not delegate
this responsibility, lock, stock and barrel, to his office secretary. If it were
otherwise, irresponsible members of the legal profession can avoid
appropriate disciplinary action by simply disavowing liability and attributing
the problem to the fault or negligence of the office secretary. Such situation
will not be countenanced by this Court.
In sum, therefore, this Court is of the well-considered opinion that the
respondent lawyer failed to live up to the duties and responsibilities of a
member of the legal profession. His suspension from the practice of law is in
order.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Leonardo N. Zulueta is hereby suspended from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective from the date of his
receipt of this resolution. He is advised to henceforth exercise greater care
and diligence in the performance of his duties towards his clients. This
decision is immediately executory and no motion for extension of time to file
a motion for reconsideration will be entertained. Let copies of this resolution
be attached to his personal record and circulated among the different courts.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.